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Want to find out what is the difference between Nepotism and Cronyism?

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The main difference between nepotism and cronyism is that the nepotism favours family members and relatives whereas the cronyism favours friends.

Favouritism is a part of human society, and it exists in any field within the social structure. Nepotism and cronyism are two such manners of favouritism. Nevertheless, both these have negative consequences such as discrimination in varied sectors.

Key Areas Covered

1. What is Nepotism
- Definition, Features, Examples
2. What is Cronyism
- Definition, Features, Examples
3. What are the Similarities Between Nepotism and Cronyism
- Outline of Common Features
4. What is the Difference Between Nepotism and Cronyism
- Comparison of Key Differences

Key Terms
Cronyism, Favouritism, Nepotism
What is Nepotism

Nepotism essentially refers to the act of favouring family members or one's relatives. In brief, it means favouritism towards the members of one's kinship. Someone in a higher position may misuse their power to promote or assist their relatives. For example, the situations when a politicians son gets a similar political position in a country, and situations when relatives of high ranking officers get easy positions in the career and other fields or favouritism in the education sectors. This happens despite the said relatives lacking the necessary qualifications or credentials.

The etymology of the word nepotism can be traced back to the Latin word 'nepos', which means 'nephew'. In earlier times, this term was associated with the religious field which included the assignment of nephews to cardinal positions by Catholic popes and bishops.

However, at present, this is widely seen in politics where some individuals, regardless of their qualifications, are employed mainly due to family ties. As a result, those who are really qualified and deserving face massive injustices in the society. This again creates inequality and unfavourable conditions in workplaces, leading to power corruption and brain drain.

What is Cronyism

Cronyism, on the contrary to nepotism, refers to the act of favouring a friend. Thus, this means favouritism based on friendship. Similarly to nepotism, in cronyism, someone who is in a higher position or someone who has influence over another, uses that power or the ability to promote and assist his or her friend.

For example, situations where someone might get a position in a company since he is a friend of the company CEO. Hence, cronyism often happens when the appointer and the beneficiary are in a social contract, where the beneficiary eventually becomes a strong ally of the appointer.

Nevertheless, similar to nepotism, cronyism also bears very negative consequences, especially in the low-quality labour and other related sectors. There will also be a high level of brain-drain from a country in addition to this. Moreover, both these types are unethical and committed via corrupting the power.

Similarities Between Nepotism and Cronyism

Nepotism and Cronyism are types of favouritism in career or any field including politics, entertainment, business or religion.

Both these happen regardless of the qualifications or credentials of those being favoured.

Also, both bear negative consequences where the truly qualified and talented have to face the injustices in the related field, often leading to power corruptions and massive brain-drain via

Furthermore, these phenomena possess the ulterior motives; the main motive may be to have the beneficiary party as an ally or a confidant to the favouring party.

Moreover, they are unethical practices that create social discrimination.

Difference Between Nepotism and Cronyism

Definition

Nepotism refers to favouritism based on kinship while Cronyism refers to favouritism based on friendship. Thus, this describes the main difference between nepotism and cronyism.

Favouritism

Describing the above further, nepotism includes favouritism for family members and relatives to recruit or promote to elevated positions, and to assign authorities in some field. On the other hand, cronyism includes favouritism for friends or friend's relatives to recruit or promote to elevated positions and to assign authorities in some field.

Context

Nepotism often happens in religious, career-based, entertainment and religious sectors whereas cronyism usually happens in politics, career-based, entertainment sectors. This is another difference between nepotism and cronyism.

Conclusion

Favouritism indeed has negative consequences in varied social contexts. Nepotism and cronyism are two such manners of favouritism that differ according to the parties that benefit through these favours. Hence, the main difference between nepotism and cronyism is that nepotism favours family members and relatives whereas cronyism favours friends.

Image Courtesy:

1. "Tizian 068" By Titian - The Yorck Project (2002) 10.000 Meisterwerke der Malerei (DVD-ROM), distributed by DIRECTMEDIA Publishing GmbH. ISBN: 3936122202 (Public Domain) via Commons Wikimedia
2. "-44 Vulgar Zone - Cronyism (big)" By Cdyera - Own work (CC BY-SA 4.0) via Commons Wikimedia

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What is the Difference Between Nepotism and Cronyism - Pediaa.Com

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The main difference between nepotism and cronyism is that the nepotism favours family members and relatives whereas the cronyism favours friends. Favouritism is a part of human society, and it exists in any field within the social structure. Nepotism and cronyism are two such manners of favouritism.

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"Nepotism" is a polite way of saying "you have no chance in hell of ever being promoted."

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“Third among 22 most crony-ridden economies, Philippine GDP went four-fifths to firms owned or favored by the ruling party.“

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Cronyism worse in Philippines today - study

GOTCHA - Jarius Bondoc (The Philippine Star) - June 13, 2016 - 12:00am

Third among 22 most crony-ridden economies, Philippine GDP went four-fifths to firms owned or favored by the ruling party.

Crony capitalism is under attack globally, but worsened in the Philippines in the past two years, The Economist magazine reports. India and Brazil have jailed billionaires who made piles from repeated sleazy government contracts. In Malaysia the prime minister no less is being probed for fraud by an investment bank close to him. China routinely interrogates bosses of state and private firms in an anti-corruption drive. The Philippines, meanwhile, is now third most crony-ridden of 22 economies in the special study. It already was bad, at fifth, in 2014 (see http://www.economist.com/news/international/21698239-across-world-politically-connected-tycoons-are-feeling-squeeze-party-winds).

Cronies thrive in state-franchised commerce. Foremost are natural resources, telecoms, transport, utilities, infrastructure works, casinos, and defense. They profiteer from common wealth like airwaves and mines, or state monopolies like rails and airports. Inversely Filipinos suffer from shabby cell phone-wifi connection, environment, and commuter train and airport services.

Filipinos have had it. A week before Election 2016 The Economist said: "Supporters of Rodrigo Duterte, the frontrunner to win the Presidency, hope he will open up a feudal political system that has allowed cronyism to flourish." In subsequent victory, Duterte reiterates his promises. He warns the telecom duopoly to shape up or face new, bigger competitors. Slated for punishment is SR Metals, the dirty nickel mine in Agusan of financiers of the ruling Liberal Party. That the mine owners were able to import seven brand-new jets tax free is to be investigated. Dossiers are with Duterte about the cornering of MRT-3 rail supply-maintenance deals by two more LP financiers. Along with it are official documents linking a senator's kin to the MRT-3 scam. (See Gotcha, 8 and 10 June 2016.) Duterte threatens to make extortionists at the Manila airport swallow the bullets they plant in passengers' luggage.

Four-fifths of Philippine GDP goes to crony companies, The Economist notes. Whether departing President Noynoy Aquino knows it, only he can say. He is an economics graduate. Yet he wonders aloud why there were no new jobs from his five years of vaunted 6.2-percent GDP growth. There can be no new jobs if the same privileged "robber barons" get all the largesse.

Perhaps P-Noy plays blind to the economic ruin of cronyism. The dirty nickel mine has destroyed forests and poisoned rivers, depriving the Agusan folk of livelihood. Mountain tribesmen have been driven from their homes, and their leaders slain. The rigged rail contracts have caused injuries in train accidents. Fuel and opportunities have been wasted in four years of consequent traffic in Greater Manila. The bullet-planting shakedown racket at the airport has scared away tourists. Yet P-Noy abetted it all by retaining the LP president as transport chief and his cousin as airport manager. His silence was defeaning over the LP contractors. He even awarded the dirty LP mine for imagined "pro-environment and pro-people" projects.

In an "exit interview" P-Noy could only shrug that the successor he campaigned hard for was swamped in the presidential election. Duterte simply benefited from his mistakes, P-Noy belittles the aftermath of his reign. That LP lawmakers and local officials defected in droves to Duterte days after the latter's victory shows how little P-Noy's own party mates believe in him after all.

* * *

Readers sent congratulatory emails about my last two columns, on SR Metals and the MRT-3 mess. Some instruct on how to post documents on the Internet. Friends texted in relief that the sleazy franchisees and contractors continually are exposed as campaign contributors. Incoming government officials called to assure that justice will be rendered.

Most heartwarming is this email (excerpted) from "Concerned senior Netizens Rolando Cruz, Eduardo Fajardo, Amable Ocampo, Gonzalo Robles, and Jaime Vitug":

"Jarius, we ordinary citizens commend your extraordinary courage and assiduity in documenting anomalies in government, specifically in 'Trillanes Kin Got MRT-3 Contract.'

"You painstakingly research and convincingly expose LP leaders and allies on the deterioration of the MRT-3 service. It can be helpful to the Ombudsman in prosecuting (graft) cases.

"A Netizen, Tony Tablizo, shared his reaction: 'If the sordid details of the systematic corruption which resulted to the appalling deterioration of MRT-3 were proven, the guilty parties should be ... made to pay dearly. P-Noy, Roxas, Abaya should not be spared. I'm counting on President Duterte.'

"Again we express our appreciation for your exposés that redound to the common weal."

* * *

Catch Sapol radio show, Saturdays, 8-10 a.m., DWIZ, (882-AM).

