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This handout introduces students to three proxy wars from the Cold War - the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Soviet-Afghan War. Students must read and explain how each conflict is an example of a proxy war and also how nations were affected by them. I use this when I have to save time and cover these three wars in one day under a similar lens.

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Proxy Wars during the Cold War - Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan

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This handout introduces students to three proxy wars from the Cold War - the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Soviet-Afghan War. Students must read and explain how each conflict is an example of a proxy war and also how nations were affected by them.

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The Domino Theory was the belief that communism was an aggressive, expanding imperialism that would spread from one country to the next, until it dominated the world. This idea shaped US and Western foreign policy during the Cold War, particularly with regard to Asia. Communist ideology itself contained some evidence to validate this argument. The writings of Russian Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin called for 'international revolution'. Communism, he said, was a movement based on class, not nationality or race. It would transcend borders, nationalities, patriotism and language barriers. Once communism had taken hold in Russia, Lenin believed it would inspire similar revolutions in Germany, France and other European nations. Wherever workers were being exploited and oppressed, communism would flourish. The new Soviet government played a leading role in advancing this international revolution. In March 1919 Moscow established the Communist International, or Comintern, a committee of Russian and foreign delegates. The Comintern's main objective was to promote and advance communist movements abroad, to facilitate the 'world revolution'. The Comintern was attended by delegates from communist parties in dozens of countries, including Western nations like the United States, Great Britain and Australia. In its early years the Comintern provided training and material support to individuals and groups around the world, including the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Vietnamese nationalist Ho Chi Minh.

The West had long been paranoid about the internationalist agenda of communism. This paranoia hardened into the Domino Theory in the late 1940s, on the back of Stalin's expansion into eastern Europe and the rise of communism in China. Western leaders came to believe that once communism gained a foothold in one nation, neighbouring countries would soon be infiltrated, overrun and seized by communists - much like a row of standing dominos topples, one knocking over the next until they have all fallen. It is not known who first used the analogy of falling dominos or coined the phrase Domino Theory. The first public mention of it was made by US president Dwight Eisenhower in a speech in 1954, where he explained why America would aid the French in their struggle against communists in Indochina (Vietnam):

[There are] broader considerations that might follow what you would call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly... But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula (Malaysia and Singapore) and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about ... millions and millions and millions of people.

This readiness to accept the Domino Theory was probably influenced by events in Europe during the 1930s. Most Cold War politicians and foreign policy planners had lived through the pre-war period, when central European regions - the Rhineland, Austria, the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia - had all fallen to Hitler, one after another. The policy of appeasement - letting Hitler annex or seize particular regions in the hope it would satisfy him - had failed to prevent war. There was a similar scenario in Asia, where Japanese imperial expansion was allowed to spread unchecked through the 1930s. The attitudes of Cold War leaders were shaped by these events, and these attitudes made them more determined to act against perceived aggression and expansion. As historians Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts put it:

The domino theory ... resulted from thinking along the lines of some simple, albeit appealing, psychological and legal analogies. If you let your daughter come home late from a date without punishment, the next thing you know she will be pregnant. If you let a crime go unpunished, you invite more crime. If aggression is tolerated in small out-of-the-way places, aggressors will be emboldened to attack larger, more vital places. US leaders saw a straight line from the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931 to the invasion of China to the invasion of Indochina to the attack on Pearl Harbour. Once the principle has been undermined, there is no stopping place.

Asia, a fertile ground for communists
An additional factor in the Domino Theory was concern that many nations were incapable of resisting communism - particularly if it was to take hold in their region. Most European nations were fatigued and economically exhausted after years of war. Their governments were weak and their people depressed, desperate and starving. This made them easy prey to communist infiltration and propaganda. Asia was just as susceptible to communist incursion. The governments and military forces of most Asian nations were comparatively weak. Their populations contained large numbers of peasants, who were susceptible to communist propaganda and recruitment. Nationalist and independence movements in Asia were considered ideal 'hiding places' for communist infiltrators. Asian borders were not well policed and were largely insecure, so communists could move in and out of target countries with ease.

