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I will take the professional prospective of an elementary school counselor at Watts Elementary in the Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City Independent School District.  This legal padlet may be used by faculty and staff on the campus as a resource for best practices in handling students who attempt or threaten suicide.

I selected this topic because there has been a rise in the number of suicides by children.  We have experienced threats and attempts on our K-4 campus this year. There is limited legislation about suicide so this guide will serve as a resource for best practices and interventions.

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I interviewed Ms. Naderia Hartley, professional school counselor at Watts Elementary. https://www.scuc.txed.net/Page/2933

Suicide is a serious issue and requires a solid action plan and clear policies. The Texas Education code requires districts to include suicide prevention programs in their district improvement plans. Before coming to Watts Elementary, Hartley helped write the crisis plan for Northside Independent School District. She also noted that David’s Law was written to prevent bullying in schools which can lead to suicide (N. Hartley, personal communication, March 4, 2021).

Best practices:

Campuses should conduct annual training on signs of suicide and what steps to take if a student makes a threat or an attempt. All staff should be included in the training and have a clear understanding of the policies and procedures.

By knowing your students, you are better able to recognize warning signs. Being aware of their home life allows you to understand what kind of support they have beyond school. It is important to have a relationship with all students and do your best to get to know them.

When interviewing students who have attempted suicide or made threats, you must be direct in your questioning.  The vocabulary attached to suicide such as “die” or “kill yourself” can seem harsh for elementary students, but that kind of direct questioning is necessary in these situations (N. Hartley, personal communication, March 4, 2021).

Current issues:

Covid has created a lot of change and stress for students and their families.  This type of stress can lead to depression and anxiety which can be triggers for suicidal thoughts and tendencies. Hartley attended a training on the language associated with suicide at Region 20. During this training she learned that saying “committed suicide” gives the stigma that the person has committed a crime. It is better to say the person died by suicide. In addition to this training she tries to read literature to keep her up-to-date on best practices (N. Hartley, personal communication, March 4, 2021).

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Granello and Zyromski (2019) wrote an article for the American School Counselor Association on how to develop a comprehensive school suicide prevention program. Concerns that suicide prevention programs could lead to contagion has kept many administrators from pursuing such programs. However, the research has shown that if conducted properly, suicide prevention programs decrease the number of adolescent deaths. The article explains the different types of suicide prevention programs such as a schoolwide curriculum or in-service for the gatekeepers. Granello and Zyromski (2019) then show how to create a suicide prevention program using a step-by-step process.

Granello, P. F., & Zyromski, B. (2019). Developing a comprehensive school suicide prevention program. Professional School Counseling, 22(1), 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2156759X18808128

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2156759X18808128

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The parents of 8-year-old Gabriel Taye filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the principal and assistant principal of Carson Elementary School alleging that they acted recklessly in handling the repeated bullying of their son leading to his suicide.  The principal and assistant principal requested to have the suit dismissed based on state government immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit rejected the request finding their actions reckless in that they:

·         Failed to respond the to the persistent bullying

·         Failed to inform the parents of the incidents

·         Lacked supervision of the student bathrooms

·         Knew the full extent to which Taye was being bullied and that a risk of bullying is suicide

Reference:

Walsh, M. (2020). Federal appeals court lets lawsuit proceed against educators in student’s suicide. Education Week. https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/federal-appeals-court-lets-lawsuit-proceed-against-educators-in-students-suicide/2020/12

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A federal appeals court has allowed a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the parents of an 8-year-old Cincinnati boy who committed suicide after alleged severe bullying at school to proceed against two school administrators.

A unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, in Cincinnati, rejected a request by the former principal and assistant principal to throw out state-law claims that they acted recklessly in handling persistent bullying of Carson Elementary School student Gabriel Taye and allegedly failing to inform his parents about several incidents.

Taye hung himself with a necktie in his bedroom on Jan. 26, 2017, two days after a student had knocked him unconscious in a school bathroom in the most serious of a pattern of bullying incidents.

The lawsuit by the parents, Cornelia Reynolds and Benyam Tate, alleges that then-Principal Ruthenia Jackson and then-Assistant Principal Jeffrey McKenzie did not tell Taye's mother that a student had attacked him in the school bathroom. The suit also alleges that McKenzie stood over Taye but did not aid him or call 911, as district policy required when a student was unconscious for longer than a minute.

A school nurse called Taye's mother and said he had fainted, court papers say. Taye stayed home from school the next day, then was bullied again in the school bathroom when he returned the following day, the same day he committed suicide.

The 6th Circuit court, in its Dec. 29 decision in Meyers v. Cincinnati Board of Education, said the parents have sufficiently alleged that Jackson and McKenzie "failed to call 911 when Taye was unconscious for seven minutes after being knocked to the floor in the bathroom."

"They reported false information about the number of 'bullying instances' that occurred as required by Ohio law, and ultimately, prevented Taye's parents from fully understanding Taye's horrifying experience at Carson Elementary until it was too late," the 6th Circuit panel added. "This court finds their behavior, as alleged, to be egregious and clearly reckless, thus barring them from the shield of government immunity."

Federal and State Claims

Taye's parents, as well as the boy's estate, sued the Cincinnati school system along with some other individual defendants on federal civil-rights claims as well as state torts such as wrongful death, intentional infliction of serious emotional distress, and others.

Jackson and McKenzie sought to have the suit dismissed on the basis of state governmental immunity. In court papers, the two administrators deny that there was bullying at Carson Elementary and that Taye's suicide was not forseeable.

A federal district court rejected their motion to dismiss. The Cincinnati Board of Education and other defendants have raised similar defenses to the lawsuit's federal claims, but those were not at issue in this appeal.

The 6th Circuit's opinion describes in detail the pattern of bullying faced by Taye since he was in 1st grade and the alleged failures by school administrators to respond adequately or keep his parents informed.

The administrators "could have asked teachers to supervise the student bathrooms or limited the number of students allowed to use the bathroom at one time," the court said. "Instead, Jackson and McKenzie allowed the boys' bathroom to remain unsupervised. Jackson and McKenzie's behavior shows their failure to take this situation seriously and exemplifies the very definition of recklessness: they consciously disregarded the known or obvious risk of harm that students would engage in violent behavior in the unsupervised bathroom, and that disregard was unreasonable in light of the attack that took place there."

As to the administrators' argument that Taye's suicide was not foreseeable, the 6th Circuit panel said that assertion was undercut by a 2017 decision of their court. In that decision, Tumminello v. Father Ryan High School, a different 6th Circuit panel had written that "if a school is aware of a student being bullied but does nothing to prevent the bullying, it is reasonably foreseeable that the victim of the bullying might resort to self-harm, even suicide."

In Taye's case, the 6th Circuit said Jackson and McKenzie "knew the full extent to which Taye was subjected to aggression and violence by his classmates. ... [T]hey knew Taye was harassed and bullied at school and that a risk of bullying is suicide, and yet they utterly failed to take reasonable steps to protect Taye from that risk."

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Federal Appeals Court Lets Lawsuit Proceed Against Educators in Student's Suicide

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A federal appeals court has allowed a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the parents of an 8-year-old Cincinnati boy who committed suicide after alleged severe bullying at school to proceed against two school administrators. A unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S.

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According to Prothero (2019), teen suicide rates have dramatically increased in the last ten years making suicide the second leading cause of death among teens. The article informs teen suicide by:

·         Discussing the impact suicide can have on the students left behind

·         Reviewing the rise in mental health issues among students

·         Identifying the limited resources schools have available to deal with the mental health needs of students

·         Exploring different reasons for the increase in suicide

Reference:

Prothero, A. (2019). Teen suicide rising sharply, federal data show. Education Week. https://www.edweek.org/leadership/teen-suicides-rising-sharply-federal-data-show/2019/10

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Teen suicide rates have increased dramatically in the past decade, according to a report released on Thursday by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Suicide rates for teens between the ages of 15 and 19 increased by 76 percent between 2007 and 2017. And the suicide rate for 10- to 14-year-olds nearly tripled over that same time period, according to CDC's data.

It's a sharp reversal from the previous period-2000 to 2007-when the suicide rate had been stable for the 15-to-19 age group and had even declined for 10- to 14-year-olds.
If you are in crisis, please call the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline at 1-800-273-TALK (8255), or contact the Crisis Text Line by texting TALK to 741741
While still relatively rare, suicide is now the second leading cause of death among 10- to 19-year-olds. Accidents are the leading cause of death, while homicides rank third.

But the impact of a single suicide can have far reaching, negative effects for the friends, family, and classmates, said Stephen Brock, a professor and school psychology program coordinator at California State University, Sacramento.

"In a given five-year period, for your typically sized high school in the United States, you wouldn't expect more than one suicide death," he said. "It has been argued that the larger problem from a public health perspective, it's not the prevention of suicide, it is rather dealing with those left behind by a suicide."

Increasing suicide rates are part of an alarming trend of rising mental health issues among school children.

"It's not so much that there's large increases in mental illness, but the type and the severity of mental illness has gone up," said Brock, who formerly served as a president of the National Association of School Psychologists. "In particular we have seen pretty significant increases in girls needing to be hospitalized because of depression."

Nine out of 10 people who die by suicide, he said, suffer from a mental illness.

Schools often struggle with limited resources and expertise to deal with the wide range of mental-health needs that teens and younger children are now experiencing.

Still, experts say teachers, principals, coaches, and other school staff members are critical players in preventing suicide by recognizing students who may be at risk for harming themselves, by connecting those students with resources and support, and by building relationships throughout the school so that students have multiple people to turn to if they need help.

It's unclear why mental health issues are increasing among children and youth, though researchers are exploring a number of explanations, including the rise of smartphone and social media use, as well as the prevalence of bullying.
Related stories:

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Teen Suicides Rising Sharply, Federal Data Show

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Teen suicide rates have increased dramatically in the past decade, according to a report released on Thursday by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Suicide rates for teens between the ages of 15 and 19 increased by 76 percent between 2007 and 2017.

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Constitutional Law:

Section 21 of the first article of the Texas Constitution prohibits the forfeiture of estates, including in cases of suicide (Tex. Const. art. I, § XXI).

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THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION



ARTICLE 1. BILL OF RIGHTS



That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and established, we declare:


Sec. 1. FREEDOM AND SOVEREIGNTY OF STATE. Texas is a free and independent State, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, and the maintenance of our free institutions and the perpetuity of the Union depend upon the preservation of the right of local self-government, unimpaired to all the States.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 2. INHERENT POLITICAL POWER; REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT. All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit. The faith of the people of Texas stands pledged to the preservation of a republican form of government, and, subject to this limitation only, they have at all times the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think expedient.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 3. EQUAL RIGHTS. All freemen†, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


† The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here.


Sec. 3a. EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW. Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative.


(Added Nov. 7, 1972.)


