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This glossary provides short definitions of legal terms you will find on this website.

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BS2 COLOUR FOR CHILDREN WRITTEN REPORT BRIEF MAY 2019

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Support for environmentally friendly, socially responsible and sustainable forest managementThe state has owned and managed forests in Russia for almost two centuries. During this time a powerful bureaucratic apparatus (employing about 250 thousand people) has developed and no country in the world can compete with Russia in the numbers of various forest officials. The country has sophisticated forest legislation, so complicated and intricate that even forest industry employees can hardly work with it (no wonder, all active forest laws and industrial regulations are written on about 10,000 typewritten pages).

Russian forest industry also takes the first place in many aspects. The forest industry enterprises employ about 800 thousand people. Each year they log some 150 million cubic meters of timber and in the 1960's this figure was twice as big. Only six countries (USA, China, India, Indonesia, Canada and Brazil) outlog Russia (some 30 years ago Russia was the leader). What gives Russia these enormous logging amounts?

In efficiency of timber use Russia lags far behind. One cubic meter of timber in Russia gives products worth ten time less than, say, in Scandinavian countries. From each cubic meter of timber forest sector employees receive salaries 20 times lower than in other countries. In other words, to produce a unit of finished product Russian forest industry logs 10 times more timber than in neighboring Finland.

Types of cuttings applied in Russian forestry are also far from being perfect, at least from the standpoint of environmental protection. Over 80% of timber in Russia is logged in clear cuttings and in most forests clear cuttings are permitted in large areas (over 50 ha). These logging practices cause largest possible damage to the environment and in large areas ancient forests are replaced with birch and aspen forests. The total annual clear cutting area in Russia is 20 times bigger than the territory of Moscow. Logging carried out in the last 100 years have largely exhausted accessible and most productive forests in Russia, which results in that many forest industry companies are facing shortages of accessible high quality timber.

The outcome is quite obvious: poor forest settlements of jobless people, salaries that at best are enough to provide water and bread, out-of-date machinery and back-breaking labor conditions of forest industry employees. And more: constant lack of funds on forest protection and conservation resulting in regular forest fires, piles of litter along forest roads, illegal logging, no funds on normal reforestation and young forest maintenance.

It is rather difficult to improve the existing situation. First of all, it is necessary to understand that logging should not be growing (this what "forest generals" from the Natural Resources Ministry want). It should efficiently use what is cut. More cutting is already impossible in Russia: economically accessible forests have been largely exhausted, while cutting remote northern and Siberian forests will only result in more losses. And it is a must that considerable investments should go to restoration and maintenance of valuable forests. Otherwise, in 10 to 20 years Russian forest industry will die. Russia should reject exports of round timber (this is where Russia is taking the first place) as this type of export brings profits only to those countries that process this timber afterwards. Not all agree to the above, though: round timber exports "feed" lots of officials as most unregistered incomes come from this type of exports (in round timber exports it is very difficult to determine precisely the quality and price of exported timber at the customs).

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Support for environmentally friendly, socially responsible and sustainable forest managementThe state has owned and managed forests in Russia for almost two centuries. During this time a powerful bureaucratic apparatus (employing about 250 thousand people) has developed and no country in the world can compete with Russia in the numbers of various forest officials.

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UKFT is a passionate supporter of the UK manufacturing sector

UK manufacturing is enjoying a great renaissance, helped by the growth in the cost benefits of re-shoring and the sustainability agenda. The latest government statistics show that last year manufacturing employment in the UK rose for the first time in decades.

Today's industry is a vibrant and innovative industry, creating growth, jobs and opportunity. This diverse sector produces high-quality products used in hospitals, cars, international catwalks and the high street. In the UK it is estimated that some 20,000 new jobs will be needed in textile and clothing manufacturing to keep up with growing demand.

The UK fashion and textile manufacturing sector has always been a significant driver of the growth of the UK economy, from the first industrial revolution to the development of Industry 4.0. In 2017 our manufacturers produced product worth £9.1 billion and employed over 105,000 staff.

In recognition of the skills and talent within UK textile, fashion and jewellery manufacturing UKFT's President HRH The Princess Royal regularly visits UKFT manufacturing members, from central London to rural Scotland. These visits form part of UKFT's Let's Make It Here initiative, in celebration of Britain's rich manufacturing heritage.

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UKFT is a passionate supporter of the UK manufacturing sector UK manufacturing is enjoying a great renaissance, helped by the growth in the cost benefits of re-shoring and the sustainability agenda. The latest government statistics show that last year manufacturing employment in the UK rose for the first time in decades.

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Interactive Map tracking its Supply Chain for Raw Materials and Factories - Responsible Wool Standard

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Thanks to DNA tracing technology, M&S can trace all our beef right back to every farm and every animal. Marks and Spencer only work with farmers across the UK who share our high standards, respect for the environment and the food they produce

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M&A RESIT WRITTEN BRAND REPORT SUMMER TERM ONE 2019

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Values, Beliefs, Traditions & Norms

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6 Characteristics of a High Performance Culture

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Developing CSR in practice - 'Inspiring Sustainable Living'

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Unilever embedding Sustainability in its purpose-led brands

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Unilever embedding Sustainability in its purpose-led brands

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We believe that sustainable and equitable growth is the only way to create long-term value for our stakeholders. That's why we have placed the Unilever Sustainable Living Plan at the heart of our business model.

Driven by our purpose & vision

We have a clear purpose - to make sustainable living commonplace - and a vision to grow our business while decoupling our environmental footprint from our growth and increasing our positive social impact.

However volatile and uncertain the world becomes, Unilever's purpose and vision will remain because we believe that managing for the long term is the best way for us to grow. Find out more about how we create value (English) (PDF | 433KB).

Our blueprint for sustainable growth

The Unilever Sustainable Living Plan (USLP) provides the detailed blueprint for how we will achieve sustainable growth, while delivering our purpose and vision. It covers all aspects of our business, incorporates all our brands and Divisions, and covers every country we work in. It aims to create change across our value chain - from our operations, to our sourcing and the way consumers use our products. And it is designed to drive profitable growth and fuel innovation, in the right way, so that all our stakeholders benefit.

The Plan, launched in 2010, is built around three big goals and nine pillars. To check these are still the right priorities, we conduct a materiality analysis every two years. For each goal, we have detailed targets and metrics. Find out more about our performance on the relevant pillars pages.

We have long known that growth and sustainability are not in conflict - and we now have evidence to prove this. Our four-point framework shows how the USLP drives value for our business:

More growth: sustainability creates innovation opportunities, opens up new markets and allows our brands to connect with consumers in new ways. Unilever's Making Purpose Pay research found that over 50% of consumers want to choose brands that are more sustainable - our brands are well-placed to capitalise on this growth opportunity.

Lower costs: by cutting waste and using resources carefully we create efficiencies, cut costs and improve margins, while becoming less exposed to the volatility of resource prices. For example, by using less energy we avoided energy costs in our factories of over €490 million since 2008. And by using fewer materials and producing less waste we have avoided costs of over €260 million over the same period.

Less risk: operating sustainably helps us future-proof our supply chain against the risks associated with climate change and long-term sourcing of raw materials. By 2017, 56% of our agricultural raw materials were sustainably sourced.

More trust: placing sustainability at the heart of our business model strengthens our relationships. It helps us maintain our value and relevance to consumers, while inspiring Unilever's current and future employees. For example, in 2017, we maintained our status were as the Graduate Employer of Choice in the fast-moving consumer goods sector among 44 of the 60 countries we recruit from.

Transformational change beyond our business

We are aware that the biggest challenges facing the world cannot be addressed by one company alone. We are changing ourselves as a business, but we also want to help transform the system in which business is done. We'll do this by acting as catalysts for change more broadly - as conveners to facilitate progressive discussion and bring others together, and as collaborators in partnerships to deliver positive business, social and environmental impact at scale.

By being part of the solution to challenges, businesses have the opportunity to win the trust of consumers while helping create societies and economies in which they can grow and succeed.

We aim to use our scale and influence to help bring about transformational change in four areas where we can make the biggest difference and which represent the biggest market opportunities for us:

Our multi-stakeholder approach enables us to understand the challenges preventing society and our ecosystems from thriving, and helps us find ways to begin addressing them. We engage shareholders, governments, NGOs and civil society organisations, and shape the business landscape through advocacy. By leveraging partnerships, blended (public/private) finance, digital and new business models, we believe transformational change is possible.

Our Plan and the Sustainable Development Goals

One way in which we are using partnerships to deliver change at scale is through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They are fundamental to future economic and business growth. The Business & Sustainable Development Commission, co-founded by Unilever, concluded that successful delivery of the SDGs will create market opportunities of at least $12 trillion a year.

We are working across many of the SDGs through the USLP. In doing so, we are unlocking new markets and investing in brands with purpose and innovation. The interdependence and mutuality of the goals ensures that progress against one, leads to progress against others. Find out about our approach to SDGs and how we are taking action on the them, throughout our Sustainable Living Report.

We're still learning

We've had some great results from our Sustainable Living Plan. We know it contributes to business growth as we see consumers choosing our brands with purpose - such as Hellmann's, Ben & Jerry's, Dove and Omo.

We've also learnt a lot about what does and doesn't work, and we'll keep making changes to get things right. One of our biggest challenges is our ability to influence change outside our business, where we don't have direct control.

For example, we've made good progress on reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from our factories and reached our 2020 target by 2017. However, the GHG impact of our products per consumer use has increased by 9% since 2010. We've updated our GHG strategy to reflect what we've learnt. Similarly, although we have reduced water use by 2% through innovations such as low rinse laundry products, this has been offset by the growth of products in our portfolio with higher water use.

We are continually looking for new ideas and ways to influence our wider value chain. We know that collaboration with others holds the key to tackling many sustainability challenges and we will be focusing even more on this in the years ahead. Our transformational change initiatives will help to bring about the systems change needed to address some of the most complex social and environmental problems.

Purpose-driven people

To achieve real change, we need to create a movement for sustainable growth within Unilever. We are always finding new ways to engage our people on sustainability and to harness their passion to achieve our goals. One particular area of focus is helping our employees find their own our purpose so that they can fulfil their potential.

