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To write an experience is to document it and this enables the possibility of returning to it at a later stage. As mentioned by Luger (2014), poetry can be considered a form of memorialization- a technology used to craft memory. Both poems can be considered a form of memorialization. While “Apocalypse Soon” records past political events, the poem “For Lasantha and others” remembers prominent individuals like the journalist Lasantha Wickramatunga.

Some western societies have moved away from the idea of remembering traumatic events to using memories to heal wounds caused by conflict. However, these two poems embody the exact moments at which disaster struck and life was lost. So although revisiting these poems may not conjure positive memories for the reader, it is still a powerful reminder that history should not be forgotten.

Luger, M. (2014, November 26). Poetry as monument: Jenny Holzer and the memorial poems of 9/11. Memory Studies, ₈(2), 183–196. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698014558658

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Media freedom and political corruption are prominent themes that run through both poems. While “Apocalypse Soon” makes reference to a kind of state sponsored violence through the “khaki and gunmetal”, in “For Lasantha and others” Seneviratne talks of political corruption that takes liberties to clamp down on the freedom of journalists. Abductions, enforced disappearances as well as murder was a common fate met by journalists. Was it a comedy of errors that de Silva’s body was found washed ashore on the Mount Lavinia beach?

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‘Drawing Blood’ : A Showcase of Political Cartoons from Oppressive Regimes

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‘Drawing Blood’ : A Showcase of Political Cartoons from Oppressive Regimes

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At present, Sri Lanka is ranked 146th out of 180 nations in terms of press freedom.

The report states that "Press freedom issues are closely tied to the civil war that ravaged the island until 2009, and to the crimes – still left unpunished – against many journalists during the crushing of the Tamil rebellion. With a media sector lacking diversity and highly dependent on major political clans, journalism is at risk."

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Reporters sans frontières assure la promotion et la défense de la liberté d'informer et d'être informé partout dans le monde. L'organisation, basée à Paris, compte des bureaux à l'international (Berlin, Bruxelles, Genève, Madrid, Stockholm, Tripoli, Tunis, Vienne et Washington DC) et plus de 150 correspondants répartis sur les cinq continents.

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Relatability to the current context: The cartoon image depicts the censor culture prevalent to this day, in the form of social media bans. Seneviratne's poem reflects on the possible responses of the writer and the public in choosing to express one's own opinions, or staying silent in fear.

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Conviviality v Censorship: On Media Freedom in Sri Lanka

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Conviviality v Censorship: On Media Freedom in Sri Lanka

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"...To a certain extent the breakdown in conviviality began in the 1980s when the government suppressed the JVP insurgency through media censorship, threats of criminal defamation, coupled with disappearances and deaths." (Perry, 2017)

Media censorship is a marked characteristic of any authoritarian mode of governance. We see this during the time of President Ranasinghe Premadasa, President Chandrika Kumaratunga and more evidently during President Mahinda Rajapaksa's decade of governance.

It is argued that the systematic suppression of the media is born out of a government's fear. "This appeared in different guises: the fear of personal, dynastic and political power being threatened; the fear of reportage lending added impetus to the Tamil Tigers’ (LTTE’s) war effort and finally the fear of human rights abuses being revealed and condemned by international powers including the UN." (Perry, 2017)

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Conviviality vs Censorship: On Media Freedom in Sri Lanka

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Featured image courtesy Reporters Sans Frontieres Under the Presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa between 2005 and 2015, government brutality and censorship towards the media in Sri Lanka reached new lev…

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Richard de Zoysa was killed on February 18, 1990

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Richard de Zoysa was killed on February 18, 1990

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"In the late-1980s, with the escalation of political violence in the south, De Zoysa took a keen interest in the killings and disappearances of thousands of men and women: the majority of which was carried out by the State using its legal and extra-legal military force.

The killing of Richard de Zoysa is a crucial juncture in the human rights discourse connected with the violence of the late-1980s. " (Perera, 2021)

"The legacy of de Zoysa as a writer and journalist is reflected in many who came after him that have been either killed or forced into exile through violence and intimidation in which the State is implicated." (Perera, 2021)

"While the actual reason for the murder may remain classified, some associate with his death incriminating information de Zoysa was said to have had in his possession regarding human rights violations in the country." (Perera, 2021)

"In the southern consciousness, the killing of Lasantha Wickrematunge, the editor of the Sunday Leader, in January 2009, and the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda in January 2010 left an impact quite similar to de Zoysa’s death twenty years before." (Perera, 2021)

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The heritage of Richard de Zoysa as a victim of State-terror - News Features | Daily Mirror

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Richard de Zoysa, who was kidnapped and killed by a death squad operating under the knowledge of the state on 18 February 1990..... ..

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BBC interview with Chris Morris with Gotabaya Rajapaksa

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BBC interview with Chris Morris with Gotabaya Rajapaksa

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BBC interview with Chris Morris with Gotabaya Rajapaksa

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"Though Sri Lanka’s civil war ended nearly five years ago, the government of Mahinda Rajapaksa has shown no political will to address its record of perfect impunity in the nine murders of journalists that have taken place under his leadership, first as prime minister and then as president. Government and military officials are suspected to be behind several of the murders, including the 2009 assassination of prominent editor Lasantha Wickramatunge, known for his critical reporting, and the nearly 10-year-old shooting of Auyathurai Nadesan , penname Nellai G. Nadesan, an award-winning journalist who was threatened before his death in response to his reporting about the army. Impunity in Sri Lanka is a major factor behind high numbers of journalists going into exile, according to CPJ research.

Impunity Index Rating: 0.443 unsolved journalist murders per million inhabitants
Last year: Ranked 4th with a rating of 0.431" (Witchel, 2014)

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Getting Away With Murder - Committee to Protect Journalists

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CPJ’s 2014 Global Impunity Index spotlights countries where journalists are slain and the killers go free IraqUnsolved Murders: 100Population: 32.6 millionRank: 1 SomaliaUnsolved Murders: 26Population: 10.2 millionRank: 2 The PhilippinesUnsolved Murders: 51Population: 96.7 millionRank: 3 Sri LankaUn…

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Who owns the media in Sri Lanka? Media Ownership Monitor

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In this survey, Transparency International Sri Lanka surveys the perception of corruption among different sectors.

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Global Corruption Barometer 2019, Sri Lanka

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Global Corruption Barometer 2019, Sri Lanka

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How the Rajapaksas Destroyed Sri Lanka’s Economy

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How the Rajapaksas Destroyed Sri Lanka’s Economy

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On April 12, a prolonged economic crisis came to a head as the Sri Lankan government temporarily halted payments to international creditors. This is the first time Sri Lanka has defaulted in its post-independence history, and it comes as no surprise to those who have followed the government's incredible economic mismanagement since the election of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in November 2019.

Sri Lanka's economy really began to unravel a long time ago-when Gotabaya's brother Mahinda Rajapaksa was president between 2005 and 2015. After the end of Sri Lanka's civil war in 2009, foreign direct investment and portfolio flows from global capital markets poured into the country. This was facilitated by Chinese capital surpluses and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, after which loose global monetary policy meant that Sri Lanka was able to borrow easily.

The Mahinda Rajapaksa government officially recorded years of spectacular growth, but the growth was of a particular type: large scale infrastructure projects such as highways, an airport, and a lotus tower that were tainted with corruption, provided low returns, and filled the pockets of a politically connected, protectionist, and parasitic class of businesspeople. Meanwhile the president's critics were intimidated, and journalists were killed or disappeared, generating widespread fear and a climate of self-censorship.

On April 12, a prolonged economic crisis came to a head as the Sri Lankan government temporarily halted payments to international creditors. This is the first time Sri Lanka has defaulted in its post-independence history, and it comes as no surprise to those who have followed the government's incredible economic mismanagement since the election of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in November 2019.

Sri Lanka's economy really began to unravel a long time ago-when Gotabaya's brother Mahinda Rajapaksa was president between 2005 and 2015. After the end of Sri Lanka's civil war in 2009, foreign direct investment and portfolio flows from global capital markets poured into the country. This was facilitated by Chinese capital surpluses and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, after which loose global monetary policy meant that Sri Lanka was able to borrow easily.

The Mahinda Rajapaksa government officially recorded years of spectacular growth, but the growth was of a particular type: large scale infrastructure projects such as highways, an airport, and a lotus tower that were tainted with corruption, provided low returns, and filled the pockets of a politically connected, protectionist, and parasitic class of businesspeople. Meanwhile the president's critics were intimidated, and journalists were killed or disappeared, generating widespread fear and a climate of self-censorship.

When a new government was elected in 2015, freedom of expression and human rights improved. (Full disclosure: I worked with the late Mangala Samaraweera, then foreign minister, between 2015-2017.) The years 2017-2019 saw a brief period of tax reform, so, despite droughts and rising global interest rates, Sri Lanka ran its first major primary surplus in 60 years in 2017 and achieved another in 2018. Though the country, under the coalition formed between Maithripala Sirisena and Ranil Wickremesinghe, moved away from the isolationism that plagued Sri Lankan economic and foreign policy in the preceding decade, it didn't do enough to reverse protectionism or to fight corruption.

