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Why are we fighting with them? What weapons do they have and what have they tried? What treats have they made? 

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Why are we fighting with them? What weapons do they have and what have they tried? What treats have they made? 

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The US is not actively fighting North Korea. The US is greatly concerned about the threat North Korea poses to the regional stability of East Asia. North Korea is a grave threat to its fellow Koreans in the South, and there is the fear that North Korea would invade the South and impose a Stalinist communist state in South Korea. Since North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and is actively seeking to develop ballistic missiles capable of nuclear strikes on South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, the US, and US bases in the Pacific, a strategic objective of the US is stopping North Korea from being able to harm the nations in the area. If need be, the US may conclude it needs to take military action to eliminate the North Korean regime of Kim Jong Un and his nuclear weapons capabilities.

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A war between the United States and North Korea seems more probable by the week, with Tuesday's missile launch from Kim Jong Un's regime being only the latest fearsome provocation.

Kim and President Donald Trump were trading threats of mass destruction for months, and the launch of North Korea's most powerful ballistic missile yet had the Trump administration weighing the option of combat yet again.

If the United States and North Korea go to war, who is better positioned to win?

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The two nations have been enemies for decades and stockpiling weapons in case a conflict broke out. If it comes to that, here's what each side would be facing.

Who has the stronger military?

The U.S. has the strongest military in the world and unquestionably outmatches North Korea, though that doesn't mean a conventional conflict between them would be quick and easy.

The Global Firepower Index is a ranking of the military strength of 133 nations based on more than 50 factors, including available manpower, diversity of weapons (which often matters more than quantity), geographical factors and local industries. In 2017, the U.S. was ranked number one, while North Korea came in 23rd.

The U.S. has roughly 1.3 million active duty troops and 999,000 reserve troops, according to the Global Firepower Index. Comparatively, North Korea has around 1.1 million active duty troops and 5.5 million reserves, giving it the fourth-largest army in the world.

If war suddenly broke out between the two countries, U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula-numbering roughly 28,500-would be outnumbered and undersupplied. But most of the fighting in such a conflict would fall on South Korean troops. South Korea currently has around 627,500 active duty personnel and around 5.2 million in reserve. The U.S. also has plans in place to rapidly move personnel in the region-such as the 45,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan -to the Korean Peninsula in the event of a war.

The U.S. outmatches North Korea when it comes to airpower.The U.S. military's total aircraft strength is roughly 13,760. North Korea's total airpower, meanwhile, is under 1,000 aircrafts.

The U.S. has 5,884 combat tanks, 41,062 armored fighting vehicles, 415 total naval assets (including 10 aircraft carriers) and the highest defense budget in the world--close to $600 billion. The U.S. also has missile defense systems in place that could potentially intercept North Korean missiles, such as THAAD in South Korea.

Comparatively, North Korea has 5,025 combat tanks, 4,100 armored fighting vehicles and a defense budget of about $7.5 billion. North Korea has around 967 naval assets, but the vast majority are patrol craft (468), and it has no ships that can transport warplanes.

North Korea is also believed to have chemical and biological weapon stockpiles that it would likely employ in a war. The United States has condemned other countries, such as Syria, that use those weapons.

North Korea's military might be great in size in many respects, but its technology is also outdated, and its soldiers are known to be extremely malnourished. A North Korean soldier who defected to South Korea in early November was found to have dozens of unusual parasites (one as long as 10 inches) and raw corn kernels in his stomach. It's hard to imagine North Korea's soldiers would last very long in a conflict if they are in such poor health. This is yet another reminder that quality often counts for far more than quantity.

Who has more nuclear weapons?

The U.S. has the second-largest nuclear arsenal in the world (after Russia), with roughly 6,800 warheads-- 1,800 deployed, 4,000 stockpiled and 2,800 retired. North Korea is believed to possess anywhere between 25 to 60 nuclear warheads, based on assessments from the U.S. intelligence community and independent experts.

The pressing question now is whether North Korea has acquired the technology to successfully launch a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile at the U.S. mainland and have it reach its target. Despite claims from the regime, North Korea doesn't seem to have reached this goal. But experts have said it isn't far off from acquiring the necessary technology and may have this capability as early as next year.

The U.S. military already has extremely reliable long-range missiles that could be launched within minutes and reach distances over 6,200 miles. In other words, America's nuclear arsenal is far larger and more advanced than North Korea's.

A war between North Korea and the U.S. would be extremely bloody, experts have warned

Most defense experts would agree there's no question that the U.S. would win in a war with North Korea, but many have concluded that millions could die in the process, including hundreds of thousands of U.S. military personnel as well as civilians in Korea, Japan and Guam.

A recent Congressional Research Service report estimated as many as 300,000 could die in the first few days of fighting between the U.S. and North Korea--even without the use of nukes. A separate assessment from 38 North, a website analyzing North Korea, estimated that 2.1 million could perish if nuclear detonations occurred over Tokyo or Seoul.

The U.S. military recently concluded that ground invasion would be necessary to destroy North Korea's nuclear arsenal, since little intelligence is available on the location of its military assets, which would make airstrikes unreliable. This could get extremely complicated given the close proximity of North Korea to Russia and China, countries that would not benefit from a pro-America, unified Korean Peninsula.

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USA vs. North Korea: If there is war, who has the stronger military and most nuclear weapons?

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A war between the United States and North Korea seems more probable by the week, with Tuesday's missile launch from Kim Jong Un's regime being only the latest fearsome provocation. Kim and President Donald Trump were trading threats of mass destruction for months, and the launch of North Korea's most powerful ballistic missile yet had the Trump administration weighing the option of combat yet again.

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I believe North Korea shouldn’t have sovereignty. The North Koreans have shown us that they cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons. Northern Korea is an autocracy. Their leader violates human rights and international laws showing us that they can’t be trusted with such destructive weapon.  Their government system tells us they are ruthless people and have very little concern for their own people. This is another reason why North Korea shouldn’t have sovereignty.

The North Korean government has relatedly threatened the United States with nuclear weapons. Recently in August 2017 North Korea launch a test missile towards the United States. North Korea does have nuclear weapons and are now believed to might have developed a Hydrogen bomb. Kim Jong Un is the dictator of North Korea. Kim Jong Un has also shown us that he really hates the United Nation. The leader of North Korea is another curial reason why we shouldn’t allow North Korea the right to sovereignty.

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Tactics used by the government to enforce laws 

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Tactics used by the government to enforce laws 

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The North Korean government has strict laws and strict tactics dealing with most of those laws. The North Korean government systematically denies basic freedoms in their country and uses time in labor prison camps to inflicted fear in the opposing government. People are publicly executed on a regular basis for national security crimes like crimes against the state or the people. Nonviolent offenses such as smuggling if found guilty are extremely serious. The government will punish the offender and also three generations of their family to a political prison camp. In these prison camps they face horrific living conditions and abuse, including induced starvation, lack of medical care, proper shelter and clothes, torture and abuse by guards, and continuous forced labor in highly dangerous conditions.

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(Bangkok) - The dynastic strongman of North Korea, Kim Jong-Un, consolidated his rights-abusing rule in 2013, Human Rights Watch said today in its World Report 2014. Over the past year, North Korea has tightened control over the country's northern border to reduce flight, and has continued systematic interrogation and torture of North Koreans caught and forcibly returned from China.

The investigation by a UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea should shed light on these and other rights crimes when it presents its report to the UN Human Rights Council this coming March.

"Kim Jong-Un has picked up where his father and grandfather left off, by overseeing a system of public executions, extensive political prison camps, and brutal forced labor," said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "The government now recognizes that the accounts of escaping North Koreans reveal Pyongyang's crimes - so it is doing what it can to stop people from fleeing."