'Bringing Sustainability to Life' is one of the six key business skills addressed in our learning programmes with our employees. We integrate sustainability into existing training and create bespoke courses to develop employees' capabilities and understanding of how sustainability applies to their role.

Our employee sustainability champions in key functions, Divisions and countries, help engage employees on sustainability, support our leadership teams to identify local priorities and review progress quarterly against our targets. During 2017, we ran a 'Have Your Say' survey - the biggest consultation of employees on the future of the business that Unilever has ever conducted.

Purpose-driven leadership

Leadership will be critical in the delivery of Unilever's purpose and in our performance over the coming years. Our leadership programmes will nurture the purpose-driven and values-led leaders that Unilever, and our world, need today.
Tim Munden, Chief Learning Officer

As a values-led and purpose-driven organisation, we have been using our Unilever Leadership Development Programme (ULDP) as the vehicle to help our executives to discover their purpose, and to use this to guide them in their decisions and careers.

Our recently refreshed General Manager (GM) programme helps equip our GMs with the mindset to develop innovative, sustainable and inclusive business models to achieve responsible growth. GMs play a key role in creating the right conditions for delivering the USLP as they have oversight of our markets and commercial operations.

In addition, we now link progress on sustainability to remuneration for a growing number of management employees, up to and including our CEO and Unilever Leadership Executive. Find out more in our Annual Report and Accounts (PDF).

External recognition

We're pleased that our approach to sustainability has been recognised by others in 2017, including:

Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) - Unilever was named leader of the Personal Products sector.

CDP - Unilever was included in the 'A' list in CDP's Climate, Water, Forests and Supplier Engagement Reports.

GlobeScan/SustainAbility Sustainability Leaders survey - we've retained our top ranking for seven consecutive years.

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We believe that sustainable and equitable growth is the only way to create long-term value for our stakeholders. That's why we have placed the Unilever Sustainable Living Plan at the heart of our business model.

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Project Portfolio Template for Guidance

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M&A MARKETING RESEARCH PRESENTATION BRIEF SPRING 2018-19

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Assignment Brief

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M&A WRITTEN REPORT BRANDS SPRING TERM 2018-19

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We are proud to introduce our brand new University of Aberdeen International Study Centre, opening in September 2019. We are looking for an experienced Academic leader to take on the crucial role of Head of Centre. Initially, this role will work with the project team to deliver a successful opening of the centre in September, ensuring that it is fully operational.

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Zero Hour Contracts, Rights, Law, Rules & Benefits | Acas

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Zero hour contracts are contracts that are between employer and worker, where employers are not obligated to provide minimum working hours, however, workers are not required to accept any work offered to them. Find out more about zero hour contracts, rights, laws and the benefits with Acas.

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Mind Tools offering information on Management Theory and Theorists

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Mind Tools offering information on Management Theory and Theorists

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In 1909, Taylor published " The Principles of Scientific Management." [1] In this, he proposed that by optimizing and simplifying jobs, productivity would increase. He also advanced the idea that workers and managers needed to cooperate with one another. This was very different from the way work was typically done in businesses beforehand. A factory manager at that time had very little contact with the workers, and he left them on their own to produce the necessary product. There was no standardization, and a worker's main motivation was often continued employment, so there was no incentive to work as quickly or as efficiently as possible.

Taylor believed that all workers were motivated by money, so he promoted the idea of "a fair day's pay for a fair day's work." In other words, if a worker didn't achieve enough in a day, he didn't deserve to be paid as much as another worker who was highly productive.

With a background in mechanical engineering, Taylor was very interested in efficiency. While advancing his career at a U.S. steel manufacturer, he designed workplace experiments to determine optimal performance levels. In one, he experimented with shovel design until he had a design that would allow workers to shovel for several hours straight. With bricklayers, he experimented with the various motions required and developed an efficient way to lay bricks. And he applied the scientific method to study the optimal way to do any type of workplace task. As such, he found that by calculating the time needed for the various elements of a task, he could develop the "best" way to complete that task.

These "time and motion" studies also led Taylor to conclude that certain people could work more efficiently than others. These were the people whom managers should seek to hire where possible. Therefore, selecting the right people for the job was another important part of workplace efficiency. Taking what he learned from these workplace experiments, Taylor developed four principles of scientific management. These principles are also known simply as "Taylorism".

Four Principles of Scientific Management

Taylor's four principles are as follows:

1. Replace working by "rule of thumb," or simple habit and common sense, and instead use the scientific method to study work and determine the most efficient way to perform specific tasks.

2. Rather than simply assign workers to just any job, match workers to their jobs based on capability and motivation, and train them to work at maximum efficiency.

3. Monitor worker performance, and provide instructions and supervision to ensure that they're using the most efficient ways of working.

4. Allocate the work between managers and workers so that the managers spend their time planning and training, allowing the workers to perform their tasks efficiently.

Critiques of Taylorism

Taylor's Scientific Management Theory promotes the idea that there is "one right way" to do something. As such, it is at odds with current approaches such as MBO (Management By Objectives), Continuous Improvement initiatives, BPR (Business Process Reengineering), and other tools like them. These promote individual responsibility, and seek to push decision making through all levels of the organization.

The idea here is that workers are given as much autonomy as practically possible, so that they can use the most appropriate approaches for the situation at hand. (Reflect here on your own experience - are you happier and more motivated when you're following tightly controlled procedures, or when you're working using your own judgment?) What's more, front line workers need to show this sort of flexibility in a rapidly-changing environment. Rigid, rules-driven organizations really struggle to adapt in these situations.

Teamwork is another area where pure Taylorism is in opposition to current practice. Essentially, Taylorism breaks tasks down into tiny steps, and focuses on how each person can do his or her specific series of steps best. Modern methodologies prefer to examine work systems more holistically in order to evaluate efficiency and maximize productivity. The extreme specialization that Taylorism promotes is contrary to modern ideals of how to provide a motivating and satisfying workplace.

Where Taylorism separates manual from mental work, modern productivity enhancement practices seek to incorporate worker's ideas, experience and knowledge into best practice. Scientific management in its pure form focuses too much on the mechanics, and fails to value the people side of work, whereby motivation and workplace satisfaction are key elements in an efficient and productive organization.

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Frederick Taylor and Scientific Management - Understanding Taylorism and Early Management Theory

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In 1909, Taylor published " The Principles of Scientific Management." [1] In this, he proposed that by optimizing and simplifying jobs, productivity would increase. He also advanced the idea that workers and managers needed to cooperate with one another. This was very different from the way work was typically done in businesses beforehand.

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Another world for ‘outsourcing’ is ‘sub-contracting’, which is a much more familiar concept to business owners. For example, how many businesses subcontract transport and logistics companies to deliver their goods from the manufacturing plant to a retail store or a warehouse? How many businesses already engage an outside accountant, tax expert, web designer, IT management company or solicitor for their company? Organisations can frequently need help undertaking Consultancy and Project Management,  Recruitment, Employment Relations, Payroll, R&D, not to mention growers / producers, suppliers, manufacturers and other strategic partnerships

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OUTSOURCING - HAS IT STARTED TO REACH ITS PEAK?

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OUTSOURCING - HAS IT STARTED TO REACH ITS PEAK?

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Apparel, Fiber, & Fabric Industry Blog | connect.lycra.com

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Create more value with the LYCRA® brand - visit our new LYCRA® Fiber for Apparel Industry Trade Portal

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Woven in Time - Marino Wool in Yorkshire

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Woven in Time - Marino Wool in Yorkshire

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Woven in Time - A History of wool in Yorkshire

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Live and Breathe - looking to future comfort and sustainability

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Live and Breathe - looking to future comfort and sustainability

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woolmark wool "australian merino" "fashion designers"

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The history of The Woolmark Company is built on innovation. Initiated by Australian woolgrowers who recognised the need for a collective body to represent their fibre globally, The Woolmark Company is a commitment between woolgrowers, manufacturers, brands and consumers of the authenticity and quality of the fibre that connects us.

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What Are Natural Fibers & Why Should You Wear Them?

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ZARA's Business Model via Its Operation Strategy

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Fleece, Fibre, Fabric & Fashion Project Portfolio

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Fleece, Fibre, Fabric & Fashion Project Portfolio

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Creating New Products, Developing Markets

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Creating New Products, Developing Markets

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Ansoff's Matrix tells us of Product Development, Market Development, Market Entry and Diversification changing people's attitudes towards a product, and their feelings / desire to purchase and own the brand

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Bertha Benz: The Journey That Changed Everything

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Sundar Supply Chain for the Textile Industry

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Sundar Supply Chain for the Textile Industry

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Transforming the Global Fashion Supply Chain | Jag Gill

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Cock & Bull Tweed Collection - Ethical Menswear, Sustainable Style

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Cock & Bull Tweed Collection brings you a modern, colourful and handsome range of tweed clothing and accessories, exclusively made in the United Kingdom.

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Ethical, Sustainable and Cherished products made in England and the UK

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We are a dedicated menswear label based in East London manufacturing small runs and limited edition menswear staples entirely in the United Kingdom.

Our focus is to create beautiful garments that capture the spirit and timelessness, quaity and durability of old world charm while encompasing a modern aspect including:

100% Organic Cotton Underwear

Knitwear and scarves

Hand finished Shirts

Light Jackets & Waistcoats

Trousers

Tweed Caps & Waistcoats

Our entire range is made from sustainable fabrics and textiles by UK based artisans and textile artists with an emphasis on hand made and hand finished items.

What Are Sustainable Fabrics & Textiles?

Sustainable fabrics and textiles are esssentially produced with limited impact to the environment and community and can be catagorised in the following ways:

Organic

A crop which is cultivated using organic agricultural principles such as bio fertilisers and organic manures. The crop is cultivated without pesticides, chemicals or synthetic fertilizers, for example, hemp, organic cotton, organic ramie / jute (linen). Organic wool can be included here is the sheeps have been raised on 'organic' land and the finished yarn is produced and coloured with organic pigments.

Eco Textiles

A textile product which is produced in a conscientious eco-friendly manner and processed under eco-friendly
limits (defined by agencies like oekotex, ifoam etc.). Natural fibres such as organic cotton, hemp, jute and ramie are considered eco textiles based on the process of cultivation.

