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Soviet Non Aggression Pact | August 1939

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Soviet Non Aggression Pact | August 1939

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The Soviet Union and Japan signed a 5-year neutrality agreement during WWII.

The pact allowed Japan to feel less threatened by a Soviet invasion.

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United Kingdom and China, the United States called for the surrender of the Japanese armed forces

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Potsdam Declaration, ultimatum issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China on July 26, 1945, calling for the unconditional surrender of Japan. The declaration was made at the Potsdam Conference near the end of World War II.

Two months after Germany surrendered, Allied leaders gathered in Potsdam, Germany, to discuss peace settlements, among other issues. However, although the European phase of the conflict had ended, the war continued in the Pacific theatre as Japan remained committed to fighting. U.S. Pres. Harry S. Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek thus drafted a declaration that defined the terms for Japan's surrender and made dire warnings if the country failed to put down its weapons; Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was not part of the ultimatum because his country had not yet declared war on Japan.

The declaration claimed that "unintelligent calculations" by Japan's military advisers had brought the country to the "threshold of annihilation." Hoping that the Japanese would "follow the path of reason," the leaders outlined their terms of surrender, which included complete disarmament, occupation of certain areas, and the creation of a "responsible government." However, it also promised that Japan would not "be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation." The declaration ended by warning of "prompt and utter destruction" if Japan failed to unconditionally surrender.

At a press conference, the Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Kantarō responded to the ultimatum with " mokusatsu." The translation of the word would become the source of much debate. While the press largely reported that he was refusing or ignoring the declaration, others later noted that mokusatsu could be translated to mean "no comment." However, Japan made no further statements in the ensuing days, and on August 6, 1945, the U.S. military dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan, destroying most of the city. More destruction followed as Nagasaki was bombed three days later. During this time, the Soviet Union also declared war on Japan. On August 15, Japan officially surrendered.

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Potsdam Declaration | Definition, Terms, & Facts

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Potsdam Declaration, ultimatum issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, and China on July 26, 1945, calling for the unconditional surrender of Japan. The declaration was made at the Potsdam Conference near the end of World War II. Learn more about the declaration's terms and the Japanese response.

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Establishment of ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ | June 1940

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Establishment of ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ | June 1940

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The Japanese occupied most of East and Southeast Asia

Was an attempt to form an economic and military alliance against Western colonization and manipulation

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Attempted coup d'etat on the Empire of Japan by rebel members of the Imperial Japan Military

Goal was to overthrow Japanese government

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Tokyo Asahi Shimbun describing the May 15 incident and assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi

The was an attempted coup d'état in the Empire of Japan, on May 15, 1932, launched by reactionary elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy, aided by cadets in the Imperial Japanese Army and civilian remnants of the ultranationalist League of Blood ( Ketsumei-dan). Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated by 11 young naval officers. The following trial and popular support of the Japanese population led to extremely light sentences for the assassins, strengthening the rising power of Japanese militarism and weakening democracy and the rule of law in the Empire of Japan.

As a result of the ratification of the London Naval Treaty limiting the size of the Imperial Japanese Navy, a movement grew within the junior officer corps to overthrow the government, and to replace it with military rule. This movement had parallels in the secret society organized within the Imperial Japanese Army. The naval officers established contacts with the ultranationalist Inoue Nissho and his "League of Blood", and agreed with his philosophy that to bring about a " Shōwa Restoration", it would be necessary to assassinate leading political and business figures ().[citation needed ]

In 1932, in the "Blood-Pledge Corps Incident", Inoue's group only managed to kill the former Finance Minister and head of the Rikken Minseitō, Inoue Junnosuke, and Director-General of Mitsui Holding Company, Takuma Dan on 9 February and 5 March respectively. While only two high-profile leaders were killed, the group initially planned to assassinate twenty other financial and political leaders.

Shūmei Ōkawa

Chaplin (third from right) and Sumo wrestlers around the time of the incident.

On May 15, 1932, the naval officers, aided by army cadets, and right-wing civilian elements (including Shūmei Ōkawa, Mitsuru Tōyama, and Kōzaburō Tachibana) staged their own attempt to complete what had been started in the League of Blood Incident.

Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was shot by eleven young naval officers (most were just turning twenty years of age) in the prime minister's residence. Inukai's last words were roughly "If I could speak, you would understand" to which his killers replied "Dialogue is useless".

The original assassination plan had included killing the English film star Charlie Chaplin who had arrived in Japan on May 14, 1932, at a reception for Chaplin, planned by Prime Minister Inukai. "These activists, eager to inject a nativist Yamato spirit into politics, recognised the charged political nature of mass culture". Chaplin's murder would facilitate war with the U.S., and anxiety in Japan, and lead on to "restoration" in the name of the emperor. When the prime minister was killed, his son Inukai Takeru was watching a sumo wrestling match with Charlie Chaplin, which probably saved both their lives.

The insurgents also attacked the residence of Makino Nobuaki, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, head of the Rikken Seiyūkai political party, and tossed hand-grenades into Mitsubishi Bank headquarters in Tokyo, and several electrical transformer substations.