In the 667-page World Report 2014, its 24th edition, Human Rights Watch reviews human rights practices in more than 90 countries. Syria's widespread killings of civilians elicited horror but few steps by world leaders to stop it, Human Rights Watch said. A reinvigorated doctrine of "responsibility to protect" seems to have prevented some mass atrocities in Africa. Majorities in power in Egypt and other countries have suppressed dissent and minority rights. And Edward Snowden's revelations about US surveillance programs reverberated around the globe.

The North Korean government systematically denies basic freedoms in the country and uses detention in labor prison camps to ensure fear of opposing the government. In November, Kim Jong-Un's public purge and execution of his uncle, Jang Song-Thaek, previously a top-level official in the government, reinforced that fear. People are publicly executed on a regular basis for vague national security crimes, including "crimes against the state" and "crimes against the people," as well as a gamut of nonviolent offenses such as fraud and smuggling if the authorities deem the offense as "extremely serious."

The North Korean government continues to practice collective punishment, sending not only an offender but also three generations of his family to political prison camps, known as kwan-li-so. These camps are notorious for horrific living conditions and abuse, including induced starvation, lack of medical care, proper shelter and clothes, torture and abuse by guards, and continuous forced labor in highly dangerous conditions.

Former North Korean security officials told Human Rights Watch that North Koreans who are caught in China are systematically interrogated and tortured, and those found to have had contact with South Koreans faced being sent to a kwan- li-so, while others judged to be a lesser risk are send to penitentiaries ( kyo-hwa-so) or other types of forced labor camps.

Despite having ratified several core UN human rights treaties, North Korea continues to systematically repress core civil and political rights, such as freedom of association, assembly, and expression, and target those involved in religious activities. Labor rights are systematically suppressed and North Korea is one of the few states in the world that has refused to join the International Labor Organization (ILO). Access to adequate food, medical care, education, and other services remains limited, especially for the majority of people who are not in the core "loyal" class under the government's songbun classification system.

"The fiction that Kim Jong-Un might be somehow more moderate because of his education in Switzerland has been thoroughly refuted by the continued brutality of the government he now leads," Robertson said. "Human rights need to be front and center in all international dealings with North Korea, starting with demanding accountability for crimes against humanity."

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North Korea: Kim Jong-Un Deepens Abusive Rule

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(Bangkok) - The dynastic strongman of North Korea, Kim Jong-Un, consolidated his rights-abusing rule in 2013, Human Rights Watch said today in its World Report 2014 . Over the past year, North Korea has tightened control over the country's northern border to reduce flight, and has continued systematic interrogation and torture of North Koreans caught and forcibly returned from China.

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North Korea earns $4 billion in Exports. They usually export goods such as Minerals, metallurgical products, manufactures (including armaments), textiles, agricultural and fishery products, coal, iron ore, limestone, graphite, copper, zinc, and lead.  Their main export partners is China.

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Currency

North Korean won (KPW, ₩)

Calendar year

Population

25,666,161 (2019)[2]

GDP

GDP rank

−4.5% (2020)

N/A

N / A

Labour force by occupation

Unemployment

2.81% (2020 est.)

N/A

Exports

$4.582 billion (2017 est.)[4]

Imports

$2.32 billion (2018 est.)[4]

$1.878 billion (December 31, 2015, est.)[4]

$20 billion (2011 est)[9]

−0.4% (of GDP) (2007 est.)[4]

Revenues

3.2 billion (2007 est.)[4]

Expenses

3.3 billion (2007 est.)[4]

The economy of North Korea is a centrally planned economy, following , where the role of market allocation schemes is limited, although increasing. As of 2022, North Korea continues its basic adherence to a centralized command economy. With a total gross domestic product of $28.500 billion as of 2016, there has been some economic liberalization, particularly after Kim Jong-un assumed the leadership in 2012, but reports conflict over particular legislation and enactment. Since the 1990s, informal market activity has increased, which the authoritarian regime has tolerated. These markets are referred to as 'Jangmadang' and were formed as a result of the economic collapse during the 1990s, which made the regime unable to distribute food to its people.

The collapse of the Eastern Bloc from 1989 to 1992, particularly North Korea's principal source of support, the Soviet Union, forced the North Korean economy to realign its foreign economic relations, including increased economic exchanges with South Korea. China is North Korea's largest trading partner. North Korea's ideology of Juche has resulted in the country pursuing autarky in an environment of international sanctions. While the current North Korean economy is still dominated by state-owned industry and collective farms, foreign investment and corporate autonomy have increased.

North Korea had a similar GDP per capita to its neighbor South Korea from the aftermath of the Korean War until the mid-1970s, but had a GDP per capita of less than $2,000 in the late 1990s and early 21st century. For 2018, the South Korean Bank of Korea estimated the GDP growth as −4.1%. For the first time, in 2021, the North Korean private sector outgrew the public sector.

Estimating gross national product in North Korea is a difficult task because of a lack of economic data and the problem of choosing an appropriate rate of exchange for the North Korean won, the nonconvertible North Korean currency. The South Korean government's estimate placed North Korea's GNP in 1991 at US$22.9 billion, or US$1,038 per capita. In contrast, South Korea posted US$237.9 billion of GNP and a per capita income of US$5,569 in 1991. North Korea's GNP in 1991 showed a 5.2% decline from 1989, and preliminary indications were that the decline would continue. South Korea's GNP, by contrast, expanded by 9.3% and 8.4%, respectively, in 1990 and 1991.

The South Korea-based Bank of Korea estimated that over 2000 to 2013 average growth was 1.4% per year. It estimated that the real GDP of North Korea in 2015 was 30,805 billion South Korean won. It has published the following estimates of North Korea's GDP growth:

This analysis converts production volume estimates into South Korean prices, so is subject to price changes over time of South Korean goods. According to analyst Andrei Lankov, writing in 2017, a significant number of observers believe that the Bank of Korea is too conservative and the real growth rate is 3-4%. North Korea reported that the government budget has been increasing at between 5% and 10% annually from 2007 to 2015. Reported planned capital expenditure, mainly on roads and public buildings, increased by 4.3% in 2014, 8.7% in 2015 to 13.7% in 2016. According to a North Korea economist, the growth rate was 3.7% in 2017, lifting GDP to $29.6 billion in 2018. The Australian government estimated 1.3% growth in 2017, while the South Korean government estimated −3.5%.

This trend did not reverse until after the end in 1945 of the Second World War, when more than 2 million Koreans moved from North to South following the division of Korea into Soviet and American military zones of administration. This southward exodus continued after the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in 1948 and during the 1950-53 Korean War. The North Korean population as of October 2008 was given as 24 million.

North and South Korea both suffered from the massive destruction caused during the Korean War. Historian Charles K. Armstrong stated that "North Korea had been virtually destroyed as an industrial society". In the years immediately after the war, North Korea mobilized its labour force and natural resources in an effort to achieve rapid economic development. Large amounts of aid from other communist countries, notably the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, helped the country achieve a high growth-rate in the immediate postwar period.

In 1961, an ambitious seven-year plan was launched to continue industrial expansion and increase living standards, but within three years it became clear this was failing and the plan period was extended to 1970. The failure was due to reduced support from the Soviet Union when North Korea aligned more with China, and military pressure from the U.S. leading to increased defence spending. In 1965, South Korea's rate of economic growth first exceeded North Korea's in most industrial areas, though South Korea's per capita GNP remained lower than North Korea's.

