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What does it mean to be truly happy?

There are many philosophical schools of thought regarding the concept of happiness and its cultivation.

For instance, the pursuit of enduring happiness is at the core of many mindfulness practices, which often emphasize gratitude and seeking contentment in the present moment.

Other models of happiness suggest the importance of living in congruence with our values and in ways that satisfy our basic human needs. Some research even shows that whether we are happy or not can, in part, be boiled down to our genetics.

In what follows, we'll walk you through several conceptualizations of happiness, show you how to measure each, and give you a wide range of strategies for cultivating whichever form of happiness you seek in your own life.

Before you continue, we thought you might like to download our three Positive Psychology Exercises for free. These science-based exercises will explore fundamental aspects of positive psychology including strengths, values, and self-compassion, and will give you the tools to enhance the wellbeing of your clients, students, or employees.

What is Happiness?

Defining happiness is no small task, but philosophers and researchers have drilled the notion down to two key conceptualizations.

These conceptualizations are known as hedonia and eudaimonia, and together, they represent two long-running traditions in the study of happiness that stem as far back as the times of ancient philosophers (Ryan & Deci, 2001).

Happiness as hedonia

The hedonic perspective of happiness argues that life's goal is to experience the maximum amount of pleasure and the minimum amount of pain. According to this tradition, how happy we are can be boiled down to the sum of one's total hedonic moments (Ryan & Deci, 2001).

When it comes to measuring hedonic happiness, modern psychologists tend to use assessments of Subjective Wellbeing (see How to Measure Happiness below; Diener & Lucas, 1999).

In the past, philosophers of hedonism adopted a fairly narrow view of pleasure and pain related to bodily sensations, appetites, and self-interests. Examples of such forms of hedonia include eating tasty food, enjoying sex, and being free of physical discomfort.

Today, psychologists adopting the hedonic view take an interest in both the pleasures of the body and mind in the broader study of wellbeing (Kahneman, 1999).

This broader, more psychological conceptualization of hedonic pleasure argues that happiness can flow from behaviors that promote mental stimulation, stress relief, feelings of social connectedness, positive mood, and more (Arnold & Reynolds, 2003).

This expanded conceptualization has resulted in the broadening of the study of hedonic pleasure to fields such as economics. For instance, hedonic conceptualizations of happiness are used to understand how shoppers make decisions between purchases, estimating how much pleasure or utility they stand to gain by choosing one product over another (Babin, Darden & Griffin, 1994).

Happiness as eudaimonia

The eudaimonic perspective of happiness presents an alternative to the hedonic view, arguing that true happiness is found when one behaves virtuously. Pursuing eudaimonia, therefore, is about doing what is worth doing.

In line with this, we can think about the eudaimonic perspective as being about reaching one's true potential and living in congruence with one's values and true self. It also involves developing one's talents and strengthening relationships with those for whom we care. By living in this way, one should feel deeply engaged and fully alive (Waterman, 1993).

When it comes to measuring eudaimonic happiness, most researchers tend to use Ryff and Keyes' (1995) multidimensional scales of psychological wellbeing (see How to Measure Happiness below).

According to the eudaimonic perspective, that which feels pleasurable is not always conducive to wellbeing. Likewise, that which is worth doing does not always feel pleasurable in the present moment.

For instance, volunteering for a cause one feels passionate about may not always feel pleasurable in the hedonic sense. It may involve spending long hours sweating in the sun, getting dirty, or dealing with challenging people or situations. Nonetheless, such pursuits may feed into our eudaimonic happiness as we live in unity with our values.

Interestingly, many traditional philosophers who championed the eudaimonic perspective denounced hedonic views of happiness, declaring them vulgar and overly self-centered. For instance, Aristotle considered hedonic happiness to make humans slavish followers of frivolous desires.

Spiritual conceptualizations of happiness

Today, we can consider a third perspective of happiness which lies in the practice of mindfulness.

Whereas the previous two perspectives consider happiness as something that must be sought, growing schools of thought argue that happiness in the form of contentment or inner peace are primarily available to us at any given moment, regardless of what we are doing.

Consider the following quote from neuroscientist and mindfulness practitioner Sam Harris (2014):

Most of us spend our time seeking happiness and security without acknowledging the underlying purpose of our search. Each of us is looking for a path back to the present: We are trying to find good enough reasons to be satisfied now.

Acknowledging that this is the structure of the game we are playing allows us to play it differently. How we pay attention to the present moment largely determines the character of our experience and, therefore, the quality of our lives.

- Sam Harris, Waking Up, p. 3

Mindfulness-based perspectives on happiness and contentment have traditionally been a feature of eastern religions. These traditions hold the view that there exists a source of psychological wellbeing that is not dependent on gratifying one's desires (hedonia) or pursuing an integrated, self-actualized sense of self (eudaimonia).

Rather, happiness can be achieved by cultivating present-moment awareness and self-transcendence. In other words, these arguments suggest that it is possible to give up the search for happiness and commit oneself to finding contentment in what is happening right now.

A rapidly growing body of psychological and neuroscientific evidence has emerged to support these claims (Hanson, 2009), pointing us toward another avenue for cultivating sustainable happiness.

Overall, happiness is likely to look different for different people. As an individual or practitioner, you may find the most value in considering how all three of these conceptualizations factor into you or your client's life as a first step toward cultivating enduring happiness.

How to Measure Happiness

Now that we have identified a few conceptualizations in which to ground our understanding of happiness, let's consider how we might measure each.

As noted, hedonic conceptualizations of happiness are often measured using assessments of subjective wellbeing (Diener & Lucas, 1999). Subjective wellbeing regards a person's cognitive and affective evaluations of his or her life (Diener, 2000).

You can read more about measures of subjective well-being in our other dedicated articles. In these, we explore several commonly accepted measures of hedonic happiness. These include:

When it comes to assessing eudaimonic happiness, most scholars apply Ryff and Keyes' (1995) multidimensional measure of psychological wellbeing (PWB).

The creators' development of the measure was spurred by their observation that previous studies had treated happiness as synonymous with a balance between positive and negative affect or overall satisfaction with one's life.

They argued that these approaches were too data-driven and not rooted in theory or lived experience. Therefore, these scholars designed and validated a measure based on responses from a representative sample of telephone interviews (Ryff & Keyes, 1995).

This measure assesses eudaimonic happiness according to six sub-dimensions:

1. Autonomy
The ability to resist social pressures, regulate behavior from within, and evaluate oneself based on personal standards.

2. Environmental mastery
Feelings of mastery and competence in a variety of situations, the ability to take advantage of opportunities, and the ability to craft one's environment to suit one's needs and values.

3. Personal growth
Feelings of ongoing development, the realization of one's potential, and observing oneself changing in ways that signify acquired knowledge and increased effectiveness.

4. Positive relations with others
Possessing warm, trusting relationships with others characterized by give and take, and the capacity for intimacy and empathy.

5. Purpose in life
Having goals and a sense of meaning and belief that gives life purpose.

6. Self-acceptance
Possessing a positive attitude toward oneself, including both one's good and bad qualities.

Two versions of this scale are available. The first is the original 42-item measure (Ryff, 1989a; 1989b), and there is also a shortened 18-item version (Ryff & Keyes, 1995).

You can find the items for both of these scales, as well as scale anchors and scoring information on Stanford University's website.

For another useful tool that attempts to reconcile the hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives of happiness, take a look at Hervás and Vázquez's (2013) Pemberton Happiness Index (PHI).

Upon recognizing that existing assessments of happiness measured either hedonic or eudaimonic conceptualizations of happiness, these scholars sought to design and validate a brief, comprehensive measure that assessed both.

The final 21-item scale also has the advantage of capturing both remembered and experienced wellbeing (Kahneman & Riis, 2005).

The former relies on participants' memory and judgment about their overall lives, using items like, "I feel able to solve the majority of my daily problems." In contrast, the latter assesses real-time affective states and feelings about the previous day, using items like, "I learned something interesting."

As for assessing happiness flowing from conceptualizations in mindfulness, many researchers have administered short scales that capture momentary changes in emotions via diary study.

The purpose of a diary study is to assess fluctuations in states (e.g., moods, thoughts, etc.) throughout a given day. This type of study design, sometimes called a within-person design, runs contrary to many studies in psychology, which typically compare differences between people.

As an example, Diener and colleagues (2010) designed the 12-item Scale of Positive and Negative Experience (SPANE), which was designed to be quickly administered and assess the full range of emotions and feelings a person may experience. The scale, therefore, contains both general and specific emotional terms, such as "pleasant" and "sad."

Thanks to its brevity, this scale can easily be administered multiple times a day. Therefore, it has been applied in diary studies assessing fluctuations in mindfulness throughout a day. For instance, Ding and colleagues (2019) used the scale in a study examining the link between state mindfulness and present-moment emotions.

The results indicated that state mindfulness was positively related to positive emotions, like happiness and contentment, and negatively related to negative emotions, like depression and boredom.

These authors also found that present-moment rumination, which involves fixation on negative thoughts, partially mediated this effect. In other words, maintaining a mindful state of awareness appears to block ruminative thought partially, helping us to enjoy more positive emotions throughout any given day.

In sum, it's clear psychologists have done much of the heavy lifting when it comes to developing measures of happiness.

As a practitioner looking to assess your clients' happiness, you should use the information above as a guide to ensure the content validity of your chosen measure. That is, take care to select a scale that has been shown to effectively assess the conceptualization of happiness (e.g., hedonic, eudaimonic) that you apply in your practice.

Neurological measures of happiness

You may have noticed that the measures of happiness discussed so far have all been self-report in nature. That is, each relies on participants providing information about their own subjective sense of their happiness.

But is there a more objective way to measure happiness?

To answer this question, philosophers and psychologists have been turning to neuroscience to better understand what happiness looks like in the brain.

This research has involved the use of sophisticated technologies, such as PET and fMRI scans, and EEG measures of electrical activity in the brain to identify how happiness manifests physiologically. (Murphy, Nimmo-Smith & Lawrence, 2003; Phan, Wager, Taylor & Liberzon, 2002; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau & Barrett, 2012)

We also see a growing wealth of research on how neurotransmitters like dopamine and serotonin play into our day-to-day experience of happiness. We will consider these more closely in the later sections as levers for strengthening our overall happiness.

What is True Happiness?

To recap, we now have three conceptualizations of happiness: hedonia, eudaimonia, and contentment rooted in mindfulness.

We also have two ways to measure each form of happiness: self-reports and various physiological indicators in the brain.

But the question remains: Is there a secret to finding true happiness?

What has hopefully become apparent is that this question is somewhat of a trick question because there is no agreed-upon understanding of what constitutes 'true' happiness.

Think about it.

Imagine racing to your favorite Mexican restaurant and arriving at the ordering counter moments before the restaurant is about to close. The server takes your order, and a few minutes later, you're handed your favorite taco.

What action would a scholar of each 'happiness philosophy' recommend at this moment when you receive your meal?

To a believer of hedonism, happiness would likely represent the moment you bite into the taco and delight in its flavors on your tongue.

To philosophers of the eudaimonic perspective, happiness would more likely involve the ritual of eating with someone you care about, thereby strengthening your connection with that person. It could also mean reaching your potential as a budding cook by learning to create a similarly tasty dish or giving the taco to someone hungry and in need.

Finally, followers of the mindfulness-based perspective would argue that contentment can be found in any or all of the above actions but that it is the quality of your attention, paid to your intentions, sensations, emotions, and interactions with others, that would dictate the happiness you derived from whatever you chose to do with the taco.

In sum, these examples indicate that searching for one 'true' source of happiness may be feeding into a fallacy. Rather, there appear to be several pathways to pursuing different sources of happiness.

The remainder of this article will outline scientifically evidenced pathways to cultivating each of these three forms of happiness.

But before setting off on your search, heed one warning...

The Wrong Way to Search for Happiness

While scientists do not agree on how best to search for happiness, evidence from multiple standpoints highlights one wrong way to search for it, and that is when one does so at the expense of enjoying life right now.

There are at least three critical bodies of theory, thinking, and research that point to why sacrificing life's present joy's chasing happiness is likely to make us paradoxically more miserable.

We have already touched on the first perspective, which is based on the philosophy of mindfulness.

This perspective encourages us to give up the search for happiness entirely, harness our attention, and discover that contentment that can exist in stillness, no matter what we yearn for or have yet to achieve (Harris, 2014).

According to this perspective, by failing to acknowledge that contentment is available to us at any given moment, we will remain dissatisfied. This is because even if we achieve all our goals and get everything we want, some newer, shinier source of happiness will always arise for us to chase.

In other words, the grass will always appear greener somewhere else, meaning it is important to look for happiness wherever we are presently standing.

The second body of thinking lies in empirical findings from the psychology of expectancies and goal-pursuit.

One study in the journal, Emotion (Mauss, Tamir, Anderson & Savino, 2011), found that those who reported valuing happiness highly experienced greater disappointment and ultimately less happiness when circumstances that should have made them happy failed to meet their expectations. In other words, the findings paradoxically suggest that the more we desire happiness, the less likely we are to experience it.

Likewise, there is evidence that placing too much importance on achieving challenging goals in the distant future may also be a recipe for misery.

One study found that students who perceived they made poor progress toward their ambitious life goals tended to exhibit significant depressive symptoms two years later (Salmela-Aro & Nurmi, 1996). Moreover, the study evidenced a downward spiral of depressive symptoms; disappointed students proceeded to derive less enjoyment from their goal pursuits, thereby worsening their symptoms.

Together, these findings highlight the danger of hanging all our hopes for being happy on the realization of future events.

A third reason why chasing happiness may be a mistake relates to a process known as hedonic adaptation (or the hedonic treadmill). Hedonic adaptation is the observed tendency of humans to quickly adapt to a baseline level of happiness, regardless of significant life events (Brickman & Campbell, 1971).

Indeed, it has been shown that even if one wins a major lottery, the happiness that person derives from day-to-day activities in life will eventually return to baseline (Brickman, Coates & Janoff-Bulman, 1978).

This finding highlights that we should not overestimate the effect that significant life events will have on our long-term happiness, serving as yet another reason to call off the search for happiness (Grant, 2013).

In sum, it is important to recognize that happiness is not somewhere off in the distance. There is always something to be gained by pausing to reflect on our reasons to be happy right now, such as by practicing gratitude.

We will explore this and several other strategies to find hedonic, eudaimonic, and present-moment happiness in the remaining sections.

7 Ways to Find Happiness

You now understand a key pitfall to avoid in your search for happiness. Next, let's consider eight different sources of happiness you can leverage today to find joy in your own life.

