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Sources B, E and F challenge the view that the Philippines did not seek a peaceful resolution and rather took on an antagonistic approach that complicated the matter further.

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Source B states that Mr Marcos, the then President of Philippines, spoke to "agitate and inflame the people" with the same "same stripe of amoral high adventure that led to the sorry Corregidor Jabidah massacres’. This implies that the Philippines has been actively promoting an aggressive approach and encouraging armed resistance, as seen from the Corregidor incident, instead of seeking diplomatic solutions to the dispute, straining the tensions between the two countries. Source E further adds to this idea of Filipino aggression rather than diplomacy as despite how "Malaysia had gone out of its way to be friendly with the Philippines", Marcos had a "secret army" in Corregidor to "prepare groundwork of the takeover of Sabah by force as the Philippines believed it would now be impossible to obtain from Malaysia ‘a legal settlement’ in their claim to Sabah". Additionally, Source F depicts a cartoon of Macapagal, the then President of the Philippines with Sukarno, ripping apart a banner labelled "Manila Accord". Below it is a photograph of Corregidor Island in March 1968’ showing the Philippines Army training with arms for an intended Sabah separatist rebellion, hence showing the Philippines violating the peaceful pact in favour of attempted military force in solving the dispute. Hence, the sources challenge the view.

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Sources B, E and F provide a more reliable argument in claiming that the Philippines did not seek a peaceful resolution. Sources B, E and F all mention the Corregidor incident as evidence of the Philippines' reluctance to use diplomatic methods to solve the dispute, instead, actively supporting the use of force. This is corroborated by my contextual knowledge as the Philippine army attempted to pursue its claim by sponsoring a training camp for an intended Sabah separatist rebellion in 1968, which led to a suspicion of diplomatic relations. This incident further causes a blemish on the Philippine government after they carried out a massacre after a mutiny among the Muslim recruits. Hence, the Corregidor incident left an additional strain on the workings of Sabah since the incident was a plot by the Philippine government, therefore showing that the Philippines were aggressive in trying to acquire Sabah.

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Sources B, E and F are largely reliable when examining the source provenance. Source B, E and F seem to be less reliable as the source authors have vested interests in depicting the Philippines as less willing to choose peaceful resolutions for the dispute, painting them as the aggressor and Malaysia as the victim. Source B is taken from a speech by “Philippine Senator Benigno S Aquino Jr” , who was known to be a vocal critic of Marcos and would want to portray him as a leader incapable of diplomatically resolving political crisis like that of the Sabah dispute. Similarly, Source E’s author was “a political advisor to Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak” and therefore more inclined to support the actions of the political leader he served previously rather than highlighting his failures. Hence, the source’s  author has a vested interest to draw attention away from the fact that Tun Razak supported training camps for Muslim Moro separatist rebels before his downfall in the 1976 elections. This had made it even more challenging to reach a peaceful solution as it angered the Philippines who saw it as Malaysian complicity in the Moro rebellion.  Source F also parallels the other two sources in appearing to be less credible due to its provenance, as it was a photograph of artefacts “displayed at the National Musuem of Malaysia”. The national museum is likely aiming to foster national pride amongst the public via the curated display of the nation’s heritage, especially since it is maintained by the central state. Hence the source is likely to paint Malaysia as the victim of Filipino aggression and resistance to diplomacy, rather than focusing on how Malaysia contributed to the dispute to protect national pride. therefore these sources  challenge the given view that the Philippines sought peaceful resolutions.

Despite the appearance of the 3 sources seeming to be less credible in challenging the view, the fact that all 3 sources are corroborated by my contextual knowledge of the Corregidor incident as evidence of Filipino military aggression, this proves the accuracy of the contents of the sources. This hence enhances the sources’ reliability, making the claim that the Philippines did not seek a peaceful resolution with Malaysia over the dispute even stronger due to its credibility.

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Sources A, C and D support the claim that the Philippines sought a peaceful resolution to the Sabah dispute as they portray it to be cooperative with Malaysia in establishing peace in the region through diplomatic solutions to the conflict.