The coalition had barely started to implement the reforms that would make exports more competitive, provide greater Central Bank independence, or loosen the stranglehold on trade before political instability set in. A constitutional coup engineered by the Rajapaksas saw Ranil Wickremesinghe and Mahinda Rajapaksa simultaneously declare their right to be prime minister and derailed the government's reform agenda. In April 2019, suicide bombers struck churches and hotels, killing nearly 270 people in the devastating Easter Sunday attacks.

The Rajapaksa family, then in opposition but claiming popular legitimacy and a right to office, railed against reforms like taxes and a fuel-pricing formula that were critical to economic stabilization; they used the Easter attacks to mobilize fear of minorities and claimed that they alone could bring the perpetrators to justice and restore national security. Much of their legitimacy stemmed from the fact that Mahinda Rajapaksa and his brother Gotabaya Rajapaksa, then the defense secretary, had ended Sri Lanka's civil war in 2009-despite war crime allegations and the incredible loss of civilian life during the final stages of war.

In 2018 and 2019, long before COVID-19 arrived in Sri Lanka, the country was already in a challenging macroeconomic position. A long history of weak export performance and declining revenue collection since the 1990s (as policymakers continuously exempted the wealthy and businesses from taxes) meant Sri Lanka just wasn't earning enough ​​to pay back its dollar loans. Between 2015 and 2019, 89.8 percent of new debt taken on by the government was used to pay back interest on outstanding loans accumulated by the end of 2014.

But then Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected president. And an economy that was deteriorating slowly began to unravel at warp speed. Instead of addressing the economy's many structural shortcomings, the government made concessions to rent-seeking crony capitalists and leaned into a divisive ethnonationalism-continuing to suppress Tamils in the economically depressed north and east while also supporting anti-Muslim hate campaigns that first began around 2012.

The Rajapaksa government passed the 20th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, undermining the independence of critical institutions such as the National Audit Office and the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption, on the basis that the president needed more executive power to conduct his duties. It lowered taxes for the wealthy and increased tax holidays for corporations, despite the country's exceptionally low tax-to-GDP ratio. It used the rhetoric of self-sufficiency to empower protectionists and imposed import restrictions so high that Sri Lanka was nearly a closed economy. It introduced an unsustainable chemical fertilizer ban that would devastate agricultural yields-including paddy and maize yields and major export earners such as tea and rubber.

The unraveling that began in 2005 only accelerated in 2019. The government failed to deliver justice for the victims of the Easter Attacks and alienated minorities by forcibly cremating Muslims and Christians who died of COVID-19. (Although cremation is a traditional funeral rite for Hindus and Buddhists, Christians and Muslims bury their deceased loved ones.)

It appointed individuals implicated in war crimes to the administration and expanded surveillance and militarization in the minority-dominated Northern and Eastern regions. It failed, in other words, to incorporate productive minority citizens into its nation-building projects, and it alienated them instead. It employed the same racially divisive governance style that led to civil war and brain drain-perhaps the two biggest contributors to Sri Lanka's historic economic decline.

Instead of rationalizing public expenditure, the government spent more on defense during peacetime than it had done during the civil war. And in true Rajapaksa fashion, it cracked down on dissent -arresting government critics without charge under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act and intimidating journalists and activists representing the relatives of the forcibly disappeared.

No serious observer believed the country was going to be able to pay back the $29 billion in debts it owed over the next five years, or the nearly $7 billion in debt it owed this year. But Sri Lanka's government, filled with Rajapaksa family members and loyalists, was buttressed by Sinhalese Buddhist supremacists, crony capitalists, the state-owned media, and some influential private media houses. It continued to gaslight its people.

It dismissed the economic meltdown as a short-term foreign currency and liquidity crisis, and it kicked the can down the road by refinancing debt using credit lines and currency swaps from India and China. And as the country dug into dwindling foreign currency reserves to pay back creditors, the Rajapaksa regime inevitably ran out of cash to meet Sri Lanka's essential needs: fuel, medicine, milk powder, and gas.

And yet, regime members and loyalists continued to argue that the country's debt was sustainable. As lines for fuel appeared around the country, and milk was rationed in shops, they claimed that there were no shortages-as if the people waiting (and later dying) in lines were part of some kind of sophisticated conspiracy.

As doctors struggled to save newborns in emergency care or others in surgery, the government claimed there was no drug shortage. As usable reserves dropped down to a month or two of imports-triggering a humanitarian crisis-the Central Bank insisted media claims about the impending sovereign default were nothing but "inaccurate stories, misleading opinions and deliberate misinterpretations spread by certain parties with vested interests." This craft of denialism, mastered through years denying war crime s and corruption allegations, was so recently rewarded by the 6.9 million voters who brought the Rajapaksas to power in 2019.

Reverting instead to their well-honed modus operandi, the Rajapaksas made a dire political miscalculation. Historically, those who criticized the Rajapaksas, challenged corruption, or demanded war crimes investigations were branded extremists, terrorists, or threats to the national interest. This decades long strategy propped up the Rajapaksas' self-portrayal as Sri Lanka's uncontestable patriots-those who alone who had the true interests of Sri Lanka at heart, and the only ones who were able to address the country's national security and economic needs.

But as fuel lines lengthened and power cuts began, voters who enjoyed Sinhalese Buddhist supremacy and believed in these myths and the minority bogeyman from which they were supposedly being protected would be sorely disappointed.

It is now they who are the enemy. Protesters, this time including vast numbers of Sinhalese Buddhists, have organically taken to the streets to express their frustrations. And this time the Rajapaksas have branded them extremists or "politically motivated" too. Police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse protests. Journalists reporting on the protests were detained and assaulted. A state of emergency, curfew, and social media ban were imposed-until the government realized these measures were amplifying, not quelling, public discontent.

Soon after the prime minister's son announced that social media bans were " useless" because of virtual private network availability, disinformation campaigns started to spring up. As the Rajapaksas refuse to step down, propaganda intended to instill apathy has multiplied. But as the shortages and inflation persist, so do the protests. On April 19, police violence in Rambukkana killed a protester and severely wounded others.

The very tools that were used for decades to prop up and fight the minority bogeyman-gaslighting, denialism, disinformation, and state repression-are being repurposed against those who protest economic mismanagement. But expanding the net of supposed extremists, bogeymen, and so-called mischief-makers to everyone impacted by the economic crisis is of course politically unsustainable.

Now, as the economic crisis deepens, the Rajapaksa divide-and-rule strategy is unraveling. It's clear to all the protesters impacted by inflation, 13-hour power cuts, and drug and fuel shortages that the peaceful expression of dissent is not "extremist." A citizen exercising their right to peaceful assembly and protest need not be "politically motivated." International assistance is not always "a conspiracy." Cosmetic accountability-for example, when a cabinet resigns and then is reappointed-is not accountability at all. When minorities or journalists call for truth and justice, it is not because they are on "racist witch hunts" or because they are "terrorists" but because no human should live in a world in which atrocious crimes are so casually committed and so hastily normalized.

Recognizing their political miscalculation in widening the net of so-called extremists to working-class Sinhalese Buddhists, many their own voters, the Rajapaksas have now begun to apologize. They have begun to reverse some policy decisions and to acknowledge some peripheral grievances of the protesters, even if they pretend it is only a " section " of the public which protests. But it is too late: The foundation of lies and racism on which the Rajapaksas have built up their political legitimacy is slowly crumbling.

While many Tamils remain justifiably skeptical about the potential of protests to deliver lasting shifts in the country's ethnocratic political structures, northern and eastern Tamil leaders have begun to address the Sinhalese people-not their manipulative leaders-directly and charismatically. Muslim women are leading chants about the discrimination they've faced, and workers from plantation communities are calling out for land they've long been denied. In the south, there are even calls to boycott Rajapaksa-affiliated politicians and allied businessmen.

The so-called carnival of protests in the capital is educational, almost like a science fair under the banner of "Why the Rajapaksas must go home." As one impacted group learns about the injustices and grievances faced by another, it is empathy-not apathy-that is growing. And the largest lie of all-that the country depends on the Rajapaksas, benefits from their rule, and owes them silent loyalty-has entirely collapsed.

Correction, May 2, 2022: An earlier version of this article incorrectly stated the type of fertilizer that had been banned.

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How the Rajapaksas Destroyed Sri Lanka's Economy

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On April 12, a prolonged economic crisis came to a head as the Sri Lankan government temporarily halted payments to international creditors. This is the first time Sri Lanka has defaulted in its post-independence history, and it comes as no surprise to those who have followed the government's incredible economic mismanagement since the election of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in November 2019.

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The socio-political context is central to many poems written by Sri Lankan English writers, who wrote during the era extending from the 1950’s onwards. As illustrated through the literature on this resource, the period spanning 1950-1990s in the history of Sri Lanka was a turbulent era and ethnic conflict was entrenched in South-Asian socio-political landscape of the time. It is thus inevitable that this dark history would merge with the literature produced during that time.

Richard de Soyza's “Apocalypse Soon” evokes this darkness through references to ethnic tensions, riots and insurrections while Malinda’ Seneviratne  “For Lasantha and others” evokes a different kind of darkness- a darkness which is reborn through the corrupt rule of the Rajapakshe regime which seeks to silence voices of truth.

