# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 5

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The first meaning of "sociobiology" is as Wilson's own term for a range of work that is currently referred to (and was largely referred to at the time) as behavioral ecology. Behavioral ecology is a science that uses evolutionary theory and especially adaptationist methods to try to understand animal behavior. Consider, for example the female parasitic jewel wasp. This wasp lives and lays its eggs in blowfly pupae; after a female wasp of this species is born and reaches adulthood she mates with one of the males also occupying her pupa, and then emerges and flies off to lay her eggs in another pupa. The jewel wasp is haplodiploid, and females can control the sex of each of their offspring by controlling whether or not the egg is fertilized when she lays it. What is particularly interesting about this wasp is that the percentage of females to males she lays depends on whether she got to the pupa first. If she is first to the pupa she lays a number of eggs, with mostly females (about 91.3%) and some males (about 8.7%). However, if she lays eggs in a pupa after another female has been there (this is called superparasitism), she lays a lot more sons than daughters. Behavioral ecologists are interested in understanding why animal behaviors like this have the peculiar features they do.

Behavioral ecology is sometimes characterized in terms of its relationships to the earlier "ethology" whose most famous practitioners are probably Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen. Tinbergen (1963) famously described four types of questions that an ethologist might ask in trying to understand some pattern of animal behavior, such as the egg laying strategy of the jewel wasp above. First, the ethologist could ask questions about the proximate causes of the behavior: for example, what neurological or psychological mechanisms lead the wasp to lay her eggs in the pattern she does? What mechanisms are responsible for the development of that mechanism-what developmental processes build the neural tissue that directly causes the egg laying behavior? Second, the ethologist could ask two ultimate, evolutionary questions about the behavior: what is the evolutionary function of the behavior, i.e. how does laying eggs in that pattern contribute to the wasp's reproductive success, to the reproductive success of its ancestors, and hence to the behavior's history of evolution by natural selection (if that is its history) in the jewel wasp population? Also, what is the phylogeny of the behavior, i.e. where did it arise in the evolutionary tree of the jewel wasp?

Unlike ethologists, behavioral ecologists studying animal behavior at first tended to focus on the third question, the question of evolutionary function, at the expense of the others (Griffiths, 2008; Krebs and Davies, 1997). Griffiths (2008) has argued such a focus by the behavioral ecologists on questions of function at the expense of questions of causation, development and phylogeny (but especially development) was highly problematic, since the four questions cannot be properly answered independently. Development constrains the evolution of biological traits in multiple ways, and behavior especially, since behavior depends on development at both neurological and psychological levels. Behavioral ecologists, however, for a long time took the complexity of the developmental resources contributing to behavior as a reason for (at least temporarily) avoiding such studies as part of their study of the evolution of behavior. Grafen (1984) argues that the problem with developmental approaches to behavior is that they are hard and lengthy to perform, especially if the only or primary purpose of the developmental work is to check that the trait in question does indeed have an evolutionary history that can be understood using adaptationist methods. Grafen argues that if behavioral ecologists had to perform developmental or psychological studies to be relatively confident of their conclusions about the evolutionary history of traits, they would probably never get as far as evolutionary studies, since such developmental and genetic work would take a very long time. Worse, such studies might well have no inherent interest of their own and represent a waste of time and resources for the scientist-not all traits have an interesting or enlightening developmental background or are produced by interesting and unknown psychological mechanisms. Instead, Grafen argues that behavioral ecologists should use what he calls the "phenotypic gambit" in studying the evolution of behavioral traits. This involves assuming that the developmental, psychological and genetic proximate causes of a behavioral trait, such as the jewel wasp's egg-laying strategy are of a type that will permit scientists to "pretend" that they are very straightforward when building evolutionary models, and yet still end up with models that give approximately the right answers about the primary processes, conditions and constraints acting on that trait during its evolution (for another similar view see Maynard Smith, 1982, 6ff).

Since Grafen wrote his article, however, there has been a certain shift in non-human behavioral ecology away from the phenotypic gambit and in favor of paying attention to proximate mechanisms, not simply because these enlighten whether a behavioral strategy could evolve by natural selection in any particular case, but also the nature of the fitness costs and benefits that accrue to an organism sometimes depend on how the adaptive problem they face is solved. For example, Lotem et al. (1995) appeal to the type of learning mechanism used by parenting great reed warblers to detect the presence of cuckoos in their nests: this limits how reliable their detection of cuckoo eggs can be. Similarly, Shuker and West (2004) argue that the constraints on the egg laying strategy of the parasitic jewel wasp cannot be properly understood without paying attention to the limits on the detection mechanisms the wasp uses to determine the presence or absence of other females, versus other females' eggs in each area.

Perhaps the most important analytical tool of the behavioral ecologist is the optimality model (Maynard Smith, 1978): however, frequency dependent models, which do not assume population fixation of a trait, such as evolutionary stable strategy models (Maynard Smith, 1982) (see also the entry on evolutionary game theory) and dynamic models, such those employed in studying life history traits (Roff, 1992), are also used. Optimality models are designed to show which of a set of possible variant behavioral strategies would maximize a local fitness currency under a range of ecological conditions and constraints implicitly or explicitly represented in the mathematical structure of the model. These conditions are supposed to represent the selection conditions of the trait (the conditions responsible for driving its evolution by natural selection - Brandon, 1990); however, they are usually derived by observing the conditions under which the organism is currently living, since these are assumed generally to have remained much the same as the conditions under which the organism evolved (Turke, 1990). Werren (1980) provided just such a model for the jewel wasp above; the model suggests that the reason for the change in the ratio of sons to daughters when a female wasp finds an occupied pupa is due to the potential opportunity to mate with the daughters of the first wasp. If only the first wasp lays her eggs on the pupa, then the hatching daughters mate with their brothers and all their offspring are entirely descendants of the first wasp. This means the first wasp needs to produce very few sons-only enough to mate with all the females; the second generation reproductive success of the first wasp is maximized by maximizing the number of daughters. However, where there is a superparasitic wasp, the superparasitic wasp's sons can mate with the large numbers of daughters of the first wasp. The superparasitic wasp needs to maximize the number of the females in the pupa that breed with her sons as opposed to their brothers, whilst at the same time limiting the amount of competition amongst her sons. So if she has only a few eggs to lay, it makes sense for her to lay almost all sons; as brood sizes grow larger, it makes sense to gradually increase the proportion of daughters in the mix. Werren calculated the optimal percentages of males and females for each brood size. His observations of male to female ratios fit the predictions of this model quite well but not perfectly.

There is some debate among various philosophers and behavioral ecologists about what exactly optimality models like Werren's are being used to demonstrate. Orzack and Sober (1994) claim that behavioral ecologists like Werren use optimality models to demonstrate that the traits in question are adaptations, i.e. that the traits have evolved by natural selection. Furthermore, Orzack and Sober take optimality models to be censored models, that is, they are designed to determine the outcome of natural selection in a population where natural selection is the only important force, and hence show, given the model correctly predicts the observed features of the trait being studied, that natural selection was the most important force in its evolution. The idea then, is that the relative success of Werren's model is supposed to demonstrate that natural selection was the most important force in the evolution of the jewel wasp's egg-laying strategy-other forces may have been involved, but they are not as causally important. However, various other philosophers have argued that such models do not make such strongly adaptationist assumptions; Potochnik (2009), for example, argues that optimality models are only designed to show the general role that natural selection and other forces (such as developmental constraints) are playing, and are not designed to test strong adaptationist hypotheses about the behavioral strategies in question-i.e. in our case above, the success of the model is intended to show that natural selection was acting on the jewel wasp's strategy, and that the way it was acting on the jewel wasp's strategy was via the effects of competition between the male wasps in the pupa, the variations in brood size and the other conditions and constraints to which Werren's model appeals. The success of the model is not intended to show that natural selection was the only important force involved in the evolution of the jewel wasp's strategy. For other criticisms of the censored model view, see Rice (2012) and Bolduc and Cezilly (2012).

However, interestingly, some behavioral ecologists have claimed that they do not use optimality models to test whether or not natural selection is acting on a trait, but instead assume the operation of natural selection in order to test hypotheses about the conditions and constraints acting on the trait (Parker and Maynard Smith, 1990). This could be problematic, if it means behavioral ecologists baldly accept the view that natural selection optimizes most traits and never properly test this claim. However, one interpretation of Parker and Maynard Smith (1990) is not that behavioral ecologists have an unfalsifiable commitment to the idea that natural selection is an optimizer. Instead, they are claiming that testing hypotheses about the operation of natural selection itself is not what the behavioral ecologists are focusing on. The behavioral ecologists are making the preliminary assumption that a trait is an adaptation in order to test other hypotheses about it-they "pretend as if" the trait were an adaptation, and use that assumption to detect deviations from optimality that might reveal interesting tradeoffs and constraints-the nature of the deviation can suggest what might be missing from the model. This of course has the upshot that when the models initially fail, the scientists do not look for alternative non-adaptationist hypotheses, but instead initially look for new constraints, tradeoffs and conditions under which selection might be operating. For example, Giraldeau (1997) describes deviations from optimality in the evolution of photopigments in the rods (as opposed to cones) in the retinas of fish that live in certain sorts of marine environments where a shift in photosensitivity would be useful; Giraldeau uses this deviation to suggest the presence of a molecular constraint on the evolution of the rod cells. Presumably, repeated failures to find ways to fill in the gaps in these optimality models could ultimately result in the scientists concerned considering alternative, non-adaptationist explanations. So in order for the behavioral ecologists do this work they do not need to be committed to the strong view that natural selection is always the most important force in the origin of traits; this heuristic requires at most the view that natural selection usually locally optimizes (i.e. optimizes only relative to possibly severe constraints).

However, another way to understand how the behavioral ecologists are using optimality models, one that is not so often considered, is that they are interested in providing a functional description of the traits they are studying (Kitcher, 1987; see also Bolduc and Cezilly, 2012, for a similar view in terms of decision patterns rather than behavioral strategies). One of the things that may concern a behavioral ecologist is how exactly to describe the nature of the behavior that they are considering: what component behavioral dispositions (from among all of the organism's behavior) make up each strategy, and how those dispositions hang together as an adaptation. They need to give a description of the relationship between the organism's behavior and its environment, and how it contributes to the organism's fitness. In the jewel wasp case, the behavioral ecologists have observed the wasps lay different egg sex ratios on different occasions. The question is how to make sense of these different sex-ratio laying behaviors: the guess is that these different behaviors hang together somehow, as manifestations of a particular egg-sex-ratio adjusting strategy; and that having this particular strategy, this particular pattern of egg-sex-ratio laying behavior, does something for the female wasp when considered as a whole. But why should a behavioral ecologist accept that any particular such a functional description is true?

An optimality model can allow a behavioral ecologist to find and test such a functional description in two ways. First, an optimality model (explicitly or implicitly) includes a strategy set, which is a set of descriptions of possible behavioral strategies; the model picks out one of these strategy descriptions as the one that is maximally adaptive. On Werren's model, the strategy set would be an (implicit) set of descriptions of the range of possible sex-ratio adjusting strategies that a jewel wasp could use (i.e. each strategy involves a different set of choices about sex ratios in a full range of relevant conditions like parasitism, superparasitism and different brood sizes). The idea is that an optimality model can pick out which member of this set is a description of the maximally adaptive strategy - on this view of what the behavioral ecologists are doing, Werren's model is designed to pick out the optimal sex ratio egg laying strategy description from the strategy set. The hypothesis is that this description of the maximally adaptive strategy will be the correct description of what the wasp is doing. If it is the correct description, then Werren can now predict what son/daughter ratios he should see the wasp lay in cases so far unobserved. These predictions allow him to test if the description is correct - if these predictions are true, then on this view, Werren has confirmed that the description of the particular sex-ratio adjusting strategy derived from his model is the correct description of what the wasp is doing.

Second, the description of the strategy picked out by the model is not simply a description of it as a series of behavioral dispositions (i.e. dispositions to lay different sex ratios under different conditions), but of the relationships between those dispositions and various ecological features that determine the fitness of those dispositions. For example, in the jewel wasp case, the presence of other female competitors, flexibility in brood size, the capacity of sons to mate multiple times, the impossibility of migration of sons between pupae and so on, are features of the environment that determine whether any potential egg laying strategy of the jewel wasp is maximally adaptive, and a well confirmed optimality model can show how. Consequently, contingent on obtaining the appropriate evidence that this is the correct model, the description of the strategy given by a successful model is (implicitly or explicitly) a functional description of the strategy-a description of how the behavior contributes to the fitness of the organism. For a more detailed discussion of the role of optimality modeling in biology, see the entry on adaptationism.

