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Thailand Visa Forum by Thai Visa | The Nation

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Thai Youth Battling With Social Issues - Violence Rampant

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Thai youth battling with social issues - violence rampant BANGKOK: -- A study by the Ramjitti Institute of Chulalongkoi. University has found that sex cri...

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Chances and Challenges and Myanmar Youth

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Chances and Challenges and Myanmar Youth

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In a recording studio by Yangon's Bogyoke park, musicans Jeff and Lone Lone are rehearsing with their four-piece band, the Ikebana.

They belong to first generation of young people growing up under Myanmar's reform process begun two years ago.

"It's a good time to be young," enthuses Lone Lone. "We produce so many talented people."

"We have our cellphones we have internet we can do whatever we like," adds Jeff. "We have easy studios. We have so much facilites. It's so different from our parents - they were in the dark ages, we could say. Because the country situation was very bad. The country situation is changing now, so for our future children it will be much better."

With Myamnar apparently emerging from more than five decades of isolation, the country's youth have good reason to feel optimistic.

But there are challenges ahead, starting with the fact that most young people are not qualified for any but the most basic jobs.

"They don't have skills to work in the field," says 25-year-old Chamda Kyaw, the Executive Director of the leading youth organisation, Pandita. "The country is changing, but mostly the young people are challenging for their education."

Pandita trains young people in how to make the most of democracy, hosting classes on human rights and how to use social media to create change.

Internet penetration of Myanmar is still only around two per cent and many rural communites are yet to benefit from increased access to information, jobs or the changing political landscape.

"For me personally, I think all these changes happening since last year, last two years, are really affecting for young people who are living in Yangon, like me," Pandita's Shunn Lei comments. "For people living in the rural areas they haven't felt the change yet.

In a country with numerous interreligous and interrethnic tensions, social media can prove a double-edged sword.

"It should be used with a good purpose, not for propaganda or making conflict," she says. "Now on Facebook there are many conflicts happening, fighting for the Muslim or the Buddhist community. For the people, especially the young people who are using the internet a lot, they need to have an awareness how the social media can affect the whole country. Also, how they can use social media effectively as part of a social change."

The government has started channelling more resources into education.

"Everybody understands that our education standard dropped tremendously after '88 until now," says education specialist Aye Cho. "With new government they put money into education and health and they reduce on the military side."

General elections are due to be held in 2015.

And with greater funding for education, and a climate increasingly tolerant to free elections, Mynamar's youth will no doubt add their voice to the democratic fray.

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Reform brings chances and challenges to Myanmar's youth

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In a recording studio by Yangon's Bogyoke park, musicans Jeff and Lone Lone are rehearsing with their four-piece band, the Ikebana. They belong to first generation of young people growing up under Myanmar's reform process begun two years ago. "It's a good time to be young," enthuses Lone Lone.

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TBC is the main provider of food, shelter and other forms of support to approximately 92,000 refugees from Burma/Myanmar living in nine camps in western Thailand. It also supports recovery and community-driven development in conflict-affected areas in southeast Burma/Myanmar.

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Thailand 'Hot Spot' for Human Trafficking 

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Thailand 'Hot Spot' for Human Trafficking 

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Asia Human Trafficking: Thailand hotspot for slave trade

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Interviews with delegates from IFP Mae Sot 2017

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Interviews with delegates from IFP Mae Sot 2017

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Khin San Yee rummaged through the bags she had brought back to Myanmar from a refugee camp in Thailand. She smiled as she pulled out a photo of herself standing next to Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner who is now de facto head of state after decades of leading a pro-democracy movement against military rule.

Khin San Yee was part of that struggle, and she paid dearly for it, becoming one of thousands of people the ruling generals imprisoned for political activities. When she was released in 1999 after spending a year in the notorious Insein prison, she fled Myanmar and ended up in Nu Po, one of nine refugee camps strung along the border inside Thailand.

Myanmar is a much different country today than the one she left, at least politically.

In 2011, the junta began implementing sweeping reforms, allowing freedom of media and political parties, and releasing political prisoners. Those freed included Aung San Suu Kyi, who had spent most of the previous 20 years under house arrest. Her National League for Democracy party swept into power in last year's election and then created the post of state counsellor for her, as the constitution bars her from becoming president.

"I decided to come back to Myanmar for her," said Khin San Yee.

Khin San Yee is a member of one of the first 19 families to return from the camps since the reform period began, as part of a repatriation programme led by the Myanmar government. The approximately 120,000 refugees remaining in Thailand are watching what happens to them.

The experience of the first group of returnees raises questions about whether Myanmar's government is prepared to support people who have been living in the camps, often for decades.

Khin San Yee's family is among four who asked to be resettled in Yangon, Myanmar's commercial capital and biggest city. They were expecting that the government would provide them with housing, but instead they are living in a warehouse owned by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement. The Yangon regional government is offering the returnees an option to buy low cost apartments at 9.8 million kyats (about $7,600), with 30 percent paid up front. But the returnees say they have neither jobs nor money.

"We cannot afford to pay the downpayment for the apartments, or the installments that come afterwards," said Aye Aye San, who took cooking and English classes while living in the Nu Po refugee camp for 10 years, but has been unable to find work in Yangon since arriving on 27 October.

The returnees said the government gave each family a resettlement package of 300,000 kyats ($233), and was providing them 3,000 kyats ($2.33) a day for living expenses.

Ko Ko Naing, a director general at the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, told IRIN that the ministry is in discussion with regional governments and other ministries to come up with a better plan for returnees.

"For the next time, i think we need more communications between different organisations on what is the need for the returnee and what is the expertise of each returnees," he said. "Because for this first pilot project, we do not have complete information about the families. If we do not know what they need, it is very difficult to prepare. Next time we need more discussion, case studies and information on the individuals."

Life is a bit easier for Tun Tun Aung and his family, who are staying with relatives in the town of Myitta, in Tanintharyi Region on the eastern frontier with Thailand.

"I was nervous before coming back, but as soon as I saw my family, I felt happy again. Yes, I will have to start from zero again, but we Myanmar people are used to it by now," he said, while putting a coat of red paint on a cart that he built to sell ice cream.

Tun Tun Aung's grandfather has also given the family a plot of land to build a house on.

Like most refugees in Thailand, Tun Tun Aung fled fighting between the military and an array of ethnic armed groups, many of which have been in conflict with the government since Myanmar's independence from Britain in 1948. Tun Tun Aung and his family decided to leave when Myitta became a battleground between the military and the Karen National Union in 2008.

In 2012, the military-backed reformist government signed a ceasefire agreement with the KNU. The group also signed on to a "Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement" last year, although the accord has been widely criticised as inneffective. Only eight of the 15 armed groups invited to sign did so, and the quasi-civilian government refused to allow three others to take part in negotations, as they were - and remain - in active combat with the military.

There is deep scepticism among refugees in Thailand that Myanmar's military - notorious for committing abuses agains civilians, and in control of the peace process - will actually end the civil wars. When the UN's refugee agency, UNHCR, and a Thai NGO, the Mae Fah Luang Foundation, surveyed refugees in Mae La camp in 2013, most respondents said they did not want to return to Myanmar and many cited poor security as a prime factor.

But the refugees are running out of options. With Myanmar's transition from military dictatorship to democracy under way, many countries are no longer accepting them. The United States, which had taken more than 73,000 refugees since 2005, officially ended its resettlement programme in 2014.

The Border Consortium, one of the largest NGOs working in the camps, told IRIN in June that international donations fell by 26 percent, from 820 million Thai baht (about $23 million) over 2015 to an estimated 605 million Thai baht for 2016.

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Landmark Myanmar refugee return programme off to rough start

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Khin San Yee rummaged through the bags she had brought back to Myanmar from a refugee camp in Thailand. She smiled as she pulled out a photo of herself standing next to Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner who is now de facto head of state after decades of leading a pro-democracy movement against military rule.

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The Horrors of the Human Trafficking threat facing Myanmar migrants in Thailand

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The Horrors of the Human Trafficking threat facing Myanmar migrants in Thailand

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Foundation for Education and Development

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The Horrors of the Human Trafficking threat facing Myanmar migrants in Thailand

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Stories and accounts of Myanmar migrant workers and the human trafficking problem in Thailand compiled by the Foundation for Education and Development (FED). FED was founded in 2000 in Sankalaburi, Kanchanaburi province under the name Grassroots Human Rights Education & Development (GHRE).

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Myanmar youth grapple with heroin addiction

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The rate of heroin abuse in Kachin State is high enough for aid groups to distribute free syringes, in an effort to minimise the risk of spreading disease. A church spokesman says at least 65 percent of young people in Kachin abuse heroin. Al Jazeera's Florence Looi reports from Myitkina, Kachin State, Myanmar.

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Africas Civil Wars Sierra Leone Documentary

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Documentary: Men at 15-The Child Soldiers of Myanmar

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This documentary gives us a glimpse into the tragic lives of young Myanmar's boys who are kidnapped and forced to fight in the army, an experience that leaves them traumatized for life. PRESS TV Documentaries

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Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar - Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin state and Myanmar's northernmost region, is a bustling market town and a central trading point between Myanmar, China and India.

The state is also renowned for its many illicit and undercover industries, such as jade and gold mining, timber and opium.

A large government military presence is heavily felt in the state in reaction to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) rebellion and local natural resources. The conflict, which escalated again on June 9, 2011, after a 17-year ceasefire, has created thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) across Kachin state.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2015 South East Asia Opium Survey ( PDF), heroin production has stayed at stable high levels since 2012, and across Kachin state a drug epidemic has developed. Though the Burmese government has not conducted an official drugs survey, the Transnational Institute has stated that "Myanmar is the world's second-largest producer of opium after Afghanistan".

Just yesterday, on February 7, a Buddhist monk was discovered to be in the possession of massive amounts of methamphetamine tablets. He was arrested when 400,000 pills were discovered in his car as he drove from Shwe Baho village in Rakhine state. A search of his monastery yielded a further four million pills, according to AFP.

But the matter is multifaceted and politicised, according to organisations monitoring the problem.

According to Ahgu Khin, steering committee secretary of the church-based anti-drugs organisation Pat Jasan, "The drug issue is made worse because the military uses it as a weapon." He says: "They are fighting the Kachin people with drugs as well as bullets, keeping people addicted.

"The Kachin people have been trying to get recognition or independence from the rest of Burma, and that is why many are fighting the government army."

On April 25, 2014, in reaction to the growing drug problem, "D-Day" was declared by the newly formed anti-drugs coalition of church- and community-based activists of Pat Jasan, whose goal is to "completely eradicate drugs from the Kachin people", says Ahgu Khin. The organisation runs awareness and education campaigns, rehabilitation centres and has a vigilante element that arrests and prosecutes drug users and dealers.

"The KIA has been trying to destroy the [opium] fields and reduce the drug problem for many years," Ahgu Khin explains ( PDF).

"They cannot win because the government military allows militias and the Burmese border force to grow and distribute the drugs freely. So the Kachin community and church leaders decided to create Pat Jasan to fight these drugs at a community level."

The United Statesstate department's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2016 states that despite Myanmar's government domestic corruption law in 2013, "many in Burma assume senior government officials benefit from narcotics trafficking".

However, no high-level officials have been arrested to date, and this practice, according to the report, is not an official policy of the Burmese government, despite "credible reports" alleging that "mid-level military officers and government officials are engaged in drug-related corruption".

Al Jazeera was unable to reach Myanmar government representatives for comment on this situation.
READ MORE: A brief history of war and drugs - From Vikings to Nazis
Battling addiction

At the Catholic Pat Jasan Rebirth Rehabilitation Centre, recovering drug users play football, study the Bible and sing together as they fight their addictions. The patients are not allowed to leave, and the compound is surrounded by a large metal wall.

It is operated by John Zau Aung, a local Catholic relief worker with a long career in helping IDPs, drug users and other people affected by the nearby war.

He believes that "there is a political deception because the government and military purposely spread the heroin. The militia groups target poor and young people and the farmers who grow the drugs are paid in heroin, which they either use or sell."

Tom Kramer is a political scientist and researcher at the Transnational Institute who has worked for more than 15 years in Myanmar and its border regions. He has found that the military's main concern is security and conflict management rather than drug production.

However, the army "has many allied non-government militias that they either support or create which are not part of the peace process, and these militias are involved with the production and trafficking of drugs.

"It is a very difficult thing to prove, but it is safe to assume that all armed groups, including the Myanmar military, are involved in the drugs trade one way or another," Kramer continues.

"For instance, some groups will tax opium farmers in the same way they would tax rice farmers. You can also tax drugs transportation in your area, or drugs production in your area, or even organise drugs production in your area. There can be a whole range of different levels of involvement at a low level. It is much more difficult to get evidence at a high level, even if we know it is there," Kramer notes.

"It is such a difficult conflict and to fund this means you would expect that there had to be some involvement from higher levels."

This mistrust of outside and governmental programmes is strong throughout the Kachin people. There are rumours of tablet-making machines on government military bases, as well as the sale of drugs in the government-run rehabilitation centres.
READ MORE: Poppylands - Understanding Myanmar's addiction to heroin
A complicated matter

Bawn Hkaw, 23, is one of the centre's patients. He came voluntarily when he relapsed after previous stays in two other Pat Jasan rehab camps, of which there are currently 29. Bawn Hkaw has been addicted to heroin for four years. He started using drugs in high school, where he had been a "troubled student".

Soon after, the drug dealers approached him to sell drugs in the educational establishments he could access with his student card.

Ahgu Khin claims that drug usage is very common in the local schools and the Kachin state universities. Pat Jasan's patients often include children as young as 13.

Tang Gun, a youth director in several local church organisations and Pat Jasan member, believes that the local environment and natural resources alongside a lack of rule of law play a massive role in the drug epidemic.

"In this region, we have a lot of natural resources, so there are lots of immigrants from other states in Myanmar, such as Shan state and even Burma, coming to work in the mines alongside the locals. These people are often paid in heroin, and the conditions are very bad," say Tang Gun.

"We have been under the military government for decades, and [in these times], there was a restriction on people coming together or becoming an organisation. No more than five people together in a space, unless it was a religious or family setting. It meant that even though we can see the drugs, we couldn't organise together to change these things or educate the people. Most drug users in Kachin are poor, uneducated and jobless and do not understand what they are getting into, and this was made worse due to years of neglect," Tang Gun says.

Tang Nau, 37, is currently a client at the New Life in Christ Centre, a Kachin Baptist Church rehabilitation compound that is small and crowded. Before being admitted for rehabilitation, he was addicted to heroin for 10 years, which he claims to have picked up while working in a jade mine.

"Before [rehabilitation], I was doing bad things; lots of drugs," says Tang Nau.

"I used to have my own business in the jade mines. We would wait at the bottom, and the bosses would throw the smaller unwanted bits down the mountain, and everyone would run and start fighting to get just a little bit to sell. It gave me lots of stress. Most people at the mines were on drugs. I started there," Tang Nau tells.

At another Pat Jasan rehab centre in Myitkyina, local operational volunteers drink tea and discuss their current investigations.

Wearing military-style vests and soldier's helmets, they look like a small paramilitary force. Pat Jasan's volunteers do not use weapons other than bamboo canes, and many drug users or dealers will fight back during the arrest.

John Phung Gan, 45, is one the volunteers responsible for investigating, arrests and guarding some of the centres, but does not worry about his safety.

Outside his Pat Jasan duties, he works as a vegetable farmer and occasionally at the jade mines.

He sees many people using drugs, including his own friends and relatives, and this is what brought him to volunteering with the organisation. Other volunteers agree. Their personal experiences with family members and friends convinced them to put their own safety on the line by helping the local community.

"I feel that it is hard to do it ourselves," says John Phung Gan. "We need cooperation from the government to actually get rid of drugs. The government is always covering up the problems in Kachin state."
READ MORE: Crackdowns and cutbacks - Indonesia's drug policy

Changing the mindset

Many Pat Jasan members have been arrested owing to their activities with the group which have been perceived as harsh and lawless.