Gotcha archives on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Jarius-Bondoc/1376602159218459, or The STAR website http://www.philstar.com/author/Jarius%20Bondoc/GOTCHA

E-mail: jariusbondoc@gmail.com

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Cronyism worse in Philippines today - study

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Cronyism worse in Philippines today - study GOTCHA - Jarius Bondoc (The Philippine Star) - June 13, 2016 - 12:00am Third among 22 most crony-ridden economies, Philippine GDP went four-fifths to firms owned or favored by the ruling party. Crony capitalism is under attack globally, but worsened in the Philippines in the past two years, The Economist magazine reports.

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Why nepotism is a form of corruption, abuse of authority

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Why nepotism is a form of corruption, abuse of authority

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" Public Service is not a family business".

Watch the video for more information.

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Why nepotism is a form of corruption, abuse of authority

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CCD Editorial Cartoon- The Cronyism of NC GOP Leaders

by Andrew David Cox

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In this video, it simplifies and explains briefly what is crony capitalism and how it works.

Watch the video to know about Cronyism.

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This image is provided in order for the readers to easily understand what is the difference between the Nepotism and Cronyism.

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"Poverty and inequality have long plagued Philippine society. During the Marcos regime, however, the disparity between the rich and the poor swelled dramatically."

Read the Article to further understand the situation during Martial Law under crony capitalist.

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Martial Law in the Philippines

Poverty and inequality have long plagued Philippine society. During the Marcos regime, however, the disparity between the rich and the poor swelled dramatically.

Within Marcos's first ten years of office, for instance, the number of Filipinos who could not meet the minimum requirements for food, shelter, and clothing rose from 39% to 48% of the population; based on food intake alone, about 84.3% of households were poorly fed. Meanwhile, estimates showed that the Philippines actually had enough resources to feed twice its population. Inequality explains this paradox: for instance, in banana plantations owned by Antonio Floirendo, an associate of Marcos, bananas were exclusively produced for export. Bananas that did not meet the required specifications were instead given to cattle to eat; workers were forbidden from eating them. Choice cuts of this beef were then given as gifts to the Marcoses and other friends.

Poor healthcare was also a problem during the Marcos regime. Globally, at the time, the Philippines had the highest rates for whooping cough, diphtheria, and rabies; in the Western Pacific Region, it had the highest rates for tuberculosis and polio. About 400 children were dying every day due to diarrhea and communicable diseases. Although potentially fatal, these diseases were all preventable; 43.2% of annual deaths had preventable causes. Seven out of ten Filipinos died without ever seeing a doctor. For a typical hospital, the ratio of beds to patients was approximately 1:650. Meanwhile, the Marcoses had a mini-hospital in Malacañang worth an estimated $250,000. Imelda's hospital projects like the Lung Center, on the other hand, could only be accessed by those with the money to pay their exorbitant fees. For instance, in 1986, the Lung Center had only one patient, while the Quezon Institute still had multiple tuberculosis patients sharing beds. Meanwhile, international donations from organizations like the WHO and UNICEF were diverted to Imelda's London account to purchase diamonds, as well as Minister of Health Florentino Solon's account to purchase several houses around the country and even a beach resort.

In 1963, about 105,000 informal settlers were said to be living in Metro Manila, a figure which doubled to about 200,000 in 1975, three years after the declaration of Martial Law. Conservative estimates gave a figure of about 1 in 5 Filipinos living in urban areas without decent housing. Many slum dwellers came to settle in these urban communities to relocate from areas being developed for hotels and infrastructure by Marcos's cronies; these relocated families were then also hired as cheap labor to work in these projects. Such living conditions sharply contrasted against the dozens of houses the Marcoses owned across the globe, worth millions in regular maintenance. It is estimated that by 1985, the upkeep of the Marcos residences cost the amount it would take to feed a small town of 48,000 people for a whole year. A particularly disturbing account is told of the island of Calauit, 275 miles southwest of Manila, from which about 120 poor families were evicted to make room for giraffes, zebras, gazelles, and other animals from Kenya. Bought using government funds and maintained at about $30,000 a month, the island was used as a private hunting ground by Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos, Jr.

To understand the deep extent to which Marcos plundered the nation, it is thus important to examine the extensive network of cronies he built through a cycle of accumulating wealth and consolidating power. Through amassing vast political and financial capital, Marcos put himself in a position to exert massive influence over big businessmen and other politicians; in turn, their allegiance served to further widen Marcos's sphere of control over the nation and its resources. Together, Marcos and his network of cronies engaged in nearly two decades of abusive, even perverse, activities which continue to leave a scar on the nation today-a scar most deeply felt by the ordinary Filipino.

Roberto Benedicto

Roberto Benedicto was Marcos's classmate and fraternity brother at the UP Law School. When Marcos ran for president, Benedicto served as Chairman of Marcos's party, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, for Western Visayas, delivering a sizeable number of votes for the future dictator. Later, Benedicto was accorded power-of-attorney to deal with corporations on behalf of Marcos. With Benedicto's help, Marcos opened his first of many Swiss bank accounts, through which he would funnel the nation's wealth to his personal accounts.

In return, Marcos appointed Benedicto as chairman of the Philippine National Bank, which was the biggest state-owned bank at the time. He proceeded to use funds from this bank to finance other crony-owned businesses, including his own. Eventually, Benedicto took control of even more banks, which allowed him to control the terms of important loans. He used these to his advantage in edging out his competitors in various businesses.

Marcos also offered Benedicto the ambassadorship to Japan, through which Benedicto ratified questionable treaties, like the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation. These gave him personal advantage in making investments, as he knew precisely where Japanese businessmen wanted to invest. He also acquired over $550M in war reparations money from Japan, which he used to forward his own private interests.

Most notably, however, Benedicto took control of the Philippine Exchange Co. (Philex) which handled all the international trade of sugar for local hacienderos. Through Philex, Benedicto bought cheaply from local producers and made enormous profits abroad. Benedicto was further supported by Marcos decrees and his Japanese money to seize leadership of the Philippine Sugar Commission, which represented 27% of the country's dollar earnings. As Benedicto grew his virtual monopoly of the sugar industry, a significant portion of the profits he made were paid to a "special fund" that was "subject to the disposition of the president for public purposes."

Antonio Floirendo

Antonio Floirendo was a close business associate of the Marcoses. In Marcos's 1965 and 1969 bids for the presidency, Floirendo greatly contributed to funding both campaigns. He soon became a regular member of Imelda's entourage and a leading contributor to the First Lady's projects.

In return, Floirendo benefited by taking control of one of the biggest banana plantations in the world, taking over vast expanses of land while driving away their indigenous inhabitants. With Marcos's assistance, Floirendo initiated a partnership with the Bureau of Prisons to enlist prisoners as laborers in his plantations. With this cheap source of labor, Floirendo could continuously expand his interests with little concern about cost.

Worse than his greed in expanding his banana empire, however, was how he treated his prisoner-workers. Prisoners were forced to wake up at 3am and work overtime. From the strain of heavy lifting at the plantations, many grew to have deformed backs. Yet workers were offered no job or health security, even when they were injured by the chemicals used in the plantations.

One might argue that they were treated worse than the bananas themselves. Bananas were given special refrigeration and cushions in storage and transport to ensure that quality was maintained for export. Meanwhile, as millions of Filipinos starved, bananas were strictly off-limits to the workers even when they did not meet export quality; instead, these bananas were given to special cows whose meat was reserved solely for the Marcoses and the cronies.

Juan Ponce Enrile

Juan Ponce Enrile was a key supporter of Marcos in the years leading up to Martial Law and afterward. In 1965, he aided Marcos in his campaign for the presidency. In 1972, he was instrumental in the establishment of the dictatorship, acting as a scapegoat for the looming Communist threat. In a staged ambush, Enrile and his convoy were "attacked" by unknown assailants on his way to his Wack Wack subdivision; this became a trigger for the declaration of Martial Law.

During Marcos's rule, Marcos appointed Enrile to key government positions such as Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Justice, and then Secretary of Defense (which was the biggest item on the national budget), he used his positions to mercilessly implement Marcos's policies in the country-through torture and murder of political opponents if necessary.

In exchange, Enrile became chairman of key institutions like the Philippine National Bank, the National Investment & Development Corporation, the Philippine Coconut Authority, the United Coconut Planters Bank, and the United Coconut Mills. He was also given key positions in big businesses as well as various logging concessions, a way of getting rich quickly with little investment.

Arguably the largest corruption scheme Enrile was involved with, however, was the imposition of the coco levy. The coco levy was essentially a tax that charged coconut farmers with $0.08 per 100 kilos of copra, supposedly to fund the Coconut Investment Company, Cocofed, and the Philippine Coconut Authority. These were all institutions which should have supported and defended the ordinary coconut farmer.

As chair of the Philippine Coconut Authority, which had control over Cocofed, Enrile benefited immensely from the coco levy and its continuous expansion. During Martial Law, the levy went up to $13 per 100 kilos of copra; from 1977 to 1981, it remained at $10, eating up about 33.8% of farmers' incomes. Meanwhile, coconut farmers at the time could only afford about 10% of what was considered the minimum requirement for food.

An estimated $475M was raised from the levy, which was not used to support the farmers, but to finance Enrile's business conglomerates and Imelda's projects, like the Miss Universe pageant and the Cultural Center of the Philippines.

Danding Cojuangco

Danding Cojuangco was entangled with the Marcoses through various close family relationships. He was godfather of Marcos's son and grandson, while Marcos was godfather of Cojuangco's eldest son (named Marcos Cojuangco). Before Martial Law, in the time of Marcos's corrupt Congress, Cojuangco was Marcos's loyal representative in Tarlac, ensuring that Marcos's votes and interests were secured in Central Luzon.