Sec. 4. RELIGIOUS TESTS. No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office, or public trust, in this State; nor shall any one be excluded from holding office on account of his religious sentiments, provided he acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 5. WITNESSES NOT DISQUALIFIED BY RELIGIOUS BELIEFS; OATHS AND AFFIRMATIONS. No person shall be disqualified to give evidence in any of the Courts of this State on account of his religious opinions, or for the want of any religious belief, but all oaths or affirmations shall be administered in the mode most binding upon the conscience, and shall be taken subject to the pains and penalties of perjury.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 6. FREEDOM OF WORSHIP. All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences. No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent. No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious society or mode of worship. But it shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 6-a. RELIGIOUS SERVICE PROTECTIONS. This state or a political subdivision of this state may not enact, adopt, or issue a statute, order, proclamation, decision, or rule that prohibits or limits religious services, including religious services conducted in churches, congregations, and places of worship, in this state by a religious organization established to support and serve the propagation of a sincerely held religious belief.


(Added Nov. 2, 2021.)


Sec. 7. APPROPRIATIONS FOR SECTARIAN PURPOSES. No money shall be appropriated, or drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any sect, or religious society, theological or religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the State be appropriated for any such purposes.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 8. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; LIBEL. Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers, investigating the conduct of officers, or men in public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence. And in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the Court, as in other cases.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 9. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 10. RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall hav† a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof. He shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself† and shall have the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both, shall be confronted by the witnesses against him and shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, except that when the witness resides out of the State and the offense charged is a violation of any of the anti-trust laws of this State, the defendant and the State shall have the right to produce and have the evidence admitted by deposition, under such rules and laws as the Legislature may hereafter provide; and no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense.† unless on an indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment, otherwise than in the penetentiary†, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Nov. 5, 1918.)


† The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here.


Sec. 11. BAIL. All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offences†, when the proof is evident; but this provision shall not be so construed as to prevent bail after indictment found upon examination of the evidence, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


† The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here.


Sec. 11a. DENIAL OF BAIL AFTER MULTIPLE FELONIES. (a) Any person (1) accused of a felony less than capital in this State, who has been theretofore twice convicted of a felony, the second conviction being subsequent to the first, both in point of time of commission of the offense and conviction therefor, (2) accused of a felony less than capital in this State, committed while on bail for a prior felony for which he has been indicted, (3) accused of a felony less than capital in this State involving the use of a deadly weapon after being convicted of a prior felony, or (4) accused of a violent or sexual offense committed while under the supervision of a criminal justice agency of the State or a political subdivision of the State for a prior felony, after a hearing, and upon evidence substantially showing the guilt of the accused of the offense in (1) or (3) above, of the offense committed while on bail in (2) above, or of the offense in (4) above committed while under the supervision of a criminal justice agency of the State or a political subdivision of the State for a prior felony, may be denied bail pending trial, by a district judge in this State, if said order denying bail pending trial is issued within seven calendar days subsequent to the time of incarceration of the accused; provided, however, that if the accused is not accorded a trial upon the accusation under (1) or (3) above, the accusation and indictment used under (2) above, or the accusation or indictment used under (4) above within sixty (60) days from the time of his incarceration upon the accusation, the order denying bail shall be automatically set aside, unless a continuance is obtained upon the motion or request of the accused; provided, further, that the right of appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of this State is expressly accorded the accused for a review of any judgment or order made hereunder, and said appeal shall be given preference by the Court of Criminal Appeals.


(b) In this section:


(1) "Violent offense" means:


(A) murder;


(B) aggravated assault, if the accused used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault;


(C) aggravated kidnapping; or


(D) aggravated robbery.


(2) "Sexual offense" means:


(A) aggravated sexual assault;


(B) sexual assault; or


(C) indecency with a child.


(Added Nov. 6, 1956; amended Nov. 8, 1977; Subsec. (a) amended and (b) added Nov. 2, 1993.)


Sec. 11b. DENIAL OF BAIL FOR VIOLATION OF CONDITION OF RELEASE. Any person who is accused in this state of a felony or an offense involving family violence, who is released on bail pending trial, and whose bail is subsequently revoked or forfeited for a violation of a condition of release may be denied bail pending trial if a judge or magistrate in this state determines by a preponderance of the evidence at a subsequent hearing that the person violated a condition of release related to the safety of a victim of the alleged offense or to the safety of the community.


(Added Nov. 8, 2005; amended Nov. 6, 2007.)


Sec. 11c. DENIAL OF BAIL FOR VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER INVOLVING FAMILY VIOLENCE. The legislature by general law may provide that any person who violates an order for emergency protection issued by a judge or magistrate after an arrest for an offense involving family violence or who violates an active protective order rendered by a court in a family violence case, including a temporary ex parte order that has been served on the person, or who engages in conduct that constitutes an offense involving the violation of an order described by this section may be taken into custody and, pending trial or other court proceedings, denied release on bail if following a hearing a judge or magistrate in this state determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the person violated the order or engaged in the conduct constituting the offense.


(Added Nov. 6, 2007.)


Sec. 12. HABEAS CORPUS. The writ of Habeas Corpus is a writ of right, and shall never be suspended. The Legislature shall enact laws to render the remedy speedy and effectual.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 13. EXCESSIVE BAIL OR FINES; CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT; OPEN COURTS; REMEDY BY DUE COURSE OF LAW. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 14. DOUBLE JEOPARDY. No person, for the same offence†, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty,† nor shall a person be again put upon trial for the same offence,† after a verdict of not guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


† The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here and here.


Sec. 15. RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY. The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its purity and efficiency. Provided, that the Legislature may provide for the temporary commitment, for observation and/or treatment, of mentally ill persons not charged with a criminal offense, for a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days, by order of the County Court without the necessity of a trial by jury.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Aug. 24, 1935.)


Sec. 15-a. COMMITMENT OF PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND. No person shall be committed as a person of unsound mind except on competent medical or psychiatric testimony. The Legislature may enact all laws necessary to provide for the trial, adjudication of insanity and commitment of persons of unsound mind and to provide for a method of appeal from judgments rendered in such cases. Such laws may provide for a waiver of trial by jury, in cases where the person under inquiry has not been charged with the commission of a criminal offense, by the concurrence of the person under inquiry, or his next of kin, and an attorney ad litem appointed by a judge of either the County or Probate Court of the county where the trial is being held, and shall provide for a method of service of notice of such trial upon the person under inquiry and of his right to demand a trial by jury.


(Added Nov. 6, 1956.)


Sec. 16. BILLS OF ATTAINDER; EX POST FACTO OR RETROACTIVE LAWS; IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 17. TAKING PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE; SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; CONTROL OF PRIVILEGES AND FRANCHISES. (a) No person's property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person, and only if the taking, damage, or destruction is for:


(1) the ownership, use, and enjoyment of the property, notwithstanding an incidental use, by:


(A) the State, a political subdivision of the State, or the public at large; or


(B) an entity granted the power of eminent domain under law; or


(2) the elimination of urban blight on a particular parcel of property.


(b) In this section, "public use" does not include the taking of property under Subsection (a) of this section for transfer to a private entity for the primary purpose of economic development or enhancement of tax revenues.


(c) On or after January 1, 2010, the legislature may enact a general, local, or special law granting the power of eminent domain to an entity only on a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to each house.


(d) When a person's property is taken under Subsection (a) of this section, except for the use of the State, compensation as described by Subsection (a) shall be first made, or secured by a deposit of money; and no irrevocable or uncontrollable grant of special privileges or immunities shall be made; but all privileges and franchises granted by the Legislature, or created under its authority, shall be subject to the control thereof.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Nov. 3, 2009.)


Sec. 18. IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT. No person shall ever be imprisoned for debt.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 19. DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, ETC. BY DUE COURSE OF LAW. No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 20. OUTLAWRY OR TRANSPORTATION OUT OF STATE FOR OFFENSE. No citizen shall be outlawed. No person shall be transported out of the State for any offense committed within the same. This section does not prohibit an agreement with another state providing for the confinement of inmates of this State in the penal or correctional facilities of that state.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Nov. 5, 1985.)


Sec. 21. CORRUPTION OF BLOOD; FORFEITURE OF ESTATE; SUICIDES. No conviction shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture of estate, and the estates of those who destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as in case of natural death.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 22. TREASON AGAINST STATE. Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it, or adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort; and no person shall be convicted of treason except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 23. RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS. Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defence† of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


† The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here.


Sec. 24. MILITARY SUBORDINATE TO CIVIL AUTHORITY. The military shall at all times be subordinate to the civil authority.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 25. QUARTERING SOLDIERS IN HOUSES. No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in the house of any citizen without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner prescribed by law.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 26. PERPETUITIES AND MONOPOLIES; PRIMOGENITURE OR ENTAILMENTS. Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free government, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture or entailments ever be in force in this State.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 27. RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY; PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES. The citizens shall have the right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good; and apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 28. SUSPENSION OF LAWS. No power of suspending laws in this State shall be exercised except by the Legislature.


 (Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 29. BILL OF RIGHTS EXCEPTED FROM POWERS OF GOVERNMENT AND INVIOLATE. To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare that every thing in this "Bill of Rights" is excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall be void.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 30. RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS. (a) A crime victim has the following rights:


(1) the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process; and


(2) the right to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process.


(b) On the request of a crime victim, the crime victim has the following rights:


(1) the right to notification of court proceedings;


(2) the right to be present at all public court proceedings related to the offense, unless the victim is to testify and the court determines that the victim's testimony would be materially affected if the victim hears other testimony at the trial;


(3) the right to confer with a representative of the prosecutor's office;


(4) the right to restitution; and


(5) the right to information about the conviction, sentence, imprisonment, and release of the accused.


(c) The legislature may enact laws to define the term "victim" and to enforce these and other rights of crime victims.


(d) The state, through its prosecuting attorney, has the right to enforce the rights of crime victims.


(e) The legislature may enact laws to provide that a judge, attorney for the state, peace officer, or law enforcement agency is not liable for a failure or inability to provide a right enumerated in this section. The failure or inability of any person to provide a right or service enumerated in this section may not be used by a defendant in a criminal case as a ground for appeal or post-conviction writ of habeas corpus. A victim or guardian or legal representative of a victim has standing to enforce the rights enumerated in this section but does not have standing to participate as a party in a criminal proceeding or to contest the disposition of any charge.


(Added Nov. 7, 1989.)


Sec. 31. FUNDS FOR COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME. (a) The compensation to victims of crime fund created by general law and the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund created by general law are each a separate dedicated account in the general revenue fund.


(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c) of this section and subject to legislative appropriation, money deposited to the credit of the compensation to victims of crime fund or the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund from any source may be expended as provided by law only for delivering or funding victim-related compensation, services, or assistance.


(c) The legislature may provide by law that money in the compensation to victims of crime fund or in the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund may be expended for the purpose of assisting victims of episodes of mass violence if other money appropriated for emergency assistance is depleted.


(Added Nov. 4, 1997.)


Sec. 32. MARRIAGE. (a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman.


(b) This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage.


(Added Nov. 8, 2005.)


Sec. 33. PUBLIC ACCESS TO AND USE OF PUBLIC BEACHES. (a) In this section, "public beach" means a state-owned beach bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico, extending from mean low tide to the landward boundary of state-owned submerged land, and any larger area extending from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on the Gulf of Mexico to which the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or over the area by prescription or dedication or has established and retained a right by virtue of continuous right in the public under Texas common law.