The group, which as of autumn 2016, have no official authority, forcibly detain people. All Pat Jasan clients are required to spend two weeks in the "detox room" - a small cage they cannot leave while going through the initial withdrawal process.

They are often restrained in this time and defecate in the cage. They are not given any withdrawal relief or medicine.

Dr Tun Tun Brang works for Substance Abuse Research Association (SARA), a local drug-related NGO that offers counselling, education and medical treatment, as well as operate harm reduction programmes.

"We have a different strategy for Pat Jasan," Tun Tun Brang says. "SARA has created a harm reduction programme through education, medical advice and a needle exchange - as 40-50 percent of drug users in Kachin state have HIV. We also try to help reintegrate people back into society by offering vocational training," Tun Tun Brang tells Al Jazeera.

"No single treatment will work in regard to addiction. Drug users need an environmental and social change in their lives. There is a huge and inspiring community involvement in this social movement, but the problem is that most of the staff in the camps are not trained in treating addiction - neither are many medical doctors," Tun Tun Brangs says. "Physically, yes. Two weeks in the detox room will remove the drugs from their bodies. But in the long term, patients need a drastic environmental change [so as to not relapse]."

"Internationally, there has always been a resistance to voluntary harm reduction techniques," says Kramer. "However, there is always a positive outcome."

Kramer believes that wider issues in Kachin state and Myanmar need to be addressed before the issue of drugs will be solved.

"Opium farmers suffer issues such as poverty and conflict, so will continue to grow the drugs. It is very hard to solve these problems without solving the conflict in Myanmar first," he says.

Spiritual ways

Reverend Gyung Hkawng, the chairman of the Pat Jasan steering committee, explains how Pat Jasan's policy is not to use medicine, but to use Christian spiritual ways to treat their clients.

"We don't emphasise treatment as we don't believe these programmes will work on the Kachin people. They will not change their mindset through spiritual bondage and using the word of God and prayer."

Kramer relates to these feelings.

"Heroin is cheap and widely available and this affects the poor, young and students the worst," he says.

"There is very little being done to keep drugs off the market in Kachin state, and few services available to people who are using drugs. There is a very strong sentiment in Kachin state that the army is using the drugs as a weapon of war against them," Kramer explains.

"This may or may not be the case, but the sentiment is there and this why you have the Pat Jasan movement trying to take matters into their own hands. However, by targeting the opium farmers and drug users, you really are targeting the lower end of the drugs trade. I understand where the Pat Jasan movement is coming from, but I believe their methods to be harsh. Everybody, even drug users, has human rights."

Ahgu Khin disagrees. "Since the start of the war in 2011, more than 500 KIA soldiers have died. However, many more have died from drugs," he says.

"It is part of their [the military's] war on the Kachin people. It is clear to see why this firm reaction to drugs has come about in Kachin state, but after decades of isolation and repression, Pat Jasan seem convinced in doing it their own way."
Photogallery

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Myitkyina, Kachin State, Myanmar - Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin state and Myanmar's northernmost region, is a bustling market town and a central trading point between Myanmar, China and India. The state is also renowned for its many illicit and undercover industries, such as jade and gold mining, timber and opium.

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Subscribe to our channel http://bit.ly/AJSubscribe Subscribe to our channel http://bit.ly/AJSubscribe More than 5,000 people have been killed in Thailand's restive southern provinces since 2004. The deadly insurgency is shadowy and shapeless. Attacks often come with no formal demands, causing a vicious circle of violence between Malay-Muslim separatist groups and death squads backed by security forces.

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In a world where the news media focuses on the failed states of the Muslim world, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, Thailand often escapes attention. Though a Buddhist-majority country, Thailand suffers from one of the longest-running Muslim insurgencies in Asia. Malay irredentists and secessionists describing themselves as Islamists have hit southern Thailand with beheadings and car bombs, nightmarish tactics rarely seen outside the Middle East. Even so, analysts and journalists must appreciate Thailand as an outlier in the history of jihadism.

A report released this month by the International Crisis Group, Jihadism in Southern Thailand: A Phantom Menace, offers several insights into the enigmatic insurgency along the Malay-Thai border. "To date, there is no evidence of jihadists making inroads among the separatists fronts fighting for what they see as liberation of their homeland, Patani," says the report. "But the conflict and a series of ISIS scares in Thailand are fanning fears of a new terrorist threat. Such fears are not irrational, though are largely misplaced and should not obscure the calamity of the insurgency and the need to end it."

Even scholar Rohan Gunaratna, who heads the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and often proves quick to label any conflict in the Muslim world an outgrowth of terrorism, has admitted: "Despite the rhetoric about 'global jihad,' the conflict in southern Thailand, however, remains predominantly local. It could best be bracketed as an old-fashioned ethno-nationalist struggle, though layered over religion as it involves Muslims in southern Thailand fighting for their identity." The insurgents identify less as Muslims than as Malays.

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Unlike in Iraq and Syria, where insurgents, Islamists, rebels, and terrorists have global or regional aspirations and love to broadcast their opinions online, southern Thailand's insurgents like to operate under a media blackout. Despite employing Islamist, jihadi rhetoric, they avoid the political trappings that underpin the Islamic State (ISIS), which tells whoever will listen about its struggling attempt at a worldwide caliphate. Because southern Thailand's insurgents have only national goals, they have no need for the international community, instead drawing from the support of the local community.

In keeping with the unique nature of southern Thailand's insurgency, the thesis of the Crisis Group's report advocates a solution that has failed other countries dealing with Muslim rebels but could succeed here: conflict resolution. "Direct talks between insurgent leaders and the government are a priority," the report states, "a decentralized political system could help address the principal grievances in the south while preserving the unitary Thai state." According to the Crisis Group, Thailand needs peace talks, not counterinsurgency. If only Thailand's military government, one of the few left in the world, agreed.

Some Malays in southern Thailand sympathetic to the insurgency have looked to secessionism in Catalonia, a region of Spain, for inspiration. Catalonian advocacy groups and nongovernment organizations have served as models for Malay activists' political party platforms to achieve autonomy or independence. The Catalonian example has run into its own challenges, though. Several Catalonian officials wanted for trying to secede from Spain fled to Belgium only to surrender to authorities there. Given that the Thai-Malays inhabit a military dictatorship, they have even fewer options.

The Crisis Group worries that political repression could inspire jihadism in southern Thailand. "Southernmost Thailand appears on the surface to offer conditions favorable for jihadist expansion: a Sunni minority that constitutes a majority in the conflict zone; a Muslim insurgency with a narrative of dispossession at the hands of non-Muslim colonizers; and a protracted conflict with frequent repression and violence by Thai authorities," reads the report. "Thai officials, analysts, and even some in the militant movement have expressed concerns about prospects for jihadist influence."

For contemporary examples of how much worse the problem can get, scholars should look no further than two of Thailand's own neighbors: Myanmar and the Philippines. The Tatmadaw, Myanmar's military, has relied on a small-scale Muslim insurgency similar to Thailand's to justify a campaign of ethnic cleansing rife with war crimes against the Rohingya, the country's largest Muslim minority. Observers fear that this brutality could radicalize the hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Myanmar, who have become a cause célèbre for many Islamist resistance movements and terrorist organizations.

Across the South China Sea, the Armed Forces of the Philippines only just retook Marawi, a city held by one of Islamic State's Southeast Asian affiliates. Now, regional authorities suspect that ISIS may try to mastermind suicide attacks in revenge, with Australia even warning its citizens about travel to the country. Unlike in Myanmar and Thailand, ISIS has found a foothold in the Philippines, foreshadowing the difficulties that Thailand may find itself confronting if it continues its current style of counterinsurgency. The peace process in the Philippines, like its half-hearted counterpart in Thailand, is faltering.

The Crisis Group's report offers some cause for cautious, narrow optimism. "Thailand lacks a legacy of jihadist movements and networks that, elsewhere in Southeast Asia, have pledged allegiance to ISIS and al-Qaeda," it notes. "The leaders of existing militant fronts are antagonistic to these groups and their Southeast Asian affiliates because they see association with international terrorists as a threat to their goal of Patani self-determination." For now at least, southern Thailand's insurgents dislike Islamists and terrorists as much as officials in Bangkok, Manila, Naypyidaw, and Washington.

Both sides must understand the mutual benefit of preventing jihadism's expansion into Southern Thailand. "Malay-Muslim militants and the Thai state alike have a common interest in keeping out ISIS and other jihadist groups," concludes the report. "While for now, the conflict has not led to the pervasive disorder that jihadists have exploited elsewhere, it could evolve in ways that generate more promising conditions for jihadist intervention." Only peace talks can keep jihadism from Thailand.

As insurgents and counterinsurgents in southern Thailand weigh how best to proceed, they must consider the implications of the Crisis Group's conclusions. Since the outset of the insurgency in the early 2000s, neither side has come close to winning. Maybe they both can at the negotiating table. Otherwise, they may be facing a decades-long Muslim insurgency similar to China's and India's.

Austin Bodetti is a freelance journalist focusing on conflict in the Muslim world. His writing has appeared in AskMen, The Daily Beast, The Daily Dot, Vox, and Wired UK.

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In a world where the news media focuses on the failed states of the Muslim world, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, Thailand often escapes attention. Though a Buddhist-majority country, Thailand suffers from one of the longest-running Muslim insurgencies in Asia.

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Ethnic conflict has been a major issue in international relations. Despite the decrease of ethnic conflicts in the world (Gurr, 2000, in Payne, 2013), there are still many cases of them existing. This article will discuss ethnic conflict in international relations. It will define ethnic conflict, as well as discussing the factors that cause ethnic conflict. There are also links to books on ethnic conflict near the end of the peg that individuals can follow to further their studies on ethnic conflict.

What Factors Cause Ethnic Conflict?

One of the most asked questions in the field of ethnic conflict in international relations is the question: "what causes ethnic conflict"? This article attempts to address this question of what causes ethnic conflict, namely since there has been a perception that ethnic conflict has increased rapidly since the end of the Cold War, even though, as mentioned, there has actually be a reduction in ethnic conflicts in the world (Gurr, 2000, in Payne, 2013).

What is important to note is that ethnic conflicts often have underlying causes that are not related to genuine historical tensions between different groups, nor should we generalize ethnic behavior when studying ethnic conflict (Asal & Wilkenfeld, 2013). There are a number of factors that scholars have found to cause ethnic conflict. Gurr (1994) begins by laying out various possible theoretical reasons for ethnic conflict in the literature. Such reasons that some have believed ethnic conflict exists include the primordial argument that suggests an almost "innate" hatred between identities. A second possible argument alone suggests that ethnic conflict arises due to ethnicity being used by political leaders for "material and political benefits" (348). Since Gurr argues that neither of these arguments can explain variations in patterns of conflict during different time-periods, he explores ethnic conflict causes by using the Minorities at Risk dataset for 233 ethnic groups, and finds that the emergence of ethnic conflict (through either protest or rebellion) depends on a number of factors including political and economic conditions, along with more systematic variables such as whether a state has had a power transition, since power shifts allow groups to "more openly pursue their objectives" (364) (For more information on Gurr's work as it relates to Minorities at Risk, see his work entitled Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitics Conflicts). Gurr also finds that contrary to many expectations, we have not seen a sharp rise in ethnic conflict following the end of the Cold War. This finding is similar to that of Fearon and Laitin (2003) who also find that ethnic conflict has already been increasing since World War II, and that current levels of ethnic conflict had been reached decades earlier. In fact, "[t]he 1999 level of 25 ongoing wars had already been reached by the mid 1980s" (77).

Related to the overall question of what causes ethnic conflict, Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggest that instead of the belief that conflicts arise primarily out of large ethnic or religious "diversity" in a state as well as ethnic grievances, they argue instead that it is important to look at overall conditions that may make insurgency more or less likely. They argue that overall ethnic identity is not important since only a small group can maintain a conflict against a government, pending the rights conditions for insurgency. In their statistical analysis, they use 127 civil conflicts from 1945-1999, and find that diversity in a country is not significant when including income measurements in the country. Specifically, they find that "1000 [dollars] less in per capita income is associated with 41 % greater annual odds of civil war onset, on average" (83). Furthermore, they find that fractionalization measures are not significant, and instead, that we are more likely to see insurgencies rise in areas where poverty and a weak government exist (88). This is similar to previous arguments in the literature that are focused more on "opportunity" than on grievances (76). This is important to their argument, since they explain that a small group of fighters can successfully challenge a government, and that ethnic or religious reasons are not necessary. Having said this, as Sambanis (2001) mentions, they do not control for the exact issue that is being fought about, namely whether the conflict issue itself is directly related to ethnic or non-ethnic issues. Sambanis (2001) addresses this by differentiating between the types of civil conflict, and finds that differences exist between ethnic and non identity conflicts, namely that ethnic heterogeneity is "positively correlated with the onset of ethnic war" (280).

Also related to ethnic conflict, Walter (2006) extends the discussion by specifically examining the conditions for which ethnic minority groups are more/less likely to attempt to gain political concessions from the government. Walter (2006) finds that ethnic groups within a state are very strategic in their actions, and that combinations of opportunity and motivation variables are significant in the decision for ethnic groups to challenge the government. For example, Walter (2006) finds that some variables from previous findings still hold such as ethnic conflicts being more likely to take place when group cohesion exists, when a group's relative rights to other groups are lower, when a group is discriminated against more relative to other ethnic groups, along with more strategic factors like whether other ethnic groups have successfully challenged the state, as well as the number of ethnic groups in a state. While Walter's research is innovative and useful in helping to understand ethnic group actions related to their government, one issue with Walter's research design that may have strong implications for the findings is how she codes for past concessions. Walter uses a dichotomous "0,1" variable as to whether the government has previously granted a political concession to an ethnic group. If a government granted a concession that year, along with every year after, Walter codes the event as "1" for a concession. The potential problem with this is that it assumes that an ethnic group will view a government's concession 40 years ago as the same as a concession a year or two ago, for example. Her measure does not capture the timing of the concession as it relates to the ethnic minority groups. It does not seem accurate to assume that a government's concession many years ago will show clear information about its current actions, compared to a concession much nearer to the present date. Future research should address this by using a measurement that reflects this difference, namely coding the variable related to differences in time. Walter also finds that ethnic groups are more likely to attempt to gain concessions from the government after another ethnic group in the state has been successful. Future research should also attempt to examine any potential coordination between ethnic groups related to government concessions. It is possible to think that at minimum different ethnic groups can work off of one another in terms of strategies if it benefits both more than individually working against the government.

Saxton & Benson (2006) expand the discussion for the causal process of ethnic conflict by arguing for a multi-staged process of how ethnicity impacts violent and non-violent actions. They suggest that socio-demographic, economic, and political factors all impact group action (138). For their analysis, they conduct a three least squares method, using four dependent variables to explain the relationship between the different variables as it relates to the overall picture of the emergence of ethnic conflict. Looking at 130 "national peoples" and not "ethnic groups" from 1990-1998, they examine the different dependent variables mentioned. For the beginning of the process, they find that cultural repressions, economic and political differences, as well as the loss of autonomy are all important factors in laying the foundation for political mobilization. However, they explain that this itself is not the entire cause of conflict, but is important as it sets the stage for potential increased ethnic activity. From this, they next find that the type of regime is related to whether the government uses repression tactics. From repression, they find that groups who are repressed and have available resources are more likely to respond to the government. Finally, groups will/will not act depending on the "opportunity" to act. Overall, Saxton and Benson (2006) find that a complex pattern of action exists, explaining that "a shared ethno-linguistic identity gives groups of people the basis for organizational mobilization; mobilizational resources give them the means for such mobilization...; grievances provide the reason to mobilize; and a series of political factors structure the opportunities of the groups to contend in a conventional, violent and non-violent manner" (160-161).

Others have found similar patterns, that ethnic conflicts are usually comprised of a number of issues combined. For example, Bojana Blagojevic, in her work entitled "Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework," looks at ethnic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. She finds that "ethnic conflict occurs when a particular set of factors and conditions converge: a major structural crisis; presence of historical memories of inter-ethnic grievances; institutional factors that promote ethnic intolerance; manipulation of historical memories by political entrepreneurs to evoke emotions such as fear, resentment and hate toward the "other"; and an interethnic competition over resources and rights " (1).