In exchange, Cojuangco was given free rein to practically cultivate his own empire under the Marcos regime. By Presidential decree, Cojuangco was given power alongside Enrile to reap the enormous funds diverted from the coco levy. Though the United Coconut Planters Bank was nominally owned by coconut farmers to use for their interests, Cojuangco was given permission to purchase the United Coconut Planters Bank (with money from the coco levy) and invest the bank's money in whatever area he pleased. With little regulation, Cojuangco used the farmers' money to take control of the sugar industry, the flour industry, and even the San Miguel Corporation

Alongside his business interests, Cojuangco was appointed Ambassador-at-Large, which allowed him to escape testimony in US courts and travel immediately to Mexico with little effort, escaping any accountability and investigation. Cojuangco was also awarded the rank of military reserve colonel, and permitted a netherworld army of about 5,000 men with high-powered firearms to do his bidding and ensure his interests were secured at whatever cost.

Armed with violence and the money of some of the poorest of the poor, Cojuangco became one of the richest men in the Philippines under the Marcos regime. At the height of Marcos's power, Cojuangco controlled about $1.5B in assets, a sizeable chunk of the country's GNP, due to monopolies in virtually all the industries he decided to invest in. In the Los Angeles Times, Cojuangco was described as "second only to Marcos in the systematic looting of the Philippines."

Manuel Elizalde

Manuel Elizalde was Marcos's cabinet minister in charge of ethnic groups. Through his seemingly harmless position in the Marcos government, Elizalde supported Marcos through unusual but powerful means.

Elizalde headed the Presidential Assistance on National Minorities, also known as Panamin, which claimed the discovery of a Stone Age culture called the Tasaday. It was posited that the Tasaday were a culture untouched by modern-day civilization, generating great interest among scientists and tourists from outside the Philippines. Some years later, however, the Tasaday were later found to be a hoax. Though indeed they belonged to an ethnic group, Elizalde had rehearsed them to look like cave dwellers to make them a more profitable venture, with better prospects for the public image of the Marcos government.

In exchange, Marcos favored Elizalde's steel companies in terms of funding and regulations which ensured lucrative markets. For example, in 1980, Elizalde had attained enough control of the industry that he could increase the price of tin plates by 17% with little effort. He even threatened an additional 7.5% increase in prices unless he was allowed to import raw materials for free.

In another get-rich-quick scheme between Marcos and Elizalde, Marcos allowed Elizalde to borrow rifle stocks from the Armed Forces of the Philippines to export to Thailand. Instead, Elizalde simply sold them back to the Philippine Constabulary for a profit-easy money.

Rodolfo Cuenca

Rodolfo Cuenca campaigned and raised funds for Marcos in his first bid for the presidency in 1965. He soon became one of Marcos's favorite golfing partners. From this relationship would spring some of the most well-known projects from the Marcos government-all of them meant to serve not the people, but Cuenca's and Marcos's private interests.

Cuenca formed the Construction & Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), which supported by the Marcos government through the awarding of contracts, including the Manila North and South Expressways. The CDCP eventually became the major public highway builder under the Marcos administration, the largest civil engineering firm in the country, and even the biggest construction firm in Southeast Asia.

In classic Marcos crony fashion, the government continuously helped CDCP get the most lucrative government and even overseas contracts. It came to a point that Cuenca virtually had the power to approve all government construction projects, depending on whether he wanted to take them for himself. When the Asian Development Bank (ADB) chose to give the Japanese company Taisei the contract to construct the new Manila International Airport instead of the CDCP, the government asked ADB to reconsider. When ADB refused, the government merely restricted Taisei work until the firm left, and the CDCP was given the contract in its stead.

Through the CDCP, Cuenca was commissioned to do many more unnecessary projects, often at Imelda's behest. One such project was the San Juanico Bridge. At the time, there was not much traffic between the two relatively underdeveloped islands of Leyte and Samar. Imelda simply wanted a bridge for her province; Cuenca, on the other hand, stood to gain a lot from his involvement in the project, including kickbacks and Imelda's favor. Despite environmental warnings, Cuenca also reclaimed the land around Manila Bay to get quick money by selling the "new land." In proposing the budget for what would soon become the LRT system, a swollen $278M was proposed instead of the supposed $8.1M in costs.

Cuenca also used his position in other schemes to accumulate more easy wealth. Under CDCP contracts, he imposed toll fees on the northern Manila-Tabang and southern Manila-Alabang highways. Although the contracts initially allowed tolls for the first 10 years, presidential decree allowed long extensions and even exorbitant increases in the fee. When buses boycotted the expressways to avoid the fee, the government simply forbade them from using service roads, so they were forced to pay the tolls again anyway.

References

Manapat, R. (1991). Some are smarter than others. New York: Aletheia Publications.

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It Takes a Village to Loot a Nation: Cronyism and Corruption

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Poverty and inequality have long plagued Philippine society. During the Marcos regime, however, the disparity between the rich and the poor swelled dramatically. Within Marcos's first ten years of office, for instance, the number of Filipinos who could not meet the minimum requirements for food,

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Nepotism: Bongbong Marcos hits nepotism in government

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Nepotism: Bongbong Marcos hits nepotism in government

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Vice presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos Jr criticized government for its culture nepotism in a forum on Tuesday, April 19, with a group of Filipino Chinese businessmen headed by an alleged crony of his late father.

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MANILA, Philippines - Vice presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos Jr criticized government for its culture nepotism in a forum on Tuesday, April 19, with a group of Filipino Chinese businessmen headed by an alleged crony of his late father.

Talking about granting business permits and contracts, Senator Marcos told the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industries: "Minsan nakikita ko may nagdadala ng proposals sa ating gobyerno at imbes na tingnan na maganda ang proposal ang tinitingnan sino nagdala nito, kasama ba natin o hindi. Kung di kasama, kahit napakaganda ng project di na gagawin."

(Sometimes I see there are people who bring in proposals to the government, but instead of looking into whether the proposal is good, what they look at is who brings them in: is he allied with us or not? If not, even though the project is good, it will be set aside.)

Ironically, Marcos' father and namesake, the late President Ferdinand Marcos, was known for favoring relatives and cronies with business concessions. Among those who benefitted from the late Marcos' practice, was Filipino-Chinese tycoon Lucio Tan.

Listed among Forbes' billionaires, Tan was able to establish his liquor and tobacco businesses during the time of President Marcos in the 1970s. Tan is the chairman emeritus of the group that organized Tuesday's forum.

The Presidential Commission on Good Government ruled in 2012 that some of the businessman's assets are not part of the Marcos' ill-gotten wealth, hindering the government from recovering part of his estates.
Investment plan
At the forum, Marcos also hit Bureau of Internal Revenue Commissioner Kim Henares, whom he described in jest as every "businessman's favorite" for the agency's lack of direction in investment and coordination with other government agencies.

"What is the investment scheme implemented? The [BIR] has to have an investment plan," he said.

Marcos stressed his campaign message of unity before business leaders, saying there is a need to "bring the government together" to have an "overarching fiscal and public investment policy."

The aspirant, who is eyeing to head the labor department if he wins, also told businessmen that the source of poverty is the lack of jobs. He then reiterated need for the government's cooperation with the private sector to generate more jobs.

He said the government should consult the private sector, which employs 90% of the labor force, what infrastructures they need in setting up businesses. - Rappler.com

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filipino-chinese chambers of commerce and industries

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Bongbong Marcos hits nepotism in government

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MANILA, Philippines - Vice presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos Jr criticized government for its culture nepotism in a forum on Tuesday, April 19, with a group of Filipino Chinese businessmen headed by an alleged crony of his late father.

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The candidates promise the moon and the stars to the poor voters, but invariably end up enriching themselves and those who are close to them once they win the election.

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By: Joe Mauricio

We owe the Philippines' political parties a great deal of gratitude. They keep the country's democratic principles of election at local and national level elections. Political aides and voters volunteer for their respective candidates, they work phones/telecoms using the social media and other media, walking and knocking door to door, serving as backdrops for speeches and TV ads, pitching in P50 to P100 contributions, etc.

But the truth is, Philippine voters are easily deceived, and they tend to be kind to the conservative wing of Pinoy voters, many of whom have divisive social issues and are kind of nutty with all the talks about religious freedom. These folks, bless their hearts, do not comprehend the nuances of real politics. Don't get me wrong, we would be lost without them. But the Philippines would be better off if everyone stayed in their own lanes. It has become clear that the country's political parties are in open revolt against the incumbent administration. It's like that they don't understand the political rules, or something. They do not seem to get the fact that they are powerless to do anything until they win back the Palace (Malacanang, that is).

One thing is clear....they need to shrink the presidential field. If they don't whittle down the options, voters could do just about anything. They must bring order to the process. Numbers of local and presidential candidates have filed their Certificates of Candidacy (COC). It's just like the GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH's grand opening, drums and bugles corps leading the parade.

Political parties have always engaged in relentless self-promotions. But the relationship between rhetorics and reality has become ever more tenuous, and the line separating is honest aspiration versus fabrication painter.

The Liberal Party of President Aquino has a tagline, "Partido ng Matuwid na Landas." Isn't this a little ambiguous or oxymoron? It's like declaring the country as a cancer-free zone, a biological impossibility as a cell mutation is a regular part of the natural world. Same as Pinoy politicians, regardless what they portray, they will also mutate, to a little or larger corruption. Or, they will resort to some form of wrongdoings, like Senators Cayetano's and Trillanes' demolition job of the Binay family.

