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the favela bulit their own community

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There are 1000 Favela

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A favela is a type of low-income informal settlement in Brazil that has experienced historical governmental neglect.

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The Origins of Rio's Favelas and Early Activism

The history of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro begins in the final years of the nineteenth century as Brazil transitioned from an empire to a republic. As the nation continued to undergo dramatic political changes throughout the course of the twentieth century, the slums of its second-largest city grew in size and number, in turn experiencing significant changes of their own. Initially, these communities were loosely incorporated squatter settlements that sprang up organically in order to house internal migrants and itinerant laborers. As they became more numerous and increasingly populated by a burgeoning urban underclass, favela residents began to organize internally, forming associações de moradores, or residents' associations. These organizations served as forums for deliberating matters of community governance, in addition to acting as liaisons between favelados (favela residents) and the prefeitura (city hall). Since the city and state governments failed to extend many public services to the favelas, community members, led by their local associations, banded together to provide sanitation, medical care, and transportation to their friends and neighbors.

Favela Removal, Public Housing, and Popular Resistance: 1940s-1970s

Largely ignored by city and state government for much of the first half of the twentieth century, the favelas began to attract political attention starting in the mid-1940s. During this period, populist politicians ascended to power on both the national and local stage championing a platform of poverty alleviation and national modernization. A central part of their program was providing modern, sanitary, public housing units as an alternative to slums, which were thought to breed not only disease, illiteracy, and crime, but also moral corruption and political radicalism. The "proletarian parks" of the 1940s, the brainchild of Mayor Henrique Dodsworth (1937-1945), set a precedent of favela removal for a series of full-scale eradication campaigns initiated in the 1960s and '70s. These original settlements were intended as temporary housing for displaced favela residents until the city and state government could erect permanent housing projects. As they were not properly maintained and their management style was quite unpopular among their residents, the parks were abandoned within several years after their first occupation.

In addition to the reduction of poverty, the ostensible primary reason for the construction of public housing, it is clear that real estate interests pressured policy makers to pursue an aggressive course of favela eradication in the 1960s and '70s. Many favelas were located on precious inner city land in Rio's most affluent neighborhoods, making them ripe territory for lucrative commercial and residential construction ventures. As arch-conservative military generals usurped power from the progressive statesman João Goulart on a national level, state and city politics, led by the pugnacious former journalist Carlos Lacerda, became more draconian as well. Over the next two decades, the state government undertook a large-scale slum removal program paired with a massive relocation effort in which displaced favelados were settled in public housing compounds located on the city's periphery.

Through the founding, first of the Housing Company of Guanabara ( Cooperativa de Habitação Popular do Estado da Guanabara), and later of the Banco Nacional de Habitação (National Housing Bank) and the Coordination of Social Interest of the Greater Rio Metropolitan Area ( Coordenadoria de Habitação de Interesse Social da Área Metropolitana do Grande Rio), the federal and Guanabara state governments created a formal apparatus for the destruction of squatter settlements and the forced relocation of their residents into public housing compounds that they proceeded to neglect after the initial stages of resettlement. Church officials were also active players in these mid-century housing debates, and while their solutions were somewhat more humane than that of the government, they proved nearly as paternalistic and self-interested as government policymakers.

Yet because favela removal failed to address the root causes of Rio's housing shortage, the city's favela population continued to grow steadily during the 1950s, '60s and '70s. As a result, government officials eventually determined that eradication was not a viable solution to the favela problem, abandoning it as an official policy in the late 1970s. Unfortunately, by the time eradication efforts ceased, Rio's poorest citizens had experienced a significant assault on their basic human rights. The removals of the 1960s and '70s had displaced about 140,000 people and exacerbated the city's housing problem, as it had further marginalized the poor both geographically and socio-economically. Punished for their poverty, favelados living in remote, poorly maintained housing compounds came to typify the marginal population that the government had painted them to be in order to justify the removal of their communities.