But along with the discussion of what causes ethnic conflict, we have to be careful as to what classifies as an "ethnic conflict," and more specifically, how and why different ethnicities act during the war. For example, Mueller (2000) argues that the use of "ethnic conflict" is misleading since many within such conflicts do not take sides against the "other." For example, in the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda, he argues that the main reason for the conflict was due to "thugs" or "hooligans" acting as opposed to the entire citizen population. In fact, he suggests that most citizens were not aware of what was taking place, or were not committing atrocities during the war. While giving more weight to ethnicity than Mueller (Andreas, 2004: 32), Andreas (2004) similarly looks at the conflict in Bosnia and argues that while the role of ethnicity was prevalent, a host of other "criminal" factors were very significant in the development and end of the conflict. Both of these pieces show that "ethnic" conflicts are much more complicated in that groups often do not act primary because of ethnic differences. Evidence suggests that individuals act for economic reasons, often selling weapons to those who will use the weapons against them. While these works were insightful, a critique of these pieces is that little can be generalized from these works, as also admitted by Andreas. Furthermore, it is difficult to show just how influential criminal motives and actions were in terms of the conflict as a whole. Future research should attempt to better quantify specific individual motivations for actions. Finding that many actions were due to non-ethnic factors can thus help better identify true causes of conflict.

To conclude, a number of variables working together best explain the reasons for increased ethnic conflict/insurgencies, many of which have nothing to do with the "primordial "or "civilizational" argument for deep ethnic hatreds (Lake & Rothchild, 1996). Thus, ethnic conflict tends to happen in economically poorer states with weak political institutions (Easterly, 2001; Payne, 2013), where "...[t]he inabilities of political institutions to effectively regulate change and provide mechanisms through which differences can be managed frequently contribute to ethnic violence" (Payne, 2013: 306). Furthermore, leaders have often used ethnicity to stir up emotions for their own political goals. This is often coupled with the lack of resources; as less jobs and food exists, groups may begin feeling more afraid of their situations, and vein to believe that one group has more resources, or a disproportional amount (Lake & Rothchild, 1996; 1998; Payne, 2013;). And as mentioned, leaders can often provoke or exacerbate these feelings.

Thus, In terms of the overall explanation of ethnic conflict, there are many factors that cause ethnic conflict. Thus, it is incorrect to dismiss group grievances (and focus on these supposed (yet inaccurate) historical hatreds, since it does seem that political and economic grievances are one factor for increased conflict. But that is only one part of the puzzle. Along with this, scholars should continue to examine the ability of group mobilization as well as the opportunity to act against the government as it relates to violent actions. Along with this, future research should further examine the exact role of how ethnicity is used at the individual and group level, as well as how grievances, mobilization, and opportunity more specifically work together. Future research should also attempt to quantify criminal factors (although the difficulty is great) to help explain the importance of criminal elements and their role related to ethnic variables.

In addition, as we have discussed what causes ethnic conflict, there are many factors that have reduced ethnic conflict in the international system. For example, Payne (2013), cite Gurr (2000), who says that there are four factors that have helped reduce ethnic wars. These are: the promotion of democratic governance, which protects ethnic minorities (and there are studies finding that proportional representation may actually reduce ethnic conflict (Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni, & Stanton, 2002). According to a recent study by Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug (2013) entitled Elections and Ethnic Civil War, they find that unfair elections may lead to increased ethnic conflict, whereas competitive elections depends on what elections they are, although this "is mediated through the relative size of ethnic groups" (408). In addition to the role of democratic governance in reducing elections, ethnic conflicts can also be reduced with more action and support by the United Nations, other international organizations, and non-governmental organizations for ethnic minorities, "[t]he virtual consensus among the foreign policy elite in favor of reestablishing and maintaining global and regional order[,]" and the known costs of ethnic fighting, which leaders of the government and rebel forces are both aware of (303).

Ethnic Conflict Books
Barbara Huff & Ted Robert Gurr, Ethnic Conflict In World Politics Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts Neal G Jesse Kristen P Williams, Ethnic Conflict: A Systematic Approach to Cases of Conflict Karl Cordell & Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Responses References
Asal, V. & Wilkenfeld, J. (2013). Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational Perspective. Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, pages 91-102.

Blagojevic, B. (2009). Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework. Journal of Global Change and Governance, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 2009.

Cederman, L-E, Gleditsch, K.S., & Hug, S. (2013). Elections and Ethnic Civil War. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pages 387-417.

Easterly, W. (2001). Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 49, No. 4, pages 687-706.

Gurr, T.R. (1993). Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace.

Gurr, T.R. (1994). Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3, pages 347-377.

Gurr, T.R. (2000). Ethnic Warfare on the Wane, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, NO. 3.

Huff, B. & Gurr, T.R. (1994). Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. New York, New York. Westview Press.

Lake, D.A. & Rothchild, D. (1996), Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, pages 41-75.

Lake, D.A. & Rothchild, D. (1998). The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton, New Jersey. Princetown University Press.

Payne, R. (2013). Global Issues. New York, New York. Pearson.

Saideman, S.M, Lanoue, D.J., Campenni, M. & Stanton, S. (2002). Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time Series Analysis, 1985-1998. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, pages 103-129.

Saxton, G.D. & Benson, M. (2006). Structure, Politics, and Action: An Integrated Model of Nationalist Protest and Rebellion, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2, pages 1-39.

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Ethnic conflict has been a major issue in international relations. Despite the decrease of ethnic conflicts in the world (Gurr, 2000, in Payne, 2013), there are still many cases of them existing. This article will discuss ethnic conflict in international relations. It will define ethnic conflict, as well as discussing the factors that cause ethnic conflict.

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Drug Addictions Amongst Youth in Thai Villages 

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Drug Addictions Amongst Youth in Thai Villages 

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Across Thailand's southern provinces, communities have been struggling with rising drug use in recent years despite crackdowns and education efforts. BBC Thai's Nanchanok Wongsamuth reports on the villages devastated by addiction.

In a small wooden hut in the middle of a rubber plantation in Narathiwat province, 28-year-old Fadel and his friends often take a drug known as kratom.

Also known as "4X100" in Thai, kratom contains four main ingredients - the leaves of a local plant known as kratom, cough syrup, Coca-Cola and ice. It is sold for around 100 Thai baht (£2.30, $2.90) per kit.

"In the past we used to boil [the leaves] ourselves, but now we buy them ready-to-drink," Fadel told BBC Thai at the hut, where Coca-Cola cans are seen scattered on the floor.

Fadel has been taking drugs regularly for the past 11 years. He also uses crystal methamphetamine, and ya ba, a stimulant containing a mixture of methamphetamine and caffeine that sells for around 100 baht per pill.

He now takes one ya ba pill every two days, and drinks kratom three times a week when he is tired from work as a rubber planter. He sometimes resorts to stealing dried betel nuts to sell and fund his addiction.

Fadel is one of the estimated 80,000 to 100,000 drug users in Thailand's predominantly Muslim southernmost provinces, about 5% of the population. Most of these users are aged between 14 and 30 years old.

The three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat have the highest rates of drug addiction, according to the Thai military. An estimated one in five teenagers are addicts. Kratom is by far the most popular drug.

A recent survey found that more than 80% of people living in those provinces feel that drugs is their most pressing issue, and want the government to solve it.

Villagers have told BBC Thai that stealing is prevalent, as drug users are desperate to find a way to obtain money.

"Most people here are farmers, and things get stolen when they go to bed and no one's minding the fields," said Samart Lakatap, a probation officer in Narathiwat province.

"The problem is that the buyers are in it too - they know the sellers are drug addicts."

On the rise

The addictions have had a deep impact on communities and relationships.

Infidelity used to be the leading cause of divorce among Muslims in Thailand's southern province of Pattani. That has recently changed as a growing number of women face neglect as a result of their husbands using drugs.

"Nowadays, when a man makes a marriage proposal, the first question the father will ask her daughter is if [her boyfriend] takes any drugs," said Ahama Hayeedermee, secretary of Pattani's Islamic Council.

Last year, the council received 525 filings for divorce, of which 80% were on the grounds of drug use.

The council says it tries to mediate, but most of the complaints end in divorce, since most men do not attend the sessions.

In one village in Narathiwat's Marue Botok sub-district, a local man called Ismail told BBC Thai that his stepson Zabar got married last year.

Four months later Zabar's wife divorced him, after her mother found out Zabar was a drug addict.

Mr Ismail said Zabar started sniffing paint thinner at the age of nine, before getting addicted to marijuana and then ya ba. He quit school after second grade and was sent to a juvenile detention centre for two years at the age of 16.

Mr Hayeedermee said kratom addiction started becoming a problem in 2012, and he estimates that almost 90% of all villages in Pattani have drug users, mostly teenagers.

"We don't know why, but the number [of addicts] is on the rise," Mr Hayeedermee said.

"I used to ask the soldiers why there are so many drugs in Pattani and how they can escape the checkpoints. They didn't have an answer."

'Insurgents paid for by drugs'

The Thai military government has claimed that security issues in the insurgency-torn south have prevented them from solving drug-related issues in the region.

That led to a "secret" report submitted by the national security council to the cabinet in 2009, which included claims that insurgency groups used drugs to influence youth to join their groups, and also used money from the drug trade to sponsor their violent activities.

"Many times when we arrest drug kingpins, we also find war weapons," Col Suwan Chirdshai of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) Region 4, which oversees military missions in the south.

"Many times we also receive information that those involved in the drug trade have wired money to local insurgency groups...and those arrested by security forces have said they were paid for by drugs."

But that information contrasts with that from the non-governmental organisation Aids Access Foundation.

A 2007-2011 field survey of staff found that none had been in contact with any drug users associated with insurgency groups.

"The government discourse is that those spreading drugs are insurgency groups... but they [local people] think that it's the government who is bringing in the drugs," said Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng, an assistant professor in anthropology at Silpakorn University.

"The only question they have is: how can there be drugs when there are so many checkpoints?"

Col Suwan said although there are many checkpoints in the southern provinces, vehicles are randomly checked or inspected only when there is a tip-off.

"There needs to be a tip-off in order [for a vehicle] to be thoroughly inspected, and therefore [the drugs] are from the vehicles that were not inspected," he said.

'The new path'

The Thai military is trying other ways to tackle the problem, such as education.

At an ISOC drug prevention training centre in Pattani's Yarang district, about 145 villagers, village headmen, former drug users and traders are singing and reciting oaths.

"Do whatever you can for children to hate drugs," the centre's director, Col Suwan, told the crowd.

The group is participating in the Yalannanbaru project, which means "the new path" in Malay.

Yalannanbaru initially started in 2007 as a project to educate youth with risks of developing a drug addiction. In 2015 its volunteers started to reach out to those in need in each village, without the use of law enforcement.

There are currently 2,512 volunteers in 352 villages, with the number next year expected to reach 20,750 volunteers in 2,075 villages.

"A crackdown accomplishes very little, it is impossible for them [drug users] to quit because they are already addicted. Apart from that, the government is not able to gain access to drug users," said Col Suwan.

Ladda Ningoh from non-governmental organisation Ozone Foundation said the government is also trying to solve drug issues by creating jobs, but this has run into problems too.

"Getting them a new job in order to say that this project had this many successful participants is not a very straightforward thing to do, because sometimes you have rubber planters who have to learn how to become a barber just to meet the government's goals," she said.

She added that follow-up attempts by village chiefs also cause conflict within communities.

'We don't talk about it'

Some villages have taken matters into their own hands.

Using drugs is considered a great sin in Islam, and some places have issued rules for the village known as "hukum pakat", such as religious leaders not participating in activities with drug users.

In the village of Ban Uyib, scrap metal, electricity wires, boilers and even betel nuts, coconuts, bananas and scrap rubber are stolen on a daily basis.

This has led to the village setting up rules where both drug buyers and sellers will be fined and reported to the police. The rules, which came into effect in March, were printed on a vinyl board and placed at the mosque.

Rosalee Hajiteh, the village chief, claims that thefts have since stopped.

But other places are still struggling.

"I used to tell the village chief that our people are not happy with all the thieves around here, but he didn't do anything," said Ismail in the village in Marue Botok.

"Even in our village we don't talk about it, and the government doesn't help."
The names of villagers in this story have been changed to protect their identities.

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The drug addictions devastating Thai villages

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Across Thailand's southern provinces, communities have been struggling with rising drug use in recent years despite crackdowns and education efforts. BBC Thai's Nanchanok Wongsamuth reports on the villages devastated by addiction. In a small wooden hut in the middle of a rubber plantation in Narathiwat province, 28-year-old Fadel and his friends often take a drug known as kratom.

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The Karen People of Thailand and Myanmar

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The Karen People of Thailand and Myanmar

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Most people know of the Karen people from television documentaries, magazines and encyclopedias as the "long-neck" or "giraffe" tribe. But the women who wear these brass rings on their neck belong to a sub-group of the Karen known as the Padaung. There are other sub-groups who do not and never have practiced this custom. A further myth is that these rings act to elongate the wearer's neck. Any chiropractor or orthopedic surgeon will tell you that this would lead to paralysis or death. In fact the appearance of a longer neck is a visual illusion. The weight of the rings pushes down the collar bone, as well as the upper ribs, to such an angle that the collar bone actually appears to be a part of the neck!

There are many different accounts of why the Padaung practice this bizzare custom. Their own mythology explains that it is done to prevent tigers from biting them! Others have reported that it is done to make the women unattractive so they are less likely to be captured by slave traders. The most common explanation, though, is the opposite of this - that an extra-long neck is considered a sign of great beauty and wealth and that it will attract a better husband. Adultery, though, is said to be punished by removal of the rings. In this case, since the neck muscles will have been severely weakened by years of not supporting the neck, a woman must spend the rest of her life lying down. According to Paul and Elaine Lewis in Peoples of The Golden Triangle, adultery and divorce among all Karen groups is extremely low.

Whatever the origin of the custom, one of the more common reasons it continues today, particularly in Thailand, is tourism. Although the Padaung have migrated to Thailand in only the last ten years (other Karen groups first settled there about a hundred and fifty years ago), they have become the most popular "attraction" for hill-tribe trekking tourists. Some have written of this as exploitation of the Padaung; many westerners I have spoken to liken the experience of visiting one of these villages to visiting a human zoo. Some tour operators in Thailand now refuse to take tourists into such villages, while some tourists boycott those operators that do.

Perhaps because the neck ring custom is so striking, less attention gets paid to other aspects of Karen culture. Among others, though, large earrings play a dominant role in ornamentation. Although not as visually striking as the apparent neck-stretching, the so-called "big-eared" Karen actually alter their body to a greater extent. As with the wearing of neck rings, the lady on the left will have first had a much smaller earring placed in her earlobe as a young child. As these are replaced over the years by successively larger rings, the earlobes are stretched by a relatively huge amount. Making music also plays an important part in Karen life and women like the one above right can be seen playing the guitar in just about every village. The Karen are also masters when it comes to training elephants.

One Karen tradition that survives very prominently today is the making of their own and their fiance's wedding clothes by young women. Most unmarried Karen women and girls wear a white robe to indicate that they are as yet unmarried. However, as soon as a union is approved (and sometimes even before that in preparation), the girl will begin weaving a different colored dress for her wedding day. In contrast to the Akha, Karen society is matrilineal. The incest taboo is therefore enforced more along the maternal lines of the prospective couple's ancestry. Successive marriages within a matrilineage in particular are discouraged. Marriage itself is considered a very important part of a woman's life; so much so, in fact, that if a woman dies before marriage, she is nonetheless buried (or cremated) in married women's clothing. This, they believe, reduces the chances of malevolent spirits preventing her from entering the afterlife.