Recycled & biodegradable

Natural and synthetic fibers and textiles which are biodegradable and / or can be broken down into pieces in order to produce more textiles or convert into fibres.

Textile Processes and Sustainability

There are many processes which must be taken into consideration to produce sustainable fabrics and textiles including the cultivation, spinning, dying, printing and finishing processes. Essentially the less chemicals, water, energy and effluent disposals that are used in the processing of textiles the better for the environment.

Buying & Producing Locally

Buying and producing locally simply makes sense to us: it enables us to continue a tradition of clothes making in the UK and reduces our carbon footprint. Additionally, we get to work closely with artists and artisans that we get to visit regularly. For more on our local production see Made in the UK.

Our Suppliers

We have chosen our suppliers carefully in order to source sustainable textiles, yarns and trimmings. This has resulted in sourcing organic cotton from India, organic wool from the United Kingdom, hemp from China and USA, organic thread from Holland, recycled yarns from France and trimmings from the UK and USA. Our suppliers have a number of global certifications including:

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We are a dedicated menswear label based in East London manufacturing small runs and limited edition menswear staples entirely in the United Kingdom.

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The Fabric of Fash

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Harris Tweed Hebrides - Fabrics and Cloths | Order Online

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Explore our world famous range of premium quality Harris Tweed fabric for interiors, upholstery and clothing designs, including 50 wool and 150 yarn Colours.

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Find a sharp and practical wardrobe go-to in the WoolOvers men's range. From timeless argyle jumpers to contemporary and flexible male cardigans, there's an all-natural garment here for any man's wardrobe. Shop securely on WoolOvers UK.

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A pure knitwear brand from Leicestershire, England

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Explore our range of beautifully crafted contemporary knitwear, available in a variety of yarns and styles for men, women and your home

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Fabric and Knitwear Design and Manufacturing

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Fabric and Knitwear Design and Manufacturing

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Jack Masters, Leicester

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Knitwear manufacturer and design house and based in Leicester, United Kingdom. Click here to find our more about our services.

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Natural Cottons, Linens Woven Stripes and Tickings, Traditional and Contemporary Printed Fabrics, 100% Linens, Checked Fabrics, Lightweight Linens and Linen Unions, Utility Fabrics, Linings and Curtain-making Sundries. Vintage and One-off Fabrics.

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Identifying British wool | Brand | Mark | Logo | Assurance | Quality | British Wool

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Find out how to identify British wool rich products.

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Textile Learning Resources include sourcing

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the journey from fibre to finished textile product is remarkably long and complicated, with many possible permutations and many quite separate and complex processes.

textiles impinge on every aspect of our lives, and the number of different fabrics that we are exposed to every day is high. broadly they fall into three groups according to the end use for the fabric: fashion and clothing; furnishing and domestic; and industrial and technical.

textile production can be vertically organised, where all parts of production, from fibre to finished fabric, are undertaken by the same company, or it can be horizontal, where companies specialise in one particular aspect of production, for example, dyeing, where textile companies send undyed fabric to commission dyers, who dye the fabric and return it to the senders. which model is adopted depends on a number of factors, including geographical location and industrial history.

the finished fabric, suitably presented for sale, is sold to customers buying with a particular end use in mind. these customers are generally manufacturers, who process the cloth into its final end use before sale to the trade or retail customer. a relatively small amount of fashion and furnishing fabric is sold directly to consumers, sometimes through a wholesaler and/or retailer, and sometimes directly via, for example, a factory shop.

the whole process is not fast, and a generalised time scale for apparel is summarised below. it is important to realise that with such a diverse and complex industry there are many variations to the pattern.

Ahead of Selling Season

Fibre Development

Several years

Colour Forecasts

20-24 months

Textile Development

1-2 years

Fabric Fairs (e.g. Premier Vision)

1 year

Yarn Fairs

18 months-2 years

Apparel Designers and Manufacturers

6-9 months

Presentation of Apparel Collections (e.g. London Fashion Week)

4-6 months

Apparel Production

1-5months

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the journey from fibre to finished textile product is remarkably long and complicated, with many possible permutations and many quite separate and complex processes. textiles impinge on every aspect of our lives, and the number of different fabrics that we are exposed to every day is high.

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Is there still a demand for natural fabrics, or have synthetics taken over, as the Textiles Industry continues to evolve?

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Fashion and the textile industry in Leeds

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Leeds was once at the very heart of the UK’s woollen and textile industries, supplying clothing to the entire Western world. Today the…

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OpenLearn Introduction to OM Course

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This free course, Introduction to operations management, will introduce you to the role of operations management in organisations, and gives you the opportunity to understand what an operations...

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OpenLearn (OU) Short Course Introduction to Marketing

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This free course, Marketing in the 21st century, offers a managerial perspective on how to deliver more effective marketing in an organisation, regardless of whether it is based in the private,...

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Schaefer Kalk

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Create your free OpenLearn profile

Get the most out of OpenLearn

Anyone can learn for free on OpenLearn, but signing-up will give you access to your personal learning profile and record of achievements that you earn while you study.

Anyone can learn for free on OpenLearn but creating an account lets you set up a personal learning profile which tracks your course progress and gives you access to Statements of Participation and digital badges you earn along the way. Sign-up now!

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different types of business: 6 case study: schaefer kalk

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Anyone can learn for free on OpenLearn, but signing-up will give you access to your personal learning profile and record of achievements that you earn while you study. Anyone can learn for free on OpenLearn but creating an account lets you set up a personal learning profile which tracks your course progress and gives you access to Statements of Participation and digital badges you earn along the way.

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BBC Two - Inside the Factory - Available now

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Available episodes of Inside the Factory

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Pipers Crisps working hard to develop and implement a wide range of CSR and Ethical policies to help others.

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Pipers Crisps working hard to develop and implement a wide range of CSR and Ethical policies to help others.

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Maybe the original concept was based on crisps, but now the brand relates to its customers via array of events, activities and actions. Pipers has been selling deckchairs for £125, donating £25 to Charity. The company supports initiatives, such as CatZero, a yachting experience for unemployed youths. Founder Alex Albone believes that an "ethical approach should be inherent in the attitudes of those working there..." In other words, Corporate Culture.

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Makes natural potato chips with regional potatoes, in four flavours. Sells wholesale only.

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Product Life Cycle that respects the Environment and improves Efficiencies throughout the process

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Product Life Cycle that respects the Environment and improves Efficiencies throughout the process

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Ethical Business is Good Business, and what's more, it is the only responsible way to do business, ensuring sustainability, and helping people in the communities in which the organisation operates - wherever in the world that might be. Ethical Business makes Economic Sense and helps Society in the process.

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ibm corporate citizenship; corporate responsibility program; corporate social responsibility; csr; citizen ibm; sustainability

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IBM - Corporate Responsibility at IBM - United States

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We use technology and expertise to solve problems. That's our business - and our approach to corporate citizenship. Explore our innovative, scalable initiatives supporting education, economic development, environmental sustainability, healthcare and more.

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Engineering Excellence - TRUST Model to enable and promote Ethical Business and Sustainability.
Pioneering the power that matters
We have a vision to pioneer cutting-edge technologies that deliver the cleanest, safest and most competitive solutions to our planet’s vital power needs. So we need to be at our best, make the right decisions and work in
the right way, guided by our values and behaviours.
From time to time we all face a situation that we don’t know how to resolve. By using the TRUST model, we can get to a solution that’s in line with our principles and make the kind of choices and actions that make us proud
of our company.

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mtu Kinetic PowerPack from Rolls-Royce approved for renewable diesel

mtu Kinetic PowerPack from Rolls-Royce approved for renewable diesel

mtu Kinetic PowerPack from Rolls-Royce...

News & Insights

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Rolls-Royce pioneers cutting-edge technologies that deliver clean, safe & competitive solutions to meet our planet's vital power needs.

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Generic approaches to pricing - useful resource.

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Cost based pricing

This involves setting a price by adding a fixed amount or percentage to the cost of making or buying the product. In some ways this is quite an old-fashioned and somewhat discredited pricing strategy, although it is still widely used.

After all, customers are not too bothered what it cost to make the product - they are interested in what value the product provides them.

Cost-plus (or "mark-up") pricing is widely used in retailing, where the retailer wants to know with some certainty what the gross profit margin of each sale will be. An advantage of this approach is that the business will know that its costs are being covered. The main disadvantage is that cost-plus pricing may lead to products that are priced un-competitively.

Here is an example of cost-plus pricing, where a business wishes to ensure that it makes an additional £50 of profit on top of the unit cost of production.

How high should the mark-up percentage be? That largely depends on the normal competitive practice in a market and also whether the resulting price is acceptable to customers.

In the UK a standard retail mark-up is 2.4 times the cost the retailer pays to its supplier (normally a wholesaler). So, if the wholesale cost of a product is £10 per unit, the retailer will look to sell it for 2.4x £10 = £24. This is equal to a total mark-up of £14 (i.e. the selling price of £24 less the bought cost of £10).

The main advantage of cost-based pricing is that selling prices are relatively easy to calculate. If the mark-up percentage is applied consistently across product ranges, then the business can also predict more reliably what the overall profit margin will be.

Customer-based pricing

You often see the tagline "special introductory offer" - the classic sign of penetration pricing. The aim of penetration pricing is usually to increase market share of a product, providing the opportunity to increase price once this objective has been achieved.

Penetration pricing is the pricing technique of setting a relatively low initial entry price, usually lower than the intended established price, to attract new customers. The strategy aims to encourage customers to switch to the new product because of the lower price.

Penetration pricing is most commonly associated with a marketing objective of increasing market share or sales volume. In the short term, penetration pricing is likely to result in lower profits than would be the case if price were set higher. However, there are some significant benefits to long-term profitability of having a higher market share, so the pricing strategy can often be justified.

Penetration pricing is often used to support the launch of a new product, and works best when a product enters a market with relatively little product differentiation and where demand is price elastic - so a lower price than rival products is a competitive weapon.