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"Riots and protests have always played an important role in human history." (Vaniarchchy, 2022)

In Sri Lanka, many of the riots that have broken out from time to time have made inter-relations among communities and economic matters worse off. More often than not, the pressure put on the relevant parties by the people, mixed with political ambitions have made the riots violent.

The poem in written in the context of the lead up to the JVP insurrection in 1987-1989. This was the second attempt in history in which the JVP (unsuccessfully) organized a violent overthrow of the government (the first was in 1971). The second insurrection had a bigger impact on society in terms of the blood shed, economic damage, property damage etc.

It is said that the property damages during the second insurrection hampered with Sri Lanka's development for over ten years since even some of the more revered religious places such as the Kandy Dalada Maligawa and the Kataragama Esala Perehera were attacked.

"Although the JVP came close to achieving State power in late 1988 and mid-1989, it was quickly destroyed." (Vaniarchchy, 2022)

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Part X

Riots and protests have always played an important role in human history. In Sri Lanka, riots and protests appeared from time to time as a result of people's pressure or as a political stunt. Regardless of the reason, in many occasions, they have resulted in chaos and made things worse.

However, the protest we are witnessing at present is different from the violent protests we had in the recent past as it seemed to be rising from within the general public. However, it still has failed to pressure the politicians substantially, and also as it is now led by political parties and those with personal agendas, it seems as if many unbiased public who do not favour any political party are disappointed with the protest. Will this protest bring hope to the oppressed general public? Or will it also be dissolved with time as it has happened in the past?

Joining us today in conversation to tell us more about the recent political history of Sri Lanka and how it has led us to the mess we are facing today, is Kaushalya Abeywickrama who is a journalist, author, and researcher on political communication. Below is the conversation we had with her.

After the horrible 1915 Sinhala-Muslim riots and their devastating results, the next notable and unfortunate protests began in 1956 when the Language Policy act was introduced by the then prime minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike.
The Language Policy protests
The Language Policy widened the rift between the Sinhalese and Tamils and also, caused great damage to the Sinhalese community, although some see it as an act of patriotism.

The Sinhala Only Act or the State Language Policy was passed in the Parliament of then Ceylon in 1956. The act replaced English with Sinhala as the sole official language of Ceylon, with the exclusion of Tamil. This decision of Bandaranaike caused massive riots, loss of lives, and property damage.

The tragedy is that still, even after decades since the riots, the anger and animosity between the communities have not completely healed despite the Act was changed.
Demand for Eelam, Riots in Jaffna, Black July, and the LTTE
Hatred, racism, and separatism were instilled in the minds of the people by racist Tamil politicians and leaders since '30s and '40s. Since as early as this, separatist Tamil leaders stood against the resettlement of Sinhalese people in the North and East under the agriculture projects by the British rulers in Sri Lanka.

Due to the heightened separatist ideologies and demands in the 1970s, Sri Lanka lost its ability to move forward as a country and the main task it had to do was to go back and forth and negotiate to appease the separatists. The Government of India was also directly involved in this.

However, appeasing the Eelam separatists was not easy. As time passed, agreements were signed and torn apart, and their reluctance to settle issues through negotiation and peace talks increased. They believed in a mythical homeland (which is archaeologically and historically proven to be false), and they greedily and ruthlessly demanded the coastal region from Puttalam all the way to Kumbukkan Oya through Jaffna and Ampara for a Tamil Eelam.

They also demanded that the Eastern Province be divided into three parts according to the Sinhalese, Tamils, ​​and Muslims. They also called for the evacuation of Sinhalese people from the Eastern and Northern Provinces, claiming that they require a 100 per cent Tamil ethnic area.

One of the earliest violent acts of the rebellions in Jaffna was to kill the Mayor of Jaffna Alfred Thangarajah Duraiappah in 1975 while he visited the Varadaraja Perumal Temple with his daughter to worship. He was shot by the LTTE and in April 1987 the LTTE issued an open letter, published in Verakesari, in which they claimed the responsibility for the killing of Duraiappah and eleven more people.

As a result of these tug-o-wars and racism, a guerrilla group led by Velupillai Prabhakaran became active in Jaffna.

In 1983 the wretched Black July happened as 13 Sri Lankan army soldiers were murdered by LTTE in Jaffna.

In 1985, the LTTE attacked unarmed civilians ad pilgrims in Anuradhapura town and at the Sri Maha Bodhi premises. The LTTE killed a large number of civilians with suicide bombings and had a notable number of child soldiers with them.

Since then, Sri Lanka entered a dark tunnel of which it took 30 years to come out.

Immediately following the end of the war, on 20 May 2009, the United Nations estimated a total of 80,000 - 100,000 deaths. More than 40,000 missing persons have been reported. The internal conflict had an immediate and indirect impact on Sri Lanka's economy. The political system, culture, and social damage were all too severe.

"Sri Lanka has not yet fully achieved peace," said Abeywickrama adding further that what we have in terms of understanding and harmony between civilian groups can be identified as 'Bad Peace'. "We need to achieve positive peace," she further added.

"This situation is still dragging the country backward in terms of sustainable development. Rational, national, and religious issues are in high demand and can spark violence at any time. This is a barrier to the development of the country's economy and the country's sovereignty."
Rohana Wijeweera and the JVP
The JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna-the People's Liberation Front) is a socialist party and a former militant organisation that first gained international attention when it launched an insurgency in 1971. The movement was involved in two armed uprisings against the Sri Lankan Government, one in 1971 and the other in 1987-89.

In 1987, the JVP attempted to retake power through force. The 1987-1989 insurgency was much organised and also more violent than the 1971 insurgency, and the casualties and societal consequences were correspondingly higher. JVP assassinated their own people who opposed their socialist dream. Many notable public figures were murdered and Buddhist religious places and events such as the Kandy Dalada Maligawa and the Kataragama Esala Perahera were attacked.

They caused property damage and hampered Sri Lanka's development for more than a decade. Although the JVP came close to achieving State power in late 1988 and mid-1989, it was quickly destroyed.

"Even though Sri Lanka talks about equality and equity, there is a large gap when it comes to the practice. People have equal rights in many ways, but when it comes to equity, the entire system fails," said Abeywickrama.

She also said that, on the other hand, cultural norms and beliefs are causing many problems in society and among ethnicities.

"When we look closely at Sri Lankan history, we can see that the state does not protect the fundamental human rights of the civilians. People in our society feel mistreated because of inequity. It could be due to culture, disparities in wages, discrimination, insufficient infrastructure, ethnicity, or religion."

Abeywickrama further explained that a conflict is a struggle and a clash of interests, opinions, or even fundamental principles. Conflict will always exist in society, regardless of whether the source of the conflict is personal, racial, political, international, or related to class and/or caste.

Abeywickrama also shared her thoughts on the current protests happening at Galle Face Green.

"In my opinion, this is the first time in history that Sri Lankans have broken down barriers such as religion, ethnicity, culture, and belief to unite against the State. This is a positive sign of the democratic country's aspiration to build a people-governed State. The protest takes a unique form of requesting a democratic State free of nepotism and political corruption, which are the most dangerous barriers to development as a developing country."
In retrospect
In our last segment, we emphasised that the understanding, tolerating, and coexistence between the ethnic and religious groups living in Sri Lanka is essential to achieve a socially, politically, and then eventually economically stable country. We also must understand that, as the party political system prevailing in Sri Lanka is extremely corrupt in which dirty games are often played to gain or retain power. Politicians are neither ashamed nor reluctant to manipulate the public for their selfish needs. 'Divide and rule' and racism is an evil tool used by them, and the public must not fall prey to it.
To be continued... (File pix) By Ama H. Vanniarachchy

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Part X Riots and protests have always played an important role in human history. In Sri Lanka, riots and protests appeared from time to time as a result of people's pressure or as a political stunt. Regardless of the reason, in many occasions, they have resulted in chaos and made things worse.

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"A mixture of different political, ideological and economic reasons exist as to why the JVP started a second, far more violent, insurgency against the government represented by the United National Front (UNP) and other established parties at the end of the 1980s." (Christian & Rahimi, 2015)

The uprising of the JVP against the government, and this time against an UNP government led by President Ranasinghe Premadasa snow-balled into one of the most brutal civil wars in Sri Lanka. However, by the end of the 1989/1990, the conflict between the state and the militant JVP ended in victory for the state.

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Rohana Wijeweera: The killing of Sri Lanka's Stalinist icon

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Rohana Wijeweera: The killing of Sri Lanka's Stalinist icon

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"In November 1989 Rohana Wijeweera was finally hunted down and arrested while living in disguise on a tea plantation with his family.

According to Prins Gunasekara, President Ranasinghe Premadasa gave the go-ahead for the captive - and one of his colleagues who had been tortured - to be summarily killed.

According to some accounts, he was burned alive.

So ended the insurrection of the People's Liberation Front. But the state continued to go after alleged sympathisers for months. Thousands remain missing to this day." (Haviland, 2014)

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Twenty-five years ago, on 13 November 1989, the Sri Lankan government announced that Rohana Wijeweera, an extreme-left Sinhalese nationalist leader of two failed insurrections, had died in police custody - in unclear circumstances.

"I heard about the death. Of course it was not unexpected, I knew it was coming," recalls his friend, lawyer and election agent, Prins Gunasekara, speaking to the BBC history programme, Witness.