Karen life, both in their own mythology and historical reality, is pervaded with persecution. Their folk history speaks of them as orphans who lost their writing system after God handed it down to them, but will have it returned one day by visitors from a far away land. Apparently, when they first came into contact with Christian missionaries, many Karen thought this promise of their history had finally been fulfilled. Marshall (see References and Further Reading), who was among the first missionaries to study the Karen in great depth, says that over two hundred folk stories had been preserved through oral history. Despite that preservation of their history, though, it is still debated as to where and when they originated. Although most writers now claim Burma to be their ancestral home, many have pointed to some of their oral history suggesting that their true origin is China.

The different Karen sub-groups historically have not recognized each other as belonging to the same group until very recently. Their languages/dialects are not spoken or understood by each other and none has a collective term for all the Karen sub-groups. Even their laguages had eluded linguistic classification until they were finally classified as a branch of their own, namely "Karenic." In fact the term "Karen" itself was considered a derogatory term in Burma until Christian missionaries brought respect to it in the late eighteenth century. It has been mainly the S'gaw sub-group that has considered themselves the guardian of Karen culture.

The Karen in Burma have suffered opression at the hands of successive regimes of that country for decades. Forced re-settlement and labor, incarceration, denial of political representation and citizenship status rights among other human rights violations have led thousands of Karen to move into Thailand. While many argue that they have a better life there, their status is yet unsure. Many of them are in Thailand as refugees.

The following quotes are taken from the Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: "Villagers continued to be forcibly relocated, and those suspected of aiding guerrillas were tortured and sometimes killed. In January, government soldiers extrajudicially executed three ethnic minority Palaung men in Ho Ha village in Shan State after a search for weapons turned up an old carbine rifle that villagers used for hunting." "In January, the [Burmese] army reportedly displaced some 30,000 villagers in Karen State when it burned villages in its dry season offensive against the insurgent Karen National Union."

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Indigenous Peoples of the World - The Karen

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Most people know of the Karen people from television documentaries, magazines and encyclopedias as the "long-neck" or "giraffe" tribe. But the women who wear these brass rings on their neck belong to a sub-group of the Karen known as the Padaung. There are other sub-groups who do not and never have practiced this custom.

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The Rohingya are an ethnic group, the majority of whom are Muslim, who have lived for centuries in the majority Buddhist Myanmar. Currently, there are about 1.1 million Rohingya in the Southeast Asian country.

The Rohingya speak Rohingya or Ruaingga, a dialect that is distinct to others spoken throughout Myanmar. They are not considered one of the country's 135 official ethnic groups and have been denied citizenship in Myanmar since 1982, which has effectively rendered them stateless.

Keep reading

Nearly all of the Rohingya in Myanmar live in the western coastal state of Rakhine and are not allowed to leave without government permission. It is one the poorest states in the country, with ghetto-like camps and a lack of basic services and opportunities.

Due to ongoing violence and persecution, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have fled to neighbouring countries either by land or boat over the course of many decades.

Where are the Rohingya from?

Muslims have lived in the area now known as Myanmar since as early as the 12th century, according to many historians and Rohingya groups.

The Arakan Rohingya National Organisation said: "Rohingyas have been living in Arakan from time immemorial," referring to the area now known as Rakhine.

Latest

On April 7, five Rohingya were rescued off the island of Sumatra.

During the more than 100 years of British rule (1824-1948), there was a significant amount of migration of labourers to what is now known as Myanmar from today's India and Bangladesh. Because the British administered Myanmar as a province of India, such migration was considered internal, according to Human Rights Watch ( HRW).

The migration of labourers was viewed negatively by the majority of the native population.

After independence, the government viewed the migration that took place during British rule as "illegal, and it is on this basis that they refuse citizenship to the majority of Rohingya," HRW said in a report issued in 2000.

This has led many Buddhists to consider the Rohingya Bengali, rejecting the term Rohingya as a recent invention created for political reasons.

Why aren't they recognised?

Shortly after Myanmar's independence from the British in 1948, the Union Citizenship Act was passed, defining which ethnicities could gain citizenship. According to a 2015 report by the International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School, the Rohingya were not included. The act, however, did allow those whose families had lived in Myanmar for at least two generations to apply for identity cards.

Rohingya were initially given such identification or even citizenship under the generational provision. During this time, several Rohingya also served in parliament.
IN PICTURES: Rohingya refugees search for shelter in Bangladesh
After the 1962 military coup in Myanmar, things changed dramatically for the Rohingya.

All citizens were required to obtain national registration cards. The Rohingya, however, were only given foreign identity cards, which limited the jobs and educational opportunities they could pursue.

In 1982, a new citizenship law was passed, effectively rendering the Rohingya stateless. Under the law, Rohingya were again not recognised as one of the country's 135 ethnic groups. The law established three levels of citizenship. In order to obtain the most basic level (naturalised citizenship), proof that the person's family lived in Myanmar before 1948 was needed, as well as fluency in one of the national languages. Many Rohingya lack such paperwork because it was either unavailable or denied to them.

As a result of the law, their rights to study, work, travel, marry, practice their religion and access health services have been and continue to be restricted. The Rohingya cannot vote, and even if they navigate the citizenship test, they must identify as "naturalised" as opposed to Rohingya, and limits are placed on them entering certain professions such as medicine or law or running for office.

How are they persecuted?

Since the 1970s, a number of crackdowns on the Rohingya in Rakhine State have forced hundreds of thousands to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh, as well as Malaysia, Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries. During such crackdowns, refugees have often reported rape, torture, arson and murder by Myanmar security forces.
READ MORE: A month of misery for Myanmar's Rohingya
After the killings of nine border police in October 2016, the government blamed what it claimed were fighters from an armed Rohingya group and troops started pouring into the villages of Rakhine State. A security crackdown on villages where Rohingya lived ensued, during which government troops were accused of an array of human rights abuses including extrajudicial killing, rape and arson - allegations the government denied.

In November 2016, a UN official accused the government of carrying out ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya. It was not the first time such an accusation has been made.

In April 2013, for example, HRW said Myanmar was conducting a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya. The government has consistently denied such accusations.

In August, residents and activists have described troops firing indiscriminately at unarmed Rohingya men, women and children. The government, however, has said nearly 100 people were killed after armed men from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) launched a raid on police outposts in the region.

In February 2018, the Associated Press released a video showing what they say is the site of a massacre and at least five undisclosed mass graves of Rohingya in Myanmar. The UN's special rapporteur to Myanmar said violence against the Rohingya bears the hallmarks of genocide.

Myanmar's government razed at least 55 villages once populated by Rohingya, destroying with them evidence of crimes against the minority, according to Human Rights Watch.

The rights groups released images in February that showed between December 2017 and mid-February, areas that were once full of buildings and greenery had been completed cleared.

HRW described the actions by Myanmar security forces as an "ethnic cleansing campaign" and called on the UN and Myanmar's donors to demand an end to the demolitions.

A total of 362 villages have been destroyed either completely or partially since Myanmar's military began a campaign against the Rohingya in August last year, according to HRW.

How many Rohingya have fled Myanmar and where have they gone?

Since the late 1970s, nearly one million Rohingya have fled Myanmar due to widespread persecution.

According to the most recently available data from the United Nations in May, more than 168,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar since 2012.

Following violence that broke out last year, more than 87,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh from October 2016 to July 2017, according to the International Organization for Migration.
READ MORE: 'I want to take my last breath without fear of attacks'
Many Rohingya also risked their lives trying to get to Malaysia by boat across the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Between 2012 and 2015, more than 112,000 made the dangerous journey.

Prior to the violence that began in August 2017, the UN estimated that there are as many as 420,000 Rohingya refugees in Southeast Asia. Additionally, it said there were around 120,000 internally displaced Rohingya.

Since the violence in Myanmar's northwest began, more than 650,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh, the UNHCR said. It added that more than 1,000 people, mostly Rohingya, may have been killed in Myanmar.

What do Aung San Suu Kyi and the Myanmar government say about the Rohingya?

State Chancellor Aung San Suu Kyi, who is the de facto leader of Myanmar, has refused to really discuss the plight of the Rohingya.

Aung San Suu Kyi and her government do not recognise the Rohingya as an ethnic group and have blamed violence in Rakhine, and subsequent military crackdowns, on those they call "terrorists".

The Nobel Peace Prize laureate does not have control over the military but has been criticised for her failure to condemn the indiscriminate use of force by troops, as well as to stand up for the rights of the over one million Rohingya in Myanmar.
OPINION: Aung San Suu Kyi's inexcusable silence
The government has also repeatedly rejected accusations of abuses. In February 2017, the UN published a report that found that government troops "very likely" committed crimes against humanity since renewed military crackdowns began in October 2016.

At the time, the government did not directly address the findings of the report and said it had the "the right to defend the country by lawful means" against "increasing terrorist activities", adding that a domestic investigation was enough.

During Pope Francis' visit to Myanmar in November 2017, Myanmar's army chief told the pope that there was "no discrimination" in the country and praised the military for maintaining "peace and stability".

In September 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi entrusted former UN chief Kofi Annan with finding ways to heal the long-standing divisions in the region. While many welcomed the commission and its findings, which were released this August, Azeem Ibrahim, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy, argued it was just a way for Aung San Suu Kyi to "pacify the global public opinion and try to demonstrate to the international community that she is doing what she can to resolve the issue".

Annan was not given the mandate to investigate specific cases of human rights abuses, but rather one to look at long-term economic development, education and healthcare.
REPORTER'S NOTEBOOK: They look at us with hope, but we can only document their despair
When setting up the commission, Aung San Suu Kyi's government said it would abide by its findings. The commission urged the government to end the highly militarised crackdown on neighbourhoods where Rohingya live, as well as scrap restrictions on movement and citizenship.

Following the release of the August report, the government welcomed the commission's recommendations and said it would give the report "full consideration with the view to carrying out the recommendations to the fullest extent ... in line with the situation on the ground".

On the latest round of violence, Aung San Suu Kyi blamed a "huge iceberg of misinformation" on the crisis, without mentioning the Rohingya who have fled to Bangladesh.

On September 19, she gave a televised address, condemning "all human rights violations" in Rakhine, without specifically mentioning the Rohingya.

She said that Myanmar was ready "at any time" to verify the status of those who had fled the violence in the last month. She did not specify who would be qualified to return and did not elaborate on how the verification process would work.

Her speech was criticised by Rohingya refugees, as well as activists who accused her government of "burying their heads in the sand".

The government has often restricted access to northern Rakhine State for journalists and aid workers. Aung San Suu Kyi's office has also accused aid groups of helping those it considers to be "terrorists".
OPINION: Myanmar needs to get serious about peace
In January, Yanghee Lee, a UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, said she was denied access to certain parts of Rakhine and was only allowed to speak to Rohingya who had been pre-approved by the government.

The country has also denied visas to members of a UN probe investigating the violence and alleged abuses in Rakhine.

What does Bangladesh say about the Rohingya?

There are more than half a million Rohingya refugees living in mostly makeshift camps in Bangladesh. The majority remain unregistered.

Bangladesh considers most of those who have crossed its borders and are living outside of camps as having "illegally infiltrated" the country. Bangladesh has often tried to prevent Rohingya refugees from crossing its border.
READ MORE: My name is Arba Khatun, I am Rohingya
In late January, the country resurrected a plan to relocate tens of thousands of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar to a remote, flood-prone island that has been called "uninhabitable" by rights groups. Under the plan, which was originally introduced in 2015, authorities would move undocumented Myanmar nationals to Thengar Char in the Bay of Bengal.

Rights groups have decried the proposal, saying the island completely floods during monsoon season. The UN also called the forced relocation "very complex and controversial".

Most recently, Bangladesh's foreign minister labelled the violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar "a genocide". The country's National Commission for Human Rights also said it was considering "pressing for a trial against Myanmar, and against the Myanmar army at an international tribunal" on charges of genocide.

Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visited a Rohingya refugee camp in September and called on the UN and the international community to pressure Myanmar's government to allow the return of hundreds of thousands Rohingya refugees.
READ MORE: Bangladesh medics struggle to cope with Rohingya influx
She said that Bangladesh would offer the refugees temporary shelter and aid, but that Myanmar should soon "take their nationals back".

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh have told Al Jazeera that the government's aid thus far as been inadequate, with many saying they haven't received any kind of government help.

Refugees in Bangladesh have been banned from leaving the overcrowded border areas. Police check posts and surveillance have been set up in key transit points from stop Rohingya from travelling to other parts of the country.

What does the international community say about the Rohingya?

The international community has labelled the Rohingya the "most persecuted minority in the world".

The UN, as well as several rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have consistently decried the treatment of the Rohingya by Myanmar and neighbouring countries.

The UN has said that it is "very likely" that the military committed grave human rights abuses in Rakhine that may amount to war crimes, allegations the government denies.
OPINION: Only international pressure can save Rohingya now
In March, the UN adopted a resolution to set up an independent international mission to investigate the alleged abuses. It stopped short of calling for a Commission of Inquiry, the UN's highest level of investigation.

The UN investigators must provide a verbal update in September and a full report next year on their findings.

Rights groups have criticised the government's reluctance to accept the UN investigators.

Human Rights Watch warned that Myanmar's government risked getting bracketed with "pariah states" like North Korea and Syria if it did not allow the UN to investigate alleged crimes.
READ MORE: Myanmar - UN probe 'can only aggravate' Rakhine tension
In response to the latest round of violence, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned of the risk of ethnic cleansing, calling on Aung San Suu Kyi and the country's security forces to end the violence.

In early September of last year, Guterres also warned of a looming "humanitarian catastrophe" if the violence did not end.

UN human rights chief Zeid bin Ra'ad al-Hussein urged Myanmar to end its "brutal security operation" against the Rohingya in Rakhine, calling it a "textbook example of ethnic cleansing".

Both UN officials said they completely supported the findings of the advisory commission, led by Kofi Annan, and urged the government to fulfil its recommendations.

In November 2017, Pope Francis visited Myanmar and while he did not explicitly use the word "Rohingya", he said that there needs to be acceptance and respect for all ethnic groups in the country.

In April, the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) asked the court to rule if it had jurisdiction over the deportations of Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh.

A ruling affirming its jurisdiction could pave the way for prosecutors to investigate whether crimes against humanity were committed.
OPINION: The Rohingya crisis and the role of the OIC
The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), formerly known as the al-Yaqeen Faith Movement, released a statement under its new name in March 2017, saying it was obligated to "defend, salvage and protect [the] Rohingya community".

The group said it would do so "with our best capacities as we have the legitimate right under international law to defend ourselves in line with the principle of self-defence".

The group is considered a "terrorist" organisation by the Myanmar government.

In its March statement, the ARSA added that it does "not associate with any terrorist group across the world" and does "not commit any form of terrorism against any civilian[s] regardless of their religious and ethnic origin".

The statement also said: "We [...] declare loud and clear that our defensive attacks have only been aimed at the oppressive Burmese regime in accordance with international norms and principles until our demands are fulfilled."

The group has claimed responsibility for an attack on police posts and an army base in Rakhine State. According to the government, nearly 400 people were killed, the majority of whom were members of the ARSA. Rights groups, however, say hundreds of civilians have been killed by security forces.

Rights group Fortify Rights said it has documented that fighters with the ARSA "are also accused of killing civilians - suspected government 'informants' - in recent days and months, as well as preventing men and boys from fleeing Maungdaw Township".

On September 9, the group declared a month-long unilateral ceasefire in Rakhine to enable aid groups to address the humanitarian crisis in the area.

"ARSA strongly encourages all concerned humanitarian actors to resume their humanitarian assistance to all victims of the humanitarian crisis, irrespective of ethnic or religious background during the ceasefire period," the group said in a statement, adding that it calls on Myanmar's military to also temporarily lay down arms.

According to the International Crisis Group, the ARSA has ties to Rohingya living in Saudi Arabia.

The Myanmar government formally categorised the group as a "terrorist" organisation on August 25.

What is the repatriation deal?

In November 2017, Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a deal for the return of 650,000 Rohingya refugees, who fled in the recent violence.

Both countries agreed to complete a voluntary repatriation in two years. The plan is based on a similar agreement that was signed in the 1990s to repatriate Rohingya who have fled a previous crackdown led by the Myanmar military.