The bottomline: there must be substantial truth in what they are represneting, but some Philippine politicians carry this responsibility so clearly. Without it, the contradictions to the mission of the parties-however defined-are just too great. Every nation has a distinct political climate, made up of things, such as key domestic issues, national sentiments, and nature of elections and government. The people in general strongly admire the ideals of individual freedom, and distrusting of any government regulations. Although the Philippine election is generally fair, there are some notable exceptions, as politics is completely dominated by political parties and partisan divides.

The candidates promise the moon and the stars to the poor voters, but invariably end up enriching themselves and thos who are close to them once they win the election.

Philippine election is a real oxymoron in the country. Witness the phone conversation between the candidate and an election crony, "Hello, Mang Juan, hello candidate, uh, well, let's make sure we top the opponent by at least a thousand votes. Bye."

Corruption is so rooted in the culture that no one dares offer solutions for fear of failure. The "daang matuwid" slogan of the Liberal Party has some drawbacks. It was led to the pork barrel scam by mastermind Secretary of Budget & Management, Butch Abad, a loyalist of President Aquino.

Parochialism, cronyism, nepotism, and a little bit of gansterism, are the words that best describe the political climate of the Philippine politics. And, nothing has changed up to the 15th President of the Land. ##

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Parochialism, Cronyism, Nepotism & Gangsterism in Philippine Politics

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By: Joe Mauricio We owe the Philippines' political parties a great deal of gratitude. They keep the country's democratic principles of election at local and national level elections. Political aides and voters volunteer for their respective candidates, they work phones/telecoms using the social media and other media, walking and knocking door to door, serving as backdrops for speeches and TV ads, pitching in P50 to P100 contributions, etc.

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Cronyism: Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State the Politics of Patrimonial Plunder

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Cronyism: Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State the Politics of Patrimonial Plunder

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Ironically, Marcos' father and namesake, the late President Ferdinand Marcos, was known for favoring relatives and cronies with business concessions. Among those who benefited from the late Marcos’ practice, was Filipino-Chinese tycoon Lucio Tan.

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Cited by 73

This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

Thompson, W. Scott 1992. The Philippines in Crisis. p. 15.

Islam, Iyanatul 1992. Political Economy and East Asian Economic Development. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 6, Issue. 2, p. 69.

Crone, Donald K. 1993. States, elites, and social welfare in Southeast Asia. World Development, Vol. 21, Issue. 1, p. 55.

Litonjua, M. D. 1994. Outside the den of dragons: The Philippines and the NICs of Asia. Studies In Comparative International Development, Vol. 28, Issue. 4, p. 3.

Winters, Jeffrey A. 1994. Power and the Control of Capital. World Politics, Vol. 46, Issue. 3, p. 419.

Montinola, Gabriella R. 1994. The foundations of political corruption: Insights from the Philippine case1. Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, Issue. 1, p. 86.

Hutchcroft, Paul D. 1994. Power and Politics in the Philippine Banking Industry. Philippine Political Science Journal, Vol. 18, Issue. 37-38, p. 57.

Kerkvliet, Benedict J. Tria 1995. Toward a More Comprehensive Analysis of Philippine Politics: Beyond the Patron-Client, Factional Framework. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 26, Issue. 2, p. 401.

Parsa, Misagh 1995. Entrepreneurs and Democratization: Iran and the Philippines. Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 37, Issue. 4, p. 803.

White, Gordon 1996. Corruption and Market Reform in China. IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, Issue. 2, p. 40.

Pinches, Michael 1997. Elite democracy, development and people power: contending ideologies and changing practices in Philippine politics. Asian Studies Review, Vol. 21, Issue. 2-3, p. 104.

Sidel, John T. 1997. Philippine politics in Town, District, and Province: Bossism in Cavite and Cebu. The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56, Issue. 4, p. 947.

Moore, Mick 1997. Societies, polities and capitalists in developing countries: A literature survey. Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 33, Issue. 3, p. 287.

Wintrobe, Ronald 1998. The Political Dimension of Economic Growth. p. 20.

Moran, Jonathan 1999. The changing context of corruption control: The Hong Kong special administrative region, 1997-99. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 37, Issue. 3, p. 98.

Moran, Jon 1999. Patterns of corruption and development in East Asia. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, Issue. 3, p. 569.

Hutchcroft, Paul 1999. After the Fall: Prospects for Political and Institutional Reform in Post‐Crisis Thailand and the Philippines. Government and Opposition, Vol. 34, Issue. 4, p. 473.

Schock, Kurt 1999. People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma. Social Problems, Vol. 46, Issue. 3, p. 355.

Hodder, Rupert 2000. Business, Politics, and Social Relationships in the Philippines. South East Asia Research, Vol. 8, Issue. 2, p. 93.

Kawanaka, Takeshi 2001. The State and Institutions in Philippine Local Politics. Philippine Political Science Journal, Vol. 22, Issue. 45, p. 135.

Abstract

Five years after the downfall of Ferdinand E. Marcos, scholars of Philippine politics have yet to achieve even minimal consensus on the proper characterization of his authoritarian regime. More importantly, scholarship has failed to account for fundamental continuity, across regimes, in the way in which dominant economic interests interact with the Philippine state. The author argues that a focus on patrimonial aspects of the Philippine state will not only bring a greater sense of coherence to many disparate aspects of Marcos's rule, but will also lead to clearer understanding of enduring characteristics of the Philippine political economy. Throughout the postwar years, political administration is often treated as a personal affair, and the assignment of privileges granted by the state is largely determined by the personal discretion of those oligarchs currently holding official position. The article explores factors that help to explain why there has been no effective pressure from either domestic or external forces to undermine the patrimonial features of the state, and suggests that future research should analyze why patrimonial features have persisted in the Philippines despite enormous change, yet elsewhere seem to have subsided in the face of change.

Cited by 73

This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

Thompson, W. Scott 1992. The Philippines in Crisis. p. 15.

Islam, Iyanatul 1992. Political Economy and East Asian Economic Development. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 6, Issue. 2, p. 69.

Crone, Donald K. 1993. States, elites, and social welfare in Southeast Asia. World Development, Vol. 21, Issue. 1, p. 55.

Litonjua, M. D. 1994. Outside the den of dragons: The Philippines and the NICs of Asia. Studies In Comparative International Development, Vol. 28, Issue. 4, p. 3.

Winters, Jeffrey A. 1994. Power and the Control of Capital. World Politics, Vol. 46, Issue. 3, p. 419.

Montinola, Gabriella R. 1994. The foundations of political corruption: Insights from the Philippine case1. Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, Issue. 1, p. 86.

Hutchcroft, Paul D. 1994. Power and Politics in the Philippine Banking Industry. Philippine Political Science Journal, Vol. 18, Issue. 37-38, p. 57.

Kerkvliet, Benedict J. Tria 1995. Toward a More Comprehensive Analysis of Philippine Politics: Beyond the Patron-Client, Factional Framework. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 26, Issue. 2, p. 401.

Parsa, Misagh 1995. Entrepreneurs and Democratization: Iran and the Philippines. Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 37, Issue. 4, p. 803.

White, Gordon 1996. Corruption and Market Reform in China. IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, Issue. 2, p. 40.

Pinches, Michael 1997. Elite democracy, development and people power: contending ideologies and changing practices in Philippine politics. Asian Studies Review, Vol. 21, Issue. 2-3, p. 104.

Sidel, John T. 1997. Philippine politics in Town, District, and Province: Bossism in Cavite and Cebu. The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56, Issue. 4, p. 947.

Moore, Mick 1997. Societies, polities and capitalists in developing countries: A literature survey. Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 33, Issue. 3, p. 287.

Wintrobe, Ronald 1998. The Political Dimension of Economic Growth. p. 20.

Moran, Jonathan 1999. The changing context of corruption control: The Hong Kong special administrative region, 1997-99. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 37, Issue. 3, p. 98.

Moran, Jon 1999. Patterns of corruption and development in East Asia. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, Issue. 3, p. 569.

Hutchcroft, Paul 1999. After the Fall: Prospects for Political and Institutional Reform in Post‐Crisis Thailand and the Philippines. Government and Opposition, Vol. 34, Issue. 4, p. 473.

Schock, Kurt 1999. People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma. Social Problems, Vol. 46, Issue. 3, p. 355.

Hodder, Rupert 2000. Business, Politics, and Social Relationships in the Philippines. South East Asia Research, Vol. 8, Issue. 2, p. 93.

Kawanaka, Takeshi 2001. The State and Institutions in Philippine Local Politics. Philippine Political Science Journal, Vol. 22, Issue. 45, p. 135.

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Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State the Politics of Patrimonial Plunder | World Politics | Cambridge Core

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Cited by 73 This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef. Thompson, W. Scott 1992. The Philippines in Crisis. p. 15. Islam, Iyanatul 1992. Political Economy and East Asian Economic Development. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 6, Issue. 2, p.

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Why does Nepotism still exist in the Philippines if there are actually laws that covers it?

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Why does Nepotism still exist in the Philippines if there are actually laws that covers it?

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Here are the laws that cover Nepotism:

-Administrative Code of 1987
-Article IX(B), Section 2(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
-Section 79 of the Local Government Code of 1991

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At the onset of a new administration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reminds elective and appointive officials to observe civil service rules on appointments, particularly those that prohibit nepotism.