(b) The public, individually and collectively, has an unrestricted right to use and a right of ingress to and egress from a public beach. The right granted by this subsection is dedicated as a permanent easement in favor of the public.


(c) The legislature may enact laws to protect the right of the public to access and use a public beach and to protect the public beach easement from interference and encroachments.


(d) This section does not create a private right of enforcement.


(Added Nov. 3, 2009.)


Sec. 34. RIGHT TO HUNT, FISH, AND HARVEST WILDLIFE. (a) The people have the right to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife, including by the use of traditional methods, subject to laws or regulations to conserve and manage wildlife and preserve the future of hunting and fishing.


(b) Hunting and fishing are preferred methods of managing and controlling wildlife.


(c) This section does not affect any provision of law relating to trespass, property rights, or eminent domain.


(d) This section does not affect the power of the legislature to authorize a municipality to regulate the discharge of a weapon in a populated area in the interest of public safety.


(Added Nov. 3, 2015.)


Sec. 35. RIGHT OF CERTAIN FACILITY RESIDENTS TO DESIGNATE ESSENTIAL CAREGIVER. (a) A resident of a nursing facility, assisted living facility, intermediate care facility for individuals with an intellectual disability, residence providing home and community-based services, or state supported living center, as those terms are defined by general law, has the right to designate an essential caregiver with whom the facility, residence, or center may not prohibit in-person visitation.


(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (a) of this section, the legislature by general law may provide guidelines for a facility, residence, or center described by Subsection (a) of this section to follow in establishing essential caregiver visitation policies and procedures.


(Added Nov. 2, 2021.)

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THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1. BILL OF RIGHTS

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Statutory Law:

Section 11.252 of the Texas Education Code requires districts to create a district improvement plan that includes:

·         Suicide prevention programs

·         Parental/guardian notification procedure

(Tex. Educ. Code § 11.252)

Reference: Tex. Educ. Code § 11.252

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EDUCATION CODE CHAPTER 11. SCHOOL DISTRICTS

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Sec. 11.002. RESPONSIBILITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION. The school districts and charter schools created in accordance with the laws of this state have the primary responsibility for implementing the state's system of public education and ensuring student performance in accordance with this code.

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Administrative Law:

The Texas Administrative Code requires:

·         All school districts and open-enrollment charter schools to provide suicide prevention training to all educators

·         School districts to maintain records of each educator who received the training

(19 TAC § 153.1013)

Reference: Suicide Prevention Training, 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 153.1013

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Chapter 153. School District Personnel
Subchapter BB. Commissioner's Rules Concerning Professional Development

§153.1011. Mentor Program Allotment.

(a) Definitions. The following words and terms, when used in this section, shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

(1) Beginning teacher--A classroom teacher in Texas who has less than two years of teaching experience in the subject or grade level to which the teacher is assigned.

(2) Classroom teacher--An educator who is employed by a school district in Texas and who, not less than an average of four hours each day, teaches in an academic instructional setting or a career and technical instructional setting. The term does not include a teacher's aide or a full-time administrator.

(A) For a school district, a classroom teacher, as defined in this paragraph, must hold an appropriate certificate issued by the State Board for Educator Certification and must meet the specifications regarding instructional duties defined in this paragraph.

(B) For an open-enrollment charter school, a classroom teacher is not required to be certified but must meet the qualifications of the employing charter school and the specifications regarding instructional duties defined in this paragraph.

(3) Mentor teacher--A classroom teacher in Texas who provides effective support to help beginning teachers successfully transition into the teaching assignment.

(4) School district--For the purposes of this section, the definition of school district includes open-enrollment charter schools.

(5) Teacher of record--An educator who is employed by a school or district and who teaches in an academic instructional setting or a career and technical instructional setting and is responsible for evaluating student achievement and assigning grades.

(b) Program requirements. In order for a district mentor program to receive funds through the mentor program allotment, as described in Texas Education Code (TEC), §48.114, the program must be approved by the commissioner of education using the application and approval process described in subsection (c) of this section. To be approved by the commissioner, district mentor programs must comply with TEC, §21.458, and commit to meet the following requirements.

(1) Mentor selection. To qualify as a mentor teacher, a classroom teacher must:

(A) complete a research-based mentor and induction training program approved by the commissioner;

(B) complete a mentor training program provided by the district;

(C) have at least three complete years of teaching experience with a superior record of assisting students, as a whole, in achieving improvement in student performance. Districts may use the master, exemplary, or recognized designations under TEC, §21.3521, to fulfill this requirement; and

(D) demonstrate interpersonal skills, instructional effectiveness, and leadership skills.

(2) Mentor assignment. School districts must agree to assign no more than:

(A) two beginning teachers to a mentor who serves as a teacher of record for, on average, six hours per instructional day; or

(B) four beginning teachers to a mentor who serves as a teacher of record for, on average, less than six hours per instructional day.

(3) District mentor training program. A school district must:

(A) provide training to mentor teachers and any appropriate district and campus employees, such as principals, assistant principals, and instructional coaches, who work with a beginning teacher or supervise a beginning teacher;

(B) ensure that mentor teachers and any appropriate district and campus employees are trained before the beginning of the school year;

(C) provide supplemental training that includes best mentorship practices to mentor teachers and any appropriate district and campus employees throughout the school year, minimally once per semester; and

(D) provide training for a mentor assigned to a beginning teacher who is hired after the beginning of the school year by the 45th day of employment of the beginning teacher.

(4) District roles and responsibilities. A school district must designate a specific time during the regularly contracted school day for meetings between mentor teachers and the beginning teachers they mentor, which must abide by the mentor and beginning teachers' entitled planning and preparation requirements in TEC, §21.404, and the provisions of paragraph (5)(A) of this subsection.

(5) Meetings between mentors and beginning teachers. A mentor teacher must:

(A) meet with each beginning teacher assigned to the mentor not less than 12 hours each semester, with observations of the mentor teacher by the beginning teacher being mentored or observations of the beginning teacher being mentored by the mentor teacher counting toward the 12 hours each semester; and

(B) address the following topics in mentoring sessions with the beginning teacher being mentored:

(i) orientation to the context, policies, and practices of the school district, including:

(I) campus-wide student culture routines;

(II) district and campus teacher evaluation systems;

(III) campus curriculum and curricular resources, including formative and summative assessments; and

(IV) campus policies and practices related to lesson planning;

(ii) data-driven instructional practices;

(iii) specific instructional coaching cycles, including coaching regarding conferences between parents and the beginning teacher;

(iv) professional development; and

(v) professional expectations.

(c) Application approval process. Each year, TEA will provide an application and approval process for school districts to apply for mentor program allotment funding. Funding will be limited based on availability of funds, and, annually, the commissioner shall adopt a formula to determine the amount to which approved districts are entitled. The application shall address the requirements of TEC, §21.458, and include:

(1) the timeline for application and approval;

(2) approval criteria, including the minimum requirements necessary for an application to be eligible for approval; and

(3) criteria used to determine which districts would be eligible for funding.

(d) Ongoing verification of compliance with program requirements.

(1) Each year, participating districts will be required to submit or participate in a verification of compliance with program requirements through a process to be described in the application form. The verification of compliance will include:

(A) an annual compliance report, submitted by the district, attesting to compliance with authorizing statute and commissioner rule. The report is to include the number of beginning teachers for whom the district used funds received under TEC, §48.114; and

(B) an annual survey of the district's beginning teachers and mentor teachers for whom funds were used under TEC, §48.114. The survey will be used to gather data on program implementation and teacher perceptions.

(2) Failure to comply with TEC, §21.458, and this section after receiving an allotment may result in negative impact on a district's future mentor program allotment funding.

(e) Allowable expenditures. Mentor program allotment funds may only be used for the following:

(1) mentor teacher stipends;

(2) release time for mentor teachers and beginning teachers limited to activities in accordance with this section; and

(3) mentoring support through providers of mentor training.

(f) District mentor program review. School districts awarded mentor program allotment funds must agree to submit all information requested by TEA through periodic activity/progress reports, which will occur not more than once yearly. Reports will be due no later than 45 calendar days after receipt of the information request and must contain all requested information in the format prescribed by the commissioner.

(g) Final decisions. Commissioner decisions regarding eligibility for mentor program allotment funds are final and appeals to the commissioner regarding such decisions will not be considered.

Statutory Authority: The provisions of this §153.1011 issued under the Texas Education Code, §21.458 and §48.114.

Source: The provisions of this §153.1011 adopted to be effective June 28, 2020, 45 TexReg 4192.

§153.1013. Suicide Prevention Training.

(a) All school districts and open-enrollment charter schools shall provide suicide prevention training as required by the Texas Education Code (TEC), §21.451(d), to all new school district and open-enrollment charter school educators as a part of new employee orientation during the 2016-2017 school year.

(b) Each subsequent school year, school districts and open-enrollment charter schools shall provide suicide prevention training as required by the TEC, §21.451(d), to all new school district and open-enrollment charter school educators as a part of new employee orientation.

(c) All school districts and open-enrollment charter schools shall provide suicide prevention training as required by the TEC, §21.451(d), to all currently employed school district and open-enrollment charter school educators on or by September 30, 2016.

(d) Suicide prevention training that is required by the TEC, §21.451(d), and was provided to existing educators by a school district or open-enrollment charter school on or after September 1, 2013, may be used to meet the requirements of this section if the training program is on the recommended best practice-based list maintained by the Department of State Health Services (DSHS), in coordination with the Texas Education Agency (TEA), or is an online program that meets the TEA guidelines for independent review.

(e) In accordance with the Health and Safety Code, §161.325, school districts shall maintain records that include the name of each educator who participated in the suicide prevention training.

(f) Open-enrollment charter schools are encouraged to maintain suicide prevention training records that include the name of each educator who participated in the suicide prevention training.

Statutory Authority: The provisions of this §153.1013 issued under the Texas Education Code, §21.451(d).

Source: The provisions of this §153.1013 adopted to be effective April 17, 2016, 41 TexReg 2748.

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Chapter 153. School District Personnel Subchapter BB. Commissioner's Rules Concerning Professional Development §153.1011. Mentor Program Allotment. (a) Definitions. The following words and terms, when used in this section, shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

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Judicial Law:

In Nguyen v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2018) the Supreme Court ruled that:

·         schools can be held liable for suicides if they fail to intervene after learning that a student has attempted or threatened suicide while enrolled

·         this ruling had significant impact in that it extends this responsibility to prevent suicide beyond those on campus with mental health expertise

(Nguyen v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018)

Reference: Nguyen v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 479 Mass. 436 (2018).

