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President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan

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Major features in politics in Africa
http://africancurators.com/2017/04/18/the-major-features-of-african-politics/

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A Story of Fear, Surviving Boko-Haram  | Fatima Yetcha | TEDxMaitama

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Poem about immigration
https://www.powerpoetry.org/poems/because-im-immigrant

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Overview of political system in Africa.
https://www.everyculture.com/Africa-Middle-East/Introduction-to-Africa-Government-and-Politics.html

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Native American Indian Spirit of Meditation

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http://masalamusic.bandcamp.com/ - FREE DOWNLOAD OF THE TRACK https://www.facebook.com/masaala?ref=tn_tnmn Join us on FaceBook :) Australian African chill out music by Masala Much Love

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Overview of the oil that comes from Africa, its effect on the economy and the undiscovered factors it may cause.
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/18/business/africa-oil-gas-potential-boom-hype/index.html

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Overview of political system in Nigeria.
https://nigerianfinder.com/nigerian-government-and-politics/

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According to BBC News , Ahamd Salkida, a Nigerian journalist with supposed links to the Islamist group has claimed that only 15 out of the 112 missing Chibok girls are still alive.

It's been exactly four years since Boko Haram abducted 276 girls from their school in the north-east Nigerian town of Chibok. Many of the pupils were Christians, and parents said that they felt safe sending their daughters to this school.

Boko Haram, the Sunni terrorist organization whose name actually translates to "Western civilization is forbidden," has a main goal to establish an Islamic caliphate within the country, allowing for the implementation of sharia law. Boko Haram sees public schools as places where students are brainwashed by a "Western" curriculum and earmarks them as significant targets in its war to drive secular, federal institutions from Nigeria's Islamic heartland.

The initial kidnapping of the 276 schoolgirls back in 2014 sparked one of the largest global campaigns to date, with users actively tweeting the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls.

Few of the girls managed to escape shortly after their kidnapping by jumping off of the trucks and running into the bushes, and close to 100 were freed in exchange for Boko Haram militants in negotiations brokered by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Others weren't so lucky.

In a series of tweets, Salkida said sources within the group told him the others died during military operations by government forces. The government, however, said it was not aware of the content of these claims.

Marking the fourth anniversary of their abduction, parents of the schoolgirls marched with thousands of others to the school in the state the girls were abducted back in 2014. Parents whose children were released wore white during the ceremony, and those whose daughters were still missing wore black.

"Our only prayer is for our girls to be released and returned to us," Hannatu Daudu, a parent of one of the missing said at the gathering. "We need to know if they are alive or dead. If they are alive, let them come back to us. If they are dead, let us know so we can at least pray for them and overcome this grief."

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Report: Only 15 of 112 Missing Chibok Girls Captured By Boko Haram Are Alive

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According to BBC News , Ahamd Salkida, a Nigerian journalist with supposed links to the Islamist group has claimed that only 15 out of the 112 missing Chibok girls are still alive. It's been exactly four years since Boko Haram abducted 276 girls from their school in the north-east Nigerian town of Chibok.

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Overview on Boko Haram and timeline of things they have done.
https://www.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html

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Africa's democratic transition is back in the spotlight. The concern is no longer the stranglehold of autocrats, but the hijacking of the democratic process by tribal politics.

Kenya's 2007-08 post-election violence revealed the extent to which tribal forces could quickly bring a country to the brink of civil war.

The challenge to democracy in Africa is not the prevalence of ethnic diversity, but the use of identity politics to promote narrow tribal interests. It is tribalism.

There are those who argue that tribalism is a result of arbitrary post-colonial boundaries that force different communities to live within artificial borders.

This argument suggests that every ethnic community should have its own territory, which reinforces ethnic competition.

The last 20 years of Somalia have shown the dangers of ethnic competition and underscore the importance of building nations around ideas rather than clan identities.

Much attention over the last two decades has been devoted to removing autocrats and promoting multiparty politics.

But in the absence of efforts to build genuine political parties that compete on the basis of ideas, many African countries have reverted to tribal identities as foundations for political competition.

Leaders often exploit tribal loyalty to advance personal gain, parochial interests, patronage, and cronyism.

But tribes are not built on democratic ideas but thrive on zero-sum competition.

