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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-11-27/there-no-grand-bargain-china?cid=int-flb&pgtype=hpg
DEAL OR NO DEAL

The contours of such a deal are well understood. Trump would agree to hit pause on any new or higher tariffs. In exchange, China would pledge to purchase more U.S. goods (including soy beans and liquefied natural gas), while issuing promises to enhance Chinese market access for U.S. products, further open its financial sector, better protect intellectual property, and reduce joint venture and technology transfer requirements.

Here we are facing different style of financialization.  United States want china to finance the trade.  Greta R. Kripner, defined financialization as a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrued primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production.

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https://foreignpolicy.com/category/shadow-government
The Chinese Communist Party is carrying out a methodical campaign of oppression in an apparent attempt to extinguish the religion and ethnicity of the Uighur people.  The article said: this is not just about human rights or China. It’s about how the United States and others respond to a growing trend of authoritarian impunity that is gaining ground worldwide.

To account for increased density of world society norms, institutions and organizations at a global level (human rights treaty ratifications,) INGO memberships and IGO they often associate with the eventual adoption of similar institutions by late adopters.  Through aid they sprayed similar institutions. ( Liam Swiss)

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https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/28/how-to-respond-to-chinese-investment-in-latin-america/
World Society and the Global Foreign Aid Network
The scale of Latin America’s borrowing from China in the past decade is astounding: Venezuela has received $62 billion; Brazil, $42 billion; Argentina, $18 billion; and Ecuador, $17 billion. The example of Ecuador is telling. President Rafael Correa’s administration borrowed an additional $3.5 billion between 2011 and 2015 to bridge the budgetary gaps that resulted from Chinese-financed development projects.

Liam Swiss explains in this article analyzes the relationship between foreign aid and globalization to explain developing country ties to world society and argues that foreign aid can be viewed as a recursive mechanism through which donor states refine and spread international norms and organizational ties.

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Over the past several years, China has managed to turn itself into Latin America's largest creditor, mostly by funding large-scale infrastructure projects. In doing so, Beijing has managed to grow quite close to some of the region's capitals. Argentine President Mauricio Macri has sought to " deepen" ties with China. In Colombia, President Iván Duque hosted Chinese Transport Minister Li Xiaopeng as an honored guest at his inauguration ceremony over the summer. And the incoming Mexican president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, is considering joining China's Belt and Road Initiative, which he has said will open a new chapter in the countries' relations.

For the Trump administration, though, China's presence in the United States' backyard is worrying. Although National Security Advisor John Bolton did not mention China by name in his recent "Troika of Tyranny" speech, his thorough condemnation of two key Chinese allies in the region, Cuba and Venezuela, made the point. In February, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was even more explicit when he said, "Today China is getting a foothold in Latin America. It is using economic statecraft to pull the region into its orbit; the question is at what price."

One cost has been to the environment and to indigenous communities. Infrastructure development, although necessary, has often been carried out irresponsibly, with enormous social, political, economic, and environmental consequences. Another consequence has been a significant loss of U.S. influence in Latin America. In 2017, for example, Venezuela published its oil prices in yuan for the first time. The move was welcomed by other countries, including Russia, which cheered the pushback against dollar dominance. In addition, three Latin American countries, El Salvador, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, have broken off ties with Taiwan, a longtime U.S. ally, in the last two years.

There is a way for the United States to help address both problems at once. Increased U.S. investment in the softer side of infrastructure, especially in social and environmental safeguards for new projects and in urban planning programs, can help ensure that these countries are able to upgrade their infrastructure and energy systems in a responsible and equitable manner. And if the United States, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and multilateral organs such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) are seen as genuinely contributing to Latin American development in a way that puts the long-term interests of the region above (or at least on par with) U.S. commercial interests, Washington's reputation as a trustworthy partner will grow.

Latin American governments have long lamented their countries' patchy infrastructure. Increasingly, in recent decades, China has stepped in with a solution: roughly $150 billion loaned to Latin American countries since 2005. About 90 percent of that has gone to boosting the region's energy, infrastructure, and mining sectors.