Aside from the murder of the prime minister, the attempted coup d'état came to nothing, and the rebellion as a whole proved a failure. The participants took a taxi to the police headquarters and surrendered themselves to the without a struggle.

The eleven officers who murdered Prime Minister Inukai were court-martialed. During the proceedings, the accused used the trial as a platform to proclaim their loyalty to the emperor and to arouse popular sympathy by appealing for reforms of the government and economy. By end of the trial, the court had received 110,000 clemency petitions, either signed or written entirely in blood, from sympathizers around the country pleading for a lenient sentence. Additionally, nine youths in Niigata asked to be tried by the court instead of the accused, and sent the court a jar containing nine of their own pickled severed pinky fingers as a gesture of their sincerity.

The punishment handed down by the court was extremely light, and there was little doubt in the Japanese press that the murderers of Prime Minister Inukai would be released in a couple of years, if not sooner. Failure to severely punish the plotters in the May 15 Incident further eroded the rule of law and the power of the democratic government in Japan to confront the military. Indirectly, it led to the February 26 Incident and the increasing rise of Japanese militarism.

Beasley, W.G. (2000). The Rise of Modern Japan, 3rd Edition: Political, Economic, and Social Change since 1850. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0-312-23373-6.

Borkwith, Mark (1989). Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia. Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-3471-3.

Oka, Yoshitake (1984). Five Political Leaders of Modern Japan: Ito Hirobumi, Okuma Shigenobu, Hara Takashi, Inukai Tsuyoshi, and Saionji Kimmochi. University of Tokyo Press. ISBN 0-86008-379-9.

Sims, Richard (2001). Japanese Political History Since the Meiji Renovation 1868-2000. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0-312-23915-7.

Spector, Ronald (1985). Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan. Vintage. ISBN 0-394-74101-3.

Toland, John (2003). The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (reprint ed.). Modern Library. ISBN 0-8129-6858-1.

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The was an attempted coup d'état in the Empire of Japan, on May 15, 1932, launched by reactionary elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy, aided by cadets in the Imperial Japanese Army and civilian remnants of the ultranationalist League of Blood ( Ketsumei-dan). Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated by 11 young naval officers.

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Another attempted coup d'etat on the Empire of Japan organized by young members of the Imperial Japanese military

Goal was to get rid of anyone in the government and military that rivaled their beliefs

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The February 26 incident was an attempted in the Empire of Japan on 26 February 1936. It was organized by a group of young Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) officers with the goal of purging the government and military leadership of their factional rivals and ideological opponents.

Although the rebels succeeded in assassinating several leading officials (including two former prime ministers) and in occupying the government center of Tokyo, they failed to assassinate Prime Minister Keisuke Okada or secure control of the Imperial Palace. Their supporters in the army made attempts to capitalize on their actions, but divisions within the military, combined with Imperial anger at the coup, meant they were unable to achieve a change of government. Facing overwhelming opposition as the army moved against them, the rebels surrendered on 29 February.

Unlike earlier examples of political violence by young officers, the coup attempt had severe consequences. After a series of closed trials, nineteen of the uprising's leaders were executed for mutiny and another forty were imprisoned. The radical Kōdō-ha faction lost its influence within the army, while the military, now free from infighting, increased its control over the civilian government, which had been severely weakened by the assassination of key moderate and liberal-minded leaders.

Sadao Araki, leader of the Kōdō-ha

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) had a long history of factionalism among its high-ranking officers, originally stemming from domainal rivalries in the Meiji period. By the early 1930s, officers in the high command had become split into two main informal groups: the Kōdō-ha "Imperial Way" faction led by General Sadao Araki and his ally General Jinzaburō Mazaki, and the Tōsei-ha "Control" faction identified with General Tetsuzan Nagata.

The Kōdō-ha emphasized the importance of Japanese culture, spiritual purity over material quality, and the need to attack the Soviet Union (Hokushin-ron), while the Tōsei-ha officers, who were strongly influenced by the ideas of the contemporary German general staff, supported central economic and military planning ( total war theory), technological modernization, mechanization and expansion within China (Nanshin-ron). The Kōdō-ha was dominant in the IJA during Araki's tenure as Minister of War from 1931 to 1934, occupying most significant staff positions, but many of its members were replaced by Tōsei-ha officers following Araki's resignation.

The "young officers"

IJA officers were divided between those whose education had ended at the Army Academy (an undergraduate academy) and those who had advanced on to the prestigious Army War College (a graduate school for midlevel officers). The latter group formed the elite of the officer corps, while officers of the former group were effectively barred by tradition from advancement to higher-level staff positions. A number of these lesser-privileged officers formed the army's contribution to the young, highly politicized group often referred to as the "young officers".