In 1979, North Korea renegotiated much of its international debt, but in 1980 it defaulted on its loans except those from Japan. By the end of 1986, hard-currency debt had reached more than US$1 billion. It also owed nearly $2 billion to communist creditors, principally the Soviet Union. The Japanese declared North Korea in default. By 2000, taking into account penalties and accrued interest, North Korea's debt was estimated at $10-12 billion. By 2012, North Korea's external debt had grown to an estimated US$20 billion despite Russia reportedly writing off about $8 billion of debt in exchange for participation in natural resources development. Besides Russia, major creditors included Hungary, the Czech Republic and Iran.

There were minor efforts toward relaxing central control of the economy in the 1980s that involve industrial enterprises. Encouraged by Kim Jong-il's call to strengthen the implementation of the independent accounting system (, tongnip ch'aesanje) of enterprises in March 1984, interest in enterprise management and the independent accounting system increased, as evidenced by increasing coverage of the topic in North Korean journals. Under the system, factory managers still are assigned output targets but are given more discretion in decisions about labour, equipment, materials, and funds.

In addition to fixed capital, each enterprise is allocated a minimum of working capital from the state through the Central Bank and is required to meet operating expenses with the proceeds from sales of its output. Up to 50% of the "profit" is taxed, the remaining half being kept by the enterprise for purchase of equipment, introduction of new technology, welfare benefits, and bonuses. As such, the system provides some built-in incentives and a degree of micro-level autonomy, unlike the budget allocation system, under which any surplus is turned over to the government in its entirety.

All these measures appear to be minor stop-gap measures to alleviate severe shortages of consumer goods by infusing some degree of incentives. In mid-1993, no significant moves signalling a fundamental deviation from the existing system had occurred. The reluctance to initiate reform appears to be largely political. This concern is based on the belief that economic reform will produce new interests that will demand political expression and that demands for the institutionalization of such pluralism eventually will lead to political liberalization.

Beginning in the mid-1980s and particularly around the end of the decade, North Korea slowly began to modify its rigid self-reliant policy. The changes, popularly identified as the open-door policy, included an increasing emphasis on foreign trade, a readiness to accept direct foreign investment by enacting a joint venture law, the decision to open the country to international tourism, and economic cooperation with South Korea.

The Third Seven-Year Plan gave a great deal of attention to developing foreign trade and joint ventures, the first time a plan has addressed these issues. By the end of 1991, however, two years before the termination of the plan, no quantitative plan targets were made public, an indication that the plan has not fared well. The diversion of resources to build highways, theatres, hotels, airports, and other facilities to host the Thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students in July 1989 must have had a negative impact on industrial and agricultural development, although the expansion and improvement of social infrastructure have resulted in some long-term economic benefits.

Although general economic policy objectives are decided by the Central People's Committee (CPC), it is the task of the State Planning Committee to translate the broad goals into specific annual and long-term development plans and quantitative targets for the economy as a whole, as well as for each industrial sector and enterprise. Under the basic tenets of the 1964 reforms, the planning process is guided by the principles of "unified planning" (, ilwŏnhwa) and of "detailed planning" (, saebunhwa).

Under "unified planning", regional committees are established in each province, city, and county to systematically coordinate planning work. These committees do not belong to any regional organization and are directly supervised by the State Planning Committee. As a result of a reorganization in 1969, they are separated into provincial planning committees, city/county committees, and enterprise committees (for large-scale enterprises).

The planning committees, under the auspices of the State Planning Committee, coordinate their work with the planning offices of the economy-related government organizations the corresponding regional and local areas. The system attempts to enable the regional planning staff to better coordinate with economic establishments in their areas, which are directly responsible to them in planning, as well as communicating directly with staff at the CPC. "Detailed planning" seeks to construct plans with precision and scientific methods based on concrete assessment of the resources, labour, funds, plant capacities, and other necessary information.

There are four stages in drafting the final national economic plan.

The first is collecting and compiling preliminary statistical data. These figures, which are used as the basic planning data on the productive capacities of economic sectors, originally are prepared by lower-level economic units and aggregated on a national level by respective departments and committees. Simultaneously, the regional, local, and enterprise planning committees prepare their own data and forward them to the CPC. Through this two-channel system of simultaneous, separate, and independent preparation of statistical data by economic units and planning committees, the government seeks to ensure an accurate, objective, and realistic data base unfettered by local and bureaucratic bias.

The second stage is preparing the control figures by the CPC based on the preliminary data in accordance with the basic plan goals presented by the Central People's Committee.

In the third stage, a draft plan is prepared. The draft plan, prepared by the CPC, is the result of coordinating all draft figures submitted by the lower-level economic units, which, in turn, base their drafts on the control figures handed down from the committee.

In the fourth stage, the CPC submits a unified national draft plan to the Central People's Committee and the State Administration Council for confirmation. After approval by the Supreme People's Assembly, the draft becomes final and is distributed to all economic units and regional and local planning committees.

The plan then becomes legal and compulsory. Frequent directives from the central government contain changes in the plan targets or incentives for meeting the plan objectives.

Although the central government is most clearly involved in the formulation and evaluation of the yearly and long-term plans, it also reviews summaries of quarterly or monthly progress. Individual enterprises divide the production time into daily, weekly, ten-day, monthly, quarterly, and annual periods. In general, the monthly plan is the basic factory planning period.

The success of an economic plan depends on the quality and detail of information received, the establishment of realistic targets, coordination among sectors, and correct implementation. High initial growth during the Three-Year Plan and, to a lesser extent, during the Five-Year Plan contributed to a false sense of confidence among the planners. Statistical over reporting-an inherent tendency in an economy where rewards lie in fulfilling the quantitative targets, particularly when the plan target year approaches-leads to overestimation of economic potential, poor product quality, and eventually to plan errors. Inefficient use of plants, equipment, and raw materials add to planning errors. Lack of coordination in planning and production competition among sectors and regions cause imbalances and disrupt input-output relationships. The planning reforms in 1964 were supposed to solve these problems, but the need for correct and detailed planning and strict implementation of plans was so great that their importance was emphasized in the report unveiling the Second Seven-Year Plan, indicating that planning problems persisted in the 1980s.

Ch'ŏngsan-ni Method

The Ch'ŏngsan-ni Method () of management was born out of Kim Il-sung's February 1960 visit to the Ch'ŏngsan-ni Cooperative Farm in South P'yŏngan Province. Influenced by Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward Policy, Kim and other members of the KWP Central Committee offered " on-the-spot guidance" (, hyŏnji chido) and spent two months instructing and interacting with the workers. The avowed objective of this new method is to combat " bureaucratism" and "formalism" in the farm management system.

The industrial management system developed in three distinct stages. The first was a period of enterprise autonomy that lasted until December 1946. The second stage was a transitional system based on local autonomy, with each enterprise managed by the enterprise management committee under the direction of the local people's committee. This system was replaced by the "one-man management system" (), with management patterned along Soviet lines as large enterprises were nationalized and came under central control. The third stage, the Taean Work System (, Taeanŭi saŏpch'e), was introduced in December 1961 as an application and refinement of agricultural management techniques to industry. The Taean industrial management system grew out of the Ch'ŏngsan-ni Method.

Taean work system is the best system of economic management. It enables the producer masses to fulfill their responsibility and role as masters and to manage the economy in a scientific and rational manner by implementing the mass line in economic management, and by combining party leadership organically with administrative, economic, and technical guidance.

Parallel to management techniques such as the Ch'ŏngsan-ni Method and the Taean work system, which were designed to increase output in more normalized and regularized operations of farms and enterprises, the leadership continuously resorts to exhortations and mass campaigns to motivate the workers to meet output targets. The earliest and the most pervasive mass production campaign was the Ch'ŏllima Movement. Introduced in 1958 and fashioned after China's Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), the Ch'ŏllima Movement organized the labour force into work teams and brigades to compete at increasing production. The campaign was aimed at industrial and agricultural workers and at organizations in education, science, sanitation and health, and culture.