Even as the Tamil conflict flared up in the north the island had been wracked by violence in the south. Wijeweera's Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), or People's Liberation Front, killed those who rejected its ideology - and was crushed by the state.

Charismatic and powerful

So who was Rohana Wijeweera?

Born in 1943 into a rural communist family in Sri Lanka's deep south, "he was not wealthy, nor did he belong to a high caste", one-time colleague Victor Ivan wrote after his death.

"His parents were poor, ordinary people."

He travelled the USSR and developed an admiration for Stalin. But, with his flowing hair and red-starred beret, he mostly styled himself on the hero of the Cuban revolution Che Guevara.

"He was a very charismatic, powerful speaker - he could speak for three or four hours without notes," recalls another one-time lawyer of Wijeweera's, P Rajanayagam. That meant that his message struck a chord with many poor rural-dwellers.

But Wijeweera also had an ethnic element to his message. Ceylon, as it was then, was an ethnically mixed island but had no common, over-arching language. And Wijeweera's natural base was among the majority Sinhalese - people who had been educated in Sinhala at school or university, but had no jobs and blamed the system.

In 1971, while in prison for activities against the state, Wijeweera tried to direct an insurrection. The revolt failed miserably, but several thousand JVP members were killed by the government.

'Kill the brutes'

In 1982 Wijeweera contested the presidential election, with Gunasekara as his agent. In speeches he accused politicians of "tearing up" the people's rights.

He came a distant third. By the late 1980s the JVP was banned and he was plotting a new, ferociously violent insurrection. The party argued that attempts to make peace with the Tamil Tigers were selling out the Sinhalese.

Prins Gunasekara says it was the president that provoked the JVP by telling his security forces to "kill the brutes".

Those in the JVP or suspected of involvement "were being picked up, tortured and killed", he says.

The JVP killed monks, academics, union leaders, even a popular politician-film-star, Vijaya Kumaratunga, whose wife Chandrika later became president.

"The JVP had these kangaroo courts where they sentenced people to death and then would send an assassin to kill that person," says Priyath Liyanage, editor of BBC Sinhala. "On the government side there were death squads, torture chambers. It became a nation of terror in 1989."

In the green jungles and rice fields, among the Buddhist temples and on campuses, the state wreaked its revenge, says Mr Gunasekara.

"The pro-JVP elements were arrested, beheaded, and their heads were put on poles and planted around a lake in the University of Peradeniya [in the city of Kandy]. So when they see it they know this is what happens if you are pro-JVP.

"In my own electorate there were one or two places where they used to bring young men, shoot them and set on fire."

Burned alive

In November 1989 Rohana Wijeweera was finally hunted down and arrested while living in disguise on a tea plantation with his family.

According to Prins Gunasekara, President Ranasinghe Premadasa gave the go-ahead for the captive - and one of his colleagues who had been tortured - to be summarily killed.

According to some accounts, he was burned alive.

So ended the insurrection of the People's Liberation Front. But the state continued to go after alleged sympathisers for months. Thousands remain missing to this day.

Prins Gunasekara says the whole period has left an awful legacy.

The numbers may be less now but "as the JVP did at one stage, the government abducts people, disappears people, tortures them, the parents are not even told where the children are", he says.

This southern conflict claimed perhaps 70,000 lives.

But it failed to attract the international attention that the much longer ethnic one has done, says the BBC's Priyath Liyanage.

Whereas the large Tamil diaspora helps maintain awareness of that issue, those caught up in the JVP conflict were "mainly Sinhala, rural people, people from poorer backgrounds", he says.

The JVP became a legal political party. It still venerates its icon, Rohana Wijeweera.

The government confined Wijeweera's widow and six children to a naval barracks. Little has been heard of them in the quarter-century since.

President Premadasa and his Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, who was present at Wijeweera's death, were both later assassinated by the Tamil Tigers.

Prins Gunasekara lives in exile in London and, at 91, still works as a lawyer.

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Rohana Wijeweera: The killing of Sri Lanka's Stalinist icon

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Twenty-five years ago, on 13 November 1989, the Sri Lankan government announced that Rohana Wijeweera, an extreme-left Sinhalese nationalist leader of two failed insurrections, had died in police custody - in unclear circumstances. "I heard about the death.

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Sri Lanka's Rajapaksa wins 25-year civil war

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Sri Lanka's Rajapaksa wins 25-year civil war

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News: "Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa did what four of his predecessors could not do, and many thought was impossible -- win one of the world’s most stubborn civil wars.

Rajapaksa fended off fierce Western criticism in the waning weeks of the war, arguing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) should not be given another chance to avoid defeat.

Ironically, Tamil Tiger leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran may have sown the seeds of his own destruction by ordering Tamils not to vote in the 2005 election that brought Rajapaksa to power." (Sirilal, 2009)

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COLOMBO (Reuters) - Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa did what four of his predecessors could not do, and many thought was impossible -- win one of the world's most stubborn civil wars.

Now, the veteran politician, 64, must win the confidence of Tamil people scarred by decades of brutality and suspicious of his support from hardline Sinhalese nationalists.

That is where his knack for persuasiveness and common touch may come in handy, after he displayed a steely presence in seeing one of Asia's longest-running wars through to its bitter end.

Rajapaksa fended off fierce Western criticism in the waning weeks of the war, arguing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) should not be given another chance to avoid defeat.

Ironically, Tamil Tiger leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran may have sown the seeds of his own destruction by ordering Tamils not to vote in the 2005 election that brought Rajapaksa to power.

Tamils were expected to have given former prime minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, now the main opposition leader, the votes he would have needed to beat Rajapaksa.

To get the required support, Rajapaksa forged pacts with the hardline Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna party and extremist Buddhist monks, who detest the Tigers.

A lawyer by trade who habitually wears the traditional dress of white knee-length shirt, sarong and a red sash, Rajapaksa hails from the southern port of Hambantota, where Chinese companies are now building a massive port.

He first entered parliament in 1970, and has served as both labour minister and prime minister.

Although history will remember Rajapaksa for winning the war, his battle-hardened brother Gotabaya, the nation's defence secretary was instrumental in building up the military to defeat the well-armed Tigers.

A decorated infantry officer in his own right, Gotabaya Rajapaksa worked closely with his former comrade-in-arms, army commander General Sarath Fonseka, in leading the fight against the LTTE.

The war success has driven Rajapaksa's popularity up, and helped him sideline the main opposition United National Party (UNP) in recent local elections. Analysts and allies expect him to call early presidential elections to capitalise on the victory.

But now that the war is over, Rajapaksa must face the dual challenges of healing divisions between the Tamil minority and Sinhalese majority and boosting an ailing $40 billion (25 billion pounds) economy.

"We have been victorious in facing one challenge. Time is now raising a new challenge before us. It is the challenge of building the motherland," Rajapaksa said in his victory speech on Tuesday.

"This great battle for national revival will be waged with the aim of raising the lives of the Tamil people in the north and east of our country, too," he said.

Already, Rajapaksa has said he expects major development aid to rebuild in the former Tiger-controlled areas. Sri Lanka is also seeking a $1.9 billion IMF loan to ease a balance of payments crisis.

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Sri Lanka's Rajapaksa wins 25-year civil war

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COLOMBO (Reuters) - Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa did what four of his predecessors could not do, and many thought was impossible -- win one of the world's most stubborn civil wars. Now, the veteran politician, 64, must win the confidence of Tamil people scarred by decades of brutality and suspicious of his support from hardline Sinhalese nationalists.

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The Sri Lankan Civil War and Its History, Revisited in 2020

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The Sri Lankan Civil War and Its History, Revisited in 2020

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"Sri Lanka’s present is haunted by memories of the island’s decades-long civil war, which began in 1983 and ended just over 10 years ago. The war was mainly a clash between the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgent group, the latter of which had hoped to establish a separate state for the Tamil minority. The mainstream narrative suggests that the civil war was derived from tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups. However, the war also represented the legacy of British imperialism. This alternative analysis suggests that the ethnic conflicts were symptoms of a much larger problem, rejecting the oversimplified narrative that Sri Lanka is home to a people that are perpetually clashing with one another due to ethnic incompatibilities." (Anandakugan, 2020)

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On June 9, 2020, Sri Lankans occupied the streets outside the US Embassy in Sri Lanka's capital, Colombo, in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement, holding signs condemning the racism, police brutality, and other maladies plaguing the United States. Sri Lanka's social issues also came to light at this protest. The country, after all, has its history of ethnic strife and is currently mending after the end of a long, brutal civil war. As the nation attempts to heal, Sri Lanka continues to sustain new injuries to its social and political structures that reveal much larger systemic problems. Police arrived at the demonstration and violently dispersed protesters-arresting at least 53 individuals-supposedly to enforce public health restrictions related to the COVID-19 outbreak. However, the police's ferocity was unsettling. Some footage, for instance, "showed a young woman being tossed into a police vehicle, head first." One of the protest's organizers, Pubudu Jayagoda, indicated that the Sri Lankan government had been "downplaying coronavirus health risks," implying that the police perhaps had ulterior motives and revealing his disillusionment with the government's policing power. Such growing disenchantment with the Sri Lankan government represents just one problem amongst the country's history of ethnic tensions.