The scale of Latin America's borrowing from China in the past decade is astounding: Venezuela has received $62 billion; Brazil, $42 billion; Argentina, $18 billion; and Ecuador, $17 billion. Those deeply in arrears to China have sometimes had to take on more loans from the superpower to stay afloat. The example of Ecuador is telling. President Rafael Correa's administration borrowed an additional $3.5 billion between 2011 and 2015 to bridge the budgetary gaps that resulted from Chinese-financed development projects.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the World Bank, and the IDB have suggested that the United States try to regain its standing in Latin America by, essentially, copying China and funding infrastructure at a large scale. That is a trap. For one, Western investors have struggled to do megaprojects well and have often passed on projects that have gone on to be funded by Chinese banks. Further, although the Latin American infrastructure gap is real, the last thing the region needs is yet another round of megaproject building driven more by foreign desires than local needs.

Hydropower is a good example. Chinese state firms are the largest financiers and builders of dams in the world, having raised over 330 in 74 countries. In Latin America, the list of countries working with China on dams includes Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela. These dams, and others financed by regional lenders, have displaced hundreds of thousands and have caused untold environmental harm. In all, over 400 dams have been built, are under construction, or are being planned in the Amazon basin alone, for example, and a team of international researchers writing for Nature argued that "the accumulated negative environmental effects of existing dams and proposed dams, if constructed ... [will be] severe, disruptive and characteristically irreversible."

Another result of all this construction is that the region has become overly reliant on hydropower. In fact, data from the International Hydropower Association show that nearly two-thirds of South American electricity is generated via hydropower projects. But as the hydrologist Philip Fearnside has argued, much of that doesn't even reach the people who need it most. "The amount of electricity devoted to rural electrification is miniscule compared to other uses," wrote last fall, continuing that "hydropower is already unreliable and is projected to become much more so in light of climate change and projected shifts in rainfall patterns."

Large hydropower projects are also consistently poor investments. University of Oxford economists have demonstrated that actual costs of hydropower construction average 96 percent over what initial models predicted. "Even before taking into account negative impacts on human society and the environment, on average the actual construction costs of large dams tend to be too high to yield a positive financial return on investment," the researchers said.

Yet Western lenders have long supported hydropower development in Latin America. The World Bank's online hydropower resource states that 62 percent of Latin America and the Caribbean's potential hydropower remains "unexploited." And, in fact, the IDB has made attempts to match such Chinese megaproject lending in the sector. Its most recent gambit, the Ituango Dam (commonly known as Hidroituango), was an unmitigated disaster. Co-financed by an IDB spinoff, IDB Invest, and the China Co-Financing Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean, it was Colombia's largest such project to date and was rushed to the construction phase despite vigorous local opposition. The dam ultimately burst during construction, displacing 25,000 people and threatening many more downstream.

Hidroituango highlights a key tension between the desire for rapid development and time-consuming social and environmental assessments. Chinese finance is enticing to Latin American governments precisely because it doesn't require the costly and arduous social and environmental evaluation processes that usually accompany World Bank and IDB projects.

Rather than trying to compete with China by forgoing such evaluations themselves, though, the United States and other lenders might more usefully focus on helping make environmental and social safeguards less burdensome. They could do so by footing the bill for meeting the community consultation requirements that might come with a World Bank project, for example, or by funding the environmental assessments that the IDB might want. Such aid could make Western-driven projects nimbler and also better investments for Latin America in the long run. And in theory, because China typically defers to local regulations where it does business, such a system could even help ensure the safety of Chinese projects by helping Latin American nations enforce their own rules.

Beyond footing the bill for impact assessments, the West could also do a lot of good by investing in higher education and public sector and professional development in Latin America. Urban planning education across the region is severely underfunded. Upgrades to planning programs will help Latin American officials and researchers endogenously craft better infrastructure development policies down the line.

Given the scale of Chinese lending throughout the past decade-as well as the Trump administration's inflammatory rhetoric toward Latin America-it doesn't appear that China's presence in the region will decrease anytime soon. The reality is that there is still a lot of demand on the part of national governments for additional construction.

And the slew of recent elections-in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia-doesn't seem like it will change anything. "Latin American countries are still looking to China as a critical partner and creditor," Margaret Myers, the director of the Asia and Latin America Program at the Inter-American Dialogue, told me. "The ways countries are engaging with China might change slightly, but the fundamentals of their bilateral relations with China will withstand political changes." In Brazil, for example, President-elect Jair Bolsonaro has already walked back his negative campaign rhetoric about China and has proposed railroad construction that is intended to facilitate growth in the soy trade, Myers told me. And under López Obrador in Mexico, Eugenio Anguiano Roch, a professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and former Mexican ambassador to China, recently wrote, "Mexico's international business ... is currently poised for a fundamental reorientation," with China set to play a key role.