As a result, they are inimical to democratic advancement.

In essence, tribal practices are occupying a vacuum created by lack of strong democratic institutions.

Tribal interests have played a major role in armed conflict and civil unrest across the continent.

'Clever and calculating'

But the extent to which it blunts efforts to deepen democracy has received little attention. This is mainly because much of the attention has focused on elections.

According to US-based pro-democracy group Freedom House, 19 African countries were considered electoral democracies in 2012, down from 24 over the 2005-08 period.

These trends conceal the influence that tribal politics exerts on the democratic process.

It took Kenyan political parties nearly a decade to unite and defeat Daniel arap Moi's regime.

Leaders of the different opposition parties were primarily focused on pursuing their tribal interests rather than uniting around a common political programme.

They in effect played into the hands of the government in power that could divide them along tribal lines.

The opposition parties were unable to find common ground through coherent party manifestos.

According to research carried out on Kenya by Stephen Keverenge at the US-based Atlantic International University in 2008, 56% of 1,500 respondents did not know that their parties had manifestos.

The manifestos are generally issued late because much of the effort goes into building tribal alliances.

The new constitution of Kenya seeks to address the issue of ethnicity by ensuring that a president needs broad geographical support to be elected.

A winner must receive more than half of all the votes cast in the election and least 25% of the votes cast in each of more than half of the country's counties.

But tribal leaders are clever and calculating.

They are quick to dress in the latest fashion and co-opt emerging trends to preserve their identities.

They buy influence and create convenient alliances, shopping for international support in power centres such as London, Paris, and Washington DC.

Their sole mission is self-preservation, with the side effect of subverting democratic evolution.

For them tribal politics is a zero-sum game, so they are prone to using hate speech and inciting violence.

Intellectual input

The way forward for African democracy lies in concerted efforts to build modern political parties founded on development ideas and not tribal bonds.

Such political parties must base their competition for power on development platforms.

Defining party platforms will need to be supported by the search for ideas-not the appeal to tribal coalitions.

Political parties that create genuine development platforms will launch initiatives that reflect popular needs.

Those that rely on manipulating ethnic alliances will bring sectarian animosity into government business.

Whoever is elected as president will spend most of his or her time on tribal balancing rather than on economic management.

Party manifestos are fundamentally documents in which parties outline their principles and goals in a manner that goes beyond popular rhetoric.

They arise from careful discussion, compromise, and efforts to express the core values and commitments of the party.

Building clear party platforms requires effective intellectual input, usually provided through think-tanks and other research institutions.

Most African political parties lack such support and are generally manifestos cobbled together with little consultation.

Tribal groupings see themselves as infallible but parties have to be accountable to the people.

By stating a vision for the future, political parties provide voters with a ways to measure their performance.

Forging platforms fosters debate within parties that transcends tribal and religious differences.

'Road to doom'

Such debates are a central pillar of democracy.

Building modern political parties and associated think-tanks is, therefore, the most urgent way to counter tribal politics.

Policy debate is a key element of democracy.

Specific manifestos would foster healthy political competition that would force parties to distinguish themselves from each other.

Conversely, such debates would also help to illustrates areas of common interest.

Indeed, it is becoming clear that issues such as infrastructure - energy, transportation, irrigation, and telecommunication - and youth employment are emerging as common themes in African politics irrespective of ideological differences.

The predominance of such issues will select for pragmatic leadership over ideology.

It is therefore not a surprise that African countries are increasingly electing engineers as presidents.

In 2012 six African countries put engineers in top political offices.

This reflects the fact that at the local level, politics is primarily a long footnote on demands for power, transportation, irrigation, and communication.

Closely linked to these foundational concerns are demands for access to education and health.

Political parties are unlikely to differ on essential points, but they might offer different approaches.

So long as democracy offers the best chance for sustained growth and prosperity, tribal politics must be replaced by genuine party platforms and modern democratic institutions like think-tanks.

Otherwise Africa's road to doom will continue to be paved by tribal intentions.

Calestous Juma is professor of the practice of international development at Harvard Kennedy School and co-chairs the African Union's High Level Panel on Science, Technology and Innovation - @calestous on Twitter.