Skimming involves setting a high price before other competitors come into the market. This is often used for the launch of a new product which faces little or no competition - usually due to some technological features. Such products are often bought by "early adopters" who are prepared to pay a higher price to have the latest or best product in the market.

Good examples of price skimming include innovative electronic products, such as the Apple iPad and Sony PlayStation 3.
There are some other problems and challenges with this approach:

Price skimming as a strategy cannot last for long, as competitors soon launch rival products which put pressure on the price (e.g. the launch of rival products to the iPhone or iPod).

Distribution (place) can also be a challenge for an innovative new product. It may be necessary to give retailers higher margins to convince them to stock the product, reducing the improved margins that can be delivered by price skimming.
A final problem is that by price skimming, a firm may slow down the volume growth of demand for the product. This can give competitors more time to develop alternative products ready for the time when market demand (measured in volume) is strongest.

The use of loss leaders is a method of sales promotion. A loss leader is a product priced below cost-price in order to attract consumers into a shop or online store. The purpose of making a product a loss leader is to encourage customers to make further purchases of profitable goods while they are in the shop. But does this strategy work?

Pricing is a key competitive weapon and a very flexible part of the marketing mix.

If a business undercuts its competitors on price, new customers may be attracted and existing customers may become more loyal. So, using a loss leader can help drive customer loyalty.

One risk of using a loss leader is that customers may take the opportunity to "bulk-buy". If the price discount is sufficiently deep, then it makes sense for customers to buy as much as they can (assuming the product is not perishable).

Using a loss leader is essentially a short-term pricing tactic for any one product. Customers will soon get used to the tactic, so it makes sense to change the loss leader or its merchandising every so often.

Predatory pricing (note: this is illegal)
Psychological pricing

With predatory pricing, prices are deliberately set very low by a dominant competitor in the market in order to restrict or prevent competition. The price set might even be free, or lead to losses by the predator. Whatever the approach, predatory pricing is illegal under competition law.

Sometimes prices are set at what seem to be unusual price points. For example, why are DVD's priced at £12.99 or £14.99? The answer is the perceived price barriers that customers may have. They will buy something for £9.99, but think that £10 is a little too much. So a price that is one pence lower can make the difference between closing the sale, or not!

The aim of psychological pricing is to make the customer believe the product is cheaper than it really is. Pricing in this way is intended to attract customers who are looking for "value".

Competitor-based pricing

If there is strong competition in a market, customers are faced with a wide choice of who to buy from. They may buy from the cheapest provider or perhaps from the one which offers the best customer service. But customers will certainly be mindful of what is a reasonable or normal price in the market.

Most firms in a competitive market do not have sufficient power to be able to set prices above their competitors. They tend to use "going-rate" pricing - i.e. setting a price that is in line with the prices charged by direct competitors. In effect such businesses are "price-takers" - they must accept the going market price as determined by the forces of demand and supply.

An advantage of using competitive pricing is that selling prices should be line with rivals, so price should not be a competitive disadvantage.

The main problem is that the business needs some other way to attract customers. It has to use non-price methods to compete - e.g. providing distinct customer service or better availability.

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Pricing Strategies (GCSE) | tutor2u Business

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There are three main approaches a business takes to setting price:Cost-based pricing: price is determined by adding a profit element on top of the cost of making the product.

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The Body Shop was one of the pioneers of ethical business.

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The Body Shop was one of the pioneers of ethical business.

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It has tried to stamp out testing on animals, and campaigned against other aspects potentially damaging to Social Responsibility. Like all other retailers, The Body Shop has regular Sales, so what is the 'real' price of a product when strategies are used to encourage you to spend more money? Using the strapline' Inspired by Nature', the brand is clearly visible in its values.

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Cruelty-Free Skincare & Beauty Products | The Body Shop

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Explore our cosmetic & beauty products, offering over 900 Skincare, make-up, haircare and body products inspired by nature and ethically made from The Body Shop.

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Women's Clothes | Shop for Women's Fashion | ASOS

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Shop for the latest fashion styles and trends for women at ASOS. Discover our range of women's clothes, accessories, beauty, activewear and more.

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Supposedly trusted brands we thought we knew well, but are they actually ethical? 

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Supposedly trusted brands we thought we knew well, but are they actually ethical? 

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VW shocked the world when being found guilty of deliberately misleading everyone about emissions tests.

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Two things now seem clear: by Roger Parloff, ProPublica Some very senior officials knew of the wrongdoing - and they're not likely to face meaningful prison time.
On Dec. 6, former Volkswagen engineer Oliver Schmidt was led into a federal courtroom in Detroit in handcuffs and leg irons. He was wearing a blood-red jumpsuit, his head shaved, as it always is, and his deep-set eyes seemed to ask, "how did I get here?" As Schmidt's wife tried to suppress tears in a second-row pew, U.S. District Judge Sean Cox sentenced him to what, had it been imposed in Schmidt's native Germany, would rank among the harshest white collar sentences ever meted out: seven years in prison.

Schmidt was being punished for his role in VW's "Dieselgate" scandal, one of the most audacious corporate frauds in history. Yet his sentence brought no catharsis, least of all to Cox, who at times seemed pained while imposing it. Sometimes, he told Schmidt apologetically, his job requires him to imprison "good people just making very, very bad decisions."

Schmidt was a henchman, everyone understood, and his sentence, a stand-in. The judge was addressing a set of people in Germany who are beyond the reach of U.S. prosecutors because Germany does not ordinarily extradite its nationals beyond European Union frontiers. Above all, the Detroit courtroom was haunted by the shadow of an individual who was absent: Martin Winterkorn, who was VW's CEO during almost all of the fraud. His name was uttered only twice, yet his aura loomed over the entire hearing.

The outlines of the scandal are well known. For nearly a decade, from 2006 to September 2015, VW anchored its U.S. sales strategy - aimed at vaulting the company past Toyota to become the world's No. 1 carmaker - on a breed of cars that turned out to be a hoax. They were touted as "Clean Diesel" vehicles. About 580,000 such sedans, SUVs and crossovers were sold in the U.S. under the company's VW, Audi and Porsche marques. With great fanfare, including Super Bowl commercials, the company flacked an environmentalist's dream: high performance cars that managed to achieve excellent fuel economy and emissions so squeaky clean as to rival those of electric hybrids like the Toyota Prius.

It was all a software-conjured mirage. The exhaust control equipment in the VW diesels was programmed to shut off as soon as the cars rolled off the regulators' test beds, at which point the tailpipes spewed illegal levels of two types of nitrogen oxides (referred to collectively as NOx) into the atmosphere, causing smog, respiratory disease and premature death.

At first, Volkswagen insisted the fraud was pulled off by a group of rogue engineers. But over time the company has quietly backed away from that claim, increasingly focusing on protecting a small cadre of top officials. The crime may well have started among a relatively small number of engineers afraid to admit to feared top executives that they couldn't reconcile the company's goals and the law's demands.

Over the past two years, prosecutors in the U.S. and Germany have been tracing who was aware of the scheme and have identified more than 40 people involved, spread out across at least four cities and working for three VW brands as well as automotive technology supplier Robert Bosch. In a new, potentially explosive move, some U.S. prosecutors are pushing to indict Volkswagen's former CEO. Such a step would be largely symbolic - the U.S. has no power to extradite them - but it would send a message that the misconduct was egregious and directed from the top.

And it would highlight a stark contrast in punishment. U.S. authorities have extracted $25 billion in fines, penalties, civil damages and restitution from VW for the 580,000 tainted diesels it sold in the U.S. In Europe, where the company sold 8 million tainted diesels, it has not sustained any major fines, nor offered snookered owners a single Euro in compensation.

There's no doubt that Schmidt was guilty. He admitted that he'd been part of a cover-up. Yet he was far from the mastermind. Schmidt claimed not to have learned of the cheating until June 2015, just three months before the decadelong conspiracy ended, though he admitted that he "suspected" it in 2013.

Schmidt, now 48, was an engineer who for several years was VW's main point of contact with U.S. environmental regulators. He had only recently been promoted to a midlevel officer (making about $170,000 a year) when he got involved in the cover-up. Everything about him exuded a car-oriented company man. Born in Lower Saxony, the VW-dominated state where about 110,000 of the company's 600,000 employees work, Schmidt came to the company in 1997, straight out of military service. About 50 personal letters submitted through his attorney - "I don't think I've ever seen as many," Cox observed - extolled him as a loyal and loving son, brother, husband, uncle and friend. In his spare time, the letters recounted, Schmidt enjoyed collecting old slot-car racing sets and restoring classic VW Beetles. When Schmidt got married, in 2010, he and his wife - herself an automotive engineer - held the ceremony in the showroom of a friend's Volkswagen dealership in Miami. Schmidt was an all-too-loyal VW lifer.

His punishment was designed to further "general deterrence," Cox explained at the hearing. In other words, the point was to send a message to other corporate officials that following illegal orders is no defense. It doubtless reflected frustration as well.

Schmidt had committed his crime, Cox told him, "to impress ... senior management and the board." He was talking about Winterkorn, who was not only CEO from 2007 until the scandal brought him down in 2015, but also chairman of the company's management board. Schmidt and a second employee had made presentations to Winterkorn and other senior officials at a meeting on July 27, 2015, according to versions of the facts endorsed by both Schmidt's counsel and the prosecutors.

Winterkorn was a notorious micromanager - he was known for carrying a micrometer with him, so he could personally measure VW parts and tolerances down to the hundredth of a millimeter - and an imperious martinet. He was also then the highest paid CEO in Germany, having made $18.6 million the previous year, more than 100 times Schmidt's pay.

Schmidt and a colleague had been summoned before Winterkorn to help solve a crisis. U.S. regulators had taken the drastic action of refusing to permit the sale of VW's model year 2016 diesels - so crucial to its U.S. strategy - and the CEO wanted Schmidt to explain what was going on. As Schmidt would lay out, regulators with the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had discovered a serious anomaly: VW Clean Diesels complied with NOx-emissions standards when tested in the lab, but then discharged up to 40 times the legal limit when driven on a road. Dissatisfied with more than a year of evasions and stonewalling, the regulators had decided to bar VW's 2016 diesels from the U.S. until they got better answers.