The young officers believed that the problems facing the nation were the result of Japan straying from the (an amorphous term often translated as "national polity", it roughly signifies the relationship between the Emperor and the state). To them, the "privileged classes" exploited the people, leading to widespread poverty in rural areas, and deceived the Emperor, usurping his power and weakening Japan. The solution, they believed, was a " Shōwa Restoration" modeled on the Meiji Restoration of 70 years earlier. By rising up and destroying the "evil advisers around the Throne", the officers would enable the Emperor to re-establish his authority. The Emperor would then purge those who exploited the people, restoring prosperity to the nation. These beliefs were strongly influenced by contemporary nationalist thought, especially the political philosophy of the former socialist Ikki Kita. Almost all of the young officers' subordinates were from poor peasant family or working class, and believed that the young officers truly understood their predicaments and spirits.

The loose-knit young officers group varied in size, but is estimated to have had roughly 100 regular members, mostly officers in the Tokyo area. Its informal leader was Mitsugi (Zei) Nishida. A former IJA lieutenant and disciple of Kita, Nishida had become a prominent member of the civilian nationalist societies that proliferated in Japan from the late 1920s. He referred to the army group as the Kokutai Genri-ha (, "National Principle") faction. Involved at least to some extent in most of the political violence of the period, following the March and October incidents of 1931, the army and navy members of the group split and largely ended their association with civilian nationalists.

Despite its relatively small size, the Kokutai Genri-ha faction was influential, due in no small part to the threat it posed. It had sympathizers among the general staff and the Imperial Family, most notably Prince Chichibu, the Emperor's brother (and, until 1933, his heir), who was friends with Nishida and other Kokutai Genri-ha leaders. Despite being fiercely anti-capitalist, the faction had also managed to secure irregular funding from leaders who hoped to shield themselves.

The exact nature of the relationship between the Kōdō-ha and the Kokutai Genri-ha was complicated, with historians treating the two factions either as the same entity or as two groups forming a larger whole. However, contemporary accounts and the writings of members of the two groups make clear they were actually distinct groups in a mutually beneficial alliance. The Kōdō-ha shielded the Kokutai Genri-ha and provided it with access, while they in exchange benefited from their perceived ability to restrain the radical officers.

The years leading up to the February 26 Incident were marked by a series of outbursts of violence by the young officers and their fellow nationalists against political opponents. Most notable was the May 15 Incident of 1932, in which young naval officers assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. This incident is significant because it convinced the young army officers (who were aware of, but not involved in, the attack) of the need to utilize troops in any potential coup attempt. The ringleaders of the incident, as in the previous March and October incidents, received relatively light punishments.

The direct prelude to the February 26 Incident, however, was the 1934 Military Academy Incident (November Incident) and its consequences. In this incident, Captain Takaji Muranaka and Captain Asaichi Isobe, prominent members of the Kokutai Genri-ha, were arrested for planning a coup with a group of military cadets. Muranaka and Isobe admitted discussing such a coup, but denied having any plans to actually carry it out. The military court investigating the incident found there was insufficient evidence to indict, but Muranaka and Isobe were suspended by the army. The two were convinced that the incident was a Tōsei-ha attack on the young officers and began circulating a pamphlet calling for a "housecleaning" of the IJA and naming Tetsuzan Nagata as the "chief villain". They were then expelled from the IJA.

It was at this time that the last Kōdō-ha officer in a prominent position, General Jinzaburō Mazaki, was forced out of office. The insidious and cantankerous Mazaki was generally disliked by his colleagues and his removal was not purely political but the young officers were enraged because, having become disillusioned with Araki for his failures to overcome resistance in the cabinet during his time as War Minister, Mazaki had become the focus of their hopes. Muranaka and Isobe released a new pamphlet attacking Nagata for the dismissal, as did Nishida.

February 26 was chosen because the officers had been able to arrange to have themselves and their allies serve as duty officers on that date, facilitating their access to arms and ammunition. The date also allowed Mazaki to testify at Aizawa's trial as scheduled on the 25th.

The uprising was planned in a series of meetings held between 18 and 22 February by Nishida, Yasuhide Kurihara, Teruzō Andō, Hisashi Kōno, Takaji Muranaka and Asaichi Isobe. The plan decided upon was relatively simple. The officers would assassinate the most prominent enemies of the kokutai, secure control of the administrative center of the capital and the Imperial Palace, then submit their demands (the dismissal of certain officers and the appointment of a new cabinet led by Mazaki). They had no longer-term goals, believing that those should be left to the Emperor. It is believed that they were prepared to replace Hirohito with Prince Chichibu if necessary, however.

The young officers believed they had at least tacit approval for their uprising from a number of important IJA officers after making a number of informal approaches. These included Araki, Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima, Jinzaburō Mazaki, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Kanji Ishiwara, Shigeru Honjō and their own immediate commanders, Kōhei Kashii and Takeo Hori. Kawashima's successor as Minister of War later remarked that if all the officers who had supported the rebels had been forced to resign, there wouldn't have been enough high-ranking officers left to replace them.