The second way that "sociobiology" has come to be understood is as a particular approach to understanding specifically human behavior which Philip Kitcher (1985) calls "Pop Sociobiology" (as opposed to his description of "narrow sociobiology" which is roughly equivalent to "behavioral ecology" above). Pop Sociobiology is so-called because it is a view about how to study human behavior described in a variety of literature written by Wilson and others for a general, rather than an academic audience. In this literature, Wilson and the other "Pop sociobiologists" present some speculative and preliminary sketches of how an evolutionary science of human behavior might proceed: Wilson's main focus in On Human Nature (Wilson, 1978) and to a lesser extent the last chapter of Sociobiology (Wilson, 1975) is to show that such a science is possible, to describe some of the techniques that might be used in pursuing it, and to sketch some possible evolutionary analyses for certain particular human behaviors. Because of its presentation in the popular press, "Pop Sociobiology" was probably important in shaping popular perceptions of the nature of sociobiology (for example, the Time article, "Why you do what you do" 1977, 110 (Aug 1), 54) and consequently drew the ire of the critics. Unfortunately, the intensity of this debate may have led to a certain amount of mischaracterization of the sociobiologists' views. This section will address the main concerns that the critics raised about Wilson's early "Pop" sociobiology, and discuss whether and how far these are fair descriptions of his views.

Genetic determinism. In a variety of articles major critics of sociobiology such as Stephen J. Gould (1977, 251-259; 1978) and the so-called "Sociobiology Study Group" (hereafter SSG) (Allen et al., 1975; Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, 1976) claim that sociobiologists are strong genetic determinists. For example, according to the SSG Wilson believes that there are particular genes "for" behavioral traits, including indoctrinability, territoriality, warfare and reciprocal altruism, and that these genes are subject to natural selection in a relatively straightforward way. Indeed, the SSG (1976) argue that claiming that traits have a selective origin requires that there are genes "for" them; Wilson's apparent acceptance that traits may often have a strong cultural component is said to be an error, since if this is true then evolutionary theory tells us nothing about the origin of such traits. Gould (1977) similarly claims that sociobiologists do not realize that genes only produce traits with a contribution from the environment.

Both of these claims are believed, even by other critics, to be unfair analyses of the views of the sociobiologists, and especially Wilson-for example, Kitcher, one of the strongest critics of sociobiology, takes Gould and the SSG to task on this point (Kitcher, 1985, 22-23). In On Human Nature Wilson describes genes as, essentially, difference makers-he explicitly claims that differences in genes, even for heritable traits, only explain the variance in traits across a population; they are by no means independent causes for any trait in individuals and variation in the environment also accounts for part of the variation in any trait (Wilson, 1978, 19). In at least one paper responding to the SSG Wilson says that, on the question of the relative contributions to the variation in human behavior from variation in genes vs. variation in the environment, his "own views lie closer to the environmentalist than the genetic pole" (Wilson, 1976, 183). Wilson also does seem to be trying to support his claim that there are some human behaviors which are probably highly heritable: he describes a variety of different sorts of evidence that might identify them. This evidence includes cross cultural appearance (e.g. Wilson, 1975, 550; Wilson, 1978, 20, 129); plausible homology with other closely related species (especially chimpanzees) (e.g. 1978, 20, 27, 151); early development of the trait in question (e.g. 1975, 551; 1978, 129); differences between individuals that arise without differences in their developmental environment (e.g. 1978, 128-130); genetic syndromes that cause behavioral differences (e.g. 1978, 43-45); and twin studies (e.g. 1978, 145). Finally, Wilson claims that trying to change human behavior from its heritable form usually fails or causes misery (Wilson, 1978, 20); he describes the failures of certain attempts to change the features of normal human behavior by massively changing the social environment, such as the persistence of family ties under slavery (Wilson, 1978, 136) and in the Israeli kibbutzim (1978, 134). Of course, whether or not all of the above is good evidence for his claims is very much up for debate (Kitcher, 1985; Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, 1976). It is worth bearing in mind that while Wilson thinks the evidence that some human behaviors are heritable is overwhelming (Wilson, 1978, 19) he does see many of his specific proposed evolutionary explanations as preliminary and speculative rather than fully formed (for example, Wilson is explicit that his discussion of homosexuality is preliminary: 1978, 146). For more discussion of the problems relating to heritability when studying the evolution of behavior, see section 4.2. below and the entry on heritability.

Ignoring learning and culture. As a concomitant of the objection that Pop Sociobiology was committed to genetic determinism, its central players are also often accused of being insensitive to the problem of learning and culture, i.e. to the problem that many traits in which they are interested are simply not subject to natural selection at all, and that this state of affairs may indeed be common in humans (Kitcher, 1985; Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, 1976). However, Wilson, for example, clearly recognized the important role of culture in many behavioral traits (Wilson, 1976); indeed, he thought that even minor genetic differences that made a difference in behavior could be exaggerated by acquired culture-this is the so-called "multiplier effect" (although it is seriously in question whether the multiplier effect works - Maynard Smith and Warren, 1982). Furthermore, partly in response to these concerns on the part of his critics Wilson eventually went on to publish Genes, Minds and Culture with Charles Lumsden (Lumsden and Wilson, 1981), which was an attempt to consider the effects of cultural transmission on the nature and spread of behavioral traits, and of the interaction between genes and culture. The book, however, was subject to heavy criticism (see, for example, Kitcher, 1985; Lewontin, 1981; Maynard Smith and Warren, 1982). The main concern raised was that there was little substance in the models the book provided-the most interesting features of these simply followed from the assumptions built into them, in particular, assumptions about the degree to which genes kept culture "on a leash" (Lumsden and Wilson, 1981, 13; Wilson, 1978, 167).

Strong adaptationism. The third problematic feature ascribed to Pop Sociobiology was its reliance on an overly strong form of adaptationism. In both papers by the SSG (1976) and by Gould and Lewontin in their famous "Spandrels of San Marco" paper (Gould and Lewontin, 1979), the critics of sociobiology argue that sociobiologists are committed to a "Panglossian" adaptationism. While the "Spandrels" paper is directed at "adaptationists" generally, sociobiologists were some of its clear targets (for example, David Barash's (1976) work on jealousy in male bluebirds).

The central accusations of the "Spandrels" paper were as follows: that adaptationists treat all traits as adaptations; that when "atomizing" individuals into traits to study they take no care to establish that the traits so atomized could actually independently evolve by natural selection; that they ignore developmental constraints on evolution; that they fail to identify traits that are prevalent due to causes other than natural selection; that they fail to distinguish between current adaptiveness and a past history of natural selection; that they generate adaptationist hypotheses, fail to test them properly and replace one such hypothesis with another, ignoring other interesting kinds of evolutionary and non-evolutionary explanation. Instead, according to Gould and Lewontin, adaptationists tell purely speculative, untestable "just so" stories and present them as science fact.

Again, insofar as Wilson and the other sociobiologists are being purely speculative this criticism may be warranted: quite a lot of the evolutionary explanations of particular human behaviors Wilson describes in the first and last chapters of Sociobiology and in On Human Nature are speculation on his part (although not entirely speculation). Perhaps the speculative adaptationist stories are appropriately described as "just so stories"; the question is whether such stories, treated as preliminary hypotheses, are problematic in themselves. Furthermore, while Wilson made no attempt to test any of his speculative hypotheses, behavioral ecologists do try to test adaptationist hypotheses about humans and other animals. Again, the proper question is whether these tests are appropriate or sufficient to establish the truth of the hypotheses in question. Gould and Lewontin do, however, make some more sophisticated objections to adaptationist methods; some of these will be discussed in Section 4.

Human behavioral ecology (HBE), or human evolutionary ecology, is the current evolutionary social science most closely related to the original sociobiological project; it is the project that is sometimes still referred to as "sociobiology" by some philosophers of science (Griffiths, 2008; Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999). "Sociobiology" is most often used this way as a term of contrast with "evolutionary psychology", another current evolutionary social science project inspired by early sociobiologists, and also much developed from how early sociobiology was conceived: see the entry on evolutionary psychology for a discussion. Other common names for HBE are "evolutionary anthropology" (Smith, 2000) or "Darwinian ecological anthropology" (Vayda, 1995) (due to most of its practitioners having a background in, or being based in anthropology departments, and using anthropological fieldwork as the main means of testing their hypotheses about human behavior). The different names tend to be used when the researchers concerned are emphasizing the connections of their field with anthropology or with non-human behavioral ecology. HBE has a great deal in common with the non-human behavioral ecology described above. In particular, it shares its focus on behavior, rather than the psychological mechanisms described in evolutionary psychology. Unlike non-human behavioral ecology it has continued to use Grafen's (1984) phenotypic gambit, in that its practitioners usually do not attempt to discover or describe the genetic or other resources employed in the development of the behavior in which they are interested; nor, for that matter, do they usually attempt to discover the underlying psychology. There are, however, some differences of emphasis, in that the questions about human behavior addressed by the human behavioral ecologists (HBEs) are sometimes different from those addressed by the non-human behavioral ecologists.

The central purpose of the HBE approach is to use the assumption that human behavioral strategies are adaptations as a heuristic to identify the evolutionary and current local ecological causes of variation in human behavior. Once nice standard example of HBE reasoning is Hillard Kaplan and Kim Hill's (1992) work on prey choice strategies amongst the Ache foragers of Paraguay. The idea here is that the Ache's prey choice strategy is a local manifestation of a larger human behavioral adaptation for prey choice: by making this assumption, Kaplan and Hill can use the Ache prey choice behavior as a way of both determining which conditions led to the evolution of the larger prey choice strategy and determining what causes the Ache to choose the prey they do in their local environment.

Just as in non-human behavioral ecology, behavioral strategies in HBE are usually described as complex behavioral dispositions. Behavioral dispositions involve behavioral responses to local stimuli; behavioral strategies then involve producing a set of different responses to a set of different stimuli (we might call this set of stimuli the response conditions of the strategy). According to Kaplan and Hill, the Ache prey choice strategy involves choosing a variety of different potential prey items from the environment; whether or not a prey item is taken depends on a number of circumstances acting as the response conditions: for example, the presence of prey with certain specific features, such as the caloric return of the prey given the time necessary to process it (known as the profitability); the rate at which that prey occurs in the environment; whether or not the prey is encountered on their search; and the search time available on a foraging trip. HBEs usually describe behavioral strategies in terms of an "epigenetic" or decision rule, which is usually given as a mathematical function mapping values for the response conditions onto the appropriate values for the parameters of the behavioral output. Kaplan and Hill's work also provides such an epigenetic rule (see Kaplan and Hill, 1992, 170), which describes the relationships between search time, profitability and so on, to decide which prey will be taken on encounter when the Ache are out foraging.

The prey choice strategy as a whole (i.e. not, for example, the Ache's specific, locally appropriate set of prey choices, but the general human prey choice strategy of which they are a manifestation) is also presumed for heuristic purposes to be an adaptation to conditions in the past that led to that strategy being selected for; these are the selection conditions for the strategy. Supposing that it is reasonable to take behavioral strategies as such to be able to be adaptations (see the later discussion in section 4) the selection conditions of a given behavioral strategy will usually include the response conditions (because presumably it takes the production of overt behavior in order for selection to act on a behavioral strategy) but possibly also features of the larger context which made it highly adaptive to respond in that way to those response conditions. In other words, in the prey choice case, profitabilities, prey densities and search time availability would presumably have been among the selection conditions of a prey choice strategy (presuming it is an adaptation). But so would larger details about the environment not explicitly included in these models, such as the limits on human capacity which determine which prey are accessible in that environment, the ecology which determines which prey are in the environment, and so on. HBEs are interested, therefore, in identifying the selection conditions of human behavioral strategies generally.

However, HBEs are anthropologists, and hence also want to describe the local causes of the highly various overt behaviors that humans engage in; this can be done by identifying the local manifestations of the response conditions of the strategies those humans are using. Identifying these response conditions is a matter of identifying the correct functional description of those strategies (Kitcher, 1987). So how might such strategies he described? It is worth pointing out that this is quite difficult to do: what HBEs observe in the field is sets of overt behaviors in a context of a variety of ecological conditions any of which could be the response conditions. It may be far from obvious exactly why those behaviors are occurring, and which local conditions are the stimuli to which the behavior is a response. Indeed, it may not even be obvious which overt behaviors are manifestations of the same strategy. In the Ache case, what Kaplan and Hill observed is not a complete prey choice strategy, but a variety of occasions on which individuals or groups of Ache people took or did not take prey they encountered whilst out foraging, among many other sorts of foraging and other types of behaviors. The question is which, if any, of the overt behaviors on these occasions manifested a single prey choice strategy, and how these overt behaviors are related to each other and to the environmental conditions in which they occur.

The idea seems to be this: if human behavioral strategies are adaptations, then the relationships between behavioral responses and local ecological conditions that resemble those of the human evolutionary past can be expected to be locally optimal, ceteris paribus; this means that the response conditions of the strategy will (allegedly) be those (along with additional plausible selection conditions) that made the behavior fitness maximizing in the environment in which it evolved, and in any environment that is relevantly similar (Irons, 1998). HBEs, like behavioral ecologists studying non-human animals, tend to use optimality modeling to determine which strategy would be maximally (if locally) fitness maximizing in the conditions under which it evolved. Just as in non-human behavioral ecology, the model will identify a strategy, including the response conditions and the various overt behavioral responses to them, which would maximize fitness under a set of proposed selection conditions in the evolutionary past. These selection conditions may be either explicit or implicit in the model or the model's assumptions.