In addition to work teams, units eligible for Ch'ŏllima citations included entire factories, factory workshops, and such self-contained units as a ship or a railroad station. The " socialist emulation" among the industrial sectors, enterprises, farms, and work teams under the Ch'ŏllima Movement frantically sought to complete the First Five-Year Plan (1957-1960) but instead created chaotic disruptions in the economy. This made it necessary to set aside 1959 as a "buffer year" to restore balance in the economy.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the principal source of external support, North Korea announced in December 1993 a three-year transitional economic policy placing primary emphasis on agriculture, light industry, and foreign trade. However, lack of fertilizer, natural disasters, and poor storage and transportation practices caused the country to fall more than a million tons per year short of grain self-sufficiency. Moreover, lack of foreign exchange to purchase spare parts and oil for electricity generation left many factories idle.

Economically, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Soviet support to North Korean industries caused a contraction of the North Korea's economy by 25% during the 1990s. While, by some accounts, North Korea had a higher per capita income than South Korea in the 1970s, by 2006 its per capita income was estimated to be only $1108, one seventeenth that of South Korea.

In 2017, Dr. Mitsuhiro Mimura, Senior Research Fellow at Japan's Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, who has visited North Korea 45 times, described it as the "poorest advanced economy in the world", in that while having comparatively low GDP, it had built a sophisticated production environment. He described the recent rise of entrepreneurial groups through "socialist cooperation", where groups of individuals could start small enterprises as cooperative groups. Managers in state-owned industries or farms were also free to sell or trade production beyond state plan targets, providing incentives to increase production. Managers could also find investment for expansion of successful operations, in a process he called "socialist competition". A state plan was still the basis for production, but was more realistic leaving room for excess production.

In order to provide a certain degree of local autonomy as well as to lessen the financial burden of the central government, a "local budget system" was introduced in 1973. Under this system, provincial authorities are responsible for the operating costs of institutions and enterprises not under direct central government control, such as schools, hospitals, shops, and local consumer goods production. In return, they are expected to organize as many profitable ventures as possible and to turn over profits to the central government.

Around December of every year, the state budget for the following calendar year is drafted, subject to revision around March. Typically, total revenue exceeds expenditure by a small margin, with the surplus carried over to the following year. The largest share of state expenditures goes to the "people's economy", which averaged 67.3% of total expenditures between 1987 and 1990, followed in magnitude by "socio-cultural", "defense", and "administration".

Defense spending, as a share of total expenditures, has increased significantly since the 1960s: from 3.7% in 1959 to 19% in 1960, and, after averaging 19.8% between 1961 and 1966, to 30.4% in 1967. After remaining around 30% until 1971, the defense share decreased abruptly to 17% in 1972, and continued to decline throughout the 1980s. Officially, in both 1989 and 1990 the defense share remained at 12%, and for 1991 it was 12.3% with 11.6% planned for 1992. The declining trend was consistent with the government's announced intentions to stimulate economic development and increase the social benefits. However, Western experts have estimated that actual military expenditures are higher than budget figures indicate.

In the 1999 budget, expenditures for the farming and power sectors were increased by 15% and 11%, respectively, compared with those of 1998.

In the 2007 budget, it was estimated an increase in revenue at 433.2bn won ($3.072bn, $1 = 141 won). In 2006, 5.9% were considered the public revenue, whereas this year, this figure was raised to 7.1%.

Since 2003, North Korean authorities issue government bonds called The "People's Life Bonds", and promoted the slogan "Buying bonds is patriotic".

The Sydney Morning Herald reported that Kim's previous propaganda has shifted focus toward patriotism and the economy, and improving its relationships with China, South Korea, and the United States. The state-run television promoted a song of praise to the National flag by airing videos with images that included the flag being raised September 2018, during mass games events, marking North Korea's 70th anniversary. In the video, brief images of troops, fighter jets releasing blue, red, and white smoke, scattered pictures of civilians, new high-rise apartments in the capital, fireworks displays, and even students in their school uniforms can all be seen at the same event.

The South China Morning Post, in a 2019 article, stated that already there is also some economical and cultural revolution happening recently within North Korea itself. It started in earnest in February 2018, during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games, when top musicians from North Korea were sent to perform in South Korea. This included a female quintet who performed in black shorts and red tops. After two months, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un saw the performance of South Korean girl group, Red Velvet. This is the first ever K-Pop show to be held in Pyongyang. The North Korean musicians that performed in South Korea were highly praised for their performance that leader Kim decided to send them to Beijing for another goodwill tour in January 2019. Part of the revolution was the introduction of other cultures, including Western, which was previously believed to be vulgar and quite corrupt in the past, but is now slowly making its way to the North Korean people. Second-hand Harry Potter books can now be read at the National Library, and Bollywood films like the Three Idiots had just had a run in their cinemas. The changes have also found their way to the economic sector with factories that are also producing products that are associated more with the West, like Air Jordan shoes, for national consumption.

Per the amendments made to the Constitution in 2019, the former economic methods of management, Ch'ŏngsan-ni in agriculture and Taean in the industries, were now phased out altogether.

After the 8th Party Congress, Kim Byung-yeon of the Seoul National University said that, between 2017 and 2019, the North Korean GDP decreased by 10% and, in 2020, the North Korean GDP decreased by 5%.

North Korea also implements planned economy in industry. The government will provide fuel and materials for a factory, while the factory will manufacture products and quantities according to the government's requirements.

North Korea's self-reliant development strategy assigned top priority to developing heavy industry, with parallel development in agriculture and light industry. This policy was achieved mainly by giving heavy industry preferential allocation of state investment funds. More than 50% of state investment went to the industrial sector during the 1954-1976 period (47.6%, 51.3%, 57.0%, and 49.0%, respectively, during the Three-Year Plan, Five-Year Plan, First Seven-Year Plan, and Six-Year Plan). As a result, gross industrial output grew rapidly.

North Korea claims to have fulfilled the Second Seven-Year Plan (1978-1984) target of raising the industrial output in 1984 to 120% of the 1977 target, equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 12.2%. Judging from the production of major commodities that form the greater part of industrial output, however, it is unlikely that this happened. For example, the increase during the 1978-1984 plan period for electric power, coal, steel, metal-cutting machines, tractors, passenger cars, chemical fertilizers, chemical fibers, cement, and textiles, respectively, was 78%, 50%, 85%, 67%, 50%, 20%, 56%, 80%, 78%, and 45%. Raw materials were in short supply and so were energy and hard currency. Infrastructure decayed and machinery became obsolete. Unlike other socialist countries in the Eastern Europe, North Korea kept planning in a highly centralized manner and refused to liberalize economic management.

In April 1982, Kim Il-sung announced a new economic policy giving priority to increased agricultural production through land reclamation, development of the country's infrastructure-especially power plants and transportation facilities-and reliance on domestically produced equipment. There also was more emphasis on trade.

In September 1984, North Korea promulgated a joint venture law to attract foreign capital and technology. The new emphasis on expanding trade and acquiring technology was not, however, accompanied by a shift in priorities away from support of the military. In 1991, North Korea announced the creation of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the northeast regions of Rason ( Rason Special Economic Zone) and Ch'ŏngjin. Investment in this SEZ has been slow in coming. Problems with infrastructure, bureaucracy, uncertainties about the security of investments, and viability have hindered growth and development. Nevertheless, thousands of small Chinese businesses had set up profitable operations in North Korea by 2011.

The most successful export industry is the garment industry. Production is by a North Korean firm for a European or other foreign partner, by a Chinese firm operating in North Korea with a North Korean partner, or by North Korean workers working in Chinese or other foreign factories. Wages are the lowest in northeastern Asia.

