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Early Career

The second son of the 1st Viscount Gage and Benedicta Maria Teresa Hall, Thomas Gage was born at Firle, England in 1719. Sent to the Westminster School, Gage became friends with John Burgoyne, Richard Howe, and the future Lord George Germain. While at Westminster, he developed a fierce attachment to the Anglican Church while also developing a deep distaste for Roman Catholicism. Departing school, Gage joined the British Army as an ensign and commenced recruiting duties in Yorkshire.

Flanders & Scotland

On January 30, 1741, Gage purchased a commission as a lieutenant in the 1st Northampton Regiment. The following year, in May 1742, he transferred to Battereau's Foot Regiment (62nd Regiment of Foot) with the rank of captain-lieutenant. In 1743, Gage was promoted to captain and joined the Earl of Albemarle's staff as an aide-de-camp in Flanders for service during the War of the Austrian Succession. With Albemarle, Gage saw action during the Duke of Cumberland's defeat at the Battle of Fontenoy. Shortly thereafter, he, along with the bulk of Cumberland's army, returned to Britain to deal with the Jacobite Rising of 1745. Taking the field, Gage served in Scotland during the Culloden campaign.

Peacetime

After campaigning with Albemarle in the Low Countries in 1747-1748, Gage was able to purchase a commission as a major. Moving to Colonel John Lee's 55th Regiment of Foot, Gage began a long friendship with future American general Charles Lee.

A member of White's Club in London, he proved popular with his peers and cultivated several important political connections including Jeffery Amherst and Lord Barrington who later served as Secretary at War.

While with the 55th, Gage proved himself an able leader and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1751.

Two years later, he mounted a campaign for Parliament but was defeated in the election of April 1754. After remaining in Britain another year, Gage and his regiment, re-designated the 44th, was sent to North America in to take part in General Edward Braddock's campaign against Fort Duquesne during the French & Indian War.

Service in America

Moving north and west from Alexandria, VA, Braddock's army moved slowly as it sought to cut a road through the wilderness. On July 9, 1755, the British column neared their target from the southeast with Gage leading vanguard. Spotting a mixed force of French and Native Americans, his men opened the Battle of the Monongahela. The engagement quickly went against the British and in several hours of fighting Braddock was killed and his army routed. In the course of the battle, the commander of the 44th, Colonel Peter Halkett, was killed and Gage was slightly wounded.

Following the battle, Captain Robert Orme accused Gage of poor field tactics. While the accusations were dismissed, it prevented Gage from receiving permanent command of the 44th. In the course of the campaign, he became acquainted with George Washington and the two men stayed in contact for several years after the battle.

After a role in a failed expedition along the Mohawk River intended to resupply Fort Oswego, Gage was sent to Halifax, Nova Scotia to take part in an abortive attempt against the French fortress of Louisbourg. There he received permission to raise a regiment of light infantry for service in North America.

New York Frontier

Promoted to colonel in December 1757, Gage spent the winter in New Jersey recruiting for his new unit which had been designated the 80th Regiment of Light-Armed Foot. On July 7, 1758, Gage led his new command against Fort Ticonderoga as part of Major General James Abercrombie's failed attempt to capture the fortress. Slightly wounded in the attack, Gage, with some assistance from his brother Lord Gage, was able to secure a promotion to brigadier general. Traveling to New York City, Gage met with Amherst who was the new British commander-in-chief in America.

While in the city, he married Margaret Kemble on December 8, 1758. The following month, Gage was appointed to command Albany and its surrounding posts.

Montreal

That July, Amherst gave Gage command of British forces on Lake Ontario with orders to capture Fort La Galette and Montreal. Concerned that expected reinforcements from Fort Duquesne had not arrived as well as that the strength of Fort La Galette's garrison was unknown, he suggested reinforcing Niagara and Oswego instead while Amherst and Major General James Wolfe attacked into Canada. This lack of aggression was noted by Amherst and when the attack on Montreal was launched, Gage was placed in command of the rear guard. Following the city's capture in 1760, Gage was installed as military governor. Though he disliked Catholics and Indians, he proved an able administrator.

Commander-in-Chief

In 1761, Gage was promoted to major general and two years later returned to New York as acting commander-in-chief. This appointment was made official on November 16, 1764. As the new commander-in-chief in America, Gage inherited a Native American uprising known as Pontiac's Rebellion. Though he sent out expeditions to deal with the Native Americans, he also pursued diplomatic solutions to the conflict as well. After two years of sporadic fighting, a peace treaty was concluded in July 1766. As peace was achieved on the frontier, tensions were rising in the colonies due to a variety of taxes imposed by London.

Revolution Approaches

In response to the outcry raised against the 1765 Stamp Act, Gage began recalling troops from the frontier and concentrating them in the coastal cities, particularly New York.

To accommodate his men, Parliament passed the Quartering Act (1765) which allowed troops to be housed in private residences. With passage of the 1767 Townshend Acts, the focus of resistance shifted north to Boston. Gage responded by sending troops to that city. On March 5, 1770, the situation came to a head with the Boston Massacre. After being taunted, British troops fired into a crowd killing five civilians. Gage's understanding of the underlying issues evolved during this time. Initially thinking the unrest to be the work of a small number of elites, he later came to believe that the problem was the result of the prevalence of democracy in colonial governments.

Promoted to lieutenant general later in 1770, Gage requested a leave of absence two years later and returned to England. Departing on June 8, 1773, Gage missed the Boston Tea Party (December 16, 1773) and the outcry in response to the Intolerable Acts. Having proven himself an able administrator, Gage was appointed to replace Thomas Hutchinson as governor of Massachusetts on April 2, 1774. Arriving that May, Gage was initially well received as Bostonians were happy to be rid of Hutchinson. His popularity quickly began to decline as he moved to implement the Intolerable Acts. With tensions increasing, Gage began a series of raids in September to seize colonial supplies of munitions.

While an early raid to Somerville, MA was successful, it touched off the Powder Alarm which saw thousands of colonial militiamen mobilize and move towards Boston.

Though later dispersed, the event had a impact on Gage. Concerned about not escalating the situation, Gage did not attempt to quash groups such as the Sons of Liberty and was criticized by his own men as being too lenient as a result. On April 18/19, 1775, Gage ordered 700 men to march to Concord to capture colonial powder and guns. En route, active fighting began at Lexington and was continued at Concord. Though British troops were able to clear each town, they sustained heavy casualties during their march back to Boston.

Following the fighting at Lexington and Concord, Gage found himself besieged in Boston by a growing colonial army. Concerned that his wife, a colonial by birth, was aiding the enemy, Gage sent her away to England. Reinforced in May by 4,500 men under Major General William Howe, Gage began planning a breakout. This was thwarted in June when colonial forces fortified Breeds Hill north of the city. In the resulting Battle of Bunker Hill, Gage's men were able to capture the heights, but sustained over 1,000 casualties in the process. That October, Gage was recalled to England and Howe given temporary command of British forces in America.

Later Life

Arriving home, Gage reported to Lord George Germain, now the Secretary of State of the American Colonies, that a large army would be necessary to defeat the Americans and that foreign troops would need to be hired. In April 1776, command was permanently given to Howe and Gage placed on the inactive list. He remained in semi-retirement until April 1781, when Amherst called upon him to raise troops to resist a possible French invasion. Promoted to general on November 20 1782, Gage saw little active service and died at the Isle of Portland on April 2, 1787.

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American Revolution: General Thomas Gage

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The second son of the 1st Viscount Gage and Benedicta Maria Teresa Hall, Thomas Gage was born at Firle, England in 1719. Sent to the Westminster School, Gage became friends with John Burgoyne, Richard Howe, and the future Lord George Germain.