This raises the question of how to choose the right model. In cases where the structure of the problem might be unique to the human case and where the current environment is expected to be different from the situation under which the strategy originally evolved, the model HBEs choose will often be unique and at least some of the proposed selection conditions identified by appealing to information about the fossil record. A nice example might be human life history, where the human situation is relatively unique: for example, compared to other primates humans have unusually long lives and childhoods, and long life after menopause. As a consequence, the human behavioral ecologists have to appeal to the fossil record in detail to determine what sorts of evolutionary transitions might have been involved (Hawkes, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2000). Where the structure of the adaptive problem humans face and the conditions acting on their behavior is expected to mirror those in non-human animals and to be very similar to those humans encountered in their evolutionary past, the choice of model is often a standard one from non-human behavioral ecology; the proposed selection conditions can be based on the current conditions observed in foraging societies. In the Ache foraging case, this is exactly what happens: the prey choice models used by Kaplan and Hill are those used to understand similar sorts of strategies in non-human animals. This is because Kaplan and Hill expect the relevant conditions acting on human prey choice to mirror very closely those acting on non-human animals. The primary issue for prey choice strategies is whether, when encountering a potential prey item when out foraging, to take and capture or collect that prey item or whether your caloric return on time invested would be maximized by ignoring it and continuing to search for something else with a higher profitability. In cases where other potential foods have much higher profitabilities or sufficiently high rates of encounter, this can be the case. The strategy is then a matter of constructing a "diet"-those prey items that are always taken when encountered. This is done by ordering prey items in order of profitability. Then the most profitable prey should be added to the diet. The next step is to calculate the average foraging return rate (in calories per hour) obtained by just searching for the most profitable item, given its profitability, how often it is encountered, and the caloric cost of the search itself. If the foraging return rate (in calories per hour) with just that item is less than the profitability (in calories per hour) of the second highest profitability item, then the second highest item should be added to the diet; the new average foraging return rate with both the first and second highest profitability items should then be calculated. Then that new average foraging return rate should be compared with the profitability of the third highest profitability item-and so on until all remaining potential prey have lower profitabilities than the average foraging return rate with all the items currently in the diet. The idea is that a forager maximizes caloric return per hour by taking only those items on encounter that are in the diet and ignoring everything else.

Finally, therefore, the HBEs will seek to test their optimality model. The description of that strategy picked out by the model will usually include descriptions of potential behavioral responses to conditions (or values for parameters of those responses) that go beyond what has already been observed; this means the model predicts that these responses should also occur if the description of the strategy is correct. For example, in Kaplan and Hill's prey choice case, the model predicts patterns of Ache prey choice that the observers had not yet seen, such as which prey the Ache should and should not take on encounter and under what circumstances. The model, therefore, can be tested by looking for a situation in which the response conditions of the strategy obtain and observing whether the behavior in response to those conditions is as the model suggests. This is partly why such rules are tested in foraging societies-because many of these strategies have response conditions which reflect conditions presumed to be present in the human evolutionary past, and which may obtain in foraging societies but not in modern societies. For example, obviously in Kaplan and Hill's foraging case, few if any modern or even small scale agricultural societies routinely engage in foraging that is a primary source of nutrition, and hence don't present an opportunity for individuals to do prey choice of the right type. The other reason for performing these tests in foraging societies is because the HBEs want to understand the local causes of overt behavior in these societies in particular.

If the strategy is as described, the HBEs take the model to be confirmed, and thereby also the trait description the HBEs are using. Consequently (since these are given by the trait description) so will the nature of the local causes of the local overt behavior the behavioral ecologists are interested in explaining (in the Kaplan and Hill case, the causes of the Ache's prey choice behavior); and so will the proposed explanation for the origin of the behavioral strategy in terms of the past selection conditions the model employs (in the Kaplan and Hill case, the adaptationist explanation of prey choice in terms of profitabilities, prey distribution and so on).

Differences between the predicted and described behavioral strategies require scientists to build new models, or suggest additional conditions or constraints to add to the original models; there must be independent evidence that these conditions or constraints obtain. Kaplan and Hill's observations do depart from what their model predicts: the Ache engage in a number of prey choice decisions that are not obviously fitness maximizing. In particular, men often seem to ignore many calorie rich food sources from plants and sometimes smaller animals, and women do not pursue larger game. The question then is how to proceed: HBEs often suggest changes to the model that might account for these failures of prediction; often, they do give some independent evidence for their suggestions. For example, one of Hawkes' proposed explanations for why male hunting behavior often fails to meet prey choice expectations (similar failures are found in many societies besides the Ache) is that men pursue large game for reasons other than merely collecting calories-they are also interested in showing off in order to get other fitness rewards, such as additional sexual partners or better alliances with other men. Hawkes was able to show that men's prey choice decisions were consistent with this view (Hawkes, 1991).

There are a number of philosophical criticisms of behavioral ecology and its methods; this section will address some of these criticisms.

Perhaps the most important of all of the criticisms of "Pop Sociobiology" was that it was excessively adaptationist; similar sorts of criticisms are leveled at modern descendants of sociobiology, such as behavioral ecology. Behavioral ecologists, including HBEs, are really methodological adaptationists (Godfrey Smith, 2001), in that they assume that natural selection is optimizing the trait they are studying as a heuristic, in order to establish other things about that trait; as such, no strong commitment about the power of natural selection is necessarily required on their part (as discussed earlier). This did lead many behavioral ecologists to regard Gould and Lewontin's (1979) criticisms as a cautionary tale, rather than as properly directed at them-see, for example, Gould and Lewontin's objection that adaptationist hypotheses were untestable, which the behavioral ecologists could easily rebut (Mayr, 1983). Similarly, Parker and Maynard Smith (1990) responded to Gould and Lewontin's objection that adaptationists do not properly account for phylogenetic and developmental constraints; Parker and Maynard Smith argued that they are taken into account-even where developmental constraints and tradeoffs are not explicitly represented in optimality models, they are often built into the strategy set or are otherwise implicit in those models. However, it is reasonable to point out that Parker and Maynard Smith's paper did not fully respond to Gould and Lewontin's objection: Gould and Lewontin recognized that adaptationist models appeal to constraints; their worry was that such constraints are appealed to ad hoc to fill in gaps in models, and are not subjected to any external test.

Another objection to adaptationist methods from Gould and Lewontin that has persisted as a criticism of behavioral ecology is that these methods do not allow scientists to consider non-adaptationist explanations for the traits to which they are applied, such as whether those traits were fixed by drift or are simply side effects of other traits (i.e. whether they are "spandrels"). In principle, correctly pursued, adaptationist methods can help identify cases where a trait is a non-adaptation: drift, for example, can be identified by comparing the distribution of traits expected under selection and under drift with actual population distributions (Sober, 2005); the question is whether the types of methods used in behavioral ecology are the most efficient at detecting these cases (Lewens, 2009). Some philosophers have argued that methodological adaptationism is more pernicious in practice than it looks in principle, because real evolutionary social scientists are not good at dropping adaptationist hypotheses for a trait even when there is a strong case to be made that they should (see, for example, Lloyd, 2005, esp. Chapter 8). For further discussion of all these problems, see the entry on adaptationism.

While it seems that the accusation that the early "Pop" sociobiologists were genetic determinists was probably unfair, there is a related objection that can be raised to both "Pop" sociobiology and to the later forms of human and non-human behavioral ecology, i.e. that any trait's being an adaptation requires that that trait be heritable, and most human behaviors are not heritable. To say a trait is heritable in the simplest sense is just to say that if the parent has that trait, then the trait tends also to appear in the offspring (i.e. to say the trait is heritable simply means that the trait is inherited reliably). The more demanding population genetic definition of heritability is that a heritable trait T is one where variation in T can be accounted for primarily by variation in genes as opposed to variation in the environment (see also the entry on heritability). Heritability in this sense is supposed to be required for natural selection because in order for natural selection to spread a variant T in a population, when T increases the average number of offspring of its possessors, those offspring have to reliably also have T if T is to spread at the expense of the other variants. The problem, however, is that many human behavioral traits do not seem likely to be heritable in this way: they tend to vary greatly across and even within cultures and environments, whereas human genetic variation is much too low to account for such differences (Buller, 2005; Cosmides and Tooby, 1987).

However, HBEs can get around this problem, by pointing out that local patterns of overt behavior are manifestations of more general strategies; differences in the environment cause the manifestations of different elements of these complex behavioral dispositions humans possess. For example, the patterns of foraging behavior of the Ache people in the Paraguay rain forest (Hill and Hurtado, 1996) and the Inuit in the Arctic (Smith, 1991) are very different, and the genetic differences between these groups are insufficient to explain them. However, both could be simply local manifestations of a larger and more general foraging strategy (or strategies) which humans possess, which could be heritable and an adaptation. A behavioral strategy is, after all, simply a complex behavioral disposition, which involves responding in a variety of specific ways to a set of environmental cues, most of which would be achieved by having an appropriate psychological mechanism or mechanisms underlying the set of dispositions. In which case, heritability of a behavioral strategy only depends on there being a psychological mechanism or mechanisms that produces that strategy reliably, and that mechanism's itself being heritable. Of course, whether there are such heritable mechanisms for the behavioral strategies in which the HBEs are interested is likely to be a matter of some controversy.

What's more, some philosophers have argued that it is possible for traits to be adaptations in the standard sense even when they are not heritable according to the population genetic definition. Despite the claim above that heritability in the population genetic sense is required as a condition of the action of natural selection, technically all that is required for natural selection to occur on a trait T is for T to be heritable in the weaker sense, i.e. that it be robustly transmitted, such that the trait variant in a parent tends to turn up reliably in the offspring. The reason heritability in the population genetic sense was believed to also be necessary for natural selection was that genes were believed to be the only developmental resource transmitted to offspring, so only if variation in traits followed variation in genes would traits be subject to natural selection for the reasons described above. However, recently a variety of philosophers and scientists have argued (Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Sterelny, 2003, 2007, 2012) that natural selection can occur on traits even if traits vary most with the environment rather than genes, so long as environments can themselves be transmitted down lineages; Sterelny's suggestion is that this might be achieved by robust niche construction. This has an interesting consequence: if highly reliably transmitted cultural traits could be subject to natural selection, standard evolutionary methods and models of the sorts used in behavioral ecology could be used to understand the evolution of such traits.

This is the not the end of the problem, however. Some philosophers have argued that not all traits that are culturally transmitted or learnt can be properly understood using adaptationist methods, because many of these traits are not heritable even in this weaker sense, and hence cannot be adaptations (Driscoll, 2009; Driscoll and Stich, 2008; Kitcher, 1990). Worse, such traits could appear highly adaptive on evolutionary models. For example, traits which are subject to highly adaptive individual learning or adaptive social transmission processes in populations (Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001) are nevertheless not adaptations because they are not shaped by natural selection. This is because in many of these cases, the features of the environment that make the trait appear adaptive may not actually have featured as selection conditions in the causal history of the trait (or perhaps as causes in any sense). In such cases, evolutionary methods popular in sociobiology and the current evolutionary social sciences (such as optimality modeling) will make traits appear to be adaptations to those conditions when they are not. For a more detailed discussion of dual inheritance theory, gene culture co-evolution and the associated theory, see the entry on cultural evolution.

Another problem for behavioral ecology and sociobiology is their focus on trying to understand the biological basis of behavior as such. The behavioral focus made sense to those behavioral ecologists influenced by Lorenz and Tinbergen's ethology, but once cognitive psychologists became interested in applying evolutionary thinking to their work, the effects of the cognitive revolution in psychology began to have an effect on some of the "sociobiological" thinkers, and they transformed sociobiology into evolutionary psychology (Cosmides and Tooby, 1987; Tooby and Cosmides, 1990). The result of the cognitive revolution in psychology was that many psychologists came to regard the proper target of explanation in psychology to be genuinely psychological states or mechanisms rather than behavioral dispositions (as in Skinnerian Behaviorism) (Chomsky, 1959). In cognitive science since the middle of the twentieth century, psychological states and mechanisms have largely been understood in computational and materialist terms, that is, that the mind is the brain, and that brain states and mechanisms are essentially computational states and computers respectively (though almost certainly not serial computers). Psychological descriptions, then, are simply descriptions of these brain systems in computational or information-processing terms; generally they appeal to representations, decision rules and algorithms that brain systems process. The shift in methodology and theory represented by this change in approach was extremely significant. But it also appears to have made cognitive psychologists interested in evolution averse to thinking of behavioral dispositions as proper targets of evolutionary explanation, just as they were averse to thinking of them as the proper targets of psychological explanation (Cosmides and Tooby, 1987). This issue never seems to have arisen for the human behavioral ecologists; indeed, not only is behavior treated as the only proper target of evolutionary explanation, but psychology is explicitly ignored in favor of behavior for methodological reasons-the focus on behavior is part of the "phenotypic gambit" (Grafen, 1984) which (as described above) simplifies evolutionary modeling and the process of deriving explanations from it in human behavioral ecology.