Myanmar set up two reception centres and what it is believed to be a temporary camp near the border of Rakhine to receive the first arrivals.

"We have been tortured, killed and our houses burnt, we want Myanmar citizenship and ID cards saying we are Rohingya. I don't want to go to another camp in Myanmar if Bangladesh and the rest of the world can protect our rights, then we will go back, but not yet," Syed Alam, a Rohingya refugee told Al Jazeera.

On the deal, Director of Human Rights Watch's ( HRW) refugee rights programme said: "Before the start of actual returns, Myanmar should agree to a set of prerequisites for return."

That includes "unfettered, independent monitoring" of returnees, restoration of lost homes and properties among others.

On April 14, the Myanmar government announced in a Facebook post that a family of five had returned to the country, a move that was denounced by Rohingya rights groups as "staged" and a "publicity stunt".

Images accompanying the social media post on Saturday showed five individuals receiving identification cards - which do not grant citizenship - from uniformed Myanmar officials, and getting medical help and living provisions from health and social workers.

According to the Rohingya Blogger, a watchdog and Rohingya rights website run by activists in Europe, the individuals in the photos are not Rohingya refugees, but family of a local administrator in Taung Pyo Latya.

The reported repatriation came days after Myanmar's social welfare minister, Win Myat Aye, visited a Rohingya camp in Bangladesh's border area of Cox's Bazar.

During the visit, Win announced that Myanmar is ready for the repatriation of Rohingya.

But Ursula Mueller, the a UN senior humanitarian official, warned that there "critical issues of freedom of movement" that Myanmar's government needs to address before beginning repatriation, AFP news agency reported.

UNHCR has also said that the "conditions in Myanmar are not yet conducive for returns to be safe, dignified and sustainable", adding that "the responsibility for creating such conditions remains with the Myanmar authorities, and these must go beyond the preparation of physical infrastructure to facilitate logistical arrangements."

WATCH: Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh

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The more than one million Rohingya Muslims are described as the 'world's most persecuted minority'.

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As more cases of influenza (H1N1) are confirmed in several different locations in Burma including the former capital, Rangoon, Karen State Health Department officials have informed residents not to be overly frightened by the deadly flu. Doctor Kyaw Swar Myint, the Deputy Ch... Read more ►

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Thai Political Tensions - Rekindling Ethic and Regional Divisions

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Thai Political Tensions - Rekindling Ethic and Regional Divisions

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"I've never seen the country this divided," said Ponganand Srisai, a member of the local council in Baan Nong Tun, a rice-farming northeastern village.

Banners strung across roads in the north calling for secession have been among the most extreme expressions of the north's bitterness toward Bangkok. The northern Lanna kingdom, including Lamphun, was annexed by Bangkok in 1899, and for decades its people have spoken a dialect distinct from the Thai officially recognized and promoted by the central government. At the time of annexation, the region had its own written language, which used a different alphabet from Thai.

Less radical have been proposals for devolution of the centralized powers of the government.

A group of local government associations and scholars, the People's Network for a Self-Governing Administration, submitted a bill to Parliament last year calling for greater self-administration of provinces.

"We propose that power be restructured," the group said in a statement last month. Among the proposals, which have not yet been taken up by Parliament: Provincial governors would be directly elected and more taxes would be collected and spent locally. The group says Bangkok "lacks knowledge or neglects the differences of local identities."

Tanet Charoenmuang, a prominent commentator and proponent of greater autonomy for northern Thailand, says northerners perceive government institutions as favoring the capital at the expense of the provinces.

"Injustice has helped fertilize localization," Mr. Tanet said. "Thailand has been an overcentralized state, and a sense of localism is quietly re-emerging."

Much of the appeal of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and her family for the north is that they have been trying to refocus government resources and attention toward rural areas in recent years, cementing the loyalty of villagers. That push started under the leadership of her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, a prime minister who was ousted in a coup supported by the Bangkok elites, the antecedent to the current standoff.

Government supporters say secessionist talk is a measure of their feelings of frustration, but very few are taking it seriously at this point. Yet the notion of secession appears to have been taken very seriously by the army, which vowed to investigate and bring legal action against anyone advocating leaving Thailand.

Building modern Thailand has been a painstaking and sometimes bloody process that took centuries but accelerated over the past century.

Local languages and dialects were banned from schools. Authoritarian leaders changed the country's name from Siam to Thailand and created what today are icons as a sort of nationalist glue for the country. Pad thai, the stir-fried noodles so common in Thai restaurants, was introduced by the authorities as a national dish. The government also promoted the use of a greeting, "sawasdee," that is used nationwide. Decisions about everything from the appointment of Buddhist clergy to the architecture of Thai temples were transferred from the provinces to Bangkok.

But perhaps most important for the cementing of a Thai identity has been the long reign of King Bhumibol, who was crowned in 1950. The king is now ailing, and his absence from civic life - he has not publicly commented on political tensions for several years - has added to a sense that the country has lost its rudder.

Three governments supported by northern and northeastern voters have been removed from power since 2006, one - Mr. Thaksin's - by a military coup and two in highly politicized court judgments. For the last five months, protesters in Bangkok have demanded the overthrow of the government and a reduction in the influence of the Shinawatra clan, which is from the northern city of Chiang Mai.

The prospect that a fourth democratically elected government could be removed by the courts in coming weeks has been met by seething anger in villages across the north and northeast. Protest leaders call government supporters "buffaloes," an insult connoting upcountry ignorance.

Mr. Ponganand, the local council member from the northeast, describes southerners, who on some days make up the bulk of protesters in Bangkok, as "extremists."

Boontham Kaewkard, a wood carver here, said he was ready to confront the antigovernment forces if they removed the prime minister. But he laughed at talk of secession. "It's a crazy idea," he said. "Thailand must remain Thailand."

Yet from a political standpoint, the Thai electoral map already shows two Thailands: The north has consistently voted for the governing party in recent elections, while the south has either voted against the party or obstructed elections, as protesters did in February. Both sides warn of civil war if tensions escalate.

Government supporters say a sense of solidarity has emerged between northern Thailand and the vast northeastern Isaan plateau, where the maternal tongue, a form of Lao, is similar to the Lanna language of the north.

Chalida Chusirithanakit, a pharmacist in the northeast, says the current round of protests has kindled "a real sense of pride in being Isaan people," especially among the government supporters, called the red shirts.

"They feel they have struggled and have been oppressed for a long time," said Ms. Chalida, who moved to Isaan from northern Thailand nearly 40 years ago.

Support for Ms. Yingluck and her party is so strong in Maha Sarakham Province that "even a dog in a red shirt could run in an election and win," she said.

The red shirts have staged a number of demonstrations in recent weeks in what they say is a message to the Bangkok establishment showing the strength of their numbers - and their readiness to fight back if the government is toppled.

At a meeting in Chiang Mai last month, a leader of the red shirts, Nisit Sinthupai, spoke about a Buddhist monk who is considered the patron saint of northern Thailand, Kru Ba Srivichai. The monk, who died eight decades ago, is lionized for his piety and devotion to his followers.

But Mr. Nisit emphasized a facet of the monk's life not covered in Thai textbooks: his long and defiant struggle to use the northern Lanna language and his refusal to bow to the authorities in Bangkok who sought to curtail his autonomy - and arrested him four times.

This defiance was his "mightiness," Mr. Nisit said, adding that the north and the northeast had new strength together.

"These two regions are the key power bases of democracy," he said. "We are the majority."

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Thailand's Political Tensions Are Rekindling Ethnic and Regional Divisions

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"I've never seen the country this divided," said Ponganand Srisai, a member of the local council in Baan Nong Tun, a rice-farming northeastern village. Banners strung across roads in the north calling for secession have been among the most extreme expressions of the north's bitterness toward Bangkok.

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On Thailand's border with Myanmar, also known as Burma, more than 100,000 people live in a string of refugee camps. Many fled ethnic conflict in their homeland decades ago, and have brought up their children here. Gracia Fellmeth arrived in one of the camps a year ago to study depression in women before and after childbirth.
After an hour's bus journey through forest from the town of Mae Sot, Mae La appears suddenly, seemingly out of nowhere. In the morning mist, thousands of bamboo huts cling to steep limestone crags.

It is the largest of nine refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border, and home to almost 40,000 people. Many residents have spent their entire lives in this isolated place, unable to work and dependent on outside aid. The majority are Karen, one of Myanmar's largest ethnic minorities.

It is a Wednesday morning, three months after my arrival, and the dusty waiting room is full. Pregnant women wait patiently to be seen by nurses, midwives and medics.

They will have their bellies examined, their blood pressure monitored and their blood screened.

Since my arrival, women are also offered a depression screen - a series of 10 questions to look for symptoms of depression, which is common in pregnancy.

Our first patient today is 18-year-old Myo Myo. She is nine weeks pregnant. She enters the room, smiling. Lar Paw, a Karen counsellor and midwife I am working with, explains what the interview involves. Myo Myo agrees to take part. We sit down on the bamboo floor and begin.

"In the past month, have you ever felt sad or down for long periods of time?" I ask.

"Sometimes," Myo Myo replies. "We have some family problems. And not enough money."

Calm and composed, she continues her story - a story by now familiar to me. She describes a happy relationship with her husband. Despite his alcohol dependency, he is good to her, she says, and she loves him. They are both happy about the pregnancy. However, there are tensions with her mother-in-law, who disapproves of Myo Myo and rebukes her for not contributing to household expenditure.

Suicide is too common in Mae La - last year it accounted for half of all deaths among pregnant women and new mothers

I want to know more about her symptoms. She tells us that the episodes of sadness are short-lived, occurring only once or twice a month and lasting an hour or so.

"Do you ever think about hurting yourself, or about suicide?" I probe.

Myo Myo hesitates.

"Sometimes I think about it, if we have been arguing with my mother-in-law," she admits. She has never attempted suicide though, and assures us she is not planning to.

A quarter of all women we speak to think about suicide at least occasionally. A smaller proportion - about 3% - have made attempts. We lack the resources to follow up all of these patients, so we focus only on those with pronounced thoughts of suicide or severe symptoms of depression.

Myo Myo has other symptoms, too - low energy and "thinking too much" - but they occur only once in a while and do not seem to be out of the ordinary.

We don't arrange a follow-up but we tell her to come and talk to us any time, if she wants to share her worries with anyone.

Two days later I am on the bus to Mae La when a colleague asks me: "Did you hear about the suicide? A young girl. She was pregnant."

My heart pounds. Was it someone I had interviewed? Someone we had been following up? Or worse, someone we hadn't followed up?

Lar Paw stands outside the clinic waiting for me.

"Doctor! We have a suicide. Do you remember this patient?" She hands me a file. It is Myo Myo's.

I feel shaky. I remember her, and I remember that we had not considered her to be high-risk. Among the hundreds of women we had spoken to, Myo Myo, tragically, had not stood out.

"Her husband also. They did it together," Lar Paw continues softly.

A double suicide? I couldn't think straight. We had seen Myo Myo only two days ago. How could this have happened? Had we given her the idea of taking her own life? Was this all my fault?

Later that day we go to Myo Myo's home to pay our respects. The family sits quietly. The two bodies lie in the middle of the room under a sheet, surrounded by candles. Two cups wrapped in plastic are lined with a fluorescent blue liquid - remnants of the toxic weed-killer that led the couple to their death.

We sit in silence until Myo Myo's mother-in-law stumbles in, drunk.

Myo Myo's sister-in-law shouts at her. "This is all your fault," she sobs.

Later we find out about an altercation that had taken place earlier in the week between Myo Myo's husband and his mother, during which she had slapped him in the face.

The death of this young couple left us deeply saddened, but also troubled. Should we have done more to encourage Myo Myo to put aside her thoughts of suicide? Could we have stopped her?

Had it been the impulsive act of an adolescent in response to a family feud? Had a Buddhist belief in rebirth enticed the couple to leave this world and start a new, better, life together?

We will never know. What we do know is that suicide is too common in Mae La - last year it accounted for half of all deaths among pregnant women and new mothers.

What is the explanation? There could be many factors - including chronic uncertainty, hopelessness, boredom, and the legacy of the conflict that led these families to Mae La in the first place.

The names of the people in this story have been changed Read Gracia Fellmeth's report for BMJ Case Reports

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On Thailand's border with Myanmar, also known as Burma, more than 100,000 people live in a string of refugee camps. Many fled ethnic conflict in their homeland decades ago, and have brought up their children here. Gracia Fellmeth arrived in one of the camps a year ago to study depression in women before and after childbirth.

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HRW Report - Thailand's Treatment of Refugees 

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HRW Report - Thailand's Treatment of Refugees 

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Get access to files anywhere through secure cloud storage and file backup for your photos, videos, files and more with Google Drive.

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Photo Essays Women & Gender From the Archive Election 2015 Burmese Version

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While terrorism in Europe and South Asia grips the headlines, the obscure but savage insurgency in southern Thailand remains an afterthought even for many politicians in Bangkok. On May 9, the insurgents hit a supermarket in Pattani with a double-tap attack, detonating a small bomb at 2:10 pm and another soon after. Human Rights Watch suggested that the insurgents, who injured 61 civilians, including children, might have committed a crime against humanity. The Thai government, however, has diverted its attention elsewhere and ignored the crisis in the south, instead addressing the ongoing dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and reviewing the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

The insurgency remains difficult to resolve in part because of the insurgents' secrecy. Though none doubt that the insurgents, who claim to champion the national interests of Thailand's Malay, Muslim minority, desire independence for the south, few can confirm or even identify who represents them. The Thai government is now negotiating with apparent representatives of the insurgency, yet experts have noted a divide between younger military commanders in southern Thailand and older political leaders, many of whom reside far from the battlefield in Malaysia. Negotiations exclude the National Revolutionary Front (BRN), which spearheads the insurgency in the south, undermining the credibility of the peace process and the Thai government's commitment to it.

The Thai military insisted that negotiations would continue after the bombing, which the BRN likely perpetrated. "The attack is not getting in the way of the peace talks, which we are pushing forward," said Major General Sith Trakulwong. "Despite the violence, the peace talks will go on."

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Yada Chuaychamnak, a Buddhist from Pattani, has grown frustrated with the Thai government. "The coup government is still dogmatic and projects useless policy for the south," she told The Diplomat, referring to the junta of General Prayut Chan-o-cha, who seized power in a 2014 coup d'état. "The government still refuses a third party to be a facilitator as the BRN requested in an announcement on April 10 this year. The BRN refused the Thai government's peace-process plan as well and called for a third party, such as an INGO or the international community, to join negotiations as an observer and witness. Also, the BRN requires a neutral mediator to be a leader of the negotiations, which the Thai Army cannot do."

The mediascape of southern Thailand has hindered the ability of Thais such as Chuaychamnak to express their views, for journalists tend to rely on the Thai government's narrative. "The study of source attribution reveals that frequently cited informers are mostly authority figures, particularly police officers and members of the government," wrote researcher Phansasiri Kularb in Reporting Thailand's Southern Conflict: Mediating Political Dissent. "In line with existing studies, it is apparent that the coverage of the southern conflict principally relies on the authorities' accounts." The insurgents, meanwhile, rarely speak to journalists to maintain their aura of mystery and secrecy. This strategy thus frees the Thai government to promote its worldview that the Thai Royal Army and Police are fighting terrorism.

"Insurgency violence is basically a form of communicative action between non-state actor and state security apparatus," Don Pathan, one of few journalists with access to the insurgents, told The Diplomat. "What's interesting about this conflict is that the audience is largely confined to the combatants and the state security apparatus. For the time being, the strategy of the insurgents is to discredit the security agencies and to make the area ungovernable as much as possible."

The Thai government has exacerbated the difficulty of separating civilians from the state by encouraging sectarianism in the south. "Thai Buddhist militarism is most particularly visible in the three southernmost provinces, where the state has situated its forces within local wat [temples]," observed Michael J. Jerryson, a professor at Youngstown State University, in Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand. "The joint presence of armed forces and monks within the wat symbolizes the collapse of any distinction between Thai Buddhist and the state." Such overlap between civilian and state can contribute to the impetus behind attacks such as the one on May 9, which targeted apolitical, innocent Buddhist and Muslim shoppers to send a political message to the Thai government and military.