The young officers prepared an explanation of their intentions and grievances in a document entitled "Manifesto of the Uprising", which they wanted to be handed to the Emperor. The document was prepared by Muranaka, but written in Shirō Nonaka's name as he was the highest-ranking officer involved in the plot. The document was entirely in line with Kokutai Genri-ha ideals, blaming the , political leaders, military factions, zaibatsu, bureaucrats and political parties for endangering the kokutai through their selfishness and disrespect for the Emperor and asserting the need for direct action:

Now, as we are faced with great emergencies both foreign and domestic, if we do not execute the disloyal and unrighteous who threaten the kokutai, if we do not cut away the villains who obstruct the Emperor's authority, who block the Restoration, the Imperial plan for our nation will come to nothing [...] To cut away the evil ministers and military factions near the Emperor and destroy their heart: that is our duty and we will complete it.

Seven targets were chosen for assassination for "threatening the kokutai":

Keisuke Okada

Prime Minister

Support for the London Naval Treaty, support for the " organ theory" of the kokutai.

Makino Nobuaki

former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, former Foreign Minister

Support for the London Naval Treaty, preventing Prince Fushimi from protesting to the Emperor at the time, establishing a court faction with Saitō.

Jōtarō Watanabe

Mazaki's replacement as Inspector General of Military Education

Support for the "organ theory" of the kokutai, refusal to resign despite his unsuitability.

The first four mentioned in the above list survived the attempted coup. Saionji, Saitō, Suzuki and Makino were targeted because they were the most influential Imperial advisers. Okada and Takahashi were moderate political leaders who had worked to restrain the military. Finally, Watanabe was targeted as a member of the Tōsei-ha and because he had been involved with Mazaki's removal.

From 22 February on, the seven leaders managed to convince eighteen other officers to join the uprising with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were informed on the night of 25 February, hours before the attacks started. Although the officers insisted that all NCOs participated voluntarily and any orders given were merely , many of the NCOs argued later that they had been in no real position to refuse to participate. The soldiers themselves, 70% of whom were less than a month out of basic training, were not told anything before the coup began, though many were (according to the officers) enthusiastic once the uprising began.

The coup leaders adopted the name "Righteous Army" for this force and the password "Revere the Emperor, Destroy the Traitors", adopted from the Meiji Restoration-era slogan, "Revere the Emperor, Destroy the Shogunate". Allies were also to display a three-sen postage stamp when approaching the army's lines.

The night of 25 February brought heavy snowfall to Tokyo. This heartened the rebel officers because it reminded them of the 1860 Sakuradamon Incident in which (political activists with ambitions) assassinated Ii Naosuke, the chief adviser to the Shōgun, in the name of the Emperor.

The attack on Okada consisted of 280 men from the 1st Infantry Regiment led by 1st Lieutenant Yasuhide Kurihara.

Captain Kiyosada Kōda, accompanied by Muranaka, Isobe, and others, led 160 men to seize control of the Minister of War's residence, the Ministry of War itself and the General Staff Office. Once this had been accomplished, they entered the residence and asked to see Minister Kawashima. When they were admitted to see him at 06:30, they read their manifesto aloud and handed him a document in which they made numerous demands of the army, including:

During this period, a number of officers sympathetic to the rebels were admitted, including General Mazaki, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, General Ryū Saitō and the Vice-Minister of War, Motoo Furushō. Saitō praised the young officers' spirit and urged Kawashima to accept their demands. Shortly before 09:00, Kawashima stated that he needed to speak with the Emperor and left for the Imperial Palace.

Captain Hisashi Kōno commanded a team consisting of seven members, including six civilians, to attack Makino, who was staying at Kōfūsō, part of the ryokan Itōya in Yugawara, Kanagawa Prefecture, with his family. Arriving at 05:45, they stationed two men outside, then entered the inn with weapons drawn, at which point policemen stationed inside opened fire, beginning a lengthy gunfight. A policeman notified Makino and his party of the attack and led them to a rear entrance. The assassins fired upon the group as they left, but did not realize that Makino had managed to escape. Kōno was wounded in the chest during the gunfire and one policeman, Yoshitaka Minagawa, was killed. As Kōno was carried from the fighting, the assassins set fire to the building. Hearing a single shot, Kōno believed Makino had shot himself inside the burning building. The men took Kōno to a nearby military hospital where all were arrested by military police.

Attack on the Asahi Shimbun

At approximately 10:00, Kurihara and Nakahashi boarded three trucks with sixty men and traveled from the Prime Minister's Residence to the offices of the Asahi Shimbun, a prominent liberal newspaper. Charging into the building, the officers forced the newspaper employees to evacuate while yelling that the attack was "divine retribution for being an un-Japanese newspaper". They then overturned and scattered the newspaper's type trays (containing 4,000 different characters) on the floor, temporarily preventing the newspaper from publishing. Following the attack the men distributed copies of the uprising's manifesto to nearby newspapers and returned to the Prime Minister's Residence.