Sri Lanka's present is haunted by memories of the island's decades-long civil war, which began in 1983 and ended just over 10 years ago. The war was mainly a clash between the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgent group, the latter of which had hoped to establish a separate state for the Tamil minority. The mainstream narrative suggests that the civil war was derived from tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups. However, the war also represented the legacy of British imperialism. This alternative analysis suggests that the ethnic conflicts were symptoms of a much larger problem, rejecting the oversimplified narrative that Sri Lanka is home to a people that are perpetually clashing with one another due to ethnic incompatibilities. Instead, the analysis surrounding the legacy of British imperialism embraces the idea that Sri Lanka's conflict has much to do with each group fighting to reclaim its dignity and power, albeit at the expense of the other. A post-colonial analysis reveals that both the Sinhalese and Tamils acted to recover what they believed they had lost during their respective golden eras, imperial rule for the Sinhalese and shortly after for the Tamils. Present moments like the June 9th protest are no longer surprising and clearly align with Sri Lanka's broader history under this interpretation. Perhaps more importantly, this post-colonial narrative suggests that Sri Lanka's conflicts are not in the past;rather, the conflicts continue to manifest through the government's leadership in moments much like the Colombo protests.

An Origin Story

Sri Lanka is 74.9 percent Sinhalese and 11.2 percent Sri Lankan Tamil. Within these two groups, Sinhalese tend to be Buddhist and Tamils tend to be Hindu, displaying significant linguistic and religious divisions. However, the strife between the grounds purportedly began much further back in Sri Lanka's ancient settlement history. Though the Sinhalese people's arrival in Sri Lanka is somewhat ambiguous, historians believe that the Tamils arrived on the island both as invaders and traders from India's Chola Kingdom. These origin stories suggest that the Sinhalese and Tamil communities have experienced tension from the very beginning-not out of cultural incompatibility, but rather out of power disputes.

During British imperial rule, the tensions between the two groups worsened. The CIA suggested in 1985 that the Sinhalese community felt threatened by the Tamil group's prosperity partly due to the British favoritism of Tamils during the British occupation of Sri Lanka. Because Tamil communities also existed in several other British colonies like India, South Africa, and Singapore, Sri Lankan Tamils benefited from broader commercial networks and a wider range of opportunities. Moreover, British colonial authorities often placed English language schools in predominantly Tamil areas, providing Tamils with more civil service and professional opportunities than their Sinhalese counterparts. This pattern of Tamil favoritism left Sinhalese people feeling isolated and oppressed. Despite the tension between these groups before British colonization, the events that followed Sri Lankan independence suggest that imperial rule had provoked the ensuing conflict. Indeed, soon after British occupiers left the island in 1948, these patterns of Tamil dominance changed dramatically.

The Story Reverses

After British independence, many Sinhalese worked their way into the upper echelons of government. These Sinhalese gained power and went on to gradually pass acts effectively disenfranchising their Tamil counterparts. One such act was the Sinhala Only Act, a 1956 bill that made Sinhala the only official language of Sri Lanka and created barriers for Tamil people trying to access government services or seeking public employment. Former Sri Lankan President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga frames the act, which her father passed, as a move to nurture and reclaim a Sri Lankan identity following an extended period of British rule. If Kumaratunga's statements about her father's legislation are sincere and accurate, her commentary may reveal that legislators at the time hoped to recover the dignity of their Sinhalese ethnicity that they felt was lost during British imperial rule-not that they wanted to actively minimize Tamil culture. Retrospectively, though, the minimization of Tamil culture is precisely what the laws accomplished.

Another pertinent policy was that of standardization, which aimed to provide more educational opportunities for disadvantaged Sinhalese students. The policy required Tamil students to achieve higher exam scores that their Sinhalese counterparts in order to be admitted Sri Lankan universities. Legislators created a program that resembled affirmative action for the Sinhalese, who lacked opportunities and were disadvantaged during British imperial rule. Yet, when coupled with the Sinhala Only Act, standardization took opportunities from Tamil students, several of whom had turned to educational avenues to compensate for their lack of professional civil service opportunities. Thus, this legislation passed by a Sinhalese-dominated government failed to level the playing field; instead, it tilted the odds in the other direction and effectively discriminated against Tamil students. Ostensibly, these ethnic frictions had roots in the social destabilization caused by British occupation, and had more to do with reclaiming Sinhalese power and dignity than to cultural tensions between the Tamils and Sinhalese. Even so, before long, a few militant Sri Lankan Tamils organized an insurgency.

The War Itself

Some Tamils responded to these discriminatory policies with the idea of Tamil Eelam, a separate state for Tamils. While the idea appears to be extreme, the two groups already lived in somewhat separate spheres of the country: the Sinhalese in Southern, Western, and Central Sri Lanka, and the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern parts of the island. Tamil Eelam aimed to formalize this existing geographic separation. The movement was built on the idea that Tamils and Sinhalese represented distinct ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. However, post-colonial thought would suggest that the underlying reasons for both Sinhalese and Tamil actions in the immediate post-colonial period were not due to untenable differences, but rather a desire for power across the country's communities and a feeling of frustration about the lack of opportunity caused by factors beyond the groups' control.

Nonetheless, Tamils had mixed reactions to the concept of Eelam. While a handful of groups supported Tamil Eelam, only one prevailed: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). LTTE destroyed other budding Eelam groups like the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) to become the "sole representative of the Tamils." The conflict then escalated into civil war. The war officially began after a day of riots targeting Tamils in Colombo in July 1983, a month which has since been dubbed "Black July." The fighting lasted just under three decades and ended in May 2009, when the Sri Lankan government announced that they killed the LTTE leader.

LTTE was an uncompromising group inspired by Che Guevarra and his guerilla warfare tactics. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) soon labeled the LTTE a terrorist group after they initiated terror tactics including suicide bombers, the suicide belt, and female-led suicide attacks. The group even assassinated two world leaders: Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Indeed, the LTTE's activities extended beyond Sri Lanka's borders. However, LTTE was not the only perpetrator of heinous crimes during the Sri Lankan Civil War. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights determined that the Sinhalese-dominated government has also been implicated in war crimes such as the torture of war prisoners and citizen disappearances. In one notably brutal example, the government's forces murdered five Tamil students in the port city of Trincomalee. These conflicts, rooted in a quest for power and dignity, descended into brutal violence on both sides, and memories of this violence still haunt the country today.

The Situation Now and the Protests Revisited

Although the Civil War ended in 2009, the current situation in Sri Lanka has only partially improved. A large portion of the Tamil population remains displaced. While there are fewer political and civil rights issues, instances of torture and enforced disappearances persist even in recent years. Moreover, the Sri Lankan government often surveils and tracks people linked to LTTE. The Sri Lankan military still occupies predominantly Tamil areas designated as "high-security zones," though to a lesser extent than during the war. The government's Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) targets mostly Tamils. In a more subtle sense, the Sri Lankan government continues to disenfranchise the Tamil community. Through the process of " Sinhalization," for instance, Sinhalese culture has slowly replaced that of the Tamil population. Sinahlese monuments, road signs, street and village names, as well as Buddhist places of worship became more common in predominantly Tamil areas. These efforts have infringed upon, and in some cases even erased, the Tamil perspective on Sri Lankan history, as well as Tamil and Hindu elements of the country's culture.

Perhaps the conflict has devolved into an ethnic issue, but it did not start that way. It may not stay that way either. The Sri Lankan government has alienated the Tamil minority since the civil war ended, but, more recently, it has come to disappoint its Sinhalese constituency as well. The government's actions since the end of the civil war have become increasingly undemocratic for Tamils and Sinhalese alike. Its response to the Black Lives Matter protests, for example, was only the latest instance in which the government exercised an unprecedented amount of power. The Sri Lankan government began growing its power during the civil war-a conflict that stemmed from ethnic tensions rooted in the legacy of British imperialism on the island. The government continues to expand its authority now many years later. What this means for the future of Sri Lanka is unclear. Still, one thing is for sure: even if the wounds caused by the Sri Lankan Civil War and its accompanying ethnic divisions heal, the country will remain haunted by much larger structural issues in its history and government. However, a unified citizenry in Sri Lanka could be a powerful tool in responding to its government's growing power. Ethnic unity on the island may be the key to a more secure future.

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The Sri Lankan Civil War and Its History, Revisited in 2020

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On June 9, 2020, Sri Lankans occupied the streets outside the US Embassy in Sri Lanka's capital, Colombo, in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement, holding signs condemning the racism, police brutality, and other maladies plaguing the United States. Sri Lanka's social issues also came to light at this protest.

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People’s Tribunal Hears Evidence Against My Father’s Killers

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People’s Tribunal Hears Evidence Against My Father’s Killers

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This piece is written by the slain journalist Lasantha Wickrematunge's daughter, Ahimsa Wickramatunge. Ahima Wickramatunge describes her father as "one of those journalists who paid with his life for speaking out and exposing the unvarnished truth, who informed the people of the many transgressions of the powers that be."

She continues to say that. "It is my belief that my father’s investigation into the MiG deal was one of the many reasons he was killed. My father, in an explosive series revealed the fraud behind the purchase of second hand fighter jets from Ukraine where Sri Lanka paid an 87 percent commission to Singaporean wheeler dealers to buy arms and services used to defeat the LTTE."