In the face of these difficulties, Bangkok appears to lack interest in resolving the insurgency through either a military victory or political settlement. Instead, the military dictatorship has redoubled its efforts to muzzle the press and quash dissent, inserting itself into everyday life. Officials have prioritized foreign policy over national security, looking to improve their military relationship with the United States and planning for Prime Minister Prayut's visit to the White House. Meanwhile a May 22 bombing in Bangkok indicated that the south will prove far from the Thai government's only dilemma in terms of security. With other concerns dominating Bangkok's attention it was only on June 5, almost a month after the supermarket bombing in Pattani, that the government saw fit to increase patrols along the Malaysian-Thai border.

Thailand's military prefers governance to war, explaining its challenges with the insurgency. "The core pursuits of the Thai military are playing politics and engaging in business activities (including illegal activities, such as smuggling); when the occasion arises, commanders are not averse to killing a few dozen unarmed civilians," Duncan McCargo, a professor at Leeds University, argued in Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand. "The Thai military had no strong grasp of counterinsurgency techniques or strategy, subjects which were not really taught at the Chulachomklao Military Academy." Rather than confronting the difficulties that it faces in the south, the military dictatorship has opted to avoid or ignore them, reinvigorating the insurgency.

In an effort to counter the insurgency through soft power, the Thai government is seeking to strengthen the south's economy. These measures will likely prove pointless without tackling the insurgency itself, though. By excluding the BRN from the peace process, the Thai government can never hope to defeat it, for history has shown that the Thai military lacks the discipline and skill to best an insurgency on the battlefield. Instead, Thai officials and soldiers should reinvest in peace. According to Pathan, the ongoing peace talks will fail "without BRN participation because this movement controls virtually all of the combatants on the ground."

Unless Bangkok changes its strategy to compensate for its failings, the military dictatorship can only hope for more of what it has now: an insurgency that shows no signs of stopping.

Austin Bodetti is a freelance journalist focusing on conflict in the Muslim world. His writing has appeared in AskMen, The Daily Beast, The Daily Dot, Vox, and Wired UK.

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thailand national revolutionary front (brn)

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While terrorism in Europe and South Asia grips the headlines, the obscure but savage insurgency in southern Thailand remains an afterthought even for many politicians in Bangkok. On May 9, the insurgents hit a supermarket in Pattani with a double-tap attack, detonating a small bomb at 2:10 pm and another soon after.

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More than 4,400 people have been killed and thousands more injured in Thailand's southern border provinces since a long-running separatist conflict reignited in 2004. Since then, attacks on civilian and government targets have been widespread, including state officials, the security forces and local village populations.

The violence has almost exclusively been centred on the provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and, to a lesser extent, Songkhla. Prior to 2004, the southern insurgency was largely driven by separatist organisations such as the PULO and the BRN. These organisations articulated clear objectives and grievances, based on a desire to protect a unique identity formed through a historical connection to the kingdom of Patani. This was annexed by Thailand in 1902; the PULO and BRN sought to protect their identity against the perceived aggression of a Thai government determined to maintain and enforce its preferred notion of an overarching Thai Buddhist identity. While the PULO and the BRN were largely defeated after a protracted insurgency, the grievances behind the insurgency were never addressed, leaving the way open for a resumption of hostilities

2004 onwards: a changing conflict

The post 2004 environment has seen the insurgency morph into a different kind of conflict. Where opposition was once centred on the PULO and the BRN, it has since dispersed into a wide variety of decentralised groups. In this context, violence has been perpetuated by loosely associated cells, acting relatively autonomously and only linking up when needed. With attacks often unclaimed by any particular group, fully understanding the context of the insurgency in its current form has been a difficult task for researchers.

Another new aspect to the conflict has an increase in religious overtones to the violence. Following 9/11, this was was interpreted as a sign that Thailand's southern militants were moving away from the grievances of their forebears towards a militant Islamist ideology. However, the evidence available still points towards an insurgency driven by a desire to protect a local identity, at odds with the prevailing governmental notion of national Thai identity.

Critics of the government argue that its response to the southern insurgency has demonstrated a misunderstanding of the nature of the violence, with a lack of appreciation for the depth of those grievances only leading to further violence. The result has been a hard military response, often resulting in human rights abuses. Measures have also included the enforcement of emergency rule, giving security forces extended powers of arrest and immunity from prosecution, aid programmes and the implementation of state run re-education and religious camps.

Wider political tensions

Thailand has been beset by political instability since the elected government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted in a military coup in September 2006 following disputed elections and a long period of street protests. The country has struggled to rebuild a functioning democratic system, with opposing political groups often taking to the streets and bypassing the parliamenty system to call for change.

Against the backdrop of the deteriorating health of the country's revered 83-year-old king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, years of political tensions have uncovered stark political, social and ideological divisions, which have, on occasion, led to bombings and arson attacks and deadly clashes on the streets between opposing protest groups, as well as between protesters and security forces. Despite prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's 2008 promise to give high priority to the conflict in the south, there has been considerable violence since 2009.

A lethal government crackdown on protesters in early 2010 left nearly 100 people dead and 1,900 injured in the worst political violence in Bangkok in nearly 20 years. No one has been held responsible for those deaths and official inquiries into the incidents have been inadequate.

Elections in July 2011, the second national polls to be held since the 2006 coup, returned a massive victory for the pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai (For Thais) party, led by Thaksin's younger sister, political novice Yingluck Shinawatra. Fears that the military would intervene to prevent Pheu Thai from taking power did not materialise. But in an increasingly polarised country, concerns remain over the fragile peace that exists between the two political camps seeking to steer the country's political future. Talk of a deal cut between Thaksin and the military which would leave the armed forces beyond government jurisdiction is concerning. If the current government is hampered in its efforts or turns its attention inwards and away from the democratic objectives it publicised in its election campaign, then further street protests are likely. Similarly, any moves to whitewash Thaksin could lead to a resurgence in anti-Thaksin demonstrations and efforts to compel the military to intervene once more.

Despite talk of reconciliation and efforts to rebuild confidence in the rule of law and the democratic system the country remains bitterly divided and there are wide held fears that the potential for further violence is increasing the longer the search for a political resolution goes on.

Last updated: August 2009

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More than 4,400 people have been killed and thousands more injured in Thailand's southern border provinces since a long-running separatist conflict reignited in 2004. Since then, attacks on civilian and government targets have been widespread, including state officials, the security forces and local village populations.

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Myanmar won its independence from British colonial rule in 1948. Sadly its history since then has been massively unhappy. From being the best educated (apart from Japan) country in East Asia, it spiraled down over the ensuing 65 years to being possibly the worst educated as well as one of the poorest. The primary cause of this decline was the world's longest continuing civil war in which the ethnic Bamar Buddhist majority in the central valley has sought to dominate dozens of non-Buddhist ethnic minorities inhabiting the mountainous borderlands.

A remarkably free and fair election in 2015 was won in a landslide by the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who had spent most of the previous 25 years under house arrest by the country's military rulers. Her government took office in April 2016 with control of parliament, but she was barred from the presidency by a provision in the country's military-drafted constitution of 2008. The president, U Htin Kyaw, is an NLD leader and close associate of Daw Suu. She governs in the newly created position of state counsellor and as the foreign minister.

The top priority of Daw Suu's government is bringing peace to the country, but, as its first anniversary approaches, the prospect for peace with the ethnic minorities is discouraging. Moreover, a new conflict has dominated the news from Myanmar in recent months: the plight of the Muslim Rohingya community.

Conflict with the Rohingya community

The post-independence governance of Myanmar was so bad (led by heavy-handed military rulers from 1962 to 2011) that no credible census had been carried out, fueling rumors that exacerbated inter-ethnic conflict. The United Nations-supported census in 2014 produced a reliable total population figure of 51.4 million. The Bamar ethnic majority was reported to be 68 percent of the total, while the largest (Shan) of the many minorities accounted for 9 percent. By religion, 88 percent of the population was Buddhist, 6 percent Christian, and 4 percent Muslim. These ethnicity and religion figures are less reliable, however. For example, many families have mixed ethnicity but the census takers had to record them as one of the 135 official ethnicities.

The Rohingya situation involves relatively few people but may be the most difficult ethnic conflict to resolve.

The Rohingya situation involves relatively few people but may be the most difficult ethnic conflict to resolve. Muslim communities scattered across the country have existed for centuries, generally living peacefully among their Buddhist neighbors. The Rohingya are the largest of these communities, an estimated 1.3 million out of the 2.5 million Muslim total, and are confined to a small part of the country-on the Indian Ocean (Arakan) coast bordering Bangladesh.

One part of the Rohingya problem is that they reside in Rakhine State, one of Myanmar's 14 main administrative areas. The largest ethnic group in Rakhine State, the Rakhine Buddhists, deeply resent the country's Bamar majority for suppressing them. This sentiment fuels their dislike of the Rohingya who are seen as crowding them out.

Another part of the problem is conflicting narratives about the origins of the Rohingya people. It is clear that during British rule from the 1870s to 1948 Muslims immigrated to Myanmar from colonial India, which included current day Bangladesh. Not so clear is how many "Bengali" Muslims from Bangladesh settled in Rakhine State after Burma's independence. Against all evidence, the Rohingya have been portrayed as an existential threat to the Rakhine Buddhists by outbreeding them with the aim of creating the country's only Muslim-majority state. An especially vicious outbreak of anti-Rohingya violence occurred in 2012, swelling the numbers in dismal refugee camps to 130,000 or more.

Then in October 2016, three units of the Myanmar border guard force were attacked and nine officers were killed. The attacks are believed to have been carried out by Muslim insurgents based in Bangladesh. In response, the Myanmar military mounted a counterinsurgency operation that displaced another 90,000 mostly Rohingya residents and that, according to a recent U.N. report, involved a range of serious atrocities.

Peace with the ethnic minorities

Anti-Muslim attacks have occurred in other parts of Myanmar in recent years, abetted by an extreme nationalist-Buddhist movement that has grown as government repression of dissent began easing after 2010. It is hard for Americans to imagine the depth of anti-Muslim sentiment among the Buddhist population of Myanmar. Daw Suu has been sharply criticized for failing to speak out forcefully against the mistreatment of the Rohingya, but she would lose her ability to govern the country were she to do so and jeopardize the chance of achieving peace with the other ethnic minorities.

The government led by retired General Thein Sein (2011-2016) also made peace a top priority. It initiated negotiations on a National Ceasefire Agreement as the first step toward creating a federal structure tolerable to the ethnic minorities. Before handing over power, however, the Thein Sein government was only able to persuade about half of the ethnic armed groups to sign the ceasefire. While Daw Suu's government invested new energy and hope in the peace process, sadly hope has been slipping in recent months.

A resource driven civil war

The borderlands of Myanmar are rich in mineral and forest resources: jade, copper, gold, tin, teak, rubber, etc. After independence, the military saved the country from being taken over by communists or from breaking up into smaller ethnic nations, with the ultimate aim of assimilating all ethnic minorities and faiths into the Bamar Buddhist majority. It maintained its control of the heartland by extracting natural resources, including natural gas from offshore fields that it began exporting to Thailand around 2000 and to China around 2014. The ethnic minorities have been able to smuggle enough resources to neighboring China, Thailand, and India to obtain the weapons required to defend their territories against the government's army. Finding a formula for sharing the country's resource wealth between the Bamar majority and the ethnic minorities could turn out to be the hardest part of making peace.

Despite tragedy, hope remains for democracy

Earlier this year, U Ko Ni, a prominent Muslim personality and a legal advisor to Daw Suu, was shot and killed at the Yangon airport. It is speculated that U Ko Ni was targeted because he was working on amendments to the 2008 constitution that would have limited the military's political power, not because he was Muslim.U Ko Ni's assassination has been widely reported in the international press, heightening concerns about Myanmar's transition to democratic rule and about Daw Suu's leadership.

One crucial policy issue today is whether the peace process set in motion by Daw Suu will get the job done or needs to be revised or replaced.

While it is a serious setback for the country, it is unlikely to have a bearing on the country's existential challenge of achieving peace. The next benchmark will be the second session of the "21st Century Panglong" peace conference in the first week of May. While the first session, last August, was simply a platform for stakeholders to express their concerns and goals, the May session will seek consensus on specific principles or actions. But because the peace process will likely extend over five or more years, the May outcome will be largely symbolic rather than a major step forward.

One crucial policy issue today is whether the peace process set in motion by Daw Suu will get the job done or needs to be revised or replaced. Another weighty issue is what the foreign diplomatic and aid community should do to support the peace process. My personal view, based on more than a dozen visits to the country since 2010 and constant research, is that foreigners may be doing more harm than good. Myanmar's government since 2011 has been overwhelmed by foreigners who know too little about the country's history and culture. The path to better governance might be shorter if Daw Suu and her ministers were given more space to study the options and learn from their mistakes without so much Monday morning quarterbacking by well-meaning but ignorant visitors.

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Peace in Myanmar depends on settling centuries-old ethnic conflicts

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Myanmar won its independence from British colonial rule in 1948. Sadly its history since then has been massively unhappy. From being the best educated (apart from Japan) country in East Asia, it spiraled down over the ensuing 65 years to being possibly the worst educated as well as one of the poorest.

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Excellent level of detail about social, economic and political considerations in Mae Sot

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Get access to files anywhere through secure cloud storage and file backup for your photos, videos, files and more with Google Drive.

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The Problems and Solutions of Refugee Education

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The Problems and Solutions of Refugee Education

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Why refugee education is a problem - and six solutions

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Having become refugees, kids face tremendous challenges in completing their education. What are the barriers - and what can we do to help?

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Refugee Camps

Many people around the world take for granted the freedom to travel and freedom to work. Others have learned to take for granted that they are unable to do so. Thousands of refugees from Burma have lived confined to the camps in Thailand for 30 years. Although refugee camps are hardly natural places to live, thousands have been born in the camps and never left. For the vast majority of them, the only way of life they have ever known is one forced to be dependent on outside assistance. For many young refugees, refugee camps are where they were born and where they grew up, and the only reality they have ever seen exists within the fences of the camp.

"It is so strict to live here. There is nothing to do. I am not allowed to go outside the camp. There is no job, no work. So much stress and depression. I feel that I am going to go crazy here." (Burmese refugee, Nu Po camp, Tak province, January 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012e, p. 18)

Meanwhile, many older people have lived in the camps for so long that they can hardly remember their homeland anymore. This is all the while the refugee camps are only considered "temporary shelters" by Thai authorities who can close down the camps whenever they decide to do so. Thailand, in recent years, has made it no secret that they want to close the camps, causing growing concerns among the refugee population who do not feel safe to return.

When the first refugees arrived in 1984, no one could have ever predicted that only would they still be there 30 years on. Majority of the refugees in the camps are Karen (79.1%) or Karenni (10.3%) from eastern Burma (TBC, December, 2014), who have fled armed conflicts and/or horrendous human rights abuse and persecution by the Burmese military. The government policy of Four Cuts, and what has been described as the slow genocide of ethnic peoples (La Guardia, June, 2005), resulted in the widespread destruction of communities and the decline of traditional cultures. Thousands of villages, especially in the Karen and Karenni States, were burned to the ground, including houses, religious buildings, schools, belongings, and sometimes even domestic animals. In many areas, it became the norm for the villagers to live in a constant fear of the Burmese military coming to their village, terrorising the villagers, stealing their food, forcing villagers to become porters and mine sweepers, raping ethnic women, and torturing and killing anyone suspected of having a connection the ethnic armed opposition. Whilst some villagers endured the abuse by developing warning systems and repeatedly fleeing to the jungle, others, who had heard about Thailand, decided to leave their village for good. Others still had no choice as their village was already in ashes on the ground.