Finding happiness through neurotransmitters

The first effective way to boost hedonic happiness is to engage in healthy behaviors that directly target neurotransmitters associated with pleasure.

While there are many neurotransmitters that affect our happiness, there are a few key ones worth focusing on: dopamine, serotonin, oxytocin, and endorphins.

Dopamine, otherwise known as the "feel-good" hormone, is a key feature of the brain's reward system and associated with pleasure. Dopamine can be triggered in many ways, including through exercise, a healthy diet, sufficient sleep, listening to music, meditating, and ensuring you get a little sunlight each day (Breuning, 2015; Hansen, Stevens & Coast, 2001).

Next is serotonin. This hormone plays an essential role in stabilizing our mood and can be triggered in many of the same ways as dopamine, such as by getting consistent sleep, exercise, and ensuring you maintain a balanced diet (Breuning, 2015; Roman, Walstra, Luiten & Meerlo, 2005).

Third is oxytocin, which is the hormone associated with love, bonding, and close connection. This hormone is boosted primarily through physical touch and closeness with others, meaning that hugs, cuddling, and even simply spending time with others can significantly increase our happiness (Breuning, 2015; Uvnäs-Moberg, Handlin & Petersson, 2015).

The final neurotransmitters to consider are endorphins, which reduce physical pain and act as your body's natural reward system. To increase this hormone, try engaging in behaviors that are 'good' for you, such as exercising or demonstrating sincere acts of kindness (Breuning, 2015). Studies have also shown that consuming cocoa, such as that in dark chocolate, can trigger endorphins in the brain (Ottley, 2000).

This was just a brief snapshot into the neurochemical bases of happiness.

To learn more and gain a range of practical tips to naturally boost your neurochemical happiness, take a look at Dr. Loretta Breuning's book, Habits of a Happy Brain.

Finding happiness through real goods

A next important step in the search for happiness is to work toward securing the basic necessities for wellbeing and development, or what Aristotle called real goods.

Real goods satisfy the natural needs of our bodies, such as our needs for warmth and sustenance. Examples of such real goods include food, clothing, health, shelter, and safety (Moss, 2012).

We might liken this conceptualization to that of the lower levels of Maslow's hierarchy, which argues that humans must satisfy basic physiological and safety-related needs before pursuing higher-order needs like esteem and self-actualization.

However, real goods also include "goods of the soul," such as love, arts, music, and literature (Joseph, 2019). These goods clearly tap into the higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy, and without them, it may be challenging to achieve eudaimonic happiness.

For instance, without a secure shelter in which to gain adequate rest, we would likely lack the energy to develop a new talent, such as painting. Nor would we gain this talent without exposure to sources of inspiration, such as other artists' work or cultural influences.

In sum, Aristotle's principles regarding real goods highlight two courses of action for improving happiness.

First, take steps toward securing the basics for your health and wellbeing. This means eating well, engaging in regular exercise, securing a stable income, and getting plenty of sleep.

Secondly, immerse yourself in environments that will bring out your best. For example, surround yourself with good company, knowledge, and cultures. In practice, this may mean stepping outside your comfort zone by meeting new people, learning new skills, or visiting new places.

Finding happiness through gratitude

Many studies stemming from the eudaimonic and mindfulness-based perspectives point to the practice of gratitude as a key source of happiness.

Gratitude can be defined as "the appreciation of what is valuable and meaningful to oneself... [representing] a general state of thankfulness and/or appreciation" (Sansone & Sansone, 2010, p. 18).

Two simple ways to practice gratitude include taking a moment at the end of the day to reflect on an occurrence for which you were grateful and sending a thoughtful message of appreciation to someone you care about.

For more ideas, take a look at some of our dedicated articles on this topic:

Finding happiness through flow

Another way to achieve happiness is to take part in activities that bring about the experience of flow, otherwise known as the feeling of "being in the zone."

In an interview, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, the researcher credited with having popularized the concept of flow, explained that those in a state of flow are:

...completely involved in an activity for its own sake. The ego falls away. Time flies. Every action, movement, and thought follows inevitably from the previous one, like playing jazz. Your whole being is involved, and you're using your skills to the utmost.

(Geirland, 1996)

Examples of just a few activities that can generate flow include games, sports, dancing, cooking, gardening, work, driving, and artistic pursuits (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).

Most followers of the eudaimonic perspective would view the flow experience as an indicator of eudaimonia. This is because flow experiences entail an optimal level of challenge, enabling us to develop our talents to their fullest (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).

For more ideas on how to cultivate flow in your life, look at our dedicated articles on the topic:

Finding happiness by living into our values

Several studies have found that making intentional efforts to live in congruence with our values can bolster our happiness or at least buffer against unhappiness (Brown, 2018; Veage et al., 2014).

For clarity, we can define values as "stable, general beliefs about what is desirable" (Feather, 1992, p. 111). Examples of values include fairness, creativity, and freedom.

Understanding our values is critical to achieving eudaimonic happiness because the eudaimonic perspective of happiness encourages us to engage in what is worth doing (Boniwell, 2008). In order to know what is worth doing, we must understand which actions generate valued outcomes, and we can only know this by looking closely at our core values.

Scientists and practitioners have developed a range of useful exercises to help individuals discover their core values. You can learn more about these in several of our other articles:

Once you are clear on your core values, you can take steps to behave in a way that is congruent with these values, helping you live a happier life.

For instance, if you discover that one of your core values is growth, you might then consider the different ways to enact this value in day-to-day life. This could involve registering for a night class or pursuing new intellectual pursuits through reading.

Research also shows that the alignment between our values and professional pursuits plays an important role in determining our overall happiness (Chatman, 1989; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman & Johnson, 2005).

Based on this, we see the emergence of research on job crafting, which involves altering one's work to better align it with our preferences (Zhang & Parker, 2019), and that on hiring practices that facilitate good person-job fit (Sekiguchi, 2004).

Therefore, organizational leaders and HR professionals may wish to dig further into some of these concepts to strengthen the happiness of their staff.

Finding happiness through needs satisfaction

One prominent theory of happiness posits that to be happy, we must engage in behaviors that satisfy our three core human needs (Ryan & Deci, 2008):

the need for competence (feeling effective);

the need for autonomy (the feeling of being the origin of one's behavior); and

the need for psychological relatedness (feeling cared for and understood by other people).

Overall, the satisfaction of these needs represents an avenue for achieving happiness that falls under the eudaimonic conceptualization. This is because need satisfaction promotes long-term wellness rather than just temporary pleasure (Boniwell, 2008).

For a simple assessment to determine your overall satisfaction of core needs within your life, consider completing the 21-item Basic Needs Satisfaction in General Scale (BNSG-S; Gagné, 2003).

Upon completing the assessment, one can calculate their total score for each core need and identify an area for growth as a first step toward fostering greater eudaimonic happiness.

For instance, if you discover that your lowest-scoring need is competence, you might consider whether you can engage in work or hobbies that better utilize your skills, enabling you to derive a greater sense of competence from daily activities.

Again, this was just a brief snapshot into the science of needs satisfaction as a mechanism for achieving happiness. To learn more, look at our dedicated article on self-determination.

Finding happiness through mindfulness

Finally, and at the core of the mindfulness-based approach to finding happiness is the practice of mindfulness itself.

Mindfulness is typically defined as the practice of bringing one's attention to the internal and external experiences occurring in the present moment, such as sensations, sights, thoughts, and emotions (Baer, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 1994).

Mindfulness has existed for centuries and was first popularized among eastern traditions. The practice functions to better understand feelings and motivations, train the capacity for attention and relaxation, and free one's mind from overidentification with negative thoughts and emotions (Fronsdal, 2004; 2006; Harris, 2014).

Often, regular meditation will lie at the core of mindfulness practice. However, other approaches to developing mindfulness can include journaling and yoga.

No matter how you practice mindfulness, the aim is typically for the practice's benefits to spill over into your experience of day-to-day consciousness, enabling you to return to states of mindful awareness throughout your day and not be at the whim of negative thoughts and emotions.

If you're interested in cultivating greater happiness through mindfulness, we have a range of articles throughout our blog to help you learn more:

3 Tips to Form Habits for Happiness

Now that you better understand how to cultivate happiness, let's set some goals and put these strategies into practice.

As with any behavior change, becoming happier requires that one form new, positive habits. For instance, if you wish to target happiness through neurotransmitters like dopamine and serotonin, a first step may be to develop routines and habits associated with good sleep and regular exercise.

Likewise, if you wish to cultivate happiness through regular gratitude practice, commit to setting aside fifteen minutes each evening to fill in a gratitude journal.

Here are three tips related to the science of habit formation to help you develop your new habits for happiness.

First, set a goal to strengthen your happiness using a goal-setting framework. By using a framework to set a happiness goal, you can avoid accidentally setting a goal that is too vague, easily track your progress, and rest assured knowing your goal is realistic and within your reach.

Second, keep in mind that it takes approximately two months for a new behavior to become an automatic habit (Lally, van Jaarsveld, Potts & Wardle, 2010), so do whatever it takes to commit to your goal for at least this long.

That way, you can see if your new practice has enduring benefits and becomes easier with time. For instance, you may find you need to set daily reminders for yourself (e.g., to journal, settle in for bed) for a couple of months until your new habit becomes automatic.

Finally, consider linking up with a friend or small group and commit to becoming happier together. In the same way that groups like AA and Weight Watchers can help their members develop better habits associated with health, you can work with others to stay accountable and get support if you face any hurdles in your pursuit of greater happiness.

A Take-Home Message

The aim of cultivating human happiness is at the core of positive psychology.

It should, therefore, be no surprise that we have linked to many of our other posts exploring different approaches to fostering happiness throughout our discussion.

Now that you hopefully have a better sense of what you're searching for when thinking about your own happiness, as well as pitfalls to avoid, we encourage you to select one area for growth. Once you've chosen an area, follow the links to read more and commit to developing one new habit for happiness.

By doing this, you're letting go of the false conception of 'true' happiness as something elusive and far off in the future. Instead, you'll be acknowledging happiness as something that can be achieved little-by-little, right now.

And if you ever find yourself getting lost in your search for happiness, consider reflecting on this famous quote:

Happiness is a journey, not a destination; happiness is to be found along the way not at the end of the road, for then the journey is over and it's too late. The time for happiness is today not tomorrow.

Paul H. Dunn

We hope you enjoyed reading this article. Don't forget to download our three Positive Psychology Exercises for free.

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How to Find True Happiness (According to Psychology)

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What does it mean to be truly happy? There are many philosophical schools of thought regarding the concept of happiness and its cultivation. For instance, the pursuit of enduring happiness is at the core of many mindfulness practices, which often emphasize gratitude and seeking contentment in the present moment.

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We review the idea of Positive & Negative Affect in terms of the Positive & Negative Affect Schedule or PANAS as both states affect our lives & how we live.

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6 Happiness Tests & Scales to Measure Happiness

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To measure happiness has led to the creation of happiness tests and scales.

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How do graphs using happiness as a factor measure happiness?

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How do graphs using happiness as a factor measure happiness?

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The science behind mindfulness as a tool for happiness | Hedy Kober

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The psychology of self-motivation | Scott Geller | TEDxVirginiaTech

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Science-Based Tools for Increasing Happiness | Huberman Lab Podcast #98

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We all want to feel happy, and each one of us has different ways of getting there. Here are 10 steps you can take to increase your joie de vivre and bring more happiness into your life:

1. Be with others who make you smile. Studies show that we are happiest when we are around those who are also happy. Stick with those who are joyful and let rub off on you.

2. Hold on to your values. What you find true, what you know is fair, and what you believe in are all values. Over time, the more you honor them, the better you will feel about yourself and those you love.

3. Accept the good. Look at your life and take stock of what's working, and don't push away something just because it isn't perfect. When good things happen, even the very little ones, let them in.

4. Imagine the best. Don't be afraid to look at what you really want and see yourself getting it. Many people avoid this process because they don't want to be disappointed if things don't work out. The truth is that imagining getting what you want is a big part of achieving it.

5. Do things you love. Maybe you can't skydive every day or take vacations every season, but as long as you get to do the things you love every once in a while, you will find greater happiness.

6. Find purpose. Those who believe they are contributing to the well-being of humanity tend to feel better about their lives. Most people want to be part of something greater than they are, simply because it's fulfilling.

7. Listen to your heart. You are the only one who knows what fills you up. Your family and friends may think you'd be great at something that really doesn't float your boat. It can be complicated following your bliss. Just be smart, and keep your day job for the time being.

8. Push yourself, not others. It's easy to feel that someone else is responsible for your fulfillment, but the reality is that it is really your charge. Once you realize that, you have the power to get where you want to go. Stop blaming others or the world, and you'll find your answers much sooner.

9. Be open to change. Even if it doesn't feel good, change is the one thing you can count on. Change will happen, so make contingency plans and emotionally shore yourself up for the experience.

10. Bask in the simple pleasures. Those who love you, treasured memories, silly jokes, warm days, and starry nights-these are the ties that bind and the gifts that keep on giving.

Happiness and fulfillment are within your grasp, but sometimes just out of reach. Understanding what works best for you is the first step in finding more of them.

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We all want to feel happy, and each one of us has different ways of getting there. Here are 10 steps you can take to increase your joie de vivre and bring more happiness into your life: Be with others who make you smile.

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Are you on a quest to find happiness? While happiness might feel elusive or out of your reach at times, that doesn't make it an impossible journey or goal to achieve. On the contrary, happiness could be waiting for you around the next corner if you just hang on.

Or, it might be even simpler than that. Happiness might have been with you all along-you just may not have taken the time to realize it was much less complicated than you once believed. You probably know it's not about driving the newest car or having the latest gadget. But, what is it that really drives happiness? Let's consider four studies from around the world to answer that question.

Always Be Improving

A 2007 study reporting on data from the British Household Panel Survey revealed an interesting set of findings of the roots of happiness.﻿﻿

What is it that makes us happy: getting what we want or having what we want? Paradoxically, it seems that it's not the state of "being married" that makes us the happiest, but rather dynamic events such as "starting a new relationship."

In the same way, "getting a new job" had a greater effect on happiness than employment status. "Becoming pregnant" had a greater effect on happiness than "being a parent." Similarly, events such as "starting a new course," "passing an exam," or "buying a new house" were all also high on the happiness scale.

In contrast, events with a low relation to happiness included the end of a relationship, losing a job, and losing a parent. What does all this mean, and what is making people in Britain happy? Let's take a moment to figure this out.

