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U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN DAVIS V. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION (1999)

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U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN DAVIS V. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION (1999)

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This case establishes a right of private action under title ix if school official(s) act with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in educational programs or activities. The court also determined that the harassment must be so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it deprives a student of an equal educational opportunity.

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United States Supreme Court

DAVIS, as next friend of LaSHONDA D. v. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.(1999)

No. 97-843

Argued: January 12, 1999Decided: May 24, 1999

Petitioner filed suit against respondents, a county school board (Board) and school officials, seeking damages for the sexual harassment of her daughter LaShonda by G. F., a fifth-grade classmate at a public elementary school. Among other things, petitioner alleged that respondents' deliberate indifference to G. F.'s persistent sexual advances toward LaShonda created an intimidating, hostile, offensive, and abusive school environment that violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which, in relevant part, prohibits a student from being "excluded from participation in, be[ing] denied the benefits of, or be[ing] subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," 20 U. S. C. §1681(a). In granting respondents' motion to dismiss, the Federal District Court found that "student-on-student," or peer, harassment provides no ground for a Title IX private cause of action for damages. The en banc Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

1. A private Title IX damages action may lie against a school board in cases of student-on-student harassment, but only where the funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which the recipient has actual knowledge, and that harassment is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school. Pp. 7-22.

2. Applying this standard to the facts at issue, the Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint. This Court cannot say beyond doubt that she can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to relief. She alleges that LaShonda was the victim of repeated acts of harassment by G. F. over a 5-month period, and allegations support the conclusion that his misconduct was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive. Moreover, the complaint alleges that multiple victims of G. F.'s misconduct sought an audience with the school principal and that the harassment had a concrete, negative effect on LaShonda's ability to receive an education. The complaint also suggests that petitioner may be able to show both actual knowledge and deliberate indifference on the part of the Board, which made no effort either to investigate or to put an end to the harassment. Pp. 22-23.

120 F. 3d 1390, reversed and remanded.

AURELIA DAVIS, as next friend of L a SHONDA D.,
PETITIONER v. MONROE COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit

Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner brought suit against the Monroe County Board of Education and other defendants, alleging that her fifth-grade daughter had been the victim of sexual harassment by another student in her class. Among petitioner's claims was a claim for monetary and injunctive relief under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §1681 et seq . The District Court dismissed petitioner's Title IX claim on the ground that "student-on-student," or peer, harassment provides no ground for a private cause of action under the statute. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. We consider here whether a private damages action may lie against the school board in cases of student-on-student harassment. We conclude that it may, but only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities. Moreover, we conclude that such an action will lie only for harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit.

I

Petitioner's Title IX claim was dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Accordingly, in reviewing the legal sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action, "we must assume the truth of the material facts as alleged in the complaint." Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas , 500 U. S. 322, 325 (1991).

A

Petitioner alleges that G. F. once more directed sexually harassing conduct toward LaShonda in physical education class in early March, and that LaShonda reported the incident to both Maples and Pippen. Id ., ¶ ;10. In mid-April 1993, G. F. allegedly rubbed his body against LaShonda in the school hallway in what LaShonda considered a sexually suggestive manner, and LaShonda again reported the matter to Fort. Id ., ¶ ;11.

B

On May 4, 1994, petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against the Board, Charles Dumas, the school district's superintendent, and Principal Querry. The complaint alleged that the Board is a recipient of federal funding for purposes of Title IX, that "[t]he persistent sexual advances and harassment by the student G. F. upon [LaShonda] interfered with her ability to attend school and perform her studies and activities," and that "[t]he deliberate indifference by Defendants to the unwelcome sexual advances of a student upon LaShonda created an intimidating, hostile, offensive and abus[ive] school environment in violation of Title IX." Id ., ¶ ;¶ ;27, 28. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief. Id ., ¶ ;32.

The defendants (all respondents here) moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the District Court granted respondents' motion. See 862 F. Supp. 363, 368 (MD Ga. 1994). With regard to petitioner's claims under Title IX, the court dismissed the claims against individual defendants on the ground that only federally funded educational institutions are subject to liability in private causes of action under Title IX. Id ., at 367. As for the Board, the court concluded that Title IX provided no basis for liability absent an allegation "that the Board or an employee of the Board had any role in the harassment." Ibid .

The Eleventh Circuit granted the Board's motion for rehearing en banc, 91 F. 3d 1418 (1996), and affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss petitioner's Title IX claim against the Board, 120 F. 3d 1390 (1998). The en banc court relied, primarily, on the theory that Title IX was passed pursuant to Congress' legislative authority under the Constitution's Spending Clause, U. S. Const., Art I, §8, cl. 1, and that the statute therefore must provide potential recipients of federal education funding with "unambiguous notice of the conditions they are assuming when they accept" it. 120 F. 3d, at 1399. Title IX, the court reasoned, provides recipients with notice that they must stop their employees from engaging in discriminatory conduct, but the statute fails to provide a recipient with sufficient notice of a duty to prevent student-on-student harassment. Id ., at 1401.

Writing in dissent, four judges urged that the statute, by declining to identify the perpetrator of discrimination, encompasses misconduct by third parties: "The identity of the perpetrator is simply irrelevant under the language" of the statute. Id ., at 1412 (Barkett, J., dissenting). The plain language, the dissenters reasoned, also provides recipients with sufficient notice that a failure to respond to student-on-student harassment could trigger liability for the district. Id ., at 1414.

II

Title IX provides, with certain exceptions not at issue here, that

"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U. S. C. §1681(a).

Congress authorized an administrative enforcement scheme for Title IX. Federal departments or agencies with the authority to provide financial assistance are entrusted to promulgate rules, regulations, and orders to enforce the objectives of §1681, see §1682, and these departments or agencies may rely on "any . . . means authorized by law," including the termination of funding, ibid ., to give effect to the statute's restrictions.

There is no dispute here that the Board is a recipient of federal education funding for Title IX purposes. 74 F. 3d, at 1189. Nor do respondents support an argument that student-on-student harassment cannot rise to the level of "discrimination" for purposes of Title IX. Rather, at issue here is the question whether a recipient of federal education funding may be liable for damages under Title IX under any circumstances for discrimination in the form of student-on-student sexual harassment.

A

Here, however, we are asked to do more than define the scope of the behavior that Title IX proscribes. We must determine whether a district's failure to respond to student-on-student harassment in its schools can support a private suit for money damages. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist ., 524 U. S. 274, 283 (1998) ("In this case, . . . petitioners seek not just to establish a Title IX violation but to recover damages . . ."). This Court has indeed recognized an implied private right of action under Title IX, see Cannon v. University of Chicago , supra , and we have held that money damages are available in such suits, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools , 503 U. S. 60 (1992). Because we have repeatedly treated Title IX as legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' authority under the Spending Clause, however, see, e.g ., Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist ., supra , at 287 (Title IX); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools , supra , at 74-75, and n. 8 (Title IX); see also Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City , 463 U. S. 582, 598-599 (1983) (opinion of White, J.) (Title VI), private damages actions are available only where recipients of federal funding had adequate notice that they could be
liable for the conduct at issue. When Congress acts pursuant to its spending power, it generates legislation "much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions." Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman , 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981). In interpreting language in spending legislation, we thus "insis[t] that Congress speak with a clear voice," recognizing that "[t]here can, of course, be no knowing acceptance [of the terms of the putative contract] if a State is unaware of the conditions [imposed by the legislation] or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it." Ibid. ; see also id ., at 24-25.

We disagree with respondents' assertion, however, that petitioner seeks to hold the Board liable for G. F. 's actions instead of its own. Here, petitioner attempts to hold the Board liable for its own decision to remain idle in the face of known student-on-student harassment in its schools. In Gebser , we concluded that a recipient of federal education funds may be liable in damages under Title IX where it is deliberately indifferent to known acts of sexual harassment by a teacher. In that case, a teacher had entered into a sexual relationship with an eighth grade student, and the student sought damages under Title IX for the teacher's misconduct. We recognized that the scope of liability in private damages actions under Title IX is circumscribed by Pennhurst 's requirement that funding recipients have notice of their potential liability. 524 U. S., at 287 -288. Invoking Pennhurst , Guardians Assn. , and Franklin , in Gebser we once again required " that `the receiving entity of federal funds [have] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award' " before subjecting it to damages liability. Id ., at 287 (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools , 503 U. S., at 74 ). We also recognized, however, that this limitation on private damages actions is not a bar to liability where a funding recipient intentionally violates the statute. Id. , at 74-75; see also Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City , supra , at 597-598 (opinion of White, J.) (same with respect to Title VI). In particular, we concluded that Pennhurst does not bar a private damages action under Title IX where the funding recipient engages in intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of the statute.