The importance of the issue to the evolutionary psychologists has led to a series of arguments traded between the human behavioral ecologists and evolutionary psychologists for preferring behavior over psychology and vice versa. Two main arguments have been raised in favor of considering behavior the proper target of explanation, both from. The first is purely practical: behavior is relatively straightforwardly observable whereas psychological mechanisms are not, to the extent that the nature of only a few psychological mechanisms has been uncontroversially demonstrated (one of the few examples might be the mechanisms for learning language) (Alexander, 1990). The second is that only behavior can be an adaptation because only behavior is the actual causal nexus between the organism and its environment (Alexander, 1990; see the same idea in early form in Skinner, 1984).

The central problem with both of these arguments is that, while they are true of overt behavior, they are not true of the behavioral dispositions or strategies (complex behavioral dispositions) which are the actual targets of explanation in behavioral ecology-or at least, no more true than of psychological mechanisms. Behavioral dispositions do not causally interact with the environment except insofar as they lead to the actual manifestation of overt behavior; they are also no more "straightforwardly observable" than psychological mechanisms since they cannot be observed until overt behavior in manifested, and even then distinguishing between different strategies with overlapping component behavioral dispositions is also difficult.

Arguments for the claim that only psychological mechanisms should be considered to be adaptations rest on the idea that behavior is really only ever a manifestation of the underlying psychology. Behavior is not an adaptation so much as it is the effect of an adaptation. Cosmides and Tooby (1987) also argue that the really interesting evolutionary generalizations emerge at the level of psychology, not behavior. Again, however, this argument depends on understanding "behavior" as "overt behavior", individual chunks of physical activity that are not necessarily reproduced over time and which do not occur in evolutionary social science generalizations, verses understanding "behavior" as "complex behavioral strategies", which do seem potentially transmissible (via the psychological mechanisms that support them). It is also notable that such strategies are the subject of a significant evolutionary literature-such as evolutionary game theory, on which Cosmides and Tooby themselves depend: the argument for expecting their famous "Cheater Detection" module (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides and Tooby, 1992) is derived from Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and Trivers' (1971) work showing that TIT FOR TAT, which requires its players to be able to detect cheaters on reciprocally altruistic interactions, is an evolutionary stable strategy.

More recently, philosophers have also presented some arguments for one side or the other of this issue. Buller (2005, 50-52), for example, argues that behaviors cannot be adaptations because they are not heritable, whereas psychological mechanisms are. However, Buller's discussion does not make the distinction between overt behaviors and behavioral strategies described above. Buller argues that behaviors could disappear from the population for generations if the necessary response conditions never arose, but yet still emerge again if the stimulus reappeared, and this suggests that these behaviors are not inherited as such rather than the underlying psychological mechanism. In this he is right as long as he means the overt behaviors; behavioral dispositions or strategies could also remain present and be inherited in the absence of the response conditions. Moreover, Buller's description of a "psychological mechanism" in this context sounds rather like a behavioral disposition (2005, 52-53).

Another argument in the philosophical literature for thinking that behaviors are not the proper targets of natural selection explanations is that behaviors are not quasi-independent (Lewontin, 1978) in the way they need to be to evolve by selection in their own right (Sterelny, 1992; Sterelny and Fitness, 2003; Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999). This is because many behavioral strategies will depend on multi-purpose mechanisms that cannot change during evolution without those changes ramifying to the other strategies those mechanisms produce. However, Driscoll (2004) argues that this is not necessarily the case; multi-purpose mechanisms, in order to be able to produce more than one strategy, would have to have branching algorithms; variation in any of these mechanisms necessary to generate variation in any one strategy need only occur on the branch relevant to the strategy in question and need have little or no effect on the other branches. Instead, whether an evolutionary explanation is properly directed at the behavioral or psychological level depends on the case.

Sociobiology, despite its complicated history, remains of interest to philosophers and has some import for certain important philosophical debates. One such question is whether human beings should be understood to have a nature, a set of traits which for Wilson are those heritable traits that have been fixed in the population by natural selection (Wilson, 1978). Consequently, this 'nature' can be discovered and understood using the standard adaptationist methods used in other areas of biology. Most importantly, Wilson suggests that some of the characteristics that make up human nature are specifically behavioral.

Quite apart from the fundamental interest of the question of whether there is a human nature, the issue is important because it might have a significant moral or social upshot: what society we can have, and indeed what society we should have might depend on what human nature is like (Wilson, 1978). It was this concern that ignited the "sociobiology wars" in the early days after the publication of Sociobiology. The "Sociobiology Study Group" was concerned that Wilson was trying to argue that many problematic or harmful features of current societies, such as oppressive gender roles, negative race relations and interpersonal aggression might be unchangeable (Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, 1976). Philosophers of biology have strongly resisted the idea that humans have a 'nature' in anything like the traditional sense of a fixed essence (Hull, 1986; Lewens, 2012; Lloyd and Crowley, 2002) but there is also some debate about whether humans could be said to have a nature in the sense of a set of evolved traits in much the way that Wilson suggests (e.g. see Machery, 2008, 2012; for a critique see Powell, 2012). Philosophers in this area are instead focusing on notions of human nature that take into account the flexibility of human development and the capacity of human beings to construct their own development and hence their own 'nature' (Griffiths, 2009; Ramsey, 2013; Stotz, 2012).

Another hope on the part of philosophers is that understanding the evolution of cognition might give us some insight into the nature of certain human psychological traits that have particular philosophical interest. One such trait is our moral psychology. Moral psychology is of interest to philosophers who hold naturalistic views of ethics because they believe moral values depend in part on features of that psychology; understanding that psychology and how it evolved would give us insight into what the correct moral values are. Understanding the origins of human moral psychology might also help answer certain metaethical questions (Street, 2006). As Wilson hoped, scientists working in disciplines which are the modern descendants of sociobiology have contributed to our understanding of the way that norms, including moral norms, might have become established in human evolution (see, for example, Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Sripada, 2005). Philosophers still strongly disagree, however, on how the evolution of moral psychology, especially for the acquisition of norms, should be understood (Dwyer, 2006; Sripada and Stich, 2006; Sterelny, 2010).

Other debates surrounding sociobiology are still ongoing. For example, while methodological adaptationism has become and remained the standard approach in behavioral ecology, not all philosophers are convinced that this is an entirely benign practice - there are still concerns about the assumptions that this methodology requires (see, for example, Lewens, 2009; Lloyd, 2005). Similarly, there has been an increasing interest in the role of culture in the nature and history of human behavior; work studying the evolution of culture has increased since Lumsden and Wilson (1981) published their book. Philosophers and scientists are still addressing questions about how and how far cultural traits can be said to evolve; and, as discussed above, whether traits that have evolved in this way can be considered adaptations in any sense (Driscoll, 2011; Fracchia and Lewontin, 1999, 2005; Henrich et al., 2008; Sperber, 2006; Sterelny, 2006).

Alexander, R. D., 1990, Epigenetic Rules and Darwinian Algorithms: The Adaptive Study of Learning and Development. Ethology and Sociobiology, 11: 241-303.

Allen, E., B. Beckwith, J. Beckwith, S. Chorover, D. Culver, M. Duncan, et al., 1975, Letter, 13 November, New York Review of Books, 22: 43-44.

Axelrod, R. and W. D. Hamilton, 1981, The Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 211: 1390-1396.

Barash, D. P., 1976, Male Response to Apparent Female Adultery in the Mountain Bluebird (Sialia currucoides): An Evolutionary Interpretation. The American Naturalist, 110(976): 1097-1101.

---, 1977, Sociobiology and Behavior, New York: Elsevier.

Bolduc, J. S., and F. Cezilly, 2012, Optimality modelling in the real world. Biology and Philosophy, 27: 851-869.

Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson, 1985, Culture and the Evolutionary Process, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Brandon, R., 1990, Adaptation and Environment, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Buller, D. J., 2005, Adapting Minds, Cambridge, MA: MIT press.

Caplan, A. L. (ed.), 1979, The Sociobiology Debate: Readings on The Ethical and Scientific Issues Surrounding Sociobiology, New York: Harper Collins.

Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. and M. W. Feldman, 1981, Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chomsky, N., 1959, Verbal Behavior. By B.F. Skinner. Language, 35(1): 26-58.

Cosmides, L., 1989, The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. Cognition, 31: 187-276.

Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby, 1987, From Evolution to Behavior: Evolutionary Psychology as the Missing Link, in J. Dupre (ed.), The Latest on the Best, Cambridge, MA: MIT press, pp. 277-306.

---, 1992, Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In Barkow, J. H., L. Cosmides & J. Tooby (eds.), The Adapted Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 163-228.

Driscoll, C., 2004, Can behaviors be adaptations? , Philosophy of Science, 71: 16-35.

---, 2009, On our best behavior: Optimality models in human behavioral ecology. Studies in the History of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 40: 133-141.

---, 2011, Fatal Attraction? Why Sperber's attractors do not prevent cumulative cultural evolution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62: 301-322.

Driscoll, C. and S. Stich, 2008, Vayda Blues: Explanation in Darwinian Ecological Anthropology. In Walters, B., B. McCay, P. West & S. Lees (eds.), Against the Grain: The Vayda Tradition in Human Ecology and Ecological Anthropology (pp. 175-191), Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

Dwyer, S., 2006, How Good is the Linguistic Analogy? In Carruthers, P., S. Laurence & S. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Vol 2: Culture and Cognition (pp. 237-256), New York: Oxford University Press.

Fracchia, J. and R. C. Lewontin, 1999, Does Culture Evolve? History and Theory, 38(4): 52-78.

---, 2005, The Price of Metaphor. History and Theory, 44: 14-29.

Giraldeau, L. A., 1997, The Ecology of Information Use. In Krebs, J. R. & N. B. Davies (eds.), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach, 4th Edition ed. (pp. 42-68), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Godfrey Smith, P., 2001, Three Kinds of Adaptationism. In Orzack, S. H. & E. Sober (eds.), Adaptationism and Optimality (pp. 335-357), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gould, S. J., 1977, Ever Since Darwin, New York: W. W. Norton and Co.

---, 1978, Sociobiology: The Art of Storytelling. New Scientist, 80: 530-533.

Gould, S. J. and R. Lewontin, 1979, The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences, 205: 581-598.

Grafen, A., 1984, Natural selection, kin selection and group selection. In Krebs, J. R. & N. B. Davies (eds.), Behavioural ecology: an evolutionary approach (pp. 62-84), Oxford: Blackwell scientific publications.

Griffiths, P. E., 2008, Ethology, Sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology. In Sarkar, S. & A. Plutynski (eds.), Blackwell's Companion to Philosophy of Biology, Oxford: Blackwells.

---, 2009, Reconstructing Human Nature. Arts: The Journal of the Sydney University Arts Association, 31: 30-57.

Hawkes, K., 1991, Showing Off: Tests of an Hypothesis About Men's Foraging Goals. Ethology and Sociobiology, 12: 29-54.

---, 2003, Grandmothers and the Evolution of Human Longevity. American Journal of Human Biology, 15: 380-400.

Henrich, J. and R. Boyd, 1998, The Evolution of Conformist Transmission and the Emergence of Between-Group Differences. Evolution and Human Behavior, 19: 215-241.

---, 2001, Why People Punish Defectors: Weak Conformist Transmission can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 208(1): 79-89.

Henrich, J., R. Boyd and P. J. Richerson, 2008, Five Misunderstandings about Cultural Evolution. Human Nature, 19: 119-137.

Henrich, J. and F. J. Gil-White, 2001, The evolution of prestige: Freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evolution and Human Behavior, 22: 165-196.

Hill, K. and A. M. Hurtado, 1996, Ache Life History, New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Hrdy, S. B., 1999, Mother Nature: A history of mothers, infants and natural selection, New York: Pantheon/Random House.

Hull, D., 1986, On Human Nature. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2: 3-13.

Irons, W., 1998, Adaptively Relevant Environments Versus the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness. Evolutionary Anthropology, 6: 194-204.

Kaplan, H. and K. Hill, 1992, The evolutionary ecology of food acquisition. In Smith, E. A. & B. Winterhalder (eds.), Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior, New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Kaplan, H., K. Hill, J. Lancaster and A. M. Hurtado, 2000, A Theory of Human Life History Evolution: Diet, Intelligence, and Longevity. Evolutionary Anthropology, 9: 156-185.

Kitcher, P., 1985, Vaulting Ambition, Cambridge MA: MIT press.

---, 1987, Why not the best?, in J. Dupre (ed.), The Latest on the Best, Cambridge, MA: MIT press, pp. 77-102.

---, 1990, Developmental decomposition and the future of human behavioral ecology. Philosophy of Science, 57: 96-117.

Krebs, J. R. and N. B. Davies, 1997, The Evolution of Behavioural Ecology. In Krebs, J. R. & N. B. Davies (eds.), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (4th ed., pp. 3-12), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Krebs, J. R. and N. B. Davies (eds.), 1978, Behavioral ecology: an evolutionary approach (1st ed.), Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications.

Lewens, T., 2009, Seven types of adaptationism. Biology and Philosophy, 24: 161-182.

---, 2012, Human Nature: The Very Idea. Philosophy & Technology, 25(4): 459-474.

Lewontin, R. C., 1978, Adaptation. Scientific American, 239(3): 212-230.

---, 1981, Sleight of Hand. The Sciences, 21(6): 23-26.