Book V, Title I(A), Chapter 8, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987, prohibits nepotic appointments or those made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

The word "relative" under the said Code refers to those related within the third degree of consanguinity (relationship by blood) or affinity (relationship by marriage) such as spouse (1st degree), children (1st degree), sibling (2nd degree), nephew and niece (3rd degree), and uncle and aunt (3rd degree).

Under Section 79 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the prohibition extends to the appointing or recommending authority's relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, such as first cousin or first cousin-in-law (4th degree).

The CSC said that nepotism is a form of corruption or abuse of authority that violates Article IX(B), Section 2(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which states, "Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination."

CSC Chairperson Alicia dela Rosa-Bala said, "Generally, appointments in the civil service should be based on merit and fitness to ensure a competent and professional workforce. There are rules and qualification standards that must be considered when choosing to appoint people in government."

The rule on nepotism covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and reemployment, regardless of status, including casuals and contractuals.

Exempted from this rule, however, are teachers, physicians, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, scientific and technology personnel under R.A. 8439, and primarily confidential positions such as Administrator (Provincial/City/Municipal), Executive Assistant, Private Secretary, and Chauffeur/Driver.

Also exempted are those involved in the personal security of elective or appointive officials; as well as the personal staff of elective officials, department heads, other Cabinet officials whose tenure is at the pleasure of the President, and chairpersons and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office.

Chair Bala added that because nepotism favors a few individuals, fairness in the hiring and promotion process in government is compromised. This degrades the morale of incumbent civil servants and excludes other, possibly more qualified individuals from being considered for employment.

The CSC warned that nepotism is classified as a grave administrative offense punishable by dismissal from the service.

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the official website of contact center ng bayan

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CSC reminds incoming gov't officials: Avoid nepotism

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At the onset of a new administration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reminds elective and appointive officials to observe civil service rules on appointments, particularly those that prohibit nepotism. Book V, Title I(A), Chapter 8, Section 59 of Executive Order No.

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"Corruption, cronyism and nepotism are serious problems in the Philippines. They pervade public life, keeping tax revenues low and hurting efforts to alleviate poverty"

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CORRUPTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

Corruption, cronyism and nepotism are serious problems in the Philippines. They pervade public life, keeping tax revenues low and hurting efforts to alleviate poverty. Charges of corruption, graft, and cronyism are common among government officials at all levels. These problems are so entrenched that Filipinos have come to accept cronyism and the diversion of a small percentage of funds as natural.

The Philippines ranked 94th out of 177 countries in Transparency International's 2013 corruption index, rising from 129th two years earlier, after Mr. Aquino pursued corruption charges against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and former Chief Justice Renato Corona, both of whom maintain their innocence. [Source: Trefor Moss, Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2014]

In the 1990s the Philippines was regarded as one of the world's most corrupt nations. Most corrupt nations: 1) Nigeria; 2) Pakistan; 3) Kenya; 4) China; 5) Cameroon; 6) Egypt; 7) Columbia; 8) Uganda; 9) the Philippines; 10) Indonesia. [Source: Transparency International]

In a survey of 10 Asia-Pacific nation, the Philippine civil service was voted most corrupt. The World Competitiveness Report ranked the Philippines just below Russia and Indonesia for tax evasion, irregular payments and favoritism towards well-connected companies. There was a corruption scandal on the new $657 million international terminal at the Manila airport.

Some blame the Philippines's corruption problem on the merging of Filipino traditions with American institutions. One Filipino political scientist told Smithsonian magazine, "Americans taught us the idea of honesty and integrity in civil service but local culture conflicts with the democratic model." With no tradition of civil service and the prevalence of strong family and community ties, bribery and nepotism have seeped into the system.

According to business-anti-corruption.com: Corruption is said to take place at all levels of the government, but it is more rampant among high-level civil servants. For businesses, it is important to note that the country's complex, sometimes contradictory regulatory regime leaves room for corrupt civil servants to attempt to extract bribes. Several surveys have also shown that companies generally have little confidence in the Philippine judicial system. The main reasons include the allegedly incompetent court personnel, corruption and long delays of court cases. There is a lack of transparency in the Philippines' public procurement, and bribes are often demanded from companies wishing to win government contracts, as shown by the Survey of Enterprises on Corruption 2014. Another sector in which companies are particularly vulnerable is obtaining licenses and permits; the Survey of Enterprises on Corruption 2014 shows that the most common type of private sector corruption was bribing local government officials in return for licenses and permits in 2012 and 2013. [Source: business-anti-corruption.com]

See Tax Evasion and Marcos and Estrada Under History

Philippines Ranked Forth Most Corrupt in Asia-Pacific

A survey released in 2010 showed ranked the Philippines as the fourth most corrupt of 16 major Asia-Pacific investment destinations. The Philippines scored 8.06 in the 2010 survey, indicating that--against its neighbors in the region--it swung from worst to bad. In 2009, its score of 7.0 landed it on the 6th most corrupt spot. In 2008, it was ranked the most corrupt. The survey was conducted by the Hong Kong-based Political & Economic Risk Consultancy, which provides strategic business information and analysis for companies doing business in East and Southeast Asia. The PERC's corruption survey polled 2,174 middle, senior, and expatriate business executives in Asia, Australia and the United States. [Source: abs-cbnNEWS.com, Reuters, AFP, March 9, 2010]

Corruption Survey by Political & Economic Risk Consultancy: 1) Singapore: 1.42; 2) Australia: 2.28; 3) Hong Kong: 2.67; 4) United States: 3.42; 5) Japan: 3.49; 6) Macau: 4.96; 7) South Korea: 5.98; 8) Taiwan: 6.28; 9) Malaysia: 6.47; 10) China: 6.52; 11) India: 7.18; 12) Thailand: 7.60; 13) Philippines: 8.06; 14) Vietnam: 8.07; 15) Cambodia: 9.10; 16) Indonesia: 9.27.

The survey looked at how corruption affected different levels of political leadership and the civil service, and how major institutions fared in terms of corruption. It also examined how corruption is perceived to affect the overall business environment, and how easy or difficult it is for companies to deal with the problem internally and externally when they encounter it. On a scale of zero to 10, zero is the best possible score, indicating the lowest level of corruption among politicians and civil servants.

Philippine Government Deals Overpriced by 20 Percent Because of Corruption

Contracts with the Philippine government are usually overpriced by at least 20 percent to facilitate kickbacks, a former senior state official told a Senate inquiry into corruption. Manny Mogato of Reuters wrote: "In emotional testimony, Rodolfo Lozada reiterated previous allegations that the Philippines' top election official had demanded $130 million as his cut for an eventual $329 million telecoms deal with China's ZTE, double the usual kickback.[Source: Manny Mogato, Reuters, February 8, 2008]

"The whole problem started when Chairman Abalos wanted to protect his $130 million in the project," said Lozada, an electronics engineer designated to evaluate the ZTE contract. He was head of the state-run Philippine Forest Corp at the time. "I told him the $130 million was too much and too difficult to cover. Maybe, if it was only $65 million (that would be acceptable)." Benjamin Abalos was forced to resign as election commissioner last year when news of the kickbacks surfaced. Media reports have said he brokered the deal because of his proximity to powerful officials.

Lozada said that a 20 percent overprice in a contract of such magnitude would usually be acceptable. "It looks like that's the norm in government," said Lozada, citing as an example the $1.3 billion Southrail project to improve railway links to and from the capital. Some of the funding has come from China. Lozada said the cost of linking government departments in a broadband network, which is what ZTE had been contracted to do, should only have cost around $132 million.

Before he voluntarily appeared at the Senate inquiry, Lozada said officials tried to prevent him from testifying. "They will not happy with what you will say there," Lozada said, quoting his boss, Environment Secretary Lito Atienza. "He told me you're going to give this administration to the opposition." Lozada returned from Hong Kong on Tuesday and went missing for over 24 hours. Police officers picked him up when he disembarked from a plane at Manila's international airport and drove him for several hours to a province south of Manila, sparking fears that he was abducted. He was later dropped off at a Catholic high school in Manila and a group of nuns from the school has stayed with him throughout his public appearances. In sometimes tearful testimony on Friday, Lozada said Abalos had threatened to kill him if he went public with his allegations.