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The History Place - American Revolution: Declaration of Independence

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Above: The top portion of the original draft document written by Thomas Jefferson, with additions-deletions by John Adams and Benjamin Franklin. Below: Presentation of the finished Declaration of Independence by Thomas Jefferson in Philadelphia, July 4, 1776. The Declaration was then signed and copies of the text were transported to key cities such as New York and Boston to be read aloud.

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At the beginning of American independence an immense task faced the colonial revolutionary. The English army, the best-trained, best-equipped military in the world, had served in the Americas, enforcing the will of the crown for many decades. American victory rested in the ability of the colonists to put together a viable fighting army. We know from history that the American Continental Army, commanded by George Washington, defeated the superior British army and expelled the rule of the crown from the colonies by 1783.

Washington and the Continental Congress largely relied on the colonial militias to man the army and win the war. Until recently, most military historians, mostly former army soldiers largely ignored the contribution of the militia in the victory over the British. As John Shy has pointed out "Critics of the militia-many of them professional soldiers point to...the apparent inefficiency of militia in combat, and on the way the myth of defense by 'citizen soldiers' led again and again to tragic unpreparedness for war."[1] Shy is implying here that for too long those who rejected militia defense in principle disavowed their success during the Revolution. If this is true then it begs an important question. How much did the colonial militia contribute to enable the Continental army to defeat the British? I would posit that the militia movement was the driving force behind the Continental Army's victory over the British because they were the main source of manpower, because they were already trained and armed with a 150 year harden tradition of defense to protect their own communities, and because the militia was made up of mostly farmers and landowners, they stood to gain the most from independence giving them something tangible to fight for other than "liberty".

The first Continental Army was composed almost entirely of militia groups, the most logical recruitment pool for two reasons. One, their paramilitary nature gave them all the qualifications to be molded relatively easily into a fighting army. Two, almost all able bodied men belonged to the militia anyway.[2] Most colonial militias required all men between sixteen and fifty to serve for different periods of time.[3] They were required "to provide their own weapons and equipment, and to be mustered and trained periodically by their duly commissioned officers."[4] Hence, the militia member was an ideal candidate for regular army service.

There was however, some resistance to forming a regular army. Unattached rebellious militias were against enlistment for several reasons. Many colonists viewed a standing army as a threat to their rights.[5] They feared that any regular army, foreign or domestic, might at sometime in the future be in a position to remove their liberties forcibly. The idea of a standing army raised the provincial "suspicion that one province would be sacrificed in favor of the interests of another". One of the original reasons for establishing "town" militias was to protect their own homes and loved ones. Fighting in an army that might force the soldier to travel would leave their homes vulnerable to attack from Indians or in the case of the south, slave uprisings.[6]

There were times when the militia just plain refused to observe calls to arms.[7] For example, in August 1777, the British attempted to seize control of the Hudson River after the battle for Quebec. Washington did not have enough soldiers to defend against the operation. Consequently, as he successfully did a number of times during the Revolutionary War, he called on the militia to fill out the needed numbers.[8] However, Washington and his generals could never be sure if the militia would answer the call or not. In this case the call went largely unheeded. Washington was furious. He severely condemned "the conduct of the Militia of Connecticut, who because they find no enemy at their doors, refuse to assist their neighbors."[9] Two months later the Connecticut Militia did serve with distinction under General Gates and contributed to the surrender of General Burgoyne at Saratoga.

Each colony decided how many of its units it would commit to the Continental force. [10] Consequently, some colonies committed more than others. However, because some militia units stayed out of the army did not necessarily mean they did not participate in the Revolution. Non-committed militia units provided a vital role in the civilian sector of the war.

While the Continental Army was waging its wars against the British at Saratoga, Princeton and Yorktown, the militias were conscientiously waging war against rebel interests in the towns and villages up and down the Eastern seaboard. They were "indispensable" in this part of the revolution. "Governors George Clinton of New York and John Rutledge of South Carolina agreed that suppressing loyalism was the most vital function the militia could perform."[11] Loyalist influence was the soft underbelly of the Rebel movement. Removing Tory forces and influence was a great help in ousting the British.

Spying and partisan activities, not limited to atrocities on both sides were well known occurrences. [12] Both the loyalists and rebels came from all walks of life, civil servants, customs officers, crown officials, clergy, merchants, tradesman and farmers.[13] They were so intertwined with each other that it was easy for each side to infiltrate each other's groups. This constituted a bloody, vengeful conflict.

Militia groups were stationed at various pockets of loyalist interest, and engaged them when necessary. For example, the Fourteenth Connecticut Regiment in the northwestern region of the colony was "held in reserve to defend the Salisbury foundry," which was a Tory stronghold, against possible uprisings.[14] Fierce Guerilla conflicts broke out in various places between Loyalists and Rebel forces. Especially in the south, these tit for tat terrorist activities spread throughout North Carolina and into Georgia. [15] Various rebel militias kept loyalist groups busy so they could not interfere on the side of the British while they were engaging the Continental Army. This enabled Washington and his generals to concentrate fully on convincing the British to leave the American continent. These unattached militia groups cooperated with the army on a regular basis. Continental troops could not be everywhere at once. The militia, operating on the local scene or behind the lines simply had to handle problems of "law and order, disaffection, and war weariness."[16]

Another advantage to utilizing the militia enabled the continentals to reinforce losses much easier than the British. This had a profound effect on the outcome of several battles, which were germane to the ultimate American victory. At the same time it contributed to the inability of the British to sustain a fight. Several times Washington's forces were depleted, even in danger of collapse, when the militia would appear to replenish badly needed numbers of soldiers.

At the battle of Brandywyne in August of 1777, American forces sustained twice as many casualties as the British. General Howe was not able to replenish his losses. General Washington however, did so within three weeks after the battle ended. Along with the 900 Continentals from Peekskill, "General Smallwood appeared with 1,100 Maryland militia, and David Forman's 600 New Jersey irregulars..."[17] Without this substantial joining of militia forces to Washington's army, they might not have been able to continue engaging the enemy with the same intensity.

At the time of the Revolution, The militia movement was a one hundred and fifty-year entrenched institution with traditions molded by almost constant warfare. Citizen defense became as much a part of colonial life as farming and "religious freedom." "John Adams called it one of the cornerstones of New England society-along with towns, schools, and congregations-from which the virtues and talents of the people were formed." [18] The first militia units can be traced to Salem, Massachusetts in 1630, a necessary development "in safeguarding small but isolated communities against a hostile and threatening environment."[19] Following Massachusetts' lead, the Virginia assembly in 1632, "told every man fit to carry a gun to bring it to church, that he might exercise with it after the service."[20] From that time the militia became a necessary entity of colonial life, culminating in using its skills to become the driving force in winning the Revolutionary War.[21]

The men that made up the militia groups were mostly farmers, middle class landowners who banded together to protect their individual communities. As the objects of hostility changed over time so did the militia policy.[22] Each colony would react to the particular dangers indicative to their own environments. For example, Virginia might be organizing to withstand Indian attacks while in the southern colonies slave revolts might require the most attention. Consequently, colonial militias developed different policy, strategy and tactics depending on their own particular means of defense. By the time of the Revolution most militias had become specialized in their own kind of warfare. Therefore, the militiaman, turned soldier, could bring a special expertise to the army, which could then be exploited at the commander's discretion.