Although the 1950s through the '70s was a time of great strife for favela residents, several pivotal developments took place that contributed positively to their struggle to obtain decent housing. The Reclaiming Service for Favelas and Unhygienic Housing ( Serviço Especial de Recuperação das Favelas e Habitações Anti-Higiênicas) and the Community Development Company ( Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Comunidade) completed groundbreaking experiments in favela development, serving as important precursors to the urbanization campaigns that the city, state, and federal governments would later adopt as the primary solution to the favela problem. These programs orchestrated much-needed improvements in infrastructure, while encouraging political empowerment and integration into the social economy of the larger city.

Several communities were successful in resisting government removal attempts through grassroots organizing. The triumphs of Vidigal, Brás de Pina, Jacarézinho, and Santa Marta display the power of solidarity, perseverance, and ingenuity when few other resources were available. Residents of numerous other communities were ultimately unable to resist removal, but the extent of their defiance was remarkable considering the very limited power they wielded against the federal government of Brazil. Although successful resistance did not engender radical changes in government policy toward favelas-most were entirely neglected after eradication was fully abandoned-it represented a significant step in the favelados' hard-fought battle to be recognized as the rightful residents of their chosen plots of land. These resistance efforts, whether successful or not, attest to the power of community organizing and coalition building, and firmly established a foundation for the thriving grassroots political culture that exists in many favelas today.

Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Police Brutality: 1970s to the Present

As the Brazilian government gradually moved away from military rule and toward democracy in the early 1980s, the country increasingly became an important hub in the international trade of illicit drugs. By the middle of that decade, favela residents were no longer contending with eviction and relocation, but had only traded that threat for another, that of drug violence and violent police repression. By 1985, not only had Rio de Janeiro become the country's most important export node for drugs from the Andean regions to the United States and Europe, it had developed a sizable local consumer market for cocaine that had been virtually non-existent in prior years. Despite a national political recalibration from authoritarianism to democratic governance, levels of violence skyrocketed in the 1980s and '90s, to the point where Brazil has often been considered the world's most violent nation not in a state of war. At the peak of drug-related violence in 1994, Rio's homicide rate was about seven times higher than the nation's rate in 1979, during the military regime. Bearing the brunt of this upsurge in violence were the poor, mostly non-white youths of the city's slums. Currently, the young black Carioca is more than twice as likely to be the victim of a homicide than white citizens of his age group.

Rio's police force, infamous for using extreme force with near total impunity, is often the perpetrator of these killings. The country's high rates of police brutality and homicide statistics have led scholars to conclude that Brazil is home to only a nominal democracy in which certain citizens are systematically prevented from realizing their intrinsic rights to security and peaceful existence free from discrimination and arbitrary violence. While not considered at war by the term's conventional definition, many residents of Brazil's urban centers, especially Rio de Janeiro, would characterize themselves as living in the crossfire of a constant battle between competing drug factions and the punitive state police.

Urbanization and the UPPs: 2008 to the Present

This dynamic, however, has undergone significant changes since 2008. In November of that year, the government of Rio de Janeiro launched the Pacifying Police Units program ( Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora- UPP), a state-run operation to disarm the drug trade and reclaim the city's favelas from the gangs that had controlled them since the mid-1980s. On January 21, 2009, State Security Secretary Beltrame announced the program to the public in an official decree of the state government. In a statement posted on the newly inaugurated UPP website, Beltrame wrote:

We can use legalism to say that favelas need to be demolished, because they are [illegal] occupations of land, or to defend them, because after all [favelados] are Brazilian victims of a perverse economic and historical model. Either society embraces and hosts these areas, or nothing will change. For this reason the police make an appeal [to the population of Rio]: go up the hill, it is part of the city (Beltrame).

Since the release of this statement, the program, a collaboration between the State Security Secretariat and the military police, has "pacified" nearly 100 communities through the establishment of 26 community policing bases. The police have occupied nearly all of the city's largest and most volatile favelas, including City of God, Rocinha, and Complexo do Alemão.