Accordingly, we rejected the use of agency principles to impute liability to the district for the misconduct of its teachers. 524 U. S., at 283 . Likewise, we declined the invitation to impose liability under what amounted to a negligence standard--holding the district liable for its failure to react to teacher-student harassment of which it knew or should have known. Ibid . Rather, we concluded that the district could be liable for damages only where the district itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge. Id ., at 290. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, the misconduct of the teacher in Gebser was not "treated as the grant recipient's actions." Post , at 8. Liability arose, rather, from "an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation." Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist. , supra , at 290. By employing the "deliberate indifference" theory already used to establish municipal liability under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, see Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist. , supra , at 290-291 (citing Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown , 520 U. S. 397 (1997), and Canton v. Harris , 489 U. S. 378 (1989)), we concluded in Gebser that recipients could be liable in damages only where their own deliberate indifference effectively "cause[d]" the discrimination, 524 U. S., at 291 ; see also Canton v. Harris , supra , at 385 (recognizing that a municipality will be liable under §1983 only if "the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue" (emphasis in original)). The high standard imposed in Gebser sought to eliminate any "risk that the recipient would be liable in damages not for its own official decision but instead for its employees' independent actions." 524 U. S., at 290 -291.

This is not to say that the identity of the harasser is irrelevant. On the contrary, both the "deliberate indifference" standard and the language of Title IX narrowly circumscribe the set of parties whose known acts of sexual harassment can trigger some duty to respond on the part of funding recipients. Deliberate indifference makes sense as a theory of direct liability under Title IX only where the funding recipient has some control over the alleged harassment. A recipient cannot be directly liable for its indifference where it lacks the authority to take remedial action.

The language of Title IX itself--particularly when viewed in conjunction with the requirement that the recipient have notice of Title IX's prohibitions to be liable for damages--also cabins the range of misconduct that the statute proscribes. The statute's plain language confines the scope of prohibited conduct based on the recipient's degree of control over the harasser and the environment in which the harassment occurs. If a funding recipient does not engage in harassment directly, it may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate indifference "subject[s]" its students to harassment. That is, the deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, "cause [students] to undergo" harassment or "make them liable or vulnerable" to it. Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1415 (1966) (defining "subject" as "to cause to undergo the action of something specified; expose" or "to make liable or vulnerable; lay open; expose"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 2275 (1961) (defining "subject" as "to cause to undergo or submit to: make submit to a particular action or effect: EXPOSE"). Moreover, because the harassment must occur "under" "the operations of" a funding recipient, see 20 U. S. C. §1681(a); §1687 (defining "program or activity"), the harassment must take place in a context subject to the school district's control, Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, supra , at 2487 (defining "under" as "in or into a condition of subjection, regulation, or subordination"; "subject to the guidance and instruction of"); Random House Dictionary of the English Language, supra , at 1543 (defining "under" as "subject to the authority, direction, or supervision of").

Likewise, although they were promulgated too late to contribute to the Board's notice of proscribed misconduct, the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has recently adopted policy guidelines providing that student-on-student harassment falls within the scope of Title IX's proscriptions. See Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12039-12040 (1997) (OCR Title IX Guidelines); see also Department of Education, Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational Institutions, 59 Fed. Reg. 11448, 11449 (1994).

While it remains to be seen whether petitioner can show that the Board's response to reports of G. F.'s misconduct was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances, petitioner may be able to show that the Board "subject[ed]" LaShonda to discrimination by failing to respond in any way over a period of five months to complaints of G. F.'s in-school misconduct from LaShonda and other female students.

B

The most obvious example of student-on-student sexual harassment capable of triggering a damages claim would thus involve the overt, physical deprivation of access to school resources. Consider, for example, a case in which male students physically threaten their female peers every day, successfully preventing the female students from using a particular school resource--an athletic field or a computer lab, for instance. District administrators are well aware of the daily ritual, yet they deliberately ignore requests for aid from the female students wishing to use the resource. The district's knowing refusal to take any action in response to such behavior would fly in the face of Title IX's core principles, and such deliberate indifference may appropriately be subject to claims for monetary damages. It is not necessary, however, to show physical exclusion to demonstrate that students have been deprived by the actions of another student or students of an educational opportunity on the basis of sex. Rather, a plaintiff must establish sexual harassment of students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities. Cf. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U. S., at 67 .

Moreover, the provision that the discrimination occur "under any education program or activity" suggests that the behavior be serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying the victim equal access to an educational program or activity. Although, in theory, a single instance of sufficiently severe one-on-one peer harassment could be said to have such an effect, we think it unlikely that Congress would have thought such behavior sufficient to rise to this level in light of the inevitability of student misconduct and the amount of litigation that would be invited by entertaining claims of official indifference to a single instance of one-on-one peer harassment. By limiting private damages actions to cases having a systemic effect on educational programs or activities, we reconcile the general principle that Title IX prohibits official indifference to known peer sexual harassment with the practical realities of responding to student behavior, realities that Congress could not have meant to be ignored. Even the dissent suggests that Title IX liability may arise when a funding recipient remains indifferent to severe, gender-based mistreatment played out on a "widespread level" among students. Post , at 31.

The fact that it was a teacher who engaged in harassment in Franklin and Gebser is relevant. The relationship between the harasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent to which the misconduct can be said to breach Title IX's guarantee of equal access to educational benefits and to have a systemic effect on a program or activity. Peer harassment, in particular, is less likely to satisfy these requirements than is teacher-student harassment.

C

Applying this standard to the facts at issue here, we conclude that the Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint. Petitioner alleges that her daughter was the victim of repeated acts of sexual harassment by G. F. over a 5-month period, and there are allegations in support of the conclusion that G. F.'s misconduct was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive. The harassment was not only verbal; it included numerous acts of objectively offensive touching, and, indeed, G. F. ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal sexual misconduct. Moreover, the complaint alleges that there were multiple victims who were sufficiently disturbed by G. F.'s misconduct to seek an audience with the school principal. Further, petitioner contends that the harassment had a concrete, negative effect on her daughter's ability to receive an education. The complaint also suggests that petitioner may be able to show both actual knowledge and deliberate indifference on the part of the Board, which made no effort whatsoever either to investigate or to put an end to the harassment.

It is so ordered.

AURELIA DAVIS, as next friend of L a SHONDA D.,
PETITIONER v. MONROE COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit

Title IX provides:

"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex be [1] excluded from participation in, [2] be denied the benefits of, or [3] be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U. S. C. §1681(a).

To read the provision in full is to understand what is most striking about its application in this case: Title IX does not by its terms create any private cause of action whatsoever, much less define the circumstances in which money damages are available. The only private cause of action under Title IX is judicially implied. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979).

When the statute at issue is a Spending Clause statute, this element of speculation is particularly troubling because it is in significant tension with the requirement that Spending Clause legislation give States clear notice of the consequences of their acceptance of federal funds. Without doubt, the scope of potential damages liability is one of the most significant factors a school would consider in deciding whether to receive federal funds. Accordingly, the Court must not imply a private cause of action for damages unless it can demonstrate that the congressional purpose to create the implied cause of action is so manifest that the State, when accepting federal funds, had clear notice of the terms and conditions of its monetary liability.

Today the Court fails to heed, or even to acknowledge, these limitations on its authority. The remedial scheme the majority creates today is neither sensible nor faithful to Spending Clause principles. In order to make its case for school liability for peer sexual harassment, the majority must establish that Congress gave grant recipients clear and unambiguous notice that they would be liable in money damages for failure to remedy discriminatory acts of their students. The majority must also demonstrate that the statute gives schools clear notice that one child's harassment of another constitutes "discrimination" on the basis of sex within the meaning of Title IX, and that--as applied to individual cases--the standard for liability will enable the grant recipient to distinguish inappropriate childish behavior from actionable gender discrimination. The majority does not carry these burdens.

Instead, the majority finds statutory clarity where there is none and discovers indicia of congressional notice to the States in the most unusual of places. It treats the issue as one of routine statutory construction alone, and it errs even in this regard. In the end, the majority not only imposes on States liability that was unexpected and unknown, but the contours of which are, as yet, unknowable. The majority's opinion purports to be narrow, but the limiting principles it proposes are illusory. The fence the Court has built is made of little sticks, and it cannot contain the avalanche of liability now set in motion. The potential costs to our schools of today's decision are difficult to estimate, but they are so great that it is most unlikely Congress intended to inflict them.

The only certainty flowing from the majority's decision is that scarce resources will be diverted from educating our children and that many school districts, desperate to avoid Title IX peer harassment suits, will adopt whatever federal code of student conduct and discipline the Department of Education sees fit to impose upon them. The Nation's schoolchildren will learn their first lessons about federalism in classrooms where the federal government is the ever-present regulator. The federal government will have insinuated itself not only into one of the most traditional areas of state concern but also into one of the most sensitive areas of human affairs. This federal control of the discipline of our Nation's schoolchildren is contrary to our traditions and inconsistent with the sensible administration of our schools. Because Title IX did not give States unambiguous notice that accepting federal funds meant ceding to the federal government power over the day-to-day disciplinary decisions of schools, I dissent.