A cross section of the entire colonial society served in militia groups for various reasons. According to militia law, "officers were to 'muster and train all sorts of men, of what condition or wheresoever born.'" This allowed for others outside of the normal militia structure to be "mustered." [23] "Friendly and domesticated Indians, free Negroes and mulattoes, white servants and apprentices, and free white men on the move" were among the most common who were more than willing to go to war. [24]

Certain tensions arose between the militia and the Continentals. The lack of scholarship about the militia contribution to the Revolutionary War mentioned in the introduction to this essay, is a testament to these tensions that still exist even to the present day. Army officers during the revolutionary war voiced openly their disdain for militia discipline and standards. They were, complained General Nathaniel Greene, "people coming from home with all the tender feelings of domestic life" and "not sufficiently fortified with natural courage to stand the shocking scenes of war. To march over dead men, to hear without concern the groans of the wounded, I say few men can stand such scenes unless steeled by habit or fortified by military pride."[25] Even though some army officers developed their military style from their militia service, they still criticized the movement for being to lax in its approach to military discipline. Militia members were accused of tardiness, absenteeism, drunkenness and a general lack of military discipline.[26]

The tensions notwithstanding, these experiences gave the militia a fighting tradition, which although lacking in strict military discipline, put the colonists in a position to man and train a regular army within a short period of time. The formation of regular American soldiers giving over to military discipline happened so rapidly that it surprised the British enemy. At the battle of Germantown in October 1777, the British observed that this " was a superior American army to the one that had fought the campaign of 1776."[27] The militia participation in the war helped the colonists to become a unified, fighting force quickly, shortening the duration of the conflict. Without the militia tradition the army would have had to take valuable time and resources to train and develop a military attitude.

Colonial America was mostly an agrarian society. Most landowners were farmers. But whether they were farmers or merchants serving the farming community, they all had the same objective at the time of the Revolution, to cease paying taxes to the King of England. By the middle of the 1770s, perceived unfair treatment in regard to having to pay revenue to a king across the ocean could not be accepted by a large portion of English colonists. Therefore, they revolted. This segment of society stood to gain the most from independence because it not only gave them liberty but freed them from having to pay the tax. .

The incentive to take up arms by 1775 commenced after years of frustration and failed negotiation over tax relief from the king to the American farmer. This frustration led to the Massachusetts Militia first engaging the British in April 1775 initiating the Revolutionary War. Their performance was an inspiration to all colonists who held a common grudge against English rule. Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill were fought entirely by "irate citizens and embattled farmers." [28] Because of the clear American victory in those initial confrontations, the Continental Congress took a daring step forward and adopted the idea of extricating the British from American shores completely.[29] The events perpetrated by the Massachusetts Militias at Lexington and Concord, decisively moved the colonies toward revolution. If the colonists could force the British to leave, tax paying landowners would no longer be liable to the King of England. This would relieve an immense burden and alleviate the frustration that had built up for years.

The great strength of the militia movement however, was the merchant or farmer who were put into positions of leadership and policy making within the militia structure. "Towns nominated two or three men for the office of captain and lieutenant." [30] The farmer the militia group, leading mostly other farmers forced the policy of the militia by 1775 to react violently, thereby initiating hostilities.

From the time of the Seven Years War many recruits into the militia were not farmers at all but "those who were recruited for all the wrong reasons-money, escape, and the assurance of easy discipline."[31] These men were easily swayed because of their predicaments and therefore exploited to fight for independence. The overwhelming fact remained that since the economy depended on an agrarian market, it was the farmers and those who served them that insisted on the war, and ultimately succeeded through the militia in ousting the British.

How significant was the militia contribution to the ultimate American victory during the Revolutionary War? The Militia was the driving force behind that victory because of three factors.

It was the main source of manpower supplied to the Continental army. Although not an organized army in 1775, it did have a long standing military tradition which enabled the colonists to build the army needed to defeat the British in a relatively short period of time. There were tensions between army officers and militia members who refused to join for various reasons. This worked more to the rebel advantage because it enabled unnatached militia groups to work within the civilian sector fighting off British sympathy in their individual colonies. And, they provided a reinforcement of soldiers, when needed, with a quickness that the British could not match. A one hundred and fifty-year tradition of citizen soldiers existing in almost every town and hamlet in North America allowed for the quick advancement into a regular army, ultimately to defeat the British, the most well trained army in the world. And, the fact that farmers, themselves a tradition in colonial America, were so influential in the militia movement, they stood to gain the most from extricating the rule of the Crown, by eliminating a perceived unfair tax. This possessed the militia soldier with more passion and incentive to win the war than the common British soldier.

In the end it was as John Galvin has termed it, a war fought and won by "irate citizens and embattled farmers."[3 2]

[1] John Shy. A People Numerous and Armed: reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 23

[2] Higgenbotham,. p. 94. "The great pool of civilian manpower largely accounted for the surprising resilience of the rebel main armies." Shy, p. 209

[3] John B. B. Jr. Trussell. The Pennsylvania Line: Regimental Organization and Operations, 1776-1783. Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1977. P.244. Each colony set its own rules as to age limits, who should go and when. For example, the Pennsylvania militia act of 1777, clearly delineated the age of able bodied men to serve in the Pennsylvania militias from eighteen to fifty-three. However, these rules were not always followed to the letter. For example, many colonies, not only Pennsylvania, followed the British tradition of using younger boys as drummers and fifers. Therefore, it was not unusual to see ten and twelve year old boys in the militia.

[4] Shy, p. 24, Higgenbotham, p. 10.

[5] Boucher, p. 36. See also Higgenbotham,, p. 114

[6] Higgenbotham, War of Independence, p.7

[7] Buel p. 31. This was a problem that continued throughout much of the war. By 1780 the defiance of the militia toward the Continentals became so severe that the Congress found it necessary to take strong action against their insolence. "The prejudice against the Continental service waned precisely as serious disorders began to plague the militia. In the spring and summer of 1780, the legislature for the first time confronted a rash of insubordination charges against officers who would not execute orders to draft their men."

[8] Jameson, "Equipment for the Militia," p. 121. "They (the militia) did serve throughout the war as replacements in the Continental lines of their respective states and as militia units attached to the army on a temporary basis.

[9] Buel p. 123. This is in reference to the militia members' criticism of joining a standing army. Their desire to stay close to home, so as not leave their families vulnerable proved to be a powerful incentive not to fight for a union. Incidences like this caused Washington and many of his officers to take pause. How much could they count on these groups? There were several statements I found that showed Washington's distrust of the militia. But, these seem more like momentary lapses of confidence or outbursts of anger as there were also numerous references to the praising of the efforts of the militia also. For example, in a letter that Washington wrote to Abner Nash on November 6, 1780, he is quite willing to praise the militia and counts this particular service they performed among the successes of the campaign. "...the success of the militia against Col. Ferguson, this I flatter myself will give a better aspect to your affair and will awaken more extensively that spirit of bravery and enterprise which displayed itself as conspicuously on that occasion." Washington Papers, Library of Congress, Web site: http://memory.loc.gov)

[10] Buel, p. 37. For example in Connecticut the militia at first conscripted one-fourth or 6000 of their 26,260 irregulars in 1775. However, more were committed later. It was a slow process at best. Buel, p. 77. According to Buel, the Connecticut militia's conscription into the army maxed out at 18,915, 75 per cent of Connecticut's militia force.

[11] Higgenbotham, P. 273.

[12] Shy, p. 212. For example, in October of 1780, a group of rebel militias wiped out a thousand man Loyal force at King's Mountain, North Carolina. Some have suggested that actual civil war existed between those sympathetic to the British and those siding with the patriots.