The North Korean motor vehicle production establishes military, industrial and construction goals, with private car ownership by citizens remaining on low demand. Having Soviet origins (the subsequent practice of cloning foreign specimens, and a recent automobile joint-venture), North Korea has developed a wide-range automotive industry with production of all types of vehicles. The basis for production is in urban and off-road minis; luxury cars; SUV cars; small, medium, heavy, and super-heavy cargo; construction and off-road trucks; minibuses/minivans, coach buses, civilian and articulated buses, trolleybuses, and trams. However, North Korea produces far fewer vehicles than its production capability due to the ongoing economic crisis. North Korea has not joined or collaborated with the OICA, or with any other automotive organization, so any critical information about its motor vehicle industry is limited.

The energy sector is one of the most serious bottlenecks in the North Korean economy. Since 1990, the supply of oil, coal, and electricity declined steadily, and seriously affected all sectors of the economy. Crude oil was formerly imported by pipeline at "friendship prices" from the former Soviet Union or China, but the withdrawal of Russian concessions and the reduction of imports from China brought down annual imports from about 23 million barrels (3.7 ⁶ m ³) in 1988 to less than 4 million barrels (640 ³ m ³) by 1997. As the imported oil was refined for fuels for transportation and agricultural machinery, a serious cutback in oil imports caused critical problems in transportation and agriculture.

North Korea has no coking coal, but has substantial reserves of anthracite in Anju, Aoji ( Ŭndŏk), and other areas. Coal production peaked at 43 million tons in 1989 and steadily declined to 18.6 million tons in 1998. Major causes of coal shortages include mine flooding, and outdated mining technology. As coal was used mainly for industry and electricity generation, decrease in coal production caused serious problems in industrial production and electricity generation. Coal production may not necessarily increase significantly until North Korea imports modern mining technology.

Electricity generation of North Korea peaked in 1989 at about 30 TWh. There were seven large hydroelectric plants in the 1980s. Four were along the Yalu River, built with Chinese aid, and supplying power to both countries. In 1989, 60% of electricity generation was hydroelectric and 40% fossil fueled, mostly coal-fired.

In 1997, coal accounted for more than 80% of primary energy consumption and hydro power more than 10%. Net imports of coal represented only about 3% of coal consumption. Hydroelectric power plants generated about 55% of North Korea's electricity and coal-fired thermal plants about 39% in 1997. However, with only 20% of the per capita electricity generation of Japan, North Korea suffered from chronic supply shortages. Coal exports to China currently account for a major portion of North Korea's revenue.

Some hydroelectric facilities were believed to be out of operation due to damage from major flooding in 1995. Coal-fired power plants were running well under capacity, due in part to a serious decline in coal supply and in part to problems with transportation of coal. The electricity supply steadily declined and was 17 TWh in 1998. Transmission losses sit at just under 16% (15.8%) as of 2014.

The years of economic contraction in the 1990s slowed this sector as it did others; the shell of the 105-story Ryugyŏng Hotel towered unfinished on Pyongyang's skyline for over a decade. The Bank of Korea claims that construction's share of GDP fell by almost one-third between 1992 and 1994, from 9.1% to 6.3%. This accords with a rare official figure of 6% for 1993, when the sector was said to have employed 4.2% of the labour force. However, the latter figure excludes the Korean People's Army, which visibly does much of the country's construction work.

Since about 2012, when 18 tower blocks were built in Pyongyang, a construction boom has taken place in Pyongyang. Major projects include the Mansudae People's Theatre (2012), Munsu Water Park (2013), the modernisation of Pyongyang Sunan International Airport (2015) and the Science and Technology Center (2015).

The Central Bank of North Korea, under the Ministry of Finance, has a network of 227 local branches. Several reissues of banknotes in recent years suggest that citizens are inclined to hoard rather than bank any savings that they make from their incomes; reportedly they now also prefer foreign currency. At least two foreign aid agencies have recently set up microcredit schemes, lending to farmers and small businesses.

In late 2009, North Korea revalued its currency, effectively confiscating all privately held money above the equivalent of US$35 per person. The revaluation effectively wiped out the savings of many North Koreans. Days after the revaluation the won dropped 96% against the United States dollar. Pak Nam-gi, the director of the Planning and Finance Department of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party, was blamed for the disaster and later executed in 2010.

As of May 2013, the Chinese banks, China Merchants Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China, stopped "all cross-border cash transfers, regardless of the nature of the business" with North Korea. The Bank of China, the China's primary institution for foreign exchange transactions, said, on May 14, 2013, that "it had closed the account of Foreign Trade Bank, North Korea's main foreign exchange bank". However, "smaller banks based in northeastern China across the border from North Korea said it was still handling large-scale cross-border transfers." For example, the Bank of Dalian branch in Dandong was still doing transfers to North Korea.

Until the early 2000s the official retail sector was mainly state-controlled, under the direction of the People's Services Committee. Consumer goods were few and of poor quality, with most provided on a ration basis. There were state-run stores and direct factory outlets for the masses, and special shops with luxuries for the elite-as well as a chain of hard-currency stores (a joint venture with the association of pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan, the Ch'ongryŏn), with branches in large cities.

In 2012, the third large shopping mall in Pyongyang, the Kwangbok Area Shopping Center, opened. In 2014 the construction of another large shopping mall started. As of 2017, these malls sold competing brands of goods, for example at least ten different kinds of toothpaste were being sold.

North Korea's sparse agricultural resources limit agricultural production. Climate, terrain, and soil conditions are not particularly favorable for farming, with a relatively short cropping season. Only about 17% of the total landmass, or approximately 20,000 km ², is arable, of which 14,000 km ² is well suited for cereal cultivation; the major portion of the country is rugged mountain terrain.

The weather varies markedly according to elevation, and lack of precipitation, along with infertile soil, makes land at elevations higher than 400 meters unsuitable for purposes other than grazing. Precipitation is geographically and seasonally irregular, and in most parts of the country as much as half the annual rainfall occurs in the three summer months. This pattern favors the cultivation of paddy rice in warmer regions that are outfitted with irrigation and flood control networks. Rice yields are 5.3 tonnes per hectare, close to international norms. In 2005, North Korea was ranked by the FAO as an estimated 10th in the production of fresh fruit and as an estimated 19th in the production of apples.

Farming is concentrated in the flatlands of the four west coast provinces, where a longer growing season, level land, adequate rainfall, and good irrigated soil permit the most intensive cultivation of crops. A narrow strip of similarly fertile land runs through the eastern seaboard Hamgyŏng provinces and Kangwŏn Province, but the interior provinces of Chagang and Ryanggang are too mountainous, cold, and dry to allow much farming. The mountains contain the bulk of North Korea's forest reserves while the foothills within and between the major agricultural regions provide lands for livestock grazing and fruit tree cultivation.

The most far-reaching statement on agricultural policy is embodied in Kim Il-sung's 1964 Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Our Country, which underscores the government's concern for agricultural development. Kim emphasized technological and educational progress in the countryside as well as collective forms of ownership and management. As industrialization progressed, the share of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in the total national output declined from 63.5% and 31.4%, respectively, in 1945 and 1946, to a low of 26.8% in 1990. Their share in the labor force also declined from 57.6% in 1960 to 34.4% in 1989.

In the 1990s, the decreasing ability to carry out mechanized operations (including the pumping of water for irrigation), as well as lack of chemical inputs, was clearly contributing to reduced yields and increased harvesting and post-harvest losses.

North Korean fisheries export seafood, primarily crab, to Dandong, Liaoning, illicitly. Crabs, clams and conches from the Yellow Sea waters of North Korea are popular in China, possibly because the less salty water improves taste.