Positive dynamic events seem to be key rather than static situations. While this may all sound a little superficial, it makes sense to some degree if you consider happiness to be a "momentary" state.

What can we glean from this study? If you want to pursue happiness in your life or stay positive, realize that there is always the possibility that some happy event is waiting around the corner for you. And if you don't feel like waiting-go out and make something happy happen. As the quote from Abraham Lincoln goes, "The best way to predict your future is to create it."

Surround Yourself With Happy People

A 2008 study reported on data from the Framingham Heart Study conducted in Framingham, Massachusetts followed 4,739 people from 1983 to 2003 to answer one interesting question: does our happiness depend on the happiness levels of the people around us?﻿﻿

Startlingly, the results of the study showed that to be precisely the case.

What's more, the analysis revealed that this effect was the result of happiness spreading, not just an artifact of happy people tending to hang out with one another.

According to this study, if you have a friend who lives within a mile of you and that friend becomes happy, the odds of you also becoming happy increase by about 25%. The same was true for spouses (up to 16% improvement), siblings living within a mile (up to 28%), and next-door neighbors (up to 70%). Interestingly, the happiness of coworkers was shown to have no effect on the happiness of those around them.

What does all this mean? Surround yourself with happy people as much as possible, because it's very likely that their happiness will spread to you.

Recall Positive Memories

In an Australian study of over 300 young adults, it was shown that those who recalled memories about problem-solving (a time when you successfully managed a challenge) or about identity (something that shaped you to become the person you are today) showed decreased negative emotions and increased positive emotions, respectively.﻿﻿

These findings suggest that simply thinking back to a time in your life when you were overcoming a challenge or to a time when you went through a significant life experience that changed you for the better could be effective in boosting your mood, and therefore, your happiness.

Collective Goals or Self-Transcendence

A 2019 study out of South Korea using data from the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) showed that respondents prioritizing spirituality were the most likely to be happy, followed by those who valued social relationships (friends, family, neighbors).﻿﻿

These findings suggest that the path to happiness in South Korea is not about all that glitters with gold-rather, going after goals related to collectivism or self-transcendence may be most important to boosting and preserving happiness. These results are consistent with those found in the field of positive psychology.

A Word From Verywell

It's clear that what makes you happy may depend on where you live in the world (although these are limited studies that looked at different concepts). The British valued positive change, Americans grew happy when those around them were happy, Australians became happy when remembering positive memories, and South Koreans were happiest when engaged in collectivistic and spiritual pursuits.

The common thread, however, is that happiness is ever-changing and your happiness meter can always be boosted. If you truly want to pursue happiness, surround yourself with positivity and see beyond your present circumstances to the bigger picture, both in terms of people and your place in the greater universe.

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How to Pursue More Happiness and Add Positivity in Your Life

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Are you on a quest to find happiness? While happiness might feel elusive or out of your reach at times, that doesn't make it an impossible journey or goal to achieve. On the contrary, happiness could be waiting for you around the next corner if you just hang on.

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Live life mindfully Ever felt there must be more to life? Well good news - there can be - as long as we learn to be more mindful and aware. Being mindful can be a firm foundation for wellbeing. Studies show the practice of mindfulness can reduce stress levels, help us manage our emotions and react…

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How does mindfulness play into the idea of happiness?

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How does mindfulness play into the idea of happiness?

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What makes for a happy life? Philosophers have pondered this question for millennia, coming up with different theories and recommendations for people to follow, but not necessarily having any hard evidence to prove their ideas.

That's what inspired the long-running Harvard Study of Adult Development.

Starting in the 1930s, researchers tracked men from different neighborhoods in the Boston area over several decades, asking them to provide regular updates on their lives, including their current health, income, employment, and marital status. The men also filled out questionnaires and participated in interviews where they revealed their fears, hopes, disappointments, accomplishments, regrets, life satisfaction, and much more. This resulted in rich, in-depth data that researchers could use to assess how life circumstances, experiences, and attitudes affect well-being.

Findings from the study have been parsed over the years as patterns emerged. But now they've been put together into a book, The Good Life: Lessons From the World's Longest Scientific Study of Happiness. Written by the study's current director and associate director, Robert Waldinger and Marc Schulz, the book not only reveals what factors lead to a "good life," but also why it's never too late to nudge our own lives in a happier, healthier direction.

The keys to well-being

It turns out the key to a long, healthy life isn't necessarily obvious. "Contrary to what many people think, it's not career achievement, or exercise, or a healthy diet," write the authors-though those things matter, too, they add. Instead, "one thing continuously demonstrates its broad and enduring importance: Good relationships."

How can the authors say this so definitively? After all, the study began with only white males in a select geographic area as participants (it's since been broadened to include others). On the other hand, the authors can point to many other longitudinal studies representing more diverse groups, all of which conclude the same thing: that human connections are important for healthy development and longevity.

"People who are more connected to family, to friends, and to community, are happier and physically healthier than people who are less well connected," they write.

This is both good news and bad. It suggests a practical way to improve our lives-by nurturing our relationships, no matter how bad things are. But loneliness and disconnection seem to be rampant in society-in part, the authors suggest, because of a culture that pushes us toward going it alone and overachieving at the expense of our relationships. If we don't understand what makes us happy, they argue, we may end up choosing unwisely-for example, pursuing high-salaried jobs that take us away from our communities.

Their book acts as a kind of course corrective, countering myths about the good life. They support their assertions with scientific findings from many sources, but also include life stories from the people involved in the Harvard study, sprinkled throughout the book. We learn that some men started out in life advantaged and acquired college degrees or great jobs, but they ended up lonely or dying prematurely. Meanwhile, other participants who'd faced more headwinds early in life fared well, finding a job that brought them meaning or a family life that helped them weather ups and downs.

People's lives don't always play out the same, of course. Many circumstances make it easier or harder to preserve our well-being-including whether we've suffered from the early loss of a parent, discrimination, child abuse, poverty, or illness. For example, Black Americans are more likely to die younger than white Americans because of the stresses of racism and poorer access to good health care. Yet having positive social ties still makes a difference in survival rates, say the authors, suggesting that relationships make us more resilient in the face of life's hardships.

"There are cultural practices and systemic factors causing significant amounts of inequity and emotional pain. But the capacity of relationships to affect our well-being and health is universal," they write.

How to cultivate better relationships

Given the importance of relationships in a good life, the authors spend much of the book outlining how we can take our social connections in a more positive direction-whether that's at home, with friends, at work, or in our communities. Here are some tips they offer.

Take stock by looking inward. The busyness of life can sometimes keep us from assessing the health of our relationships, to our detriment. But taking time to consider our current state of affairs can bring insights. Many of the participants in the Harvard study benefitted from being interviewed at regular intervals, because it helped them realize where they'd neglected their relationships and consider reaching out.

To help you take stock of your own social life, the authors provide a chart where you can make a list of the people in your life while noting the kind of relationship you have with them, the supports they provide, and how often you spend time together. Filling out the chart may clarify what relationships matter most and help you make decisions accordingly. For example, you might find you want to spend more time with the person who makes you laugh and less time with the person who drains you.

Consider how your needs may differ at different stages of life. For example, young adults may benefit from a wide variety of less intimate relationships, which can help them find work or romantic partnerships. The elderly may not need so many friends, but require a few intimates to keep them happy. While some studies find that happiness takes a nosedive in midlife, the Harvard study found that "the happiest and most satisfied adults [in midlife] were those who managed to turn the question 'What can I do for myself?' into 'What can I do for the world beyond me?'" Knowing where you are in life may guide you in how to develop your social network-whether that's zeroing in on family ties or volunteering in your community.

Prioritize your relationships and be present. Many of us think we don't have enough hours in the day to give to developing our relationships. But even when we're not on duty at work or at home, we are probably missing opportunities to spend quality time with the people who matter to our happiness. Too many of us spend our spare moments zoning out with social media or barely noticing who and what is around us, argue the authors. Taking time to bring your full attention to other people when you're with them is a gift to them and to yourself that can build more closeness. For example, having a close friend at work brings all kinds of benefits.

To be present in relationships, the authors suggest showing curiosity (even if you think you know someone well), listening carefully when people talk, expressing interest, and showing affection (when appropriate), all of which can make even short interactions with others more meaningful-and beneficial to all.

When difficulties arise, be reflective, not reflexive. When conflicts arise in relationships-or even when we're just overwhelmed with other challenges in life-we may go on autopilot and withdraw from others or lash out at them. Neither of these are ideal ways to manage stress or anger, as they aren't focused on preserving closeness or working through difficulty. Trying to suppress or avoid emotions is rarely a good strategy for health and well-being and can backfire when it comes to preserving relationships.

The authors suggest that, instead, we take a moment to use emotion regulation strategies to help us deal with anger, frustration, or stress before engaging in conflict resolution with someone else. "The key is to try to slow things down where you can, zoom in, and move from a fully automatic response to a more considered and purposeful response that aligns with who you are and what you are seeking to accomplish," they write. This can help you be less reactive and give you a better chance of working through issues-whether relationship issues or personal ones.

Let people know how much they matter to you. The book includes many more ideas of how to preserve or enhance relationships, offering hope that change can happen at any stage of life when we use the right tools. One of those tools is expressing gratitude-something we may forget to do in our everyday lives. While many passages in the book inspired me to want to act in support of my own relationships, letting people know they mattered to me was the most inspiring-and the one I took to heart:

"Think about someone, just one person, who is important to you. . .Think about what they mean to you, what they have done for you in your life. Where would you be without them? Who would you be? Now think about what you would thank them for if you thought you would never see them again. And at this moment-right now-turn to them. Call them. Tell them."

Greater Good wants to know: Do you think this article will influence your opinions or behavior?

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What the Longest Happiness Study Reveals About Finding Fulfillment

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A new book summarizes the findings from a famous happiness study that began in the 1930s-and explains how you can be happier.

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The Harvard Study of Adult Development has established a strong correlation between deep relationships and well-being. The question is, how does a person nurture those deep relationships?

This article was featured in One Story to Read Today, a newsletter in which our editors recommend a single must-read from The Atlantic, Monday through Friday. Sign up for it here.
Turn your mind for a moment to a friend or family member you cherish but don't spend as much time with as you would like. This needn't be your most significant relationship, just someone who makes you feel energized when you're with them, and whom you'd like to see more regularly.

How often do you see that person? Every day? Once a month? Once a year? Do the math and project how many hours annually you spend with them. Write this number down and hang on to it.

For us, Bob and Marc, though we work closely together and meet every week by phone or video call, we see each other in person for only a total of about two days (48 hours) every year.

How does this add up for the coming years? Bob is 71 years old. Marc is 60. Let's be (very) generous and say we will both be around to celebrate Bob's 100th birthday. At two days a year for 29 years, that's 58 days that we have left to spend together in our lifetimes.

Fifty-eight out of 10,585 days.

Of course, this is assuming a lot of good fortune, and the real number is almost certainly going to be lower.

Since 1938, the Harvard Study of Adult Development has been investigating what makes people flourish. After starting with 724 participants-boys from disadvantaged and troubled families in Boston, and Harvard undergraduates-the study incorporated the spouses of the original men and, more recently, more than 1,300 descendants of the initial group. Researchers periodically interview participants, ask them to fill out questionnaires, and collect information about their physical health. As the study's director (Bob) and associate director (Marc), we've been able to watch participants fall in and out of relationships, find success and failure at their jobs, become mothers and fathers. It's the longest in-depth longitudinal study on human life ever done, and it's brought us to a simple and profound conclusion: Good relationships lead to health and happiness. The trick is that those relationships must be nurtured.
From the June 2009 issue: What makes us happy?
We don't always put our relationships first. Consider the fact that the average American in 2018 spent 11 hours every day on solitary activities such as watching television and listening to the radio. Spending 58 days over 29 years with a friend is infinitesimal compared with the 4,851 days that Americans will spend interacting with media during that same time period. Distractions are hard to avoid.

Thinking about these numbers can help us put our own relationships in perspective. Try figuring out how much time you spend with a good friend or family member. We don't have to spend every hour with our friends, and some relationships work because they're exercised sparingly. But nearly all of us have people in our lives whom we'd like to see more. Are you spending time with the people you most care about? Is there a relationship in your life that would benefit both of you if you could spend more time together? Many of these are untapped resources, waiting for us to put them to use. And, enriching these relationships can in turn nourish our minds and bodies.

You don't have to examine scientific findings to recognize that relationships affect you physically. All you have to do is notice the invigoration you feel when you believe that someone has really understood you during a good conversation, or the tension and distress you feel after an argument, or how little sleep you get during a period of romantic strife.

In this sense, having healthy, fulfilling relationships is its own kind of fitness-social fitness-and like physical fitness, it takes work to maintain. Unlike stepping on the scale, taking a quick look in the mirror, or getting readouts for blood pressure and cholesterol, assessing our social fitness requires a bit more sustained self-reflection. It requires stepping back from the crush of modern life, taking stock of our relationships, and being honest with ourselves about where we're devoting our time and whether we are tending to the connections that help us thrive. Finding the time for this type of reflection can be hard, and sometimes it's uncomfortable. But it can yield enormous benefits.

Many of our Harvard Study participants have told us that filling out questionnaires every two years and being interviewed regularly have given them a welcome perspective on their life and relationships. We ask them to really think about themselves and the people they love, and that process of self-reflection helps some of them.
Read: 10 practical ways to improve happiness
This is a practice that could help anyone. Looking in the mirror and thinking honestly about where your life stands is a first step in trying to live a good life. Noticing where you are can help put into relief where you would like to be. Having some reservations about this kind of self-reflection is understandable. Our study participants were not always keen on filling out our questionnaires, or eager to consider the larger picture of their life. Some would skip difficult questions or leave entire pages blank, and some would just not return certain surveys. Some even wrote comments in the margins of their questionnaires about what they thought of our requests. "What kinds of questions are these!?" is a response we received occasionally, often from participants who preferred not to think about difficulties in their life. The experiences of the people who skipped questions or entire questionnaires were also important, though-they were just as crucial in understanding adult development as the experiences of people eager to share. A lot of useful data and gems of experience were buried in the shadowed corners of their lives. We just had to go through a little extra effort to excavate them.

One of these people was a man we'll call Sterling Ainsley. (We are using a pseudonym to protect his confidentiality as a study participant.)

Sterling Ainsley was a hopeful guy. He graduated from Harvard in the 1940s and then served in World War II. After he left the service, he got a job as a scientist and retired in his 60s. When asked to describe his philosophy for getting through hard times, he said, "You try not to let life get to you. You remember your victories and take a positive attitude."