[13] Lynn Montross. Rag, Tag, and Bobtail: The story of The Continental Army, 1775-1783. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1952. p. 95.

[14] Buel, p. 77.

[15] Shy, p. 212

[16] Higgenbotham, p. 94. Jameson, "Equipment for the Militia." P. 121. "They were called repeatedly to render services which ranged from turning out on any sudden alarm, to guarding prisoners, apprehending deserters, building fortifications, and protecting cattle.

[17] Higgenbotham, War of Independence, p.186.

[18] Higgenbotham, War of Independence, p.13

[19] Ronald L. Boucher. "The Colonial Militia as a Social Institution." Anthology by the editors of Military affairs. Military Analysis of the Revolutionary War. New York: KTO Press, 1977. p. 35

[20] Shy, A people numerous and Armed. p. 24

[21] These dates tend to vary slightly between historians. But one could assume from most of the scholarship that the first militias formed in the colonies were in Virginia and Massachusetts, and did take place sometime between 1630 and 1633.

[22] Shy, A People Numerous and Armed. p. 25. "Indian policy had a direct bearing on military organization. For a time, Virginia attempted to treat all Indians as hostile, ipso, facto. But the military requirements of such a policy were too great, demanding large forces to make almost continuous raids into Indian country. The policy was changed, and the system of defense changed with it; henceforth, Virginia relied on a buffer of friendly Indians, on several forts along the frontier..."

[23] Shy, A people numerous and Armed. p. 28.

[24] Shy, A people numerous and Armed. p. 29. Although this policy varied from colony to colony and depended on several factors, it shows a multicultural blend, a rather unique statement for that time in history.

[25] Higgenbotham, p. 107-108. This might be an unfair characterization of the typical American militia member but it shows the disdain that American army officers had for these groups.

[26] Boucher, "Militia as Social Institution." P. 38

[27] Higgenbotham, War of Independence, p.187.

[28] Gen. John R. Galvin, U.S. Army. The Minute Men: The First Fight: Myths & Realities of the American Revolution. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey Publishers. 1989. Some argue that the embattled farmers concept, while maybe accurate does not do the story justice. "It was much more than that." Galvin argues that it was more like a final outrage rather than an opening battle in that the colonists had enough of British presence in what they considered a country apart from England. The American success at Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill, can be attributed at least in part to the fact that the British were clearly outnumbered. Fourteen thousand colonists in forty-seven militia regiments employed organization and tactics, which had been forged over the previous 150 years of nearly constant warfare. The British were handedly defeated on April 19, 1775, thus beginning the American Revolutionary War. p. 3.

[29] Don Higgenbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practices, 1763-1789. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971. P. 57

[30] Jack S. Radabaugh, "The Militia of Colonial Massachusetts." Anthology by the editors of Military affairs. Military Analysis of the Revolutionary War. New York: KTO Press, 1977.

[31] Shy, A People Numerous and Armed. p. 31. "The generally low opinion acquired by most British officers of the American fighting man, an opinioin that later would have disastrous consequences for them, originated with wthe kind of provincial units they saw during the Severn Years' War."

[32] Galvin, The Minute Men. P. 3

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The Colonial Militia during the Revolutionary War - The Hart beat

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At the beginning of American independence an immense task faced the colonial revolutionary. The English army, the best-trained, best-equipped military in the world, had served in the Americas, enforcing the will of the crown for many decades. American victory rested in the ability of the colonists to put together a viable fighting army.

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The Battles of Lexington and Concord are considered the first battles of the American Revolutionary War, and according to Ralph Waldo Emerson, the first shot of the battle was the "shot heard round the world"

Podcast: Download (Duration: 31:09 - 22.0MB)

I closed our last episode with a quote from Emerson, which stated the shot first fired at Lexington was the "shot heard round the world..." Lexington was the first official clash of American Colonial Forces and the British military, and while the events were slightly unorganized and mismanaged on both sides of the field, it was enough to plunge the two countries into a full-blown war. This episode marks the first major battles of the Revolutionary War, so let's jump right in...

Lexington

When we last left off Paul Revere and William Dawes had performed their midnight ride to alert colonials that British troops were coming. Those troops lead by Lt. Col. Francis Smith and Major John Pitcairn were approaching the town of Lexington. Inside the town, alerted to troop movement, local militia commander Captain John Parker, a veteran of the French and Indian War, had mustered his militia forces on the town green shortly after Revere rode into town earlier that morning. The men waited for about an hour in the chill of the April morning with no clear idea why they were gathering. Parker himself later recounted that he had assembled everyone so that they may decide what they should do. The consensus that standing in the dark and cold was doing no good. He agreed to allow the men to fall out and await developments. Men that lived closed to the green returned to their homes while others took refuge from the morning chill in Buckman's Tavern. Parker had cautioned his men to be ready to form quickly at the beat of a drum.

Thaddeus Bowman, one of the scouts Parker had sent out, galloped into town around 4:30am with news that the regulars were near. Parker ordered the men to assemble on the green and the confusion was almost immediate. Some men failed to hear the drums ordering them to assemble, some ignored them, and some men without ammunition rushed to the meeting-house where it was stored before mustering as ordered. Capt. Parker soon had control of his men and lined them in two ranks of a little over 70 men. The men were positioned on the road to Concord, which ran along the base of the green. It's interesting to see what Parker did here. The men were positioned in parade-ground formation, in plain sight, not blocking the road to Concord. Parker knew that he was outmatched and was not prepared to sacrifice himself or his men for no purpose. He knew that most of the colonists powder and military supplies at Concord were already moved or hidden, there had been no formal declaration of war and he also knew that the British had gone on such expeditions in Massachusetts before, found nothing, and marched back to Boston. Capt. Parker had every reason to expect this to occur again.

Many years later, one of the participants of the battle recalled Parker's words as being what is now engraved in stone at the site of the battle:

"Stand your ground; don't fire unless fired upon, but if they mean to have a war, let it begin here."

Major Pitcairn and his advance light infantry, six companies in column formation, soon marched into view. The regulars stood out with their bright scarlet coats, white breeches, and bayonets glistening in the early morning sun. Pitcairn ordered his men into the conventional battle formation, a single line of three ranks divided into two sections or platoons. As the regulars transitioned into formation there was shouting and huzzahing from the rear of the ranks as they rushed forward to take up position.

Not surprisingly more than one militia man was unnerved watching this larger, disciplined force deploy in front of them, one said "There are so few of us, it is folly to stand here..." Parker would not have this in his ranks and spoke "The first man who offers to run will be shot down."

After Pitcairn's forces had deployed, he and two or three officers (accounts vary) rode to within a hundred feet of the militia and ordered: "Lay down your arms, you rebels and disperse!" Capt. Parker, again not wanting to pick a fight he couldn't win, ordered his men to fall out and his men turned and began to leave the green, with their muskets in hand. Major Pitcairn was not satisfied and called again for them to lay down their arms, cursing and shouting at them to just lay down their arms. To set the scene of the battlefield...it's confusing: the soliders are amped up and anxious, yelling with nervous energy at each other, the officers of each side are yelling back and forth, it's loud and to a degree organized chaos.

The events that followed next are not clear, and probably never will be, but a shot was fired. American eyewitnesses accuse a British officer of taking a shot, British eyewitnesses deny that any regular fired first. Apparently however, a British officer, after hearing the first shot, gave the order to "Fire by God! Fire!" and one of the platoons delivered a volley into the half dispersing/half assembled Colonial forces. Pitcairn tried to stop the firing, but the second platoon fired off a volley before he regained control. The return fire from the militia was weak, and the regulars charged into their line. Total time was less than 5 minutes and the battle was over.