I

I turn to the first difficulty with the majority's decision. Schools cannot be held liable for peer sexual harassment because Title IX does not give them clear and unambiguous notice that they are liable in damages for failure to remedy discrimination by their students. As the majority acknowledges, Title IX prohibits only misconduct by grant recipients, not misconduct by third parties. Ante , at 9. ("The recipient itself must `exclud[e] [persons] from participation in, ... den[y] [persons] the benefits of, or ... subjec[t] [persons] to discrimination under' its `program[s] or activit[ies]' in order to be liable under Title IX"). The majority argues, nevertheless, that a school "subjects" its students to discrimination when it knows of peer harassment and fails to respond appropriately.

A

In any event, a plaintiff cannot establish a Title IX violation merely by showing that she has been "subjected to discrimination." Rather, a violation of Title IX occurs only if she is "subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity," 20 U. S. C. §1681(a), where "program or activity" is defined as "all of the operations of " a grant recipient, §1687.

This reading is also consistent with the fact that the discrimination must be "under" the "operations" of the grant recipient. The term "operations" connotes active and affirmative participation by the grant recipient, not merely inaction or failure to respond. See Black's Law Dictionary 1092 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "operation," as an "[e]xertion of power; the process of operating or mode of action; an effect brought about in accordance with a definite plan; action; activity").

B

1

Quite aside from its disregard for the "under the program" limitation of Title IX, the majority's reading is flawed in other respects. The majority contends that a school's deliberate indifference to known student harassment "subjects" students to harassment--that is, "cause[s] [students] to undergo" harassment. Ante , at 13. The majority recognizes, however, that there must be some limitation on the third-party conduct that the school can fairly be said to cause. In search of a principle, the majority asserts, without much elaboration, that one causes discrimination when one has some "degree of control" over the discrimination and fails to remedy it. Ante , at 13.

To state the majority's test is to understand that it is little more than an exercise in arbitrary line-drawing. The majority does not explain how we are to determine what degree of control is sufficient--or, more to the point, how the States were on clear notice that the Court would draw the line to encompass students.

One would think that the majority would at least limit its control principle by reference to the long-established practice of the Department of Education (DOE). For the first 25 years after the passage of Title IX--until 1997--the DOE's regulations drew the liability line, at its most expansive, to encompass only those to whom the school delegated its official functions. See 34 CFR §106.51(a)(3) (1998) ("A [grant] recipient shall not enter into any contractual or other relationship which directly or indirectly has the effect of subjecting employees or students to discrimination prohibited by this subpart, including relationships with employment and referral agencies, with labor unions, and with organizations providing or administering fringe benefits to employees of the recipient"). It is perhaps reasonable to suppose that grant recipients were on notice that they could not hire third parties to do for them what they could not do themselves. For example, it might be reasonable to find that a school was on notice that it could not circumvent Title IX's core prohibitions by, for example, delegating its admissions decisions to an outside screening committee it knew would discriminate on the basis of gender.

Given the state of gender discrimination law at the time Title IX was passed, however, there is no basis to think that Congress contemplated liability for a school's failure to remedy discriminatory acts by students or that the States would believe the statute imposed on them a clear obligation to do so. When Title IX was enacted in 1972, the concept of "sexual harassment" as gender discrimination had not been recognized or considered by the courts. See generally C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination 59-72 (1979). The types of discrimination that were recognized--discriminatory admissions standards, denial of access to programs or resources, hiring, etc.--could not be engaged in by students. See, e.g., 20 U. S. C. §1681(a)(2) (referencing application of Title IX prohibitions to school admissions).

2

The majority nonetheless appears to see no need to justify drawing the "enough control" line to encompass students. In truth, however, a school's control over its students is much more complicated and limited than the majority acknowledges. A public school does not control its students in the way it controls its teachers or those with whom it contracts. Most public schools do not screen or select students, and their power to discipline students is far from unfettered.

In addition, federal law imposes constraints on school disciplinary actions. This Court has held, for example, that due process requires "[a]t the very minimum," that a student facing suspension "be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." Goss v. Lopez , 419 U. S. 565, 579 (1975) (emphasis added).

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U. S. C.1400 et seq ., (1994 ed., Supp. III), moreover, places strict limits on the ability of schools to take disciplinary actions against students with behavior disorder disabilities, even if the disability was not diagnosed prior to the incident triggering discipline. See, e.g. , §1415(f)(1) (parents entitled to hearing when school proposes to change disabled student's educational placement); §1415(k)(1)(A) (school authorities can only "order a change in the placement of a child with a disability . . . to an appropriate interim alternative educational setting, another setting, or suspension" for up to "10 school days" unless student's offense involved a weapon or illegal drugs); §1415(k)(8) ("[A] child who has not been determined to be eligible for special education . . . and who has engaged in behavior that violated any [school rule], may assert any of the protections" of the subchapter if the school "had knowledge . . . that the child was a child with a disability before the behavior that precipitated the disciplinary action occurred"); §1415(k)(8)(B)(ii) (school "deemed to have knowledge that a child is a child with a disability if . . . the behavior or performance of the child demonstrates the need for such [special education and related] services"). "Disability," as defined in the Act, includes "serious emotional disturbance," §1401(3)(A)(i), which the DOE, in turn, has defined as a "condition exhibiting ... over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affects a child's educational performance" an "inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers" or "[i]nappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances." 34 CFR §300.7(b)(9) (1998). If, as the majority would have us believe, the behavior that constitutes actionable peer sexual harassment so deviates from the normal teasing and jostling of adolescence that it puts schools on clear notice of potential liability, then a student who engages in such harassment may have at least a colorable claim of severe emotional disturbance within the meaning of IDEA. When imposing disciplinary sanction on a student harasser who might assert a colorable IDEA claim, the school must navigate a complex web of statutory provisions and DOE regulations that significantly limit its discretion.

The practical obstacles schools encounter in ensuring that thousands of immature students conform their conduct to acceptable norms may be even more significant than the legal obstacles. School districts cannot exercise the same measure of control over thousands of students that they do over a few hundred adult employees. The limited resources of our schools must be conserved for basic educational services. Some schools lack the resources even to deal with serious problems of violence and are already overwhelmed with disciplinary problems of all kinds.

The difficulties associated with speech codes simply underscore the limited nature of a university's control over student behavior that may be viewed as sexual harassment. Despite the fact that the majority relies on the assumption that schools exercise a great deal of control over their students to justify creating the private cause of action in the first instance, it does not recognize the obvious limits on a university's ability to control its students as a reason to doubt the propriety of a private cause of action for peer harassment. It simply uses them as a factor in determining whether the university's response was reasonable. See ante , at 18.

3

The majority's presentation of its control test illustrates its own discomfort with the rule it has devised. Rather than beginning with the language of Title IX itself, the majority begins with our decision in Gebser and appears to discover there a sweeping legal duty--divorced from agency principles--for schools to remedy third-party discrimination against students. The majority then finds that the DOE's Title IX regulations and state common law gave States the requisite notice that they would be liable in damages for failure to fulfill this duty. Only then does the majority turn to the language of Title IX itself--not, it appears, to find a duty or clear notice to the States, for that the majority assumes has already been established, but rather to suggest a limit on the breathtaking scope of the liability the majority thinks is so clear under the statute. See ante , at 14 ("These factors [("subjects" and "under")] combine to limit a recipient's damages liability to circumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs").

Our decision in Gebser did not, of course, recognize some ill-defined, free-standing legal duty on schools to remedy discrimination by third parties. In particular, Gebser gave schools no notice whatsoever that they might be liable on the majority's novel theory that a school "subjects" a student to third-party discrimination if it exercises some measure of control over the third party. We quoted the "subjected to discrimination" language only once in Gebser , when we quoted the text of Title IX in full, and we did not use the word "control." Instead, we affirmed that Title IX prohibits discrimination by the grant recipient. See Gebser , 524 U. S., at 286 ; id., at 291-292; supra, at 5.

Neither the DOE's Title IX regulations nor state tort law, moreover, could or did provide States the notice required by our Spending Clause principles. The majority contends that the DOE's Title IX regulations have "long provided funding recipients with notice that they may be liable for their failure to respond to the discriminatory acts of certain non-agents." Ante , at 12. Even assuming that DOE regulations could give schools the requisite notice, they did not do so. Not one of the regulations the majority cites suggests that schools may be held liable in money damages for failure to respond to third-party discrimination.

In addition, as discussed above, the DOE regulations provide no support for the proposition that schools were on notice that students were among those "non-agents" whose actions the schools were bound to remedy. Most of the regulations cited by the majority merely forbid grant recipients to give affirmative aid to third parties who discriminate. See 34 CFR §106.31(b)(6) (1998) (A grant "recipient shall not, on the basis of sex," "[a]id or perpetuate discrimination against any person by providing significant assistance to any agency, organization, or person which discriminates on the basis of sex in providing any aid, benefit or service to students or employees"); see also §106.37(a)(2) (A grant recipient shall not "[t]hrough solicitation, listing, approval, provision of facilities or other services, assist any foundation, trust, agency, organization, or person which provides assistance to any of such recipient's students in a manner which discriminates on the basis of sex"); §106.38(a) (A grant recipient "which assists any agency, organization or person in making employment available to any of its students . . . [s]hall assure itself that such employment is made available without discrimination on the basis of sex [and] [s]hall not render such services to any agency, organization, or person which discriminates on the basis of sex in its employment practices"). The others forbid grant recipients to delegate the provision of student (or employee) benefits and services to third parties who engage in gender discrimination in administering what is, in effect, the school's program. See §106.51(a)(3) ("A [grant] recipient shall not enter into any contractual or other relationship which directly or indirectly has the effect of subjecting employees or students to discrimination prohibited by this subpart, including relationships with employment and referral agencies, with labor unions, and with organizations providing or administering fringe benefits to employees of the recipient"); see also §106.31(d) (A grant recipient "which requires participation by any applicant, student, or employee in any education program or activity not operated wholly by such recipient, or which facilitates, permits, or considers such participation as part of or equivalent to an education program or activity operated by such recipient, including participation in educational consortia and cooperative employment and student-teaching assignments" must take steps to assure itself that the education program or activity is not discriminating on the basis of gender and "shall not facilitate, require, permit, or consider such participation" if the program is discriminating). None of the regulations suggests a generalized duty to remedy discrimination by third parties over whom the school may arguably exercise some control.