The year was 1986. George Vaillant, the then-director of the study, was on a long interview trek, driving through the Rocky Mountains to visit the study's participants who lived in Colorado, Utah, Idaho, and Montana. Sterling had not returned the most recent survey, and there was some catching up to do. He met Vaillant at a hotel to give him a ride to the diner where Sterling wanted to do his scheduled interview. When Vaillant buckled himself into the passenger seat of Sterling's car, the seat belt left a stripe of dust across his chest. "I was left to wonder," he wrote, "the last time somebody had used it."

Sterling was technically married, but his wife lived far away, and they hadn't slept in the same room in years. They spoke only every few months.
Read: The six forces that fuel friendship
When asked why they had not gotten a divorce, he said, "I wouldn't want to do that to the children," even though his kids were grown and had children of their own. Sterling was proud of his kids and beamed when he spoke of them, saying they were the most important thing in his life. But he rarely saw them and seemed to prefer to keep his relationships with them thriving mostly in his imagination. Vaillant noted that Sterling seemed to be using optimism to push away some of his fears and avoid challenges in his life. Putting a positive spin on every matter and then pushing it out of his mind made it possible for him to believe that nothing was wrong, he was fine, he was happy, his kids didn't need him.

He didn't travel to see his son's new home abroad, because he didn't "want to be a burden"-even though he'd been learning a new language to prepare for the trip. He had another child who lived closer, but he hadn't visited in more than a year. He didn't have a relationship with his grandchildren, and he wasn't in contact with any friends.

When asked about his older sister, Sterling seemed startled. "My sister?" he said.

Yes, the sister he had told the study so much about when he was younger.

Sterling thought about it for a long time, and then told Vaillant that it must have been decades since he last spoke with her. A frightened expression came over his face. "Would she still be living?" he said.

Sterling tried not to think about his relationships, and he was even less inclined to talk about them. This is a common experience. We don't always know why we do things or why we don't do things, and we may not understand what is holding us at a distance from the people in our life. Taking some time to look in the mirror can help. Sometimes there are needs inside of us that are looking for a voice, a way to get out. They might be things that we have never seen or articulated to ourselves.

This seemed to be the case with Sterling. Asked how he spent his evenings, he said he spent time with an elderly woman who lived in a nearby trailer. Each night he would walk over, and they'd watch TV and talk. Eventually she would fall asleep, and he would help her into bed and wash her dishes and close the shades before walking home. She was the closest thing he had to a confidant.

"I don't know what I'll do if she dies," he said.

Listen to Robert Waldinger in conversation with Arthur Brooks and Rebecca Rashid on "How to Build a Happy Life":

Loneliness has a physical effect on the body. It can render people more sensitive to pain, suppress their immune system, diminish brain function, and disrupt sleep, which in turn can make an already lonely person even more tired and irritable. Research has found that, for older adults, loneliness is far more dangerous than obesity. Ongoing loneliness raises a person's odds of death by 26 percent in any given year. A study in the U.K., the Environmental Risk (E-Risk) Longitudinal Twin Study, recently reported on the connections between loneliness and poorer health and self-care in young adults. This ongoing study includes more than 2,200 people born in England and Wales in 1994 and 1995. When they were 18, the researchers asked them how lonely they were. Those who reported being lonelier had a greater chance of facing mental-health issues, partaking in unsafe physical-health behaviors, and coping with stress in negative ways. Add to this the fact that a tide of loneliness is flooding through modern societies, and we have a serious problem. Recent stats should make us take notice.

In a study conducted online that sampled 55,000 respondents from across the world, one out of every three people of all ages reported that they often feel lonely. Among these, the loneliest group were 16-to-24-year-olds, 40 percent of whom reported feeling lonely "often or very often." In the U.K., the economic cost of this loneliness-because lonely people are less productive and more prone to employment turnover-is estimated at more than £2.5 billion (about $3.1 billion) annually and helped lead to the establishment of a U.K. Ministry of Loneliness.
Read: Why do we look down on lonely people?
In Japan, 32 percent of adults expected to feel lonely most of the time during 2020. In the United States, a 2019 study suggested that three out of four adults felt moderate to high levels of loneliness. As of this writing, the long-term effects of the coronavirus pandemic, which separated us from one another on a massive scale and left many feeling more isolated than ever, are still being studied.

Alleviating this epidemic of loneliness is difficult because what makes one person feel lonely might have no effect on someone else. We can't rely entirely on easily observed indicators such as whether or not one lives alone, because loneliness is a subjective experience. One person might have a significant other and too many friends to count and yet feel lonely, while another person might live alone and have a few close contacts and yet feel very connected. The objective facts of a person's life are not enough to explain why someone is lonely. Regardless of your race or class or gender, the feeling resides in the difference between the kind of social contact you want and the social contact you actually have.

It never hurts-especially if you've been feeling low-to take a minute to reflect on how your relationships are faring and what you wish could be different about them. If you're the scheduling type, you could make it a regular thing; perhaps every year on New Year's Day or the morning of your birthday, take a few moments to draw up your current social universe, and consider what you're receiving, what you're giving, and where you would like to be in another year. You could keep your chart or relationships assessment in a special place, so you know where to look the next time you want to peek at it to see how things have changed.

If nothing else, doing this reminds us of what's most important. Repeatedly, when the participants in our study reached old age, they would make a point to say that what they treasured most were their relationships. Sterling Ainsley himself made that point. He loved his older sister deeply-but he lost touch with her. Some of his fondest memories were of his friends-whom he never contacted. There was nothing he cared more about than his children-whom he rarely saw. From the outside it might look like he didn't care. That was not the case. Sterling was quite emotional in his recounting of his most cherished relationships, and his reluctance to answer certain study questions was clearly connected to the pain that keeping his distance had caused him over the years. Sterling never sat down to really think about how he might conduct his relationships or what he might do to properly care for the people he loved most.

Sterling's life reminds us of the fragility of our connections, and it echoes the lessons of science: Relationships keep us happier and healthier throughout our life spans. We neglect our connections with others at our peril. Investing in our social fitness is possible each day, each week of our lives. Even small investments today in our relationships with others can create long-term ripples of well-being.
This article is adapted from Robert Waldinger and Marc Schulz's new book, The Good Life: Lessons From the World's Longest Scientific Study of Happiness. When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

​When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

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long-term ripples of well-being.this article

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enormous benefits.many of our harvard study participants

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What the Longest Study on Human Happiness Found Is the Key to a Good Life

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The Harvard Study of Adult Development has established a strong correlation between deep relationships and well-being. The question is, how does a person nurture those deep relationships?

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There are roughly two philosophical literatures on "happiness," each corresponding to a different sense of the term. One uses 'happiness' as a value term, roughly synonymous with well-being or flourishing. The other body of work uses the word as a purely descriptive psychological term, akin to 'depression' or 'tranquility'. An important project in the philosophy of happiness is simply getting clear on what various writers are talking about: what are the important meanings of the term and how do they connect? While the "well-being" sense of happiness receives significant attention in the contemporary literature on well-being, the psychological notion is undergoing a revival as a major focus of philosophical inquiry, following on recent developments in the science of happiness. This entry focuses on the psychological sense of happiness (for the well-being notion, see the entry on well-being). The main accounts of happiness in this sense are hedonism, the life satisfaction theory, and the emotional state theory. Leaving verbal questions behind, we find that happiness in the psychological sense has always been an important concern of philosophers. Yet the significance of happiness for a good life has been hotly disputed in recent decades. Further questions of contemporary interest concern the relation between the philosophy and science of happiness, as well as the role of happiness in social and political decision-making.

What is happiness? This question has no straightforward answer, because the meaning of the question itself is unclear. What exactly is being asked? Perhaps you want to know what the word 'happiness' means. In that case your inquiry is linguistic. Chances are you had something more interesting in mind: perhaps you want to know about the thing, happiness, itself. Is it pleasure, a life of prosperity, something else? Yet we can't answer that question until we have some notion of what we mean by the word.

Philosophers who write about "happiness" typically take their subject matter to be either of two things, each corresponding to a different sense of the term:

1. A state of mind

2. A life that goes well for the person leading it

In the first case our concern is simply a psychological matter. Just as inquiry about pleasure or depression fundamentally concerns questions of psychology, inquiry about happiness in this sense-call it the (long-term) "psychological sense"-is fundamentally the study of certain mental states. What is this state of mind we call happiness? Typical answers to this question include life satisfaction, pleasure, or a positive emotional condition.

Having answered that question, a further question arises: how valuable is this mental state? Since 'happiness' in this sense is just a psychological term, you could intelligibly say that happiness isn't valuable at all. Perhaps you are a high-achieving intellectual who thinks that only ignoramuses can be happy. On this sort of view, happy people are to be pitied, not envied. The present article will center on happiness in the psychological sense.

In the second case, our subject matter is a kind of value, namely what philosophers nowadays tend to call prudential value-or, more commonly, well-being, welfare, utility or flourishing. (For further discussion, see the entry on well-being. Whether these terms are really equivalent remains a matter of dispute, but this article will usually treat them as interchangeable.) "Happiness" in this sense concerns what benefits a person, is good for her, makes her better off, serves her interests, or is desirable for her for her sake. To be high in well-being is to be faring well, doing well, fortunate, or in an enviable condition. Ill-being, or doing badly, may call for sympathy or pity, whereas we envy or rejoice in the good fortune of others, and feel gratitude for our own. Being good for someone differs from simply being good, period: perhaps it is always good, period, for you to be honest; yet it may not always be good for you, as when it entails self-sacrifice. Not coincidentally, the word 'happiness' derives from the term for good fortune, or "good hap," and indeed the terms used to translate it in other languages often have similar roots. In this sense of the term-call it the "well-being sense"-happiness refers to a life of well-being or flourishing: a life that goes well for you.

Theories of well-being-and hence of "happiness" in the well-being sense-come in three basic flavors, according to the best-known taxonomy (Parfit 1984): hedonism, desire theories, and objective list theories. Whereas hedonists identify well-being roughly with experiences of pleasure, desire theorists equate it with the satisfaction of one's desires- actually getting what you want, versus merely having certain experiences. Both hedonism and desire theories are in some sense subjectivist, since they ground well-being in the individual's subjective states. Objective list theorists, by contrast, think some things benefit us independently of our attitudes or feelings: there are objective prudential goods. Aristotelians are the best-known example: they take well-being ( eudaimonia) to consist in a life of virtuous activity-or more broadly, the fulfillment of our human capacities. A passive but contented couch potato may be getting what he wants, and he may enjoy it. But he would not, on Aristotelian and other objective list theories, count as doing well, or leading a happy life.

Now we can sharpen the initial question somewhat: when you ask what happiness is, are you asking what sort of life benefits a person? If so, then your question concerns matters of value, namely what is good for people-the sort of thing that ethical theorists are trained to address. Alternatively, perhaps you simply want to know about the nature of a certain state of mind-happiness in the psychological sense. In this case, some sort of psychological inquiry will be needed, either philosophical or scientific. (Laypersons often have neither sort of question in mind, but are really asking about the sources of happiness. Thus it might be claimed, say, that "happiness is being with good friends." This is not a view about the nature or definition of happiness, but rather a theory about the sorts of things that tend to make us happy. It leaves unanswered, or takes for granted, the question of just what happiness is, such that friends are a good source of it.)

In short, philosophical "theories of happiness" can be about either of at least two different things: well-being, or a state of mind. Accordingly, there are essentially two bodies of philosophical literature about "happiness" and two sets of debates about its nature, though writers often fail to distinguish them. Such failures have generated much confusion, sometimes yielding bogus disagreements that prove to be merely verbal. For instance, some psychologists identify "happiness" with attitudes of life satisfaction while remaining neutral on questions of value, or whether Bentham, Mill, Aristotle, or any other thinker about the good life was correct. Such researchers employ the term in the psychological sense. Yet it is sometimes objected against such claims that life satisfaction cannot suffice for "happiness" because other things, like achievement or knowledge, matter for human well-being. The objectors are confused: their opponents have made no claims about well-being at all, and the two "sides," as it were, are simply using 'happiness' to talk about different things. One might just as sensibly object to an economist's tract on "banks" that it has nothing to say about rivers and streams.

Which use of 'happiness' corresponds to the true meaning of the term in contemporary English? Arguably, both. The well-being usage clearly dominates in the historical literature through at least the early modern era, for instance in translations of the ancient Greeks' ' eudaimonia' or the Latin ' beatitudo', though this translation has long been a source of controversy. Jefferson's famous reference to "the pursuit of happiness" probably employed the well-being sense. Even later writers such as Mill may have used the term in its well-being sense, though it is often difficult to tell since well-being itself is often taken to consist in mental states like pleasure. In ordinary usage, the abstract noun 'happiness' often invites a well-being reading. And the locution 'happy life ' may not naturally take a psychological interpretation, for the simple reason that lives aren't normally regarded as psychological entities.

Contrast this with the very different meaning that seems to attach to talk of " being happy." Here it is much less clear that we are talking about a property of a person's life; it seems rather to be a property of the person herself. To be happy, it seems, is just to be in a certain sort of psychological state or condition. Similarly when we say that so-and-so "is happy" (as opposed to saying that he is leading a happy life). This psychological usage, arguably, predominates in the current vernacular. Researchers engaged in the self-described "science of happiness" usually do not take themselves to be making value judgments when they proclaim individuals in their studies to be happy. Nor, when asserting that a life satisfaction study shows Utahans to be happier than New Yorkers, are they committing themselves to the tendentious claim that Utahans are better off. (If they are, then the psychology journals that are publishing this research may need to revise their peer-review protocols to include ethicists among their referees.) And the many recent popular books on happiness, as well as innumerable media accounts of research on happiness, nearly all appear to take it for granted that they are talking about nothing more than a psychological condition.

Henceforth 'happiness' will be used in the long-term psychological sense, unless otherwise specified. Note, however, that a number of important books and other works on "happiness" in recent decades have employed the well-being sense of the term. Books of this sort appear to include Almeder 2000, Annas 1993, 2011, Bloomfield 2014, Cahn and Vitrano 2015, Kenny and Kenny 2006, McMahon 2005, McPherson 2020, Noddings 2003, Russell 2013, White 2006, and Vitrano 2014, though again it is not always clear how a given author uses the term. For discussion of the well-being notion, see the entry on well-being.