There are several interesting theories as to the "origin" of the first shot of the battle. One is that the British killed Asahel Porter, a prisoner, whom they had told could go free if he walked away, he panicked and ran and was shot. Historian David Hackett Fischer has proposed that there may have been multiple near simultaneous shots. Historian Mark Urban claims that the British surging forward to form a line formation with their bayonets affixed could have appeared to be a charge, which spooked the colonials into firing first.

Regardless of what actually happened the lack of discipline in the British troops played a key role in the escalation of violence that day. Pitcairn's companies got beyond his control partly because they were unaware of the actual mission they were performing. Typically this type of movement would be followed by house to house searches for weapons, etc... but putting his troops in a line formation facing off against a colonial regiment, could have confused the troops as to their actual purpose.

Colonel Smith arrived with the rest of the forces and heard the gunfire, he quickly ordered a drummer to beat assembly. Once the grenadiers arrived and order was restored among the British soldiers, the light infantry were permitted to fire one more "victory volley" and then the troops formed a column and marched towards Concord, making no effort to hide they march, the illusion that they could conceal their mission was completely shattered now.

The Battle of Lexington was actually nothing more than a minor brush or skirmish, but it does hold significance as it is the first time that British forces and Colonial militia have lined up and exchanged gunfire (albeit minimal). Parker's disposition after the battle stated the following:

"I ... ordered our Militia to meet on the Common in said Lexington to consult what to do, and concluded not to be discovered, nor meddle or make with said Regular Troops (if they should approach) unless they should insult or molest us; and, upon their sudden Approach, I immediately ordered our Militia to disperse, and not to fire - Immediately said Troops made their appearance and rushed furiously, fired upon and killed eight of our Party without receiving any Provocation therefor from us."

To summarize Lexington by the numbers:

The local militia forces, lead by Captain John Parker, numbered around 77 men while the British forces, lead by Major John Pitcairn and Lt. Col Francis Smith, although Pitcairn was primarily in charge during the battle as Smith was bringing up the rear, numbered around 700
After the battle eight militia were dead, ten were wounded while only one British private was injured when a musket ball grazed him.

Concord

Pitcairn and Smith marched their forces towards Concord, along the way alarm guns could be heard in the distance which would summon local militia for miles. Rider's were leaving Concord to summon other militia forces and by the end of the day forces as far away as Worcester would start out for Lexington and Concord.

Smith and his men arrived around 7:00 AM, with their main objective being the house of Colonel James Barrett, where most of the munitions were rumored to be hidden. The road to Barrett's home took them past a meetinghouse and several taverns and twenty to thirty other houses. The road passed along a ridge about sixty feet high, then cut to the right along a second ridge at right angles to the first. From the end of the second bridge it swung to the left across the North Bridge, over the Concord river, and then continued on to Barrett's home. Overlooking the North Bridge was Punkatasset Hill, around 200 feet high.

In Concord, the mustered militiamen were still unsure of a course of action. One company marched towards and set up on the first ridge, Smith sent light infantry towards them and they retreated with no shots fired. As the British forces approached the center of town another militia company marched down the road, saw Smith and his forces and turned to fallback to the second ridge. Smith and his men soon marched towards and occupied the second ridge as well. The colonial militia forces withdrew and fell back to Punkatasset Hill.

The forces on this hill were under the command of Colonel James Barrett, another veteran of the French and Indian War. Through the course of the morning the men would build to over 400 in number and include companies from Acton, Bedford, Lincoln, Westford and countryside volunteers. Barrett was aware that the troops had come from Lexington, but the full story of shots being fired hadn't made it's way to him yet.

While Barrett and his troops were assembling on Punkatasset Hill, Smith sent three light companies over the North Bridge to Colonel Barrett's home to conduct the search for munitions and posted another three companies on the bridge itself. Smith ordered his grenadiers to search the houses, taverns and other buildings in the town. Nothing of tremendous value was found during the search and the search itself proved to be disastrous, either by accident or deliberately the blacksmith shop and the courthouse were set on fire.

On Punkatasset Hill, the men could see the smoke from the burning buildings in town and became agitated. Joseph Hosmer, Barrett's adjunct asked, "Will you let them burn the town?" Barrett answered "No" and resolved "to march into the middle of the town for it's defense or die in the attempt." Barrett began to march his men from their position on Punkatasset Hill to another, lower hill about 300 yards from the North Bridge. As he advanced two of the three British companies deployed near the bridge fell back across the river. At this point Barrett has positioned his force of 400 men between about six companies of British troops. Three are further down the road at Barrett's home, and three are now across the North Bridge, blocking his access into the town of Concord. Barrett told his men to load their weapons, but not to fire unless fired upon and he advanced towards the bridge.

The three companies at the North Bridge were under the command of a relatively inexperienced Captain Walter Laurie. In total Laurie commanded just shy of 100 men, or a quarter of what faced him across the bridge. He, erroneously, ordered his men into a "street-fire" formation. Which was a line formation of narrow width designed to focus fire down alley's between buildings. His intent was to focus fire on the troops coming across the bridge, but he cut his effective forces by a third. Due to the terrain and the fact that the shoreline of the river was covered with spring floodwaters, he had to stack his three units, which means that the front company could fire, but the other two could not (not without risking killing the men in front of them).

A shot was fired, more than likely a warning shot, from an exhausted British soldier (according to Captain Laurie's report to his commander). Two other regulars fired, missing their target, and then the narrow group, in street fire formation, thinking that the order to fire had been given, fired a ragged volley before Laurie could stop them. Two militiamen were killed and another was wounded. The Colonial Militia, more spread out than the British troops and now roughly 50 yards from the British, fired a volley which took a heavier toll, killing three men, and wounding nine others.

The Regulars, shocked at the results of the American fire, and outnumbered almost four to one broke and retreated hurriedly, so much so, that they left behind their dead and one wounded man. The Colonial forces behaved only slightly better, they crossed the North Bridge, milled about and couldn't fully get their ranks reformed until they were almost into town. This confusion among the colonial forces allowed the British companies from Barrett's farm to slip over the bridge, maneuver around the colonial forces and rejoin the main body. It was now around 11:00 am. Lt. Colonel Smith knew that he was done and by noon had assembled all of his forces and began the march back to Boston.

Smith and his forces were able to make it a mile before they ran into the militia, at a place called Meriam's Corner. This was not so much a battlefield as it was an exercise in running the gauntlet. For sixteen miles and never more than three or four hundred yards away and on some occasions as close as 50 yards, the colonial militia would harass the retreating British troops. The militia troops poured fire into the marching column or sniped at it from behind trees, rocks and occasionally buildings or fences. The regulars answered fire as well as they could from a column formation. While the colonial militia had an advantage in numbers, cover, and knowledge of the terrain, they eventually lost their advantage as they lost control of the units and the fight began to be fought by groups of individualists vs. a cohesive force.

When the British troops reached Lexington, they were ragged, beaten, bruised and demoralized. They attempted to reform on the outskirts and then again on the green (where they had skirmishes with colonial forces earlier that morning). Fortunately for Smith, around 2:30 in the afternoon, Brigadier General Percy arrived with a relief brigade of roughly 1,000 men and artillery. Smith ordered his men to rest an hour while Percy deployed his artillery and fired upon the militia. An hour later the column set out once more, now under the command of Percy, and was unmolested until they reached Menotomy where the militia men from Concord caught up to them as well as fresh militia troops from other local towns. The fighting here became more brutal and savage as British bayonet squared off against colonial hatchet and club. The British commanders also made no attempt to stop their men from pillaging, plundering, burning, and smashing to civilians and civilian buildings.