The program has been quite popular among Cariocas, favelados, and asfalto dwellers alike, yet some instances of violence and corruption on the part of the occupying police forces have attracted criticism. Changing local consciousness has proved more difficult than UPP planners envisioned, as residents are reluctant to believe that the police are no longer the enemy. "I am scared even to say 'good afternoon' to the police here," resident Beatriz Soares told The New York Times, illustrating that traditional perceptions of the police harbored by the poor are difficult to change (Barrionuevo). Even when officers are on their best behavior, it will be a difficult task to convince favelados that they have good intentions after decades of abusing the poor. A resident of Pavão-Pavãozinho told a reporter from El País, "Don't believe what they tell you. According to [the police], they're like an NGO. But the other day I saw how they sprayed some kids in the face with pepper spray" (Baron). Many police officers are aware that a permanent, armed police presence in these communities is difficult for many residents to accept. UPP officer Eduardo da Silva teaches karate to teenagers and adults in Cidade de Deus and as a gesture of goodwill, he doesn't carry a gun or wear a bulletproof vest when he goes to work. He said to The New York Times, "Force doesn't bring about peace. It can instill respect, but not trust" (Barrionuevo).

Despite these reservations about the future of the program, many favela residents are confident that this initiative will be the one to finally break down the century-old barriers that have prevented them from fully participating in urban life. This prediction isn't unfounded. The UPP's unique fusion of security and social welfare measures bodes well for future development. Before the UPP, the military police focused on apprehending criminals and the Municipal Housing Secretariat took care of urbanization projects, but there was no coordination between the two government organs. Police operations terrorized communities and were rarely fruitful, due to the resourcefulness of drug traffickers and the widespread corruption of policemen. Urbanization projects only addressed half the problem, as the presence of armed gangs discouraged community cooperation with the government and prevented residents from achieving their true collective social potential. Now, communities with UPPs are the recipients of holistic development projects, intended to both introduce state law enforcement and build community institutions. For the first time in the history of the city of Rio de Janeiro, favelados are able to participate in civil society in ways previously beyond their reach. A resident of Santa Marta spoke to this point:

Things are changing. Today, young people say proudly "my community" [referring to Santa Marta]. People enjoy living in favelas today. My wife and I say that we are favelados with pride. Even foreigners come to see Santa Marta. Madonna came; some politicians from the United States came. This has brought self-esteem to the community (Peirera).

By allowing for the development of social, political, and economic capital in the city's poorest neighborhoods, the UPPs represent the potential for meaningful community empowerment, ultimately the most useful tool for development. The program is far from perfect, but it is the product of substantial effort and thoughtful planning on the part of the state government. As long as project planners curb police misconduct and ensure that it enlists meaningful collaboration from community members, the program's prospects for long-term success appear quite promising.

Further Reading

For more information on drug-related violence in Rio's favelas, Crossfie: Favela Residents, Drug Dealers, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro by Maria Helena Moreira Alves discusses and chronicles the interactions and experiences of favela residents, drug dealers, and police in Rio de Janeiro.

Theresa Williamson's editorials in The New York Times offer insight into current favela policy in light of the upcoming World Cup and Olympic games in Rio de Janeiro.

Sources

Barón, Francho. "La paz comienza a abrirse paso en Río." El País, March 26, 2010.

Barrionuevo, Alexei. "In Rough Slum, Brazil's Police Try Soft Touch." The New York Times, October 10, 2010.

Beltrame, José Mariano. "Palavra do Secretário." http://upprj.com/wp/?p=175 (accessed 15 March, 2011).

Leeds, Elizabeth and Anthony. "Brazil in the 1960s: Favelas and Polity, The Continuity of the Structure of Social Control." LADAC Occasional Papers 2, no. 5 (1972).

Pereira, Valdeci. interview by the author, August 10, 2010, Rio de Janeiro, digital recorder.

Perlman, Janice. Favela: Four Generations of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

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Favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Past and Present

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The Origins of Rio's Favelas and Early Activism The history of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro begins in the final years of the nineteenth century as Brazil transitioned from an empire to a republic.