Philosophers have most commonly distinguished two accounts of happiness: hedonism, and the life satisfaction theory. Hedonists identify happiness with the individual's balance of pleasant over unpleasant experience, in the same way that welfare hedonists do. The difference is that the hedonist about happiness need not accept the stronger doctrine of welfare hedonism; this emerges clearly in arguments against the classical Utilitarian focus on happiness as the aim of social choice. Such arguments tend to grant the identification of happiness with pleasure, but challenge the idea that this should be our primary or sole concern, and often as well the idea that happiness is all that matters for well-being.

A third theory, the emotional state view, departs from hedonism in a different way: instead of identifying happiness with pleasant experience, it identifies happiness with an agent's emotional condition as a whole, of what is often called "emotional well-being." This includes nonexperiential aspects of emotions and moods (or perhaps just moods), and excludes pleasures that don't directly involve the individual's emotional state. It might also include a person's propensity for experiencing various moods, which can vary over time, though several authors have argued against this suggestion (e.g., Hill 2007, Klausen 2015, Rossi 2018). Happiness on such a view is more nearly the opposite of depression or anxiety-a broad psychological condition-whereas hedonistic happiness is simply opposed to unpleasantness. For example, a deeply distressed individual might distract herself enough with constant activity to maintain a mostly pleasant existence-broken only by tearful breakdowns during the odd quiet moment-thus perhaps counting as happy on a hedonistic but not emotional state view. The states involved in happiness, on an emotional state view, can range widely, far more so that the ordinary notion of mood or emotion. On one proposal, happiness involves three broad categories of affective state, including "endorsement" states like joy versus sadness, "engagement" states like flow or a sense of vitality, and "attunement" states like tranquility, emotional expansiveness versus compression, and confidence. Given the departures from commonsensical notions of being in a "good mood," happiness is characterized in this proposal as "psychic affirmation," or "psychic flourishing" in pronounced forms.

A fourth family of views, hybrid theories, attempts an irenic solution to our diverse intuitions about happiness: identify happiness with both life satisfaction and pleasure or emotional state, perhaps along with other states such as domain satisfactions. The most obvious candidate here is subjective well-being, which is typically defined as a compound of life satisfaction, domain satisfactions, and positive and negative affect. (Researchers often seem to identify happiness with subjective well-being, sometimes with life satisfaction, and perhaps most commonly with emotional or hedonic state.) The chief appeal of hybrid theories is their inclusiveness: all the components of subjective well-being seem important, and there is probably no component of subjective well-being that does not at times get included in "happiness" in ordinary usage.

How do we determine which theory is correct? Traditional philosophical methods of conceptual or linguistic analysis can give us some guidance, indicating that some accounts offer a better fit with the ordinary concept of happiness. Thus it has been argued that hedonism is false to the concept of happiness as we know it; the intuitions taken to support hedonism point instead to an emotional state view (Haybron 2001). And some have argued that life satisfaction is compatible with profoundly negative emotional states like depression-a suffering artist might not value emotional matters much, and wholeheartedly affirm her life (Carson 1981, Davis 1981b, Haybron 2005, Feldman 2010). Yet it might seem counterintuitive to deem such a person happy. At the same time, people do sometimes use 'happiness' to denote states of life satisfaction: life satisfaction theories do seem faithful to some ordinary uses of 'happiness'. The trouble is that HAPPINESS appears to be a "mongrel concept," as Ned Block (1995) called the concept of consciousness: the ordinary notion is something of a mess. We use the term to denote different things in different contexts, and often have no clear notion of what we are referring to. This suggests that accounts of happiness must be somewhat revisionary, and that we must assess theories on grounds other than simple fidelity to the lay concept of happiness-"descriptive adequacy," in Sumner's (1996) terms. One candidate is practical utility: which conception of happiness best answers to our interests in the notion? We talk about happiness because we care about it. The question is why we care about it, and which psychological states within the extension of the ordinary term make the most sense of this concern. Even if there is no simple answer to the question what happiness is, it may well turn out that our interests in happiness cluster so strongly around a particular psychological kind that happiness can best, or most profitably, be understood in terms of that type of state (Haybron 2003). Alternatively, we may choose to distinguish different varieties of happiness. It will be less important how we use the word, however, than that we be clear about the nature and significance of the phenomena that interest us.

The debate over theories of happiness falls along a couple of lines. The most interesting questions concern the choice between life satisfaction and affect-based views like hedonism and the emotional state theory. Proponents of life satisfaction see two major advantages to their account. First, life satisfaction is holistic, ranging over the whole of one's life, or the totality of one's life over a certain period of time. It reflects not just the aggregate of moments in one's life, but also the global quality of one's life taken as a whole (but see Raibley 2010). And we seem to care not just about the total quantity of good in our lives, but about its distribution-a happy ending, say, counts for more than a happy middle (Slote 1982, Velleman 1991). Second, life satisfaction seems more closely linked to our priorities than affect is, as the suffering artist case illustrates. While a focus on affect makes sense insofar as we care about such matters, most people care about other things as well, and how their lives are going relative to their priorities may not be fully mirrored in their affective states. Life satisfaction theories thus seem to fit more closely with liberal ideals of individual sovereignty, on which how well my life is going for me is for me to decide. My satisfaction with my life seems to embody that judgment. Of course a theory of happiness need not capture everything that matters for well-being; the point is that a life satisfaction view might explain why we should care so much about happiness, and so enjoy substantive as well as intuitive support.

But several objections have been raised against life satisfaction views. The most common complaint has already been noted, namely that a person could apparently be satisfied with her life even while leading a highly unpleasant or emotionally distressed existence, and it can seem counterintuitive to regard such a person as happy (see section 2.2). Some life satisfaction theorists deny that such cases are possible (Benditt 1978), but it could also be argued that such possibilities are part and parcel of life satisfaction's appeal: some people may not get much pleasure out of life because they don't care particularly about affective matters, and a life satisfaction theory allows that they can, in their own fashion, be happy.

Two other objections are more substantive, raising questions about whether life satisfaction has the right sort of importance. One concern is whether people often enough have well-grounded attitudes of life satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Evaluating one's life as a whole can be a complicated business, and there is some question whether people typically have well-defined attitudes toward their lives that accurately reflect how well their lives measure up relative to their priorities. Some research, for instance, suggests that life satisfaction reports tend to reflect judgments made on the spot, drawing on whatever information comes readily to mind, with substantial influences by transient contextual factors like the weather, finding a dime, etc. (Schwarz and Strack 1999). Debate persists over whether this work undermines the significance of life satisfaction judgments, but it does raise a question whether life satisfaction attitudes tend to be well-enough grounded to have the kind of importance that people normally ascribe to happiness.

The third objection is somewhat intricate, so it will require some explaining. The claim is that a wide range of life satisfaction attitudes might be consistent with individuals' perceptions of how well their lives are going relative to what they care about, raising doubts about the importance of life satisfaction (Haybron 2016). You might reasonably be satisfied when getting very little of what you want, or dissatisfied when getting most of what you want. One reason for this is that people tend to have many incommensurable values, leaving it open how to add them up. Looking at the various ups and downs of your life, it may be arbitrary whether to rate your life a four out of ten, or a seven. A second reason is that life satisfaction attitudes are not merely assessments of subjective success or personal welfare: they involve assessments of whether one's life is good enough -satisfactory. Yet people's values may radically underdetermine where they should set the bar for a "good enough" life, again rendering the judgment somewhat arbitrary. Given your values, you might reasonably be satisfied with a two, or require a nine to be satisfied. While it may seem important how well people see their lives going relative to what they care about, it is not obviously so important whether people see their lives going well enough that they are willing to judge them satisfactory.

If life satisfaction attitudes are substantially arbitrary relative to subjective success, then people might reasonably base those attitudes on other factors, such as ethical ideals (e.g., valuing gratitude or noncomplacency) or pragmatic concerns (e.g., comforting oneself). Shifts in perspective might also reasonably alter life satisfaction attitudes. After the funeral, you might be highly satisfied with your life, whereas the high school reunion leaves you dissatisfied; yet neither judgment need be mistaken, or less authoritative.

As a result, life satisfaction attitudes may be poor indicators of well-being, even from the individual's own point of view. That people in a given country register high levels of life satisfaction may reflect nothing more than that they set the bar extremely low; they might be satisfied with anything short of pure agony. Another country's citizens might be dissatisfied with their lives, but only because they set the bar much higher. Relative to what they care about, people in the dissatisfied nation could be better off than those in the satisfied nation. To take another example, a cancer patient might be more satisfied with his life than he was before the diagnosis, for he now looks at his life from a different perspective and emphasizes different virtues like fortitude and gratitude as opposed to (say) humility and non-complacency. Yet he need not think himself better off at all: he might believe himself worse off than he was when he was less satisfied. Neither judgment need seem to him or us to be mistaken: it's just that he now looks at his life differently. Indeed, he might think he's doing badly, even as he is satisfied with his life: he endorses it, warts and all, and is grateful just have his not-so-good life rather than some of the much worse alternatives.

For present purposes, the worry is that life satisfaction may not have the kind of significance happiness is normally thought to have. This may pose a difficulty for the identification of life satisfaction with happiness: for people frequently seem to use happiness as a proxy for well-being, a reasonably concrete and value-free stand-in that facilitates quick-and-dirty assessments of welfare. Given the discovery that someone is happy, we might infer that he is doing well; if we learn that someone is unhappy, we may conclude that she is doing poorly. Such inferences are defeasible: if we later find that the happy Ned's wife and friends secretly hate him, we need not decide that he isn't happy after all; we simply withdraw the conclusion that he is doing well. So long as happiness tracks well-being well enough in most cases, this sort of practice is perfectly respectable. But if we identify happiness with life satisfaction, then we may have a problem: maybe Sally is satisfied only because she values being grateful for the good things in life. This sort of case may not be merely a theoretical possibility: perhaps the very high rates of self-reported life satisfaction in the United States and many other places substantially reflects a broad acceptance of norms of gratitude and a general tendency to emphasize the positives, or perhaps a sense that not to endorse your life amounts to a lack of self-regard. It is not implausible that most people, even those enduring great hardship, can readily find grounds for satisfaction with their lives. Life may have to be pretty hard for a person to be incapable of affirming it.

Despite these concerns there is significant intuitive appeal in the idea that to be happy is to be satisfied with one's life. Perhaps a different way of conceiving life satisfaction, for instance dispensing with the global judgment and aggregating particular satisfactions and dissatisfactions, would lessen the force of these objections. Alternatively, it is possible that idealized or qualified forms of life satisfaction would mitigate these concerns for some purposes, such as a theory of well-being.

A second set of issues concerns the differences between the two affect-based views, hedonism and emotional state. The appeal of hedonism is fairly obvious: the pleasantness of our experience is plainly a matter of great significance; many have claimed it to be the only thing that matters. What, by contrast, motivates the emotional state account, which bears obvious similarities to hedonism yet excludes many pleasures from happiness? The question of motivation appears to be the chief worry facing the emotional state theory: what's to be gained by focusing on emotional state rather than pleasure?

One argument for taking such a view is intuitive: some find it implausible to think that psychologically superficial pleasures invariably make a difference in how happy one is-the typical pleasure of eating a cracker, say, or even the intense pleasure of an orgasm that nonetheless fails to move one, as can happen with meaningless sexual activity. The intuitive distinction seems akin to distinctions made by some ancient philosophers; consider, for instance, the following passage from Epictetus's Discourses:

'I have a headache.' Well, do not say 'Alas!' 'I have an earache.' Do not say 'Alas!' And I am not saying that it is not permissible to groan, only do not groan in the centre of your being. (Discourses, 1.18.19, emphasis added).

The Stoics did not expect us never to feel unpleasant sensations, which would plainly be impossible; rather, the idea was not to let such things get to us, to impact our emotional conditions.

Why should anyone care to press such a distinction in characterizing happiness? For most people, the hedonic difference between happiness on an emotional state versus a hedonistic view is probably minimal. But while little will be lost, what will be gained? One possibility is that the more "central" affects involving our emotional conditions may bear a special relation to the person or the self, whereas more "peripheral" affects, like the pleasantness of eating a cracker, might pertain to the subpersonal aspects of our psychologies. Since well-being is commonly linked to ideas of self-fulfillment, this sort of distinction might signal a difference in the importance of these states. Another reason to focus on emotional condition rather than experience alone may be the greater psychological depth of the former: its impact on our mental lives, physiology, and behavior is arguably deeper and more pervasive. This enhances the explanatory and predictive significance of happiness, and more importantly its desirability: happiness on this view is not merely pleasant, but a major source of pleasure and other good outcomes (Fredrickson 2004, Lyubomirsky, King et al. 2005). Compare health on this score: while many think it matters chiefly or entirely because of its connection with pleasure, there are few skeptics about the importance of health. As well, emotional state views may capture the idea that happiness concerns the individual's psychological orientation or disposition: to be happy, on an emotional state theory, is not just to be subjected to a certain sequence of experiences, but for one's very being to manifest a favorable orientation toward the conditions of one's life-a kind of psychic affirmation of one's life. This reflects a point of similarity with life satisfaction views of happiness: contra hedonism, both views take happiness to be substantially dispositional, involving some sort of favorable orientation toward one's life. But life satisfaction views tend to emphasize reflective or rational endorsement, whereas emotional state views emphasize the verdicts of our emotional natures.

While hedonism and emotional state theories are major contenders in the contemporary literature, all affect-based theories confront the worries, noted earlier, that motivate life satisfaction views-notably, their looser connection with people's priorities, as well as their limited ability to reflect the quality of people's lives taken as a whole.

Given the limitations of narrower theories of happiness, a hybrid account such as a subjective well-being theory may seem an attractive solution. This strategy has not been fully explored in the philosophical literature, though Sumner's "life satisfaction" theory may best be classified as a hybrid (1996; see also Martin 2012). In any event, a hybrid approach draws objections of its own. If we arrive at a hybrid theory by this route, it could seem like either the marriage of two unpromising accounts, or of a promising account with an unpromising one. Such a union may not yield wholesome results. Second, people have different intuitions about what counts as happiness, so that no theory can accommodate all of them. Any theory that tries to thus risks pleasing no one. A third concern is that the various components of any hybrid are liable to matter for quite different reasons, so that happiness, thus understood, might fail to answer to any coherent set of concerns. Ascriptions of happiness could be relatively uninformative if they cast their net too widely.