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Viewpoint: How tribalism stunts African democracy

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Africa's democratic transition is back in the spotlight. The concern is no longer the stranglehold of autocrats, but the hijacking of the democratic process by tribal politics. Kenya's 2007-08 post-election violence revealed the extent to which tribal forces could quickly bring a country to the brink of civil war.

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Immigration to the United Kingdom in the 21st century is larger and more diverse than at any point in its history. As the global recession bites, early evidence shows a reduction in the numbers of immigrants coming to work. However, fundamental dynamics indicate sustained net immigration is here to stay.

Although the United Kingdom has received immigrants for centuries, the country has traditionally been a net exporter of people; only from the mid-1980s did the United Kingdom become a country of immigration.

The last decade nevertheless differs markedly because of high levels of net immigration, a surge generated in large part by sustained economic growth for the last 15 years. Since 2004, immigration levels have been boosted by an extraordinary wave of mobility from Eastern European countries, particularly Poland, whose citizens have free movement and labor rights following European Union (EU) enlargement.

Public anxiety about immigration, fueled by media attention, has risen in parallel to the numbers. Monthly polling data from the IpsosMORI agency shows that beginning in the late 1990s, people identified race and immigration as one of the top three most important issues facing the country for all but a couple of months.

Opinion polling data from different sources shows a similar picture, with between two-thirds and four-fifths of the public indicating a preference for less immigration.

In this context of rising numbers and rising anxieties, UK policymakers have attempted to draw up policies to manage migration. They have responded imaginatively, implementing a Points-Based System for Migration and new institutional arrangements, for example. But they continue to face a complex set of challenges - from securing borders and convincing the public that government is in control to meeting labor market needs and accelerating immigrant integration.
Historical Background
After World War II, two contrasting trends changed the nature of UK immigration. First, Irish nationals and the countries of the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, and Wales) have consistently enjoyed free movement and settlement rights.

Similarly, as the United Kingdom has deepened its ties with European partners, mostly through what is now the European Union, Europeans have enjoyed free movement and exemption from UK immigration control.

Second, nationals of many other countries, particularly former British colonies like India and Jamaica, have had their access to the United Kingdom progressively eroded.

These trends did not happen immediately after the war. Immigration policy remained embedded in the structures and systems of the British Commonwealth (also known as the British Empire) until the 1960s, with Commonwealth citizens guaranteed the right of entry.

The high watermark of this approach was the British Nationality Act of 1948, which tried to assert Britain's role as leader of the Commonwealth and affirmed the right of Commonwealth citizens (including those of newly independent Commonwealth countries like India) to settle in the United Kingdom.
The Postwar Policy Model
The British Nationality Act was a sandy edifice against the tides of change that broke the British Empire apart. Instead, a new migration policy emerged based on two pillars: limitation and integration.

Limitation followed immigration flows of workers from Commonwealth countries in the 1950s and early 1960s. The three laws that make up this pillar together had the goal of "zero net immigration." The relevant laws were enacted in 1962, 1968, and 1971.

The 1971 Immigration Act, with a few minor exceptions, repealed all previous legislation on immigration. It still provides the structure of current UK immigration law, which accords the Home Secretary with significant rule-making powers on entry and exit.

The core of the legislation was strong control procedures, which included new legal distinctions between the rights of the UK born/UK passport-holders and people from former British colonies - notably India, Pakistan, and the Caribbean - who became subject to immigration controls.

The second pillar, integration, was inspired by the U.S. civil rights movement. The approach mainly took the form of antidiscrimination laws: in a limited form in the 1965 Race Relations Act, in an expanded form in the 1968 Race Relations Act, and in a more comprehensive form in the 1976 Race Relations Act.
The Conservative Era
From 1979 to 1997, policy continued on much the same track, albeit with a stronger emphasis on limitation and restriction. The British Nationality Act of 1981 ended centuries of common-law tradition by removing the automatic right of citizenship to all those born on British soil, for instance.

The target of policy changed from the late 1980s onwards, when asylum-seekers became the greater concern. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union - together with conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s - led to increased humanitarian flows to the United Kingdom and other European countries. Policymakers, unused to flows of asylum seekers, began to legislate change.

