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In Session 5 ‘Online Drug Crypto Markets’ was the topic of discussion. There are some key features involved with drug crypto markets, these are anonymising software (Tor) and cryptocurrencies.  The anonymising software gives vendors the opportunity to mask their identities and the use of cryptocurrencies can serve to secure this digital currency. This cybercrime first appeared in 2009 with the creation of The Drugstore, Buxton and Bingham (2015, p.7) found in an interview that :

"The Drugstore was the first onion drugs market that operated on the Tor network".

Then came Silk Road 2011 which used cryptocurrencies rather than traditional currencies.

Another important aspect of online drug crypto markets is the dark web. Barratt and Aldridge explain in their paper (2016, p.2) that:

"The dark web consists of websites that use anonymity tools, usually Tor I2P, to hide the Internet Protocol addresses of their servers, so that their physical location cannot be determined".

Within this space of the dark web exists crypto markets and drug trafficking.

The main parties involved when discussing drug crypto markets are the vendors and the buyers. As discussed in the session 5 slides, it is typical for buyers to be acquiring ecstasy, cannabis and LSD as these products are the most common drugs being purchased. Further discussed is the concept of open and closed markets, open markets being drug markets open to any buyer and closed markets being drug markets that are not open to any buyer, only parties that have been vouched for. Drug crypto markets feature both markets.

A common question for crypto market vendors is why do they do it? It is shown in session 5 that Martin (2018) interviewed multiple vendors and found a few theories. These theories include social learning: that vendors often entered the trade when a friend introduced them to it. Strain: several vendors began selling in order to pay for college tuition/student loans.  Theorist Katz (1987) suggests the idea of seductions of crime: several vendors expressed experiencing an emotional buzz from their work. The final criminological approach is by Buxton and Bingham (2015), who suggest the subcultural theory: being trustworthy enough to be part of the market.

Responses to online drug crypto markets are generally viewed from a societal perspective and in terms of how police respond to this cybercrime. The drug policy for policing uses a zero-tolerance model and in Australia the main response is supply reduction. This response involves seizure at the borders related to air transport and through criminalization. (Dietze and Peacock, 2020).  Two other policing responses are demand reduction and harm reduction.

Societal responses to drug crypto markets involve the acknowledgment that crypto markets might reduce the harms associated with the drug trade, as these markets are leading to the increases in quality of the drugs being purchased, decreasing the risks associated with purchasing drugs in person, less violence between vendors and buyers and less overdoses due to better quality product.

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Unfotunately, a key form of online harassment is through image-based abuse. IBA is described by McGlynn and Rackley (2017, 536-537) as:

"The range of ways in which sexual images are created and/or distributed without the consent of the individual depicted".

Image based sexual abuse, contains three key behaviours according to Henry and Flynn (2019, 1-2):

1. The nonconsensual creation (or taking) of nude and/or sexual images.

2. The nonconsensual distribution of the nude and/or sexual images.

3. Threats to share the nude and/or sexual images. (Sextortion)

Examples of different image-based sexual abuse are recordings of sexual assault, nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, voyeuristic recordings, pornographic photoshopping and deepfakes. Session 6 portrayed the serious impacts of imaged-based abuse through the words of Salter, McGlynn and Rackley and Henry et al.

It is important to consider the perpetrators and their motivations towards committing image-based abuse. A report by the Office of the eSafety Commissioner in 2017 found that perpetrators of image-based abuse are typically someone known to victim and that women are more likely than men to report experiencing this abuse from a former partner. This report also found that these perpetrators tend to be 49% male, 35% female and the remainder unknown.

In terms of motivations for this digital harm, Henry and Flynn found in 2019 through studying 77 different image-based abuse distribution sites that:

“There is a high demand for non-consensual imagery on these sites; the motivations of perpetrators were more commonly related to sexual gratification or proving social status to an online peer network, as opposed to revenge; and most of these platforms are designed for heterosexual male pleasure and the objectification of women”.

Responses to image-based abuse consists of law reform and police enforcement. In Australia, there are laws against this digital harm in every state and territory excluding Tasmania. These laws are comprehensive as they protect all individuals no matter their background. In Victoria, it is is further against legislation to make threats to commit image-based abuse. Although, Dr. Nicola Henry states that:

“Laws are only as effective as they can be enforced”.

In connection with the enforcement of image-based abuse punishment, it is important to consider police responses to the issue. The police have been met with inter-jurisdictional challenges notably internationally and challenges regarding the guidelines of social media platforms and their lack of clear pathways to remove content such as child exploitation.  It is evident to note the challenges in getting assistance from police as to the seriousness of the shared content.

Nonetheless, the Enhancing Online Safety Act (2015) established the Civil Penalties Scheme in Australia. The scheme offers victims the opportunity to seek civil redress and victims can report to the eSafety Commissioner to enforce Removal Notices to platforms where the image is being displayed.