It would be a mistake, however, for the United States to approach this reality antagonistically. Staggering inequality is Latin America's defining issue, and Washington would be prudent to recognize that gearing its investments toward combating this complex set of problems will reap enormous benefits in the long term. Instead of admonishing China for its growing role in the region, the United States needs to see the opportunities present for strengthening the soft side of infrastructure development and realize that pursuing them could reap vast goodwill, solidarity, and cooperation.

At the moment, Latin America lacks the safeguards and planning capacities to ensure that megaprojects have the best possible fiscal, social, and environmental outcomes. The United States, by playing a supporting role in development, could help to lay the groundwork for increased economic connectivity, regional political integration, an approach to growth mindful of and respectful to indigenous communities and the environment, and substantial reductions in poverty and inequality across the region.

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How to Respond to Chinese Investment in Latin America

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Over the past several years, China has managed to turn itself into Latin America's largest creditor, mostly by funding large-scale infrastructure projects. In doing so, Beijing has managed to grow quite close to some of the region's capitals. Argentine President Mauricio Macri has sought to " deepen" ties with China.

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https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/10/27/donald-trump-is-wrong-about-honduran-migrants-the-democrats-are-incoherent
According to President Donald Trump, the “caravan” of migrants trudging north towards the United States represents “an assault on our country”. He adds that among the thousands of Central American pedestrians are criminals, gangsters and Middle Eastern terrorists. He hints that the entire spectacle was funded by Democrats.

In our class, we were pounding on immigrants making a parallel with development.  Data proves that immigration increase income per capita through remittance.  We conclude immigration widens international & inequalities and concentrates advantage in developing countries.  It is a global chain care, specially through Filipino migrant woman.

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Alan Greenspan was the best instrument in the 2008 financial crises
In their despair, Brazilians are about to reject a discredited party in favor of a political adventurer with repellent ideas. That’s unlikely to turn out well. Lawmakers, judges, and civil servants will have to work hard to limit the damage.  Just as it’s been the case here, government always has his wishes.

Reading that video, Alan Greenspan was involved in 1982 with Charles Kitting wo went to jail in 1982.  In 1985 Greenspan stated after the scandal, he saw no risk in using investor money.  Alan Greenspan was appointed by the next three presidents of the United States.  The depression couldn’t happen without a soft spat of investigation.

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B RAZILIANS FACE an awful choice. One candidate in the presidential run-off on October 28th is Jair Bolsonaro, a seven-term congressman who venerates dictators and guns, goads police to kill suspected criminals, threatens to banish opponents and belittles women, blacks and gays. His rival is Fernando Haddad, the nominee of the leftist Workers' Party(PT). Its 13 years in power, from 2003 to 2016, ended in a self-inflicted economic depression and revelations that the party encouraged bribery on an unprecedented scale, in part to prolong its hold on power.
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Dilma Rousseff, a PT president, was impeached in 2016 for hiding the true size of the budget deficit. Crime continued to rise after she left office. Nearly 64,000 people were murdered in Brazil last year, a record number. Understandably, Brazilians are enraged. They now look poised to elect Mr Bolsonaro, a populist with authoritarian instincts, as their president.

That such a man will probably lead Latin America's largest country is a tragedy. If it happens, it will be because Brazil's political class has failed the country's people. Some of the corruption was orchestrated by the PT, but almost all parties took part in it. Today's crime and economic stagnation are a consequence of a dangerously indebted state that is at once too big and too feeble to provide adequate policing, education and other public services. Nearly all politicians share the blame for that.

Mr Bolsonaro's probable election will pose a new challenge: ensuring that a president with autocratic impulses does not subvert Brazil's democracy. It is critical that politicians of all ideologies rise to the occasion. But they cannot forget about the old problems. If Mr Bolsonaro puts forward good ideas for fixing the economy and controlling corruption, he should get help.

Brazil is a relatively young democracy; dictatorial rule ended in 1985. But it is not a weak one. Although Brazilians view congress as a corruption-ridden collection of rent-a-parties, it is not a rubber stamp. It has impeached two presidents in the democratic era and can provide a vital check on Mr Bolsonaro. The judiciary has shown its independence over the past four years through the Lava Jato (Car Wash) investigations. These have implicated scores of politicians and led to the jailing of the PT' s leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a former president. The press is already challenging Mr Bolsonaro, which is why, like Donald Trump, he accuses it of spreading fake news.