Lloyd, E. A., 2005, The Case of the Female Orgasm: Bias in the Science of Evolution, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Lloyd E. A. and S. J. Crowley, 2003, Essentialism and Human Nature. Encyclopedia of Life Sciences (eLS), published online 28 MAY 2003. doi: 10.1038/npg.els.0003453

Lotem, A., H. Nakamura and A. Zahavi, 1995, Constraints on egg discrimination and cuckoo-host co-evolution. Animal Behavior, 48: 1185-1209.

Lumsden, C. and E. O. Wilson, 1981, Genes, Mind and Culture, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Machery, E., 2008, A Plea for Human Nature. Philosophical Psychology, 21(3): 321-329.

---, 2012, Reconceptualizing Human Nature: Response to Lewens. Philosophy & Technology, 25: 475-478.

Maynard Smith, J., 1978, Optimization Theory in Evolution. Annual Review of Ecological Systems, 9: 31-56.

---, 1982, Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maynard Smith, J. and N. Warren, 1982, Models of Cultural and Genetic Change. Evolution, 36(3): 620-627.

Mayr, E., 1983, How to carry out the Adaptationist Program? , American Naturalist, 121(3): 324-334.

Odling-Smee, J., K. N. Laland and M. W. Feldman, 2003, Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Orzack, S. H. and E. Sober, 1994, Optimality Models and the Test of Adaptationism. American Naturalist, 143(3): 361-380.

Parker, G. A. and J. Maynard Smith, 1990, Optimality theory in evolutionary biology. Nature, 348: 27-33.

Potochnik, A., 2009, Optimality modeling in a suboptimal world. Biology and Philosophy, 24: 183-197.

Powell, R., 2012, Human Nature and Respect for the Evolutionarily Given: a Comment on Lewens. Philosophy & Technology, 25: 485-493.

Ramsey, G., 2013, Human Nature in a Post-essentialist World. Philosophy of Science, 80(5): 983-993.

Rice, C., 2012, Optimality explanations: a plea for an alternative approach. Biology and Philosophy, 27: 685-703.

Roff, D. A., 1992, The Evolution of Life Histories, New York: Chapman & Hall.

Segerstrale, U., 2000, Defenders of the truth: the sociobiology debate, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shuker, D. M. and S. A. West, 2004, Information constraints and the precision of adaptation: Sex ratio manipulation in wasps. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101(28): 10363-10367.

Skinner, B. F., 1984, The Evolution of Behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 41(2): 217-221.

Smith, E. A., 1991, Inujjuamiut Foraging Strategies: Evolutionary Ecology of an Arctic Hunting Economy, Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.

---, 2000, Three Styles in the Evolutionary Analysis of Human Behavior. In Adaptation and Human Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, pp. 27-46.

Smith, E. A., M. Borgerhoff Mulder and K. Hill, 2001, Controversies in the evolutionary social sciences: a guide for the perplexed. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 16(3): 128-135.

Sober, E., 2005, Is Drift a Serious Alternative to Natural Selection as an Explanation of Complex Adaptive Traits? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 80(56): 125-154.

Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People, 1976, Sociobiology: Another Biological Determinism. BioScience, 26(3): 182; 184-186.

Sperber, D., 2006, Why a Deep Understanding of Cultural Evolution is Incompatible with Shallow Psychology. In Enfield, N. J. & S. Levinson (eds.), Roots of Human Sociality, Oxford: Berg, pp. 441-449.

Sripada, C. S., 2005, Punishment and the strategic structure of moral systems. Biology and Philosophy, 20(4): 767-789.

Sripada, C. S. and S. Stich, 2006, A Framework for the Psychology of Norms. In Carruthers, P., S. Laurence & S. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Vol. 2: Culture and Cogntion (pp. 280-301), New York: Oxford University Press.

Sterelny, K., 1992, Evolutionary Explanations of Human Behavior. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70(2): 156-172.

---, 2003, Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell publishing.

---, 2006, The Evolution and Evolvability of Culture. Mind and Language, 21(2): 137-165.

---, 2007, Social intelligence, human intelligence and niche construction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 362: 719-730.

---, 2010, Moral Nativism: A Sceptical Response. Mind and Language, 25(3): 279-297.

---, 2012, The Evolved Apprentice, Cambridge, MA: MIT press.

Sterelny, K. and J. Fitness (eds.), 2003, From Mating to Mentality: Evaluating Evolutionary Psychology, New York: Psychology Press.

Sterelny, K. and P. Griffiths, 1999, Sex and Death, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stotz, K., 2010, Human nature and cognitive-developmental niche construction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9: 483-501.

Street, S., 2006, A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value. Philosophical Studies, 127: 109-166.

Tinbergen, N., 1963, On aims and methods of ethology. Zeitschrift fur Tierpsychologie, 20: 410-433.

Tooby, J. and L. Cosmides, 1990, The Past Explains the Present: Emotional Adaptations and the Structure of Ancestral Environments. Ethology and Sociobiology, 11: 375-424.

Trivers, R. L., 1971, The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46: 35-57.

Turke, P. W., 1990, Just Do It. Ethology and Sociobiology, 11: 445-463.

Vayda, A. P., 1995, Failures of Explanation in Darwinian Ecological Anthropology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 25: 219-249, 360-375.

Werren, J. H., 1980, Sex Ratio Adaptations to Local Mate Competition in a Parasitic Wasp. Science, 208: 1157-1159.

Wilson, E. O., 1975, Sociobiology, Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press.

---, 1976, The Response: Academic Vigilantism and the Political Sigificance of Sociobiology. BioScience, 26(3): 183; 187-190.

---, 1978, On Human Nature, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Winterhalder, B. and E. A. Smith, 1992, Evolutionary Ecology and the Social Sciences. In Smith, E. A. & B. Winterhalder (eds.), Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior (pp. 3-23), New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The first meaning of "sociobiology" is as Wilson's own term for a range of work that is currently referred to (and was largely referred to at the time) as behavioral ecology. Behavioral ecology is a science that uses evolutionary theory and especially adaptationist methods to try to understand animal behavior.

# data[].attributes.body
Intro to the course

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Theories About Family & Marriage: Crash Course Sociology #37

# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 2

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Skip to Content

Last updated: 5/31/2023

Many Americans refrain from talking about sexual orientation and gender identity or expression because it feels taboo, or because they're afraid of saying the wrong thing. This glossary was written to help give people the words and meanings to help make conversations easier and more comfortable. LGBTQ+ people use a variety of terms to identify themselves, not all of which are included in this glossary. Always listen for and respect a person's self identified terminology.

Ally | A term used to describe someone who is actively supportive of LGBTQ+ people. It encompasses straight and cisgender allies, as well as those within the LGBTQ+ community who support each other (e.g., a lesbian who is an ally to the bisexual community).

Asexual | Often called "ace" for short, asexual refers to a complete or partial lack of sexual attraction or lack of interest in sexual activity with others. Asexuality exists on a spectrum, and asexual people may experience no, little or conditional sexual attraction.

Biphobia | The fear and hatred of, or discomfort with, people who love and are sexually attracted to more than one gender.

Bisexual | A person emotionally, romantically or sexually attracted to more than one gender, though not necessarily simultaneously, in the same way or to the same degree. Sometimes used interchangeably with pansexual.

Gay | A person who is emotionally, romantically or sexually attracted to members of the same gender. Men, women and non-binary people may use this term to describe themselves.

Genderqueer | Genderqueer people typically reject notions of static categories of gender and embrace a fluidity of gender identity and often, though not always, sexual orientation. People who identify as "genderqueer" may see themselves as being both male and female, neither male nor female or as falling completely outside these categories.

Gender binary | A system in which gender is constructed into two strict categories of male or female. Gender identity is expected to align with the sex assigned at birth and gender expressions and roles fit traditional expectations.

Gender dysphoria | Clinically significant distress caused when a person's assigned birth gender is not the same as the one with which they identify.

Gender-expansive | A person with a wider, more flexible range of gender identity and/or expression than typically associated with the binary gender system. Often used as an umbrella term when referring to young people still exploring the possibilities of their gender expression and/or gender identity.

Gender expression | External appearance of one's gender identity, usually expressed through behavior, clothing, body characteristics or voice, and which may or may not conform to socially defined behaviors and characteristics typically associated with being either masculine or feminine.

Gender-fluid | A person who does not identify with a single fixed gender or has a fluid or unfixed gender identity.

Homophobia | The fear and hatred of or discomfort with people who are attracted to members of the same sex.

Intersex | Intersex people are born with a variety of differences in their sex traits and reproductive anatomy. There is a wide variety of difference among intersex variations, including differences in genitalia, chromosomes, gonads, internal sex organs, hormone production, hormone response, and/or secondary sex traits.

Lesbian | A woman who is emotionally, romantically or sexually attracted to other women. Women and non-binary people may use this term to describe themselves.

LGBTQ+ | An acronym for "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer" with a "+" sign to recognize the limitless sexual orientations and gender identities used by members of our community.

Non-binary | An adjective describing a person who does not identify exclusively as a man or a woman. Non-binary people may identify as being both a man and a woman, somewhere in between, or as falling completely outside these categories. While many also identify as transgender, not all non-binary people do. Non-binary can also be used as an umbrella term encompassing identities such as agender, bigender, genderqueer or gender-fluid.

Outing | Exposing someone's lesbian, gay, bisexual transgender or gender non-binary identity to others without their permission. Outing someone can have serious repercussions on employment, economic stability, personal safety or religious or family situations.

Pansexual | Describes someone who has the potential for emotional, romantic or sexual attraction to people of any gender though not necessarily simultaneously, in the same way or to the same degree. Sometimes used interchangeably with bisexual.

Queer | A term people often use to express a spectrum of identities and orientations that are counter to the mainstream. Queer is often used as a catch-all to include many people, including those who do not identify as exclusively straight and/or folks who have non-binary or gender-expansive identities. This term was previously used as a slur, but has been reclaimed by many parts of the LGBTQ+ movement.

Questioning | A term used to describe people who are in the process of exploring their sexual orientation or gender identity.

Same-gender loving | A term some prefer to use instead of lesbian, gay or bisexual to express attraction to and love of people of the same gender.

Sex assigned at birth | The sex, male, female or intersex, that a doctor or midwife uses to describe a child at birth based on their external anatomy.

Sexual orientation | An inherent or immutable enduring emotional, romantic or sexual attraction to other people. Note: an individual's sexual orientation is independent of their gender identity.

Transgender | An umbrella term for people whose gender identity and/or expression is different from cultural expectations based on the sex they were assigned at birth. Being transgender does not imply any specific sexual orientation. Therefore, transgender people may identify as straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual, etc.

Transitioning | A series of processes that some transgender people may undergo in order to live more fully as their true gender. This typically includes social transition, such as changing name and pronouns, medical transition, which may include hormone therapy or gender affirming surgeries, and legal transition, which may include changing legal name and sex on government identity documents. Transgender people may choose to undergo some, all or none of these processes.

You can help pass the Equality Act!

The Senate must pass the Equality Act. With pro-equality majorities in both chambers of Congress, there has never been a better time to pass it.

The Human Rights Campaign reports on news, events and resources of the Human Rights Campaign Foundation that are of interest to the general public and further our common mission to support the LGBTQ+ community.

You'll receive email updates from HRC. You can unsubscribe at any time.

Manage Your Membership

Adjust your membership details

Equality Magazine

The nation's largest-circulation LGBTQ+ magazine

Full-time positions, fellowships and internships

Press releases, corporate assets

Department contacts, membership inquiries

The Human Rights Campaign, All Rights Reserved

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
This glossary was written to help give people the words and meanings to make conversations about sexual orientation and gender expression easier.

# data[].attributes.body
Title
Chapter 2: Gender & Chapter 9 :Work, Marriage, and Family

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
We love connecting with other people because it makes us happy-good communication is the key when it comes to positive social interaction.

But what does a healthy conversation look like? How can you avoid over-communicating? And how can you improve communication in a romantic relationship?

Read on for a summary of some important models and theories in the field of communication.

Before you continue, we thought you might like to download our three Positive Communication Exercises (PDF) for free. These science-based tools will help you and those you work with build better social skills and better connect with others.

The Importance of Communication

We all have a strong need for connectivity and belonging. This is why positive social interactions increase our subjective wellbeing and provide greater life satisfaction (Lyubomirsky, 2008).

"It is the encounters with people that make life worth living."

Guy de Maupassant

Nursing social relationships enhance happiness because spending time with friends or colleagues builds positive emotions-a key component of happiness (Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002).

Interactions with people can be verbal or nonverbal-we can even connect with each other through a smile. A vital element of positive social interaction, however, is good communication. But what does that signify?

What Is Healthy Communication?

A communication model usually involves a sender, a receiver, and a (verbal or nonverbal) message which is encoded by the sender and decoded by the receiver.

It also includes feedback, the response of the receiver to the message, as well as noise, which is anything that can disrupt communication.

Encoding refers to the sender transforming thoughts into communicable messages. The receiver interprets what they receive as the message-both verbal and nonverbal parts. Although this seems simple in theory, as you can imagine a lot happens in between and no message is ever decoded without bias.