Before the floods, recipients were generally allotted 600-700 grams per day while high officials, military men, heavy laborers, and public security personnel were allotted slightly larger portions of 700-800 grams per day. As of 2013, the target average distribution was 573 grams of cereal equivalent per person per day, but varied according to age, occupation, and whether rations are received elsewhere (such as school meals). However, as of 2019, this number has been reduced to 312 grams per day according to an investigation conducted by the United Nations between March 29 and April 12.

Decreases in production affected the quantity of food available through the public distribution system. Shortages were compounded when the North Korean government imposed further restrictions on collective farmers. When farmers, who had never been covered by the PDS, were mandated by the government to reduce their own food allotments from 167 kilograms to 107 kilograms of grain per person each year, they responded by withholding portions of the required amount of grain. By 2008, the system had significantly recovered, and, from 2009 to 2013, daily per person rations averaged at 400 grams per day for much of the year, though in 2011 it dropped to 200 grams per day from May to September.

In the 1990s, the North Korean economy saw stagnation turning into crisis. Economic assistance received from the Soviet Union and China was an important factor of its economic growth. Upon its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union withdrew its support and demanded payment in hard currency for imports. China stepped in to provide some assistance and supplied food and oil, most of it reportedly at concessionary prices. The North Korean economy was undermined and its industrial output began to decline in 1990. Deprived of industrial inputs, including fertilizers, pesticides, and electricity for irrigation, agricultural output also started to decrease even before North Korea had a series of natural disasters in the mid-1990s. This evolution, combined with a series of natural disasters including record floods in 1995, caused one of the worst economic crises in North Korea's history. Other causes of this crisis were high defense spending (about 25% of GDP) and bad governance.

The 1990s famine paralyzed many of the Stalinist economic institutions. The government pursued Kim Jong-il's policy, under which the military is deployed to direct production and infrastructure projects. As a consequence of the government's policy of establishing economic self-sufficiency, the North Korean economy has become increasingly isolated from that of the rest of the world, and its industrial development and structure do not reflect its international competitiveness. Domestic firms are shielded from international as well as domestic competition; the result is chronic inefficiency, poor quality, limited product diversity, and underutilization of plants. This protectionism also limits the size of the market for North Korean producers, which prevents taking advantage of economies of scale.

The food shortage was primarily precipitated by the loss of fuel and other raw materials imports from China and the Soviet Union which had been essential to support an energy intensive and energy inefficient farming system. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former concessional trade relationships which benefited the North Korea were not available. The three flood and drought years between 1994 and 1996 only served to complete the collapse of the agriculture sector. In 2004, more than half (57%) of the population did not have enough food to stay healthy. 37% of children had their growth stunted and of mothers severely lacked nutrition.

In 2006, the World Food Program (WFP) and FAO estimated a requirement of 5.3 to 6.5 million tons of grain when domestic production fulfilled only 3.825 million tons. The country also faces land degradation after forests stripped for agriculture resulted in soil erosion. In 2008, a decade after the worst years of the famine, total production was 3.34 million tons (grain equivalent) compared with a need of 5.98 million tons. Thirty seven percent of the population was deemed to be insecure in food access. Weather continued to pose challenges every year, but overall food production grew gradually, and by 2013, production had increased to the highest level since the crisis, to 5.03 million tons cereal equivalent, against a minimum requirement of 5.37 MMT.

It is the world's 18th largest producer of iron and zinc, and has the 22nd largest coal reserves in the world. It is also the 15th largest fluorite producer and 12th largest producer of copper and salt in Asia. Other major natural resources in production include lead, tungsten, graphite, magnesite, gold, pyrites, fluorspar, and hydropower.

North Korea's cartoon animation studios such as SEK Studio sub-contract work from South Korean animation studios. Mansudae Overseas Projects builds monuments around the world.

Since the government is the dominant force in the development and management of the economy, bureaus and departments have proliferated at all administrative levels. There are fifteen committees-such as the agricultural and state planning committees-one bureau, and twenty departments under the supervision of the Cabinet; of these, twelve committees-one bureau, and sixteen departments are involved in economic management. In the early 1990s, several vice premiers of the then State Administration Council supervised economic affairs. Organizations undergo frequent reorganization. Many of these agencies have their own separate branches at lower levels of government while others maintain control over subordinate sections in provincial and county administrative agencies.

North Korea, one of the world's most centrally planned and isolated economies, faces desperate economic conditions. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and shortages of spare parts. Industrial and power output have declined in parallel. During what North Korea called the "peaceful construction" period before the Korean War, the fundamental task of the economy was to overtake the level of output and efficiency attained toward the end of the Japanese occupation; to restructure and develop a viable economy reoriented toward the communist-bloc countries; and to begin the process of socializing the economy. Nationalization of key industrial enterprises and land reform, both of which were carried out in 1946, laid the groundwork for two successive one-year plans in 1947 and 1948, respectively, and the Two-Year Plan of 1949-50. It was during this period that the piece-rate wage system and the independent accounting system began to be applied and that the commercial network increasingly came under state and cooperative ownership.

Until the 1960s, North Korea's economy grew much faster than South Korea's. Although North Korea was behind in total national output, it was ahead of South Korea in per capita national output, because of its smaller population relative to South Korea. For example, in 1960 North Korea's population was slightly over 10 million people, while South Korea's population was almost 25 million people. Annual economic growth rates of 30% and 21% during the Three-Year Plan of 1954-1956 and the Five-Year Plan of 1957-1960, respectively, were reported. After claiming early fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan in 1959, North Korea officially designated 1960 a "buffer year"-a year of adjustment to restore balances among sectors before the next plan became effective in 1961. Not surprisingly the same phenomenon recurred in subsequent plans. Because the Five-Year Plan was fulfilled early, it became a de facto four-year plan. Beginning in the early 1960s, however, North Korea's economic growth slowed until it was stagnant at the beginning of the 1990s.

Beginning in the early 1960s, a series of serious bottlenecks began to impede development. Bottlenecks were pervasive and generally were created by the lack of arable land, skilled labor, energy, and transportation, and deficiencies in the extractive industries. Moreover, both land and marine transportation lacked modern equipment and modes of transportation. The inability of the energy and extractive industries as well as of the transportation network to supply power and raw materials as rapidly as the manufacturing plants could absorb them began to slow industrial growth.

The First Seven-Year Plan (initially 1961-1967) built on the groundwork of the earlier plans but changed the focus of industrialization. Heavy industry, with the machine tool industry as its linchpin, was given continuing priority. During the plan, however, the economy experienced widespread slowdowns and reverses for the first time, in sharp contrast to the rapid and uninterrupted growth during previous plans. Disappointing performance forced the planners to extend the plan three more years, until 1970. During the last part of the ten-year plan, emphasis shifted to pursuing parallel development of the economy and of defense capabilities. This shift was prompted by concern over the military takeover in South Korea by General Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), escalation of the United States involvement in Vietnam, and the widening Sino-Soviet split. It was thought that stimulating a technological revolution in the munitions industry was one means to achieve these parallel goals. In the end, the necessity to divert resources to defense became the official explanation for the plan's failure.

The Six-Year Plan of 1971-1976 followed immediately in 1971. In the aftermath of the poor performance of the preceding plan, growth targets of the Six-Year Plan were scaled down substantially. Because some of the proposed targets in the First Seven-Year Plan had not been attained even by 1970, the Six-Year Plan did not deviate much from its predecessor in basic goals. The Six-Year Plan placed more emphasis on technological advance, self-sufficiency () in industrial raw materials, improving product quality, correcting imbalances among different sectors, and developing the power and extractive industries; the last of these had been deemed largely responsible for slowdowns during the First Seven-Year Plan. The plan called for attaining a self- sufficiency rate of 60-70% in all industrial sectors by substituting domestic raw materials wherever possible and by organizing and renovating technical processes to make the substitution feasible. Improving transport capacity was seen as one of the urgent tasks in accelerating economic development-it was one of the major bottlenecks of the Six-Year Plan.