Requiring a school to take affirmative steps to remedy harassment by its students imposes a much heavier burden on schools than prohibiting affirmative aid or effective delegation of school functions to an entity that discriminates. Notice of these latter responsibilities, then, can hardly be said to encompass clear notice of the former. In addition, each of the DOE regulations is predicated on a grant recipient's choice to give affirmative aid to, or to enter into voluntary association with, a discriminating entity. The recipient, moreover, as the regulations envision, is free to terminate that aid or association (or could have so provided through contract). The relationships regulated by the DOE are thus quite different from school-student relationships. The differences confirm that the regulations did not provide adequate notice of a duty to remedy student discrimination.

The majority's final observation about notice confirms just how far it has strayed from the basic Spending Clause principle that Congress must, through the clear terms of the statute, give States notice as to what the statute requires. The majority contends that schools were on notice because they "were being told" by a 1993 National School Boards Association publication that peer sexual harassment might trigger Title IX liability. Ante , at 16. By treating a publication designed to help school lawyers prevent and guard against school liability as a reliable indicium of congressional notice, the majority has transformed a litigation manual--which, like all such manuals, errs on the side of caution in describing potential liability--into a self-fulfilling prophecy. It seems schools cannot even discuss potential liabilities amongst themselves without somehow stipulating that Congress had some specified intent.

II

Title IX, however, gives schools neither notice that the conduct the majority labels peer "sexual harassment" is gender discrimination within the meaning of the Act nor any guidance in distinguishing in individual cases between actionable discrimination and the immature behavior of children and adolescents. The majority thus imposes on schools potentially crushing financial liability for student conduct that is not prohibited in clear terms by Title IX and that cannot, even after today's opinion, be identified by either schools or courts with any precision.

The law recognizes that children--particularly young children--are not fully accountable for their actions because they lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment. See, e.g. , 1 E. Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts §4.4 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing minor's ability to disaffirm a contract into which he has entered). It should surprise no one, then, that the schools that are the primary locus of most children's social development are rife with inappropriate behavior by children who are just learning to interact with their peers. The amici on the front lines of our schools describe the situation best:

"Unlike adults in the workplace, juveniles have limited life experiences or familial influences upon which to establish an understanding of appropriate behavior. The real world of school discipline is a rough-and-tumble place where students practice newly learned vulgarities, erupt with anger, tease and embarrass each other, share offensive notes, flirt, push and shove in the halls, grab and offend." Brief for National School Boards Association et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11 (hereinafter school amici ).

No one contests that much of this "dizzying array of immature or uncontrollable behaviors by students," ibid ., is inappropriate, even "objectively offensive" at times, ante at 19, and that parents and schools have a moral and ethical responsibility to help students learn to interact with their peers in an appropriate manner. It is doubtless the case, moreover, that much of this inappropriate behavior is directed toward members of the opposite sex, as children in the throes of adolescence struggle to express their emerging sexual identities.

It is a far different question, however, whether it is either proper or useful to label this immature, childish behavior gender discrimination. Nothing in Title IX suggests that Congress even contemplated this question, much less answered it in the affirmative in unambiguous terms.

The majority, nevertheless, has no problem labeling the conduct of fifth graders "sexual harassment" and "gender discrimination." Indeed, the majority sidesteps the difficult issue entirely, first by asserting without analysis that respondents do not "support an argument that student-on-student harassment cannot rise to the level of discrimination' for purposes of Title IX," ante , at 7, and then by citing Gebser and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60 (1992), for the proposition that "[w]e have elsewhere concluded that sexual harassment is a form of discrimination for Title IX purposes and that Title IX proscribes harassment with sufficient clarity to satisfy Pennhurst 's notice requirement and serve as a basis for a damages action," ante , at 19.

Contrary to the majority's assertion, however, respondents have made a cogent and persuasive argument that the type of student conduct alleged by petitioner should not be considered "sexual harassment," much less gender discrimination actionable under Title IX:

"[A]t the time Petitioner filed her complaint, no court, including this Court had recognized the concept of sexual harassment in any context other than the employment context. Nor had any Court extended the concept of sexual harassment to the misconduct of emotionally and socially immature children. The type of conduct alleged by Petitioner in her complaint is not new. However, in past years it was properly identified as misconduct which was addressed within the context of student discipline. The Petitioner now asks this Court to create out of whole cloth a cause of action by labeling childish misconduct as `sexual harassment,' to stigmatize children as sexual harassers, and have the federal court system take on the additional burden of second guessing the disciplinary actions taken by school administrators in addressing misconduct, something this Court has consistently refused to do." Brief for Respondents 12-13 (citation omitted).

See also Brief for Independent Women's Forum as Amicus Curiae 19 (questioning whether "at the primary and secondary school level" it is proper to label "sexual misconduct by students" as "sexual harassment" because there is no power relationship between the harasser and the
victim).

The majority admits that, under its approach, "[w]hether gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable `harassment' . . . `depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships, including, but not limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved." Ante , at 20 (citations omitted). The majority does not explain how a school is supposed to discern from this mishmash of factors what is actionable discrimination. Its multifactored balancing test is a far cry from the clarity we demand of Spending Clause legislation.

The difficulties schools will encounter in identifying peer sexual harassment are already evident in teachers' manuals designed to give guidance on the subject. For example, one teachers' manual on peer sexual harassment suggests that sexual harassment in kindergarten through third grade includes a boy being "put down" on the playground "because he wants to play house with the girls" or a girl being "put down because she shoots baskets better than the boys." Minnesota Dept. of Education, Girls and Boys Getting Along: Teaching Sexual Harassment Prevention in the Elementary Classroom 65 (1993). Yet another manual suggests that one student saying to another, "You look nice" could be sexual harassment, depending on the "tone of voice," how the student looks at the other, and "who else is around." N. Stein & L. Sjostrom, Flirting or Hurting? A Teacher's Guide on Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment in Schools (Grades 6 through 12) 14 (1994). Blowing a kiss is also suspect. Ibid . This confusion will likely be compounded once the sexual-harassment label is invested with the force of federal law, backed up by private damages suits.

The only guidance the majority gives schools in distinguishing between the "simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children," said not to be a basis for suit even when they "target differences in gender," ante at 21, and actionable peer sexual harassment is, in reality, no guidance at all. The majority proclaims that "in the context of student-on-student harassment, damages are available only in the situation where the behavior is so serious, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is designed to protect." Ante , at 21. The majority does not even purport to explain, however, what constitutes an actionable denial of "equal access to education." Is equal access denied when a girl who tires of being chased by the boys at recess refuses to go outside? When she cannot concentrate during class because she is worried about the recess activities? When she pretends to be sick one day so she can stay home from school? It appears the majority is content to let juries decide.

The majority's reference to a "systemic effect," ante at 22, does nothing to clarify the content of its standard. The majority appears to intend that requirement to do no more than exclude the possibility that a single act of harassment perpetrated by one student on one other student can form the basis for an actionable claim. That is a small concession indeed.

The only real clue the majority gives schools about the dividing line between actionable harassment that denies a victim equal access to education and mere inappropriate teasing is a profoundly unsettling one: On the facts of this case, petitioner has stated a claim because she alleged, in the majority's words, "that the harassment had a concrete, negative effect on her daughter's ability to receive an education." Ante , at 23. In petitioner's words, the effects that might have been visible to the school were that her daughter's grades "dropped" and her "ability to concentrate on her school work [was] affected." App. to Pet. for Cert. 97a. Almost all adolescents experience these problems at one time or another as they mature.

III

The majority's inability to provide any workable definition of actionable peer harassment simply underscores the myriad ways in which an opinion that purports to be narrow is, in fact, so broad that it will support untold numbers of lawyers who will prove adept at presenting cases that will withstand the defendant school districts' pretrial motions. Each of the barriers to run-away litigation the majority offers us crumbles under the weight of even casual scrutiny.