At Cambridge, Percy was able to lose the pursuing militia forces and pushed his men on towards the safety of Charlestown, shortly after sundown. The battle of Concord, was finally over.

To summarize Concord by the numbers:

The local militia forces, lead by Captain James Barrett, numbered around 400 men in and around Concord, but grew as the day went on and more local units joined, some estimates put it as high as 3,000 men. while the British forces, lead by Lt. Col Francis Smith and later Brigadier Gen. Percy, started with around 100 men fighting on the North Bridge, but total forces (including Percy's reinforcements) were around 1,500 men.
After the battle 95 militia were dead and around 275 British soldiers had been killed.

The battles of the Lexington and Concord were unlike any other in the Revolution, it was the only battle that would feature a battlefield sixteen miles long. And while the battles in the Revolution were typical of the time, with armies facing off on a battlefield, it was the one of the first times that we see civilian enlistment vs. career soldiers, as well as the British negotiating how to subdue not just another army, but a populace that was in rebellion as well.

As I wrap up this episode I'd like to take a minute to express my gratitude to all of you who are listening, have followed me on facebook or twitter or left feedback for the episodes that you've heard. It's a very humbling experience and I'm glad that you like it. A listener named Dennis mentioned me on Twitter and said the podcast was "a welcome addition to the history podcast ranks". Dennis, thank you so much for your kind words! If anyone else has feedback to share, please do so in iTunes and make sure to rate the podcast! Thanks so much for your support! The facebook page is closing in on 500 likes, if you haven't liked it yet, please do, let's hit that big 5-0-0!

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Battle of Lexington and Concord - American Military History Podcast

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The Battles of Lexington and Concord are considered the first battles of the American Revolutionary War, and according to Ralph Waldo Emerson, the first shot of the battle was the "shot heard round the world" Podcast: Download (Duration: 31:09 - 22.0MB) I closed our last episode with a quote from Emerson, which stated the shot first fired at Lexington was the "shot heard round the world..."

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Britain and the Imperial Crises

Throughout most of colonial history, the British Crown was the only political institution that united the American colonies. The Imperial Crises of the 1760s and 1770s, found England saddled with crippling debt, incurred in large part by wars such as the French and Indian War.

The British government responded by increasing taxes on the American colonists, which drove the colonies toward greater unity. Americans throughout the 13 colonies united in opposition to the new system of imperial taxation initiated by the British government in 1765.

The Stamp Act of that year-the first direct, internal tax imposed on the colonists by the British Parliament-inspired concerted resistance within the colonies. Nine colonial assemblies sent delegates to the Stamp Act Congress, an extralegal convention that met to coordinate the colonies' response to the new tax. Although the Stamp Act Congress was short-lived, it hinted at the enhanced unity among the colonies that would soon follow.

Did you know? Almost every significant political figure of the American Revolution served in the Continental Congress, including Samuel Adams, John Adams, John Hancock, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, Patrick Henry and George Washington.

Colonial opposition effectively killed the Stamp Act and brought about its repeal in 1766. The British government did not abandon its claim to the authority to pass laws for the colonies, however, and would make repeated attempts to exert its power over them in the years to follow.

Taxation Without Representation

In response to the violence of the Boston Massacre of 1770 and new taxes like the Tea Act of 1773, a group of frustrated colonists protested taxation without representation by dumping 342 chests of tea into Boston Harbor on the night of December 16, 1773 - an event known to history as Boston Tea Party.

Colonists continued to coordinate their resistance to new imperial measures, but between 1766 until 1774, they did so primarily through committees of correspondence, which exchanged ideas and information, rather than through a united political body.

The First Continental Congress

On September 5, 1774, delegates from each of the 13 colonies-except Georgia, which was fighting a Native American uprising and was dependent on the British for military supplies-met at Carpenters' Hall in Philadelphia as the First Continental Congress to organize colonial resistance to the Intolerable Acts (or Coercive Acts) recently passed by the British Parliament.

The delegates included a number of future luminaries, such as future presidents John Adams of Massachusetts and George Washington of Virginia, and future U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice and diplomat John Jay of New York. The Congress was structured with emphasis on the equality of participants, and to promote free debate.

After much discussion, the Congress issued a Declaration of Rights, affirming its loyalty to the British Crown but disputing the British Parliament's right to tax it without representation in the parliament. The Congress also passed the Articles of Association, which called on the colonies to stop importing goods from the British Isles beginning on December 1, 1774, if the Intolerable Acts were not repealed.

Should Britain fail to redress the colonists' grievances in a timely manner, the Congress declared, then it would reconvene on May 10, 1775, and the colonies would cease to export goods to Britain on September 10, 1775. After proclaiming these measures, the First Continental Congress disbanded on October 26, 1774.

Second Continental Congress

As promised, Congress reconvened at Independence Hall in Philadelphia as the Second Continental Congress on May 10, 1775-and by then the American Revolution had already begun.

The British army in Boston had met with armed resistance on the morning of April 19, 1775, when it marched out to the towns of Lexington and Concord to seize a cache of weapons held by colonial Patriots who had ceased to recognize the authority of the royal government of Massachusetts.

The colonists drove the British expedition back to Boston and laid siege to the town. The Revolutionary War had begun.

Fighting for Reconciliation

Although the Congress professed its abiding loyalty to the British Crown, it also took steps to preserve its rights by dint of arms. On June 14, 1775, a month after it reconvened, it created a united colonial fighting force, the Continental Army. The next day, it named George Washington as the new army's commander in chief.

The following month, the Continental Congress issued its "Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms," penned by John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, a veteran of the First Congress whose "Letters from a Farmer of Pennsylvania" (1767) had helped arouse opposition to earlier imperial measures, and by a newcomer from Virginia, Thomas Jefferson.

In an effort to avoid a full-scale war, Congress coupled this declaration with the Olive Branch Petition, a personal appeal to Britain's King George III, asking him to help the colonists resolve their differences with Britain. The king dismissed the petition out of hand.

Common Sense, Divided Loyalties

For over a year, the Continental Congress supervised a war against a country to which it proclaimed its loyalty. In fact, both the Congress and the people it represented were divided on the question of independence even after a year of open warfare against Great Britain.

Early in 1776, a number of factors began to strengthen the call for separation. In his stirring pamphlet " Common Sense," published in January of that year, the British immigrant Thomas Paine laid out a convincing argument in favor of independence.

At the same time, many Americans came to realize that their military might not be capable of defeating the British Empire on its own. Independence would allow it to form alliances with Britain's powerful rivals-and France was at the forefront of everyone's mind. Meanwhile, the war itself evoked hostility toward Britain among the citizenry, paving the way for independence.

Declaration of Independence

In the spring of 1776, the provisional colonial governments began to send new instructions to their congressional delegates, obliquely or directly allowing them to vote for independence. The provisional government of Virginia went further: It instructed its delegation to submit a proposal for independence before Congress.

On June 7, Virginia delegate Richard Henry Lee complied with his instructions. Congress postponed a final vote on the proposal until July 1, but appointed a committee to draft a provisional declaration of independence for use should the proposal pass.

The committee consisted of five men, including John Adams and Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania. But the declaration was primarily the work of one man, Thomas Jefferson, who penned an eloquent defense of the natural rights of all people, of which, he charged, Parliament and the king had tried to deprive the American nation.

The Continental Congress made several revisions to Jefferson's draft, removing, among other things, an attack on the institution of slavery; but on July 4, 1776, the Congress voted to approve the Declaration of Independence.