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NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 5571030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12329 DZUNG DUY NGUYEN, administrator,1 vs. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY & others.2 Middlesex. Present: November 7, 2017. - May 7, 2018. Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Wrongful Death. Negligence, Wrongful death, College. Damages, Wrongful death, Conscious pain and suffering, Breach of contract. Practice, Civil, Amendment of complaint. Workers' Compensation Act, Exclusivity provision. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 6, 2011. The case was heard by Bruce R. Henry, J., on motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Jeffrey S. Beeler for the plaintiff. Kevin P. Martin (Yvonne W. Chan also present) for the defendants. Alan D. Rose, B. Aidan Flanagan, & Antonio Moriello, for Amherst College & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 1 Of the estate of Han Duy Nguyen. 2 Birger Wernerfelt, Drazen Prelec, and David W. Randall. 2 Jonathan A. Karon, Thomas R. Murphy, Mark F. Itzkowitz, & Lisa DeBrosse Johnson, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. KAFKER, J. The plaintiff, Dzung Duy Nguyen, commenced a wrongful death action against the defendants, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), MIT Professors Birger Wernerfelt and Drazen Prelec, and MIT assistant dean David W. Randall, arising out of the suicide of his son, Han Duy Nguyen (Nguyen). The defendants are alleged to have been negligent in not preventing Nguyen's suicide. The motion judge allowed summary judgment for MIT and the individual defendants, finding no duty to prevent Nguyen's suicide. Although we conclude that, in certain circumstances not present here, a special relationship and a corresponding duty to take reasonable measures to prevent suicide may be created between a university and its student, we affirm the decision of the motion judge that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3 Background. We summarize the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Godfrey v. Globe We acknowledge the amicus brief filed by the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys; and the amicus brief filed in support of defendants by Amherst College, Bentley University, Berklee College of Music, Boston College, Boston University, Brandeis University, College of the Holy Cross, Emerson College, Endicott College, Harvard University, Northeastern University, Simmons College, Smith College, Stonehill College, Suffolk University, Tufts University, Williams College, and Worcester Polytechnic Institute. 3 3 Newspaper Co., 457 Mass. 113, 114 (2010). We reserve additional facts for our discussion of the legal issues. 1. The parties. At the time of his death on June 2, 2009, Nguyen was a twenty-five year old graduate student in the marketing program at MIT's Sloan School of Management (Sloan) and lived off-campus. Prelec was a Sloan faculty member and served as Nguyen's graduate research advisor. Wernerfelt was a Sloan faculty member and head of the Marketing Group Ph.D. program whose responsibility included advising graduate students concerning their coursework and research. Randall was an assistant dean in MIT's student support services (student support) office. 2. MIT support resources. In May, 2007, after his first academic year at MIT and two years before his death, Nguyen contacted Sloan's Ph.D. program coordinator, Sharon Cayley, for assistance with test-taking problems. Nguyen explained to Cayley that he was "failing all of my classes because I don't know how to take [examinations (exams)]. I know the course material, but it just won't happen for me on exams." Cayley then referred Nguyen to an MIT student disability services office coordinator, who described some of MIT's accommodations for individuals with disabilities. accommodations. Nguyen declined such In her notes from her meeting with Nguyen, the coordinator wrote that Nguyen "does not want to connect with MIT 4 Medical. (I recommended that he do so.) Says it won't be helpful; no reason to do so" (emphasis in original). After two meetings with the coordinator, Nguyen reported to Cayley that the meetings were of "absolutely no use . . . [the coordinator] seemed to think that because I was referred to her, that meant that I was disabled, and therefore had only disability accommodations to offer me." On June 25, 2007, Cayley referred Nguyen to MIT's mental health and counselling service (MIT Mental Health) and informed Wernerfelt that this referral was Cayley's "response to [Nguyen's] expressed need for remedial study skills." On July 9, 2007, Nguyen met with Dr. Celene Barnes, a psychologist at MIT Mental Health. On meeting Barnes, Nguyen stated that he did not know why he "was referred here. My issues have nothing to do with [mental health]." During the intake meeting, Nguyen denied suicidal ideation. Barnes "provided [a] brief overview of [information] on test anxiety and gave him handouts used in the test anxiety workshop [and] [o]ffered to work with him on this issue." Nguyen "declined, stating again that he did not want to seek[] services at [MIT Mental Health] due to the stigma associated with it." On July 25, 2007, Nguyen had a second appointment with Barnes. She conducted a general intake, which irritated Nguyen because "he didn't know what other [mental health] issues had to 5 do with his test taking problem." During this meeting, Nguyen disclosed to Barnes that he had had a long history of depression with two prior suicide attempts during college but denied any present suicidal ideation. Nguyen also disclosed that he had been in treatment prior to coming to MIT and that he had resumed treatment with a psychiatrist in the area. Although Nguyen had hoped that his test anxiety issue would be resolved in one appointment, he agreed to follow up with Barnes at the start of the school year. On July 29, 2007, Nguyen told Cayley that he found MIT Mental Health to be "useless," that Barnes "proceeded to turn me into a mental patient, and I was forced to discuss things that I really didn't want to," and that he doubted that MIT Mental Health was the "correct agency to solve my problem." Further, Nguyen questioned why Wernerfelt had to be informed of the referral to Barnes because Nguyen was "hoping to keep the circle as small as possible, since I'm very ashamed and embarrassed about [my test-taking problems]." On August 9, 2007, Nguyen reported to Barnes that he was receiving treatment from Dr. John J. Worthington, a psychiatrist at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH), not MIT Mental Health. Barnes offered to consult about treatment planning, but Nguyen declined. Subsequently, Nguyen informed Barnes that he had "been able to make other arrangements for treatment, so there 6 will be no need to search any further, but I really appreciate all of your effort thus far." On September 6, 2007, Nguyen met with Randall, the assistant dean in the student support office.4 Before meeting with Randall, Nguyen had sent an electronic mail (e-mail) message to another student support dean, inquiring whether the student support office could help him with his problem, which was that he had "difficulty with taking exams, to the extent that [he was] failing classes" and asked if the student support office offered "any kind of counseling service that teaches study skills." In their first meeting, Randall reported that Nguyen was "very committed to this not being seen as a 'problem' and [was] looking for a quick fix." Toward the end of the meeting, Nguyen acknowledged that he had a long history of mental health issues and depression and that he was seeing a psychiatrist, Dr. Worthington, off campus. On September 24, 2007, Nguyen returned to see Randall. Nguyen described a "long history of depression dating back to high school," and treatment by "several . . . therapists during college." He also "acknowledged two suicide attempts in the At the time, Randall was a licensed clinical psychologist. Both parties are in agreement, however, that Randall did not have a clinician-patient relationship with Nguyen in his nonclinical capacity as assistant dean in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) student support services office. 4 7 past and frequent suicidal thoughts." Nguyen, however, stated that he "did not identify a specific plan [to commit suicide] . . . and [was] not imminently suicidal." Although perceiving that Nguyen was not an imminent threat, Randall "strongly encouraged" Nguyen to visit MIT Mental Health. But after his recent MIT Mental Health meeting with Barnes, Nguyen was resistant and stated that his current psychiatrist was already aware of his prior suicidal ideation and that Nguyen also had plans to see another therapist, Dr. Stephen Bishop, in Rhode Island. By the end of the September 24 meeting, Nguyen gave Randall permission to contact Worthington, Bishop, and Barnes. Later that day, Randall left a voice message for Worthington. Subsequently, Nguyen revoked Randall's permission to contact Worthington and stated in an e-mail message that he would "like to keep the fact of my depression separate from my academic problems. I'd prefer that we not any further discuss the depression, that my academic problems can be framed in terms of a deficit in study skills instead. If you can offer any such aid, I'd be happy to further employ your services." On September 25, Randall acknowledged Nguyen's decision and replied that he "would still like to meet with you and think that I can be helpful." Randall also stated in the e-mail message that Nguyen was permitted "to schedule another [appointment]." 8 Nguyen did not respond to Randall's e-mail message and did not have any further meetings or contact with Randall after September, 2007. Worthington followed up with Randall on September 27, 2007. Worthington was unable to share any information or confirm that Nguyen was his patient, but said that he could listen to Randall's concerns, especially regarding Nguyen's safety. Randall informed Worthington that Nguyen appeared "agitated, a little suspicious, and anxious, both at [the student support office] and MIT [Mental Health]," and of Nguyen's "suicidal thoughts and previous attempts." Worthington did not discuss the case further, but agreed the information should be taken seriously. On September 28, 2007, Randall told Barnes that he had spoken with Worthington about Nguyen, and wrote, "Let's keep in touch about this student." Barnes responded, "I agree, let's definitely keep in touch about [Nguyen]." Nguyen did not return to see Barnes or any other mental health provider at MIT Mental Health. 3. Nguyen's mental health history. Although Nguyen briefly sought out the student disability services office, MIT Mental Health, and the student support office between May and September, 2007, he extensively consulted with clinicians not affiliated with MIT. Between July, 2006, when Nguyen moved to Massachusetts, and May, 2009, Nguyen saw at least nine private 9 mental health professionals who collectively recorded over ninety in-person visits during this period. There was no indication from any of these mental health professionals that Nguyen was at an imminent risk of committing suicide. From July, 2006, two months before enrolling at MIT, to November, 2008, Nguyen was treated by Worthington, a psychiatrist at MGH. Over the course of their forty-three in- person appointments, Worthington discerned nothing indicating that Nguyen was at an imminent risk of suicide. Nguyen requested electroconvulsive therapy to treat his depression, and received six rounds of it at MGH in August and September, 2006. Starting in September, 2006, Nguyen began therapy with a social worker at MGH and was scheduled for sixteen sessions. Nguyen disclosed to the social worker that he had occasional suicidal thoughts, but no suicidal intent or plan. After their twelfth visit, Nguyen canceled his remaining appointments stating that his "time together [with the social worker had] not resulted in an inch of progress." Nguyen's next therapist was Bishop, whom he saw for several months in Rhode Island beginning in October, 2007. Bishop diagnosed Nguyen with dysthymic disorder, a chronic depressive condition. Nguyen saw Bishop six times between October, 2007, and March, 2008, but stopped seeing him because of the distance and because Bishop did not accept his health insurance plan. 10 From April, 2008, to March, 2009, Nguyen sought treatment from a doctor at a private practice group who specialized in sleep disorders. This doctor did not think that Nguyen was at risk of suicide during the time she was treating him. Starting in August, 2009, Nguyen saw a psychologist affiliated with the same private practice group. In February, 2009, Nguyen canceled his future appointments with the psychologist because he believed his "sleep patterns [were] beginning to converge on nonpathology." Next, in November, 2008, Nguyen met twice with another doctor to complete a psychological test. During the interview, Nguyen told that doctor that he was "not imminently suicidal." That same month, Nguyen stopped seeing Worthington because Nguyen believed him to be "too autocratic and didn't consider [Nguyen's] input."5 Nguyen then began seeing yet another doctor and continued to see him through May, 2009. At Nguyen's initial appointment, that doctor noted that Nguyen "made two 'halfassed' suicide attempts. He denies suicidal ideation." At each appointment, the doctor and Nguyen discussed whether Nguyen had "any self-destructive thoughts . . . [or felt like] giving up." Nguyen had made a similar point in June, 2008, when he sent an electronic mail (e-mail) message to Worthington stating, "I need you to consider me as part of the team when it comes to my own treatment. . . . After all I am a PhD student at one of the world's top universities. Please give me a little credit here." 5 11 Nguyen denied any such thoughts or feelings. In March, 2009, Nguyen began seeing a different doctor, with whom he had six visits. Nguyen told the doctor about his two prior suicide attempts but denied any current suicidal ideation. Throughout this time, the doctor did not believe that Nguyen was at an imminent threat of self-harm. Nguyen's last appointment with this doctor was on May 28, 2009, five days before Nguyen's death. The doctor noted that Nguyen "did not say anything that sounded imminently suicidal or hopeless, and we discussed more things that he would do toward exploring thesis and career options, and we made a next [appointment] for [June 18]." 4. Nguyen's academic challenges. At times during his studies at Sloan, Nguyen struggled academically and performed "well below average" in some of his courses. During Nguyen's time at MIT, neither Wernerfelt nor Prelec was aware of Nguyen's history of severe depression or prior suicide attempts. Wernerfelt knew only that Nguyen had insomnia and test taking anxiety, and that he was consulting off-campus mental health professionals. On May 9, 2008, Prelec was informed by one of his MIT colleagues that Nguyen was reportedly "out of it" and "despondent," potentially because Nguyen was "having trouble sleeping as of late." On May 12, Prelec met with Nguyen and 12 reported to Wernerfelt that Nguyen is "sleep deprived . . . and is taking something on prescription to help him sleep. He is seeing a psychiatrist regularly, at Mass General (not MIT). Same person he has been seeing since he got here." Wernerfelt replied that Nguyen "has had some serious issues with exam anxiety, so I worry about the general[] [exams]. Perhaps we can give them in a less concentrated form . . . [t]hat way he can get a good grade under his belt . . . I think that it would be good to give him some confidence."6 On May 26, 2008, Wernerfelt was informed that Nguyen had performed poorly in a course that an MIT colleague taught. Nguyen had told that colleague that he had "medical problems that have prevented him from focusing on classes . . . [and] asked [the colleague] to consider his weakened health when he [took] the final." Wernerfelt responded to his colleague that Nguyen was "having serious problems. Some of his issues seem to peak at exam time, but there is much more to it than that. He has been seeing a psychiatrist at MGH (not MIT) as long as he has been here. I thus have no official information, but I do Wernerfelt testified that "general exams" were required for all MIT Sloan School of Management Ph.D. students. Students typically take these examinations at the end of their second year, over a period of several days. 6 13 believe that he is at risk."7 Wernerfelt suggested that his colleague be lenient and "grade him based on the problem sets" rather than his final examination. On June 2, 2008, Wernerfelt sent an e-mail message to seven of Nguyen's professors, informing them that Prelec and he had "decided to reduce the pressure on [Nguyen] by spreading out his general[] [exams] over several weeks." On June 4, Wernerfelt, "[i]n an attempt to reduce the pressure on [Nguyen] as much as possible," further modified Nguyen's examination schedule allowing Nguyen to take the examinations when he was ready. In a June, 2008 self-evaluation form, Nguyen stated that his academic performance was "[b]elow average, due to my medical condition." Nguyen indicated that the "primary nature of this illness [was] insomnia" and that he had "been seeing a team of doctors at [MGH] and elsewhere who have been trying to help me." Nguyen described how "horrendously bad" his medical condition was, stating that "[t]here were days during which I was so completely debilitated for the entire day that I was unable to get out of bed at all, much less function properly" and that at one point he "had to be hospitalized because I was so delirious Wernerfelt testified that he meant "risk" to refer to "some adverse reaction if [Nguyen] were to get a really low grade" in Nguyen's economics course. Wernerfelt stated that a low grade was "not a big deal" because if Nguyen got "a bad grade . . . he [could] take a makeup exam or . . . take another course instead" to satisfy the graduate school requirement. 