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Source A claims that the Philippines participated diplomatically in the Manila Accords, pledging to uphold peace and security in the Southeast Asian region, along with Malaya and Indonesia. Source C similarly states that the Philippines sought to resolve the dispute using diplomatic means by bringing to the attention of the International Court of Justice, instead of resorting to violent means. Moreover, upon cross referencing sources A and C together, both sources corroborate each other, as on both occasions, the Philippines chose to handover the decision making of the dispute to a impartial third party without a vested interest in the conflict. Source D also shares this view, saying that both Malaysia and the Philippines had worked together in establishing peace by collaborating with one another in reaching a diplomatic and peaceful arrangement, averting armed conflict. This shows that the Philippines was active in pursuing a non-violent solution to the Sabah dispute with Malaysia.

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Source C claims that the Philippines has strived to pursue a diplomatic solution to the conflict, but according to my contextual knowledge, this was not always the case. In 1968, the Corregidor Incident became known to the international community, showing that the Philippines had intended to infiltrate Malaysia.

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Source A is less credible, as the source was written immediately after the Manila accord was signed, and did not have the benefit of hindsight that the accord, while signed, would not be ratified, as seen through Indonesia’s initiation of Konfrantasi with Malaysia in the same year and the Corregidor incident where the Philippines trained Sabah separatist rebels to retake Sabah from Malaysia, thus breaching the treaty that they would “welcome the formation of Malaysia” which included Sabah, thus undermining the source. Hence source A is a less credible source.

Source C is a less credible source as it was made by the Philippines Foreign Secretary, which would be invoked in the dispute as a member of Philippines government, and would be more inclined to be biased towards the dispute and be more inclined to favour Philippines. Possibly making statements to portray Philippines in a positive light

Source D is also a less credible source as although was made by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, which was directly involved in the dispute over Sabah with Philippines, which could thus make him more inclined to suport Malaysia. He could be making this statement to appease Philippines to preserve their bilateral relations, as at the time of the source, ASEAN members included both Philippines and Malaysia, thus bilateral relations were important to maintain  the integrity of ASEAN

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Sources B, E and F challenge the statement that the Philippines sought a peaceful resolution of the Sabah dispute with Malaysia, instead arguing that the Philippines employed violent means against Malaysia.

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Sources A, C and D support the view that the Philippines sought peaceful resolution of the Sabah dispute with Malaysia

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Sources B, E, and F challenge the view that the Philippines sought peaceful resolution of the Sabah dispute with Malaysia, instead portraying the Philippines as confrontational and aggressive in dealing with the dispute.

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Sources B, E, F however disagree that the Philippines were willing to cooperate with Malaysia in order to settle the dispute over Sabah in a peaceful manner to a large extent. Instead, these sources claim that the Philippines were willing to engage in direct confrontation through the leadership of Marcos.

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Source A says “the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative.” Source A thus implies that the Philippines took the initiative in inviting third parties to help determine the sovereignty of the territories concerned. Cross-referencing to Source C, it states “From the beginning of this controversy on Sabah … the Philippines has endeavored to have the dispute elevated to the International Court of Justice for decision… the Philippines is committed to the principle of self-determination and would be prepared to ensure the observance of that principle in Sabah.” Source C further supports Source A by showing evidence of the Philippines’ commitment to respecting the interests of the Sabah people through appealing to the UN General Assembly for their assistance in resolving the dispute. Similarly, Source D states “It is now my pleasure and privilege to announce that as a result of

discussions with General Romulo, it is agreed that in the spirit of goodwill and friendship

diplomatic relations between Malaysia and Philippines will be normalized.” Source D thus shows the result of the Philippines’ negotiations with Malaysia where both parties agreed to a peaceful resolution and were on friendly terms.

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This can be seen in source B where it states:" Mr. Marcos has turned Sabah into a slogan of hate, a battle cry of indignation, a call to arms!" Similarly, Source E states:"  to prepare groundwork for the takeover of Sabah by force as the Philippines believed it would now be impossible to obtain from Malaysia a ‘legal settlement’ in their claim to Sabah." This meant that source B suggests that Marcos required a distraction from his administrations' inefficacies and as such took an aggressive and confrontational stance in order to rally the population against a "common enemy" as it necessitates a countries' full attention while source E similarly states a stance of continued escalation by The Philippines when Malaysia refused to back down, contrary to the view that the Philippines sought a peaceful solution as a result of its will to create an armed uprising in Sabah.