With the explosive rise of empirical research on happiness, a central question is how far, and how, happiness might be measured. There seems to be no in-principle barrier to the idea of measuring, at least roughly, how happy people are. Investigators may never enjoy the precision of the "hedonimeter" once envisaged by Edgeworth to show just how happy a person is (Edgeworth 1881). Indeed, such a device might be impossible even in principle, since happiness might involve multiple dimensions that either cannot be precisely quantified or summed together. If so, it could still be feasible to develop approximate measures of happiness, or at least its various dimensions. Similarly, depression may not admit of precise quantification in a single number, yet many useful if imprecise measures of depression exist. In the case of happiness, it is plausible that even current measures provide information about how anxious, cheerful, satisfied, etc. people are, and thus tell us something about their happiness. Even the simplest self-report measures used in the literature have been found to correlate well with many intuitively relevant variables, such as friends' reports, smiling, physiological measures, health, longevity, and so forth (Pavot 2008).

Importantly, most scientific research needs only to discern patterns across large numbers of individuals-to take an easy case, determining whether widows tend to be less happy than newlyweds-and this is compatible with substantial unreliability in assessing individual happiness. Similarly, an inaccurate thermometer might be a poor guide to the temperature, but readings from many such thermometers could correlate fairly well with actual temperatures-telling us, for instance, that Minnesota is colder than Florida.

This point reveals an important caveat: measures of happiness could correlate well with how happy people are, thus telling us which groups of people tend to be happier, while being completely wrong about absolute levels of happiness. Self-reports of happiness, for instance, might correctly indicate that unemployed people are considerably less happy than those with jobs. But every one of those reports could be wrong, say if everyone is unhappy yet claims to be happy, or vice-versa, so long as the unemployed report lower happiness than the employed. Similarly, bad thermometers may show that Minnesota is colder than Florida without giving the correct temperature.

Two morals emerge from these reflections. First, self-report measures of happiness could be reliable guides to relative happiness, though telling us little about how happy, in absolute terms, people are. We may know who is happier, that is, but not whether people are in fact happy. Second, even comparisons of relative happiness will be inaccurate if the groups being compared systematically bias their reports in different ways. This worry is particularly acute for cross-cultural comparisons of happiness, where differing norms about happiness may undermine the comparability of self-reports. The French might report lower happiness than Americans, for instance, not because their lives are less satisfying or pleasant, but because they tend to put a less positive spin on things. For this reason it may be useful to employ instruments, including narrower questions or physiological measures, that are less prone to cultural biasing.

The idea that sincere self-reports of happiness are incorrigible can only be correct, it seems, given a quite specific conception of happiness-a kind of life satisfaction theory of happiness on which people count as satisfied with their lives so long as they are disposed to judge explicitly that they are satisfied with their lives on the whole. Also assumed here is that self-reports of happiness are in fact wholly grounded in life satisfaction judgments like these-that is, that people take questions about "happiness" to be questions about life satisfaction. Given these assumptions, we can plausibly conclude that self-reports of happiness are incorrigible. One question is whether happiness, thus conceived, is very important. As well, it is unlikely that respondents invariably interpret happiness questions as being about life satisfaction. At any rate, even life satisfaction theorists might balk at this variant of the account, since life satisfaction is sometimes taken to involve, not just explicit global judgments of life satisfaction, but also our responses to the particular things or domains we care about. Some will hesitate to deem satisfied people who hate many of the important things in their lives, however satisfied they claim to be with their lives as a whole.

In a similar vein, the common practice of measuring happiness simply by asking people to report explicitly on how "happy" they are is sometimes defended on the grounds that it lets people decide for themselves what happiness is. The reasoning again seems to presuppose, controversially, that self-reports of happiness employ a life satisfaction view of happiness, the idea being that whether you are satisfied ("happy") will depend on what you care about. Alternatively, the point might be literally to leave it up to the respondent to decide whether 'happy' means hedonic state, emotional state, life satisfaction, or something else. Thus one respondent's "I'm happy" might mean "my experience is generally pleasant," while another's might mean "I am satisfied with my life as a whole." It is not clear, however, that asking ambiguous questions of this sort is a useful enterprise, since different respondents will in effect be answering different questions.

This entry focuses on subjective well-being studies, since that work is standardly deemed "happiness" research. But psychological research on well-being can take other forms, notably in the "eudaimonic"-commonly opposed to "hedonic"-literature, which assesses a broader range of indicators taken to represent objective human needs, such as meaning, personal growth, relatedness, autonomy, competence, etc. (The assimilation of subjective well-being to the "hedonic" realm may be misleading, since life satisfaction seems primarily to be a non-hedonic value, as noted earlier.) Other well-being instruments may not clearly fall under either the "happiness" or eudaimonic rubrics, for instance extending subjective well-being measures by adding questions about the extent to which activities are seen as meaningful or worthwhile (White and Dolan 2009). An important question going forward is how far well-being research needs to incorporate indicators beyond subjective well-being.

The scientific literature on happiness has grown to proportions far too large for this article to do more than briefly touch on a few highlights. Here is a sampling of oft-cited claims:

1. Most people are happy

2. People adapt to most changes, tending to return over time to their happiness "set point"

3. People are prone to make serious mistakes in assessing and pursuing happiness

4. Material prosperity has a surprisingly modest impact on happiness

The first claim, that most people are happy, appears to be a consensus position among subjective well-being researchers (for a seminal argument, see Diener and Diener 1996). The contention reflects three lines of evidence: most people, in most places, report being happy; most people report being satisfied with their lives; and most people experience more positive affect than negative. On any of the major theories of happiness, then, the evidence seems to show that most people are, indeed, happy. Yet this conclusion might be resisted, on a couple of grounds. First, life satisfaction theorists might question whether self-reports of life satisfaction suffice to establish that people are in fact satisfied with their lives. Perhaps self-reports can be mistaken, say if the individual believes herself satisfied yet shows many signs of dissatisfaction in her behavior, for instance complaining about or striving to change important things in her life. Second, defenders of affect-based theories-hedonistic and emotional state views-might reject the notion that a bare majority of positive affect suffices for happiness. While the traditional view among hedonists has indeed been that happiness requires no more than a >1:1 ratio of positive to negative affect, this contention has received little defense and has been disputed in the recent literature. Some investigators have claimed that "flourishing" requires greater than a 3:1 ratio of positive to negative affect, as this ratio might represent a threshold for broadly favorable psychological functioning (e.g., Larsen and Prizmic 2008). While the evidence for any specific ratio is highly controversial, if anything like this proportion were adopted as the threshold for happiness, on a hedonistic or emotional state theory, then some of the evidence taken to show that people are happy could in fact show the opposite. In any event, the empirical claim relies heavily on nontrivial philosophical views about the nature of happiness, illustrating one way in which philosophical work on happiness can inform scientific research.

The second claim, regarding adaptation and set points, reflects well-known findings that many major life events, like being disabled in an accident or winning the lottery, appear strongly to impact happiness only for a relatively brief period, after which individuals may return to a level of happiness not very different from before. As well, twin studies have found that subjective well-being is substantially heritable, with .50 being a commonly accepted figure. Consequently many researchers have posited that each individual has a characteristic "set point" level of happiness, toward which he tends to gravitate over time. Such claims have caused some consternation over whether the pursuit and promotion of happiness are largely futile enterprises (Lykken and Tellegen 1996; Millgram 2000). However, the dominant view now seems to be that the early claims about extreme adaptation and set points were exaggerated: while adaptation is a very real phenomenon, many factors-including disability-can have substantial, and lasting, effects on how happy people are. This point was already apparent from the literature on correlates and causes of happiness, discussed below: if things like relationships and engaging work are important for happiness, then happiness is probably not simply a matter of personality or temperament. As well, the large cross-national differences in measured happiness are unlikely to be entirely an artifact of personality variables. Note that even highly heritable traits can be strongly susceptible to improvement. Better living conditions have raised the stature of men in the Netherlands by eight inches-going from short (five foot four) to tall (over six feet)-in the last 150 years (Fogel 2005). Yet height is considered much more heritable than happiness, with typical heritability estimates ranging from .60 to over .90 (e.g., Silventoinen, Sammalisto et al. 2003).

The question of mistakes will be taken up in section 5.2. But the last claim-that material prosperity has relatively modest impacts on happiness-has lately become the subject of heated debate. For some time the standard view among subjective well-being researchers was that, beyond a low threshold where basic needs are met, economic gains have only a small impact on happiness levels. According to the well-known "Easterlin Paradox," for instance, wealthier people do tend to be happier within nations, but richer nations are little happier than less prosperous counterparts, and-most strikingly-economic growth has virtually no impact (Easterlin 1974). In the U.S., for example, measured happiness has not increased significantly since at least 1947, despite massive increases in wealth and income. In short, once you're out of poverty, absolute levels of wealth and income make little difference in how happy people are.

Against these claims, some authors have argued that absolute income has a large impact on happiness across the income spectrum (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers 2008). The question continues to be much debated, but in 2010 a pair of large-scale studies using Gallup data sets, including improved measures of life satisfaction and affect, suggested that both sides may be partly right (Kahneman and Deaton 2010; Diener, Ng et al. 2010). Surveying large numbers of Americans in one case, and what is claimed to be the first globally representative sample of humanity in the other, these studies found that income does indeed correlate substantially (.44 in the global sample), at all levels, with life satisfaction-strictly speaking, a "life evaluation" measure that asks respondents to rate their lives without saying whether they are satisfied. Yet the correlation of household income with the affect measures is far weaker: globally, .17 for positive affect, -.09 for negative affect; and in the United States, essentially zero above $75,000 (though quite strong at low income levels). For more recent discussions of empirical work, see Jebb et al. 2018 along with relevant chapters in Diener et al. 2018 and the annual World Happiness Reports from 2012 onward (Helliwell et al. 2012). Research on the complex money-happiness relationship resists simple characterization, but a crude summary is that the connection tends to be positive and substantial, strong at lower income levels while modest to weak or even negative at higher incomes, and stronger and less prone to satiation for life evaluation than emotional well-being metrics. But again, these are very rough generalizations that gloss over a variety of important factors and admit of many exceptions across both individuals and societies.

In short, the relationship between money and happiness may depend on which theory of happiness we accept: on a life satisfaction view, the relationship may be strong; whereas affect-based views may yield a much weaker connection, again above some modest threshold. Here, again, philosophical views about the nature and significance of happiness may play an important role in understanding empirical results and their practical upshot. Economic growth, for instance, has long been a top priority for governments, and findings about its impact on human well-being may have substantial implications for policy.

It is important to note that studies of this nature focus on generic trends, not specific cases, and there is no dispute that significant exceptions exist-notably, populations that enjoy high levels of happiness amid low levels of material prosperity. Among others, a number of Latin American countries, Maasai herders, Inughuit hunter-gatherers, and Amish communities have registered highly positive results in subjective well-being studies, sometimes higher than those in many affluent nations, and numerous informal accounts accord with the data. Such "positive outliers" suggest that some societies can support high levels of happiness with extremely modest material holdings. The importance of money for happiness may depend strongly on what kind of society one inhabits. An interesting question, particularly in light of common environmental concerns, is how far the lessons of such societies can, or should, be transferred to other social forms, where material attainment and happiness are presently more tightly coupled. Perhaps some degree of decoupling of happiness and money would be desirable.

So the role of money in happiness appears, at this juncture, to be a mixed bag, depending heavily on how we conceive of happiness and what range of societies we are considering. What (else), then, does matter most for happiness? There is no definitive list of the main sources of happiness in the literature, partly because it is not clear how to divide them up. But the following items seem generally to be accepted as among the chief correlates of happiness: supportive relationships, engagement in interesting and challenging activities, material and physical security, a sense of meaning or purpose, a positive outlook, and autonomy or control. Significant correlates may also include-among many others-religion, good governance, trust, helping others, values (e.g., having non-materialistic values), achieving goals, not being unemployed, and connection with the natural environment.

An illustrative study of the correlates of happiness from a global perspective is the Gallup World Poll study noted earlier (Diener, Ng et al. 2010; see also Jebb et al. 2020). In that study, the life satisfaction measure was more strongly related to material prosperity, as noted above: household income, along with possession of luxury conveniences and satisfaction with standard of living. The affect measures, by contrast, correlated most strongly with what the authors call "psychosocial prosperity": whether people reported being treated with respect in the last day, having family and friends to count on, learning something new, doing what they do best, and choosing how their time was spent.

What these results show depends partly on the reliability of the measures. One possible source of error is that this study might exaggerate the relationship between life satisfaction and material attainments through the use of a "ladder" scale for life evaluation, ladders being associated with material aspirations. Errors might also arise through salience biases whereby material concerns might be more easily recalled than other important values, such as whether one has succeeded in having children; or through differences in positivity biases across income levels (perhaps wealthier people tend to be more "positive-responding" than poorer individuals). Another question is whether the affect measures adequately track the various dimensions of people's emotional lives. However, the results are roughly consonant with other research, so they are unlikely to be entirely an artifact of the instruments used in this study. A further point of uncertainty is the causal story behind the correlations-whether the correlates, like psychosocial prosperity, cause happiness; whether happiness causes them; whether other factors cause both; or, as is likely, some combination of the three.

Such concerns duly noted, the research plausibly suggests that, on average, material progress has some tendency to help people to better get what they want in life, as found in the life satisfaction measures, while relationships and engaging activities are more important for people's emotional lives. What this means for happiness depends on which view of happiness is correct.

Were you to survey public attitudes about the value of happiness, at least in liberal Western democracies, you would likely find considerable support for the proposition that happiness is all that really matters for human well-being. Many philosophers over the ages have likewise endorsed such a view, typically assuming a hedonistic account of happiness. (A few, like Almeder 2000, have identified well-being with happiness understood as life satisfaction.)

Most philosophers, however, have rejected hedonistic and other mental state accounts of well-being, and with them the idea that happiness could suffice for well-being. (See the entry on well-being.) Objections to mental state theories of well-being tend to cluster around two sets of concerns. First, it is widely believed that the non-mental conditions of our lives matter for well-being: whether our families really love us, whether our putative achievements are genuine, whether the things we care about actually obtain. The most influential objection of this sort is Robert Nozick's experience machine case, wherein we are asked to imagine a virtual reality device that can perfectly simulate any reality for its user, who will think the experience is genuine (Nozick 1974). Would you plug in to such a machine for life? Most people would not, and the case is widely taken to vitiate mental state theories of well-being. Beyond having positive mental states, it seems to matter both that our lives go well and that our state of mind is appropriately related to how things are.

A second set of objections concerns various ways in which a happy person might nonetheless seem intuitively to be leading an impoverished or stunted life. The most influential of these worries involves adaptation, where individuals facing oppressive circumstances scale back their expectations and find contentment in "small mercies," as Sen put it. Even a slave might come to internalize the values of his oppressors and be happy, and this strikes most as an unenviable life indeed. Related worries involve people with diminished capacities (blindness, Down Syndrome), or choosing to lead narrow and cramped or simpleminded lives (e.g., counting blades of grass). Worries about impoverished lives are a prime motivator of Aristotelian theories of well-being, which emphasize the full and proper exercise of our human capacities.