Two major Acts of Parliament encapsulated the changes. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was restrictive, creating new "fast-track" procedures for asylum applications, allowing detention of asylum seekers while their claim was being decided, and reducing asylum seekers' benefit entitlements.

The 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act continued in the same vein with new measures and concepts designed to reduce asylum claims, such as further welfare restrictions.
Immigration Policy since 1997
When the Labour party came to power in 1997, migration policy shifted course.

The direction of policy has been one of "selective openness" to immigration, with a commitment to economic migration on one hand and development of a tough security and control framework on the other. The change in economic migration has been accepted across the political divide, and, consequently, limiting and restricting immigration is no longer a prerequisite for UK migration policy.

The security approach, which accelerated after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, has been built on greater efforts to combat illegal immigration and reduce asylum seeking through various measures, but especially new visa controls.

In addition, the Labour government has also altered the second postwar pillar of integration. Labour has reinforced antidiscrimination measures under an agenda of equality and has developed ideas and policies around "community cohesion," which roughly means bringing together segregated communities and fostering shared values and belonging.

In order to make such changes, Labour has passed six major pieces of legislation on immigration and asylum over the last 12 years, alongside a number of policy strategies (see the Table 1 in The Immigration Legacy of Tony Blair).

The benefit of hindsight suggests that legislation in 2002 was a turning point. The government expanded economic immigration and, for the first time, introduced visas for highly skilled economic immigrants to come to the United Kingdom without a job offer, but simply on the basis of their skills.

However, many changes, some not immediately of great import, together have fundamentally altered how government approaches immigration.

Among these are policies to encourage international students, new labor market programs that have culminated in the development of a Points-Based System, and above all the government's decision to allow labor market access to citizens of a newly enlarged Europe.

By tightening up visas, the government has built a more restrictive framework for asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. Reinforcing this framework are institutional changes, especially the creation of an enlarged arm's-length agency, the UK Borders Agency (UKBA), which has greater powers than its predecessor, the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND).

UKBA encompasses visa responsibilities from the Foreign Office and detection responsibilities from Customs, and has greater operational freedom than IND had.
Recent Immigration Flows
The policy changes described above have affected the flows and patterns of immigration, both reactively (e.g., on asylum) and proactively (e.g., on Eastern European migration).

In 2007, the United Kingdom received a gross flow of 577,000 people and a net flow of about 237,000. Net immigration contributed 1.8 million people to the UK population from 1997 to 2007 (see Table 1).

This 1.8 million figure is comprised of growing numbers of workers, international students, asylum seekers (applications spiked between 2000 and 2002), and family members reunifying with those already in the country.

Throughout this period, both the inflow of non-British nationals and the outflow of British citizens (mainly to Australia and Spain) have risen. Consequently, since the mid-1990s, net immigration has exceeded 100,000 people per year, and in some years since 2000, has exceeded 200,000 (see Figure 1).

UK Immigrant Population
The sustained inflows of immigrants have resulted in increases in the United Kingdom's stock of foreign born and foreign citizens; the latter group has nearly tripled in size since the early 1980s. The current picture shows that the United Kingdom had about 6.9 million foreign born in 2008, 11 percent of its population, and 4.4 million foreign citizens, about 7 percent of the population. The latter figure is lower primarily because of naturalizations.

The five largest foreign-born populations were from India (639,000), Poland (526,000), Pakistan (436,000), Ireland (424,000), and Germany (293,000).

Yet the Polish are the United Kingdom's largest foreign-national group. According to the Labor Force Survey (LFS), in the fourth quarter of 2008, 522,000 Polish nationals were living in the country. The next-largest groups were from Ireland (355,000), India (307,000), Pakistan (202,000), France (133,000), and the United States (127,000).

The rankings differ because EU citizens are less likely to apply for British citizenship.

The key analytical point remains the increasing diversity of immigrants to the United Kingdom. Many have come from European countries and former settler colonies, such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, while immigration from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Caribbean, and African countries including Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda have continued.

Recent asylum and refugee inflows from other parts of the world (notably Somalia, Afghanistan, China, and Iraq) have contributed to increasing ethnic diversity. It is therefore unsurprising that diversity has grown (see Table 2).
Economic Migration, Enlargement, and the Recession

A second characteristic of the UK immigrant population is its transience. Research has found that about 40 percent of male immigrants and 55 percent of female immigrants who arrived in the early 1990s and stayed for at least a year returned home within five years. These percentages have likely increased since the beginning of large-scale immigration from Eastern Europe.