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Source B depicts how the Philippines had initiated a violent form of confrontation to Malaysia as the source states how Marcos had a "cynical design to set [the Philippines] on an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with Malaysia" which would eventually result in the two countries to be set on a "fearsome collision course." This suggests how Marcos had prepared the Philippines to undergo an aggressive process of making its claim over Sabah. This is further supported by source E which states how the Philippines had planned to "infiltrate into Sabah after training to prepare groundwork for the takeover of Sabah by force" as they had believed it would be "impossible to obtain from Malaysia a ‘legal settlement’ in their claim to Sabah." This reflects how the Philippines had taken on a rather forceful approach in its claim over Sabah and avoided a negotiation with Malaysia. Hence, Source B depicts how the Philippines had taken an aggressive approach in confronting Malaysia in the Sabah dispute.

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Sources B, E and F state how the Philippines used forceful violent tactics to resolve the Sabah dispute. Source B talks about the "sorry corregidor jabidah massacres" where the Philippines' leader, "Mr Marcos, has turned Sabah into a slogan of hate and a battle cry of indignation, a call to arms". This would suggest that Marcos had resorted to using "arms" and violence to settle the Sabah dispute. Similarly, source E, talks about the same corregidor incident in which the Philippines had used "guerrilla warfare.... to infiltrate into Sabah.... (to) takeover Sabah by force". This would also suggest at a forceful and violent tactic such as the "guerrilla warfare" employed, and thus would suggest at a violent and forceful settlement rather than a peaceful resolution. Finally, Source F corroborates this and the cartoon depicts Macapagal being a key actor in teaming up the Manila Accord. This would be symbolic of the Philippines, as represented by Macapagal, symbolically dishonouring the peaceful agreement as per the Manila accord with the photograph depicting weapons and firearms recovered from the Corregidor incident, suggesting a bloodbath of the violence that occurred as a result of the settlement of the Sabah dispute. Thus, Sources B, E and F do not support the view that the Philippines sought a peaceful resolution, but rather went for a more violent and forceful way to settle the Sabah dispute.

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Sources B and E may seem to be unreliable as they are opponents of Marcos. Source B is a speech by Philippine Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. who opposes Marcos’ authoritarian rule while Source E is an extract from a book by Dato’ Abdullah Ahmad, a political advisor to Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak, where Malaysia was an opponent to the Philippines in the Sabah conflict. Thus, they may be biased against Marcos' Philippines and more inclined to portray the Philippines’ actions in a negative light and as violent.
Source F also seems unreliable as , the source is displayed at the National Museum of Malaysia in 2015, and would want to portray Malaysia as the victim and innocent party, and the Philippines as a violent aggressor in the Sabah conflict.

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However, sources B, E and F can still ultimately be considered reliable because Contextual knowledge corroborates with the claim of source F, as contextual knowledge highlights how even though the Philippines signed the Manila Accord, it refused to recognise Malaysia as a nation in her own right until 1966, when the Philippines was preparing to join the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Furthermore the claims of sources B and E are also supported by contextual knowledge, where in 1968, the Philippine Congress also passed a law that openly claimed Sabah as part of Philippine territory, even though Sabah had joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963, and the Philippines's role in training a separatist rebellion in Sabah during the Corregidor incident was revealed. These events highlight how even though the Philippines did eventually acknowledge the existence of Malaysia as a sovereign nation, it had no intention of respecting Malaysia's claim over Sabah, and were still insistent on seizing Sabah as their rightful territory through violent, militaristic means.

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Source A’s claims are undermined by contextual knowledge, as Source A states that “Philippines would welcome the formation of Malaysia” however, the Philippines only recognised the existence of Malaysia in 1966. This proves that the Philippines did not fully welcome Malaysia, as they still neglected it and refused to recognise it, thus being a root cause of the tension. Furthermore, it is known that in 1962, the dispute was first surfaced when the Philippines lodged a claim over Sabah by president Macapogal for domestic political reasons. This evidently led to regional consequences — the diplomatic break between Malaysia and the Philippines, proven to be started by the philippines, which opposes the view that source A presents, thus making it somewhat unreliable.

Source C’s reliability is questioned because in 1968, the corregidor incident occured, where the philippines leaders had a plot to infiltrate Sabah, which strained the workings of ASEAN because Malaysia was unhappy as a result of this incident and refused to work together. Thus, it is observed how the Philippines was responsible for starting the problem that further ruined the relationship between the 2 countries, though also highlighting how difficult Malaysia was to work with.

Source D: it is known that in 1968, the Philippines congress passed a law affirming claim in Sabah for domestic political reasons — this coincides with the claim in source D, that the peace established was with the success of ASEAN in mind. Thus the source’s reliability is strengthened, and the desire of both Philippines and Malaysia to resolve the Sabah dispute in order to benefit ASEAN is evident.