In the face of these and other objections most commentators have concluded that neither happiness nor any other mental state can suffice for well-being. Philosophical interest in happiness has consequently flagged, since its theoretical importance becomes unclear if it does not play a starring role in our account of the good.

Even as happiness might fail to suffice for well-being, well-being itself may be only one component of a good life, and not the most important one at that. Here 'good life' means a life that is good all things considered, taking account of all the values that matter in life, whether they benefit the individual or not. Kant, for example, considered both morality and well-being to be important but distinct elements of a good life. Yet morality should be our first priority, never to be sacrificed for personal happiness.

The mainstream views in all three of the major approaches to ethical theory-consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics-agree on some form of the priority of virtue. Where these views chiefly differ is not on the importance of being good, but on whether being good necessarily benefits us. Virtue ethicists tend to answer in the affirmative, the other two schools in the negative. Building virtue into well-being, as Aristotelians do, may seem to yield a more demanding ethics, and in some ways it does. Yet many deontologists and consequentialists-notably Kant-advocate sterner, more starkly moralistic visions of the good life than Aristotle would ever have dreamt of (e.g., Singer 1972).

Happiness, in short, is believed by most philosophers to be insufficient for well-being, and still less important for the good life. These points may seem to vitiate any substantial role for happiness in ethical thought. However, well-being itself is still regarded as a central concept in ethical thought, denoting one of the chief elements of a good life even if not the sole element. And there are reasons for thinking happiness important, both practically and theoretically, despite the worries noted above.

Even if happiness does not suffice for well-being-a point that not all philosophers would accept-it might still rate a privileged spot in theories of well-being. This could happen in either of two ways.

First, happiness could be a major component of a theory of well-being. Objective list theories of well-being sometimes include happiness or related mental states such as enjoyment among the fundamental constituents of well-being. A more ambitious proposal, originated by L.W. Sumner, identifies well-being with authentic happiness-happiness that is authentic in the sense of being both informed and autonomous (Sumner 1996). The root idea is that well-being involves being happy, where one's happiness is a response of one's own (autonomous), to a life that genuinely is one's own (informed). The authenticity constraint is meant to address both experience machine-type worries and "happy slave" objections relating to adaptation, where happiness may be non-autonomous, depending on manipulation or the uncritical acceptance of oppressive values. Since these have been the most influential objections to mental state accounts of well-being, Sumner's approach promises to considerably strengthen the position of happiness-centered approaches to well-being, and several philosophers have developed variants or close relations of the authentic happiness theory (Brülde 2007, Haybron 2008a, Tiberius and Plakias 2010, Višak 2015). The approach remains fairly new, however, so its long-term prospects remain unclear.

A second strategy forsakes the project of giving a unitary theory of well-being, recognizing instead a family of two or more kinds of prudential value. Happiness could be central to, or even exhaustive of, one of those values. Shelly Kagan, for instance, has suggested that welfare hedonism could be correct as a theory of how well a person is doing, but not of how well a person's life is going, which should perhaps be regarded as a distinct value (Kagan 1992, 1994). In short, we might distinguish narrow and wide well-being concepts. An experience machine user might be doing well in the narrow sense, but not the wide-she is doing well, though her life is quite sad. Happiness might, then, suffice for well-being, but only in the narrow sense. Others have made similar points, but uptake has been limited, perhaps because distinguishing multiple concepts of prudential value makes the already difficult job of giving a theory of well-being much harder, as Kagan pointedly observes. An interesting possibility is that the locution 'happy life', and the corresponding well-being sense of happiness, actually refers to a specific variety of well-being-perhaps well-being in the wide sense just suggested, or well-being taken as an ideal state, an ultimate goal of deliberation. This might explain the continued use of 'happiness' for the well-being notion in the philosophical literature, rather than the more standard 'wellbeing.'

The preceding section discussed ways that happiness might figure prominently even in non-mental state theories of well-being. The question there concerned the role of happiness in theories of well-being. This is a different question from how important happiness is for well-being itself. Even a theory of well-being that includes no mention at all of happiness can allow that happiness is nonetheless a major component or contributor to well-being, because of its relation to the things that ultimately constitute well-being. If you hold a desire theory of well-being, for instance, you will very likely allow that, for most people, happiness is a central aspect of well-being, since most people very much desire to be happy. Indeed, some desire theorists have argued that the account actually yields a form of hedonism, on the grounds that people ultimately desire nothing else but happiness or pleasure (Sidgwick 1907 [1966], Brandt 1979, 1989).

Happiness may be thought important even on theories normally believed to take a dismissive view of it. Aristotelians identify well-being with virtuous activity, yet Aristotle plainly takes this to be a highly pleasant condition, indeed the most pleasant kind of life there is (see, e.g., NE, Bk. I 8; Bk. VII 13). You cannot flourish, on Aristotelian terms, without being happy, and unhappiness is clearly incompatible with well-being. Even the Stoics, who notoriously regard all but a virtuous inner state as at best indifferent, would still assign happiness a kind of importance: at the very least, to be unhappy would be unvirtuous; and virtue itself arguably entails a kind of happiness, namely a pleasant state of tranquility. As well, happiness would likely be a preferred indifferent in most cases, to be chosen over unhappiness. To be sure, both Aristotelian and Stoic accounts are clear that happiness alone does not suffice for well-being, that its significance is not what common opinion takes it to be, and that some kinds of happiness can be worthless or even bad. But neither denies that happiness is somehow quite important for human well-being.

In fact it is questionable whether any major school of philosophical thought denies outright the importance of happiness, at least on one of the plausible accounts of the matter. Doubts about its significance probably owe to several factors. Some skeptics, for example, focus on relatively weak conceptions of happiness, such as the idea that it is little more than the simple emotion of feeling happy-an idea that few hedonists or emotional state theorists would accept. Or, alternatively, assuming that a concern for happiness has only to do with positive states. Yet 'happiness' also serves as a blanket term for a domain of concern that involves both positive and negative states, namely the kinds of mental states involved in being happy or unhappy. Just as "health" care tends to focus mainly on ill health, so might happiness researchers choose to focus much of their effort on the study and alleviation of unhappiness-depression, suffering, anxiety, and other conditions whose importance is uncontroversial. The study of happiness need be no more concerned with smiles than with frowns.

The last set of questions we will examine centers on the pursuit of happiness, both individual and collective. Most of the popular literature on happiness discusses how to make oneself happier, with little attention given to whether this is an appropriate goal, or how various means of pursuing happiness measure up from an ethical standpoint. More broadly, how if at all should one pursue happiness as part of a good life?

We saw earlier that most philosophers regard happiness as secondary to morality in a good life. The individual pursuit of happiness may be subject to nonmoral norms as well, prudence being the most obvious among them. Prudential norms need not be as plain as "don't shoot yourself in the foot." On Sumner's authentic happiness view of well-being, for instance, we stand to gain little by pursuing happiness in inauthentic ways, for instance through self-deception or powerful drugs like Huxley's soma, which guarantees happiness come what may (Huxley 1932 [2005]). The view raises interesting questions about the benefits of less extreme pharmaceuticals, such as the therapeutic use of antidepressants; such medications can make life more pleasant, but many people worry whether they pose a threat to authenticity, perhaps undercutting their benefits. It is possible that such drugs involve prudential tradeoffs, promoting well-being in some ways while undermining it in others; whether the tradeoffs are worth it will depend on how, in a given case, the balance is struck. Another possibility is that such drugs sometimes promote authenticity, if for instance a depressive disorder prevents a person from being "himself."

Looking to more broadly ethical, but not yet moral, norms, it may be possible to act badly without acting either immorally or imprudently. While Aristotle himself regarded acting badly as inherently imprudent, his catalogue of virtues is instructive, as many of them (wit, friendliness, etc.) are not what we normally regard as moral virtues. Some morally permissible methods of pursuing happiness may nonetheless be inappropriate because they conflict with such "ethical" virtues. They might, for instance, be undignified or imbecilic.

Outwardly virtuous conduct undertaken in the name of personal happiness might, if wrongly motivated, be incompatible with genuine virtue. One might, for instance, engage in philanthropy solely to make oneself happier, and indeed work hard at fine-tuning one's assistance to maximize the hedonic payoff. This sort of conduct would not obviously instantiate the virtue of compassion or kindness, and indeed might be reasonably deemed contemptible. Similarly, it might be admirable, morally or otherwise, to be grateful for the good things in one's life. Yet the virtue of gratitude might be undermined by certain kinds of gratitude intervention, whereby one tries to become happier by focusing on the things one is grateful for. If expressions of gratitude become phony or purely instrumental, the sole reason for giving thanks being to become happy-and not that one actually has something to be thankful for-then the "gratitude" might cease to be admirable, and may indeed be unvirtuous.

A different question is what means of pursuing happiness are most effective. This is fundamentally an empirical question, but there are some in-principle issues that philosophical reflection might inform. One oft-heard claim, commonly called the "paradox of hedonism," is that the pursuit of happiness is self-defeating; to be happy, don't pursue happiness. It is not clear how to interpret this dictum, however, so that it is both interesting and true. It is plainly imprudent to make happiness one's focus at every moment, but doubtful that this has often been denied. Yet never considering happiness also seems an improbable strategy for becoming happier. If you are choosing among several equally worthwhile occupations, and have good evidence that some of them will make you miserable, while one of them is likely to be highly fulfilling, it would not seem imprudent to take that information into account. Yet to do so just is to pursue happiness. The so-called paradox of hedonism is perhaps best seen as a vague caution against focusing too much on making oneself happy, not a blanket dismissal of the prospects for expressly seeking happiness-and for this modest point there is good empirical evidence (Schooler, Ariely et al. 2003, Lyubomirsky 2007).

That happiness is sometimes worth seeking does not mean we will always do a good job of it (Haybron 2008b). In recent decades a massive body of empirical evidence has gathered on various ways in which people seem systematically prone to make mistakes in the pursuit of their interests, including happiness. Such tendencies have been suggested in several domains relating to the pursuit of happiness, including (with recent surveys cited):

1. Assessing how happy we are, or were in the past (Haybron 2007)

2. Predicting ("forecasting") what will make us happy (Gilbert 2006)

3. Choosing rationally (Kahneman and Tversky 2000, Gilovitch, Griffin et al. 2002, Hsee and Hastie 2006)

Taken together, this research bears heavily on two central questions in the philosophical literature: first, the broad character of human nature (e.g., in what sense are we rational animals? How should we conceive of human autonomy?); second, the philosophical ideals of the good society and good government.

Just a decade ago the idea of happiness policy was something of a novelty. While it remains on the fringes in some locales, notably the United States, in much of the world there has been a surge of interest in making happiness an explicit target of policy consideration. Attention has largely shifted, however, to a broader focus on well-being to reflect not just happiness but also other welfare concerns of citizens, and dozens of governments now incorporate well-being metrics in their national statistics.

Let's consider the rationale for policies aimed at promoting well-being. In political thought, the modern liberal tradition has tended to assume an optimistic view of human nature and the individual's capacities for prudent choice. Partly for this reason, the preservation and expansion of individual freedoms, including people's options, is widely taken to be a central goal, if not the goal, of legitimate governments. People should be freed to seek the good life as they see it, and beyond that the state should, by and large, stay out of the well-being-promotion business.

This vision of the good society rests on empirical assumptions that have been the subject of considerable debate. If it turns out that people systematically and predictably err in the pursuit of their interests, then it may be possible for governments to devise policies that correct for such mistakes. Of course, government intervention can introduce other sorts of mistakes, and there is some debate about whether such measures are likely to do more harm than good (e.g., Glaeser 2006).

But even if governments cannot effectively counteract human imprudence, it may still be that people fare better in social forms that influence or even constrain choices in ways that make serious mistakes less likely. (Food culture and its impact on health may be an instructive example here.) The idea that people tend to fare best when their lives are substantially constrained or guided by their social and physical context has recently been dubbed contextualism; the contrary view, that people do best when their lives are, as much as possible, determined by the individuals themselves, is individualism (Haybron 2008b). Recent contextualists include communitarians and many perfectionists, though contextualism is not a political doctrine and is compatible with liberalism and even libertarian political morality. Contextualism about the promotion of well-being is related to recent work in moral psychology that emphasizes the social character of human agency, such as situationism and social intuitionism.

Also relatively light-handed, and perhaps not paternalistic at all, are state efforts to promote happiness directly through social policy, for instance by prioritizing unemployment over economic growth on the grounds that the former has a larger impact on happiness. Other policies might include trying to reduce commute times, or making walkable neighborhoods and green space a priority in urban planning, again on happiness grounds. Some may deem such measures paternalistic insofar as they trade freedom (in the form of economic prosperity) for a substantive good, happiness, that people value unevenly, though it has also been argued that refusing to take citizens' values like happiness into consideration in policy deliberation on their behalf can amount to paternalism (Haybron and Alexandrova 2013).

A related sort of objection to happiness-based policy argues that happiness, or even well-being, is simply the wrong object of policy, which ought instead to focus on the promotion of resources or capabilities (Rawls 1971, Nussbaum 2000, Quong 2011, Sen 2009). Several reasons have been cited for this sort of view, one being that policies aimed at promoting happiness or well-being violate commonly accepted requirements of "liberal neutrality," according to which policy must be neutral among conceptions of the good. According to this constraint, governments must not promote any view of the good life, and happiness-based policy might be argued to flout it. Worries about paternalism also surface here, the idea being that states should only focus on affording people the option to be happy or whatever, leaving the actual achievement of well-being up to the autonomous individual. As we just saw, however, it is not clear how far happiness policy initiatives actually infringe on personal liberty or autonomy. A further worry is that, happiness isn't really, or primarily, what matters for human well-being (Nussbaum 2008).

But a major motivation for thinking happiness the wrong object of policy is that neither happiness nor well-being are the appropriate focus of a theory of justice. What justice requires of society, on this view, is not that it make us happy; we do not have a right to be happy. Rather, justice demands only that each has sufficient opportunity (in the form of resources or capabilities, say) to achieve a good life, or that each gets a fair share of the benefits of social cooperation. However plausible such points may be, it is not clear how far they apply to many proposals for happiness-based policy, save the strongest claims that happiness should be the sole aim of policy: many policy decisions are not primarily concerned with questions of social justice, nor with constitutional fundamentals, the focus of some theories of justice. Happiness could be a poor candidate for the "currency" of justice, yet still remain a major policy concern. Indeed, the chief target of happiness policy advocates has been, not theories of justice, but governments' overwhelming emphasis on promoting GDP and other indices of economic growth. This is not, in the main, a debate about justice, and as of yet the philosophical literature has not extensively engaged with it.