The United Kingdom, until it hit the wall of the global recession, enjoyed high growth, low unemployment, and large numbers of unfilled job vacancies. Consequently, significant numbers of foreign workers filled the gap. Foreign-born workers from different entry categories made up more than 13 percent of the country's labor force in 2008 - up from 7 to 8 percent a few decades ago (see Figure 2).

In response to public and media disquiet over such high levels of economic migration, the government introduced a new approach in 2008 that it first announced in 2005: a Points-Based System (PBS) incorporating revised and consolidated versions of existing labor migration schemes.

PBS has five tiers. Tier 1 is aimed at the highly skilled and does not require a job offer. Instead, it is based on applicants' skills and characteristics for which points are awarded. Points allocations show a strong commitment to youth and to certificated qualifications.

Tier 2 incorporates the main body of the work permit system and offers entry to those with a confirmed job offer in a sector of labor market shortage. Such shortage is designated by an independent, new body - the Migration Advisory Committee - that provides the government with nonbinding advice on areas of labor market shortage. It is expected that Tier 2 will account for the majority of non-EU economic migrants.

In 2006, around 141,000 work permits were issued. The leading source country was India, with over a third of all work permits. One in 10 came from the United States, the next biggest source country for work permits. Approximately half of work permit holders come to take up jobs in professional occupations.

The government envisages Tier 3, aimed at filling "lower-skill" jobs, as a highly restricted migration route. This route has been suspended indefinitely because of intra-EU migration; indeed, all low-skilled migration schemes, such as the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS), have been slated for closure.

Tier 4 is dedicated to student visas. It differs from the previous system by compelling colleges and universities to act as "sponsors" for which they must undertake obligations, such as checking student attendance.

Tier 5 is aimed at a variety of exchange programs including five subcategories under temporary workers and a youth mobility scheme.

PBS makes the route to permanent settlement open only to those from Tiers 1 and 2. Lower-skilled workers will not be eligible; instead the country will rely on workers from the European Union.

Overall, with its focus on points and sponsors, policy has moved away from an employer-led system to one that is increasingly government led and more focused on control.

It is important to point out that PBS has no control over intra-European movement - yet the most dramatic increase in economic migration in living memory came from Europe.

When eight Eastern European countries joined the European Union in May 2004, the United Kingdom, along with Ireland and Sweden, allowed nationals from these new Member States to work without any restrictions; this group of countries is known as the accession eight or A8. Nationals of Romania and Bulgaria, which joined the European Union in 2007, face restrictions.

The booming UK economy proved an attractive destination for many A8 citizens. Together with restrictions elsewhere in Europe, high unemployment at home, favorable exchange rates, and pent-up demand, a wave of immigration was unleashed.

About 1.3 million people from the A8 arrived in the United Kingdom between May 2004 and May 2009. Analysts estimate about half left by the end of that period. The sheer size of the inflow has meant that Polish nationals, despite the high churn, jumped from being the United Kingdom's 13th-largest foreign-national group at the end of 2003 to number one by the end of 2008.

Eastern European migrants have worked mainly in low-paid jobs in sectors such as hospitality and catering, administration, and construction. In 2008, only 12 percent of Eastern European immigrants worked in highly skilled occupations, and more than half worked in "routine" ones.

The full effect of the current recession on economic migration from Eastern Europe will not be clear for some time.

However, some preliminary trends can be established. Data from the Worker Registration Scheme (which gives an indication of the number of arrivals from the A8) shows a substantial drop-off in applications. The number of approved applications in the first quarter of 2009 was the lowest since EU enlargement in 2004 and represented a drop of 53 percent from one year earlier (see Figure 3).

Evidence from past recessions suggests some changes in certain categories of immigration during a downturn, but overall flows do not seem highly responsive to the economic cycle or to changes in unemployment.

Historically, inflows have declined more than outflows have increased during periods of high unemployment. Econometric analyses confirm this pattern. The analyses show that trends in unemployment and relative income (of source and host countries) had only a modest impact on net immigration to the United Kingdom.