The cost of a journalist has to pay: "My father’s assassination caused outrage, not only in Sri Lanka but the world over. His posthumous editorial titled And Then They Came For Me where he foretold his own death became an oft quoted example of journalistic brilliance and a beacon of hope and inspiration for all those who stood for fairness, justice, accountability and a free and robust press."

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Today the People's Tribunal on the Murder of Journalists in the Hague will commence hearing evidence in the assassination of my father Lasantha Wickrematunge. The indictment alleges the Sri Lankan government's complicity in the crime and has invited the government to exercise its right of defence during the hearing. The tribunal does not have the legal capacity to punish perpetrators if found guilty; however, the evidence heard will invite global awareness to the issue of attacks on journalists, more often than not carried out with total impunity. And if a guilty judgement is delivered, it will put those that have long been considered responsible for my father's killing in a negative spotlight.

My father was one of those journalists who paid with his life for speaking out and exposing the unvarnished truth, who informed the people of the many transgressions of the powers that be. Most of the stories he brought into the public domain through his incisive investigation and research shook the very foundations of the corridors of power.

It is my belief that my father's investigation into the MiG deal was one of the many reasons he was killed. My father, in an explosive series revealed the fraud behind the purchase of second hand fighter jets from Ukraine where Sri Lanka paid an 87 percent commission to Singaporean wheeler dealers to buy arms and services used to defeat the LTTE. The Singaporeans paid at least $400,000 as a kickback to then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa's cousin Udayanga Weeratunga. A hefty chunk of the remaining $6,428,547.24 made its way to accounts controlled by prominent Sri Lankans. Gotabaya Rajapaksa had sued my father, which resulted in a court order preventing anything about him being written in The Sunday Leader of which he was Editor in Chief.

Two years later, my father was assassinated on the streets of Colombo by men on motorcycles who followed his car and smashed its windscreen just days before he was due to testify in this lawsuit brought against him. That was the darkest day of my life, January 8, 2009. But today, more than 13 years later, his assassination remains unsolved and the killers and those who ordered this most heinous and cowardly crime roam free. This is hardly surprising. In Sri Lanka there is total, 100 percent impunity in journalists' murders, torture and attacks on news organisations. No one has ever been convicted for the murders of journalists, torture of journalists, blowing up of newsrooms or torching of presses.

My father's assassination caused outrage, not only in Sri Lanka but the world over. His posthumous editorial titled And Then They Came For Me where he foretold his own death became an oft quoted example of journalistic brilliance and a beacon of hope and inspiration for all those who stood for fairness, justice, accountability and a free and robust press.

Although a case was initiated and opened soon after his assassination, nothing came of it. When the government changed in 2015 and the Rajapaksas were voted out of office, Sri Lanka, and our family in particular finally braced ourselves for justice for Lasantha Wickrematunge. Police investigators soon zoomed in on a military death squad, the Tripoli platoon, that had allegedly been controlled by then-Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa. However, certain members of the new government were more interested in covering up for the killers than seeking to punish the perpetrators of this crime.

Now 13 years later, the People's Tribunal on Murdered Journalists in the Hague have taken up the case of my father, together with those of two other slain journalists from Syria and Mexico. I am indebted to Free Press Unlimited, the Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Sans Frontiers who collaborated to bring this trial to life and to human rights lawyer Almudena Bernabeu and all others who are contributing in no small measure in an attempt to see justice is done. I have long said that we, the families of these journalists, would never see justice done within the confines of Sri Lanka. The justice system, compromised as it is with ties to the rulers, is not geared to bringing justice to these brave men who fought so hard to speak out and put their lives on the line in doing so. It is indeed heartening that over a decade after his assassination, the People's Tribunal is providing my family something resembling a day in court.

My father's assassination, just like the murders of all journalists, was not only a heinous crime that denied our family of a wonderful father but also denied the people's right to be informed. He wrote in his last editorial, "I hope my assassination will not be seen as a defeat of freedom but an inspiration for those who survive...I hope it will galvanise forces that will usher in a new era of human liberty in our beloved motherland." Those prophetic words are now coming to fruition before our eyes as the people of Sri Lanka rise in unity against years of corruption, misrule, state sanctioned murder and impunity. Even as I write, remarkable and truly historic events are taking place in Sri Lanka. After years of suffering under the jackboot of tyranny, of Rajapaksa misrule and despotism, the people have risen in one strident voice and are demanding their exit from government. My father's name is in the mix of their battle cries.

For the first time in our country's post-independence history, we are witnessing people power result in concrete change. There have been cabinet changes, resignations and Prime Minister Rajapaksa finally caved into pressure and handed his resignation to his brother President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Now there are very valid calls for the president, prime minister and the defence establishment to be held accountable for the events of May 9, when on the 31st day of peaceful protests in the Galle Face Green, the young protestors were set upon by government sponsored thugs, assaulted and the protest site vandalised. The thugs arrived from the prime minister's official residence Temple Trees where they listened to a rousing speech by Rajapaksa and an incendiary rant by former minister and henchman Johnston Fernando.

The government perhaps never expected the country's rousing support for the protestors who have today become a symbol of hope for change and for a better tomorrow. The protestors, mostly youth from all walks of life, from all ethnic groups and religions, championed our cause day and night, in the blazing sun and pouring rain and became Sri Lanka's beloved children and for me personally, my brothers and sisters in arms.

People always ask me how I feel about the protests. My family has paid a huge price for our father's love and service to our country. I have carried the cross of my father's commitment to Sri Lanka my entire life. When Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected as president, my world shattered and I felt my father had died in vain. I felt the pain of 6.9 million voters tell me my father's life didn't matter.

Today as I watch these very people rise up and cheer into the streets that my father was right all along and as I witness my father's words being fulfilled I feel the wheels of divine justice are finally turning in our favour. My little brother was robbed of the opportunity of growing up with a father. After watching some of these protests he told me how surreal it is and how proud he feels to have been born to a father who is greater and more inspiring than any hero or person in history he idolises or looks up to. Our father gave his life for everything Sri Lanka is now fighting for and it is a cross we are now proud to bear.

If the changes we are seeing now is an indication of what is to come, we can dare hope for the "system change" that is being spoken of. Our new generation have made it clear they will settle for nothing less. A complete overhaul is not just needed in the electoral system; we need to see things change in the entire political system. For instance, undermining the justice system is deeply entrenched in the political culture of Sri Lanka. The people have lost faith in a system that throws out cases against politicians whose role is to represent us, where murderers are pardoned and investigations into crimes as shocking and far reaching as the Easter Sunday bombings are tampered with.

I can only dream that any system change will include a justice system which is truly independent, fair and just. Where investigations will be carried out, without scuttling of investigations, hiding of evidence and the preventing of successful conclusions.

Until then, I continue to look to the international community and now turn to the People's Tribunal to give our loved ones and our families the justice they deserve.

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People's Tribunal Hears Evidence Against My Father's Killers

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Today the People's Tribunal on the Murder of Journalists in the Hague will commence hearing evidence in the assassination of my father Lasantha Wickrematunge. The indictment alleges the Sri Lankan government's complicity in the crime and has invited the government to exercise its right of defence during the hearing.

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"In 2007, journalist Lasantha Wickrematunge published a series of exposes about a murky arms procurement that has since come to be known as the ‘MiG deal’. The articles resulted in Lasantha and his newspaper being sued for defamation over his reporting on the alleged involvement of then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa in the transaction involving mothballed MiG-27 bombers in Ukraine. Friends and family have long suspected that the reporting and legal battle may have cost the outspoken journalist his life." (Sunday Observer, 2019)

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In 2007, journalist Lasantha Wickrematunge published a series of exposes about a murky arms procurement that has since come to be known as the ‘MiG deal’. The articles resulted in Lasantha and his newspaper being sued for defamation over his reporting on the alleged involvement of then Defence Secre…

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The Sri Lankan state found guilty in the murder of Lasantha Wickrematunge 

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The Sri Lankan state found guilty in the murder of Lasantha Wickrematunge 

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Mothers mourn the lost of loved ones who are victims of enforced disappearances

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Collective remembering may also be a foreign concept to Sri Lankans, because culturally we are accustomed to mourning in private as opposed to mourning in public. This is reflected in both poems where both poets present personal accounts as witnesses to a moment in Sri Lanka’s past.

Thus, in choosing to document these moments in time -1983, 1956 and the death of Wickramatunga, both de Soyza and Seneviratne have contributed to memorialization of  a dark history that is referred to when we remember ethnic conflicts, riots and insurrections and the consequences of bloody violence that followed.

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Malinda Seneviratne in the act of memorializing a fellow journalist

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Malinda Seneviratne in the act of memorializing a fellow journalist

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Seneviratne details his opinion on Lasantha Wickrematunge and his political writings. This article proves to be a valuable resource to read alongside the poem "For Lasantha and Others" since it explores the tenacity and also the weaknesses of the silenced journalist. Moreover, Seneviratne contends that memorialising of a person is best achieved through continuing their legacy, and not remaining silent: "... let us remember a man who lived in a country where many lived as though dead and who in death remains alive" (Seneviratne, 2014). Hence, this article is almost a prose version of the poem.