Dozens of Filipino Politicians Caught in $229 Million Graft Scandal

In May 2014, Trefor Moss wrote in the Wall Street Journal, "A growing corruption scandal entangled a swath of Manila's political elite as dozens of politicians were accused of being linked to the theft of $229 million in Philippines taxpayer money. The scandal centers on Janet Lim Napoles, a businesswoman who says she was part of a scheme in which dummy nongovernmental organizations were formed between 2004 and 2010 to siphon off $229 million for herself and her accomplices. [Source: Trefor Moss, Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2014 >>>]

Manuel Mogato of Reuters wrote: ""Filipinos were shocked by media accounts of the opulent lifestyle of the woman who is suspected of running a massive kickback scheme for lawmakers. Janet Lim Napoles, the wife of a former Marine major, has been accused by the Department of Justice of setting up fake non-government organizations that since 2007 received lawmakers' pork barrel funds and then routed the money back to them. The whistleblower, a former associate of Napoles, testified to the Senate in a public hearing that the businesswoman received so much cash she would stash it in the bathtub of her luxury Manila home. Before her arrest, Napoles denied involvement in the scheme and said her wealth came from her family's investments in coal mining in Indonesia. [Source: Manuel Mogato, Reuters, October 31, 2013 ^=^]

"Napoles said she had given money to 120 current and former lawmakers-far more than the eight already facing charges over the affair. A list of alleged accomplices was released by the Senate committee investigating the matter, prompting declarations of innocence across the board, including from Secretary for Budget and Management Florencio Abad, one of two serving Cabinet members named. Ms. Napoles's lawyer said his client "is not maintaining her innocence, but she is saying that she did not envision [the alleged scheme], did not invent it, that it was already there when she came into play." >>>

"Ms. Napoles says the scheme depended on discretionary "pork barrel" funds that legislators receive for district projects. The Justice Department charges that the accused pocketed the funds, after having assigned them to the fabricated NGOs. The scandal first came to light in July after a whistleblower told the Justice Department that he had served as a bag man in transactions between politicians, Ms. Napoles and others. >>>

"Until Ms. Napoles's latest revelations, the pork-barrel case had focused on three senators: Juan Ponce Enrile, the Senate minority leader; Jinggoy Estrada, the son of former President Joseph Estrada ; and Ramon Revilla Jr. , who has declared himself a candidate for president in 2016. In September 2013, the Justice Department filed charges with the ombudsman against the three men, as well as five House members and 30 other individuals, including Ms. Napoles. All those accused, except Ms. Napoles, have denied any wrongdoing. The three senators are all prominent members of the opposition, and have claimed that the charges against them are politically motivated. The ombudsman said last month it had found "probable cause" against the three senators, and said proceedings against them would soon begin at the anticorruption court. >>>

ZTE Kickback Scandal in Philippines

Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment, or ZTE, a Chinese state-linked manufacturing giant that sells communications gear in more than 140 countries, allegedly paid tens of millions of dollars in kickbacks in connection with a 2007 contract. Among those charged in connection with the case were former president Gloria Magacapal-Arroyo, her husband and two other former senior officials. [Source: Andrew Higgins, Washington Post, June 24, 2012 ]

Andrew Higgins wrote in the Washington Post, "Among those charged with graft is Benjamin Abalos Sr., the former head of the Election Commission. According to testimony during hearings by the Philippine Senate, Abalos took large kickbacks from ZTE in connection with a contract for the construction of a broadband network and fed some $30 million into the campaign coffers of Philippine politicians ahead of a 2007 election. His Manila attorney, Gabby Villareal, said Abalos "categorically denies receiving any money" from ZTE. Claims that he did, the attorney said, are just hearsay.

"ZTE, which has nearly 90,000 employees and last year ranked as the world's fourth-biggest maker of mobile phones, has issued shares on stock markets in Hong Kong and nearby Shenzhen. It denies being state-controlled and describes itself as an "independent company." Its biggest shareholder, however, is a state-dominated entity, as are at least seven of its other 10 largest shareholders.

"ZTE won its 2007 broadband network contract in the Philippines after China's then-commerce minister, Bo Xilai, helped arrange a low-interest loan from a Chinese state bank to finance the deal, which was subsequently canceled. ZTE did not address specific allegations raised in the Philippines but said that "abiding by Chinese and local laws is a basic principle that ZTE has always followed."

"When rumors of ZTE kickbacks began to surface and triggered a political storm in the Philippines, the U.S. Embassy in Manila in 2008 sent a cable to Washington reporting that "the ZTE case is typical of the deals that China reportedly uses worldwide to make friends and buy influence." Unlike institutions such as the World Bank, according to the cable, which was later made public by WikiLeaks, "China does not link its aid to issues such as good governance, rule of law, or respect for human rights. Public skepticism and scrutiny have underlined shortcomings in China's soft power efforts."

"A witness list drawn up recently for the trial here at a special anti-graft court known as Sandiganbayan includes two Chinese executives involved in the since-aborted ZTE contract for a broadband network to link government offices. ZTE's head office in Shenzhen said neither person now works for the company but declined to say when they left or why.

"The ZTE affair has attracted the a lot of attention, thanks to intense media interest after Senate hearings that featured detailed testimony of illicit payments. Jose De Venecia, a businessman who first blew the whistle on alleged kickbacks, said in an interview that his own company, Amsterdam Holdings, had proposed building a broadband network linking government offices in 2006 and offered to do it for $130 million. ZTE later proposed doing the same for $329 million and got the contract. "I put two and two together - they were overpricing to pay so-called advances," said De Venecia, recalling a December 2006 meeting he attended with ZTE executives and the then-head of the Philippine Election Commission in Shenzhen. The meeting, he said, revolved around discussion of kickbacks.

"De Venecia, whose father served for more than a decade as speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives and had close ties with Chinese leaders, puts most of the blame for the broadband fiasco on officials in Manila, saying that China merely got sucked into local shenanigans by its determination to win the contract. "Officials here were trying to extort money from ZTE. Unfortunately, ZTE was willing to participate," De Venecia said. "ZTE is a company we will all remember."

Arroyo's Husband Arrested on Bribery Charges on His Role in the ZTE Case

In March 2012, Mike Arroyo-the husband of former Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo-was arrested on charges that he received millions of dollars in bribes to push through an overpriced $330 million contract with a Chinese telecoms supplier ZTE while Arroyo was in office. [Source: Associated Press, The Guardian, March 13, 2012 /^/]

Associated Press reported: "Jose Miguel "Mike" Arroyo, who was seen as a backroom operator during his wife's troubled nine years in office, later posted bail to avoid detention. He was indicted on the bribery charges in December 2012. He is accused of accepting money to push through a $330 million government contract with Chinese telecommunication company ZTE Corp. to set up a nationwide broadband network in 2007. The contract was originally priced at $130 million. His wife approved the deal but later backtracked under public pressure and a congressional investigation that found the contract was vastly overpriced. /^/

"Mike Arroyo has denied wrongdoing and says the bribery charges are flawed because the former president cancelled the deal. His wife, who left office in 2010, faces the same charges as her husband, and more. She has pleaded innocent to electoral fraud charges, but is in detention at a military hospital as she awaits trial. A former elections chief, Benjamin Abalos, and the former transport secretary, Leandro Mendoza, also also charged over the ZTE contract, and the courts ordered their arrests on Tuesday. They previously testified in a senate hearing and denied receiving millions of dollars in kickbacks. Mendoza posted bail, while Abalos is under arrest on the same electoral fraud charge as the former president. /^/

"Former economic planning secretary Romulo Neri had testified that Abalos offered him a bribe to approve the ZTE contract. Jose de Venecia III, a losing bidder with connections to the Arroyos' inner circle, testified that the ex-president's husband was promised a $70 million commission. Arroyo had prevented top officials, including Neri, from continuing to testify in the congressional inquiry. Under her successor, President Benigno Aquino III, the Philippines' ombudsman investigated and filed charges at the anti-corruption court, which issued the arrest warrants. If convicted, they face a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. Aquino blames his predecessor for corruption and says he wants to clean up the government, starting with the prosecution of the Arroyos and their allies. The former first couple accuse Aquino of pursuing a political vendetta. /^/

Rodolfo Lozada said he has no direct evidence or information that would link the president's husband to the broadband deal, but he did remember having dinner with him, Abalos and representatives from ZTE Corp. at a hotel in Manila. [Source: Manny Mogato, Reuters, February 8, 2008]

See Arroyo Under History

Philippine National Police: the Philippines Most Corrupt Agency

In July 2013, the Philippine National Police (PNP) was ranked as the most corrupt institution in the Philippines, according to a survey by the Global Corruption Barometer of the anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International. Alexis Romero wrote in the Philippine Star, "The survey showed that 69 percent of surveyed Filipinos believed police personnel were corrupt, 64 percent believed public officials and civil servants were affected by corruption, while 58 percent had the same view on political parties. The media and religious institutions were perceived to be the least affected by corruption with 14 percent and 15 percent, respectively. The military was deemed corrupt by 43 percent of the respondents. The Global Corruption Barometer has been gathering the corruption views and experiences of people around the world since 2003. This year's survey covered more than 114,000 respondents in 107 countries.[Source: Alexis Romero, Philippine Star, July 11, 2013]

"Armed Forces public affairs chief Lt. Col. Ramon Zagala assured the public that efforts are underway to make the military less vulnerable to corruption. Zagala said reforms are continuous and the survey is "a manifestation of the things we need to do to improve the people's perception of us." The PNP has yet to issue a statement on the results of the survey. "We are not yet competent to answer that report. We will still have to look at the report," Senior Superintendent Reuben Theodore Sindac, PNP-Public Information Office chief, said. Sindac promised members of the media that an official statement of the PNP would be issued at 3 p.m. yesterday but no statement has been issued as of press time. [Ibid]

Low salaries are named as the main cause of police corruption. Joel D Adriano wrote in the Asia Times, "Salaries of cops are not commensurate to the risks they face. A low-ranking police officer makes only 12,500 pesos (US$290) a month and approximately 60 percent of the police force are estimated to live below the poverty line. Many live in squatter settlements and cannot afford to send their children to school, according to a recent study by the University of the Philippines and the CORPS Foundation. Half of the police officers they surveyed said that they have no bank savings. Lean economics "leaves members of the police force vulnerable to corruption, bribery and criminal activities", according to Pacific Strategies and Assessments, a global consulting firm. [Source: Joel D Adriano, Asia Times, February 5, 2011]