The way we decode a message is never the objective reality. We all have our own filters and explanatory styles which create the picture of the world as we see it.

What makes the process of communication even more complex is the fact that the message of the sender is hardly ever just factual information.

"We speak not only to tell other people what we think, but to tell ourselves what we think. Speech is a part of thought."

Oliver Sacks

In his Four-Sides model of communication, Friedemann Schulz von Thun (1981) points out that every message has four facets to it:

1. Fact: What I inform about (data, facts, statements);

2. Self-revealing: What I reveal about myself (information about the sender);

3. Relationship: What I think about you (information about how we get along);

4. Appeal: What I want to make you do (an attempt to influence the receiver).

There is never the same emphasis put on each of the four facets, and the emphasis can be meant and understood differently. For instance, a wife saying "the sugar jar is empty" may be less about the fact that there is no sugar left in the jar and more a prompt for her husband to go and fill the jar.

To make it even more complex, as a receiver we tend to have one of the four "ears" particularly well trained (factual ear, relationship ear, self-revelation ear or appeal ear).

So if the husband has a well-trained relationship ear, he may decode the sentence to be something like "you are unreliable since you have forgotten to refill the sugar jar," and he might retort with something like, "Well you are not very reliable, you still haven't fixed the light in the kitchen!"

Do you recognize this type of conversation? Things unravel quickly when we are not hearing each other.

The underlying emphasis of both the sender and the receiver on the four facets can create a barrier to healthy communication. It is important to understand that what we hear may not be what the other person was trying to get across.

Think about it: which one is your best developed "ear"? For instance, do you tend to hear an appeal in every sentence? Or do you often feel questioned (hence you are listening with your relationship "ear")?

In order to engage in healthy communication, we need to be aware of the four facets. So the next time you feel questioned, go back to the original statement and think about the four facets. How else could you have interpreted the message? Focus on the actual facts of the message and use questions to clarify whether you understood what the other person was trying to tell you.

For some more information on the theory and some examples watch this 3-minute video:

What to Do If There's No Communication in a Relationship

One of the most important communication skills is listening. Deep, positive relationships can only be developed by listening to each other (Weger, Castle, & Emmett, 2010). If there is no communication in your relationship, maybe neither party is truly listening; instead, are both people just trying to prove they are right, or maybe listen while "doing something else" too?

You cannot truly listen to anyone and do anything else at the same time.

M. Scott Peck

Here are the most common listening mistakes:

Daydreaming or thinking of something else (even something as simple as your list of groceries) while another person is speaking;

Thinking of what to say next;

Judging what the other person is saying;

Listening with a specific goal/outcome in mind.

But active listening is so much more than not talking. It is an art that requires a genuine interest in the other person, a curiosity rather than an anticipative mind. Active listening involves:

Nonverbal involvement (show your attention)

Paying attention to your vis-à-vis, not your own thoughts

No judgment

Tolerating silence

To revive communication in a relationship try the following exercise: Person A gets 10 minutes to talk about their day, while person B is listening actively and with a genuine interest. Person B is allowed to ask clarifying questions but should not interrupt person A.

If there is a silence that's fine. Relax.

After person A's 10 minutes are up (all of the allotted time needs to be used), person B gets to talk for ten minutes as well, while the same listening rules apply to person A. You will find that 10 minutes is a very long time to listen.

You may be amazed at how much you learn about each other, and how this exercise adds value to the quality of your relationship and your communication. It could be something you try once a week, as an intentional way to practice active listening together.

Here are some additional techniques to improve communication in personal and intimate relationships.

How to Better Communicate in Personal Relationships

A great technique to improve communication in any personal relationship is Marshall B. Rosenberg's nonviolent communication.

It is based on the willingness and the ability to approach and perceive issues in a non-judgmental way. This is important because whenever you want to change someone, you will create resistance.

This technique is great to discuss an issue that is on your mind. For instance, your partner arrives late for your date and you feel angry and disappointed.

For a positive outcome of the conversation follow these four steps:

1. Observation ≠ Interpretation/Evaluation

Firstly, try to communicate your observations without labeling or interpreting them. In the case of your date arriving late, it is just that: he is late.

Your interpretation may be that the date (or you) doesn't mean a great deal to him or that something else was more important.

So rather than buying into your interpretation, you could simply say "I realize you were late for our date". This is a factual observation without any evaluation.

2. Feelings ≠ Thoughts

Secondly, it is important that you communicate your feelings. An argument often develops from hidden emotions. Make sure you understand your emotions and express them in a non-judgmental way.

In the case of a late arrival of your date, you could say "I am feeling annoyed", or "I am bothered by this because it makes me wonder whether you are looking forward to spending time with me".

3. Need ≠ Strategy

Thirdly, you need to understand and express your needs. In doing so, you give your partner the chance to decide whether they can and want to meet them. For instance, you could say: "I would like to be treated with consideration and I would like to feel important to you".

4. Request ≠ Demand

The fourth step is to make a clear request. What does your partner have to do for you to feel that your needs have been met? You could simply say: "That is why I ask you to arrive at the agreed time".

The four-step process is, as Rosenberg (2003) puts it, "simple but not easy" and it will take some time to get your head around it. It may feel clunky at first, but you will find that with practice your communication will become clearer. You are accepting your partner with all their flaws and asking them in a nonviolent way for what you need in order to be happy.

Active Constructive Responding Model

While nonviolent communication is a great way to improve personal communication, there are also ways you can improve the way you respond as a receiver. Barbara Fredrickson (2003) has shown the benefit of positive emotions for wellbeing. Conversations provide great opportunities to increase positive emotions.

Appreciative feedback in its nature needs to be supportive, inspiring and focused on the strengths of the situation. A common model used is the Active Constructive Responding Model (Gable, Reis, Impett, & Asher, 2004).

According to the model, messages can be active or passive, and constructive or destructive. For instance, if your friend tells you that a presentation he gave went well, here are different ways you can respond to him.

The way you react falls in one of four response types:

Nurturing (active constructive) "That is great! I'm so happy for you! Tell me more about it!"

Cold (passive constructive) "Oh, that is good;"

Ignorant (passive destructive) "Sorry I don't have time to listen to you right now;"

Hurtful (active destructive) "That's surprising, you're usually pretty bad at delivering presentations."

For more examples, visit the following article: Active constructive responding.

If you aim to improve communication, make sure you respond in an active constructive way. Be enthusiastic and show genuine interest. If you were truly happy for him, offer feedback like, " That is great! Well done! I'm so happy for you, I know how hard you worked on the powerpoint slides and preparing for the speech."

Also, you could ask your friend what it was that went so well or to share the positive comments they received. By asking more questions you will allow the other person to relive the positive experience-encouraging all the positive emotions to resurface.

Let them feel the upward spiral of positive emotions and float on the wave of happiness. For more information on this theory watch the following video:

How to Improve Communication in Romantic Relationships

Unhealthy verbal communication often starts with negative thoughts or difficult emotions rather than words. If you are in a long-term romantic relationship, you have spent enough time with your partner to feel like you know them inside-out. You anticipate how they react in certain situations, however, your idea of who they are may lead to missing an opportunity to re-discover them.

This often has a negative impact on how we communicate in a romantic relationship-relationships are all about remaining curious about who the other person really is and how they see the world. But, after so many years, how can you see your partner in a different light?

Marva Collins, an American educator known for her tough but respectful teaching methods, has worked with impoverished and troubled students who have a challenging time succeeding in school. Her teaching methods helped them to succeed. Her approach is valuable in any relationship.

At the beginning of each semester, Collins would make a point to tell students they had already received their grades for the school year ahead. She told them that they had all received top marks and their job during the semester was to make sure they did everything not to lose this standing.

So rather than having the students prove to her that they were able to get top grades, she showed them that she believed in them-that they were worthy of the best education. This proved to be highly motivating and inspiring (Collins & Tamarkin, 1990).

Collins' approach was based on creating the right perception for herself and others. She would treat students as if they were top Harvard graduates, as long as they did not prove her otherwise. Students began with her full trust, encouragement, and appreciation.

Applied to a romantic relationship, this can greatly improve communication. Try the following experiment and see where it takes you.

Assume only the best for your partner. Put them on a pedestal for being so great and then talk to them in an appropriate way. Wouldn't you like to be spoken to as if you were valued, appreciated, respected, and loved no matter what? In response, how would you react to someone who thought so highly of you? What comes around goes around. You will see your communication improve drastically.

Communication in Long-Distance Relationships

Communication can be difficult even when we are standing right next to each other, let alone when we are in a relationship with someone in a different part of the world.

In long-distance relationships, effective maintenance strategies are crucial. Being optimistic is important.

Studies also found that openly discussing the relationship and assuring commitment to the relationship are also important strategies (Dainton & Aylor, 2002). Access to technology has made communicating in long-distance relationships much easier, faster, and cheaper. But technology also leaves room for plenty of miscommunications.

While being in touch can be tricky in a normal relationship, in a long-distance relationship the real challenge is the time in between.

The fact that your partner hasn't replied to your Whatsapp or Voxer message even though she has been online several times since you sent it causes your mind to run free, jumping from one assumption to the next.

The distance between you exacerbates these feelings since you can't drive over to talk in person. Sound familiar?

If you are caught in a downward spiral like this, you may stuck in one of the main types of thought distortions.

1. Awfulizing/Catastrophizing

We exaggerate the negative consequences. For instance, if your partner does not respond to a message immediately or fails to call you at the agreed time, you jump to the conclusion that it must be because they have fallen head over heels in love with someone else and have eloped to Vegas.

This thinking trap is particularly dangerous as our mind has a tendency to "close the gap". We look for information to feed our story and once you have decided that your partner is unfaithful, you are likely to see evidence in every corner.

2. Black & White Thinking

You have finally agreed to meet again in a few months' time, but then your partner tells you that May is actually not a good time. Therefore you decide that if he is not willing to make May work, you do not want to catch up with him this year at all.

It is either black or white for you, with no room for gradients of truth.

3. Emotional Reasoning

You feel misunderstood after you hang up the phone. The conversation was not flowing and you feel anxious and low. You reason that because you feel that way, it must be true. This is a thinking trap and will not be helpful in creating positive relationships.

The first step to getting out of a thinking trap is recognizing it. Once you have realized what is happening you are ready to pull yourself out of the downward spiral of negative thoughts.

Next, remind yourself that most events are neutral. It is the way you decide to look at them which categorizes them as good or bad. Your partner may be on Facebook after you hung up the phone, but this is just a fact-no need to interpret or judge it. Allow yourself to adjust your lens and focus on yourself. What have you got planned for the rest of the evening?

Remember, what you focus on grows, so invest your thoughts wisely.

So thirdly, change your focus. A great way to do this is mindfulness-a non-judgemental presence at the moment. Mindfulness can help tame those wild running thoughts and studies also show that meditation can reduce emotional and cognitive bias (Hanley et al., 2015).

Watch Jon Kabat-Zinn explain mindfulness:

Some apps, such as Buddhify, provide guided meditations and offer episodes specifically designed for those dealing with difficult emotions. Here are the top mindfulness apps. It is a great way to label thought distortions, and bring the mind back into the living and breathing body.

How to Spot Defensive Communication (And Non-Verbal Signs)

What we say and how we say it creates a communication climate (the emotional tone of the conversation).

A destructive communication climate can have a negative impact on the conversation.

If people feel comfortable talking to you, they will be more inclined to speak openly and share information. However, when they are feeling uneasy during the conversation they may shut down. This stems from the fact that humans behave much like all other animals when we are stressed: we either attack (fight) or run away (flight).

There are certain communication patterns that tend to increase or decrease defensiveness between people. Jack Gibb identified six behaviors that are likely to trigger an instinctive defensive reaction. Among them are judgmental language, hidden motives, or lack of concern.

If we spot any of those behaviors, we can react defensively without even realizing it. Our body freezes and muscles tense up, arms may be crossed in front of the body. We can no longer accurately perceive the motives, values, and emotions as we devote a considerable amount of mental energy on defending ourselves-the actual message in the conversation gets lost.

A defensive communication climate creates a barrier to open, clear, and genuine communication

(Forward, Czech, & Lee, 2011).

Gibb also identified six contrasting behaviors that can help maintain a supportive climate- a genuine desire to understand, respect, and openness to finding a solution.

The following table shows the 12 behavioral characteristics divided by either supportive or defensive communication climates:

Defensive Climates

Supportive Climates

Evaluation (judgmental and accusatory language);

Description (genuine desire to understand);

Control (manipulative lead);

Problem Orientation (open to finding a solution);

Superiority (perceived power, intellectual ability);

Equality (respect and politeness for everyone);

Neutrality (lack of concern);

Empathy (worthy of affection);

Certainty (unwillingness to compromise);

Provisionalism (willingness to investigate);

Strategy (hidden motives and deceit).

Spontaneity (straightforwardness, directness).

Source: Forward, Czech & Lee (2011)

A defensive climate will never provide a good basis for a constructive conversation. So it is important you identify defensive communication patterns and turn them into supportive ones. Ask yourself if what you are planning to say may trigger defensiveness and actively try to create or maintain a supportive emotional tone in a conversation.