Korekiyo Takahashi

1st Lieutenant Motoaki Nakahashi of the 3rd Imperial Guard assembled 135 men and, telling his commanders that they were going to pay their respects at Yasukuni Shrine (or Meiji Jingū; sources differ), marched to Takahashi's personal residence. There he split his men in half and took one group to attack the residence while having the other stand guard outside. After the men smashed their way into the compound, confused servants led Nakahashi and Lieutenant Kanji Nakajima to Takahashi's bedroom. There, Nakahashi shot the sleeping Takahashi with his pistol while Nakajima slashed him with his sword. Takahashi died without waking.

Once Takahashi was dead, Nakahashi sent the group that had participated in the attack to join the troops already at the Prime Minister's Residence. He then accompanied the remaining group of men onward to the Imperial Palace.

Nakahashi and his 75 men entered the palace grounds using the western Hanzō Gate at 06:00. Nakahashi's unit was the scheduled emergency relief company, and he told the commander of the palace guard, Major Kentarō Honma, that he had been dispatched to reinforce the gates because of the attacks earlier that morning. Honma had been informed of the attacks, so he found Nakahashi's arrival unsurprising. Nakahashi was assigned to help secure the Sakashita Gate, the main entrance to the grounds directly in front of the Kyūden (the Emperor's residence).

Nakahashi's plan had been to secure the Sakashita Gate, then use flashlights to signal the nearby rebel troops at police headquarters to join him. Having gained control over access to the Emperor, the rebels would then be able to prevent anyone but Honjō and others they approved of from seeing him. Nakahashi had difficulty contacting his allies, however, and by 08:00 Honma had learned of his involvement in the uprising. Nakahashi was ordered at gunpoint to leave the palace grounds. He did so, joining Kurihara at the Prime Minister's Residence. His soldiers remained at the gate until they were relieved at 13:00, at which point they returned to their barracks. For this reason, these 75 soldiers were not included in the government's official tally of rebel forces.

Saitō Makoto

Kantarō Suzuki

Captain Teruzō Andō led 200 men of the 3rd Infantry Regiment to Suzuki's private residence just across from the Imperial Palace in Kōjimachi. They surrounded and disarmed the police on guard, then a group entered the building. After Suzuki was discovered in his bedroom, he was shot twice (sources differ as to who fired the shots). Andō then moved to deliver a coup de grace with his sword, when Suzuki's wife pleaded to be allowed to do it herself. Believing Suzuki to be mortally wounded, Andō agreed. He apologized to her, explaining that it was done for the sake of the nation. He then ordered his men to salute Suzuki and they left to guard the Miyakezaka junction north of the Ministry of War. Suzuki, although seriously wounded, would survive.

Andō had visited Suzuki at his home in 1934 to suggest that Araki be appointed prime minister following Saitō's resignation. Suzuki had rejected the suggestion, but Andō had come away with a favorable impression of Suzuki.

Watanabe Jōtarō

Jōtarō Watanabe's dead body

Captain Shirō Nonaka took nearly a third of all the rebels' troops, 500 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment, to attack the headquarters of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, located directly south of the Imperial Palace, with the goal of securing its communication equipment and preventing the dispatch of the police's Emergency Service Unit. They met no resistance and soon secured the building, possibly due to a police decision to leave the situation in the hands of the army. Nonaka's group was as large as it was because they were intended to move on to the palace itself.

After the occupation of the police headquarters, 2nd Lieutenant Kinjirō Suzuki led a small group to attack the nearby residence of Fumio Gotō, the Home Minister. Gotō was not home, however, and escaped the attack. This attack appears to have been the result of an independent decision by Suzuki rather than part of the officers' overall plan, however.

Hanzōmon, February 26, 1936

With Saitō dead and Suzuki gravely wounded, the Emperor's chief remaining advisors were Kōichi Kido, Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper; Kurahei Yuasa, Minister of the Imperial Household; and Vice-Grand Chamberlain Tadataka Hirohata. These officials met after learning of the attacks from Suzuki's secretary. They took a hard line, advising the Emperor that he should demand that efforts be concentrated on suppressing the uprising and that he must not accept the resignation of the current government, as doing so would "effectively be granting victory to the rebel army". It was after hearing this advice that Hirohito hardened his position.

Kawashima met with the Emperor at 09:30 after his meeting with the rebel officers at the Ministry of War. He read the officers' manifesto and demands aloud and then recommended the Emperor form a new cabinet to "clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life, and fulfill national defense." The Emperor refused and demanded that Kawashima suppress the uprising. When the remaining members of Okada's government, unaware that he was alive, attempted to resign that afternoon, Hirohito told them he would not allow it until the uprising had been suppressed.

The Minister of War's proclamation and de facto recognition

The Supreme Military Council (SMC) held an unofficial meeting in the afternoon, attended by a number of other officers including Kashii, Yamashita, Kawashima and Hajime Sugiyama, Vice Chief of Staff. The SMC, while a prestigious part of the IJA, had little function in peacetime and had therefore become a body to which high-ranking officers could be appointed without actually granting them power. For this reason, by 1936 a number of Kōdō-ha generals, including Araki and Mazaki, had been made members.