For example, the majority establishes what sounds like a relatively high threshold for liability--"denial of equal access" to education--and, almost in the same breath, makes clear that alleging a decline in grades is enough to survive 12(b)(6) and, it follows, to state a winning claim. The majority seems oblivious to the fact that almost every child, at some point, has trouble in school because he or she is being teased by his or her peers. The girl who wants to skip recess because she is teased by the boys is no different from the overweight child who skips gym class because the other children tease her about her size in the locker room; or the child who risks flunking out because he refuses to wear glasses to avoid the taunts of "four-eyes"; or the child who refuses to go to school because the school bully calls him a "scaredy-cat" at recess. Most children respond to teasing in ways that detract from their ability to learn. The majority's test for actionable harassment will, as a result, sweep in almost all of the more innocuous conduct it acknowledges as a ubiquitous part of school life.

The string of adjectives the majority attaches to the word "harassment"--"severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive"--likewise fails to narrow the class of conduct that can trigger liability, since the touchstone for determining whether there is Title IX liability is the effect on the child's ability to get an education. Ante at 20. Indeed, the Court's reliance on the impact on the child's educational experience suggests that the "objective offensiveness" of a comment is to be judged by reference to a reasonable child at whom the comments were aimed. Not only is that standard likely to be quite expansive, it also gives schools--and juries--little guidance, requiring them to attempt to gauge the sensitivities of, for instance, the average seven year old.

By choosing not to adopt the standard in explicit terms, the majority avoids having to confront the bizarre implications of its decision. In the context of teacher harassment, the Gebser notice standard imposes some limit on school liability. Where peer harassment is the discrimination, however, it imposes no limitation at all. In most cases of student misbehavior, it is the teacher who has authority, at least in the first instance, to punish the student and take other measures to remedy the harassment. The anomalous result will be that, while a school district cannot be held liable for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student without notice to the school board (or at least to the principal), the district can be held liable for a teacher's failure to remedy peer harassment. The threshold for school liability, then, appears to be lower when the harasser is a student than when the harasser is a teacher who is an agent of the school. The absurdity of this result confirms that it was neither contemplated by Congress nor anticipated by the States.

The majority's limitations on peer sexual harassment suits cannot hope to contain the flood of liability the Court today begins. The elements of the Title IX claim created by the majority will be easy not only to allege but also to prove. A female plaintiff who pleads only that a boy called her offensive names, that she told a teacher, that the teacher's response was unreasonable, and that her school performance suffered as a result, appears to state a successful claim.

There will be no shortage of plaintiffs to bring such complaints. Our schools are charged each day with educating millions of children. Of those millions of students, a large percentage will, at some point during their school careers, experience something they consider sexual harassment. A 1993 Study by the American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, for instance, found that "fully 4 out of 5 students (81%) report that they have been the target of some form of sexual harassment during their school lives." Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools 7 (1993). The number of potential lawsuits against our schools is staggering.

The cost of defending against peer sexual harassment suits alone could overwhelm many school districts, particularly since the majority's liability standards will allow almost any plaintiff to get to summary judgment, if not to a jury. In addition, there are no damages caps on the judicially implied private cause of action under Title IX. As a result, school liability in one peer sexual harassment suit could approach, or even exceed, the total federal funding of many school districts. Petitioner, for example, seeks damages of $500,000 in this case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 101a. Respondent school district received approximately $679,000 in federal aid in 1992-1993. Brief for the School Amici 25, n. 20. The school district sued in Gebser received only $120,000 in federal funds a year. 524 U. S., 289-290. Indeed, the entire 1992-1993 budget of that district was only $1.6 million. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 96-1866, p. 34.

The limitless liability confronting our schools under the implied Title IX cause of action puts schools in a far worse position than businesses; when Congress established the express cause of action for money damages under Title VII, it prescribed damage caps. See Gebser , supra , 286 ("It was not until 1991 that Congress made damages available under Title VII, and even then, Congress carefully limited the amount recoverable in any individual case, calibrating the maximum recovery to the size of the employer. See 42 U. S. C. §1981a(b)(3). Adopting petitioners' position would amount, then, to allowing unlimited recovery of damages under Title IX where Congress has not spoken on the subject of either the right or the remedy, and in the face of evidence that when Congress expressly considered both in Title VII it restricted the amount of damages available"). In addition, in contrast to Title VII, Title IX makes no provision for agency investigation and conciliation of complaints (prior to the filing of a case in federal court) that could weed out frivolous suits or settle meritorious ones at minimal cost.

The prospect of unlimited Title IX liability will, in all likelihood, breed a climate of fear that encourages school administrators to label even the most innocuous of childish conduct sexual harassment. It would appear to be no coincidence that, not long after the DOE issued its proposed policy guidance warning that schools could be liable for peer sexual harassment in the fall of 1996, see 61 Fed. Reg. 42728, a North Carolina school suspended a 6-year-old boy who kissed a female classmate on the cheek for sexual harassment, on the theory that "[u]nwelcome is unwelcome at any age." Los Angeles Times, Sept. 25, 1996, p. A11. A week later, a New York school suspended a second-grader who kissed a classmate and ripped a button off her skirt. Buffalo News, Oct. 2, 1996, p. A16. The second grader said that he got the idea from his favorite book "Corduroy," about a bear with a missing button. Ibid . School administrators said only, "We were given guidelines as to why we suspend children. We follow the guidelines." Ibid .

At the college level, the majority's holding is sure to add fuel to the debate over campus speech codes that, in the name of preventing a hostile educational environment, may infringe students' First Amendment rights. See supra, at 14. Indeed, under the majority's control principle, schools presumably will be responsible for remedying conduct that occurs even in student dormitory rooms. As a result, schools may well be forced to apply workplace norms in the most private of domains.

Even schools that resist overzealous enforcement may find that the most careful and reasoned response to a sexual harassment complaint nonetheless provokes litigation. Speaking with the voice of experience, the school amici remind us, "[h]istory shows that, no matter what a school official chooses to do, someone will be unhappy. Student offenders almost always view their punishment as too strict, and student complainants almost always view an offender's punishment as too lax." Brief for the School Amici 12.

A school faced with a peer sexual harassment complaint in the wake of the majority's decision may well be beset with litigation from every side. One student's demand for a quick response to her harassment complaint will conflict with the alleged harasser's demand for due process. Another student's demand for a harassment-free classroom will conflict with the alleged harasser's claim to a mainstream placement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act or with his state constitutional right to a continuing, free public education. On college campuses, and even in secondary schools, a student's claim that the school should remedy a sexually hostile environment will conflict with the alleged harasser's claim that his speech, even if offensive, is protected by the First Amendment. In each of these situations, the school faces the risk of suit, and maybe even multiple suits, regardless of its response. See Doe v. University of Illinois , 138 F. 3d, at 679 (Posner, C. J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Liability for failing to prevent or rectify sexual harassment of one student by another places a school on a razor's edge, since the remedial measures that it takes against the alleged harasser are as likely to expose the school to a suit by him as a failure to take those measures would be to expose the school to a suit by the victim of the alleged harassment").

The majority's holding in this case appears to be driven by the image of the school administration sitting idle every day while male students commandeer a school's athletic field or computer lab and prevent female students from using it through physical threats. See ante , at 20. Title IX might provide a remedy in such a situation, however, without resort to the majority's unprecedented theory of school liability for student harassment. If the school usually disciplines students for threatening each other and prevents them from blocking others' access to school facilities, then the school's failure to enforce its rules when the boys target the girls on a widespread level, day after day, may support an inference that the school's decision not to respond is itself based on gender. That pattern of discriminatory response could form the basis of a Title IX action.

(Contrary to the majority's assertion, see ante at 22, we do not suggest that mere indifference to gender-based mistreatment--even if widespread--is enough to trigger Title IX liability. We suggest only that a clear pattern of discriminatory enforcement of school rules could raise an inference that the school itself is discriminating. Recognizing that the school itself might discriminate based on gender in the enforcement of its rules is a far cry from recognizing Title IX liability based on the majority's expansive theory that a school "subjects" its students to third-party discrimination when it has some control over the harasser and fails to take corrective action.)

Even more important, in most egregious cases the student will have state-law remedies available to her. The student will often have recourse against the offending student (or his parents) under state tort law. In some cases, like this one, the perpetrator may also be subject to criminal sanctions. And, as the majority notes, the student may, in some circumstances, have recourse against the school under state law. Ante , at 13.

Disregarding these state-law remedies for student misbehavior and the incentives that our schools already have to provide the best possible education to all of their students, the majority seeks, in effect, to put an end to student misbehavior by transforming Title IX into a Federal Student Civility Code. See Brief for Independent Women's Forum as Amicus Curiae 2 (urging the Court to avoid that result). I fail to see how federal courts will administer school discipline better than the principals and teachers to whom the public has entrusted that task or how the majority's holding will help the vast majority of students, whose educational opportunities will be diminished by the diversion of school funds to litigation. The private cause of action the Court creates will justify a corps of federal administrators in writing regulations on student harassment. It will also embroil schools and courts in endless litigation over what qualifies as peer sexual harassment and what constitutes a reasonable response.