7 14 and incoherent after not being able to sleep for over [seventytwo] hours." Nguyen further stated that he "would not be surprised if I have to be hospitalized again in the near future." Nguyen also stated that he was on his ninth different sleeping pill prescription and that he was still not functioning well. Nguyen did not disclose any history of depression, suicidal ideation, or his prior suicide attempts in his selfevaluation. After receiving Nguyen's self-evaluation, Wernerfelt offered to help Nguyen obtain a "leave from the program . . . such that [he] could return to a good situation once the [doctors] lick [his] sleeping problems." On October 30, 2008, Nguyen sent an e-mail message to Wernerfelt and requested an examination schedule that would take place between January 12 and January 26, 2009, with his oral examination during the week of January 26 through January 30, 2009.8 Prelec testified that Nguyen's performance "varied some, but overall it was not a good performance." After Nguyen had completed his general examinations, the faculty in his department met in January, 2009, to discuss Nguyen's performance and whether he had passed. Wernerfelt advocated that "Nguyen should be passed and that the faculty should counsel him to pursue a master's degree." Wernerfelt Nguyen's general examinations originally had been scheduled for the summer of 2008. 8 15 also stated that "they might end up with 'blood on their hands'" if the faculty were to fail Nguyen.9 One of Wernerfelt's colleagues testified that the phrase, "blood on our hands," was repeated several times. After the faculty passed Nguyen, Wernerfelt met with Nguyen to inform him that he had passed, although he was required to take certain additional courses to remain in the Ph.D. program. Further, Wernerfelt "laid out the path to a [Master's degree] . . . [and] [s]aid that all members of the faculty felt that he would be unhappy in a professorial job." In March, 2009, Nguyen sent an e-mail message to Prelec, telling him that "to be a professor" is what Nguyen "want[ed] more than anything. . . . [and he was not] convinced that anyone has really taken [his] health issues into consideration." Nguyen remained insistent that he would "still do everything in [his] power to ensure that [he] will finish the PhD." Prelec met with Nguyen weekly during the spring of 2009 and noticed that Nguyen "seemed better" and was having fewer sleep problems. That semester, Nguyen served as a teaching assistant and, at the end of the semester, was offered another teaching assistant position for the fall of 2009, which he accepted. In In contrast to failing a course, failing general examinations could lead to dismissal from the graduate program. Wernerfelt testified that if Nguyen were to fail his general examinations, there was a "very small chance that . . . something bad could happen . . . such as [Nguyen] hurting himself or others." 9 16 May, 2009, Prelec recommended Nguyen for a summer research assistant position in an MIT laboratory. On May 27, 2009, Nguyen sent an e-mail message to the project investigator that he was "very excited about [the] project . . . [and] would be eager to begin very soon." Nguyen also requested an update about funding logistics, as he was under the impression that the MIT laboratory's "coffers were bottomless." Prelec was copied on this message and forwarded it to Wernerfelt, stating that he was "mildly nervous" about recommending Nguyen because "[w]ith this talk of bottomless coffers . . . [Nguyen] will rapidly offend . . . folks." In response, Wernerfelt suggested that "someone should talk to [Nguyen] about sending more respectful e-mails" and that "[p]erhaps we should offer to prescreen his emails . . . after two or three [Nguyen] might get the idea." Wernerfelt offered to take the lead on speaking with Nguyen about e-mail etiquette. 5. Nguyen's suicide. At approximately 7 A.M. on June 2, 2009, Nguyen sent the project investigator an e-mail message, on which he blind-copied Prelec: "I forgot to mention that this upcoming Monday I have a doctor's appointment that I had scheduled a long time ago, so I won't be able to come into the office until about 11:30 that day. I hope that that won't be a problem. "If we can quickly follow up on the conversation that we had yesterday, if you'll forgive me, I'd like to be honest with you about something. [Prelec] recommended me for this position . . . [a]nd I'm not an undergrad 17 anymore; I'm a grad[uate] student now. For those reasons, it was disturbing, as well as a little insulting, to me that yesterday you took pains to express your expectations of me in a manner that presumed that I would give you anything less than this project deserved, that you would 'give me a signal' if you didn't think that my contribution amounted to something deserving of authorship credit, that 'there would be a problem' if it turned out that '[you] could do [the work] faster [your]self,' that you threatened me that you could tell by visual inspection whether my work was up to par. I like to feel like I've earned the right not to have my effectiveness or my integrity questioned anymore, and to hear you do that yesterday was kind of hurtful. I'm not sure that if you continue to do this that I'll be able to work as effectively as I'd like to be able to. Although I keep asking about it, I'm not just doing this for the money. I want to learn something and make a meaningful contribution . . . . Would it be possible that we could move forward with an understanding of good faith on my part?" After receiving Nguyen's e-mail message, Prelec and the project investigator spoke about it. The project investigator told Prelec that Nguyen had taken his comments out of context and that Nguyen misinterpreted his intentions and the tone of the meeting. Prelec forwarded the e-mail message to Wernerfelt, asking if Wernerfelt could "talk to [Nguyen] as a somewhat neutral party . . . [Nguyen] is misreading things. reply is totally out of line." sorry. Even so, the tone of Wernerfelt responded, "I am so I will talk to [Nguyen] and let you know what he says." At approximately 9 A.M. on June 2, Nguyen arrived at a laboratory in a building on MIT's campus. The laboratory coordinator noted that Nguyen's demeanor appeared "pretty 18 normal" and that Nguyen was preparing for a research project. After a number of missed calls between Nguyen and Wernerfelt, at 10:51 A.M., Nguyen reached Wernerfelt by telephone. the laboratory to take the call.10 Nguyen left After the telephone call ended at approximately 10:59 A.M., Nguyen went to the roof of the building and jumped off the building to his death. A first responder administered first aid to Nguyen "a few seconds" after he landed and did not identify any signs of breathing, eye movement, pulse, or consciousness. It was determined that the immediate cause of Nguyen's death was "blunt trauma with head, skull, torso and extremity injuries" and that it occurred within "seconds." Meanwhile, after Wernerfelt finished speaking with Nguyen, at 11:04 A.M., Wernerfelt sent an e-mail message to Prelec: "I read [Nguyen] the riot act "Explained what is wrong about the e-mail "Told him that you or I would look over future e-mails he Wernerfelt testified that he contacted Nguyen because he had been forwarded Nguyen's e-mail message to the project investigator and that he wanted to help with Nguyen's "social skills." Wernerfelt testified that he "went through point for point" giving "advice and explanations" on what was improper with Nguyen's e-mail. Wernerfelt recommended that Nguyen, in the future, let him or Prelec review Nguyen's e-mail drafts. Wernerfelt reiterated that Nguyen "would be happier outside the academe" and "should think about getting a [M]aster's degree and pursuing a nonacademic job." At the conclusion of the telephone call, Wernerfelt told Nguyen that "some patching up would have to be done after this e-mail, and [Wernerfelt] thought [Nguyen] should . . . contact [Prelec] and the two of them could together figure out what the next steps would be." 10 19 send[s] . . . "I said that we know that he is not out to offend anyone but that he seems poor at navigating the academe "Said that this is an example of why we all recommended that he take a [Master's Degree] and go out to get a job "I talked about some papers he could turn into [a Master's] thesis and volunteered to supervise it "Said that he made you look bad vs [the laboratory] and that some patching up was necessary "He will call you about what to do" Later in the afternoon on June 2, 2009, one of Wernerfelt's colleagues sent an e-mail message to Wernerfelt that "I know you were worried about suicide, but you can feel positive that we tried very hard to help [Nguyen] (and especially you did so much to help him)."11 In 2011, the plaintiff commenced an action in Superior Court, alleging that the defendants' negligence caused Nguyen's death. In March, 2016, the defendants moved for summary judgment and the plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment. In October, 2016, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was allowed and the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment was denied. The plaintiff appealed from the denial of his motion, and we granted his motion for direct appellate review. Discussion. The plaintiff contends that the defendants owed Nguyen a duty of reasonable care and committed a breach of The colleague testified that Wernerfelt "didn't actually say suicide. He said serious consequences, which I interpreted . . . as a risk for suicide." 11 20 this duty. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the record supports claims for punitive damages, conscious pain and suffering, and breach of contract. The plaintiff also asserts that the Superior Court judge improperly denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to assert claims against former MIT chancellor Phillip Clay. Lastly, the plaintiff contends that summary judgment should be entered in his favor that Nguyen was not an MIT employee at the time of his death for workers' compensation purposes. 1. Standard of review. Where the parties have cross-moved for summary judgment, we review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the unsuccessful opposing party and drawing all permissible inferences and resolving any evidentiary conflicts in that party's favor, the successful opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Epstein v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 752, 756 (2010). See Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 448 Mass. 629, 636-637 (2007), citing Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991). 2. Negligence claim. a. General negligence principles. "To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care, that the defendant [committed a breach of] this duty, that damage resulted, and that there was a causal relation between the 21 breach of the duty and the damage." 141, 146 (2006). Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. Generally, there is no duty to prevent another from committing suicide. Under our case law, "we do not owe others a duty to take action to rescue or protect them from conditions we have not created." Cremins v. Clancy, 415 Mass. 289, 296 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring). "[T]he law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger, even if the other is in danger of losing his life." W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Torts § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984). b. Special relationships and the duty to prevent suicide. We have, however, recognized that special relationships may arise in certain circumstances imposing affirmative duties of reasonable care in regard to the duty to rescue, including the duty to prevent suicide. The classic case is the custodial relationship, particularly jails or hospitals.12 In Slaven v. In noncustodial cases, a defendant is also "liable for another's death by suicide when, as a consequence of a physical impact, death results from an 'uncontrollable impulse, or is accomplished in delirium or frenzy.'" Slaven v. Salem, 386 Mass. 885, 886-887 (1982), quoting Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 183 Mass. 393, 399-400 (1903). The plaintiff asserts that the second scenario applies, that Wernerfelt triggered Nguyen's uncontrollable suicidal impulse by the "riot act" telephone call. In this case, the "uncontrollable impulse" scenario does not apply, as there has been no prior physical 12 22 Salem, 386 Mass 885, 888 (1982), we addressed the duty and accompanying responsibilities of a jailor for the suicide of a prisoner in his custody. "One who is required by law to take or voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection is under a duty (1) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and (2) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others." Id. at 887, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965). We further explained that "[t]he comments to § 314A state that a 'defendant is not liable where he neither knows nor should know of the unreasonable risk, or of the illness or injury.'" Slaven, supra, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra at § 314A comment e. Finally, we noted that in cases in other jurisdictions "that have addressed the issue of the liability of a jailor for the suicide of one in his custody, most have required that there be evidence that the defendant knew, or had reason to know, of the plaintiff's suicidal tendency." Slaven, supra at 888. We likewise conclude that there are other special relationships, outside the custodial context, that may impose affirmative, albeit limited, duties in regard to suicide injury causing the uncontrollable impulse. 887. Slaven, supra at 23 prevention. We therefore turn to the scope of the university- student relationship, and the duties, if any, it imposes regarding suicide prevention.13 c. The modern university-student relationship. We begin with the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which states that "[a]n actor in a special relationship with another owes the other a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship." Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 40(a) (2012). Included in the list of special relationships giving rise to such duty is "a school with its students." Id. at § 40(b)(5). This, of course, is the beginning and not the end of the analysis. There is a wide range of schools -- from elementary to graduate school -- and great differences in the scopes of student-school relationships. Additionally, the Restatement (Third) of Tort's formulation of special relationship is not focused on the specific question of student suicide. The particularities of the university-student relationship are of paramount importance in defining any duty. Universities are clearly not bystanders or strangers in regards to their students. See Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 51- Our use of the term "university" encompasses other institutions of higher education, including but not limited to colleges and universities. 