"Two generations of presidents and officials had lived through or were reared on the dominos of the 1930s. Whatever their exact circumstances and consequences, these cases came to possess a simple and compelling message: if aggression is tolerated in small, out-of-the-way places, aggressors will be emboldened to attack larger, more vital places. US leaders saw straight lines from the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931 to the invasion of China to the invasion of Indochina to the attack on Pearl Harbour. They saw the straight line from Italy's attack on Ethiopia in 1935 to German re-occupation of the Rhineland to the anchluss of Austria to the rape of Czechoslovakia at Munich to general war in Europe."
Leslie H. Gelb, historian

The Domino Theory was also underpinned by assumptions about Chinese expansion. Western planners believed that China would act as a vanguard for advancing communism in Asia, much as Soviet Russia had done in eastern Europe. The events of the late 1940s and 1950s seemed to support this. Chinese troops supported the communist invasion of South Korea during the Korean War (1950-53). During the same period Beijing was providing moral, material and logistic support to Ho Chi Minh and the emerging Viet Minh in northern Vietnam. As Chinese economic and military capacity increased, the West believed China would export communism to create a buffer between itself and potential threats. This placed a number of countries at risk of communist aggression, including South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Tibet, Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia.
'Piece by piece, country by country'
Every US president from the late 1940s to the early 1970s was an advocate of the Domino Theory. Though Harry Truman never used the domino analogy, he accepted its general principles nonetheless and used it as the basis of his Truman Doctrine. John F. Kennedy spoke of the Domino Theory and hinted at it in his inauguration speech, when he warned that "our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country." Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon also accepted the Domino Theory as fact, underpinning their decision to escalate and remain involved in the Vietnam War. The costly American defeat in Vietnam saw the Domino Theory largely discredited. Today, it remains a controversial idea with its detractors generally outnumbering its supporters. Some claim the Domino Theory was entirely valid and proved correct by the southward march of communism into Asia; only US intervention in Asia halted its progress. Others argue that it was a simplistic theory which failed to acknowledge that Asian communism was motivated by nationalism as much as by the push for 'world revolution'.

1. The Domino Theory was the belief that communism was spread from one nation to its neighbours, and so on.
2. It was based on an analogy with falling dominos, was popularised in the 1950s and became widely accepted.
3. The theory was partly supported by the Soviet-led Comintern, which promoted communism around the world.
4. Asia was considered to be particularly susceptible to communism, as its governments and borders were weak.
5. The Domino Theory was accepted as fact by all US presidents during the Cold War and became an underlying principle in American foreign policy.

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This page was written by Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim Southey and Steve Thompson. To reference this page, use the following citation:
J. Llewellyn et al, "The Domino theory", Alpha History, accessed [today's date], http://alphahistory.com/coldwar/domino-theory/.

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The Domino Theory was the belief that communism was an aggressive, expanding imperialism that would spread from one country to the next, until it dominated the world. This idea shaped US and Western foreign policy during the Cold War, particularly with regard to Asia. Communist ideology itself contained some evidence to validate this argument.

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Occurs when 2 powers in conflict use substitutes instead of fighting each other directly.
A historical significance is that "the viet Cong were rebels in the south who fought against the southern Vietnam gov and the u.s."

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Not firing a weapon because other side could strike back with same power.
A historical significance is that "during the cold war the u.s and soviet union both built a stock pile of nuclear weapons "

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If one country became communist,neighboring countries would also fall.
A historical significance is that it was "used as a short hand expression of the strategic importance of south Vietnam to the u.s."

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Today, the escalation of geopolitical tensions is fuelling local conflicts across the globe, much like during the Cold War era.

Getty Images

Tensions in 2017 between Washington and Moscow can certainly be comparted to the political strain during the Cold War, and experts say Russia and the West need to find common ground to avoid a new conflict.