North Korea claimed to have fulfilled the Six-Year Plan by the end of August 1975, a full year and four months ahead of schedule. Under the circumstances, it was expected that the next plan would start without delay in 1976, a year early, as was the case when the First Seven-Year Plan was instituted in 1961. Even if the Six-Year Plan had been completed on schedule, the next plan should have started in 1977. However, it was not until nearly two years and four months later that the long-awaited plan was unveiled-1977 had become a "buffer year".

The inability of the planners to continuously formulate and institute economic plans reveals as much about the inefficacy of planning itself as the extent of the economic difficulties and administrative disruptions facing the country. For example, targets for successive plans have to be based on the accomplishments of preceding plans. If these targets are underfulfilled, all targets of the next plan-initially based on satisfaction of the plan-have to be reformulated and adjusted. Aside from underfulfillment of the targets, widespread disruptions and imbalances among various sectors of the economy further complicate plan formulation.

The basic thrust of the Second Seven-Year Plan (1978-1984) was to achieve the three-pronged goals of self-reliance, modernization, and "scientification". Although the emphasis on self-reliance was not new, it had not previously been the explicit focus of an economic plan. This new emphasis might have been a reaction to mounting foreign debt originating from large-scale imports of Western machinery and equipment in the mid-1970s. Through modernization North Korea hoped to increase mechanization and automation in all sectors of the economy. "Scientification" means the adoption of up-to-date production and management techniques. The specific objectives of the economic plan were to strengthen the fuel, energy, and resource bases of industry through priority development of the energy and extractive industries; to modernize industry; to substitute domestic resources for certain imported raw materials; to expand freight-carrying capacity in railroad, road, and marine transportation systems; to centralize and containerize the transportation system; and to accelerate a technical revolution in agriculture.

Successful fulfillment of the so-called nature-remaking projects also was part of the Second Seven-Year Plan. These projects referred to the five-point program for nature transformation unveiled by Kim Il-sung in 1976: completing the irrigation of non-paddy fields; reclaiming 1,000 square kilometres of new land; building 1,500 to 2,000 km ² of terraced fields; carrying out afforestation and water conservation work; and reclaiming tidal land.

Growth and changes in the structure and ownership pattern of the economy also have changed the labor force. By 1958 individual private farmers, who once constituted more than 70% of the labor force, had been transformed into or replaced by state or collective farmers. Private artisans, merchants, and entrepreneurs had joined state or cooperative enterprises. In the industrial sector in 1963, the last year for which such data are available, there were 2,295 state enterprises and 642 cooperative enterprises. The size and importance of the state enterprises can be surmised by the fact that state enterprises, which constituted 78% of the total number of industrial enterprises, contributed 91% of total industrial output.

Labor force (12.6 million)-by occupation:

Agricultural: 35%

Industry and services: 65% (2008 est.)

Statistics from North Korea's trade partners are collected by international organizations like the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, and by the South Korean Ministry of Unification.

It has also been estimated that imports of arms from the Soviet Union in the period 1988 to 1990 accounted for around 30% of the North Korea's total imports, and that between 1981 and 1989 North Korea earned approximately $4 billion from the export of arms, approximately 30% of North Korea's total exports in that period. The nominal dollar value of arms exports from North Korea in 1996 was estimated to have been around $50 million.

In addition to Kaesŏng and Kŭmgang-san, other special economic areas were established at Sinŭiju in the northwest (on the border with China), and at Rasŏn in the northeast (on the border with China and Russia).

International sanctions impeded international trade to some degree, many related to North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction. United States President Barack Obama approved an executive order in April 2011 that declared "the importation into the United States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, services, or technology from North Korea is prohibited". Operational sanctions included United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718, 1874, 1928, 2087, and 2094. Reports in 2018 indicated that trade sanctions (bans on almost all exports and the freezing of overseas accounts) were seriously affecting the economy. The main paper Rodong Sinmun was running short of paper and was publishing only a third of its normal print run, two energy plants supplying electricity to Pyongyang had to be shut down intermittently due to lack of coal, causing blackouts, coal mines were operating under capacity due to lack of fuel, coal could not be transported due to lack of fuel and food rations had been cut by half.

The Taep'oong International Investment Group of Korea is the official company that manages oversea investments to North Korea.

North-South economic ties

North and South Korea's economic ties have fluctuated greatly over the past 30 years or so. In the late 1990s and most of the 2000s, north-south relations warmed under the Sunshine Policy of President Kim Dae-jung. Many firms agreed to invest in North Korea, encouraged by the South Korean government's commitment to cover their losses, should investment projects in the north fail to become profitable.

Following a 1988 decision by the South Korean Government to allow trade with the North (see Reunification efforts since 1971), South Korean firms began to import North Korean goods. Direct trade with the South began in the fall of 1990 after the unprecedented September 1990 meeting of the two Korean Prime Ministers. Trade between the countries increased from $18.8 million in 1989 to $333.4 million in 1999, much of it processing or assembly work undertaken in the North.

During this decade, the chairman of the South Korean company Daewoo visited North Korea and reached agreement on building a light industrial complex at Namp'o. In other negotiations, Hyundai Asan obtained permission to bring tour groups by sea to Kŭmgang-san on the North Korea's southeast coast (see Kŭmgang-san Tourist Region), and more recently to construct the 800 acres (3.2 km ²) Kaesŏng Industrial Park, near the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), at a cost of more than $1 billion.

In response to the summit between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung in 2000, North and South Korea agreed in August 2000 to reconnect the section of the Seoul- Pyongyang Gyeongui Railway Line across the DMZ. In addition, the two governments said they would build a four-lane highway bypassing the truce village at Panmunjeom.

TV commercials for Samsung's Anycall cell phone featuring North Korean dancer Cho Myong-ae and South Korea's Lee Hyo-ri were first broadcast on June 11, 2006.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has been North Korea's primary trading partner. Bilateral trade rose sharply after 2007. In 2007 trade between the two countries was $1.97 billion (₩1.7 trillion). By 2011 trade had increased to $5.6 billion (₩5.04 trillion). Trade with China represented 57% of North Korea's imports and 42% of exports.

Some South Korean companies launched joint ventures in areas like animation and computer software, and Chinese traders have done a booming business back and forth across the China-North Korea border. In a 2007 survey of 250 Chinese operations in North Korea, a majority reported paying bribes. Robert Suter, who headed the Seoul office of Swedish-Swiss power generation company ABB, says ABB was staking out a position in North Korea, "It is the same as it was in China years ago. You had to be there and you had to build trust." A number of South Korean enterprises were mainly active in a specially developed industrial zone in Kaesong Industrial Region and Chinese enterprises were known to be involved in a variety of activities in trade and manufacturing in North Korea. European enterprises founded in 2005 the European Business Association (EBA), Pyongyang, a de facto chamber of commerce representing a number of European-invested joint ventures and other businesses. Ch'ongryŏn, the pro-North Korean General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, broadcast on their TV channel in 2008 a TV film in three parts featuring foreign investment and business in North Korea. This film was put on a YouTube channel called " BusinessNK" and could be watched together with a number of other videos on foreign joint ventures as well as other investment and business activities in North Korea.

Though no international banks operated in the isolated socialist state in 2013, foreign companies were said to be increasingly interested in dealing with North Korea.