Until 1995, refugees on the Thailand-Burma border lived in village-type settlements and were allowed to travel outside the camps to get food and shelter materials. Camp life changed dramatically in 1995 after the DKBA attacks; the village-type settlements were merged into large, sprawling camps that became increasingly dependent on outside aid as residents became more and more restricted on space and movement (TBC, 2004). Refugees still frequently break the rules of confinement and as a consequence, are often detained and occasionally deported (e.g. SHRF & SWAN, 2002). There are even reports of refugees been found killed outside the camp fences under mysterious circumstances (see e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2012e, pp. 37-38; Poe Kwa Lay, November 2012). Refugees have no means of seeking redress; similarly to Burmese authorities in their home country, Thai officials often seem to enjoy total impunity (see Human Rights Watch, 2012e).

Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, more refugees kept pouring across the border to Thailand. Alongside the growing need, a humanitarian and human rights network grew along the border. One of the organisations to respond to the crisis is The Border Consortium (TBC), which remains the main agency organising food and other aid to the refugees. TBC was originally formed by TBC's former Executive Director Jack Dundorf who was among the first people to witness and respond to the urgent needs of thousands of refugees who fled to Thailand in 1984. TBC gradually evolved into a multi-membership aid organisation, and is one of the Executive Members of the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) that works together with the UNHCR to coordinate all humanitarian service and protection activities in Thailand.

TBC maintains a database which includes all registered and unregistered refugees and is shared with the UNHCR to ensure compatibility. The database is updated monthly for births, deaths, departures, and new arrivals, to create the 'verified caseload'. Food rations are distributed only to those who show up in person to receive their supplies. The actual number of people fed each month is known as the "feeding figure." According to the December 2014 figures, the verified caseload in the camps was 110,607 and the feeding figure 108,583. As nearly 100,000 have been resettled to third countries, current numbers do not represent the overall population that has fled to the camps over the years.

In the camps, refugees have limited educational and training opportunities and no official means of earning an income. While education in the camps is far better than any education available to civilians inside Burma, there are limited opportunities for higher education, which also largely remains unrecognised outside the camps. Karen and other ethnic peoples of Burma traditionally place a very high value on education and many have crossed the border to Thailand in order to go to a camp school. Although the majority of the camp populations have arrived as a family unit (TBC, 2012b), many parents also send their children to attend schools in refugee camps across the Thai border (KHRG, 2008).

"If we had stayed in the village, we knew that our children could never attend school and I wanted my children to go to school to be educated people. We also didn't have any house to stay in. We could only stay in the forest and we had to flee away when the SPDC came or patrolled around our area, so we decided it was better to go to the refugee camp." (Saw P-, a 47-year-old male from P- village, Papun District; KHRG, 2008, p. 58)

With more than 40,000 residents, Mae La is the biggest of the refugee camps on the Thailand-Burma border. Due to its size and easily accessibly location, Mae La is considered a centre of study for refugees. Mae La's current population includes 1,039 boarding house students who have come to study in the camp mostly from Burma. In total, as of July 2014 there were 2,763 boarding house students in the camps (TBC, 2014a). Many other students also stay with their relatives in the camps. The issue for many young students is what happens after they finish a post-ten school, the highest level of education available in most of the camps. There are only a handful of schools on the Thailand-Burma border where these young students can apply for, leaving thousands of talented and dedicated aspiring university students with no means to educate themselves.

Education in the camps is provided by CBOs such as the Karen Refugee Committee - Education Entity (KRC-EE) backed up by international NGOs such as World Education. Many schools, especially in the less remote camps in Tak Province, have foreign teachers and volunteers, majority of whom stay illegally in the camps as permits remain largely unattainable. These foreigners teach refugees English and other subjects while hiding from Thai authorities, risking fines or even deportation. After the Thai junta took over power in May 2014, however, it has become increasingly difficult to enter and stay in the camps without a permit.

Educational opportunities also vary greatly from one camp to the next. In the more remote camps such as Mae La Oon in Mae Hong Son Province and Ban Don Yang in Kanchanaburi Province, situation is dire as education remains largely unattainable, and higher education institutions are far away out of reach. Most of these opportunities are available either in the Tak camps - Mae La, Umpiem Mai and Nu Po - or in the border town of Mae Sot.

One of the most prestigious of the schools available for refugees is the Australian Catholic University (ACU), which offers a Diploma in Liberal Studies in Mae Sot as well as in Ranong. Other commendable schools include the Wide Horizons and Minmahaw GED Programs in Mae Sot, English Immersion Program in Umpiem Mai, and Global Border Studies Program in Nu Po. As these opportunities are only available to a few students each year, thousands of capable young adults are left with no means to pursue their dream of higher education. Many young people are determined to help their people and their country, but with no place to go for study, they often end up opening a shop or becoming a nurse or a teacher in the camp. Some leave to find factory work in Bangkok or elsewhere in Thailand while many others turn to drugs and alcohol, or even commit suicide, as they see their dreams crushed before them.

Having lived in a place where freedom of movement as well as self-expression is severely restricted, many young refugees feel scared about leaving the refugee camps even to pursue higher education in other camps on the border. Most have heard stories about the police check points and intimidation by Thai authorities that sometimes takes place even when refugees have managed to obtain travel documents (Human Rights Watch, 2012e). Others have already experienced being thrown to a detention centre and are reluctant to take the risk of leaving the camps.

International organisations such as the UNHCR, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have also faced restrictions in Thailand that have made it difficult for them to provide even rudimentary protection for those who have crossed the border to Thailand (see Human Rights Watch, 2007). The framework of international principles that recognises the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family to be universally protected have little significance to refugees who live in Thailand.

The 1951 United Nations Convention lays down basic minimum standards for the treatment of refugees, including access to the courts, to primary education, and to work (UNHCR, 2010). The Convention defines a refugee as a person who:

"...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol. For 30 years now, Thailand's policy has been to confine the 'persons of concern' to their 'temporary shelters' until the situation in Burma would improve and the displaced could go home. The Burmese government has also consistently denied having any problems associated with refugees. In 2003, the government published a highly controversial statement:

"As Myanmar is not engaged in any war with other countries, there is no problem of refugees. The armed insurrection groups also have come back into the legal fold and there is peace in the country." (Government of Burma, 2003, p. 54, IX A art.22 / 217)

While the UNHCR publically maintains that "...the generosity of the Royal Thai Government in hosting refugees and asylum-seekers has spanned several decades" (UNHCR, 2012b), others have described Thailand's refugee policies as "fragmented, unpredictable, inadequate and ad hoc (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2012e, p. 1)." Even UNHCR goes on to explain how they operate in a challenging environment, which is characterised by inadequate protection space for many persons of concern. Although UNHCR normally promotes three durable solutions for refugees; repatriation to their home countries, local integration in the host country, or resettlement to third countries, none of these solutions were available in Thailand until 2004 (TBC, 2012b), twenty years after the first refugees had arrived from Burma.

Thai authorities allowed refugees to register with the UNHCR periodically during 2004 and 2005, and since 2005, all registered refugees have been eligible for resettlement to third countries. In June 2014, 96,206 had been resettled, vast majority (75%) of them to the US, followed by Australia, Canada, Finland, and Norway (TBC, 2014a). Departures for resettlement have declined each year since 2008, mainly because the majority of those who were able to register in 2004 and 2005 have already left. The group settlement program to the US has now closed, but a significant number remain in the pipeline and are expected to depart in 2015 (TBC, 2014a).

Of the current camp residents, 33.5% are not registered and thus ineligible for resettlement (TBC, 2015a). Refugees also have numerous concerns regarding resettlement that often lead to eligible refugees staying in the camps. One of the common issues is the inability to organise family reunions when resettled refugees have children that are over the age of 18. Those who have been resettled often have done so in order to provide for their families and relatives in the camps. Refugees typically maintain close links with the camps and frequently send money to their loved ones. According to Human Rights Watch (2012e), despite the UNHCR having a presence on the border since 1998, its role in the camps is extremely limited. Human Rights Watch adds: "The agency has demonstrated little ability to counter the Thai government's ad hoc policies of containment and provides virtually no protection to Burmese asylum seekers outside the camps (p. 19)."

As a result of inadequate protection of refugees, as well as the highly restricted life in the camps, thousands live in the country as illegal aliens (for more information, see In Exile Outside the Camps). Many Burman nationals who have fled their home country, including most former (forcibly conscripted) child soldiers in the Burma army, also remain outside the refugee camps because they fear they may be ostracised by the refugee population who has fled Burmese military (most of whom are Burman) abuses and who are usually of a different ethnicity. Many Burman refugees in the camps talk about problems of discrimination, exclusion, and suspicions of being government spies, often leading them to depart the camps in the end. Other camp residents, who speak Burmese, have also faced similar problems as they have been mistaken for being Burman. Refugees belonging to minority groups, however, say that the situation has improved in recent years and refugees are mostly not afraid to speak Burmese anymore.

Due to the refugees in the camps being forced to be nearly completely dependent on outside help for food, shelter, protection and other basic needs, their coping mechanisms have been severely eroded. Travel and work restrictions have had adverse psychological and social effects on the refugees, decreasing their self-sufficiency, camp morale and mental health (TBC, 2012b).

"Living in the camp is similar to living in prison because I can't go outside or make my own decision. I can commute only in the camp. The camp is surrounded by barbed wire. If we go outside of the camp, Thai police will arrest us. In the long run, it affects not only my physical but also my mental health." (Christine, 22, Karen refugee, spoke with Burma Link in Mae La refugee camp in May 2014; see 'Authorities Should Take Action for Refugees NOW')

In a 2006 study, PU-AMI found that 50% of adult camp residents suffer from mental health problems and anti-depressants constituted one of the most common drug prescriptions for refugees (as cited in Human Rights Watch, 2012e, p. 19). Halting long-term sustainability prospects in the camps has also created a climate where refugees tend to think only short-term, from one ration to another. Some refugees have adapted this form of thinking already back in Burma where many were forced to flee Burma Army attacks from one hiding site to another. When the refugees will eventually return to Burma, many of them will need assistance not only in skills to sustain themselves but also in changing their thinking from short-term survival to long-term development. In a similar vein, those who have remained in hiding inside the country have been on the run for so long that many consider it normal to regularly flee and hide from government forces and to build a new village after another.

Considering the often traumatic backgrounds as well as the challenging circumstances that refugees face in Thailand, many people who visit the camps are impressed by the significant effort refugees make in order to maintain dignity and hope in the camp communities. Despite severe restrictions and depressive realities, refugees strive to remain active and to maintain their cultural traditions through practices such as teaching ethnic nationality languages and dances. People marry and have children, play sports, and organise festivals and other celebrations. Despite the devastating reality, life goes on. Thousands of people of Burma have come to consider these enclosed areas as their homes, trying to lead their lives as the best they can.

"From the beginning I was moved by the faith and dignity of the refugees I met, their determination to get on with their lives as best as they could, and their apparent belief that somehow, someday, justice would be done." (Jack Dunford, Executive Director of TBC 1984-2012; TBC, 2013a)

While vast majority of refugees in the camps are ethnic Karen from eastern Burma, camps also vary greatly with regard to ethnic diversity. Umpiem Mai and Nu Po are the most ethnically diverse with over 20% of the camp populations comprising of non-Karen or Karenni ethnic groups. Mae Ra Ma Luang, Mae La Oon, and Tham Hin are the most homogenous with ethnic Karen comprising 99% of the populations (TBC, 2013c). Literacy rate in the camps is estimated as 60% (TBC, 2013c).

When living in the camps, one will notice the integral part that religion plays in most refugees' lives. Religious buildings are centres of communal activities and refugees regularly attend religious ceremonies, sing and listen to religious songs, and read religious texts. Prayers are said before each meal, and often before the beginning of each school day. Most refugees are either Christian (51%) or Buddhist (36%), which is evident in the way refugees often ask visitors whether they are Christian or Buddhist, as if there are no other religions. In the Tak camps, however, there are also significant Muslim communities. Muslims have been particularly successful in setting up businesses in the camps, particularly noticeable in Mae La camp, where the main market has only one shop maintained by an ethnic Karen, the rest being run by Muslims.

Most of the camps are isolated in the mountains and at the end of dirt roads, while some camps, such as Mae La and Umpiem Mai, are located as close as 1 to 1.5 hour drive away from the nearest town of Mae Sot. The isolated camps tend to be far away from hospitals and some of them have no phone signal (Human Rights Watch, 2012e). The realities in the remote camps are very different from the easily accessible camps that also have much more opportunities for study and work. In these camps almost all residents are de facto refugees, as the camps have had very little pull factor other than safety from the Burmese military.

Three of the camps (Mae La, Tham Hin, and Ban Don Yang) are overcrowded (Human Rights Watch, 2012e). In all camps, the challenge of space is a significant concern. When living in one of the camps one will notice the almost complete lack of personal space or privacy. In some areas of the camps, houses are built right next to each other, people are everywhere, and it seems to never be quiet as there is always someone in the earshot singing, playing music, listening to the radio, or simply talking. Refugees who still have memories of life in Burma struggle to adapt to having no space around their houses; "Here, it is like fifty villages are crammed into one," one refugee told TBC (2004, p. 53).

Due to space restrictions and limited housing supplies provided in the camps, many households comprise more than one family and young married couples typically continue to live with their parents. Space restrictions coupled with bamboo building materials also make camps into 'fire traps' and despite refugees being aware of the danger, fires regularly sweep through the communities. In February 2012, a huge fire in Umpiem camp destroyed as many as 1,000 houses (Karen News, February, 2012). In April 2013, 36 refugees died in a tragic fire that destroyed Ban Mae Surin refugee camp in Mae Hong Son Province. In December 2013, around 750 refugees were left homeless in Mae La camp when more than a hundred houses were destroyed by a fire. The next day one refugee woman died in a fire in Ban Mai Nai Soi camp.

Although some basic health care is provided in the camps, diseases such as malaria, dengue fever and tuberculosis are still common among the refugees. According to TBC (2015a), the border-wide average chronic (stunting) malnutrition rate is classified as "very high", with camps with the highest stunting rates being located in the most remote areas of the border.

The camps are highly organised with regularly elected camp leaders, committees, and section leaders, although refugees regularly complain about corruption and lack of transparency in the leadership. The Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) and the Karenni Refugee Committee (KnRC) are the overall representatives of the refugees living in the camps. These Committees coordinate and oversee all camp activities through the Camp Committees, coordinate assistance provided by NGOs, and liaise with UNHCR, Thai authorities, and security personnel (TBC, 2013a). Each camp is headed by a single leader and hundreds of people serve on the Camp Committees, organising the storage and distribution of rations, safeguarding the camps' physical environment and infrastructure, and overseeing health clinics, the school system, and the administration of justice (TBC, 2004).

The latest Refugee Committee and Camp Committee elections were held in early 2013. According to TBC (2013a), all registered and unregistered refugees over the age of 20, regardless of gender, religion and ethnicity, were able to vote. Camp residents, however, voiced concerns over the elections. According to one young refugee who spoke with Burma Link, "Most people don't know whether they are eligible to vote or not. So, most unregistered didn't vote".

A variety of CBOs formed by members of the refugee communities also support specific social groups, such as the Karenni Students Union, the Karen Youth Organisation, and the Karen Handicapped Welfare Association. Refugee women's organisations have also actively sought ways to improve women's participation in all aspects of society.

TBC remains the only agency responsible for providing food and shelter assistance to the refugees in the camps. In the past, TBC also regularly purchased and distributed blankets, mosquito nets, clothing for children under five and thread for longyi weaving, sleeping mats, and cooking pots both to current and newly arrived camp residents. Recent funding cuts on the border have forced TBC to cease the provision of all non-food items even to new arrivals. Only cooking stoves and donated items are still being distributed to refugees. As a consequence of the funding cuts, TBC's food rations have also fallen substantially below minimum daily nutritional levels (see TBC, 2013a, p. 44). Health and education services for the refugees have also been cut back, having an adverse effect on the camp residents.