The authority of this meeting was disputed; it had not been convened by the Emperor, and Sugiyama argued that it had no authority. Araki countered that the "elders of the army" had a moral obligation to resolve the situation. The Kōdō-ha members and their supporters controlled a clear majority of the council.

Despite the Emperor's order to Kawashima that the uprising be suppressed, Araki proposed that a message be drafted to the rebels. This message, which came to be known as the "Minister of War's Proclamation", has become a point of controversy (it was issued in Kawashima's name because of the unofficial nature of the SMC meeting). Araki and other participants argued later that it had been intended to persuade the officers to surrender. Others interpreted it as an endorsement of the uprising.

The proclamation read:

1. The purpose of your actions has been reported to His Majesty.

2. We recognize that your motives are based on a sincere desire to clarify the national polity.

3. The current state of the national polity (including its defilement) is a matter of great regret to us.

4. All the Supreme War Councilors have agreed to unite and move forward in accordance with the principles stated above.

Once approved, Yamashita brought the message to the rebels in the Ministry of War, who were pleased but somewhat confused by its vagueness. Some of the officers later testified that Yamashita claimed that the Emperor had approved the message, but Yamashita denied this.

Another point of controversy was the proclamation's wording. Although the above text notes that the rebels' "motives" were recognized, another version of the text was distributed by Kashii (possibly at Kawashima's instructions) shortly after 15:30 to military units in Tokyo. This version recognized the rebels' "actions" rather than their "motives". This difference has been attributed to Kōdō-ha manipulation of the text after-the-fact. Araki, Yamashita and others claimed that what Kashii distributed was an earlier, unfinished draft of the proclamation.

Two other developments deepened the rebel officers' impression that their uprising had succeeded. At 15:00, shortly before the Minister of War's message was released, Kashii, acting as commander of the Tokyo garrison, ordered a state of "wartime emergency" in the 1st Division's operational area (which included the area being occupied by the rebel troops). This had the effect of formally placing the rebel troops within the chain of command under Lieutenant General Takeo Hori's 3rd Infantry Regiment. Hori placed them under Colonel Satoshi Kofuji and charged them with maintaining law and order in their area. Thus, the rebel officers were no longer acting illegally by occupying their positions. As with the earlier Minister of War's Proclamation, this order was later justified as an attempt to convince the rebel officers to end their occupation. The officers were, however, encouraged by the act and convinced that they were on the verge of success.

Despite the above developments, the position of the Righteous Army was less secure than it seemed. Most significantly, as noted above, the Emperor and his court officials had taken a hard line towards the uprising. In addition, the rebels also faced important opposition within the military as well, especially from the Army General Staff and navy. Many within the army were pleased by the assassinations because they had removed a number of the army's opponents within the government. However, they could not accept the more radical social ideas included within a "Shōwa Restoration" and were not disposed to accept a Kōdō-ha-dominated cabinet. Others, such as Kanji Ishiwara, were infuriated at the rebel officers' use of troops without authorization.

Imperial Japanese Navy Land Force of Yokosuka arriving at Shibaura, Tokyo, following the outbreak of the "February 26 Incident".

The Naval Staff had taken a similarly dim view of the uprising, at least partly due to the attacks on three admirals (Okada, Saitō and Suzuki). It summoned the 1st Fleet to Tokyo on 26 February. By the afternoon of 27 February forty warships were stationed in Tokyo Bay and the navy's land forces (rikusentai) had been dispatched to defend naval installations in the city.

It was for this reason that Araki, Mazaki and most of the other members of the SMC met with Muranaka and Kurihara at the Ministry of War on the night of 26 February. There they congratulated the officers again, but asked that they return to their units and leave the rest to the SMC. The rebel officers refused, correctly pointing out that it was only because they had fully armed troops behind them the generals were prepared to listen, and again spoke of the need to promote the Shōwa Restoration and form a "strong cabinet centered around the military". No agreement was reached.

However, unknown to Kashii, Mazaki and the rebel officers, Sugiyama had already asked the Emperor at 08:20 to issue an imperial command authorizing the use of force against the Righteous Army. This was immediately granted and issued to Sugiyama, to be released at his discretion. Addressed to Kashii, the command ordered him to quickly evict "the officers and men occupying the Miyakezaka area".

Order in Prince Kan'in Kotohito's name transmitting the imperial command to Kōhei Kashii

The Emperor had, by the end of 27 February, become increasingly impatient with the failure of the Army to suppress the uprising as he had ordered on the previous day. The Navy's quick response satisfied him but the Army's hesitation was inexplicable to the Emperor. He summoned Honjō throughout the day, demanding to know if the rebels had been suppressed. When Honjō spoke in defense of the officers' motives, the Emperor angrily replied "killing my ministers is tantamount to strangling me with cotton wool" and added that the rebels deserved no leniency. At one point, Hirohito became so impatient he threatened to assume personal command of the Imperial Guard and order them to attack the rebels himself.

The General Staff and Martial Law Headquarters decided to release the imperial command at 05:00 on the 28th. From this point on formal documents, which had previously used "uprising", the word chosen by the rebel officers themselves, began to use the word "rebellion" instead.