13 24 52 (1983). nature.14 The primary mission of universities is academic in Universities also sponsor and have special relationships with their students regarding athletics and other potentially dangerous activities. See, e.g., Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1370 (3d Cir. 1993) (duty of care to lacrosse player during practice); Davidson v. University of N. Carolina at Chapel Hill, 142 N.C. App. 544, 555-556 (2001) (duty of care to cheerleader during practice). Suicide on Campus: See also Massie, The Appropriate Legal Responsibility of College Personnel, 91 Marq. L. Rev. 625, 641 (2008) (Suicide on Campus). Cf. Kavanagh v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 440 Mass. 195, 202 (2003) (special relationship does not extend to athletes from other schools). They are also property owners and landlords responsible for their students' physical safety on campus. See Mullins, 389 Mass. at 51-52; Massie, Suicide on Campus, supra at 642. Furthermore, university involvement extends widely into other aspects of student life. Determining Duty in Collegiate Tort Litigation: See Dall, Shifting Paradigms of the College-Student Relationship, 29 J.C. & U.L. 485, 519 (2003) (universities "do not conceive of their For example, "[t]he mission of MIT is to advance knowledge and educate students in science, technology, and other areas of scholarship that will best serve the nation and the world in the 21st century]." http://web.mit.edu/facts /mission.html [https://perma.cc/KF4R-PQ3W]. 14 25 educational role narrowly . . . and foster many aspects of student life and community involvement such as residential life, multicultural programs, student organizations, student government, student media, community service, internships and externships, technology, health and fitness, and spirituality"). Accord Regents of the Univ. of Cal. vs. Superior Court of Los Angeles, Supreme Court of California, No. S230658, slip op. at 27 (Mar. 22, 2018) (Regents) ("Along with educational services, colleges provide students social, athletic, and cultural opportunities. Regardless of the campus layout, colleges provide a discrete community for their students."). But universities are not responsible for monitoring and controlling all aspects of their students' lives. "There is universal recognition that the age of in loco parentis has passed, and that the duty, if any is not one of a general duty of care to all students in all aspects of their collegiate life." Massie, Suicide on Campus, 91 Marq. L. Rev. at 640. See Mullins, 389 Mass. at 52 (describing major "changes in college life," and "the general decline of the theory that a college stands in loco parentis to its students"); Schieszler v. Ferrum College, 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 610 (W.D. Va. 2002) ("colleges are not insurers of the safety of their students"). See also Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979) (describing end of loco parentis relationship "between college 26 and student that imposed a duty on the college to exercise control over student conduct and, reciprocally, gave the students certain rights of protection by the college"). University students are young adults, not young children. Indeed, graduate students are adults in all respects under the law. Universities recognize their students' adult status, their desire for independence, and their need to exercise their own judgment. Consequently the modern university-student relationship is respectful of student autonomy and privacy. See Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138 ("Trustees, administrators, and faculties have been required to yield to the expanding rights and privileges of their students"); Furek v. University of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 516-517 (Del. 1991) (describing "realities of modern college life where students are regarded as adults in almost every phase of community life" [quotations and citation omitted]). This includes students' personal mental health decisions. Indeed, the privacy of student mental health records are generally protected, absent the student's consent or an emergency where disclosure is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other persons. See Family Educational Right and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). See also Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012) (imposing limitations on rights of nonclinicians in obtaining or disclosing individually 27 identifiable health information); Massie, Suicide on Campus, 91 Marq. L. Rev. at 648.15 In deciding whether a special relationship and accompanying duty exists between a university and a student in regard to suicide prevention, and whether a breach of such a duty has occurred, we must therefore take into account a complex mix of competing considerations. Students are adults but often young and vulnerable; their right to privacy and their desire for independence may conflict with their immaturity and need for protection. As for the universities, their primary mission is to educate and they no longer are acting in loco parentis, but they still have a wide-ranging involvement in the lives of their students. See, e.g. Mullins, 389 Mass. at 52; Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138. d. See also Regents, slip op. at 17. A university's duty regarding suicide prevention. In analyzing whether a duty to prevent suicide falls within the scope of the complex relationship that universities have with their students, we consider a number of factors used to delineate duties in tort law. Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 756 Universities must also be attentive to the requirements of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012), which states, "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 15 28 (1984). See Massie, Suicide on Campus, 91 Marq. L. Rev. at 639. "Foremost among these is whether a defendant reasonably could foresee that he [or she] would be expected to take affirmative action to protect the plaintiff and could anticipate harm to the plaintiff from the failure to do so." Irwin, supra. A related factor is "reasonable reliance by the plaintiff [on the defendant], impeding other persons who might seek to render aid." Id. Other factors that have been considered relevant to special relationships and the creation of a duty in the university context are the "degree of certainty of harm to the plaintiff; burden upon the defendant to take reasonable steps to prevent the injury; some kind of mutual dependence of plaintiff and defendant upon each other, frequently . . . involving financial benefit to the defendant arising from the relationship; moral blameworthiness of defendant's conduct in failing to act; and social policy considerations involved in placing the economic burden of the loss on the defendant." Massie, Suicide on Campus, supra. 53. See also Lake, Still Waiting: See Mullins, 389 Mass. at 51The Slow Evolution of the Law in Light of the Ongoing Student Suicide Crisis, 34 J.C. & U.L. 253, 257-277 (2008) (Still Waiting) (catalog of key cases and factors used by courts to determine duty); Regents, slip op. at 18 ("Students are comparatively vulnerable and dependent on their colleges for a safe environment. Colleges have a superior 29 ability to provide that safety with respect to activities they sponsor or facilities they control"). With these considerations in mind, we conclude that a university has a special relationship with a student and a corresponding duty to take reasonable measures to prevent his or her suicide in the following circumstances. Where a university has actual knowledge of a student's suicide attempt that occurred while enrolled at the university or recently before matriculation, or of a student's stated plans or intentions to commit suicide,16 the university has a duty to take reasonable The Columbia Lighthouse Project, under the auspices of Columbia University, created the Columbia-Suicide Severity Rating Scale(C-SSRS), a suicide risk assessment tool that provides useful guidance. See Columbia-Suicide Severity Rating Scale. http://cssrs.columbia.edu/the-columbia-scale-cssrs/about-the-scale/ [https://perma.cc/TR7Y-S8JB]. More specifically, C-SSRS category four or five behavior is informative of what constitutes a student's stated plans or intentions to commit suicide: 16 "4. Active Suicidal Ideation with Some Intent to Act, without Specific Plan -- Active suicidal thoughts of killing oneself and subject reports having some intent to act on such thoughts, as opposed to 'I have the thoughts but I definitely will not do anything about them.' "5. Active Suicidal Ideation with Specific Plan and Intent -- Thoughts of killing oneself with details of plan fully or partially worked out and subject has some intent to carry it out." (Emphasis in original.) See Posner, Brent, Lucas, Gould, Stanley, Brown, Fisher, Zelazny, Burke, Oquendo, & Mann, Columbia-Suicide Severity Rating Scale (C-SSRS), Lifetime Recent, Version 1/14/09 m9/12/17 (2008). 30 measures under the circumstances to protect the student from self-harm. See Mullins, 389 Mass. at 52 ("Parents, students, and the general community still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by colleges themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised to protect . . . students from foreseeable harm"); Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 608-609 ("relationship between a college or university and its students can give rise to a duty to protect students from harms of which the school has knowledge," including risk of suicide); Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 40(b)(5); Massie, Suicide on Campus, 91 Marq. L. Rev. at 631 ("where college or university personnel are aware that a student has made serious suicidal threats or attempts, they have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect the student's safety"). See also Pavela, Questions and Answers on College Student Suicide: A Law and Policy Perspective 8-9 (2006) ("[I]nstitutions of higher education face heightened risk of liability for suicide when they ignore or mishandle known suicide threats or attempts. . . . The main obstacle to better suicide prevention on campus is underreaction, especially the failure to provide [perhaps even require] prompt professional evaluation and treatment for any student who threatens or attempts suicide" [emphasis in original]). We have sought to define here the circumstances creating the special relationship and the duty realistically recognizing the scope of the suicide 31 problem on university campuses, the capacities of nonclinicians, and the nature of the modern university-student relationship.17 It is estimated that 1,100 university students die by suicide ever year. See Jed Foundation's Framework for Developing Institutional Protocols For the Acutely Distressed or Suicidal College Student 2 (2006), available at https://www.jedfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07 /framework-developing-institutional-protocols-acutelydistressed-suicidal-college-student-jed-guide_NEW.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MLG-2T3U] ("Jed Framework"). "According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), suicide is the 'second leading cause of death among [twenty-five to thirtyfour] year olds and the third leading cause of death among [fifteen to twenty-four] year olds.' Thus, suicide prevention is not simply a focus for traditional college- and universityaged populations, but must also be a focus for graduate and professional schools. The [twenty-five to thirty-four] year-old demographic factors prominently in most graduate and professional school programs and applies to the many college and university students who extend their education" (footnote omitted). Lake, Still Waiting: The Slow Evolution of the Law in Light of the Ongoing Student Suicide Crisis, 34 J.C. & U.L. 253, 254-255 (2008). See Center for Disease Control, National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 10 Leading Causes of Death by Age Group, United States -- 2015, https://www.cdc.gov /injury/wisqars/pdf/leading_causes_of_death_by_age_group_2015a.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8TN-N2HQ] (from most recent statistics available from CDC, in 2015, suicide was second leading cause of death among both fifteen to twenty-four and twenty-five to thirty-four year olds). 17 The number of students with suicidal thoughts is even more alarming. According to an Internet-based survey of 26,000 undergraduate and graduate students administered by the National Research Consortium of Counseling Centers in Higher Education, six per cent of undergraduate and four per cent of graduate students reported seriously considering suicide within the past twelve months. See Drum, Brownson, Denmark, & Smith, New Data on the Nature of Suicidal Crises in College Students: Shifting the Paradigm, 40 Prof. Psychol.: Res. & Prac. 213, 214-216 (2009). Similarly, in the American College Health Association's National College Health Assessment, which surveyed over 63,000 students at ninety-two colleges and universities in 2017, 10.3 32 It is important to understand the limited circumstances creating the duty. prevent suicide. It is definitely not a generalized duty to Nonclinicians are also not expected to discern suicidal tendencies where the student has not stated his or her plans or intentions to commit suicide. Even a student's generalized statements about suicidal thoughts or ideation are not enough, given their prevalence in the university community. The duty is not triggered merely by a university's knowledge of a student's suicidal ideation without any stated plans or intentions to act on such thoughts. As previously explained, this duty hinges on foreseeability. at 52. 639. See Irwin, 392 Mass. at 756; Mullins, 389 Mass. See also Massie, Suicide on Campus, 91 Marq. L. Rev. at Where a student has attempted suicide while enrolled at the university or recently before matriculation, or has stated plans or intentions to commit suicide, suicide is sufficiently foreseeable as the law has defined the term, even for university nonclinicians without medical training. Reliance of the student per cent of students reported that they had "seriously considered" suicide within the previous twelve months, and 1.5 per cent of students had attempted to commit suicide within the previous twelve months. See American College Health Association National College Health Assessment (2017), at 2, 14, http://www.acha-ncha.org/docs/NCHA-II_SPRING_2017_ REFERENCE_GROUP_EXECUTIVE_SUMMARY.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3NNU9XD]. 33 on the university for assistance, at least for students living in dormitories or away from their parents or guardians, is also foreseeable. Universities are in the best, if not the only, position to assist. See Mullins, supra. They have also "fostered" expectations, at least for their residential students, that reasonable care will be exercised to protect them from harm. Id. at 52, 54. See Irwin, supra. The probability of the harm must of course be considered along with its gravity including the death of the student. See Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 609 ("there was an imminent probability that [the decedent] would try to hurt himself"); Lake, Still Waiting, 34 J.C. & U.L. at 284 & n.204 (referencing in article on risk of student suicide and violence Justice Learned Hand's United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 [2d Cir. 1947], formulation that "if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is] less than PL"); Eisel v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 324 Md. 376, 386 (1991) (discussing magnitude of harm and statistical possibility of risk of suicide). Thus, where a student has attempted to commit suicide while enrolled at the university or recently before matriculation or stated plans or intentions to commit suicide, that probability is sufficient to justify imposition of a duty on the university. See Eisel, 34 supra. The burden on the university is not insubstantial, but so is the financial benefit received from student tuition. See generally Mullins, 389 Mass. at 53 (relating tuition to duty to provide adequate protection); Regents, slip op. at 13. Moral blameworthiness on the part of a university in failing to act to intervene to save a young person's life, when it was within the university's knowledge and power to do so, is understood and accepted by our society. See Eisel, supra at 391 ("if classmates of [a middle school decedent] found her lying on the floor of a lavatory, bleeding from slashed wrists, and those students told one or more teachers of the emergency, society would be outraged if the teachers did nothing and [the decedent] bled to death"); Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 97, 112113 (1908) ("We should all be better satisfied if the man who refuses to throw a rope to a drowning man or to save a helpless child on the railroad track could be punished and be made to compensate the widow of the man drowned and the wounded child"). Reasonable measures by the university to satisfy a triggered duty will include initiating its suicide prevention protocol if the university has developed such a protocol.18 In One resource that provides universities with guidance for drafting is Jed Foundation's Framework for Developing Institutional Protocols For the Acutely Distressed or Suicidal College Student. See Jed Framework, supra at 2-3, 10-16. 