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Two questions have been posed by journalist Hafeel Farisz on the subject of Lasantha Wickremathunge : Has Lasantha's journalistic panache evolved into a more vibrant and potent form of media, or have we been left still fighting to sift through the rubble after his death? What does it mean to the rule of law and the right of the public to be informed, when an editor of a national newspaper is brutally murdered a stone's throw from a High Security Zone, with not a single person found responsible for the murder?

Farisz believes that the answers to these questions 'will help unravel the many strands that truth might possess and help understand the bigger dynamics of democracy that prevail in the country as of now'. He believes also that his death should not be mourned and instead his legacy demands celebration.

The last is a personal view and a subjective assessment of legacy worth. Nothing wrong in that. It is something applicable to anyone who has died whatever the circumstances of death. The questions, however, are pertinent. Let's consider them.

Lasantha had panache, few would disagree. He got stories that made waves. He dug deep into things that others didn't dare touch or just could not. There was vibrancy and potency. Then again, he was selective. There was a lot of frilling. He got the cheers from his readership because they for the most part shared his political positions, especially his party color. He was also cheered by fellow-travelers who shared his pet peeves. He benefitted posthumously from those associations and the accolades showered on him by people who found it a useful way of feathering their own nests. In that rush to make political capital these individuals including those near and dear did Lasantha the supreme injustice by penning in his name a from-the-grave editorial. Peruse his work and you will easily notice the difference in style.

He was selective and conscious of the costs and benefits to party, political project and preferred outcomes. He was effective. His relentless pursuit of Thilanga Sumathipala bore fruit. And yet, once Thilanga plonked himself in the UNP camp, he went silent. He drew from the adage 'enemy's enemy is friend' and this saw him bed with less than savory creatures in the political firmament including the LTTE.

Through it all, however, Lasantha was not apologetic. He made no bones about his preferences or rather didn't have to. Everyone knew.

These histories frame him squarely. His vibrancy and potency likewise are qualified by his politics which include loyalty, selectivity and obviously conspicuous silences. So when we consider the 'now' of media and ask if our 'today' is less or more vibrant and potent, the issue spills over everything that 'Lasantha' means and has been taken to mean since he was assassinated. If, on the other hand, such things are assessed by consistency, panache, effectiveness and rigor of taking on particular regimes (different from critique of regimes in general) then the benchmark is not too high. Too often courage and panache are assessed in terms of the target of the particular journalist. Throw in venom and then you are champion in the eyes of political friends. If one is sober, is focus on policy rather than individual and still distance oneself from the benefitting party and that's not enough. Not enough panache, not enough courage. No, one has to attack regime and stand with opposition.

For the record, Lasantha did bite his political enemies, but left corporate crime strictly alone. He picked his fights, as do others, for whatever reasons. He was not a 'bring it on, bring it all on' kind of person. On the other hand we have many who would never even dare whisper, even in secret, those words, 'bring it on'. Comfort zone journalists have always been the majority. Lasantha was an exception.

In short there's always been navel gazing and always been look-in-the-eye probe. Farisz himself has taken bulls by the horn, so to speak. The Ravaya, then and now, framed by ideology more than party preferences of course, does it well. Thisaranee Gunasekera writes as though she's never had a happy week in over thirty years, but her critique is as sharp as anyone's. Emil Vander Poorten sticks to his guns, powered by his own ideological and political preferences. There's no lack of courage in either. That there are no takers for other reasons (for example their political histories and preferences) is a different matter altogether. As a tribe we are not richer or poorer in that sense. We are poorer because we have lost a colorful, and in many ways charming, fellow journalist. We are poorer because even if it was party politics that shaped his work there was courage in what he did; vibrancy and potency if you will. That rubs off.

Farisz' second question is more important. Lasantha's killers are still at large. Any killer at large is a threat and an affront to the rule of law and law enforcement mechanisms. When a journalist is murdered and the killer roams free then indeed the right to information is compromised to boot. Lasantha was unarmed. He was killed in cold blood, and as Farisz says, 'a stone's throw from a high security zone'. Failure to apprehend the killers is a blot on the Government and a blot that continues to grow with each passing day, more so because we are talking of a system that was able to track down key terrorists overseas. It is not a can't-be-done thing. It appears more like a will-not-do thing.

We have lived through many eras where governments of all political persuasion imposed limits by way of regulation and intimidation. The media has taken hits but has not turned over and died. That however is not comfort enough, not reason enough not to be perturbed and certainly no reason not to fight.

If we want to celebrate Lasantha's life, then, we have to go beyond his legacy, recognize his humanity, his courage and his frailties, draw strength from what was best of the man and cross the boundaries he set himself. That's how issues embedded in Farisz' second questions can be addressed.

For now, five years after he was slain, let us remember a man who lived in a country where many lived as though dead and who in death remains alive and gives breath to the living, regardless of differences and preferences.

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Wither Media Five Years After Lasantha Was Slain? - Colombo Telegraph

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Two questions have been posed by journalist Hafeel Farisz on the subject of Lasantha Wickremathunge : Has Lasantha's journalistic panache evolved into a more vibrant and potent form of media, or have we been left still fighting to sift through the rubble after his death?

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The Roots of Sri Lankan English Literature

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The Roots of Sri Lankan English Literature

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The English language had a significant influence on culture and art in Sri Lanka due to British hegemony. This article traces the use of the English language, and English literature across colonial and postcolonial times.

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Being embroiled in treacherous times (Perera, 2020). This reflects the inability of writers to disengage themselves from the goings-on around them, as many critics such as Kandiah point out the value of remaining relevant; and yet the simultaneous threat embedded in doing so: the threat of being censored or silenced)

Wijesinghe reflects on who might have been responsible for de Zoysa's murder (The act of pointing fingers as noted in Seneviratne's poem)

Memorialising de Soyza is done by his friend Rajiva Wijesinghe through the preservation of his poetry (the speaker himself plays a part in memorialising the silenced voice)

The sociopolitical context in which Richard de Zoysa lived and the reflections of it in his poems : the issues of politics, class addressed in his poetry are also discussed in the video.

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Richard de Zoysa: A Poet in the City at a Time of Trouble

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1. Senadie De Alwis- 2019BA23113
2. Sithmi Edirisinghe- 2019BA23157
3. Muminah Hakeem-2019BA23207
4. Jonathan Cruse- 2019BA23681
5. Azra Jabbar- 2019BA23235

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This poem describes the events leading up to the 1989 insurrection in Sri Lanka, and elaborates on the volatile, dangerous atmosphere that pervaded the society during this time. This poem is also written in a prophetic sense, and the poet is warning the readership against the horrors of what is to come.

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This poem is a response by poet Malinda Seneviratne to the murder of veteran journalist Lasantha Wickramathunge. He portrays Wickramathunge as a seeker of the truth, and commends his courage while asking who should be held responsible for his death.

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The poems chosen for analysis are:

Apocalypse Soon by Richard de Zoysa

For Lasantha and Others by Malinda Seneviratne

Both are poems of resistance, written to oppose the prolonged violence caused by the ethnic conflicts, political corruption, the brutal murders and the lack of media freedom in Sri Lanka. "Apocalypse Soon" is set during the time of insurrection, while "For Lasantha and Others" is set in more recent times (2009). Despite the passing of time, the themes explored in the poems remain more or less similar, indicating that these are persistent and pervasive issues in the social and political landscape of Sri Lanka. These poems are examined in terms of their socio-cultural contexts as well as their linguistic style and relatability.

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SLE writers not upto standards? Let De Zoysa and Seneviratne challenge Kandiah

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SLE writers not upto standards? Let De Zoysa and Seneviratne challenge Kandiah

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Sri Lankan English Poetry and the Colonial Heritage

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Sri Lankan English Poetry and the Colonial Heritage

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Western thought dictates that the language Sri Lankan writers should follow should have the actual rhythms and idioms of ordinary Sri Lankan speech. However, the writer claims that a truly creative writer has to use language that comes naturally with experience. De Zoysa's style of writing is splattered with references that are distinctly not Sri Lankan – for example, the damson fruit (line 35) is not something that a Sri Lankan would recognise. Biblical allusions such as the horsemen are also references that most Sri Lankans would not be able to grasp without close reading, and are also not references used in ordinary Sri Lankan speech. These are, however, part of the context de Zoysa wrote in, and part of his experience, so they cannot be entirely dismissed as unhelpful contributions to Sri Lankan English literature.

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Sri Lankan writers: detached from poltical reality?

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Sri Lankan writers: detached from poltical reality?

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Sri Lankan English Literature writers are thought to be writing from fields that are distanced from political realities. Having the cultural legitimacy of one’s work being questioned is a problem that is common to both expatriate writers and writers in Sri Lanka who hail from affluent backgrounds. Richard de Zoysa in particular comes from a mixed and upper-class background. His affiliations are reflected in his poetry, which, while set mostly in a Sri Lankan context, is still full of language that an ordinary Sri Lankan would not understand (for example, the Fifth Horseman).