The July 2015 meeting with Winterkorn delved into detail about the company's misbehavior, legal filings allege. "An unindicted co-conspirator presented certain technical aspects of the defeat device," according to Schmidt's sentencing memo. ("Defeat device" is the phrase used to describe the software that enabled VW diesels to fool emissions tests.) Schmidt warned attendees of "the potential severe consequences to VW if regulators discovered the cheating." A slide in his presentation raised a disturbing prospect - "Indictment?" - according to the FBI agent's affidavit that initiated the charges against Schmidt.

Schmidt and his colleague explained to the group "in unmistakable terms that Volkswagen had been cheating, how they were cheating," prosecutor Benjamin Singer told Cox at the sentencing. (The prosecutors and Schmidt's attorney, David DuMouchel, declined to be interviewed.)

If one believes the prosecutors and Schmidt - that Winterkorn was unmistakably informed of the cheating at the meeting - the CEO's response to that information looked suspiciously like a cover-up. Winterkorn did not direct his subordinates to notify authorities about the cheating or launch an investigation to determine exactly what had happened.

Instead, he sent Schmidt on a mission to persuade U.S. regulators to allow the sale of 2016 VWs.

Winterkorn "directed Mr. Schmidt to seek an informal meeting with a senior-ranking CARB official he knew from his time in the U.S.," according to Schmidt's sentencing memo. "Rather than advocate for disclosure of the defeat device to U.S. regulators," the FBI agent alleged in his affidavit, "VW executive management authorized its continued concealment."

Before leaving on his mission, Schmidt "sought and obtained approval for the 'storyline' he intended to convey during his meeting with CARB," Schmidt's memo asserted. The script was approved by at least four senior VW officials below Winterkorn, according to the memo, which added, "Mr. Schmidt was instructed not to disclose the defeat device or any intentional cheating."

In August 2015, Schmidt flew from Germany to Michigan, where he successively lied to two CARB officials. He emailed "detailed updates" to his boss in Germany and 10 other "senior people," conveying that "he was following the script of deception and deceit that VW, with Schmidt's input, had chosen," prosecutor Singer stated.

Finally, a different VW engineer, unable to stomach the deceit any longer, went off-script and confessed to CARB during a meeting on Aug. 19. A VW supervisor formally conceded use of the defeat device to regulators on Sept. 3, and the EPA and CARB made VW's confession public on Sept. 18, 2015.

Winterkorn stepped down five days later, asserting that he was "stunned" by the events of "the past few days," adding that he was "not aware of any wrongdoing on my part." The company's supervisory board exonerated him the same day, stating that he "had no knowledge of the manipulation of emissions data." In testimony before the German Parliament in January 2017, Winterkorn insisted he had never even heard the phrase "defeat device" until the scandal erupted publicly. On four occasions that day he declined to answer legislators' questions, citing ongoing criminal inquiries by German prosecutors.

So far, the Schmidt sentencing in Detroit is the ex-CEO's closest brush with American criminal justice. Twenty-seven months after the conspiracy was exposed, Winterkorn has not been charged with any offense in either the U.S. or Germany. (His U.S. counsel declined comment for this article.)

Will he ever be? Will anyone higher up the ladder than Oliver Schmidt ever answer for this remarkable crime?

______________________________________________

It's very unclear. U.S. prosecutors want to indict Winterkorn, but have not yet received approval from the brass at the Department of Justice, according to two sources familiar with the process.

That would seem like a huge step. Yet in truth, a U.S. indictment of Winterkorn or other top VW figures is increasingly becoming moot simply because the prosecutors can't gain access to most of the key figures in the case. Winterkorn hasn't set foot in the U.S. since the scandal broke and, after Schmidt's crushing sentence, is not likely to do so anytime soon.

Among the eight VW engineers charged in the U.S., only Schmidt and James Liang, a non-supervisor sentenced to 40 months this past August, are actually in the U.S., and only one other - an Audi engine development supervisor, Zaccheo Giovanni Pamio, who happens to be an Italian national - is extraditable.

That means the judicial focus is shifting to Germany. There, three sets of prosecutors are certainly going through the proper motions. The authorities in Braunschweig - acting for the state of Lower Saxony, where both the parent company, VW AG, and its VW brand passenger car unit are based - say they are investigating 39 individuals for fraud in connection with Dieselgate, one for obstruction of justice, and three for financial market manipulation (which in this instance would mean the failure to promptly disclose the gestating crisis to shareholders). In Munich, Bavarian prosecutors are looking at 13 individuals at VW's Audi unit, based in Ingolstadt, for fraud and false advertising. And in Stuttgart, three executives are under scrutiny for market manipulation.

The two market manipulation inquiries focus on Winterkorn and three very senior current VW officials. The Braunschweig prosecutors, for instance, are looking at supervisory board chairman Hans Dieter Pötsch (who was CFO when the scandal broke) and current VW brand manager Herbert Diess, while the Stuttgart authorities are scrutinizing Pötsch and current CEO Matthias Müller. (VW declined to comment on the record for this article other than to provide a written statement in which it asserted that its executives fully complied with disclosure laws.)

Yet progress is strikingly slow. There have been only two German arrests so far. One was of Pamio; the other was of Wolfgang Hatz, a senior supervisor at, successively, Audi, VW and Porsche. German prosecutors do not confirm the identities of detained individuals or what they're charged with, but the Munich probe is focusing on fraud and false advertising, the office says.

We may not see many criminal prosecutions in Germany, let alone convictions or lengthy sentences. The country's law presents many serious hurdles. There's no criminal liability for corporations, for starters. There's no statute barring a criminal conspiracy, no relevant criminal clean air law, and no law against lying to regulators or investigators. (The latter is actually protected by the robust German right to silence, according to Carsten Momsen, a law professor at Berlin's Free University.) Prosecutors' tools to reward and turn perpetrators into state witnesses are weaker than those wielded by their American counterparts. And some of the criminal laws that do exist - written to catch individuals who swindle other individuals - may be ill-suited to capturing the corporate machinations that happened in this case.

The result is breathtakingly different outcomes for both the company and its customers in the two countries. In the U.S., the system has delivered swift consequences. Facing harsh corporate criminal sanctions, flexible and draconian criminal laws, and streamlined consumer class-action procedures, Volkswagen quickly capitulated. Within nine months - breakneck speed in the legal realm - it agreed to pay roughly $15 billion in civil compensation and restitution to consumers and federal and state authorities for the 2.0-liter cars involved, and the sum has since crept up to more than $25 billion, as deals were reached for the 3.0-liter cars, and for criminal fines and penalties. Volkswagen has bought back or fixed most of the offending vehicles, and customers have received thousands of dollars per car in compensation for a variety of losses, including the deception itself and diminished resale value. The company pleaded guilty in April to federal criminal charges of conspiracy, fraud, making false statements and obstruction of justice.

VW gave U.S. prosecutors liberal access to the fruits of an investigation it commissioned by the Jones Day law firm, which conducted more than 700 interviews and collected more than 100 million documents. (The inquiry is ongoing, according to VW.) VW also helped recover forensically thousands of pages of documents that had been deleted by scores of VW employees in the final days of the conspiracy. In return, U.S. prosecutors gave the company credit for cooperation, slicing 20 percent from its criminal fine, which came to $2.8 billion even after the reduction.

In Canada, too, the company has paid compensation, including a $290 million deal for 3.0-liter cars just reached in January. And in South Korea, Volkswagen also paid dearly, receiving record fines and seeing eight local VW and Audi officials charged criminally, with one now serving an 18-month prison term.

Yet in Germany and Europe, it's been a totally different story. There, VW has not offered compensation to any customer. In Germany, where the key decisions were made and all the decision makers reside, no criminal or administrative fines or penalties have yet been imposed.

VW's "cooperation," which so impressed American prosecutors, hasn't extended beyond U.S. borders. Volkswagen has not shared the Jones Day materials with German prosecutors, for instance. And last April, the company revealed that it would be breaking its repeated promise to issue a report summarizing the results of the Jones Day inquiry. VW said the public statement of facts that accompanied its guilty plea revealed the inquiry's key findings, and that any further announcement would risk undermining ongoing investigations or conflicting with its plea agreement. But the plea bargain document is just 30 double-spaced pages, identifies nobody by name, and, as prosecutorial documents often do, plays its cards close to the vest. It includes only one sentence, for instance, about the July 27, 2015, meeting that was so central to the Schmidt prosecution. (It states that a meeting took place, but gives no hint of what was discussed or that senior executives were present.)

Even when German law enforcement has taken aggressive action, it has been stymied so far. Last March, Munich authorities raided Jones Day's German offices and seized materials from the firm's VW investigation. But the Federal Constitutional Court has temporarily blocked their examination, at Jones Day's request, while it sorts out issues of attorney-client privilege and the privacy rights of interviewed employees. German court precedents are deeply divided on these questions, according to professor Momsen.

The definitions of "defeat device" in the U.S. and EU are nearly identical. Nevertheless, VW contends the software was lawful outside North America. Germany's Federal Motor Transport Authority, or KBA - notoriously lax in its diesel oversight policies - rejected this theory in December 2015.

The company has also insisted non-American customers suffered no injury. Because of more lenient NOx limits abroad, it maintains, most of those cars could be fully addressed with simple software fixes. Yet many engineers can't fathom how software alone could possibly repair a NOx problem without correspondingly reducing fuel economy and undermining the durability of the emissions control equipment - the very problems that led VW to cheat in the first place. The KBA and other national regulators have approved these fixes, but haven't released any test results shedding light on what the recalls achieved. "VW could not do miracles regarding NOx emissions without replacing the hardware," argues Yoann Bernard of the International Council on Clean Transportation, which commissioned the 2014 study by West Virginia University that first revealed VW's use of a defeat device.

Plaintiffs' lawyers abroad are suing VW over the affected diesels there. But, like the criminal authorities, they are hampered by a slew of handicaps. Under EU rules, all 8 million EU customers who bought Dieselgate cars could theoretically sue in Lower Saxony, where VW AG is based. But in Germany there are no consumer class actions. In addition, plaintiffs have very limited discovery rights; lawyers are prohibited from accepting contingency fees; and plaintiffs who sue run the risk that if they lose, they will have to pay not just their own legal fees, but a portion of their adversary's, as well.