As the recent restrictions in movement have strictly prohibited refugees from leaving camp premises, the reduced rations have become a grave concern. According to the refugees themselves, it is the poorest and the most vulnerable who suffer the consequences as they are not able to go to the forest to hunt for rats and collect vegetables, nor to buy extra food as they are now not allowed to take on work as daily workers. Some refugees are now employing more risky behaviours and strategies in order to bridge the widened gap between their basic needs and the humanitarian assistance they receive. While some households are able to supplement their needs through well-established economic activities, others are simply no longer able to meet their basic needs.

In order to cope with the situation, TBC has employed a method of identifying food secure and insecure households in order to implement Community Managed Targeting, in which self-reliant refugees will forfeit their rations whilst the most vulnerable receive extra supplies (see TBC, 2013a, p. 45). Eye-witness accounts, however, tell a grim story as Burma Link has received reports of some refugees believing they are being starved out in order to avoid their continuing assistance and future repatriation.

Many refugees refuse to settle for their faith as helpless and passive victims and are making great efforts to cope and provide for their families through taking part in different livelihood activities, when possible. Some international NGOs and local CBOs such as TBC provide the refugees with opportunities for skills training and income generation, although these projects reach only a small part of refugee populations. Refugees are also often left frustrated as after taking part in the training, they have nowhere to use their newly-found skills. Some have taken part in one TBC training after another, unable to apply their skills in practice.

TBC does, however, have several successful projects in the camps such as the Community Agriculture Program (CAP) that is currently implemented in eight camps (TBC, 2014a). CAP gardening activities are important in that they increase the availability of fresh food in camps, and prepare refugees with vital livelihood skills. As a result of CAP activities, hundreds of households in the camps are now able to cultivate their own gardens. TBC also supports some projects run by local CBOs on Burma side of the border, e.g. the Back Pack Health Worker Team's (BPHWT) water supply and sanitation projects and the Karen Human Rights Group's (KHRG's) village agency project.

Other organisations also undertake training activities in the camps. COERR, for example, has trained refugees on appropriate and sustainable organic agricultural practices, assisted refugee communities to develop basic social work technical skills, and provided vocational training for individuals in extremely vulnerable situations (see COERR - Project).

These activities, when successfully implemented, are essential for the refugees to regain confidence, motivation, and a sense of independence from external aid. They will also be extremely valuable for refugees if they return to Burma or are resettled in third countries. Since 2005, the UNHCR and CCSDPT have advocated with the Thai authorities for a relaxation in the policy of confinement to camps (see TBC, 2013a). The policy nevertheless remains in place and restrictions have recently been tightened. While many refugees make significant efforts to remain active in the challenging and often depressive situation, the vast majority of camp residents are increasingly reliant on outside support and aid as a result of forced passivity.

The recent political changes and ceasefire talks in Burma have resulted in widespread and grossly premature talks of repatriating the refugees. Only one month after Burma transitioned to a nominally civilian government in March 2011, Thai authorities announced that they are in the process of discussion with the Burmese government about closing the refugee camps (Chitradon, April, 2011). More recently, the Thai junta announced that it wants to repatriate all refugees by 2015 (Saw Yan Naing, July, 2014b). These are grave concerns for the refugees as major obstacles for safe repatriation remain. In fact, none of the reasons why refugees fled have seen a sustainable solution; peace process has stalled, ceasefires remain fragile and unpredictable, landmines contamination is among the worst in the world, health and education is lacking, poverty is rampant, and human rights violations continue (see e.g. Davis, Gittleman, Sollom, Richards, & Beyrer, 2012; KHRG, 2014a; ND-Burma, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b).

Although the consensus is that conditions are not yet conducive for refugees to return, there are now significant concerns that camps could be closed and refugees repatriated before they can do so with a sense of dignity and hope. In recent years, even TBC has changed their focus to preparedness for refugee and IDP return (TBC, 2013a, 2014a). Talks about repatriation coupled with reduced aid and increased restrictions have caused anxiety and uncertainty among the refugees who do not feel safe returning to their homeland. Despite the positive change that has emerged during the past years, much more needs to be done before refugees can safely return to Burma yet no one knows when the refugees will have to go back and whether they can do so voluntarily. Read more about Repatriation of Refugees.

It is hoped that organisations such as the TBC and UNHCR, as well as the international donor community, will be willing to continue necessary support on the border until the time is right for refugees to return. A major current challenge, however, is that many NGOs and CBOs along the border are struggling to sustain even basic services to refugees as donors are shifting their funds inside Burma. One can only hope that agencies such as the UNHCR will respect its public commitments and "ensure that repatriation is voluntary, undertaken in safety and dignity, and takes place only when conditions are conducive" (UNHCR, 2013b).
Updated April 27, 2015 RECOMMENDED READING
On April 27, 2015, Burma Link and Burma Partnership launched a joint briefing paper, Voices of Refugees - Situation of Burma's Refugees Along the Thailand-Burma Border (click to download PDF).

Continue to In Exile Outside the Camps

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Many people around the world take for granted the freedom to travel and freedom to work. Others have learned to take for granted that they are unable to do so. Thousands of refugees from Burma have lived confined to the camps in Thailand for 30 years.

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Walking Tour Through Mae La Refugee Camp

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Walking Tour Through Mae La Refugee Camp

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Walk Through Mae La Refugee Camp, Volunteer Thai/Burma Border - LA Girl Abroad

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This was originally just going to be a video for my family but I felt that this could help raise awareness and attract more volunteers. I gained a passion for the people of Myanmar affected by the world's longest running civil war and have come to the Thai/Burma border to lend a hand.

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The world is facing the highest number of displaced people ever, surpassing even World War II levels. Over 65 million people are asylum seekers, refugees, or internally-displaced people. Rich countries are groaning under the strain of refugee and migrant influxes, which have prompted a political backlash.

Some 4.4 million people applied for asylum in 44 industrialized countries between 2013 and 2016, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency's data. It has become a hot-button issue in the West as the United States and Europe grapple with unprecedented levels of asylum-seekers.

To visualize the situation, number junkies at the data visualization site put together an interactive map of what asylum seekers went where from 2013 to 2016 based on U.N. data.

Each dot represents 500 asylum seekers. The map shows a steady stream of asylum seekers from war-torn Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia to Europe, particularly to refugee-friendly countries like Germany and Sweden. According to the U.N., slightly more than half of refugees worldwide come from just three countries: Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

An asylum-seeker is someone who has applied for asylum in another country on grounds that they would face persecution if they returned to their home country. If their application is accepted, they then become a refugee. The distinction is important; once people are designated refugees they're entitled to international assistance and protection. If an asylum-seeker's claim is denied, they can be sent back to their country of origin.

Seven countries in the world host over half of the world's refugees. Despite the debates gripping Europe over whether and how to absorb so many refugees, none of the seven countries are in the European Union. They are: Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

While Europe is a prime destination for refugees, only a fraction make it there. Most land in neighboring countries and can't make it further due to a variety of geographic, resource, and legal barriers. Of the 11 million Syrians who fled their country since the conflict began in 2011, only about 1 million have requested asylum in Europe.

Photo credit: GABRIEL BOUYS/AFP/Getty Images

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Watch: The Global Flow of Asylum-Seekers In One Interactive Map

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The world is facing the highest number of displaced people ever, surpassing even World War II levels. Over 65 million people are asylum seekers, refugees, or internally-displaced people. Rich countries are groaning under the strain of refugee and migrant influxes, which have prompted a political backlash.

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Asylum Seeker v Refugee - Important Defintions

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Asylum Seeker v Refugee - Important Defintions

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Revised version August 2017
This paper was originally published in January 2006. In view of the considerable interest which is shown by the frequency of its consultation, it has now been revised and brought up to date. Material relating to migrant flows in 2016 on page 2 has been added by Dr Benedict Greening, Migration Watch researcher.
There is much confusion in the media and in public debate generally about asylum seekers, refugees and economic migrants. We feel that a useful purpose will be served if we publish a brief paper defining these terms and explaining the extent to which these categories overlap. This paper is written from the point of view of the laws and immigration practices of the United Kingdom but its contents are of general application in other countries in Europe, North America and elsewhere which are parties to the 1951 Convention referred to in the next paragraph.

"Asylum seeker" means a person who has claimed asylum under the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention") on the ground that if he is returned to his country of origin he has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political belief or membership of a particular social group. He remains an asylum seeker for so long as his application or an appeal against refusal of his application is pending. This definition is a paraphrase of the statutory definitions of "asylum seeker" and "claim for asylum" in section 94(1) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.

"Refugee" as the word is used in the Convention means an asylum seeker whose application or subsequent appeal against initial refusal has been successful. In its broader context it may also mean a person fleeing e.g. civil war or natural disaster and not necessarily fearing persecution as defined by the Convention. Such persons may be entitled to humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules. "Humanitarian protection" is defined and explained in the Legal Briefing Paper MW174 ( Glossary of the Main Legal Words and Expressions used in the Context of Asylum and Immigration).

"Economic migrant" means a person who has left his or her own country and seeks by lawful or unlawful means to make a living for himself or herself (and their family in many cases) in another country. As will be explained later, many asylum seekers are in fact economic migrants who hope to secure entry into the United Kingdom by claiming asylum.

So far so good and at least as far as asylum seekers are concerned, there ought to be no confusion. To describe a person as an asylum seeker is in principle a neutral statement, not making any assumption as to whether his claim is justified or not. Unfortunately "asylum seeker" and "refugee" are frequently conflated, giving rise to much confusion. As an example of this we refer to a booklet published by the Church of England in 2005 entitled "A place of refuge - a positive approach to asylum seekers and refugees in the UK". It was a serious and obviously well-intentioned study, running to 63 pages with a foreword by the Bishop of Southwark. Its preparation resulted from a discussion of the subject by the General Synod in February 2004. Clearly a document to which the Church attached much importance. The booklet gets off to a good start with definitions of "refugee" and "asylum seeker" similar to those above. However, it soon becomes apparent in the text that the authors are not capable of maintaining a proper distinction between these terms. At several points in the text the two expressions are conflated and contrasted with "migrants" economic or otherwise. Thus on page 11:

Whilst the migrant stands to lose a better quality of life if her or his request for hospitality is rejected, the asylum seeker stands to lose his or her life [1].

The italicised words in this quotation might be true of an asylum seeker who has a genuine case and who is in due course accepted as a genuine refugee. It is, however, manifestly incorrect to say that all asylum seekers fear loss of life. Most are found not to have a genuine case and their applications/appeals are dismissed. Even in the case of genuine refugees it is not true to say that they all fear loss of life if they are returned to their countries of origin. Many fear loss of liberty or some other non-lethal form of persecution. This is explicitly recognised in the Convention itself, which in Article 33.1 defines the principal obligation of Contracting States as follows:

No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom [2] would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

On page 13 of the booklet appears the following passage :

[3]ifferent criteria must apply to those fleeing persecution and oppression from those applied to other migrants. Asylum seekers are extremely marginalized and vulnerable people. They have ceased to be under the protection of the governments of their own countries, and are unable to return home through fear of persecution. [4]

The two italicised passages are obviously based on the assumption that all asylum seekers are genuine and that there is no difference between "asylum seeker" and "refugee". Furthermore, the first sentence draws an invalid distinction between asylum seekers and migrants. Frans Timmermans, vice-president of the European Commission, said in January 2016 that more than half of migrants, who at the time were arriving in Europe by sea at a rate of more than 2,300 per day, were motivated by "economic reasons" and not fleeing war or persecution. This view of the importance of economic factors was echoed by a recent United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees report with respect to migrants who have been travelling from other parts of the world to Libya in the hope of crossing the Mediterranean into Europe. It also needs to be borne in mind that most asylum applications and appeals in the UK are unsuccessful. The average rate of grant of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave in the last ten years (using Home Office cohort analysis data), including grants following appeal, was 40%. The main reason for the failure of a large number of applications is that the evidence given by the applicants/appellants is not credible, at either the application or appeal stage or both. On this subject you are invited to read briefing paper MW89 ( The Immigration Appeals System Revised - 2010 Version) on this website on the working of the appeals system and in particular paragraph 17, which gives examples of the kind of contradictory or otherwise unbelievable stories which lead Home Office officials and immigration judges to dismiss applications and appeals because they conclude that the applicant/appellant is not telling the truth. Another common reason for dismissal is that even if the appellant is believed his evidence does not establish that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in his country of origin for one or other of the reasons set out in the Convention.

Asylum applications and appeals which are unsuccessful have been dismissed because of the failure of the applicants/appellants to persuade Home Office officials and immigration judges of the strength of their cases, even though the standard of proof required of a "reasonable degree of likelihood" is much more lenient than the normal civil burden of "balance of probabilities" and the applicant/appellant is often given the benefit of the doubt. The Archbishop of York, Dr John Sentamu, recently claimed publicly that many asylum applications were being unjustly dismissed, but he has not so far as we are aware supplied any evidence in support of this assertion. So what is the position of the unsuccessful asylum seeker? In the majority of cases he is an economic migrant who has tried to take advantage of the asylum system in the absence of any other available means of obtaining lawful entry into the United Kingdom. This conclusion is reinforced when one considers that most asylum seekers are young men, a disproportionate majority in relation to the make up of the populations of their countries of origin. Furthermore, many of them, particularly from China and the Indian sub-continent, have paid huge sums of money to people traffickers to bring them to the UK.

There are of course other categories of economic migrants, including many people entering the UK lawfully with work permits or coming from other Member States of the European Union to take up employment here. There are also large numbers of illegal immigrants who are smuggled into the country as well as visitors, students and others who enter on short term visas and overstay. The position of unsuccessful asylum seekers is similar to that of the latter category. They are granted temporary admission while their applications/appeals are pending, but once they have exhausted their rights and are still unsuccessful they no longer have any lawful right to remain in the United Kingdom. They do not monopolise the category of economic migrant, but that remains nevertheless a reasonable designation for many of them.

The confusion of nomenclature is not helped by statements made by the then United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres in the course of an interview, as reported on the Telegraph Online website on 30th December 2005. According to the report:

Mr Guterres believed too many people confused refugees and asylum seekers on the one hand and would-be economic migrants on the other.

If this report is correct, Mr Guterres is falling into the common error of conflating asylum seekers and refugees on the one hand and failing to appreciate that there is an overlap between asylum seekers, particularly unsuccessful ones, and economic migrants on the other.

Further statements attributed to Mr Guterres make it necessary to deal with the alternative meaning of "refugee", i.e. a person fleeing civil war, natural disaster or other calamity. He makes the fair point that the largest numbers of refugees are close to the countries where their problems originated. As an example, many thousands of Tamils fled to India to escape the brutal civil war being waged between the Tamil Tigers and the government of Sri Lanka. In some cases they may have been escaping persecution as defined by the Convention but it is reasonable to assume in the majority of cases that they left Sri Lanka because of fears for their own personal safety or that of their families. Many were caught up in cross fire or had their properties or livelihoods destroyed by the fighting. The distinction is recognised by paragraph 164 of the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, a publication for which Mr Guterres has responsibility and which is relied on by officials and immigration judges dealing with asylum cases:

Persons compelled to leave their country of origin as a result of international or national armed conflicts are not normally considered refugees under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol... They do, however, have the protection provided for in other international instruments, e.g. the Geneva Conventions of 1949... etc

The United Kingdom government has long recognised that many people from countries in a state of turmoil for one reason or another, although they may not have a valid claim for asylum under the 1951 Convention, should not be compelled to return to their countries of origin because of general anarchy or lack of security there. Account is taken of this by allowing such people to remain for a limited period on grounds of humanitarian protection even though their claims have failed. In recent years persons from Liberia, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and Iraq have been granted limited leave to remain on this basis.

Harry Mitchell QC
Honorary Legal Adviser
Migration Watch

Updated 1 August, 2017

Notes

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The distinction between asylum seekers and refugees

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Revised version August 2017 This paper was originally published in January 2006. In view of the considerable interest which is shown by the frequency of its consultation, it has now been revised and brought up to date. Material relating to migrant flows in 2016 on page 2 has been added by Dr Benedict Greening, Migration Watch researcher.