18 35 the absence of such a protocol, reasonable measures will require the university employee who learns of the student's suicide attempt or stated plans or intentions to commit suicide to contact the appropriate officials at the university empowered to assist the student in obtaining clinical care from medical professionals or, if the student refuses such care, to notify the student's emergency contact.19 In emergency situations, reasonable measures obviously would include contacting police, fire, or emergency medical personnel. By taking the reasonable measures under the circumstances presented, a university satisfies its duty. We stress that the duty here, at least for nonclinicians, is limited.20 It is created only by actual knowledge of a We recognize that for college and university students the emergency contact will often be the student's parents. But it might not always be a parent or guardian, such as where the student is married or where the student has informed the University that the suicide attempt or stated plans or intentions to commit suicide derive in part from a toxic home environment (including parental pressures or abuse inflicted by a parent). See Susan R. Furr, Westefeld, McConnell, & Jenkins, Suicide and Depression Among College Students: A Decade Later, 32 Prof. Psychol.: Res. & Prac. 97, 98 (2001) (survey of 1,455 college and university students demonstrated that twenty per cent of students who identified themselves as having suicidal thoughts considered "parental problems" to be contributor to their suicidal ideation and behavior). 19 For university-employed medical professionals, the duty and standards of care are those established by the profession itself. See Stepakoff v. Kantar, 393 Mass. 836, 841 (1985) ("plaintiff has not directed our attention to any case in which 20 36 student's suicide attempt that occurred while enrolled at the university or recently before matriculation, or of a student's stated plans or intentions to commit suicide. It also is limited to initiating the university's suicide prevention protocol, and if the school has no such protocol, arranging for clinical care by trained medical professionals or, if such care is refused, alerting the student's emergency contact. the duty is time-bound. Finally, Medical professionals may, for example, conclude that the student is no longer a suicide risk and no further care or counselling is required. This limited duty takes a number of the complex and competing considerations discussed above into account. First, it respects the privacy and autonomy of adult students in most circumstances, relying in all but emergency situations on the student's own capacity and desire to seek professional help to a court has bifurcated the duty owed by a psychiatrist to a suicidal patient by declaring that, when diagnosing a patient, the psychiatrist must exercise the care and skill customarily exercised by an average qualified psychiatrist, while, after diagnosing a patient as suicidal, the psychiatrist's duty to take preventive measures becomes one of 'reasonableness.' We are unwilling to disturb our longstanding rule that a physician, practicing a specialty, owes to his or her patient a duty to comply in all respects with the standard set by the average physician practicing that specialty"). See also McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass 43, 49 (1989), citing Stepakoff, supra at 840 ("psychiatrist must exercise the same degree of skill and care as is exercised by the average qualified practitioner in that specialty, taking into account the advances in that profession and the resources available to the physician"). 37 address his or her mental health issues. Second, it recognizes that nonclinicians cannot be expected to probe or discern suicidal intentions that are not expressly evident. It also acknowledges the scope of the suicide risk on campus and seeks to impose realistic duties and responsibilities on the universities, allowing them to respond with their own suicide prevention protocols if such protocols have been developed. Finally, this limited duty is consistent with the modern university relationship with its students, which is no longer in loco parentis but rather provides for the students' independence and self-determination. e. Whether a duty was created in this case and, if so, whether a breach of that duty occurred. For reasons that will be explained in detail below, we conclude that there was no duty created in the instant case, and if there arguably was such a duty two years before Nguyen's death, the defendants did not commit a breach of it as a matter of law. In sum, Nguyen never communicated by words or actions to any MIT employee that he had stated plans or intentions to commit suicide, and any prior suicide attempts occurred well over a year before matriculation. He also was a twenty-five year old adult graduate student living off campus, not a young student living in a campus dormitory under daily observation. Nguyen repeatedly made clear that he wanted to keep his mental health issues separate from his 38 academic performance problems and that he was seeking professional help from psychiatrists and psychologists outside the MIT Mental Health system. i. The relationship with Dean Randall in 2007. In the instant case, the question whether Randall, and therefore MIT, had a special relationship with Nguyen to take reasonable measures to prevent suicide in 2007 requires consideration of Randall's knowledge of Nguyen's prior suicide attempts and Nguyen's statements about present suicidal thoughts. First, Nguyen's prior suicide attempts in December, 2002, and April, 2005, were as an undergraduate student at a different university and preceded his September, 2006, enrollment as an MIT graduate student. Additionally, although Nguyen had frequent suicidal thoughts, which, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, can be read as present not past suicidal thoughts, Nguyen denied suicidal ideation in 2007. Thus, Randall had no actual knowledge of Nguyen having attempted suicide while enrolled at or recently before matriculating to MIT, or whether Nguyen had stated plans or intentions to commit suicide. Consequently, Randall had no special relationship with Nguyen and thus no duty to take reasonable measures to prevent Nguyen's suicide two years before his death. Nonetheless, Randall properly encouraged Nguyen to seek professional help at MIT, which Nguyen, as was his right, refused. Nguyen also informed Randall 39 that he was seeking professional help elsewhere and Randall sought permission to communicate with that psychiatrist, which Nguyen allowed and then promptly revoked. Finally, Randall invited further conversations with Nguyen, which he declined. That being said, Randall left Nguyen in the care of competent outside professionals as Nguyen demanded. In these circumstances, as a matter of law, a twenty-five year old graduate student's rights to privacy, autonomy, and selfdetermination were properly respected. ii. Prelec. The relationship with Professors Wernerfelt and In contrast to Randall's circumstances, no such special relationship was even arguably created between Nguyen and the defendants Wernerfelt and Prelec. There was no evidence that Wernerfelt and Prelec had actual knowledge of Nguyen's plans or intentions to commit suicide. a trained clinician. Both were academics; neither was Nguyen's communications to them about his mental health problems related to insomnia and test-taking, not to suicidal thoughts. There was also no evidence that Wernerfelt or Prelec were informed by MIT Mental Health, the student support office, or Randall about Nguyen's two suicide attempts in 2002 and 2005. Even if Wernerfelt or Prelec had such knowledge, the prior attempts were not close in time to Nguyen's enrollment at MIT. Given Nguyen's express request that his academic issues be kept separate from his mental health 40 issues and his assurances that he was being treated elsewhere, there also was no duty to communicate this information to either Wernerfelt or Prelec. Finally, even though Wernerfelt commented about possible "blood on their hands," it was stated metaphorically in the entirely different context of persuading his colleagues to allow Nguyen to pass his examinations. We note that Wernerfelt's expressed anxieties at the time of the general examinations that Nguyen might harm himself were not based on express statements or actions by Nguyen or information from trained clinicians and were more than five months before the time of the suicide. As none of the medical professionals treating Nguyen considered him "imminently suicidal," this was certainly not something Wernerfelt could have intuited on his own.21 Because the circumstances at hand did not trigger a Dr. Worthington, who treated Nguyen over the course of forty-three appointments over more than two years, testified that he "never thought [Nguyen] was at that imminent risk [of suicide] that he had to be admitted." Dr. Jeffrey Fortgang, the last medical professional that Nguyen saw, also noted that Nguyen did not seem "imminently suicidal or hopeless." 21 Although clinicians commonly assess the "imminence of the risk of suicide," such assessment, even for clinicians, is difficult and disputed. See, e.g., Hawes, Yaseen, Briggs, & Galynker, The Modular Assessment of Risk for Imminent Suicide (MARIS): A proof of concept for a multi-informant tool for evaluation of short-term suicide risk, 72 Comprehensive Psychiatry 88 (2017); Simon, Imminent Suicide: The Illusion of Short-Term Prediction, 36 Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 296 (2006). We do not here in any way impose such assessment on a nonclinician. 41 special relationship, we need not consider the duty of reasonable care and whether a breach of such a duty occurred. f. Voluntary assumption of a duty of care. The plaintiff also claims the defendants had a duty stemming from their voluntary assumption of a duty of care. assumed must be performed with due care." "[A] duty voluntarily 52. Mullins, 389 Mass. at This duty, however, can lead to liability only where a "failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or "the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking." Id. at 53. Although MIT voluntarily offers mental health student support services, there is no evidence that these services increased Nguyen's risk of suicide. Additionally, there was no evidence that Nguyen relied on MIT's mental health services. of such services. The facts bear out Nguyen's rejection Nguyen briefly consulted with MIT Mental Health and the student support office for only a few months in 2007, nearly two years before his death. Nguyen wanted assistance from MIT only as it pertained to test-taking and wanted to keep his mental health treatment separate. Nguyen declined further MIT services and instead engaged with nine offcampus mental health professionals while remaining enrolled as an MIT graduate student. Cf. Mullins, supra at 54 (prospective residential students rely on university's security features). Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot succeed on a "voluntarily 42 assumed duty" theory. 3. Punitive damages for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and breach of contract. The plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to punitive and emotional distress damages because the defendants' reckless or grossly negligent conduct was the proximate cause of Nguyen's death. As we concluded above, there was no evidence of the defendants' negligence and consequently the plaintiff cannot succeed on such claims. The plaintiff also cannot succeed on his breach of contract claim, as references to MIT Mental Health and the student support office's coordination of services is merely generalized and not sufficient to form an enforceable contract. See Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106, 150 (D. Mass. 1997). Further, even if such a contract existed, the claim would still fail, as Nguyen rejected assistance from both MIT Mental Health and the student support office. 4. Motion to amend. The plaintiff contends that his motion to amend the complaint to assert claims against former MIT chancellor Clay should have been allowed. The Superior Court judge denied the motion on grounds of futility. We review the denial of a motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 409 Mass. 842, 864 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991). Although leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so 43 requires," Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 (a), 365 Mass. 761 (1974), such leave may be denied where there is undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility in the amendment (citation omitted). (1991). Mathis v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 409 Mass. 256, 264 Here, Clay, who served as chancellor of MIT from 2001 through 2011, directed efforts in implementing MIT's mental health task force. At the time of Nguyen's death, several key recommendations had not yet been implemented. There was no indication that Clay had any personal knowledge of Nguyen's mental health issues or was personally involved with Nguyen in any other way. Clay had no common-law duty to prevent Nguyen's suicide, nor any special relationship with Nguyen, and he had not voluntarily assumed a duty of care. Furthermore, Clay had no individual liability solely on the basis of his "general supervisory role." Lyon v. Morphew, 424 Mass. 828, 833 (1997). Consequently, the proposed claims against Clay would be futile, and we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend. 5. Workers' compensation. The plaintiff argues that Nguyen was not an MIT employee at the time of his death and consequently his tort claims were not barred by the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation act, G. L. c. 152. The defendants claim that Nguyen was acting as an MIT employee and the tort claims were barred. We conclude, as did a judge in the 44 Superior Court in his written decision on cross motions for summary judgment that were filed on this issue, "that there are too many conflicting pieces of material evidence presented for this court to determine, as a matter of law, the unique question of whether or not Nguyen was an MIT employee at the time of his death." The factual record is undeveloped and unclear and the briefing inadequate on this difficult question involving paid summer research outside of Nguyen's ordinary graduate school activity for which he received a stipend. Further complicating matters, the financial and other documentary evidence is unclear as to Nguyen's work status at MIT on June 2, 2009. Additionally, whether the June 2, 2009, telephone call prior to the suicide was work or school-related is also in question. Consequently, there was no error in the denial of summary judgment on this issue. See Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 460 Mass. 91, 97 (2011). Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted for the defendants on the tort claims as a matter of law. We further conclude that the Superior Court judge properly denied summary judgment on the workers' compensation claim, as there are material disputed facts. So ordered.