Other factors, such as the level of inequality relative to source countries, immigration policies, and the size of the migrant community from a given source country (a predictor of future family reunification flows), had significantly greater influence over the volume of net migration.
Asylum Numbers
Thus, the recession appears unlikely to have major impacts on future flows of immigrants. A temporary blip in volume is more likely than a permanent adjustment, although immigrants from the A8 countries and immigrants coming under Tier 2 (which requires a job offer) will be affected most; the inflow of A8 nationals in particular may not fully recover.

The United Kingdom received between 20,000 and 40,000 asylum applications per year in the early and mid-1990s, a time when Germany saw hundreds of thousands of applications from people fleeing war in the former Yugoslavia. The numbers rose rapidly in the late 1990s, peaking in 2002 (see Figure 4).

Not including dependents, the United Kingdom received 15.2 percent of the worldwide total of 555,310 asylum applications in 2002, more than any other country, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The increase in 2002 partly reflected major conflicts and persecution as claims worldwide jumped. That year, the main origin countries of asylum applicants were Iraq (4,375), Zimbabwe (2,750), Somalia (1,835), Afghanistan (1,350), and China (905).

The Sangatte crisis (where prospective asylum seekers massed at the French Port of Calais, a short journey through the Channel Tunnel to the British city of Dover) provided a media staple of a chaotic scene at the border: desperate young men regularly attempting to enter the United Kingdom.

As numbers rose and the "Sangatte crisis" framed the issue, public pressure to curb asylum seekers grew. The government subsequently passed successive pieces of legislation aimed at "pressing down" the number of asylum applications, as well as speeding up processing and achieving more effective removals (deportations) of failed asylum seekers (i.e., those who had not been granted refugee status after the appeals process had concluded).

Effective policy measures included tougher visa regimes; financial penalties on air and truck carriers; juxtaposed controls at various European ports (e.g., when British border guards are physically stationed in Calais, with immigration powers, and vice versa); and British immigration liaison officers posted abroad. The measures, when taken together, can best be described as expanding the UK border.

A combination of such measures and a worldwide drop in asylum claims (now on the upturn) reduced the number of people claiming asylum. Applications totaled 30,545 (including dependents) in 2008 and came mainly from those fleeing Afghanistan (14 percent), Zimbabwe (12 percent), Eritrea (9 percent), Iran (9 percent), Iraq, (7 percent), and Sri Lanka (6 percent).

Probably less effective in curtailing claims, but intensely consequential to asylum-seeking communities, have been policy moves to reduce access to benefits and the labor market, increase surveillance and detention, and force relocation outside of London in a policy known as "dispersal."

For example, as of 2002, asylum seekers are not permitted to work; they receive social benefits at levels below those accorded to British citizens and legal residents with entitlement. To be eligible for government-funded housing, they must accept dispersal outside of London. Over 100,000 asylum seekers have been relocated so far, typically placed in cheap housing in deprived areas.

Furthermore, there has been a steady rise in asylum seekers in detention centers. Over the last five years, there has been an average number of 1,453 asylum seekers in detention per year.

The number of asylum claims has dropped, but these latter measures have come at the expense of social cost and disruption. There is widespread destitution among some asylum-seeking groups, and a range of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are troubled by various aspects of their lives and government treatment.

For example, NGOs have raised concerns over asylum seekers' employment and access to quality housing, health, and education. They have also campaigned vigorously against several aspects of asylum-seeker hardship, including detention - particularly of children and families - destitution, and access to justice.

Asylum seeking and concerns over illegal migration are inextricably bound up in UK policy. The question of illegal immigration climbed the policy agenda at much the same time and was often deliberately conflated.

The issue received distinct national attention in 2000, when 58 Chinese people died while locked in the back of a truck en route to the United Kingdom. The national consciousness was again punctured in 2004 with the deaths of 22 Chinese cockle pickers at Morecambe Bay in northwest England, an event that pressured Parliament into passing legislation regulating gangmasters (employers who hire and deploy short-term agricultural workers).
Illegal Migration and Policy
The Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA), the body tasked by Parliament to reduce exploitation, was established in 2005. But GLA works only within certain labor market sectors, namely the agriculture and fish-processing industries.