Such institutions can thwart some of Mr Bolsonaro's worst plans. He wants the police to have "carte blanche" to kill. But the main police forces are under the authority of the 27 states. Their governors must reject his trigger-happy philosophy. Congress can stop him from carrying out his threat to stuff the supreme court with pliant judges. Mr Bolsonaro's proposal to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement and his eagerness to promote development in the Amazon, where rates of deforestation appear to be rising, should alarm the world. Congress and activist groups can stand in his way.

Not all Mr Bolsonaro's ideas are bad. He has shown more interest than the PT in solving Brazil's main economic problems (see article). If he is serious about reforming the costly pension system, which threatens Brazil's financial stability, and eliminating useless rules, congress should co-operate. (Though that is a big "if".)

The worst effects of a Bolsonaro presidency may be hardest to contain. Already he has damaged Brazil's democratic culture by praising the former dictatorship, choosing as his running-mate a retired general who has justified military coups under some circumstances, and insinuating that political opponents are enemies of the state. He probably does not intend to be a dictator. But his corrosive rhetoric may make Brazilians more receptive to autocracy in the future. To confront that, Brazil needs an opposition that defends democratic norms and an army determined to remain scrupulously apolitical.

In their despair, Brazilians are about to reject a discredited party in favour of a political adventurer with repellent ideas. That is unlikely to turn out well. Lawmakers, judges, journalists and civil servants will have to work hard to limit the damage.

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BRAZILIANS FACE an awful choice. One candidate in the presidential run-off on October 28th is Jair Bolsonaro, a seven-term congressman who venerates dictators and guns, goads police to kill suspected criminals, threatens to banish opponents and belittles women, blacks and gays.

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Measures of attractiveness, London for the top dog in global financial.
Industries moved to London from abroad, precisely to excel in finance. If their jobs left the City, they would surely follow them.  City does encourage foreign investment in British firms and property. That pushes up both wages and rents in London, and probably the pound too, making it harder for other, price-sensitive export industries to thrive.

Advantages and disadvantages of Foreign Direct Investment, is all depend with the amount of attractiveness domestic government offers and is able dominate the game investors is playing.  In our study, the risk has always been a preoccupation and this article pointed how Great Britain is doing just fine.

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MEASURES of the attractiveness of global financial centres, rough and ready as they are, are consistent: only New York can vie with London for the title of top dog. Financial firms from around the world are drawn to the British capital; the assets in the country's financial system are ten times its GDP. Yet little of the Square Mile's bountiful wealth seems to trickle out. The gap between Britain's richest and poorest parts is perhaps the biggest in Europe. Britain's productivity growth is woeful.

Many Britons suspect that the City succeeds at everyone else's expense. That view is decades old, but the financial crisis of 2007-08 intensified it greatly. The crisis brought the economy to its knees; the state spent £140bn ($220bn) bailing out banks. Public services have been squeezed in the years since; living standards have stagnated. Yet bankers still earn royal ransoms. As Britain prepares to fall out of the European Union's single market after Brexit-thereby weakening the City's appeal-some wonder whether it is time to rethink Britain's economic model. Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the opposition Labour Party, boasts that he is a "threat" to bankers, who, he says, "should not run our country". Now a new book by Nicholas Shaxson, a writer (and a former contributor to The Economist), in effect argues that Britain would indeed be better off with a smaller financial sector.
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Mr Shaxson provocatively compares Britain's situation to that of Angola, a country where oil makes up over 95% of exports. Oil should bring widespread prosperity to Angola, but it does not. Brainy Angolans flock to the oilfields rather than to the civil service or health care. Floods of foreign capital raise the value of the currency, making non-oil industries uncompetitive. Angola, in wonk-speak, suffers from a "resource curse", in which plentiful natural resources lead to worse economic growth. Mr Shaxson worries that Britain suffers from something similar, with financial services playing the role of oil.

The comparison is unwarranted. Since the City's deregulatory "Big Bang" of 1986, GDP per person has grown faster in Britain than the average for rich countries. The claim that Britain's financial industry sucks the best people from elsewhere is dubious. The share of economic output accounted for by finance is much higher than the share of university graduates in the sector.