To be sure, VW isn't yet in the clear. It may yet be hit with penalties worth hundreds of millions of euros, imposed by German state prosecutors or by the BaFin, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (something like the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).

And two groups of plaintiffs - VW shareholders, and owners of VW diesels - are attempting to overcome the obstacles to civil litigation. The bigger threat comes from German shareholders, who allege that VW failed to disclose the budding scandal. Plaintiffs' lawyers are using a "model" litigation mechanism, a class action analog available only for shareholder suits, which is scheduled to begin in September in the Higher Regional Court of Braunschweig. But that procedure is expected to take years and the amount recovered may be a fraction of the huge sums sought (€9.5 billion, or $11.2 billion), depending on how early or late the court concludes VW should have disclosed the crisis. At the same time, an innovative "group action" was filed in Braunschweig in November on behalf of a German consumer group - to whom 15,347 VW diesel owners had assigned their claims - by the Berlin office of the American law firm, Hausfeld.

In fairness, Volkswagen's obstructive stance abroad may be more defensible when one considers the vast divide between the political, social and regulatory milieus in Europe and the U.S. Since the scandal broke, further testing has made clear that cheating on diesel emissions was endemic across Europe. In December 2016 the European Commission began investigating whether regulatory authorities in Germany and six other EU nations have been lax in their oversight of diesel emissions. Though VW's cheating was, in most instances, more brazen in methodology, its diesels' NOx emissions outside the U.S. appear to have been no worse than their competitors'. Moreover, BMW, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, Daimler (maker of Mercedes), PSA (maker of Peugeots and Citroëns), and Renault-Nissan have all come under scrutiny over the past year by either German or French authorities for possible diesel emissions irregularities. (The manufacturers deny wrongdoing.)

Even in the U.S., it's become clear, VW's conduct - though still the most egregious - was not unique. In May, the Justice Department sued Fiat Chrysler for having allegedly placed a species of defeat device on 104,000 model year 2014-16 Jeep Grand Cherokees and Dodge Ram 1500 pickups, the most popular diesel pickup sold in America. (FCA, which denies wrongdoing, is in settlement negotiations.)

European and, especially, German industrial, labor and even environmental policy favored the production of diesel cars. Regulatory oversight was slight, penalties for violations were trifling, and national regulators were disinclined to handicap their home country's carmakers vis-à-vis those of neighboring countries, whose regulators were presumed to be winking at the same gamesmanship.

Dieselgate's $25 billion consequences in the U.S. have transformed the political landscape in Europe, however. The scandal has drawn attention to a long simmering public health issue that, it turns out, was not caused by Volkswagen alone, but rather by the diesel car industry and the political culture that nurtured and protected it. For example, a European government report has found that 72,000 EU residents die prematurely each year because of NOx emissions.

In February, the Administrative Law Court in Leipzig will decide a case brought by an advocacy group called Environmental Action Germany that could eventually result in diesel car bans in as many as 70 German cities. Diesel auto sales are dropping precipitously in anticipation, and in December VW CEO Matthias Müller shocked the automotive world by suggesting in a newspaper interview that the time had come for Europe to abandon key tax subsidies that have long supported the diesel industry.

The regulatory, environmental and cultural gap between the EU and the U.S. is closing. But it was that chasm that spawned Dieselgate, and that chasm that Schmidt toppled into. So there is some injustice in the fact that Schmidt will pay so dearly. Yet there will be even greater injustice if he is the only one to do so.

The key contours of the Dieselgate affair emerged soon after the scandal broke. Since then the slowly accumulating evidence amassed and presented (or leaked) from criminal, civil and media investigations have only made the breadth of VW's conspiracy clearer. Examining the chronology of the company's behavior in light of that information leaves little doubt that knowledge of the wrongdoing reached high up the ranks, repeatedly coming within a whisker of CEO Winterkorn himself.

In 2006, Volkswagen initiated a strategy to revive its then-moribund U.S. sales by marketing a clean diesel car. The challenge was that diesels produce more NOx than gasoline engines, and American NOx regulations were far more stringent than Europe's - permitting only about one-sixth of what Europe then allowed. Most ways of cleaning NOx reduced fuel economy, harmed performance, took up space, increased cost or required frequent servicing. (Environmentally, Europe had focused on reducing greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide. Diesels, due to their excellent fuel economy, were great at reducing carbon emissions. But diesels also produced NOx, which causes smog. Because of the history of smog problems in Los Angeles, regulators from CARB and the EPA had long been more sensitive to the health dangers posed by NOx than their European counterparts.)

VW's U.S. strategy was born under then-CEO Bernd Pischetsrieder, and continued when Winterkorn replaced him in January 2007. In early 2008, Winterkorn announced a 10-year plan that called for tripling the company's U.S. sales by 2018, enabling it to surpass General Motors and Toyota to become the world's leading automaker. Clean Diesel was the linchpin of the plan, which, by mid-2015, had succeeded.

Winterkorn was the protégé of the chairman of VW's supervisory board, Ferdinand Piëch. (German companies have two boards: a management board, composed of top executives, and a non-executive supervisory board.) Piëch, who had been CEO himself from 1993 to 2002, was considered the most influential figure in the company's history. A gifted engineer and prophetic leader, he was also ruthless; Piëch boasted about his willingness to fire executives if they didn't deliver quickly.

VW had an arrogant culture, shielded by the vital role the company plays in its nation's economy; its officials' cozy relationship with German politicians; and its unusual quasi-public status (the state of Lower Saxony controls 20 percent of its voting stock). Piëch had survived major scandals, including a corporate espionage debacle in the 1990s, which led to a $100 million settlement with General Motors, and a nearly decade-long labor scandal that surfaced in 2004, in which the company made illegal payments to labor representatives and politicians. The company had a "corrupt corporate culture," lacking in "openness and honesty," former Deputy U.S. Attorney General Larry Thompson, who became VW's outside monitor in June under the terms of its U.S. guilty plea, told a German newspaper in December.

In Winterkorn, Piëch selected a Ph.D. engineer and former quality assurance chief with a reputation for perfectionism and micromanagement. Just a few years later Forbes would comment with wonder at how, in 2011, he visited the VW factory in Chattanooga, Tennessee - where some diesels were manufactured - "no less than seven times" to oversee the U.S. launch of the 2012 Passat. "He drove early prototypes," the article continued, "and pored over initial quality, using a micrometer he carries in his pocket to measure the tiniest of gaps between body panels. Even minor paint flaws didn't escape the former quality manager, one American executive recalled. 'He finds everything.'"

Under Pischetsrieder and then Winterkorn, two sets of engineers attacked the riddle of how to build a diesel passenger car for the U.S. market. It was a tall order, given how draconian U.S. environmental regulations were, at least in the company's view. A high-level VW supervisor, Wolfgang Hatz (since arrested in Germany), was captured on video in 2007, complaining about California's rules in a widely repeated remark that would come to be seen as prophetic. "The CARB is not realistic," he said. "We can do quite a bit, and we will do a quite a bit. But impossible we cannot do."

And so the two sets of VW engineers, located in different cities, embarked on their missions. One group would design the 2.0-liter engines for VW and Audi cars. A second set, from Audi, would design the 3.0-liter engines for SUVs and luxury vehicles for both brands.

Both groups quickly homed in on the same solution: a defeat device. It is unclear whether they acted independently; to date U.S. prosecutors have not alleged coordination. Each group was aware of, and adapted, a variant of the cheating software that Audi had developed as far back as 1999, and had in its diesel V6 SUVs in Europe from 2004 to 2006.

At the time that the earlier cheating software was allegedly being implemented on Audis in Europe, Winterkorn was already just a couple steps from the action. He was CEO of Audi, while Hatz - reportedly a Winterkorn confidant - was Audi's head of engine development. When Winterkorn became CEO of VW AG in 2007, he promoted Hatz to head engine development for VW AG.

A succession of four top supervisors for engine development for the VW Brand, serving from 2006 to 2015, all knew about the cheating software, as did, from as early as 2006, the head of exhaust control measures for all of VW AG, according to U.S. prosecutors. Three of these five individuals have been indicted in the U.S., for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and making false statements. But all are in Germany, beyond the prosecutors' extradition powers. (None have filed papers in the Detroit criminal proceedings. Lawyers for two of them declined comment, and the others could not be reached by ProPublica.) None of the five have been charged in Germany.

News of the fraudulent software reached "senior Audi managers" as early as 2008, according to U.S. prosecutors. In January 2008, they assert, members of that team sent a presentation to the head of the group, Zaccheo Pamio, and other senior Audi managers, warning that the software solution was possibly illegal and "highly problematic in the U.S." In July 2008, a member of Audi's environmental certification team wrote Pamio that the software was "indefensible." The plan went forward, nonetheless. (Last July, Pamio was charged in federal court in Detroit with conspiracy, wire fraud and making false statements. That same month he was arrested by Munich authorities. His lawyers declined comment.)

In 2011, the cheating spread to a third VW brand in another city, seemingly creating still more opportunities for word to leak up to executives. VW had just acquired Porsche, and Porsche engineers in Stuttgart sought to adapt Audi's 3.0-liter diesel engine for use in a Porsche Cayenne SUV for the U.S. market. That September, Audi engineers explained to Porsche engineers how the cheat software worked, according to a civil complaint filed by the New York State Attorney General's office, and Porsche adopted the fraudulent technology. By this time Winterkorn had moved Hatz to Porsche as head of research and development. He served on Porsche's management board, where he worked alongside VW's current CEO, Müller.

Meanwhile, in Wolfsburg, problems with the 2.0-liter diesel exhaust systems were forcing knowledge of the cheat software further up the corporate hierarchy to people who knew Winterkorn personally and well. Engineer Liang had learned of unusually high numbers of hardware failures involving the NOx treatment equipment. The problem, as he diagnosed it, stemmed from the fact that the equipment was being used too much - not just during lab testing, but sometimes on the road. He proposed refining the cheat software to ensure that full exhaust treatment would be triggered solely during testing.