Waging the War

The Declaration of Independence allowed Congress to seek alliances with foreign countries, and the fledgling U.S. formed its most important alliance early in 1778 with France, without the support of which America might well have lost the Revolutionary War.

If the Franco-American alliance was one of Congress's greatest successes, funding and supplying the war were among its worst failures. Lacking a pre-existing infrastructure, Congress struggled throughout the war to provide the Continental Army with adequate supplies and provisions.

Exacerbating the problem, Congress had no mechanism to collect taxes to pay for the war; instead, it relied on contributions from the states, which generally directed whatever revenue they raised toward their own needs. As a result, the paper money issued by Congress quickly came to be regarded as worthless.

The Articles of Confederation

Congress's inability to raise revenue would bedevil it for its entire existence, even after it created a constitution, known as the Articles of Confederation, to define its powers. Drafted and adopted by the Congress in 1777 but not ratified until 1781, it effectively established the United States as a collection of 13 sovereign states, each of which had an equal voice in Congress (which became officially known as the Congress of the Confederation) regardless of population.

Under the Articles, congressional decisions were made based on a state-by-state vote, and the Congress had little ability to enforce its decisions. The Articles of Confederation would prove incapable of governing the new nation in a time of peace, but they did not seriously undermine the war effort, both because the war was effectively winding down before the Articles took effect, and because Congress ceded many executive war powers to General Washington.

Treaty of Paris

Congress's final triumph came in 1783 when it negotiated the Treaty of Paris, officially ending the Revolutionary War. The Congressional delegates Franklin, Jay and Adams secured a favorable peace for the U.S. that included not only the recognition of independence, but also claim to almost all of the territory south of Canada and east of the Mississippi River.

On November 25, 1783, the last British troops evacuated New York City. The Revolutionary War was over and Congress had helped to see the country through.

However, the Articles of Confederation proved an imperfect instrument for a nation at peace with the world. The years immediately following the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 presented the young American nation with a series of difficulties that Congress could not adequately remedy: dire financial straits, interstate rivalries and domestic insurrection.

Legacy of the Continental Congress

A movement developed for constitutional reform, culminating in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. The delegates at the convention decided to scrap the Articles of Confederation completely and create a new system of government.

In 1789, the new U.S. Constitution went into effect and the Continental Congress adjourned forever and was replaced by the U.S. Congress. Although the Continental Congress did not function well in a time of peace, it had steered the nation through one of its worst crises, declared its independence and helped to win a war to secure that independence.
READ MORE: What Did the Three Continental Congresses Do?
Sources

Continental Congress, 1774-1781. U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian.
First Continental Congress. George Washington's Mount Vernon.
The Continental Congress. PBS: American Experience.
Continental and Confederation Congresses. U.S. House of Representatives: History, Art & Archives.
The Second Continental Congress and the Declaration of Independence. National Park Service.

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Continental Congress: First, Second & Definition - HISTORY

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Throughout most of colonial history, the British Crown was the only political institution that united the American colonies. The Imperial Crises of the 1760s and 1770s, found England saddled with crippling debt, incurred in large part by wars such as the French and Indian War.

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Parliament passes the Quartering Act | May 15, 1765 | HISTORY

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On May 15, 1765, Parliament passes the Quartering Act, outlining the locations and conditions in which British soldie…

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Discover and share The Townshend Acts Quotes. Explore our collection of motivational and famous quotes by authors you know and love.

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In Boston, a group of colonists board three British tea ships and dump 342 chests of tea into the harbor in protest of the Tea Act of 1773.

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Why Did the Boston Massacre Happen?

Tensions ran high in Boston in early 1770. More than 2,000 British soldiers occupied the city of 16,000 colonists and tried to enforce Britain's tax laws, like the Stamp Act and Townshend Acts. American colonists rebelled against the taxes they found repressive, rallying around the cry, "no taxation without representation."

Skirmishes between colonists and soldiers-and between patriot colonists and colonists loyal to Britain (loyalists)-were increasingly common. To protest taxes, patriots often vandalized stores selling British goods and intimidated store merchants and their customers.

On February 22, a mob of patriots attacked a known loyalist's store. Customs officer Ebenezer Richardson lived near the store and tried to break up the rock-pelting crowd by firing his gun through the window of his home. His gunfire struck and killed an 11-year-old boy named Christopher Seider and further enraged the patriots.

Several days later, a fight broke out between local workers and British soldiers. It ended without serious bloodshed but helped set the stage for the bloody incident yet to come.

Violence Erupts between Colonists and Soldiers

On the frigid, snowy evening of March 5, 1770, Private Hugh White was the only soldier guarding the King's money stored inside the Custom House on King Street. It wasn't long before angry colonists joined him and insulted him and threatened violence.

At some point, White fought back and struck a colonist with his bayonet. In retaliation, the colonists pelted him with snowballs, ice and stones. Bells started ringing throughout the town-usually a warning of fire-sending a mass of male colonists into the streets. As the assault on White continued, he eventually fell and called for reinforcements.

In response to White's plea and fearing mass riots and the loss of the King's money, Captain Thomas Preston arrived on the scene with several soldiers and took up a defensive position in front of the Custom House.

Worried that bloodshed was inevitable, some colonists reportedly pleaded with the soldiers to hold their fire as others dared them to shoot. Preston later reported a colonist told him the protestors planned to "carry off [White] from his post and probably murder him."

The violence escalated, and the colonists struck the soldiers with clubs and sticks. Reports differ of exactly what happened next, but after someone supposedly said the word "fire," a soldier fired his gun, although it's unclear if the discharge was intentional.

Once the first shot rang out, other soldiers opened fire, killing five colonists-including Crispus Attucks, a local dockworker of mixed racial heritage-and wounding six. Among the other casualties of the Boston Massacre was Samuel Gray, a rope maker who was left with a hole the size of a fist in his head. Sailor James Caldwell was hit twice before dying, and Samuel Maverick and Patrick Carr were mortally wounded.

Boston Massacre Fueled Anti-British Views

Within hours, Preston and his soldiers were arrested and jailed and the propaganda machine was in full force on both sides of the conflict.

Preston wrote his version of the events from his jail cell for publication, while Sons of Liberty leaders such as John Hancock and Samuel Adams incited colonists to keep fighting the British. As tensions rose, British troops retreated from Boston to Fort William.

Paul Revere encouraged anti-British attitudes by etching a now-famous engraving depicting British soldiers callously murdering American colonists. It showed the British as the instigators though the colonists had started the fight.

It also portrayed the soldiers as vicious men and the colonists as gentlemen. It was later determined that Revere had copied his engraving from one made by Boston artist Henry Pelham.

John Adams Defends the British

It took seven months to arraign Preston and the other soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre and bring them to trial. Ironically, it was American colonist, lawyer and future President of the United States John Adams who defended them.

Adams was no fan of the British but wanted Preston and his men to receive a fair trial. After all, the death penalty was at stake and the colonists didn't want the British to have an excuse to even the score. Certain that impartial jurors were nonexistent in Boston, Adams convinced the judge to seat a jury of non-Bostonians.

During Preston's trial, Adams argued that confusion that night was rampant. Eyewitnesses presented contradictory evidence on whether Preston had ordered his men to fire on the colonists.

But after witness Richard Palmes testified that, "...After the Gun went off I heard the word 'fire!' The Captain and I stood in front about half between the breech and muzzle of the Guns. I don't know who gave the word to fire," Adams argued that reasonable doubt existed; Preston was found not guilty.