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Taking contextual knowledge into account, in 1968, the Philippines congress passed the law that constituted Sabah under the Philippines despite the fact that Sabah had joined Malaysia in 1963 and the Philippines' role in the Corregidor Incident was exposed. This supports the view of Source B and E. As for source F, even though the Philippines had signed the Manila accord it refused to recognize Malaysia as an independent nation until 1966 when the Philippines were preparing to join ASEAN. This aligns with the view of source F.

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Source B offers a less credible perspective on the view that the Philippines sought a peaceful resolution over the dispute with Malaysia. This is because contextual knowledge shows the source has the tendency to be influenced by political developments of the Sabah dispute, as seen in how the source was published on 5 October 1968, which is around the time that the Philippine congress passed a law affirming their claim on Sabah. Hence, this explains the rationale behind Benigno criticising Marcos’ leadership in the Sabah dispute in “Mr. Marcos has turned Sabah into a slogan of hate, a battle cry of indignation, a call to arms!”, and that the act of the Philippine Congress in affirming their claim on Sabah has escalated tensions over the Sabah dispute.

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Source A is more credible as it was taken from the Manila Accord, which is a legally binding document that requires all signatories to abide by international regulations. Source C is less credible as it was a speech made to the United Nations General Assembly, thus it is likely that he would be trying to portray the Philippines in a positive light in order to attain international support for the Philippines. Source D is less credible as it was an opening speech made by Tunku Abdul Rahman at the third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, thus it is likely to be less credible as he would be trying to portray all countries in positive light in order to foster cooperation between all nations and gain the countries' favour in the conference.

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Source B is an excerpt from a speech made by S. Aquino Jr. to a civic group. This undermines the credibility of Source B, as Aquino and Marcos have a history of political rivalry, thus preventing Aquino to provide a detached analysis of the situation at the time. Furthermore, the speech has the aims of convincing the civic group that Marcos was an ineffective leader in dealing with the dispute, thus proving that there is vested interests in the speech, which ultimately undermines the credibility of Source B. Source E is from a book by Dato’ Abdullah Ahmad, a political advisor to
Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, published in 1985. The authorship here undermines the credibility of Source E as it is expected for the Malaysian political advisor to disregard Philippines' attempts at peaceful resolution, and instead focus entirely on their aggressive reactions during the dispute. Source F is a photograph of the artefacts displayed in the National Museum of Malaysia. The message of the artefacts undermine the credibility of Source F as it claims that the Philippines and Indonesia were responsible for not following the Manila Accord, and subsequently claiming that the Philippines sought an aggressive approach to the Sabah dispute. This portrayal of the dispute is expected from Malaysia, thus making Source F less credible.

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Source B offers less credibility towards the view that the Philippines sought a peaceful resolution over the Sabah dispute. This is because it is a speech by Philippine Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr., who would be more inclined to portray President Marcos’ efforts in the Sabah dispute in a negative light since they were political rivals, and were both running for president in the Philippines. By criticising Marcos’ efforts, this would allow him to gain more political support for his presidency. Moreover, the speech was delivered on 5 October 1968, which is around the same period where the Philippine congress passed a law affirming their claim on Sabah, hence his speech would have the tendency to be affected by the political situation in the Philippines. Thus, Source B is less credible. In the case of Source E, it is written by Dato' Abdullah Ahmad in 1985 who was a political advisor to Malaysian Deputy Tun Razak. While his view on the issue on Sabah would lend some credibility since it was published in 1985, having a more nuanced take and he would have a first-person take on the issue, it is ultimately less credible. This is because as a political advisor to the Malaysian government, it would mean that he would be more biased towards Malaysian issue than consider the Sabah incident in a non-biased context. As a result, the sources claims that the Philippines were not peaceful in resolving the Sabah issue is less credible. For Source F, it depicts a cartoon featuring Macapagal and Sukarno and the Corregidor Island in March 1968 in the National Museum of Malaysia in 2015. Seeing as it is artefects in a museum, the events that it is depicting would lend the source some credibility since it would have been vetted before being displayed in the museum. However, because the source is displayed in the National Museum of Malaysia, there may have been some bias in displaying the Philippines as the main violent instigator in the Sabah issue. Yet, overall, it can be said that the source can be considered credible in showing that the Philippines approach the Sabah issue through direct means.