Estimates of the illegal immigrant population vary. The only officially commissioned estimate, and the one most widely accepted, was published in 2005.

The report estimated the size of the illegally resident population at 430,000, based on census data from 2001. That number is about 9 percent of the 4.9 million foreign born in 2001 and less than 1 percent of the total UK population.

A more recent report from the London School of Economics, using a similar methodology but based on figures through the end of 2007, estimates a higher figure of 618,000 illegal residents, with a range between 417,000 and 863,000. London has about 70 percent of this total, with a central estimate of 442,000 and a range between 281,000 and 630,000.

Government policy on illegal migration has developed incrementally since 2002. In addition to external measures, such as tougher visa regimes, the government has also developed internal measures to combat the problem. These measures can be loosely categorized into four areas: identity management, increased employer compliance, more public service compliance, and regularization.

First, in response to September 11 and for other security concerns, the government introduced compulsory biometric identification data for all migrants who intend to stay in the country for longer than six months.

The rollout for "Biometric Identity Cards" for all non-EU foreign residents began in November 2008 for certain foreign students and expanded in March 2009 to other visa categories. By April 2011, it is expected to cover all those coming from outside the European Union.

Though these measures have controversial civil-liberties implications, the government has argued they reduce the scope for illegal entry and working and that more secure identity documents will prevent the entry of people who may pose a security threat.

Second, the government has imposed increasing sanctions on those who employ unauthorized workers. New legislation has allowed fines of 5,000 pounds sterling ($7,500) per illegal employee to be levied on employers, for example. Research suggests that the number of civil penalties (91 firms in the six months through September 2008) has increased.

The third category in the government's effort to reduce illegal immigration has been compliance measures placed on public service providers. Restrictions have been placed on access to nonemergency health care, for example.

Similarly, schools have been asked to check the status of children and report those not legally resident to the immigration authorities although the United Kingdom guarantees the right of all children, illegally resident or not, to attend public school.

Finally, through administrative changes and ad hoc decisions, the government has regularized between 60,000 to 100,000 people over the last decade. Those regularized have tended to be in the country for 13 years or more (seven if in a family), and have often made asylum claims that have not been resolved.
Multiculturalism, Integration, and British Muslims
The effectiveness of such measures is difficult to judge given the nature of the issue. However, with a mass amnesty unlikely, illegal immigration is likely to dominate much of the UK migration debate in the future.

Over the last five years, the United Kingdom has seen significant debate about the multicultural or race relations model of immigrant integration, which has come under sustained criticism, including from within government.

It is first worth describing the "multiculturalist" or "race relations" model, for which the United Kingdom has been known. The classic definition of this model comes from the 1970s Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, who described it as "not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance."

In practice, this meant new antidiscrimination laws and some enforcement and promotion work - especially the creation of an independent, publicly funded body, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), which combined both unique enforcement functions and a promotional role of encouraging "good race relations."

The kindling for the change in mood dates to 2001 when three events shook official policy: riots involving minority communities in the northern towns of Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham; the peak of the Sangatte refugee crisis; and the September 11 terrorist attacks.

The next stage in altering entrenched multiculturalist policies occurred when the July 7, 2005, attacks on London's transit system led to concerns about white and minority ethnic and religious groups (especially Muslims) leading segregated lives.

In parallel, rising support in some areas for far-right political parties like the British National Party (BNP), which saw two of its most high-profile members elected in to the European Parliament in June 2009, further heightened concern about attitudes toward diversity, immigration, and race.

Thus over the last five years, there have been passionate debates about national identity and concerns over radicalization in Muslim communities. This has led to four semidistinct strands of policy: refugee integration policy; community cohesion; active promotion of citizenship; and a strong and broad emphasis on equality.

Until recently, formal "integration" policy concerned settlement services for recognized refugees. The refugee integration strategy - first introduced in 2000 and strengthened in 2005 - makes refugees eligible for orientation services and some financial assistance for integration.

Community cohesion is concerned with bringing (segregated) communities together through a variety of local level initiatives, such as school twinning projects, which encourage education and pastoral links between schools with ethnically different student bodies, and mixed-housing policies. Unsurprisingly, questions remain as to whether the promotion of "cohesion" is an appropriate way to accommodate social and cultural differences.