In July 2012 he and other engineers met with Hans-Jakob Neusser and Bernd Gottweis, according to U.S. prosecutors. Neusser was then head of engine development at the VW brand. Gottweis was a member of the powerful Products Safety Committee, answering to the head of quality management at VW AG, Frank Tuch. Tuch met weekly with Winterkorn, according to an account in VW's in-house magazine. Gottweis was a close confidant of Winterkorn and was sometimes referred to as "the fireman" at VW - someone who put out fires.

Liang's solution was approved, and his more finely tailored defeat device was installed on the next generation of VW diesels, which arrived in mid-2013. In addition, a recall was carried out in 2014 to retrofit older models with the tweaked software. Customers and regulators were told that the recall was to fix a dashboard warning light and address certain environmental issues. (Neusser and Gottweis have been charged in the U.S. with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and making false statements in the U.S.; neither has been charged in Germany. Neusser's attorney declined comment, and Gottweis could not be reached.)

In late 2013, the fact that cheat software was being used in 3.0-liter engines reached the top echelons of Audi, according to U.S. prosecutors, presenting still another opportunity for someone to blow the whistle. An Audi engineer, prompted by the concerns of a manager in the environmental certification department, had his people prepare a presentation to a "then-senior executive and member of Audi's brand management board," describing in detail how the software worked. The engineer who sent the presentation advised every recipient to delete the email and attachment after downloading it.

That same month, Schmidt saw a different presentation about Audi's fraudulent software. "It would be good if you deleted us from the cover page," Schmidt emailed afterwards. "If such a paper somehow falls into the hands of the authorities, VW can get into considerable difficulties."

In March 2014, the biggest clue about the criminal conduct festering within VW began filtering out into the automotive community, soon reaching Gottweis, Tuch, and, through them, Winterkorn. At an industry conference, researchers at West Virginia University presented a study, which would be published in May. They had studied the emissions of three randomly selected diesel cars available in the U.S. A BMW X5 had done fine, but a VW Jetta and VW Passat had each performed suspiciously, passing the test in the lab, but emitting up to 35 times the lawful NOx limit during real-world driving.

In Wolfsburg, VW engineers, led by Neusser, Gottweis and others formed an ad hoc committee to address the study. Their goal, according to prosecutors, was to concoct evasive and misleading responses to regulators' anticipated questions.

On May 23, 2014, Gottweis wrote a now infamous report about the West Virginia study, which Tuch forwarded to Winterkorn the same day, as part of his regular weekend package of reading materials. (VW suspended Tuch in October 2015, and he resigned in February 2016. He could not be reached for comment.)

The memo, revealed by Bild Am Sonntag in 2016, has been regarded as a smoking gun by Winterkorn's critics. "A thorough explanation for the dramatic increase in NOx emissions cannot be given to the authorities," Gottweis wrote. "It can be assumed that authorities will then investigate" to see if VW used a "defeat device," he continued, explaining what a defeat device was. A team is working on software changes that can "reduce the real driving emissions," he noted, "but this will not bring about compliance with the limits either."

For its part, Volkswagen asserts that nothing in the Gottweis report should have caused its CEO to suspect that anything more than a routine product defect was afoot. "This memo merely raised the prospect that U.S. regulators would investigate whether a defeat device was in use," the company's lawyers wrote in its motion to dismiss U.S. shareholder litigation in August 2016; "it did not state or imply that a defeat device had actually been installed, or what it meant if a defeat device were found by U.S. authorities, much less the potential magnitude of any associated financial risks resulting from such a finding."

Winterkorn admits receiving the report, according to papers his attorney filed in U.S. civil litigation, "but does not recall whether he read [it] that weekend." He also admits being aware of the West Virginia University study by May 2014 - 15 months before the conspiracy ended - but says, according to the same filing, that "he believed a task force of Volkswagen employees were working to address the situation."

One was. At its behest, VW engineers, including Liang, lied to CARB and EPA regulators for more than a year. They even promised regulators that they'd address the problem with a software fix, carried out through yet another recall in late 2014.

In November, Winterkorn was advised of this recall in a one-page memo that estimates the fix would cost just €20 million to effectuate - a negligible sum for a company whose 2014 net operating profit would come to €12.7 billion. Winterkorn, in his testimony before the German Parliament, said the memo reassured him that the problem had been addressed.

But by early 2015 CARB had discovered that the recalled vehicles still exceeded NOx limits during real-world driving.

By that time, Schmidt, who'd been at VW's environmental office in Auburn Hills, Michigan, for three years, had been promoted. In February 2015, he had returned to Wolfsburg to become one of three deputies to Neusser, who, by then, had become chief of development for the VW Brand, overseeing 10,000 employees.

In July, CARB told VW engineers that it would refuse to certify the company's 2016 diesels until it got better answers. That precipitated the July 27, 2015, meeting at which Schmidt and a colleague made their presentations to Winterkorn and other top executives, including Herbert Diess, then and now the highest executive in charge of its VW brand passenger car unit, and a member of VW's management board.

"Winterkorn admits," his attorney wrote in a U.S. legal filing, "that on July 27, 2015, after a regular meeting about damage and product issues, he, Diess, and other VW AG personnel participated in an informal meeting during which there was a discussion regarding approval for the sale of model year 2016 diesel vehicles." However, the attorney, Gregory Joseph, continues, "Winterkorn denies that he knew the cause or significance of the issues related to diesel emissions before September 2015."

To date, the company has been vague and noncommittal about the July 27 meeting, and it declined to comment on it for this article. "Individual employees discussed the diesel issue on the periphery of a regular meeting about damage and product issues," the company said in a March 2016 press release, its last and fullest public discussion of matter. "It is not clear whether the participants understood already at this point in time that the change in the software violated U.S. environmental regulations. Mr. Winterkorn asked for further clarification of the issue." (The company is expected to describe its perspective on the meeting more fully in late February in a filing in German securities litigation, though such filings are not public.)

The lying to US regulators continued until Aug. 19, when an engineer confessed to CARB regulators. Later that month, after word of this development reached Wolfsburg, a high-level in-house attorney notified employees that a "litigation hold" would be issued on Sept. 1, after which they would not be permitted to destroy pertinent documents. About 40 Volkswagen engineers took this as a directive to start deleting immediately. Some notified Bosch engineers, who did the same.

Top VW officials clearly sensed trouble. By August they had asked the American law firm Kirkland & Ellis to look into possible regulatory liability for use of a defeat device. VW received the reassuring news that the largest fine that had ever been meted out for a Clean Air Act violation had been just $100 million, in 2014, for an incident involving 1.1 million cars - more than twice as many vehicles as were then known to be implicated in VW's Clean Diesel problems.

Yet the incident being used as a benchmark was hardly similar. In that instance, Hyundai-Kia, which never admitted wrongdoing, had overstated fuel economy by 1 to 6 miles per gallon because it used figures obtained in the most favorable tests it had run, rather than by averaging results from a large number of tests. But the cars' emissions were never illegal, no recalls were required, and no lying to regulators had been alleged.

The text of the Kirkland memo suggests that the lawyers hadn't been informed that the company had

been lying to regulators for a decade. The lawyers urged VW to find out if statements made to regulators had been "complete and not misleading." Given the lack of information, the memo concluded that "we are currently unaware of any facts that suggest any such [criminal] issues in the present situation." (Kirkland & Ellis did not return calls and emails seeking comment on the memo, which became public when plaintiffs' lawyer Michael Melkerson filed it in a lawsuit on behalf of diesel owners who opted out of the federal class action.)

On Sept. 3, 2015, a VW supervisor confessed to CARB in writing the use of a defeat device, formalizing his subordinate's earlier oral admission. Winterkorn was notified the next day, VW has acknowledged. Still, despite German laws requiring that material market information be disclosed immediately, VW shareholders were given no inkling that anything was amiss. They learned only when CARB and EPA stunned the world on Sept. 18 with the news that the company had admitted using an illegal defeat device on close to 500,000 2.0-liter cars sold in the U.S. The Justice Department announced a criminal investigation the next day. Three days after that, VW revealed that some 11 million cars worldwide were equipped with the dual-mode software that the U.S. regulators had discovered. Over that week, the company's shares lost about €32.5 billion in value ($38.5 billion at today's rates). In the ensuing months, the total decline ballooned to about €55.6 billion ($66 billion).

Volkswagen argues that it had no obligation to disclose anything until U.S. regulators announced they were issuing a "notice of violation" in September 2015. "Volkswagen believes that it duly fulfilled its disclosure obligation under capital markets laws," the company asserted in a written statement for ProPublica. "Right up until the publication of the notice of violation, the board of management believed, based on the advice of its U.S. external legal counsel and numerous precedents, that Volkswagen could resolve the issue consensually with U.S. regulators."

As the Dieselgate investigation slowly churned, allegations of a much vaster conspiracy unexpectedly emerged this summer. Der Spiegel reported then that since 1999 all five German carmakers - Audi, BMW, Daimler, Porsche and Volkswagen - had been colluding in ways that may have violated competition laws. (VW, which owns three of the brands, and Daimler have admitted to EC competition authorities that some discussions might have been improper; BMW maintains they were lawful.)

The participants held more than 1,000 meetings relating to 60 working groups on different aspects of automotive production, including emissions control. As early as 2007, according to the magazine, the emissions group began colluding on specifications for exhaust equipment that was used to control NOx emissions in some of the diesel engines. This new scandal could hurt VW executives by bringing even more scrutiny to their actions - or help them by suggesting every car company was doing the same thing.

In early 2018 came yet more news that sullied German automakers, as filmmaker Alex Gibney's "Dirty Money" documentary and The New York Times' Jack Ewing reported that research organizations funded by those manufacturers - including VW - had, in 2014, gassed monkeys with diesel exhaust fumes from a modern-day, allegedly Clean Diesel VW and an old Ford diesel pickup truck, each running on rollers in a lab, in order to show their relative effects. When the news broke in January, VW CEO Müller wrote to employees, calling the tests "unethical, repulsive and deeply shameful" and apologizing for "the poor judgment of individuals who were involved." The CEO said the company is investigating and "we will be coming to all the necessary conclusions." VW's stock price fell when the reports of the monkey tests emerged. But that was a minor bump in a resurgence of the company's shares: They're now priced just above where they were when Dieselgate was revealed.