However, the push for happiness-based policy is a recent development. In coming years, such questions will likely receive considerably more attention in the philosophical literature.

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Acknowledgments

For helpful comments, many thanks are due to Anna Alexandrova, Robert Biswas-Diener, Thomas Carson, Irwin Goldstein, Richard Lucas, Jason Raibley, Eric Schwitzgebel, Stephen Schueller, Adam Shriver, Edward Zalta, and an anonymous referee for the SEP. Portions of Section 2 are adapted from Haybron 2008, "Philosophy and the Science of Subjective Well-Being," in Eid and Larsen, The Science of Subjective Well-Being, and used with kind permission of Guilford Press.

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There are roughly two philosophical literatures on "happiness," each corresponding to a different sense of the term. One uses 'happiness' as a value term, roughly synonymous with well-being or flourishing. The other body of work uses the word as a purely descriptive psychological term, akin to 'depression' or 'tranquility'.

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Happiness: An Interactionist Perspective

CITATION: Ahuvia, A., Thin, N., Haybron, D. M., Biswas-Diener, R., Ricard, M., & Timsit, J. (2015). Happiness: An interactionist perspective. International Journal of Wellbeing, 5(1), 1-18. doi:10.5502/ijw.v5i1.1

Few would deny that happiness arises from a complex interaction of internal and external factors, like optimism on the one hand and money on the other. Yet research, as well as practical strategies for promoting happiness, tends to focus narrowly on one side or the other. A typical study, for instance, might examine the correlation between happiness and an internal variable like optimism, or an external variable like income. And practical strategies commonly divide into "change the world" versus "change your mind" approaches: promote health and wealth, for example, or cultivate gratitude for what you already have. This paper explores how our understanding of happiness is enhanced by "interactionist" approaches that emphasize the complex webs of interactions and feedbacks that give rise to happiness and unhappiness. While implicitly interactionist themes have increasingly characterized research on happiness, we anticipate that an explicit recognition of the interactionist perspective will foster greater attention to the complexities of happiness, particularly in the domain of human sociality, which involves especially rich and potent webs of interaction. A further upshot, we believe, is a greater awareness of our co-responsibility for one another's happiness.

Theory of Well-Being

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Happiness: An Interactionist Perspective CITATION: Ahuvia, A., Thin, N., Haybron, D. M., Biswas-Diener, R., Ricard, M., & Timsit, J. (2015). Happiness: An interactionist perspective. International Journal of Wellbeing, 5(1), 1-18. doi:10.5502/ijw.v5i1.1 Few would deny that happiness arises from a complex interaction of internal and external factors, like optimism on the one hand and money on the other.

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Pew Research Center's Social & Demographic Trends Project

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Americans have always had a thing about happiness. We all have certain unalienable rights, declares our Declaration of Independence, among them "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

So then, a couple of centuries into the chase, how are we doing?

Alas, only so-so. Just a third (34%) of adults in this country say they're very happy, according to the latest Pew Research Center survey. Another half say they are pretty happy and 15% consider themselves not too happy. These numbers have remained very stable for a very long time.

But some of us are happier than others, and this variance helps to paint a portrait of the kind of people Americans are. It also casts doubt on some of the famous wisdom on the subject.

For example, remember grandma's aphorism about money not buying happiness? Well, brace yourself, but dear ole grandma may have been misinformed. Our survey shows that nearly half (49%) of those with an annual family income of more than $100,000 say they're very happy. By contrast, just 24% of those with an annual family income of less than $30,000 say they're very happy.

This finding definitely puts grandma on shaky ground, but it doesn't necessarily prove her wrong. It establishes a correlation (two things that go hand in hand) rather than a cause (one thing that leads to the other). There are, in fact, any number of possible causes of this correlation. Perhaps money leads to happiness. Perhaps happiness leads to money. Or perhaps both are influenced by some other, more powerful factor.

Later in this report we'll try to sort out which correlations are most powerful. But meantime, we should note at the outset that all of the findings from this survey should be taken with a general caution.

Much of the research into the field of happiness - to say nothing of simple common sense - suggests that at the level of the individual, happiness is heavily influenced by life events (Did you get the big promotion? Have a fight with your boyfriend?) as well as by psychological traits (self-esteem, optimism, a sense of belonging, the capacity to love, etc.). The Pew survey did not look at life events or psychological characteristics. We only looked at happiness by demographic and behavioral traits. But through this admittedly limited prism, we found some fascinating correlations.

Several of them stand out: Married people are happier than unmarrieds. People who worship frequently are happier than those who don't. Republicans are happier than Democrats. Rich people are happier than poor people. Whites and Hispanics are happier than blacks. Sunbelt residents are happier than those who live in the rest of the country.

We also found some interesting non-correlations. People who have children are no happier than those who don't, after controlling for marital status. Retirees are no happier than workers. Pet owners are no happier than those without pets.

The findings are drawn from a telephone survey of a nationally representative, randomly-selected sample of 3,014 adults, conducted from Oct. 5 through Nov. 6, 2005. You can go directly to the full battery of happiness tables by clicking on this index. Here is a run-down of the most compelling findings.

Income

The correlation between happiness and family income is very strong indeed - reported happiness rises in a nearly straight line through eight levels of annual family income. At the highest income category - $150,000 and above - fully 50% of respondents report being very happy; by contrast, just 23% of those who have a family income below $20,000 say they are very happy.

But there is also a way to look at the long term trend in happiness that sheds a different light on the question of whether it is tied to money. As noted above, about a third of the public has been reporting they are very happy ever since 1972, when the General Social Survey (sociological surveys funded largely by the National Science Foundation) started asking the same happiness question that Pew posed in its survey. But during these past three decades, the average annual per capita income in this country has more than doubled in inflation adjusted dollars. Thus, in the aggregate, Americans have more money now than they did a generation ago. But in the aggregate, we're no happier.

So was grandma right after all - money doesn't buy happiness? Well, no. The trend data also show that what matters on the happiness front is not how much money you have, but whether you have more (or less) at any given time than everyone else.

That raises one more question: how about the really rich? Does the linear relationship between happiness and income continue right up into the income stratosphere - with billionaires happier than millionaires, who in turn are happier than the folks just getting by on $500,000 a year?

This survey can't provide an answer; random phone calls don't generate a large enough sample of the super rich. So all we can do is fall back on the wisdom of the popular culture, which is fond of chronicling the travails of the rich and famous. Of course, we can't be sure if these stories are based on a representative sample. But we do notice that reading them often makes us happy.

Political Party Affiliation

Some 45% of all Republicans report being very happy, compared with just 30% of Democrats and 29% of independents. This finding has also been around a long time; Republicans have been happier than Democrats every year since the General Social Survey began taking its measurements in 1972. Pew surveys since 1991 also show a partisan gap on happiness; the current 16 percentage point gap is among the largest in Pew surveys, rivaled only by a 17 point gap in February 2003.

Could it be that Republicans are so much happier now because their party controls all the levers of federal power? Not likely. Since 1972, the GOP happiness edge over Democrats has ebbed and flowed in a pattern that appears unrelated to which party is in political power.

For example, Republicans had up to a 10 and 11 percentage point happiness edge over Democrats in various years of both the Carter and Clinton presidencies, and as small as a three and five percentage point edge in various years of the Reagan and first Bush presidencies. Also, we should explain here a bit about how our survey questionnaire was constructed. The question about happiness was posed at the very beginning of the interview, while the question about political affiliation was posed at the back end, along with questions about demographic traits. So respondents were not cued to consider their happiness through the frame of partisan politics. This question is about happiness; it is not a question about happiness with partisan outcomes.

Of course, there's a more obvious explanation for the Republicans' happiness edge. Republicans tend to have more money than Democrats, and - as we've already discovered - people who have more money tend to be happier.

But even this explanation only goes so far. If one controls for household income, Republicans still hold a significant edge: that is, poor Republicans are happier than poor Democrats; middle-income Republicans are happier than middle-income Democrats, and rich Republicans are happier than rich Democrats.

Might ideology be the key? It's true that conservatives, who are more likely to be Republican, are happier than liberals, who are more likely to be Democrats. But even controlling for this ideological factor, a significant partisan gap remains. Conservative Republicans are happier than conservative Democrats, and moderate/liberal Republicans are happier than liberal Democrats. Hmmm, what other factors might be at play? Well, there's always...

Religiosity

People who attend religious services weekly or more are happier (43% very happy) than those who attend monthly or less (31%); or seldom or never (26%). This correlation between happiness and frequency of church attendance has been a consistent finding in the General Social Surveys taken over the years.

The same pattern applies within all major religious denominations. For example, 38% of all Catholics who attend church weekly or more report being very happy, while just 28% of Catholics who attend church less often say they are very happy. The survey also finds that white evangelical Protestants (43%) are more likely than white mainline Protestants (33%) to report being very happy, but this difference goes away after taking frequency of church attendance into account.

Marital and Parenting Status

Married people (43% very happy) are a good bit happier than unmarrieds (24%) and this too has been a consistent finding over many years and many surveys. It holds up for men as well as for women, and for the old as well as the young, though the marriage gap in happiness is not quite as great among the old.

Overall, parents are happier than adults who have no children, but this gap disappears once a person's marital status is considered. That is, married people with children are about as happy as married people without children. And unmarried people with children are about as happy as unmarried people without children.

Race and Ethnicity

Blacks (28%) are somewhat less likely than whites (36%) or Hispanics (34%) to report being very happy. The difference in average family income among the groups appears to be a factor, but it plays out in different ways for different groups. For non-Hispanic whites, having more family income is clearly correlated with being happier. (There are not enough Hispanics in the survey for analysis by income groups.) But among blacks, there is no correlation - blacks with a family income of $50,000 a year or more are about equally likely to say they are very happy (28%) than are blacks with a family income of less than $50,000 (27%). It's possible that blacks with incomes much higher than $50,000 (say $100,000 or more) are happier than others, but there were not enough of these higher income blacks in our survey for further analysis on this point.

Age and Gender

There is virtually no difference in happiness by gender and only a bit of variance in happiness by age. But the age data run counter to the prevailing ethos of the popular culture, which is forever extolling the blessings of youth.

It turns out that the young are less happy than the middle-aged or old. This gap is a bit more pronounced for men, who have a 15 percentage point happiness gap between those who are 18-to-29 years old and those who are over age 65, than it is for women, among whom the equivalent gap is just seven percentage points.

Work, Education, Health, Geography, Miscellanceous

Here most of the findings are pretty predictable - healthier people tend to be happier, and so do better-educated people.

The pattern in happiness by work status is a bit more complicated. Retirees (36%) and workers (35%) are equally likely to report being very happy, and both are happier than those who are not employed (26% very happy). There is a significant gender variance here. Retired men and retired women are about equally likely to be very happy, as are working men and working women. But among those who are not employed, men (16%) are less likely than women (30%) to report being very happy - presumably because for more women than men, not working outside the home is a matter of choice.

Recent immigrants are about as happy as those who have been here for generations. People who often feel rushed are less happy than those who don't. Suburbanites are a bit happier than city folks, and Sunbelt residents are a bit happier than people who live in colder climates.

Putting It All Together

How do all these factors play out together? Well, it can get complicated. Sometimes the correlations tend to reinforce one another. For example, healthy people tend to have more income, and both these traits independently correlate with happiness. But sometimes the correlations are not in sync. Frequent church-goers, for example, on average have less income than infrequent church-goers - so their religious profile pushes them up the happiness scale while their financial profile pushes them down. Which factor is more powerful? And is being a Republican really a predictor of happiness, independent of all other factors?

One way to find out is by way of a statistical technique known as multiple regression analysis, which gauges the relationship between each factor and happiness while controlling for all the other factors. That analysis shows that the most robust correlations of all those described in this report are health, income, church attendance, being married and, yes, being a Republican. Indeed, being a Republican is associated not only with happiness, it is also associated with every other trait in this cluster. Even so, the factor that makes the most difference in predicting happiness is neither being a Republican nor being wealthy - it's being in good health.

The same regression analysis also finds that education, gender, and race do not have a statistically significant independent effect on predicting happiness, once all the other factors are controlled.

Keep in mind, however, that even taking into account all these factors, we don't actually improve by very much our ability to predict which specific individual is likely to be very happy. If we knew who'd been fired last week, or who's a glass-is-always-half-full kind of person, we'd probably do a lot better.

Unhappiness

So much for happiness. What about the other side of the coin? Which Americans are "not too happy"? Well, as one would expect, the unhappy campers are for the most part the demographic mirror image of the happy campers. But there are a few wrinkles.

The first has to do with race. As already noted, whites and Hispanics are about equally likely to say they are very happy, and both groups are happier than blacks. But looking only at unhappiness, the relationship between the three groups changes: many fewer whites (12%) than blacks or Hispanics (each 23%) say they are not too happy.

On the health front, while there's a strong association between feeling healthy and happy, there's an even stronger association between feeling unhealthy and unhappy. Fully 55% of people who say their health is poor also report that they are "not too happy." No other characteristic measured in this report comes close to rivaling poor health as a predictor of unhappiness.

The unhappiness data also highlight the plight of another demographic group - single parents with minor age children. More than a quarter of them (27%) report being not too happy - by far the largest percentage for any marital or parenting sub-group in the survey.

A Closing Note on a Delicate Subject

Lastly, we come to what may be the most controversial non-finding of all. It turns out that there is no significant happiness gap between dog owners and cat owners. Or between owners of pets of any kind and those who have no pets. We're at a loss to explain. We're just happy - no, make that very happy - that neither Fido nor Felix can read.

About the Survey

Results for this survey are based on telephone interviews conducted with a nationally representative sample of adults, ages 18 years and older, living in continental U.S. telephone households.

Interviews conducted October 5-November 6, 2005

3,014 interviews

Margin of sampling error is plus or minus 2 percentage points for results based on the total sample at the 95% confidence level. The margin of sampling error is higher for results based on subgroups of respondents.

Survey interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish.

In addition to sampling error, bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias in the findings of opinion polls.
Read the full report for more details.

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Some of us are happier than others, and this variance helps to paint a portrait of the kind of people Americans are. It also casts doubt on some of the famous wisdom on the subject.