Accounts of Police Corruption in the Philippines

One person posted on answers.yahoo.com: "During a trip to the Philippines I was drinking at a bar in Makati. At about 2 - 3 am I left the bar intending to walk around a bit and perhaps find another one. As soon as I walked outside of the bar a kid approached me asking me for money. Since I only had $100 bills in my pocket I declined to give him anything. He persisted and before long other street beggars started shouting "give the boy some food and money!!!" I again declined and started walking away. The street people began cussing at me and became very rude so I flipped them all off. [Source: answers.yahoo.com */*]

"I was then surrounded by them and the police were called. I believe (but am not sure) that these police were low level or barangay police in Makati's red light district. They told me to go with them and when I asked them why they told me that somebody has a complaint against me. I asked who has a complaint and I was told that we would discuss it at the police station. While on the way to the police station I asked the men to prove that they were police and they showed me their guns. At the police station I was told to have a seat and a police officer told me that I could settle this now or settle this in court. I asked him what I did wrong and what I was accused of and he asked one of the street people that had come along what the complaint was. The street person told him that I had flipped off a boy on the street. The police officer then looked at me and told me that was the complaint and I could settle it by giving this street lady what she wanted or go to court. */*

"I asked him if I would go to jail and the officer told me I would go to jail unless I settled with this lady. I asked him how much it would cost me to settle and the lady replied that I had to give her 12,000 pesos. I didn't have 12,000 pesos so I told her I didn't have it. The policeman then responded by telling me that I should give all the money in my pockets and if that is not enough then he will take me to an ATM machine where I can get more money. The lady then told me that she will take dollars. I told them both that I have committed no crime and won't give anything. The policeman then asked for my ID and then muttered under his breath that I was going to learn the hard way and started typing a report. At this point I became scared and paid the lady $300. She gave $200 to the policeman and kept $100 for herself." */*

Tips on How to Handle Police Corruption in the Philippines

In response to a query advise on how to deal with situations like the one above one person posted on answers.yahoo.com: "Those cops are just looking for a free ride. I would have given them some small amount of cash and buy them cheap beers, leave them, and return to the bar or go home and tell everyone I know about it. If you're lucky, there may be just a police beat reporter around the block looking for opportunities like this. Those cops will be grilled in no time. [Source: answers.yahoo.com */*]

Another said: "1) always carry small bills. when you change money, get mostly 100 peso notes; 2) carry around hard candy like mentos, or coins to give to the kids, candy is better because the kids actually get it, some of the beggar kids give the money to Fagin type characters like the Oliver story. 3) don't hang around the street arguing with peddlers, dodge into a bar or shop to avoid them, the security at the shop or bar will keep them out.. this is a good way to avoid scammers or pick pockets also. 4) don't flip off anyone at 3am after you have been drinking for hours...and for that matter don't go walking around the 'red light district' at 3 am, you fool, go to the early happy hours. 5) if you were a drunk fool, stumblilng around arguing with pan handlers, at 3am in the 'red light' district, in the USA, you could likely find your self in jail, and the bail would be far greater than $300, and $300 would not pay for a 1 hour consult with a lawyer.. it could cost many thousands of dollars to try and reduce the drunk and disorderly charge. So consider yourself lucky, that the cops were so kind to you, to let you go with only a $300 warning. */*

Yet another said: "If your ever in that situation, keep walking. The police like to think that they are big, especially around tourists and foreingers. The only language that they understand is not to back down - they prey on weakness. Force the police to bring you to the police station and to file a report. I would have then told them to bring the matter to court - and right in front of them i would have called your embassy. Then the next day or that same day - go straight to your embassy and report what had happened in person and tell them you had been summoned to court - and get a legal representative. You watch the police back straight down when you get your embassy involved. Have you reported this to your embassy? */*

Others said to pretend to call an embassy or a made-up influential friend or report the whole incident to a radio station or another police station. Finally one person posted: "This is completely an EXTORTION CASE in their part and can be summarily terminated or charge in court. YOU SHOULD HAVE STAND YOUR GROUND and tell them just lock you up in jail. Actually they can't lock you up because the charge or complaint is completely BS or non-existence. So under the Philippines law no body can be put to jail unless there is a valid reason which is falls under the category of a crime. And since you said you done nothing wrong then why pay them, might as well spent your nights in jail and ask someone from your side to fetch you in the precinct or the place they lock you in. But like I said these people are just intimidating you or scaring you that they will put you in jail because they are demanding some money out of you." */*

One in Every Ten Families Gives Money or Gift for Government Service

According to the 2010 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) conducted by the Philippines National Statistics Office in August 2010, four in every ten families (41.3 percent) nationwide had at least one member who purposely saw a government official or personnel or visited a government office to secure permit or licenses, pay taxes, avail of social services or seek assistance from police or court during the 12 month-period prior to the survey. Of those who saw a government official or personnel or went to a government office for the cited reasons, about 9 percent gave money or gift or favor or anything of value to facilitate or avoid getting problems with their transaction. In this survey, such giving of money or gift or favor or anything of value was classified into two types: supply-driven wherein a person voluntarily gives money or gift or favor or anything of value, and demand-driven wherein a person was asked to give it. The survey revealed that 75 percent of families with at least one member who gave money or gift or favor to facilitate securing or availing of a service from a government office voluntarily gave the money or gift or favor. The other 25 percent were asked to give it. The survey also revealed that less than one percent of those who did not voluntarily give money or gift or favor, reported the incident to anyone in authority. [Source: Philippine Statistics Authority, February 15, 2013]

In the survey, families were classified as poor or non-poor by grouping them into two income strata according to their per capita income. Families who fall at the bottom 30 percent per capita income stratum were considered as poor while those at the upper 70 percent were classified as non-poor. The survey revealed that 10 percent of non-poor families give money, gift or favor in order to facilitate their transactions with a government office, compared to 7 percent of poor families. Among poor families who gave money, gift, or favor to facilitate their transaction with a government office, about 32 percent did so involuntarily, compared with 24 percent among the non-poor families.

Among the regions, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao had the highest incidence of giving money or gift or favor to facilitate their transactions with a government office at 42 percent of families, followed by SOCCSKSARGEN (27 percent), and Central Luzon (16 percent).

The 2010 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) is a nationwide survey covering around 26,000 sample households. The survey is designed to provide non-income indicators related to poverty, and provides data on the socio-economic profile of families and other information that are related to their living conditions. In this round of APIS, questions aimed at gathering information to describe the extent or pervasiveness of giving money, gift or favor to facilitate securing or availing of a service from a government office were included in order to establish an empirical baseline data on bribery.

Image Sources:

Text Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, Lonely Planet Guides, Library of Congress, Philippines Department of Tourism, Compton's Encyclopedia, The Guardian, National Geographic, Smithsonian magazine, The New Yorker, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, AP, AFP, Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic Monthly, The Economist, Foreign Policy, Wikipedia, BBC, CNN, and various books, websites and other publications.

&copy 2008 Jeffrey Hays

Last updated June 2015

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Corruption, cronyism and nepotism are serious problems in the Philippines. They pervade public life, keeping tax revenues low and hurting efforts to alleviate poverty. Charges of corruption, graft, and cronyism are common among government officials at all levels. These problems are so entrenched that Filipinos have come to accept cronyism and the diversion of a small percentage of funds as natural.

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Family owned? A dynasty created? Is nepotism just a part of our culture or a corrupt way to impose unfair treatment among the people?

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A GENERAL knowledge on the laws and rules governing nepotism is very critical to all Philippine government officials, as it is an inherent trait of Filipinos to take care of their kamag-anak first, like in the appointment or designation of officials or employees in the government service. We hope that this article will be helpful to all officials in the government service, especially to our Department of Education (DepEd) appointing officials in light of its implementation of its "Rationalization Plan," which basically covers the department's nonteaching personnel in its Central, Regional and Schools Division Offices nationwide. Section 59, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provided the parameters on the rule of nepotism. Thus, it states that: " All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority or the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited."

The same section then defined the word "relative" as members of the family who are related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. Relationship by "consanguinity" refers to your relatives who are related to you by "blood" (examples are your parents, siblings and children),while "affinity" refers to your "in-laws" or relatives because of marriage.

Without discussing how to determine the degree of relationship you may have to any of your blood relatives, the prohibition on appointment covers your following relatives: your spouse, brothers and sisters, children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, uncles and aunts (meaning the siblings of your parents), and nieces and nephews (meaning the children of your siblings or your "niblings").Thus, if you are the appointing authority, recommending authority, chief of the bureau or office, or the persons exercising immediate supervision over the appointee, then the aforementioned relatives may not be appointed as it may violate our law on nepotism. So that's your general rule on nepotism. Is there any exception to this general rule?

Yes, as the same provisions states that the "following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (b) teachers; (c) physicians; and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." The law, however, requires that if the appointment falls under the exceptions on the law on nepotism, a full report of such appointment shall be made to the Civil Service Commission.

It may be important to note that "confidential capacity" refers to appointments that are at the pleasure of, or are coterminous with, the appointing authority. Also, in Laurel v. CSC, G.R. No. 71562, October 28, 1991, the Supreme Court declared that the "rule admits of no distinction between appointment or designation."