That Liang and Schmidt - and perhaps eventually Pamio - would end up being the only ones to take the fall for Dieselgate in the U.S. is happenstance. Though Liang was working in Wolfsburg when the conspiracy began in 2006, he was transferred in 2008 to VW's Oxnard, California, test center, near Los Angeles, to help with the Clean Diesel launch. He was still working there in October 2015 when the FBI knocked on his door in the nearby affluent community of Newberry Park.

Liang began cooperating immediately, according to the government. A slight, mild-mannered man with a wife and three children, Liang, now 63, had worked for VW for 34 years. He was never a supervisor. Still, because of his long involvement in the scheme - from start to finish - Judge Cox sentenced him last August to 40 months in prison, a lengthier term than prosecutors had requested.

Schmidt's presence in the U.S. was strange, even reckless. Acting without counsel, he contacted FBI agents in November 2015, offering aid with their investigation. The FBI flew him from Wolfsburg to London to meet with him there. U.S. prosecutors flew there, too, to participate. But the agents and prosecutors later determined that Schmidt lied extensively at the five-hour debriefing, falsely exonerating himself and his superiors, and setting back their probe.

Evidently imagining that he was still on good terms with the government, in December 2016 Schmidt had his U.S. lawyer notify the FBI that he and his wife would be travelling to Florida later that month for their annual Christmas vacation. (He owned some rental properties in Florida, and had hoped to retire there.) On Jan. 7, 2017, as they headed home to Germany, eight officers converged on Schmidt in a men's room at the Miami International Airport. They brought him out in shackles and then led him away. His wife was left alone, crying amid a pile of luggage.

Had Schmidt remained in Germany, it's unclear whether he could have been charged under German law, and it's inconceivable that the result would've been a seven-year sentence. Prosecutors would be hard-pressed to bring a major case against him and the same is true for the VW suspects still in Germany. One possible charge is false advertising, but that is narrow, not necessarily apt - it is aimed primarily at unfair competition - and carries a two-year maximum term, according to two German law professors who have studied corporate crimes: Michael Kubiciel, of the University of Augsburg, and Momsen of Berlin's Free University. (Momsen is associated with a law firm that represents a VW employee in the inquiry, but says he is not personally working on that case.)

The relevant German fraud statute, in turn, is generally designed to capture individuals who swindle others out of money. "Fraud requires proof of a concrete financial loss on the part of an individual consumer," writes Kubiciel in an email. "Proving that a manipulation of the diesel engine caused concrete financial damage is not easy, if possible."

"You need to be able to figure out," says Momsen in an interview, "what is the damage in dollars or euros?" That's challenging, he continues, because the cars were roadworthy and safe. It's not clear whether German judges will consider the fact that a vehicle was polluting more than the consumer realized to constitute the sort of financial damage the law recognizes. As VW put it in its statement to ProPublica concerning its civil liability in Europe, "Customer satisfaction is our highest priority and the modification we have provided our customers in Europe entails no change to performance, fuel economy or other key vehicle attributes, as confirmed by our regulator."

Indeed, scores of consumer lawsuits have been tried in Germany and Volkswagen appears to be winning most of them, according to newspaper accounts and interviews with three European plaintiffs' lawyers. Even when judges have ruled that VW used an illegal defeat device, many have still concluded that consumers suffered no compensable injury.

The main remaining criminal statute in play is the one barring market manipulation. VW executives might appear to have been astoundingly tardy in notifying the market of the building crisis at their company. Yet there are hurdles here, too. Executives can point, for instance, to the Kirkland & Ellis report - predicting modest sanctions in the vicinity of $100 million - and argue that that didn't sound like a "material" loss that needed to be disclosed.

Perhaps, despite the many daunting obstacles, German prosecutors will yet manage to obtain some convictions. It sounds as if Oliver Schmidt will be rooting for them. In a letter to Cox before his sentencing, he described how he had pored over the government's VW evidence "during my many sleepless nights in my prison cell." As Schmidt put it, "I've learned that my superiors that claimed to me to have not been involved earlier than me at VW knew about this for many, many years. I must say that I feel misused by my own company."

ProPublica is a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative newsroom. Sign up for their newsletter.

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How VW Paid $25 Billion for Dieselgate - And Got Off Easy

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Two things now seem clear: by Roger Parloff, ProPublica Some very senior officials knew of the wrongdoing - and they're not likely to face meaningful prison time. On Dec. 6, former Volkswagen engineer Oliver Schmidt was led into a federal courtroom in Detroit in handcuffs and leg irons.

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Do consumers value ethical products  and support CSR businesses?

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There are over 4,500 Fairtrade products from coffee and tea to flowers and gold, so when you shop, look for the FAIRTRADE Mark.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rAPXK-i2xgE

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DHL Express world wide commercial (Full length)

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Sustainability and Bio-Diversity

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When you see our little frog seal on a product, you're probably aware that it signifies something positive. But have you ever wanted to know more about what's behind the seal-and exactly how choosing a product bearing the Rainforest Alliance Certified seal helps people and nature thrive in harmony?

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Interesting collection of Ethical & Eco Clothing Blog.

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Hello! How's it going? It's been school holidays here, so I've had time off work and have spent it hanging out with my kids. We've never been the type to jet off anywhere fancy in the October holidays and this October holiday was no exception. Instead, we stayed at home and went exploring. On Thursday we hit up the Hallowe'en trail and the Glasshouses at the Botanic Gardens in Edinburgh. Always a joy!

This week's links:

1. Fracking started in Lancashire on Monday, and by Friday four minor earthquakes were detected in the area.

2. Don't despair: the climate fight is only over if you think it is.

" The histories of change that have made me hopeful are often about small groups that seem at the outset unrealistic in their ambition. Whether they were taking on slavery in antebellum USA or human rights in the Soviet bloc, these movements grew exponentially and changed consciousness and then toppled institutions or regimes ".

3. How advertising for cleaning products is fuelling ecological collapse.

4. Relatedly, something that came up on Instagram this week was that many people aren't aware that Ecover and Method were, last year, bought over by SC Johnson, the same people that make the non eco-friendly Mr Muscle, Toilet Duck and Pledge. Raising it again here in case you missed the news too. Handily, I have an alternative!

5. Do we need an IPCC special report for humans?

"[I] wonder whether the time is right to produce a special report for humans. One that better illustrates what a transition to a zero carbon economy really means for the day-to-day lives of humans, of all of us. A special report that is less spreadsheet and jargon, more family and hugs ".

6. Brazil's election on 28th October is a lot more pertinent to us all than you would ever think.

7. It's far too early to discuss the C word, but Selfridges will this year sell Iceland's own brand mince pies, and they are proud. Why? Iceland's mince pies are palm oil free. Something to make a mental note of for later on in the year...!

8. Why it's always important to look into who funded a particular study. All the eye rolls right now.

9. Thailand is to follow China and Malaysia in banning imports of plastic waste.

10. Finally, decorating for Hallowe'en? Try these no-carve, no-waste pumpkin decorations.

Enjoy your Sunday!

Wendy.x

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Moral Fibres - UK Eco Green Blog | Sustainable living that's hip, not hippie

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Hello! How's it going? It's been school holidays here, so I've had time off work and have spent it hanging out with my kids. We've never been the type to jet off anywhere fancy in the October holidays and this October holiday was no exception. Instead, we stayed at home and went exploring.

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People Tree is a FairTrade Clothing Retailer

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http://www.brandrefinery.co.uk/the-importance-of-market-research-in-product-development/

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AIDA - ATTENTION / AWARENESS,  INTEREST, DESIRE, ACTION

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ADVANTAGES OF FORMING A PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY

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ADVANTAGES OF FORMING A PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY

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ADV v DISADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES IN UK

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CONTINUOUS AND INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENT

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INTRODUCTION TO MARKET RESEARCH SPRING 2017 JGH

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MARKET SEGMENTATION, TARGETING & POSITIONING

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MARKET SEGMENTATION, TARGETING & POSITIONING

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SEGMENTATION, TARGETING & POSITIONING MAY 2017

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Amazon breeds a culture where it’s work hard, sacrifice personal life, succeed and climb ahead or be tossed aside. It’s best encapsulated in a famous Jeff Bezos quote,“You can work long, hard or smart, but at Amazon.com you can’t choose two out of three,”

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Amazon breeds a culture where it’s work hard, sacrifice personal life, succeed and climb ahead or be tossed aside. It’s best encapsulated in a famous Jeff Bezos quote,“You can work long, hard or smart, but at Amazon.com you can’t choose two out of three,”

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Factsheet from CIPD, explaining benefits and legal position.
Further useful sources:
ACAS - Good Practice at Work
Health & Safety At Work

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Stakeholder Management - Understanding its links to ethical business strategies

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Stakeholder Management - Understanding its links to ethical business strategies

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Ed Freeman's updated thoughts

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Written Assignment Brief - Important details regarding requirements:

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Written Assignment Brief - Important details regarding requirements:

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SUBMISSION DATE: WED 17 MAY 2017

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BS1 Coursework - WRITTEN ASSIGNMENT SUMMER ONE 2017

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Ensuring employees understand the significance of CSR.

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Recruiting, Developing, Training and Rewarding the Right People, while also practicing Equal Opportunities and encouraging Diversity
Important information at the Knowledge Hub:
www.CIPD.co.uk

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Who controls the company?
John Lewis Partnership

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LIMITED LIABILITY
INCORPORATION
FRANCHISE
ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION
COMMERCIAL VIABILITY
CRITICAL PATH ANALYSIS
SWOT
SMART OBJECTIVES
PURPOSE
EVALUATION ENTREPRENEURSHIP
RECRUITMENT
HEADHUNTING
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
DIVERSITY
JOBSHARE
PROSPECTS
POTENTIAL
ETHICS
SUSTAINABILITY

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Advice / Formation / Incorporation

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Business Start-up - choosing the right business formation, finding the correct information:

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Business Start-up - choosing the right business formation, finding the correct information:

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Princes Trust
Government Advice
Company Formation - Incorporation
Business Advice