True, some of these brainy folk do things that could fairly be described as socially useless: who really benefits from speculation on a derivative which is the fifth-cousin-once-removed of an interest rate? But many in the industry have studied hard, or moved to London from abroad, precisely to excel in finance. If their jobs left the City, they would surely follow them rather than set up an engineering firm in the provinces.

It is also hard to firm up Mr Shaxson's claim that Britain's large financial sector makes other industries uncompetitive. True, the City does encourage foreign investment in British firms and property. That pushes up both wages and rents in London, and probably the pound too, making it harder for other, price-sensitive export industries to thrive. But dynamic industries squeeze out sluggish ones everywhere: try being a steel-processor in the Bay Area. And the City is not to blame for some deep-rooted British shortcomings. The trade-weighted value of sterling has been declining for 50 years. Britain's manufacturing exports as a share of the global total have been falling since the 1860s, long before the City became as powerful as it is today. Manufacturing's share of output began falling in the 1950s, when financial regulation was extremely strict. Governments have tried countless times to arrest this decline, without success.

Against these uncertain costs can be set more certain benefits. Surveys suggest that Britain's small and medium-sized enterprises find it easier to get hold of finance than the average European firm. Britain's burgeoning peer-to-peer lenders help. London has a vibrant fintech scene partly because of proximity to the City's pools of expertise and money.

Britain runs a large overall trade deficit but last year the surplus in financial services was 3% of GDP. From that, some may conclude that Britain is over-reliant on finance. But it may simply be a sign of strength. Nor, despite appearances, is finance confined to the City. Two-thirds of its jobs are outside London. Finance also contributes around a tenth of Britain's total tax take.

Monopoly money

That reliance on finance can cause trouble is not in doubt. The crisis of 2007-08 is Exhibit A. Another worry is that an oversized financial sector has turbocharged the recent trend across rich countries for industries to be dominated by ever fewer big companies. Investment bankers get juicy fees when firms merge, so encourage them to do so. Relative to its economy, Britain sees 50% more mergers and acquisitions than America, where the financial sector is less powerful. Finance may play some part in Britain's wider competition problem.

But in preventing both crises and monopolies, regulation is a better way forward than shrinking finance. Banks must already hold more equity than they did before the crisis. By next year they must put a "ring-fence" between retail and investment banking. Supervisors could go further-demanding yet more capital or doing more to discourage frothy property lending. Tightening antitrust policy, meanwhile, would help to ensure that mergers did more good than harm.

There is no need to be "sizeist", in other words. Finance is big in Britain because Britain is good at it. Mr Shaxson is right that parts of finance are socially useless. He is also right that the City is too welcoming to dirty money (see article). Nevertheless, forcing finance to leave Britain is the road to a smaller economy and less tax revenue for the exchequer. Especially with Brexit looming, running down a successful commercial cluster looks like folly.

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The notion that the City needs to shrink is gathering momentum

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MEASURES of the attractiveness of global financial centres, rough and ready as they are, are consistent: only New York can vie with London for the title of top dog. Financial firms from around the world are drawn to the British capital; the assets in the country's financial system are ten times its GDP.

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Why Globalization may not reduce inequality in poor country.
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2014/09/02/why-globalisation-may-not-reduce-inequality-in-poor-countries

Globalization has made the planet more equal.  As communication gets cheaper, transportation get faster developing countries closed the gap.  But, within many developing economies, inequality has worsened.  Does Globalization responsible?  Economists, usually say no!  Contrary to popular belief, multinationals in poor countries employ skilled workers pay high wages is.

In accordance, on a sociological perspective multinational brings economic disarticulation through transnational.  Uneven economic development and low wages in the same sector of local firm impact domestic firm in the same industry.  Collective growth associated research and development brought a product market rivalry effect whereas technology spillovers are beneficial to some firms and negative to others.

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Losing our core

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Why would Germany refused FDI

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Neoliberalism, is it a new liberalism?
https://www.economist.com/essay/2018/09/13/the-economist-at-175
Related notes in our class, depicted Neoliberalism in Margaret and Reagan see it: Government cannot create growth and prosperity, markets can.
So, this article tells us, "Liberal world order failed to confront epic challenge of climate change or to adapt its institutions to growing importance of emerging economies. it was consensus success of deregulation from 1970 forward brought up the 2008 crises.  Following 2008 crises, one would think that liberalism would just give up.  Instead, it keeps coming back.  Neoliberalism is nothing new, just same old idea, government should step aside, efficient businesses can prevail for world market