At 08:00 the rebel officers' nominal superior, Major Kofuji, was told to inform the officers of the imperial command and order them to return to their units. However, Muranaka and Kōda had already heard of the command from Nakahashi. Believing the order to be a mistake, they went to see him. When they met Kofuji, he only told them to come to 1st Division Headquarters. There they met General Hori, who lied to them, telling them that no command had been issued. The relieved but skeptical officers left.

A meeting of the heads of the army - including Kawashima, Kashii and Sugiyama - had been held from the early morning onward (Araki and Mazaki had attempted to attend but had been told to leave, as the SMC had no authority). Kawashima and Kashii attempted to convince the group to avoid violence, but when 10:00 passed without any word of movement by the rebel officers, they approved the use of force. However, when Hori and Kofuji came to see Kashii at 10:40, the three agreed that it was too early to enact the imperial command. It has also been suggested that a lack of preparedness on the part of government forces was another factor. Either way, the action was delayed.

Yamashita visited the Ministry of War at 12:00 and told the rebel officers that the issuance of the imperial command was merely a matter of time and that they should "take responsibility". Hori joined the group at 12:30 and confirmed Yamashita's words. Shortly after, Kurihara, speaking for the group, asked that an Imperial messenger be sent. He said that the officers would commit suicide and the NCOs would take the soldiers back to their barracks. Yamashita, joined by Kawashima, immediately went to the Imperial Palace, where he informed Honjō of the officers' request for the Imperial Command for their suicide, perceived to be the only honourable way out for them. Honjō, thinking this was a good solution for all parties concerned, asked his majesty that the request be granted, but to his surprise, the Emperor flatly refused. His fury was such that he blurted "If they want to die, do as they wish. Do it on their own. An Imperial Command is out of question".

Not all the rebels had been prepared to commit suicide. Andō had been infuriated at the idea, yelling that "the generals want to use us as footstools and have us kill ourselves". His rejection of the idea and the Emperor's refusal led to a change of heart among the officers. By 13:30 they had decided to fight. Kofuji learned this at 14:00, when he finally attempted to gather the officers to read them the imperial command and they refused to return to their units (the orders had to be formally given in order to be valid). Soon after, at 16:00, Martial Law Headquarters announced that force would be used and the rebel troops were removed from Kofuji's command at 18:00. At 23:00 orders went out to begin preparations at 05:00 on 29 February for a general attack.

To enlisted men!
1. It is still not too late, so return to your units.
2. All those who resist will be shot as rebels.
3. Your fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters are all weeping because they will become traitors.
Martial Law Headquarters, February 29.

By the morning of 29 February, the Righteous Army, consisting of less than 1,500, was surrounded by more than 20,000 loyal government troops and 22 tanks. The general attack was planned for 09:00. By 05:30 all civilians in the surrounding areas had been evacuated.

The Emperor signed an ordinance on March 4, 1936, establishing a Special Court Martial to try those involved in the uprising. All 1,483 members of the Righteous Army were interrogated, but ultimately only 124 were prosecuted: nineteen officers, 73 NCOs, nineteen soldiers and ten civilians. Of these, all of the officers, 43 NCOs, three soldiers and all of the civilians were found guilty. The trials related to the uprising took nearly eighteen months to complete.

The main trial of the ringleaders of the rebellion (the nineteen surviving officers, Isobe, Muranaka and two other civilians) began on 28 April. The trial was held in secret, and the defendants did not have rights to legal representation, call witnesses or appeal. The judges were not interested in hearing about the defendants' motives and intentions, and forced them to concentrate on their actions in their testimony. The trial was therefore far different from the ordinary court martial that Aizawa had faced a few months earlier. Charged with rebellion, the rebel officers argued that their actions had been approved by the Minister of War's Proclamation and their incorporation into the martial law forces, and that they had never been formally presented with the imperial command. The verdicts were handed down on 4 June and the sentences on 5 July: all were found guilty and seventeen were sentenced to death.

Kita and Nishida were also charged as ringleaders of the rebellion and tried in a separate trial. Their actions during the uprising had only been indirect (primarily providing support over the telephone) and as such they did not actually meet the requirements of the charge. The chief judge, Major-General Isao Yoshida, protested to the Ministry of War that the charges were improper. However, the Tōsei-ha generals now dominant in the IJA had decided that the two men's influence had to be eliminated; Yoshida later wrote another judge to tell him that regardless of the lack of evidence, it had been decided that the two must die. They were sentenced to death on 14 August 1937.