In the final analysis, this case is about federalism. Yet the majority's decision today says not one word about the federal balance. Preserving our federal system is a legitimate end in itself. It is, too, the means to other ends. It ensures that essential choices can be made by a government more proximate to the people than the vast apparatus of federal power. Defining the appropriate role of schools in teaching and supervising children who are beginning to explore their own sexuality and learning how to express it to others is one of the most complex and sensitive issues our schools face. Such decisions are best made by parents and by the teachers and school administrators who can counsel with them. The delicacy and immense significance of teaching children about sexuality should cause the Court to act with great restraint before it displaces state and local governments.

Heedless of these considerations, the Court rushes onward, finding that the cause of action it creates is necessary to effect the congressional design. It is not. Nothing in Title IX suggests that Congress intended or contemplated the result the Court reaches today, much less dictated it in unambiguous terms. Today's decision cannot be laid at the feet of Congress; it is the responsibility of the Court.

The Court must always use great care when it shapes private causes of action without clear guidance from Congress, but never more so than when the federal balance is at stake. As we recognized in Gebser , the definition of an implied cause of action inevitably implicates some measure of discretion in the Court to shape a sensible remedial scheme. Gebser , 524 U. S., at 284 . Whether the Court ever should have embarked on this endeavor under a Spending Clause statute is open to question. What should be clear beyond any doubt, however, is that the Court is duty-bound to exercise that discretion with due regard for federalism and the unique role of the States in our system. The Court today disregards that obligation. I can conceive of few interventions more intrusive upon the delicate and vital relations between teacher and student, between student and student, and between the State and its citizens than the one the Court creates today by its own hand. Trusted principles of federalism are superseded by a more contemporary imperative.

Perhaps the most grave, and surely the most lasting, disservice of today's decision is that it ensures the Court's own disregard for the federal balance soon will be imparted to our youngest citizens. The Court clears the way for the federal government to claim center stage in America's classrooms. Today's decision mandates to teachers instructing and supervising their students the dubious assistance of federal court plaintiffs and their lawyers and makes the federal courts the final arbiters of school policy and of almost every disagreement between students. Enforcement of the federal right recognized by the majority means that federal influence will permeate everything from curriculum decisions to day-to-day classroom logistics and interactions. After today, Johnny will find that the routine problems of adolescence are to be resolved by invoking a federal right to demand assignment to a desk two rows away.

As its holding makes painfully clear, the majority's watered-down version of the Spending Clause clear-statement rule is no substitute for the real protections of state and local autonomy that our constitutional system requires. If there be any doubt of the futility of the Court's attempt to hedge its holding about with words of limitation for future cases, the result in this case provides the answer. The complaint of this fifth grader survives and the school will be compelled to answer in federal court. We can be assured that like suits will follow--suits, which in cost and number, will impose serious financial burdens on local school districts, the taxpayers who support them, and the children they serve. Federalism and our struggling school systems deserve better from this Court. I dissent.

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FindLaw's United States Supreme Court case and opinions.

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DAVIS, as next friend of LaSHONDA D. v. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.(1999) Petitioner filed suit against respondents, a county school board (Board) and school officials, seeking damages for the sexual harassment of her daughter LaShonda by G. F., a fifth-grade classmate at a public elementary school.

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Reference: Davis v. Monroe County School Board, 526 US 629 (1999).

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Reference: Davis v. Monroe County School Board, 526 US 629 (1999).

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Requires schools to establish policies preventing and mediating incidents of bullying that interfere with student's educational opportunities or substantially disrupt the orderly operation of school activities.

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Texas Constitution and Statutes - Statutes By Date

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Reference: Bullying Preventions Policies & Procedures, Tex. Educ. Code § 37.0832 

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Reference: Bullying Preventions Policies & Procedures, Tex. Educ. Code § 37.0832 

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The 9th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of
America: (1791)
*States that "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people" (U.S. Const. amend. IX, § 1).

There is not a direct law protecting against bullying or cyberbullying but the 9th Amendment protects all humans rights.  This law lines up with The Declaration of Independence stating that all humans have the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.

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Constitution of the United States
Preamble Article I Article II Article III Article IV Article V Article VI
Article VII AMENDMENTS
Introduction

Written in 1787, ratified in 1788, and in operation since 1789, the United States Constitution is the world's longest surviving written charter of government. Its first three words - "We The People" - affirm that the government of the United States exists to serve its citizens. The supremacy of the people through their elected representatives is recognized in Article I, which creates a Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The positioning of Congress at the beginning of the Constitution affirms its status as the "First Branch" of the federal government.

The Constitution assigned to Congress responsibility for organizing the executive and judicial branches, raising revenue, declaring war, and making all laws necessary for executing these powers. The president is permitted to veto specific legislative acts, but Congress has the authority to override presidential vetoes by two-thirds majorities of both houses. The Constitution also provides that the Senate advise and consent on key executive and judicial appointments and on the approval for ratification of treaties.

For over two centuries the Constitution has remained in force because its framers successfully separated and balanced governmental powers to safeguard the interests of majority rule and minority rights, of liberty and equality, and of the federal and state governments. More a concise statement of national principles than a detailed plan of governmental operation, the Constitution has evolved to meet the changing needs of a modern society profoundly different from the eighteenth-century world in which its creators lived. To date, the Constitution has been amended 27 times, most recently in 1992. The first ten amendments constitute the Bill of Rights.

Annotated Constitutions

The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation (popularly known as the Constitution Annotated) contains legal analysis and interpretation of the United States Constitution, based primarily on Supreme Court case law.

The Constitution of the United States of America, S.PUB.103-21 (1994) (pdf), prepared by the Office of the Secretary of the Senate with the assistance of Johnny H. Killian of the Library of Congress in 1994, provided the original text of each clause of the Constitution with an accompanying explanation of its meaning and how that meaning changed over time.

Italicized text indicates words and passages of the Constitution that were changed or affected by amendments.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representatives from each State having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice-President.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,

G o. Washington-Presid t.

And deputy from Virginia

New Hampshire John Langdon

Nicholas Gilman

Massachusetts Nathaniel Gorham

Rufus King

Connecticut Wm. Saml. Johnson

Roger Sherman

New York Alexander Hamilton

New Jersey Wil: Livingston

David Brearley

Wm. Paterson

Jona. Dayton

Pennsylvania B Franklin

Thomas Mifflin

Robt Morris

Geo. Clymer

Thos. FitzSimons

Jared Ingersoll

James Wilson

Gouv Morris

Delaware Geo: Read

Gunning Bedford jun

John Dickinson

Richard Bassett

Jaco: Broom

Maryland James McHenry

Dan of St. Thos. Jenifer

Danl Carroll

Virginia John Blair-

James Madison Jr.

North Carolina Wm. Blount

Richd. Dobbs Spaight

Hu Williamson

South Carolina J. Rutledge

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney

Charles Pinckney

Pierce Butler

Georgia William Few

Abr Baldwin

Attest William Jackson Secretary

AMENDMENTS
Amendment I (1791) Amendment II (1791)
Amendment III (1791) Amendment IV (1791)
Amendment V (1791) Amendment VI (1791)
Amendment VII (1791) Amendment VIII (1791)
Amendment IX (1791) Amendment X (1791)
Amendment XI (1795/1798) Amendment XII (1804)
Amendment XIII (1865) Amendment XIV (1868)
Amendment XV (1870) Amendment XVI (1913)
Amendment XVII (1913) Amendment XVIII (1919)
Amendment XIX (1920) Amendment XX (1933)
Amendment XXI (1933) Amendment XXII (1951)
Amendment XXIII (1961) Amendment XXIV (1964)
Amendment XXV (1967) Amendment XXVI (1971)
Amendment XXVII (1992)

The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;-The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;-The person having the greatest Number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President -The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.

Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.

Section 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.

Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article.

Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.

Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.

Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

Section 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct:

A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.

Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

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Constitution of the United States Preamble Article I Article II Article III Article IV Article V Article VI Article VII AMENDMENTS Introduction Written in 1787, ratified in 1788, and in operation since 1789, the United States Constitution is the world's longest surviving written charter of government.

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Administrative Law - Dear Colleague Letter

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Administrative Law - Dear Colleague Letter

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Dear Colleague Letter addressing bullying of a student with disabilities.
*The letter discusses a previous letter published addressing "bullying of a student with a disability that results in the student not receiving meaningful educational benefit constitutes a denial of free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the IDEA  that must be remedied" (Musgrove & Yudin, 2013).

*All students must feel safe in school in order to ensure they are learning to their full potential.

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Musgrove, M. & Yudin, M.K. (2013). Dear Colleague Letter. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights.

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Burleson ISD Anti-Bullying Policy & Procedure Manual

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Burleson ISD Anti-Bullying Policy & Procedure Manual

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"The Burleson Independent School District school board has adopted a district policy

Prohibiting “harassment,” which typically addresses many of the behaviors that also constitute

Bullying" (Burleson Independent School District, 2002-2020)

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Student Services / Anti-Bullying Policies and Procedures Manual

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Professional Perspective and Field of Education

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Professional Perspective and Field of Education

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I am currently a teacher at Centennial High School in Burleson, Texas.  I am working on my Masters in Professional School Counseling with Angelo State University and completing my practicum hours at Centennial High School as well.