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements. Introduction Part 1. 1. Literature and Territoriality: Boundary Marking as a Critical Paradigm Part 2 2. Allegorical Islands 3. Spectral Spaces 4. Fugitive Selves 5. Genealogical Maps Part 3 6. Border Dialogues 7. Place as Palimpsest 8. Past Paradise 9. Conclusion: Destinations Notes. Select Bibliography. Index

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Writing Sri Lanka: Literature, Resistance & the Politics of Place

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Focusing on ways in which cultural nationalism has influenced both the production and critical reception of texts, Salgado presents a detailed analysis of eight leading Sri Lankan writers - Michael Ondaatje, Romesh Gunasekera, Shyam Selvadurai, A.

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Dare to voice your truth: SLE Poetry and its Focus on Ethnic Conflicts

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Dare to voice your truth: SLE Poetry and its Focus on Ethnic Conflicts

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The article gives a historical overview of the ethnic conflicts since the 1983 riots in Sri Lanka and highlights how Sri Lankan English writers have made it a frequent topic for their poetry. While he observes that SLE writers tend to write about the tensions and violence from the "sidelines", one cannot agree that the writers are completely detached from the divisions and impacts of the violence. Considering the fates of Richard de Zoysa and Lasantha Wickramatunga (the subject of Malinda Seneviratne's poem) is enough evidence that writers, whether they are poets or journalists, are not simply observers of the issues surrounding them, but rather they are the active participants giving voice to those issues through the power of language.

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Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict in Its Literature in English

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The Fifth Horseman: a Metaphor for Racial Strife?

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The Fifth Horseman: a Metaphor for Racial Strife?

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Richard de Zoysa, being of an affluent background, would have been familiar with apocalyptic images such as ones of the four horsemen. Traditionally, the four differently-colored horses function as symbols of conquest (white), war (red), famine (black) and green (disease and death). The horses represent what may happen during the end of times. De Zoysa refers to Tarzie Vittachi’s Emergency ’58, where the Fifth Horseman is said to be race-hate. The poet uses the horses to add to the prophetic atmosphere of the entire poem, indicating that they symbolise what will come of the Sri Lankan community if the contemporary situation persists.

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SLE creative writing: Debates on Content and form 

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SLE creative writing: Debates on Content and form 

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The Politics of English as a World Language_ New Horizons in Postcolonial Cultural Studies

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A Perspective on SLE Poetry: The English Language as a Tool?

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A Perspective on SLE Poetry: The English Language as a Tool?

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This editor’s note provides a brief but fitting historical overview of the nature of the poetry written by Sri Lankan writers. It points out two contradicting results of English education on Sri Lankan literature: on one hand, Sri Lankan writers and readers were increasingly inspired by the great works of English writers, on the other they were encouraged to ignore and forget the literary traditions of Sinhala and Tamil.  ”. However, modern poets like Richard de Zoysa and Malinda Seneviratne have the ability to “experiment with language in terms of individual experience, and to look with fresh eyes at a known society and a familiar environment” by using the English language as a tool.

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A PERSPECTIVE ON THE POETRY OF SRI LANKA

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SL Writing in Eng Contestation Marginality Transnationalism

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Poet, critic and journalist,  Malinda Seneviratne is from Sri Lanka and is well-known for his outspoken political opinions. His parents were both graduates in English, and he pursued a sociology degree at the University of Peradeniya. In 2013, he was given the Gratiaen Award. Malinda's father is claimed to have introduced him to politics and Marxism at a young age. Although he continues to vehemently oppose Tamil separatism, he is a fervent believer in citizenship free from racial or religious discrimination.

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In March 1958, Richard de Zoysa was born in Colombo, Sri Lanka. His father, Lucien de Zoysa, was a Sinhalese physician, and his mother, Dr. Manorani Saravanamuttu, was a well-known surgeon in the Tamil society. He attended St. Thomas' College in Mount Lavinia for his early education. He was a well-known journalist, novelist, human rights advocate, and actor from Sri Lanka and was kidnapped and killed on February 18, 1990.

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How is "Apocalypse Soon" linked to the Socio-Political context?

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How is "Apocalypse Soon" linked to the Socio-Political context?

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“Apocalypse Soon” cannot be divorced from the socio-political context of the time simply because it is the socio-politics of the time that shapes Richard de Soyza’s writing. The same can be said for other poets of Sri Lankan English Literature such as Jean Arasanayagam. The socio-political context was a catalyst for poetry that preserved an account of  Sri Lanka’s past and contrary to Gonetileke’s (1992) opinions, by evoking the North and South, de soyza does in fact include more than one perspective of the ethnic conflict.
"...what of the roots spread wide and deep and far beyond the limestone of the North?"

Goonetilleke, D. C. R. A. (1992). Sri Lanka’s “Ethnic” Conflict in Its Literature in English. World Literature Today, ₆₆(3), 450–453. https://doi.org/10.2307/40148368

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Beyond Alienation : The Efflorescence of Sri Lankan Literature in English

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Beyond Alienation : The Efflorescence of Sri Lankan Literature in English

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This paper claims that the years from 1956 onwards were times when English was in a decline as it was no longer an official language.  This paper elaborates on an issue faced by many Sri Lankan writers: although these writers wrote out of indigenous or personal experiences, and were natively Sri Lankan, they were still ostracised from the public as they came from an English-educated, English-speaking background. In terms of the two poems chosen, it can be said that although English lost prominence in 1956, there was still ample reason to write during this era, as it was a time of ethnic tensions and rising violent tendencies between the majority and minorities in Sri Lanka. Therefore, there was enough and more subject matter for poetry. Since the socio-political context in that era was plentiful, it made up for any deficiencies that came up when English lost its position of power. In fact, de Zoysa’s poetry is focused on the increasing ethnic tensions, and Seneviratne’s poem focuses on the injustice faced by journalists – both contemporary concerns. English was still widely used as it was a neutral language to use in the midst of ethnic issues, as well as because it had the capacity to reach international audiences.

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South Asian Literature in English - Where Language and Identity Collide 

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South Asian Literature in English - Where Language and Identity Collide 

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This paper focuses on the themes of identity, survival, colonialism, post colonialism, class, ethnic distinctions and culture brought out through the unique linguistic elements of South Asian literature written in English. It is not just the linguistic creativity of the poets that emphasize this collision of language and identity, but also the wide range of socio-political topics that they choose to write about. In a region split by linguistic divisions, the English language indeed has the power to serve as a medium of objectivity.

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Identity and survival - south asian postcolonial lit in english

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The paradox in Sri Lankan Anglophone literature lies in the fact that it straddles several lines such as ethnic identity politics and human rights advocacy. The attempt to tread this line carefully can be seen in Malinda Seneviratne’s For Lasantha and Others. In this poem, Seneviratne takes a cautious approach. He clearly condemns the brutal killing of Lasantha Wickramathunge, but he also seems to be wary of crossing the line towards outright criticism, as he also puts some of the blame on Wickramathunge himself, parenthetically saying “he was wrong a lot of times; hard to agree with too”. His poetry is not bold, it wavers between extremes, and the reader is left to wonder whether this is because he fears for his own life, writing in a time when journalists were in danger of being snuffed out for the slightest offense, or because he truly was impartial regarding the matter of the cause behind Wickramathunge’s death.

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Contestation, Marginality, and (Trans)nationalism: Considering Sri Lankan Anglophone Literature

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Published in South Asian Review (Vol. 33, No. 3, 2012)

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6O0HgKfjk8

In “Apocalypse Soon” de Soyza mentions “violence erupting like waves” which is a powerful image that captures how violence manifested itself as a result of racial strife that had its origins as far back as 1956.

Moments before there was the pretense of brotherhood, possibilities of unity and hope but now we only witness the sheer force of this violence rooted in hate for the “Other”: a hate that is disruptive and “shatters all amities” and “shards all bonds”.

In the poem de Soyza mentions two important dates- two landmark moments that led to the ethnic conflict ('71 and '58) and in doing so he evokes a history of violence. This violence rears its head from time to time and takes many forms sometimes through physical violence unleashed at riots- like the insurrections led by the JVP or discriminative language policies- like the Sinhala Only Act of 1956.

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The Sinhala Only Act and the 30-year-long War

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Seneviratne has a different message on the subject of political corruption. He urges that we “point a finger” at ourselves– which is a powerful statement indicating the need to look within, to assess and to rectify.

Individuals make up systems and institutions and in this way rectification of the self can lead to rectification of the state system. While this may seem idealistic, it resonates with the current political crisis in Sri Lanka. Following the recent hardships faced by people there was a rallying cry to oust all corrupt politicians and rectify the broken political system, and for many this called for assessing why they voted in a corrupt regime?

The Aragalaya also witnessed a potent moment where the citizens of Sri Lanka demanded an end to all impunity for crimes against journalists. This poem resonates powerfully with this current moment and hence can be considered not just relatable but also relevant to the current socio-political situation.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfc-bJu03uM

In many ways what De Soyza paints for us when he evokes this violent history. What we witness is the rape of a nation- bloodied, bruised and ruptured. Not even “nationalism” could save its people, in fact it only bred more violence and still more violence. With his concluding line

“Has the Fifth Horseman*** come again to raise

his banner, and wreak havoc on the land?”

De Soyza leaves us haunted, shaken and pained by the violence we have just witnessed. The concluding line is moving but also makes us wonder: why so much hate? Why so much violence? What was it all for?