The promotion of citizenship has involved "activating" the naturalization process through new citizenship tests, language tests (also mandatory for long-term residence), and citizenship ceremonies.

The Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill 2009, currently going through Parliament, seeks to create a year-long "probationary citizenship" stage under which migrants would not be able to pass until they successfully meet such integration criteria as proven English language ability. Achieving full citizenship could be accelerated by other acts, such as volunteering.

Finally, major equal opportunity measures introduced under Labour have reinforced and extended the antidiscrimination framework. The 1998 Human Rights Act enshrined the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into UK law. The 2000 Race Relations (Amendment) Act aimed to eradicate institutionalized racism by obligating certain public authorities, including the police and immigration services, to take action to correct ethnic inequalities in recruitment, employment, and service delivery.

Most recently, the government has begun to address immigrant incorporation more directly. In 2008, the Department of Communities and Local Government published a nascent national immigrant integration strategy that complements the existing strategy for refugees.

This move away from multiculturalism toward "shared values" does not indicate a wholesale regression to the acculturation overtures of a previous generation. Further, this is not simply rhetorical, as the implementation of equality measures makes clear.

The exception to this picture may involve the treatment of British Muslims, estimated at 2.4 million in 2008 according to the Labour Force Survey.

On the one hand, concerns over segregation and radicalization have led the government to expand the equality agenda. The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which has had important symbolic value, made it illegal to stir up hatred against persons on racial or religious grounds.

On the other hand, much of the increased attention to Muslim populations falls explicitly under the heading of "preventing extremism."
Looking Ahead
Pressures have also been placed on Britain's traditionally liberal religious accommodation policies: Islamic schools, Sharia law, and religious dress have all provoked serious public debate, the last when, in 2006, Minister Jack Straw publicly called the headscarf "a visible statement of separation and of difference." The reframing of Muslim integration as a security issue may have implications for incorporation outcomes in the future.

The Office for National Statistics assumes a net immigration level of 190,000 people per year in the next decade. Forecasts have been lowered in light of the current global recession, but analysts expect continued net immigration at high levels. British policymakers should expect to work with a high-immigration scenario.

The Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill 2009 is likely to become law in the current parliamentary session. The bill would increase the length of time (and cost) associated with becoming a British citizen by introducing a "provisional citizenship" stage into the process. The details regarding these markers and milestones are yet unclear.
Sources
There is also likely to be much change on the political scene, both with the seismic impacts on public spending expected as a result of the recession and an expected change in government in the general election that must be held by June 2010. Although it is unclear where budget cuts will bite, it seems likely that no government department or agency will escape a funding squeeze in the years ahead.

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Papademetriou, Demetrios G. and Will Somerville. 2008. Regularisation in the United Kingdom. London: CentreForum.

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Pollard, Naomi, Maria Latorre, and Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah. 2008. Floodgates or turnstiles: Post-EU enlargement migration flows to (and from) the UK. London: ippr. Available online.

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Somerville, Will. 2007. Immigration under New Labour. Bristol: Policy Press.

Somerville, Will and Madeleine Sumption. 2009. Immigration in the UK: the recession and beyond. London: Equality and Human Rights Commission.

Sriskandarajah, Dhananjayan and Catherine Drew. 2006. Brits Abroad: Mapping the scale and nature of British emigration. London: ippr. Available online.

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Will Somerville Will Somerville, Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, Maria Latorre

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United Kingdom: A Reluctant Country of Immigration

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Recent immigration to the United Kingdom is larger and more diverse than at any point in its history. This updated profile examines how the global recession is affecting migration flows, the latest immigration and asylum data, and overviews of new immigration and integration policies.

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The UNICEF appealed to Boko Haram to release the children and warned against the use of children by terrorists.
https://punchng.com/boko-haram-unicef-appeals-for-release-of-abducted-children/

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Nigeria's economy is heavily dependent on oil revenue, and price swings can send the country from recession to recovery in a matter of months.

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Following the discovery of crude oil by Shell D'Arcy Petroleum, pioneer production began in 1958 from the company's oil field in Oloibiri in the Eastern Niger Delta. Reserves of crude oil stands at 28.2 billion barrels today.
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/OilGasinNigeria/IndustryHistory.aspx