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Nguyen v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Download PDF NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 5571030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12329 DZUNG DUY NGUYEN, administrator,1 vs.

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The Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City Independent School District Administrative Policy on Suicide Prevention and Response includes a crisis intervention flowchart which is a clear visual map of the steps to take and who to inform if a student makes a suicidal gesture or comment. The policy also includes risk factors and protective factors, prevention strategies, and steps for assessment and referral.  All Texas Statutes regarding suicide are also noted in the policy .
Reference:
Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City Independent School District (2017). Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City Independent School District Administrative Policy on Suicide Prevention and Response.

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Section A.2 of the American School Counselor Association Ethical Standards for School Counselors states that counselors must keep information confidential unless “a breach is required to prevent serious and foreseeable harm to the student” (American School Counselor Association, 2016, p. 2). Students may reveal suicidal ideation during a session. When this occurs, it is imperative that the school counselor break confidentiality to protect the student. This may include informing parents, teachers, staff, and administrators.

Reference:

American School Counselor Association. (2016). The ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors. https://www.schoolcounselor.org/getmedia/f041cbd0-7004-47a5-ba01-3a5d657c6743/Ethical-Standards.pdf

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Slide #12 Personal Connection to the Legal and Ethical Standards: 

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Slide #12 Personal Connection to the Legal and Ethical Standards: 

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During my adolescence, I do not remember being aware of suicide. It was not discussed in school, and I did not experience losing a friend or loved one to suicide. However, as a teacher I have lost a student and had several make outcries. Being aware of the legislation and policies that have been put in place to prevent suicide allowed me to see the responsibility educators have to keep students safe. More schools and individuals are being held accountable for wrongful death by suicide.  Ignoring bullying situations and suicidal threats made by students should never happen.  It was heartbreaking to discover through my research how many times these types of situations were ignored or not handled properly. One of my educational goals is to continue to learn about the best practices of suicide prevention and response by reviewing other school districts’ plans. Keeping up with new legislation and current court cases will also help me grow in this area. My ultimate goal is to help students who may be suffering from suicidal ideation or who have lost someone to suicide. As a school counselor, I feel it is my responsibility to ensure that the teachers and staff receive quality in-service and training on best practices and policies and procedures.

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Slide #13 Recommendations / Best Practices for Compliance

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Slide #13 Recommendations / Best Practices for Compliance

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The following are recommendations or best practices gained through my research of adolescent suicides as it applies to school faculty and staff:
·         Training on suicide prevention and how to handle possible attempts or outcries should be provided to all staff each year.  Any adult who interacts with the students must be aware of the signs to look for and understand the procedures for when a student makes an attempt or threat (N. Hartley, personal communication, March 4, 2021; 19 TAC § 153.1013)

·         Each district should have a suicide prevention and response plan or policy (Tex. Educ. Code § 11.252; Granello & Zyromski, 2019). These policies must be clearly communicated to all gatekeepers.

·         Teachers and counselors must know their students and be aware of what protective factors they have in place (N. Hartley, personal communication, March 4, 2021). Knowing your students allows staff to identify change in behavior and possible signs of suicide.

·         Supervision of students should be increased outside of instructional settings such as the playground or bathroom (Walsh, 2020).

·         Use direct language when questioning a student who has attempted suicide or made threats (N. Hartley, personal communication, March 4, 2021). Asking direct questions such as “did you want to kill yourself?” is necessary to have a clear understanding of where the student is at emotionally.

·         Respond to bullying immediately and have a process to notify the parents of the victim (Walsh, 2020). Each campus should have a curriculum and policies that address bullying. Students who are victims of bullying have an increased risk of suicide.

·         Counselors must break confidentiality if a student appears to be in danger of harming themselves (American School Counselor Association, 2016). The need to break confidentiality should have been explained to the student prior to the session.

References:

American School Counselor Association. (2016). The ASCA Ethical Standards for School Counselors. https://www.schoolcounselor.org/getmedia/f041cbd0-7004-47a5-ba01-3a5d657c6743/Ethical-Standards.pdf

Granello, P. F., & Zyromski, B. (2019). Developing a comprehensive school suicide prevention program. Professional School Counseling, 22(1), 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2156759X18808128

Suicide Prevention Training, 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 153.1013

Tex. Educ. Code § 11.252

Walsh, M. (2020). Federal appeals court lets lawsuit proceed against educators in student’s suicide. Education Week. https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/federal-appeals-court-lets-lawsuit-proceed-against-educators-in-students-suicide/2020/12