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I am presenting the topic of Bullying and Cyberbullying in the high school setting. As a potential school counselor at Centennial High School, I am covering the topic so that this can be shared with all Administration and Staff on campus.

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I have chosen the topic of Bullying and Cyberbullying because this is a problem that I dealt with as a student, so it is personal for me. I see this as an issue in our schools daily and think that more staff needs to be educated on the topic and what to do when it occurs.

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Why Bullying and Cyberbullying is Important

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Why Bullying and Cyberbullying is Important

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Bullying and Cyberbullying is something that occurs on a school campus almost daily.  There are not many federal or state laws that directly protect a person from Bullying or Cyberbullying while on a school campus, so this becomes an issue that is hard to consistently punish.  The school districts are left to set their own policies and procedures of how they will define bullying and cyberbullying and handle acts of bullying and cyberbullying will be handled or disciplined. As a school counselor it is our job to educate the students as well as staff of to recognize and handle such situations. We are the support system set in place for the school.

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Cyberbullying is a new and ever changing issue for our students.  With the new changes to the way that our students are attending school, both in person and virtually, we are going to see cyberbullying become a bigger issue. I am watching our students spend more than 70% of their day on a computer in order to do their course work.  This is naturally going to mean that more students are going to experience some sort of cyberbullying.  Now students can hid behind a computer screen or a zoom video and bullying someone, where as before they would bullying them in person while on campus.

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A free one hour webinar on the differences between Rude, Mean, or Bullying.  This webinar helps explain the differences between the three.  It will teach you ways to recognize bullying behavior as well as engaging ways to help students recognize and stop bullying behavior.

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When rude and mean behaviors are overgeneralized as bullying, a pressing issue loses its urgency. Learn how to consistently distinguish between rude, mean and bullying behaviors and to effectively assess reported incidents of bullying. Download accompanying handouts.

Learning outcomes:
Upon completion of this webinar, attendees should be able to:

1. List the key differences between rudeness, mean behavior and bullying in schools.

2. Use the three P's that identify bullying behavior to effectively assess reported incidents of bullying.

3. Implement fun, engaging learning activities that help students understand and stop bullying.

Presenter:
Signe Whitson

Original air date: Oct. 10, 2017

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When rude and mean behaviors are overgeneralized as bullying, a pressing issue loses its urgency. Learn how to consistently distinguish between rude, mean and bullying behaviors and to effectively assess reported incidents of bullying. Download accompanying handouts. Learning outcomes: Upon completion of this webinar, attendees should be able to: List the key differences between rudeness, mean behavior and bullying in schools.

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Whitson, S. (2017). Rude, Mean, or Bullying. American School Counselor Association. Retrieved from https://videos.schoolcounselor.org/rude-mean-or-bullying

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Cyberbullying Is on the Rise Among Teenagers, National Survey Finds

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Cyberbullying Is on the Rise Among Teenagers, National Survey Finds

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This article goes over the increase in bullying and cyberbullying reports:
*20% of students 12-18 years of age surveyed reported experienced some sort of bullying.
*This was a 3.5% increase from the 2014-2015 year.
*Cyberbullying rates differ according to gender and age groups.
*Rumors and exclusion seem to be the most common forms of bullying and cyberbullying reported.

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While smartphones, tablets, and other digital tools have transformed how schools teach, they've also changed the way students interact with one another. And with those changes, have come increased reports of cyberbullying, according to the new report by the National Center for Education Statistics.

The nationwide report, " Student Reports of Bullying: Results from the 2017 School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey," found that 20 percent of surveyed students ages 12-18 reported being bullied during the 2016-2017 school year. Among those students, 15 percent were bullied online or through text messages. The results marked a 3.5 percent increase in cyberbullying from the 2014-2015 school year, according to the NCES.

Data on cyberbullying was collected separately from in person bullying up until 2015. But researchers feel that the shifting landscape requires both uniformity and awareness in measuring bullying in all its forms.

"It is important to collect information on the location of bullying so there is awareness of where students are experiencing these behaviors," said Rachel Hansen, the project officer for the NCES. "While developing the uniform definition of bullying, it was determined that cyberbullying is a form of bullying and shouldn't be collected as a separate concept."

The survey does not currently collect specific information on the forms of technology or social media platforms that bullies are using most often, focusing instead on the behaviors of respondents.
Differences in Bullying
The study found notable differences in cyberbullying rates among different student groups. In the 2016-2017 school year, 21 percent of female students report being bullied online or through texts-a rate that is three times higher than that for male students, at 7 percent.

The report also found that the students reporting being bullied online or by text also reported being bullied in several ways at higher percentages than students who were bullied in person. The nature of cyberbullying included actions similar to traditional bullying. One type of action included being made fun of, name calling, or insults, which were experienced by 74 percent of those who were bullied online compared to 63 percent of those bullied in person.

More prevalent, however, was the use of rumors. According to the 2017 School Crime Supplement, 90 percent of students who were cyberbullied reported having rumors spread about them, compared to 62 percent of those who had been bullied only in person. The report also found exclusion to be a key type of bullying, with 39 percent of those bullied online being purposefully excluded from activities compared to 23 percent of those bullied in person.

Dating to 2001, the report provides a long-running barometer on the fast-changing face of bullying, which affects students no matter where they plug in.

"We recognize the need to continue to collect relevant information that is informative for policymakers, researchers, schools, and communities," said Hansen. "The continued increase in use and accessibility of technology may result in modifications to the School Crime Supplement to address the emerging trends or high profile topics, such as online bullying."
CORRECTION: A previous version of this story misstated the percent increase in cyberbullying between the 2014-15 and 2016-17 school years. It is 3.5 percent.

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Cyberbullying Is on the Rise Among Teenagers, National Survey Finds

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While smartphones, tablets, and other digital tools have transformed how schools teach, they've also changed the way students interact with one another. And with those changes, have come increased reports of cyberbullying, according to the new report by the National Center for Education Statistics.

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Arzate, H. A. (2019). Cyberbullying is on the rise among teenagers, national survey finds. Education Weekly. Retrieved from https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/District_Dossier/2019/07/cyberbullying_is_on_the_rise_a.html

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Feds Warn Schools About Bullying Over Coronavirus

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Feds Warn Schools About Bullying Over Coronavirus

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This article discusses:
*The increased need to be aware of the harassment and bullying of Chinese-Americans or Asian Americans due to COVID.
*Schools implemented guidance education for staff and students after 9/11 to protect muslim students.
*Schools need to ensure a minimum disruption to the students education in response to the corona virus pandemic, while protecting its students.

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The civil rights arm at the U.S. Department of Education has urged schools to address the harassment of certain students amid ongoing concerns over the spread of the coronavirus.

In a March 4 letter to educators, Asisstant Secretary for Civil Rights Kenneth L. Marcus wrote that schools should be paying "careful attention" to bullying and other unfair treatment of students who are perceived to be Chinese-American or otherwise of Asian descent. Marcus called such incidents a "particular concern" of U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos.

"Some individuals may regrettably turn toward racial or ethnic stereotypes. Worse, ethnic harassment or bullying exacerbates hatred, harms students, and is never justified. These incidents can create a climate of misunderstanding and fear. This hurts all of us," Marcus wrote.

He also said that in some cases, the Civil Rights Act "may require educational institutions to investigate bias incidents and take reasonable steps to end unlawful harassment, eliminate hostile environments, prevent the harassment from recurring, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects."

See Our In-Depth Coverage: Coronavirus and Schools

The Education Department has taken similar steps in the past. For example, after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Education Department sent guidance to schools concerning bullying and other harassment of Muslim students.

Schools are at the center of many emerging stories about the coronavirus. In testimony before a Senate committee earlier this week, a CDC official said schools should aim to "minimize disruption" when responding to the coronavirus. Decisions to close schools require balancing safety and health concerns with significant costs to communities.

Read the full letter from Marcus below:

Dear Education Leader:

I write to request your careful attention to recent challenges that have been reported in light of the coronavirus (COVID-19). There has been an increasing number of news reports regarding stereotyping, harassment, and bullying directed at persons perceived to be of Chinese American or, more generally, Asian descent, including students. These reports are quite troubling and are of particular concern to Secretary Betsy DeVos and the Office for Civil Rights.

The Department appreciates that some institutions are taking prompt and forceful measures to protect the health and safety of students, instructors, and staff, consistent with guidance issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Schools and educators should follow the recommendations in the CDC guidance and this Department's Information and Resources for Schools and School Personnel, as these recommendations are the most effective precautions that can be taken to safeguard the health of our educational communities. In an environment of fear, however, some individuals may regrettably turn toward racial or ethnic stereotypes. Worse, ethnic harassment or bullying exacerbates hatred, harms students, and is never justified. These incidents can create a climate of misunderstanding and fear. This hurts all of us.

Educational institutions should take special care to ensure that all students are able to study and learn in an environment that is healthy, safe, and free from bias or discrimination. Discrimination can take many forms, ranging from verbal abuse to physical attacks based on race, ancestry, or misunderstandings about cultural traditions. As education leaders working within our respective communities, we must ensure that harassment based on race or ethnicity is not tolerated.