Section 59 of the Administrative Code clearly shows the comprehensive character of the statutory prohibition against the practice of nepotism in the government service. "Except for the enumerated exceptions in the law, the rule on nepotism applies in all instances of personnel actions where the issuance of appointments is involved. The rationale for its rather broad and all-encompassing reach is to ensure the objectivity of the appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative, which is of utmost significance in the light of the Philippines societal culture, where family bonds remain, in general, compelling and cohesive." (Please see also page 36 of Sourcebook on Administrative Offenses in the Civil Service, published by the Civil Service Commission in September 2013, citingthe case of Lee Calo, Teresita R., et al., CSC Resolution 07-2395, dated December 17, 2007.)

This column should not be taken as a legal advice applicable to any case,. as each case is unique and should be construed in light of the attending circumstances surrounding such particular case.

Lawyer Toni Umali is the current assistant secretary for Legal and Legislative Affairs of the DepEd. He is licensed to practice law not only in the Philippines, but also in the state of California and some federal courts in the United States after passing the California State Bar Examinations in 2004. He has served as a legal consultant to several legislators and local chief executives. As education assistant secretary, he was instrumental in the passage of the K to 12 law and the issuance of its implementing rules and regulations. He is also the alternate spokesman of the DepEd.

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A GENERAL knowledge on the laws and rules governing nepotism is very critical to all Philippine government officials, as it is an inherent trait of Filipinos to take care of their kamag-anak first, like in the appointment or designation of officials or employees in the government service. We hope that this...

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What are we compromising with Nepotism and Cryonism?

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What are we compromising with Nepotism and Cryonism?

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Will you appoint somebody because they are qualified or because you know that person?

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These materials were prepared for the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics program in Government Ethics by former Senior Fellow Judy Nadler and former Communications Director Miriam Schulman.
What are favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism?
What do favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism have to do with ethics?
What ethical dilemmas do favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism present?

What are favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism?

As favoritism is the broadest of these related terms, we'll start with its definition. Basically favoritism is just what it sounds like; it's favoring a person not because he or she is doing the best job but rather because of some extraneous feature-membership in a favored group, personal likes and dislikes, etc. Favoritism can be demonstrated in hiring, honoring, or awarding contracts. A related idea is patronage, giving public service jobs to those who may have helped elect the person who has the power of appointment.

Favoritism has always been a complaint in government service. In 2002, a survey from the federal government's Office of Personnel Management found that only 36.1 percent of federal workers thought promotions in their work units were based on merit. (Government Executive Magazine, "Playing Favorites," by Brian Friel, October 2004). They believed that connections, partisanship, and other factors played a role.

Cronyism is a more specific form of favoritism, referring to partiality towards friends and associates. As the old saying goes, "It's not what you know but who you know," or, as blogger Danny Ferguson put it, "It's not what you don't know; it's who your college roommate knows." Cronyism occurs within a network of insiders-the "good ol' boys," who confer favors on one another.

Nepotism is an even narrower form of favoritism. Coming from the Italian word for nephew, it covers favoritism to members of the family. Both nepotism and cronyism are often at work when political parties recruit candidates for public office.

What do favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism have to do with ethics?

One of the most basic themes in ethics is fairness, stated this way by Artistotle: "Equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally." Favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism all interfere with fairness because they give undue advantage to someone who does not necessarily merit this treatment.

In the public sphere, favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism also undermine the common good. When someone is granted a position because of connections rather than because he or she has the best credentials and experience, the service that person renders to the public may be inferior.

Also, because favoritism is often covert (few elected officials are foolish enough to show open partiality to friends, and family), this practice undercuts the transparency that should be part of governmental hiring and contracting processes.

What ethical dilemmas do favoritism, cronyism, and nepotism present?

Probably the biggest dilemma presented by favoritism is that, under various other names, few people see it as a problem. Connections, networking, family-almost everyone has drawn on these sources of support in job hunting in the private spherre.

And everyone can point to instances where cronyism or nepotism is an accepted fact of life in political sphere, as well. John F. Kennedy, for example, appointed his brother Robert as attorney general. Every president and governor names close associates to key cabinet positions. Mayors put those they know and trust on citizens committees and commissions. Friends and family can usually be counted on for loyalty, and officeholders are in a good position to know their strengths.

So what's the problem?

The first issue is competence. For cabinet level positions, an executive will probably be drawn to experienced, qualified candidates, but historically, the lower down the ladder, the more likely for someone's brother-in-law to be slipped into a job for which he is not qualified. The American Civil Service Act was passed in 1883 in large part because so many patronage jobs, down to dogcatcher, were being filled by people whose only qualification for employment was their support for a particular party or candidate. Also, the appearance of favoritism weakens morale in government service, not to mention public faith in the integrity of government.

Reasonable people will differ about the appointment of friends and family in high-level positions, but public officials should be aware that such choices can give the appearance of unfairness. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, 19 state legislatures have found the practice of nepotism troubling enough to enact laws against it. Others may restrict the hiring of relatives or friends in more general conflict-of-interest rules.

Public officials should also note that dilemmas involving favoritism extend beyond hiring and contracting practices to the more general problem of influence. Golfing partners, people who come over for Sunday dinner, members of the same congregation all are likely to exert a greater influence over an official than a stranger might. Council members, mayors, and legislators must make special efforts to ensure that they hear all sides of an issue rather than just relying on the views of the people they know. Further, many conscientious lawmakers have discovered that they must change their patterns of socializing when their work involves many decisions affecting friends and associates. At the least, they may choose to recuse themselves from votes where social relationships may exert undue influence.

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An introduction to the ethical issues presented by favoritism in government.

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Nepotism may be a negative thing but it could actually work in certain instances.

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Nepotism has negative connotations both in the workplace and politics because it promotes partiality and produces undesirable outcomes such as organizational inefficiencies. However, under certain but limited circumstances, it can be beneficial.

The Benefits and Applications of Nepotism

An extensive study by J. Ruch et al. involving a species of spiders explored the role of kinship in survival and evolution. Results revealed that spiders were considerably more efficient at foraging for food and cooperate better when they are related to each other.

Based on its conclusion, in several animal species, being surrounded by kin members usually lead to better group dynamics and more cooperation, as well as better chances of survival.

The study mentioned above can help explain some of the benefits and applications of nepotism under selected situations. Consider small organizations as an example. Take note of the following:

* Family Business: Private enterprises often resort to hiring family members and other relatives to maintain secrecy and preserve what they consider as a family legacy.

* Startups: Nepotism can help speed up the creation and operation of a startup business because working with familiar people can promote efficiency.

* Hiring and Retention: Time and cost of hiring relatives are lesser. Furthermore, in properly managed organizations, absenteeism and turnover rates are low.

* Knowledge Management: Knowledge can be transferred and secured efficiently when passed down on familiar people such as family members.

Another study by P. Jaskiewicz et al. proposed two types of nepotism: entitlement and reciprocal. The latter provides several advantages such as better and healthier social exchange, as well as the facilitation of tacit knowledge that can bring forth competitive advantage.

However, the study also noted that when hiring or including family members, it is important to consider interdependence, the depth of interactions and relationship, and prevailing cultural norms of the family.

The Disadvantages of Nepotism

Nepotism is still problematic in most circumstances. A number of studies have investigated and explained its negative implications in leadership and organizational efficiency. Take note of the following:

* Promotes Corruption: Both in politics and workplace, family members can foster connivance that facilitates corrupt practices.

* Authoritarian Leadership: Having a leader surrounded mostly by people familiar to him or her can enable authoritarian leader. Note that this type of leadership has its pros and cons depending on the situation.

* Organizational Incompetency: Nepotism means hiring people based primarily on kinship and not on actual abilities and potential contribution to the organization. These can harm the competency of the organization.

* Harms Leadership: Family members can undermine authority by using connection and number to scheme against their leaders. These members can also exert their familial connections and entitlement toward non-relative authorities.

* Effects of Family Problems: In an organization composed primarily of people who are related to one another, problems within the family can leak further to the organization. It can be impossible to separate family affairs with organizational affairs.

* Organizational Politics: Similar to connivance against leaders, relatives in an organization can resort to power play to undermine non-relatives, advance their own interests, and neglect their responsibilities.

* Hinders Growth: A general disadvantage of nepotism is that it can hamper the growth or progress of an organization due to workforce incompetency, harms on leadership, and the possibility of corruption, among others.

Based on the drawbacks mentioned above, nepotism is not suitable in specific situations or contexts. In politics and governance, it contradicts the advantages of democracy and leadership through representation. Moreover, in workplace, especially in medium and large enterprises, it reduces the effectiveness and efficiency of an organization.
FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Jaskiewicz, P., Uhlenbruck, K., Balkin, D. B., and Reay, T. 2013. Is Nepotism Good or Bad? Types of Nepotism and Implications for Knowledge Management. Family Business Review. 26(2): 121-139. DOI: 10.1177/0894486512470841

Ruch, J., Heinrich, L., Bilde, T., and Schneider, J. M. 2009. "Relatedness facilitates cooperation in the subsocial spider, Stegodyphus tentoriicola." BMC Evolutionary Biology. 9(1): 257. DOI: 10.1186/1471-2148-9-257

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The Pros and Cons of Nepotism | Profolus

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Nepotism has negative connotations both in the workplace and politics because it promotes partiality and produces undesirable outcomes such as organizational inefficiencies. However, under certain but limited circumstances, it can be beneficial. An extensive study by J. Ruch et al. involving a species of spiders explored the role of kinship in survival and evolution.