The remaining soldiers claimed self-defense and were all found not guilty of murder. Two of them-Hugh Montgomery and Matthew Kilroy-were found guilty of manslaughter and were branded on the thumbs as first offenders per English law.

To Adams' and the jury's credit, the British soldiers received a fair trial despite the vitriol felt towards them and their country.

Aftermath of the Boston Massacre

The Boston Massacre had a major impact on relations between Britain and the American colonists. It further incensed colonists already weary of British rule and unfair taxation and roused them to fight for independence.

Yet perhaps Preston said it best when he wrote about the conflict and said, "None of them was a hero. The victims were troublemakers who got more than they deserved. The soldiers were professionals...who shouldn't have panicked. The whole thing shouldn't have happened."

Over the next five years, the colonists continued their rebellion and staged the Boston Tea Party, formed the First Continental Congress and defended their militia arsenal at Concord against the redcoats, effectively launching the American Revolution. Today, the city of Boston has a Boston Massacre site marker at the intersection of Congress Street and State Street, a few yards from where the first shots were fired.

Sources

After the Boston Massacre. John Adams Historical Society.
Boston Massacre Trial. National Park Service: National Historical Park of Massachusetts.
Paul Revere's Engraving of the Boston Massacre, 1770. The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History.
The Boston Massacre. Bostonian Society Old State House.
The Boston "Massacre." H.S.I. Historical Scene Investigation.

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Boston Massacre: Causes, Date & Facts - HISTORY

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Tensions ran high in Boston in early 1770. More than 2,000 British soldiers occupied the city of 16,000 colonists and tried to enforce Britain's tax laws, like the Stamp Act and Townshend Acts. American colonists rebelled against the taxes they found repressive, rallying around the cry, "no taxation without representation."

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The Stamp Act of 1765 was the first internal tax levied directly on American colonists by the British Parliament. The act, which imposed a tax on all paper documents in the colonies, came at a time when the British Empire was deep in debt from the Seven Years' War (1756-63) and looking to its North American colonies as a revenue source.

Arguing that only their own representative assemblies could tax them, the colonists insisted that the act was unconstitutional, and they resorted to mob violence to intimidate stamp collectors into resigning. Parliament passed the Stamp Act on March 22, 1765 and repealed it in 1766, but issued a Declaratory Act at the same time to reaffirm its authority to pass any colonial legislation it saw fit. The issues of taxation and representation raised by the Stamp Act strained relations with the colonies to the point that, 10 years later, the colonists rose in armed rebellion against the British.

Why The Stamp Act Was Passed

British Parliament passed the Stamp Act to help replenish their finances after the costly Seven Years' War with France. Part of the revenue from the Stamp Act would be used to maintain several regiments of British soldiers in North America to maintain peace between Native Americans and the colonists. Moreover, since colonial juries had proven notoriously reluctant to find smugglers guilty of their crimes, violators of the Stamp Act could be tried and convicted without juries in the vice-admiralty courts.

Raising Revenue

The Seven Years' War (1756-63) ended the long rivalry between France and Britain for control of North America, leaving Britain in possession of Canada and France without a footing on the continent. Victory in the war, however, had saddled the British Empire with a tremendous debt. Since the war benefited the American colonists (who had suffered 80 years of intermittent warfare with their French neighbors) as much as anyone else in the British Empire, the British government decided that those colonists should shoulder part of the war's cost.

Britain had long regulated colonial trade through a system of restrictions and duties on imports and exports. In the first half of the 18th century, however, British enforcement of this system had been lax. Starting with the Sugar Act of 1764, which imposed new duties on sugar and other goods, the British government began to tighten its reins on the colonies. Shortly thereafter, George Grenville (1712-70), the British first lord of the treasury and prime minister, proposed the Stamp Act; Parliament passed the act without debate in 1765.

Stamp Act opponent Patrick Henry is known for his "Give me liberty, or give me death!" speech, delivered before a meeting of Virginia's colonial leaders in 1775 in an effort to mobilize a militia against a possible attack by the British. He later served as Virginia's governor (1776-79, 1784-86).

Instead of levying a duty on trade goods, the Stamp Act imposed a direct tax on the colonists. Specifically, the act required that, starting in the fall of 1765, legal documents and printed materials must bear a tax stamp provided by commissioned distributors who would collect the tax in exchange for the stamp. The law applied to wills, deeds, newspapers, pamphlets and even playing cards and dice.

The Roots of Colonial Resistance

Coming in the midst of economic hardship in the colonies, the Stamp Act aroused vehement resistance. Although most colonists continued to accept Parliament's authority to regulate their trade, they insisted that only their representative assemblies could levy direct, internal taxes, such as the one imposed by the Stamp Act. They rejected the British government's argument that all British subjects enjoyed virtual representation in Parliament, even if they could not vote for members of Parliament.

The colonists also took exception with the provision denying offenders trials by jury. A vocal minority hinted at dark designs behind the Stamp Act. These radical voices warned that the tax was part of a gradual plot to deprive the colonists of their freedoms and to enslave them beneath a tyrannical regime. Playing off traditional fears of peacetime armies, they wondered aloud why Parliament saw fit to garrison troops in North America only after the threat from the French had been removed. These concerns provided an ideological basis that intensified colonial resistance.

Colonists React to the Stamp Act

Parliament pushed forward with the Stamp Act in spite of the colonists' objections. Colonial resistance to the act mounted slowly at first, but gained momentum as the planned date of its implementation drew near. In Virginia, Patrick Henry (1736-99), whose fiery orations against British tyranny would soon make him famous, submitted a series of resolutions to his colony's assembly, the House of Burgesses. These resolutions denied Parliament's right to tax the colonies and called on the colonists to resist the Stamp Act.

Newspapers throughout the colonies reprinted the resolutions, spreading their radical message to a broad audience. The resolutions provided the tenor for the proclamations of the Stamp Act Congress, an extralegal convention composed of delegates from nine colonies that met in October 1765. The Stamp Act Congress wrote petitions to the king affirming both their loyalty and the conviction that only the colonial assemblies had the constitutional authority to tax the colonists.

While the Congress and the colonial assemblies passed resolutions and issued petitions against the Stamp Act, the colonists took matters into their own hands. The most famous popular resistance took place in Boston, where opponents of the Stamp Act, calling themselves the Sons of Liberty, enlisted the rabble of Boston in opposition to the new law. This mob paraded through the streets with an effigy of Andrew Oliver, Boston's stamp distributor, which they hanged from the Liberty Tree and beheaded before ransacking Oliver's home. Oliver agreed to resign his commission as stamp distributor.

Similar events transpired in other colonial towns, as crowds mobbed the stamp distributors and threatened their physical well-being and their property. By the beginning of 1766, most of the stamp distributors had resigned their commissions, many of them under duress. Mobs in seaport towns turned away ships carrying the stamp papers from England without allowing them to discharge their cargoes. Determined colonial resistance made it impossible for the British government to bring the Stamp Act into effect. In 1766, Parliament repealed it.

The Stamp Act's Legacy

The end of the Stamp Act did not end Parliament's conviction that it had the authority to impose taxes on the colonists. The British government coupled the repeal of the Stamp Act with the Declaratory Act, a reaffirmation of its power to pass any laws over the colonists that it saw fit. However, the colonists held firm to their view that Parliament could not tax them. The issues raised by the Stamp Act festered for 10 years before giving rise to the Revolutionary War and, ultimately, American independence.

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The Stamp Act of 1765 was the first internal tax levied directly on American colonists by the British Parliament. The issues raised by the Stamp Act festered for 10 years before giving rise to the Revolutionary War and, ultimately, American independence.