Despite the failure of the coup, the February 26 Incident had the effect of significantly increasing the military's influence over the civilian government. The Okada cabinet resigned on 9 March and a new cabinet was formed by Kōki Hirota, Okada's foreign minister. This transition was not without its problems, however. When the selection of Hirota was made clear and efforts began to assemble a cabinet, General Hisaichi Terauchi, the new cabinet's Minister of War, made his displeasure with some of the selections clear. Hirota gave in to Terauchi's demands and changed his selections, choosing Hachirō Arita over Shigeru Yoshida as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Although only Mazaki faced criminal charges, this didn't mean that the Kōdō-ha didn't suffer any consequences from the incident. Under Terauchi's auspices, "reform staff officers", most notably Ishiwara and Akira Mutō, began a purge of the military. Of the twelve full generals in the army, nine were removed from active service by the end of April, including Kōdō-ha members Araki, Mazaki, Kawashima and Honjō. At the same time, other Kōdō-ha officers and their supporters were either removed from active service or sent to positions away from the capital, where they would be less able to influence policy. Among these were Yamashita, Kashii, Kofuji, Hori, Hashimoto and Yanagawa. Although other, non-Kōdō-ha officers were also targeted to a limited extent, the focus of the actions was clearly on eliminating Kōdō-ha influence. Almost every high-ranking officer who had helped support the Righteous Army during the uprising was therefore affected.

The parents, widows, and children of the executed rebels, who were prevented by the government from commemorating them until the end of the Second World War, formed the Busshinkai. They have established two sites in Tokyo commemorating the officers of the February 26 Incident. In 1952, shortly after the end of the Allied occupation of Japan, they placed a gravestone entitled "Grave of the Twenty-two Samurai" in Kensōji, a temple in Azabu-Jūban, where the ashes of the executed men had been placed. The "twenty-two" signifies the nineteen men executed, the two who committed suicide (Nonaka and Kōno) and Aizawa. Then, in 1965, they placed a statue of Kannon, the Buddhist goddess of mercy, dedicated to the memories of the rebel officers and their victims at the former location of the Shibuya execution grounds.

^ Shillony translates the word 認む in the 2nd clause as "approve" rather than "recognize". Shillony (1973), p. 153

Bix, Herbert P. (2000). Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. Perennial.

Brown, Delmer M. (1955). Nationalism in Japan. University of California Press.

Chaen Yoshio (2001). Zusetsu Ni Niroku Jiken. Nihon Tosho Center.

Crowley, James B. (1962). "Japanese Army Factionalism in the Early 1930s" The Journal of Asian Studies (21:3).

Hane, Mikiso (1983). Emperor Hirohito and His Chief Aide-de-Camp: the Honjo Diary, 1933-36. University of Tokyo Press.

Jansen, Marius (2002). The Making of Modern Japan. Harvard University Press.

Kita Hiroaki (2003). Ni Niroku Jiken Zenkenshō. Asahi Shimbun.

Shillony, Ben-Ami (1973). Revolt in Japan: The Young Officers and the February 26, 1936 Incident. Princeton University Press.

Sims, Richard. "Japanese Fascism," (1982) History Today (Jan 1982), Vol. 32 Issue 1, pp. 10-13. online.

Storry, Richard (1957). The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism. Greenwood Press.

Yoshii Hiroshi (ed.) (1989). Mokugekisha ga Kataru Showa-shi (Vol. 4): 2/26 Jiken. Shin-Jinbutsuoraisha.

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The February 26 incident was an attempted in the Empire of Japan on 26 February 1936. It was organized by a group of young Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) officers with the goal of purging the government and military leadership of their factional rivals and ideological opponents.

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Also known as the Second China-Japan war

Japan invaded the China

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Japan Invaded French Indochina | September 22, 1940

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Japan Invaded French Indochina | September 22, 1940

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Japan demanded the termination of war materials and restriction on imports into China in exchange for the territory of Indochina.

Vichy France rejected Japan's demand for the occupation of Indochina.

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The Axis powers were created

Formed by Japan, Germany, and Italy.

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Attack on Pearl Harbor | December 7, 1941

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Attack on Pearl Harbor | December 7, 1941

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The Japanese military launched an unsuspected attack on Pearl Harbor

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt decided to declare war against Japan.

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United States detonated an atomic bomb over Hiroshima, a city in Japan

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Soviet Union Declare War on Japan | August 8, 1945

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Soviet Union Declare War on Japan | August 8, 1945

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Soviet Union declared war on Japan

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USSR Invades Japanese Puppet State | August 9, 1945

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USSR Invades Japanese Puppet State | August 9, 1945

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The Soviet Union invaded the Imperial Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo

Hours later, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Japan

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Soviet-Japan and the termination of the Second World War - The National Archives blog

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75 years ago today, in the morning of Sunday 2 September 1945, the Japanese representatives signed the Instrument of Surrender, which officially ended the Second World War. The Second World War in the Far East had started with Japan's attack of the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in the morning of Sunday 7 December [...]

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A mass murder of Chinese civilians in the capital of the Republic of China, Nanking, by the Imperial Japanese army

Was a part of the Second Sino-Japanese War

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Japanese representatives signed an official “Instrument of Surrender”

The letter sent out outlined the complete defeat of Japan

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Japanese aircraft attacked and damaged the U.S. base on Midway.

The Japanese navy became aware of the presence of the U.S. naval forces in the area.

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Tojo was sentenced to death for war crimes and executed by hanging