A flat LCD television factory in North Korea was funded by the Ch'ongryŏn in 2010.

The Rason Special Economic Zone was established in the early 1990s, in the northeastern corner of the country bordering China and Russia. In June 2011, an agreement with China was made to establish a joint free trade area on North Korea's Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa Islands and China's border area near Dandong. North Korea designated over a dozen new special economic zones in 2013 and 2014.

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39. Schwekendiek, Daniel, ^ A socioeconomic history of North Korea, Jefferson and London: McFarland Publishers, 2011, p.122

40. ^ "Resolution 2087 (2013)". United Nations Security Council. January 22, 2013. Archived from the original on October 26, 2013.

41. ^ "Commercial unites stars from both sides of Korea". Korea is one. June 3, 2006.

42. ^ "N. Korea's China trade nearly triples in 4 years". China Post. December 28, 2012. Archived from the original on January 7, 2014.

43. "Pyongyang Business Group celebrates 1st anniversary". ^ The Korea Herald. April 28, 2006.

44. ^ Kim, Seong-Jin (January 20, 2010). "평양서 슬림.평면형 TV 인기"<조선신보>. Yonhap News (in Korean). Archived from the original on June 10, 2011.

Felix Abt. North Korea - a demanding business environment. Advice on investing and doing business, Hamburg: German Asia-Pacific Business Association, 2009

Cumings, Bruce. Korea's place in the Sun: a Modern history, New York: WW Norton and company, 2005.

Reese, D. The prospects for North Korea's survival, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998.

Savada, Andrea Matles. "North Korea: A Country Study." Washington: Library of Congress, 1994.

International Trade Office of Korea Full of information on investments in North Korea.

North Korean Economy Watch Archived December 6, 2011, at the Wayback Machine

World Hunger - Korea (DPR), World Food Programme

Despite U.S. Attempts, N. Korea Anything but Isolated, The Washington Post, May 12, 2005

On North Korea's streets, pink and tangerine buses, The Christian Science Monitor, June 2, 2005

North Korea on the rebound, Global Beat Syndicate, June 27, 2005

A Question of Interpretation: Economic Statistics From and About North Korea Archived July 21, 2012, at the Wayback Machine, Ruediger Frank, 38 North, School of Advanced International Studies, July 16, 2012

Korea Society Podcast: North Korea: Market Opportunity, Poverty and the Provinces

"North Korea lifts the veil on its agroforestry practices "

"Agroforestry is not rocket science but it might save DPR Korea"

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Currency North Korean won (KPW, ₩) Calendar year Population 25,666,161 (2019)[2] GDP GDP rank −4.5% (2020) N/A N / A Labour force by occupation Unemployment 2.81% (2020 est.)

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25.37 million

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The level of education of North Korean Children is that they need to go through one year of kindergarten, four years of primary education, six years of secondary education, and then on to university.

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Formal education has played a central role in the social and cultural development of both traditional Korea and contemporary North Korea. During the Joseon Dynasty, the royal court established a system of schools that taught Confucian subjects in the provinces as well as in four central secondary schools in the capital.

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-An average North Korean makes 1,000-2,000 a year.

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Korea, North Poverty and wealth, Information about Poverty and wealth in Korea, North

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Neither extreme poverty nor wealth exists in North Korea, though in general the inhabitants live under conditions that do not match those of people in more modern countries, including their prosperous neighbors in South Korea. The government is committed to providing necessities to every person, but the ruling elite enjoys a more prosperous life than the general population.

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North Korea has a Dictated Republican Government. The Supreme leader of North Korea is the Chief of State, who is elected by the Supreme People’s Assembly. The Premier is also elected by the Supreme People’s Assembly. As head of government, the Premier appoints the cabinet as well as other three Vice Premiers. The Premier, in collaboration with the ministers implements and directs national policies as determined by the Worker’s Party of Korea's Central Committee.

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North Korea is a communist state in Eastern Asia bordering Russia, China, and South Korea. The government of North Korea has been dominated by the ruling Workers' Party of Korea since 1948. The East Asian country has its government structure fashioned on the Soviet model, where the primary principle is self-reliance on its national resources. The government of North Korea subscribes to communist ideologies under a dictatorship. The Constitution in use was adopted by the country in 1998 and subsequently amended in 2009, 2012, 2013, and 2016.

Chief of State Of North Korea

The Supreme leader of North Korea is the Chief of State, who is elected by the Supreme People's Assembly. Since the country's liberation from Japanese occupation in 1945, the position has been hereditary. The current Chief of State, Kim Jong Un, was elected unopposed after the death of his father, Kim il-Sung. The Chief of State oversees the country's security, both internal and external and heads the National Defense Commission (NDC). The Chief of State also leads the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly.

Premier Of The Government Of North Korea

The Premier is also elected by the Supreme People's Assembly. As head of government, the Premier appoints the cabinet as well as other three Vice Premiers. The Premier, in collaboration with the ministers implements and directs national policies as determined by the Worker's Party of Korea's Central Committee.

Supreme People's Assembly Of The Government Of North Korea

The Supreme People's Assembly is the legislative arm of North Korea's government. 687 deputies from individual constituencies are elected by secret ballot in five-year intervals. In practice, only one name appears on the ballot paper, which is preapproved by the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland. The Assembly congregates once or twice a year in the capital Pyongyang to approve national budgets and legal amendments and to appoint the leadership and members of the National Defence Commission, Presidium, and Cabinet. The Supreme People's Assembly is regarded as nothing more than a rubber stamp since decisions are drafted by the Workers' Party of Korea and the Presidium.

Presidium Of The Government Of North Korea

The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly is the principal legislative institution in the country. The Presidium is mandated to oversee legislative affairs in place of the Supreme People's Assembly. Membership of the organ is comprised of the President, Vice-Presidents, Secretary and members. The institution is elected for the same term length as the sitting Supreme People's Assembly.

The Presidium congregates the Supreme People's Assembly's sessions. When the Supreme People's Assembly is in recess, the Presidium debates and approves concerns such as the state's economic plans and budget and new legislation. The institution also appoints or dismisses members of the cabinet upon advice from the Premier, interprets the constitution, ratifies international treaties, grants pardons, conducts elections for membership to the Supreme People's Assembly and forms or abolishes ministries and commissions.

Judiciary Of The Government Of North Korea

The Central Court is the supreme judicial institution in North Korea. Judges to the Court are elected by the Supreme People's Assembly. Cases are mostly heard by one judge and two people assessors. Special cases may warrant the presence of three judges. The Court is also the main court of appeal and hears cases from the provincial courts. The judicature is answerable to the Supreme People's Assembly and the Presidium when the Assembly is in recess.

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What Type of Government Does North Korea Have?

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North Korea is a communist state in Eastern Asia bordering Russia, China, and South Korea. The government of North Korea has been dominated by the ruling Workers' Party of Korea since 1948. The East Asian country has its government structure fashioned on the Soviet model, where the primary principle is self-reliance on its national resources.

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The GDP value of North Korea is 0.03 percent of the world economy.

GDP in North Korea averaged 11.42 USD Billion from 1970 until 2015.
- According to North Korea's state news agency, military expenditures for 2010 made up 15.8 percent of the state budget.

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Trading Economics members can view, download and compare data from nearly 200 countries, including more than 20 million economic indicators, exchange rates, government bond yields, stock indexes and commodity prices.

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North Korea GDP | 1970-2018 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News

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The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in North Korea was worth 16.12 billion US dollars in 2015. The GDP value of North Korea represents 0.03 percent of the world economy. GDP in North Korea averaged 11.42 USD Billion from 1970 until 2015, reaching an all time high of 17.40 USD Billion in 2014 and a record low of 4.85 USD Billion in 1995.