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Surette (2015) describes performance crimes as the intertwined practice of recording, sharing and/or uploading crime with the aim to distribute the performance to new media audiences. Surette further states that:

“Performances are no longer rare events that are place and time bound to physical stages and scheduled broadcasts; they are now constantly created and repeatedly distributed in millions of social media interactions”.

An example of broadcasting through social platforms includes the murder of Robert Godwin Sr. In 2017, where the perpetrator uploaded a video to Facebook that displayed the murder of the victim. Powell, Stratton and Cameron (2018) note that this is not an isolated or rare occurrence, and that:

“There are many examples of all types of offending being live streamed or ‘performed’ to social media”.

It is argued that the pairing of technology and media enables offending such as these performance crimes. Yar (2012:246), establishes that:

“It may be that, in the new media age, the terms of criminological questioning need to be sometimes reversed: instead of asking whether ‘media’ instigates crime or fear of crime, we must ask how the very possibility of mediating oneself to an audience through self-representation might be bound with the genesis of criminal behaviour”.

Responses to performance crimes are divided into three categories: reactive, proactive and deterrence. Reactive responses to performance crimes involve the tracking down of offenders after they have posted online. Proactive responses to the offence involve the discussion of the role social media companies play in removing performance crimes whilst they are being live streamed (Christchurch Call, Tech Against Terrorism).  Finally, deterrence which is the introduction of legislation that criminalises the filming of violent content.

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When considering cybercrimes, the term hacking certainly comes to mind. Common hacking techniques involve shoulder surfing, exploit, social engineering and script-kidding. The aim of hacking is to access unauthorised data in a system or computer.
The individuals behind this cybercrime we found in session 7 are predominately male and aged under 30, leading to Yar asking in 2005:

“Is hacking another example of juvenile delinquency?”

Grabosky and Smith (1998) found that the motivations behind the actions of these hackers range from monetary gain, power, intellectual challenge and curiosity to vengeance, attacking the system and terrorism. Additionally, there are criminological explanations for hacking that exist:

1. Subcultural: This is the idea that hackers belong to a subculture group and are relating to one another through these groups. Holt et al (2015) suggest that hacking subcultures are formed by three primary norms: technology, knowledge and secrecy.

2. General Deterrence Theory: The perception of certain severe punishment for offences will deter people from committing such acts.

3. Specific Deterrence: This deterrence is focused on a specific individual.

There are challenges in terms of general deterrence theory and specific deterrence as to the effectiveness of putting these theories into practice.

Regarding responses to hacking, the Criminal Code recognises the offence of unauthorized access to, modification of, restricted data; unauthorized impairment of electronic communication; using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence. Further responses involve police cybercrime units. Harkin et al made three key findings in their study of specialist police cybercrime units in Australia, these were that there has been an increase in the quantity of work cybercrime units are expected to undertake; cybercrime units do not have enough resources to meet demands and the skill level and training of most unit members is often not high enough to handle the increase of complexities with cyberspace.

It is evident that the following improvements need to be made within cyber policing:

Increased numbers of sworn and non-sworn officers in cybercrime units

Increased supervisor and higher management awareness of the difficult learning curb in training cybercrime investigators

Increased staffing stability in specialist cybercrime units

The educating of frontline officers on cybercrime and the role of these units

Consideration of deterrence through sentencing of offenders in the criminal justice system

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Online fraud can be accomplished through the use of the internet or certain software that utilizes internet access in order to defraud. Victims of online fraud are often deceived into sending money or goods to individuals online. This deception is made possible due to romance fraud, investment fraud and phishing and can result in identity theft.

Victims of romance fraud are generally approach on social media through dating sites and platforms where individuals communicate through messaging or email. In 2020, Australians reported to have lost approximately 37 million dollars in dating and romance scams. Romance fraud functions through the relationship that is formed between the deceptive individual and the victim. Often a rapport is made and the deceptive individual presents as a convincing online profile through offering ‘personal’ information and at times providing the victim with gifts. However, inevitably the deceptive individual committing the offence will begin to request money and gifts from the victim, often under the pretense that they intend to travel to the victim.

Investment fraud typically involves the perpetrator contacting the victim through cold calling, email, message forums or websites, acting as investment manager and offering the victims ‘low-risk advice’ with the aim of deceiving the victim into investing into shares or real estate pyramid schemes.

Phishing is an online fraud method that allows perpetrators to steal confidential information from victims. The fraudulent material is sent to victim via email, SMS or on social media platforms and can often appear to be legitimate however leads to the confidential information being stolen.

Victims of online fraud are often reluctant to admit the crime that has been committed against them, this is due to the fear of being blamed for not taking precautions and the victims can feel the effects of responsibilization:

“The transferal of responsibility for something from a higher authority, such as state or community onto an individual” (Garland, 2001)

Responses to online fraud involve creation of programs such as the Stay Smart Online Program and an area for victims to report online fraud, phishing or to educate themselves on the offence. Tips taught to individuals include advice to minimize the amount of personal identifiable information available online, two step factor authentication and updating and securing personal information.