The Department appreciates the efforts of educators who have reaffirmed their commitment to protecting all students from the harmful effects of bullying and harassment based on race and national origin. We also remind you that in some circumstances, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) may require educational institutions to investigate bias incidents and take reasonable steps to end unlawful harassment, eliminate hostile environments, prevent the harassment from recurring, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects.

Through our own conduct, as well as through the language that we use to discuss this sensitive topic, we must demonstrate that health and tolerance are compatible values; they are both central elements of the educational excellence that our students deserve.

If you have questions or would like additional information or technical assistance, you may visit the website of the Department of Education's OCR at www.ed.gov/ocr or contact OCR at (800) 421-3481 (TDD: 800-877-8339) or at [email protected] You may also contact OCR's Outreach, Prevention, Education and Non-discrimination (OPEN) Center at [email protected].gov. For more information about your civil rights obligations, including the obligation to avoid discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin, please visit Ed.gov/OCR.

Thank you for your help in ensuring that our educational system is safe for all students.

Sincerely,

Kenneth L. Marcus

Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights
Photo: A man walks his dog past barricades outside Forest Hills Elementary School in Lake Oswego, Ore., on Saturday Feb. 29, 2020 after an employee at the school was diagnosed with the coronavirus on Friday. The school in the Lake Oswego School District south of Portland, Ore., will be closed until Wednesday and other schools and schools buses in the district will be deep-cleaned this weekend. (AP Photo/Gillian Flaccus) Don't miss another Politics K-12 post. Sign up here to get news alerts in your email inbox. Follow us on Twitter And follow the Politics K-12 reporters @EvieBlad @Daarel and @AndrewUjifusa.

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Feds Warn Schools About Bullying Over Coronavirus

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The civil rights arm at the U.S. Department of Education has urged schools to address the harassment of certain students amid ongoing concerns over the spread of the coronavirus. In a March 4 letter to educators, Asisstant Secretary for Civil Rights Kenneth L.

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Ujifusa, A. (2020). Feds warn schools about bullying over coronavirus. Education Weekly. Retrieved from http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2020/03/coronavirus-bullying-schools-warned-education-department.html

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ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors

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ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors

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A.1. Supporting Student Development
School counselors:
a. Have a primary obligation to the students, who are to be
treated with dignity and respect as unique individuals.

*The very 1st ethical standard for a school counselor discusses our obligation to protect students and ensure they are treated with "dignity and respect" (ASCA, 2016).
*We do this by supporting all students if they feel they have become victims of bullying or cyberbullying.

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American School Counselor Association. (2016). ASCA Ethical Standards for School

Counselors. Alexandria, VA.

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This website is a federal government website managed by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
*This website is a great resource for information on bullying and cyberbullying.
*Definition of what the difference between bullying and cyberbullying
*Prevention strategies
*information about laws addressing bullying and where to find more information on laws.

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State and local lawmakers have taken action to prevent bullying and protect children 1. Each jurisdiction, including all 50 states, the District of Columbia and U.S. territories (state), addresses bullying differently. Some have established laws, policies, and regulations 2. Others have developed model policies schools and local educational agencies (districts) can use as they develop their own local laws, policies and regulations. Most state laws, policies, and regulations require districts and schools to implement a bullying policy and procedures to investigate and respond to bullying when it occurs. A handful of states also require bullying prevention programs, inclusion of bullying prevention in health education standards, and/or teacher professional development. These state laws generally do not prescribe specific consequences for kids who engage in bullying behavior, and very few classify bullying as a criminal offense. Further, states may address bullying, cyberbullying, and related behaviors in a single law or across multiple laws. In some cases, bullying appears in the criminal code of a state that may apply to juveniles.

In December 2010, the U.S. Department of Education developed a framework of common components found in state laws, policies, and regulations focused on bullying at the time. The framework was used to describe how schools were taking action to prevent and respond to bullying incidents. The common components found in state laws, policies, and regulations- which have evolved over time--include definitions of bullying, defining characteristics that are commonly targeted for bullying behaviors, and detailed requirements for school district policies.

Common Components of State Anti-Bullying Laws and Regulations show the components in each state's laws, policies, and regulations, allowing for a quick comparison of how each state compares. Click on a state or territory below to find out more about their anti-bullying laws and policies and which of the key components they contain.

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State and local lawmakers have taken action to prevent bullying and protect children 1. Each jurisdiction, including all 50 states, the District of Columbia and U.S. territories (state), addresses bullying differently. Some have established laws, policies, and regulations 2.

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Laws & Policies. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.stopbullying.gov/resources/laws

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*According to BISD Anti-Bullying handbook bullying is "when a student or group of students engages in written or verbal expression,
expression through electronic means, or physical conduct that occurs on school property, at a school-sponsored or school-related activity, or in a vehicle operated by the District" (Burleson Independent School District, 2002-2020).

*According to BISD Anti-Bullying handbook cyberbullying "involves the use of information and communication technologies to support deliberate, repeated, and hostile behavior by an individual or group, that is intended to harm others (Burleson Independent School District, 2002-2020).

*"The Burleson Independent School District School Board has adopted a district policy prohibiting “harassment,” which typically addresses many of the behaviors that also constitute

bullying" (Burleson Independent School District, 2002-2020)

*Steps to Reporting:
*Student or Parent should report to:

*Teacher

*counselor

*principal

*district employee

or

*complete the on-line

Anonymous bullying report.

*reports of bullying may also be directed to the:
Student Services Department Burleson ISD Administration Building 1160 SW Wilshire Boulevard, Burleson, TX 76028

(817) 245-1056

*School counselors should follow up with any student that reports bullying to check-in on their well-being.

*School counselors should also develop guidance lessons to be taught throughout the school year addressing topics such as bullying and cyberbullying.

*Any reports of bullying should be investigated following the Burleson ISD Anti-Bullying Policies and Procedures.

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Student Services / Anti-Bullying Policies and Procedures Manual

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Burleson Independent School District, (2002-2020). Anti-Bullying Policies & Procedures Manual. Retrieved from https://www.burlesonisd.net/Page/1524

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Voted No. 1 tourist destination 2015

STOMP Out Bullying™ is the leading national anti-bullying and cyberbullying organization for kids and teens in the U.S.

A pioneer on the issue, STOMP Out Bullying is the most influential anti-bullying and cyberbullying organization in the country and beyond.

STOMP Out Bullying™ is dedicated to changing the culture for all students. It works to reduce and prevent bullying, cyberbullying, and other digital abuse, educates against homophobia, LGBTQ discrimination, racism and hatred, and deters violence in schools, online and in communities across the country. In this diverse world, STOMP Out Bullying p romotes civility, inclusion and equality. It teaches effective solutions on how to respond to all forms of bullying, as well as educating kids and teens in school and online. It provides help for those in need and at risk of suicide, and raises awareness through peer mentoring programs in schools, public service announcements by noted celebrities, and social media campaigns.

Read Our Manifesto

Both the STOMP Out Bullying Program™ and its Annual BLUE SHIRT DAY™ WORLD DAY OF BULLYING PREVENTION initiative brings awareness and educates kids and teens, parents and schools about the issue. It offers hope for every student who experiences the harmful effects of bullying and teaches parents to keep open communication with their kids and teens and to look for signs. It also educates school administrators across the country, who have swept this issue under the rug for far too long.

Funds raised for the campaign go towards assisting students in need of help and at-risk of suicide. Funds also support the HelpChat Line, in-school education, changing the culture and other prevention programs; as well as public awareness and education, a dedicated website, brochures, an Educator's Bullying Prevention Toolkit and additional education and bullying prevention resources and materials.

Today's students are at risk, and that risk grows more and more everyday as the popularity of the Internet increases. Today our youths are exposed to so much more than we were years ago. And years ago, when a kid or teen threatened to kill someone they didn't mean it. Today students have access to guns and the threat to kill someone is no longer idle.

The issues of bullying and cyberbullying have increased to alarming proportions. As a form of violence against children of all ages, these issues have caused a crisis. Some victims are so tormented that suicide has become an alternative for them. It has everyone worried. Not just the kids and teens on its receiving end, but the parents, teachers and others who may not understand how extreme bullying can get. STOMP Out Bullying works aggressively to prevent these issues and to help those affected by it.

Adults must empower the victims and help change the behavior of the bullies. Schools must react swiftly and redirect negative behaviors into positive and productive solutions.

Bystanders who witness the assaults, harassment and threats must not remain silent. They must stand up for victims.

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STOMP Out Bullying says NO to victimization, NO to anti-bullying legislation that does not work and NO to the hate and intolerance of others. We say YES to choosing kindness, YES to inclusion, YES to teaching empathy, YES to accepting others ... NO MATTER™ what they look like, their race, their beliefs, or their sexual orientation or gender, and YES to becoming responsible and kind digital citizens.

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Voted No. 1 tourist destination 2015 STOMP Out Bullying™ is the leading national anti-bullying and cyberbullying organization for kids and teens in the U.S. A pioneer on the issue, STOMP Out Bullying is the most influential anti-bullying and cyberbullying organization in the country and beyond.