The last leader of the USSR - Mikhail Gorbachev - who repeatedly warned about the dawning of a new Cold War, has reiterated his thoughts once again:

"The language of politicians and the top-level military personnel is becoming increasingly militant. Military doctrines are formulated increasingly harshly. [...] all the indications of a Cold War are there."

Political analyst Fyodor Lukyanov wrote (in Russian) that the prospect of a second Cold War had turned into a game of crying wolf. However, he's changed his tune: "This time, the former USSR president is right."

Noise coming from the U.S. and Russia has indeed become less restrained and the countries' leaders increasingly talk about diminishing trust. Although experts point to disquieting parallels with the Cold War, worryingly many believe that the present situation between Washington and Moscow is on far shakier ground than it was during to the Cold War.

Cold War 2.0?

Today, the escalation of geopolitical tensions is fuelling local conflicts across the globe, much like during the Cold War era. War in Syria and Ukraine are contemporary examples of this.

But even in the situation where distrust between Russia and the U.S. is growing, the absence of ideological confrontation precludes experts to seriously speak about the return of the Cold War.

"The big difference is that then the two worlds were largely insulated from each other, whereas now [...] they have in many ways internalized the same worldview," says Mark Galeotti, as senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague.

Despite some signs being prematurely interpreted as omens of a new Cold War, the current state of affairs is not the same as it was during the second half of the 20th century.

A shared world view and the absence of common ideological struggle, however, are not the only differences that separate the new era from the Cold War. "The two countries are still the world's largest nuclear powers, but hard military power has retreated in importance in the last three decades," says Boris Stremlin, a professor of International Relations and expert in Cold War history.

"The gross power level of the two sides is no longer commensurable, but more importantly, there are many more players in today's international system that cannot effectively be disciplined by either side," says Stremlin.

In other words, Russia and the U.S. cannot effectively solve international problems without involving other players of global and regional influence. The era of tête-à-tête decision-making evaporated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and successful crisis management today requires the inclusion of all stakeholders. This feature generates so much unpredictability and risk in contemporary politics that people unwittingly turn to a more stable Cold War-like era in search for a foothold, or a reference point, experts say.

Back to the future

"The irony of the situation is that although the West has fallen back on Cold War stereotypes as a way to portray Russia as a threat, the Cold War as a concept is also a palliative for finding reference points in a world that is today a lot more confusing, fluid, and difficult to comprehend," says Anton Fedyashin, director of the Carmel Institute of Russian Culture and History at the American University in Washington D.C.

In today's world, where the threat of terrorism is ever-present, "Cold War bipolarity now seems like a period of relative stability with an enemy that was identifiable and approachable through diplomacy. Today's conflicts are much more open-ended," says Fedyashin.

Despite the aggressive "Cold War" rhetoric, America and the USSR "were in substantial agreement about how to collectively manage the world. Today, the main reason behind the return of the conflict is that nobody is clear on how the management of the world can continue, and this leads to tensions," continues Stremlin.

Whether world leaders will need an equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis, as Fedor Lukyanov wonders (in Russian), in order to start building a new system of crisis management - and possibly of international collaboration - is one of today's most pressing questions that harks back to the Cold War era, and yet differs so much.

But while scholars are talking about the need to cooperate, politicians, it seems, continue living in the Cold War 2.0.

If using any of Russia Beyond's content, partly or in full, always provide an active hyperlink to the original material.

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Is the world gearing up for 'Cold War: The Sequel'?

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Today, the escalation of geopolitical tensions is fuelling local conflicts across the globe, much like during the Cold War era. Getty Images Tensions in 2017 between Washington and Moscow can certainly be comparted to the political strain during the Cold War, and experts say Russia and the West need to find common ground to avoid a new conflict.

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U.S would prevent communism from spreading not destroy it where it already existed.
A historical significance is that this policy was a response to the series of moves by the soviet union.

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No actual combat
A historical significance is that "the u.s emerged as the sole super power  in the world."