For more information on defensive communication watch this lecture:

Avoiding Over-Communication

We tend to not communicate enough, rather than too much. However, there can be too much of a good thing, especially when it comes to smartphone habits. Some couples are in touch via social media throughout the day even when they see each other every day, while others do not feel that need.

There is no rule as to how much communication is healthy-if a couple finds something that works for them, there is no need to change it.

However, if you felt you are over-communicating and would like to change, ask yourself why you need to be in touch? What is it that makes you want to reach out and connect? What is your motivation behind the message you send or the call you make? What are you hoping to get out of it?

Positive psychology is all about flourishing in life-finding solutions rather than trying to understand problems. It is a human need to connect with others but we can't forget the importance of connecting to ourselves. Are you communicating with yourself as much as you are with others? What are the conversations you have with yourself? Is your inner voice your best friend or your worst critic?

Remember that what we focus on grows. What would happen if we try to meet our own needs rather than hoping for other people to do so for us? What if we communicated kindly when we were upset, rather than suffered or acted in ways that caused further pain?

It is crucial, especially in intimate relationships, to communicate in a way that feels good for both partners.

Books on Communication in Relationships

Here is are our three picks on improving communication in relationships:

1. Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life (Marshall B. Rosenberg). Available on Amazon.

2. Miteinander reden 1 (Friedemann Schulz von Thun), this book is not available in English. Available on Amazon.

3. Games People Play: The Basic Handbook of Transactional Analysis. (Eric Berne). Available on Amazon.

Quotes on Communication in Relationships

Listen with curiosity. Speak with honesty. Act with integrity. The greatest problem with communication is we don't listen to understand. We listen to reply. When we listen with curiosity, we don't listen with the intent to reply. We listen for what's behind the words.

Roy T. Bennett

When you give yourself permission to communicate what matters to you in every situation you will have peace despite rejection or disapproval. Putting a voice to your soul helps you to let go of the negative energy of fear and regret.

Shannon L. Alder

Having not said anything the first time, it was somehow even more difficult to broach the subject the second time around.

Douglas Adams

We have two ears and one mouth, so we should listen more than we say.

Zeno of Citium

There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.

William Shakespeare

A Take-Home Message

Like painting or singing, communication in relationships is a skill that requires practice. If you would like to improve communication in your relationships, remember the following three things.

Firstly, unhealthy communication starts with negative thoughts or difficult emotions. Words are only the result of those thoughts and emotions. So be mindful of what is going through your mind when you talk with someone. Try to understand and communicate your emotions.

Secondly, be aware of your inner lens which is responsible for how you decode a message. Paraphrasing is a great tool when you are unsure whether what you have understood is what the other person was trying to say. Simply use your own words to summarize how you understood the message.

And thirdly, listening is the better skill to practice than talking. Focus on your friend's facial expression as they tell a story. Try to listen without thinking of what to say next and try not to judge what you hear.

You will see your relationships improve with these three simple steps. Why? Because good communication is a sign of appreciation. Easy examples of showing appreciation are: I am curious what you have to say, I enjoy speaking with you, or I value our time together.

You don't have much time? I understand! Here is the Essential Skill to Improve Communication in Relationships in a nutshell, but make sure you read the article for better use of the tools and models.

What are some of the ways that have helped you communicate positively with a partner or friend? Leave a comment below.

We hope you enjoyed reading this article. Don't forget to download our three Positive Communication Exercises (PDF) for free.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
7 Ways to Improve Communication in Relationships

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Healthy communication in relationships is necessary to sustain them long term. But how can you improve communication in a relationship?

# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 15

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
Modern Aging - Holistic Health and Wealth After 50

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Dating After 60, Find True Love at 70: How To Fall In Love Again

# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 4

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.provider_name
Pew Research Center's Social & Demographic Trends Project

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The share of adults who have lived with a romantic partner is now higher than the share who have ever been married; married adults are more satisfied with their relationships, more trusting of their partners

As more U.S. adults are delaying marriage - or forgoing it altogether - the share who have ever lived with an unmarried partner has been on the rise. Amid these changes, most Americans find cohabitation acceptable, even for couples who don't plan to get married, according to a new Pew Research Center survey. Even so, a narrow majority says society is better off if couples in long-term relationships eventually get married.

The survey also examines how adults who are married and those who are living with an unmarried partner are experiencing their relationships. It finds that married adults are more satisfied with their relationship and more trusting of their partners than those who are cohabiting.

The share of U.S. adults who are currently married has declined modestly in recent decades, from 58% in 1995 to 53% today. Over the same period, the share of adults who are living with an unmarried partner has risen from 3% to 7%. While the share who are currently cohabiting remains far smaller than the share who are married, the share of adults ages 18 to 44 who have ever lived with an unmarried partner (59%) has surpassed the share who has ever been married (50%), according to a Pew Research Center analysis of the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG).

Young adults are particularly accepting of cohabitation - 78% of those ages 18 to 29 say it's acceptable for an unmarried couple to live together, even if they don't plan to get married - but majorities across age groups share this view. Still, even among those younger than 30, a substantial share (45%) say society is better off if couples who want to stay together long-term eventually get married. Roughly half of those ages 30 to 49 say the same, as do majorities of those ages 50 and older.

Views about marriage and cohabitation are also linked to religious affiliation. About three-quarters of Catholics (74%) and white Protestants who do not self-identify as born-again or evangelical (76%) say it's acceptable for an unmarried couple to live together even if they don't plan to get married. By contrast, only 47% of black Protestants and 35% of white evangelical Protestants share this view. And while half or more across these groups say society is better off if couples who want to stay together long-term eventually get married, white evangelicals are the most likely to say this (78% do so). Among those who are not religiously affiliated, fully nine-in-ten say cohabitation is acceptable even if a couple doesn't plan to get married, and just 31% say society is better off if couples who want to stay together eventually get married.

The nationally representative survey of 9,834 U.S. adults was conducted online June 25-July 8, 2019, using Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel. The survey includes 5,579 married adults and 880 adults who are living with an unmarried partner. It includes married and cohabiting adults in same-sex relationships. Among the other key findings:

Married adults have higher levels of relationship satisfaction and trust than those living with an unmarried partner

Majorities of married and cohabiting adults express at least a fair amount of trust in their spouse or partner to be faithful to them, act in their best interest, always tell them the truth and handle money responsibly, but by double digits, married adults are more likely than those who are cohabiting to express a great deal of trust in their spouse or partner in each of these areas.

Married adults also express higher levels of satisfaction with their relationship. About six-in-ten married adults (58%) say things are going very well in their marriage; 41% of cohabiters say the same about their relationship with their partner.

When asked about specific aspects of their relationship, larger shares of married than cohabiting adults say they are very satisfied with the way household chores are divided between them and their spouse or partner, how well their spouse or partner balances work and personal life, how well they and their spouse or partner communicate, and their spouse's or partner's approach to parenting (among those with children younger than 18 in the household). When it comes to their sex life, however, similar shares of married and cohabiting adults say they are very satisfied.

Married adults are also more likely than cohabiters to say they feel closer to their spouse or partner than to any other adult. About eight-in-ten married adults (78%) say they feel closer to their spouse than to any other adult in their life; a narrower majority of cohabiters (55%) say the same about their partner.

Even after controlling for demographic differences between married and cohabiting adults (such as gender, age, race, religion and educational attainment), married adults express higher levels of satisfaction, trust and closeness than those who are living with a partner.

The reasons why people get married and the reasons they move in with a partner differ in some key ways

Most married and cohabiting adults cite love and companionship as major reasons why they decided to get married or move in with a partner. But about four-in-ten cohabiters also say finances and convenience were important factors in their decision: 38% say moving in with their partner made sense financially and 37% say it was convenient. In comparison, just 13% of married adults cite finances and 10% cite convenience as major reasons why they decided to get married.

About six-in-ten married adults (63%) say making a formal commitment was a major factor in their decision to get married. This is particularly the case among those who did not live with their spouse before getting married.

Among cohabiters, about a quarter (23%) say wanting to test their relationship was a major reason why they decided to move in with their partner.

Many cohabiting adults see living together as a step toward marriage

Most married adults (66%) who lived with their spouse before they were married (and who were not yet engaged when they moved in together) say they saw cohabitation as a step toward marriage when they first started living with their now-spouse. Among cohabiting adults who were not engaged when they moved in with their partner, 44% say they saw living together as a step toward marriage. Cohabiters who have gotten engaged since moving in with their partner are more likely than those who are not currently engaged to say they saw living together as a step toward marriage (63% vs. 38%).

Among cohabiters who are not currently engaged, those with at least some college education are more likely than those with less education to say they saw moving in with their partner as a step toward marriage. Half of cohabiting college graduates who are not engaged - and 43% of those with some college experience - say this, compared with 28% of those with a high school diploma or less education.

About four-in-ten cohabiting adults who are not currently engaged (41%) say they want to get married someday. Of this group, 58% say they are very likely to marry their current partner, while 27% say this is somewhat likely and 14% say it's not too or not at all likely that they will marry their partner. About a quarter of non-engaged cohabiters (24%) say they don't want to get married, and 35% aren't sure.

Two-thirds of cohabiters who want to get married someday cite either their own or their partner's finances as a reason why they're not engaged or married

About three-in-ten cohabiting adults who are not engaged but say they would like to get married someday say their partner's (29%) or their own (27%) lack of financial readiness is a major reason why they're not engaged or married to their current partner. About a quarter (24%) say their partner not being ready financially is a minor reason, and 29% say the same about their own finances.

Roughly four-in-ten cite not being far enough along in their job or career as a major or minor reason why they're not engaged or married to their partner. Similar shares say they (44%) or their partner (47%) not being ready to make that kind of commitment is at least a minor reason why they're not engaged or married, though more cite their partner not being ready, rather than themselves, as a major reason (26% vs. 14%).

Younger adults are more likely to see cohabitation as a path to a successful marriage

About half of U.S. adults (48%) say couples who live together before marriage have a better chance of having a successful marriage than those who don't live together before marriage; 13% say couples who live together before marriage have a worse chance of having a successful marriage and 38% say it doesn't make much difference.

Adults younger than 30 are more likely than older adults to see cohabitation as a path to a successful marriage: 63% of young adults say couples who live together before marriage have a better chance of having a successful marriage, compared with 52% of those ages 30 to 49, 42% of those ages 50 to 64 and 37% of those 65 and older. About a third or more of those 30 and older say cohabitation doesn't have much of an impact on a couple's chance of having a successful marriage.

Adults who lived with their spouse before they were married are much more likely than those who didn't to say that couples who live together have a better chance of having a successful marriage (57% vs. 24%, respectively). About a third of married adults who didn't live with their spouse before marriage (32%) say cohabitation worsens a couple's chance of having a successful marriage, while 44% say it doesn't make much difference.

A majority of Americans say cohabiting couples can raise children just as well as married couples

Just over half of cohabiting adults ages 18 to 44 are raising children, including about a third who are living with a child they share with their current partner. A majority of Americans (59%) say that unmarried couples who are living together can raise children just as well as married couples; 40% say couples who are married do a better job raising children.

White non-evangelical Protestants (57%) and black Protestants (59%) are far more likely than white evangelicals (33%) to say cohabiting couples can raise children as well as those who are married.

There are also differences among Catholics: 73% of Hispanic Catholics - compared with 48% of white Catholics - say cohabiting and married couples can raise children equally well.

Views on this are also linked to partisanship. Overall, 73% of Democrats and those who lean Democratic say cohabiting couples can raise children just as well as married couples; 41% of Republicans and those who lean to the GOP say the same. These gaps persist even when taking religion and age, which are strongly linked to partisanship, into account.

Cohabiting adults (82%) are far more likely than those who are married (52%) to say couples who are living together but are not married can raise children as well as married couples. Cohabiters with and without children younger than 18 in the household are about equally likely to hold this view.

Most Americans favor allowing unmarried couples to have the same legal rights as married couples

About two-thirds of U.S. adults (65%) say they favor allowing unmarried couples to enter into legal agreements that would give them the same rights as married couples when it comes to things like health insurance, inheritance or tax benefits; 34% oppose this. For the most part, views about these types of legal agreements don't vary considerably along demographic lines, although white (66%) and Hispanic (68%) adults are more likely than black adults (58%) to express support.

About three-quarters of Democrats (77%) favor allowing unmarried couples to enter into these types of legal agreements. In contrast, Republicans are about evenly divided, with 50% saying they favor and 49% saying they oppose this.

Most don't see being married as essential to living a fulfilling life

Relatively small shares of U.S. adults say being married is essential for a man (16%) or a woman (17%) to live a fulfilling life; 54% say being married is important but not essential for each, while about three-in-ten say being married is not important for a man (29%) or a woman (28%) to live a fulfilling life. When asked more generally about the importance of being in a committed romantic relationship, 26% say this is essential for a man and 30% say it is essential for a woman to live a fulfilling life.

Far larger shares see having a job or career they enjoy as essential in order for a man (57%) or a woman (46%) to live a fulfilling life. One-in-five say having a lot of money is essential for a man, while 15% say it is essential for a woman. When it comes to having children, 22% see it as essential in order for a woman to live a fulfilling life; 16% say this is essential for a man.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Views on Marriage and Cohabitation in the U.S.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The share of adults who have lived with a romantic partner is now higher than the share who have ever been married; married adults are more satisfied with their relationships, more trusting of their partners As more U.S.

# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 8

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
A new question about citizenship on the 2020 census form is in the headlines these days, but the U.S. Census Bureau also plans other changes for the next national count. Among them: For the first time, the agency will add specific check boxes for same-sex couples to identify themselves, and it will ask people who check the white or black race boxes to say more about their national origins.

Try our email course on the U.S. census

Learn about why and how the U.S. census is conducted through five short lessons delivered to your inbox every other day.
Sign up now!

The bureau's list of 2020 questions, sent to Congress for review late last month, also was notable for what it did not include. Despite years of research into possible benefits of combining the race and Hispanic questions on the form, the bureau will continue to ask them separately. Bureau researchers had said the combined question produced more complete and accurate data, especially about Hispanics. The census form also will not include a much-researched check box for people of Middle Eastern or North African origins.

The 2020 census is to ask seven data questions: age, sex, Hispanic origin, race, relationship status, homeownership status (own or rent) and citizenship. The bureau also listed several follow-up questions it will ask to make sure that everyone who usually lives in the household being surveyed is included.

The citizenship question, which has been challenged in court, will be asked last to "minimize any impact on decennial census response rates," according to a memo from Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, whose department oversees the Census Bureau.
Census has overcounted same-sex couples
The new check boxes for same-sex couples are an attempt to fix a long-standing problem of Census Bureau overcounts of these couples.

Currently, the bureau produces a count of same-sex couples by using people's answers to two questions - one about respondents' sex and another about how each person in the household is related to the person who filled out the questionnaire. To date, the options for answering the relationship question have included "husband or wife," "unmarried partner" (this "unmarried partner" category was added to the census in 1990) and more than a dozen other categories. If, for example, the person who filled out the census form was male, and another man in the same household said he was that person's "husband or wife," they were counted as a same-sex married couple. But Census Bureau research found that the majority of same-sex married couples counted in the 2010 census and the 2010 American Community Survey were recorded as opposite-sex couples in Social Security files.

For 2020, the census form will include separate categories for "opposite-sex" and "same-sex" spouses and unmarried partners. The new wording is meant to be an additional backstop against misreporting. If people give inconsistent answers to the relationship and gender questions when responding online, a question will pop up alerting the respondent of the discrepancy. If there is an inconsistency on a written questionnaire, the bureau will have the option to change an answer.

There is growing demand for good data about same-sex couples. Same-sex marriage is not tracked consistently by all states, and some couples marry abroad. More broadly, the rise in same-sex partnerships has fueled demand for more data on these couples. Among the uses for the data are to study the well-being of children in different types of living arrangements and to forecast demand for benefits based on marital status.
Questionnaire will ask for details on racial ancestry
The four categories for opposite- and same-sex spouses and opposite- and same-sex unmarried partners are among 16 categories to be offered as answers to the relationship question, two more than in the 2010 census. The form also will bring back the "foster child" category that was dropped for reasons of space in 2010. The 2020 form is to drop the "roomer or boarder" category that has been on the census form for more than a century but is a far less common arrangement than it used to be.

The 2020 census form will use similar questions on race and ethnicity as in 2010, first asking whether someone is Hispanic or not, then asking that person's racial category. The bureau studied combining the two questions, and researchers said that it produced generally better data for Hispanics, many of whom have avoided answering the race question in the past.

But the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, which oversees how data about race and ethnicity are collected on federal forms, did not act on the Census Bureau's suggested changes in question categories, so the agency will stick with the two-question format.

Bureau researchers had also recommended adding a new racial or ethnic category for people of Middle Eastern or North African descent, who now generally are counted as white. But the head of the bureau's population division, Karen Battle, said the bureau needs to do more research on the option, because there is debate as to whether the category would be counted as a race or an ethnicity.

The 2020 census questionnaire will ask white and black respondents for the first time to write in detail about their national origins. The question will supply examples of the most commonly used answers, such as "German" and "Lebanese" under "white" and "Jamaican" or "Somali" under black." (About half of white and black respondents have supplied additional detail in tests of this option, according to census officials.)

Another change from past censuses is that the question about race also will drop the word "Negro," so the category will be "Black or African Am." Census Bureau research found that many people found it offensive. The word "Negro" was added in 1900 on census forms to replace "colored," one of many changes in racial terminology since the first census in 1790.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
2020 census will ask about same-sex marriages for first time

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
A new question about citizenship on the 2020 census form is in the headlines these days, but the U.S. Census Bureau also plans other changes for the next national count. Among them: For the first time, the agency will add specific check boxes for same-sex couples to identify themselves, and it will ask people who check the white or black race boxes to say more about their national origins.

# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 5

# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 7

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.provider_name
Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
5. Gender, family and marriage, same-sex marriage and religion

Americans generally believe that women continue to face obstacles that make it more difficult for them to get ahead than men. While there are sizable gender differences in these opinions, the partisan divide is even more pronounced.

Overall, 57% of adults say that "significant obstacles still make it harder for women to get ahead than men." About four-in-ten (42%) say that the obstacles that once made it harder for women to get ahead are largely gone.

The public's views on whether it is more difficult for women to advance have changed modestly since 2016, when 53% of the public said women still face significant obstacles.

Men and women hold very different views on whether obstacles continue to stand in the way of women's advancement: Nearly seven-in-ten women (69%) say there are still significant obstacles that make it harder for women to get ahead than men, compared with 43% of men.

But the partisan differences are even wider: While 77% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say significant obstacles continue to make it harder for women to get ahead, just a third of Republicans and Republican leaners say the same.

White adults (53%) are less likely than black (72%) and Hispanic (63%) adults to say significant obstacles remain that make it harder for women to get ahead than men. Black adults (25%) are the least likely to say the obstacles women face are largely gone.

While six-in-ten or more adults with postgraduate (65%) or college degrees (60%) say obstacles make it difficult for women to advance than men, about half of adults without a college degree (54%) say the same.

Combining gender and partisanship, Republican men stand out for their view that the obstacles standing in the way of women's progress are largely gone. A large majority of Republican men (81%) say such obstacles are mostly a thing of the past. By contrast, Republican women are evenly divided: 49% say the obstacles to women's progress are largely gone, while 50% say significant obstacles remain.

Gender differences among Democrats are not as stark, but a larger majority of Democratic women (83%) than men (69%) say significant obstacles still make it harder for women to advance.

Growing share of Democrats say it's harder for women to advance

Since 2016, there has been a modest increase in the share of the public that says there are still obstacles that make it harder for women to get ahead than men. While 53% held this view three years ago, 57% now say there are still obstacles making it harder for women to advance.

However, virtually all of the change has occurred among Democrats; Republicans' views have remained stable.

Today, 77% of Democrats say significant obstacles continue to stand in the way of women's progress, up from 68% three years ago. Since 2016, the shares of both Democratic women and men expressing this view have increased by 9 percentage points.

A third of Republicans say women still face significant obstacles, little changed from three years ago (35%). But the share of Republican men who say this has ticked down, from 23% in 2016 (and 2018) to 18% currently. Opinions among Republican women have remained fairly stable over this period (50% currently).

Only a third of Americans say society is better off prioritizing marriage and children

Nearly two-thirds of Americans (65%) say society is just as well off if people have priorities other than marriage and having children - a significant increase from the 57% who said this in 2016. The share of Americans saying society is better off if people prioritize marriage and children has decreased: 33% say this today, compared with 40% three years ago.

Overall, views among Republicans are split: 51% say society is just as well off with people having priorities other than marriage and children, while 48% say society is better off if people focus on marriage and having children.

Among Republicans, there are stark differences in these views by ideology. Nearly six-in-ten conservative Republicans (58%) say society is better off if people make marriage and children a priority, while roughly two-thirds of moderate and liberal Republicans (65%) say society is just as well off if people do not.

While nearly eight-in-ten Democrats (78%) say that society is just as well off if people have priorities other than getting married and having children, liberal Democrats (85%) are more likely than conservative and moderate Democrats (72%) to say this.

Overall, men (37%) are more likely than women (30%) to say that society is better off if people prioritize marriage and having children. However, these gender differences are much less pronounced than partisan and ideological differences on this question.

Among both Republican men and women, conservatives are much more likely than their moderate and liberal counterparts to say this. For example, 53% of conservative Republican women - compared with 32% of moderate and liberal Republican women - hold the view that people should prioritize starting a family, a difference of 21 percentage points.

Similarly, a far larger share of conservative Republican men (61%) than moderate and liberal Republican men (37%) say society would be better off if people prioritized marriage and having children.

Among Democrats, there are no significant gender differences in these views. Still, conservative and moderate Democratic men (30%) and women (25%) are about twice as likely to say people should prioritize marriage and children than their liberal Democratic counterparts (15% of liberal Democratic men and 13% of liberal Democratic women say this).

Most adults view legalization of same-sex marriage as positive step

A majority of U.S. adults (61%) say that same-sex marriage being legal in the U.S. is a very good (35%) or somewhat good (25%) thing for society. About four-in-ten (37%) say legalization of same-sex marriage is bad, with 21% saying it is very bad.

Views of the effect of same-sex marriage on our society have grown more positive over the past year. In 2018, 56% of Americans said same-sex marriage now being legal in the U.S. was a good thing.

Over the past two decades, public support for allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally has increased dramatically. Earlier this year, 61% favored allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally.

As with support for same-sex marriage, opinions about its impact on our society differ by age, race, education, religion and partisanship.

Opinions about the effect of same-sex marriage have become more positive among members of both parties over the past year. Currently, 41% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say same-sex marriage has had a positive effect, up from 34% in 2018. Conservative Republicans continue to be far less likely than moderates and liberals in the GOP to have a positive view of legalization of same-sex marriage (27% and 62% respectively say it is a good thing).

Nearly eight-in-ten Democrats and Democratic leaners (79%) say the legalization of same-sex marriage has a been a good thing for our society; last year, 73% expressed this view. Although the ideological divide is less pronounced among Democrats than Republicans, liberal Democrats are more likely than conservative and moderate Democrats to say same-sex marriage is a good thing for society (90% vs. 69%).

A large majority of white evangelical Protestants (72%) and a smaller share of black Protestants (53%) say the legalization of same-sex marriage has been a bad thing for our society. By contrast, 63% of white non-evangelical Protestants say that same-sex marriage has been a good thing for our society.

Nearly two-thirds of Catholics say the legalization of same-sex marriage has been a very good (29%) or somewhat good (35%) thing for our society; 33% of Catholics say it has been a bad thing. Religiously unaffiliated adults are among the most positive about the impact of same-sex marriage: 82% say it has been a good thing for society.

Republicans differ by age in views of same-sex marriage; Democrats differ by education and race

There are stark differences in views of same-sex marriage among Republicans, with relatively modest age differences in these views among Democrats. However, there are educational divides among Democrats in these views, as well as a wide gap between the views of white and black Democrats.

A clear majority of Republicans and Republican leaners under 30 (59%) say the legalization of same-sex marriage has been a good thing for society - the highest share of any GOP age group. Those ages 30 to 49 are split in their views (50% say legal same-sex marriage has been a good thing, 49% a bad thing). Republicans ages 50 and older are less likely to have a positive view: Just 31% say legal same-sex marriage is a good thing for society.

Among Democrats, 70% or more across all age groups say same-sex marriage now being legal is a good thing for society.

However, views among Democrats vary by education and race. Democrats with at least a bachelor's degree (89%) are more likely than Democrats with no college experience (67%) to say same-sex marriage is a good thing for society.

Nearly nine-in-ten white Democrats (88%) say the legalization of same-sex marriage is good thing for society, compared with 76% of Hispanic Democrats and 52% of black Democrats. And while 67% of white Democrats say this development is very good for society, 44% of Hispanic Democrats and just 25% of black Democrats say the same.

Views on belief in God and morality

About six-in-ten Americans (63%) say it is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral, while 36% say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values.

While majorities of white (67%) and Hispanic Americans (58%) say it is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral, fewer black Americans (41%) say the same. Nearly six-in-ten black Americans (57%) say belief in God is necessary to be moral.

Majorities of adults across all age groups say that morality is not reliant on belief in God. However, adults under the age of 50 are more likely to say this (70% vs. 56% of those 50 and older).

Nearly half of adults with no more than a high school diploma (45%) say it is necessary to believe in God to be moral. That compares with 38% of those with some college experience but no degree and just 23% with more educational experience.

Similar shares of white evangelical Protestants (62%) and black Protestants (66%) say it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral. But a large share of white non-evangelical Protestants (65%) say it is not necessary. A majority of Catholics (58%) and those without a religious affiliation (88%) also share this view.

Conservatives in both parties more likely to say belief in God is necessary to be moral

Although a majority of Americans say belief in God is not necessary for a person to be moral, there are sizable differences of opinion by partisanship and ideology.

Overall, a narrow majority of Republicans (53%) say it is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral. Conservative Republicans are divided (52% say belief in God is necessary for morality, while 48% say it is not necessary), while a majority of moderate and liberal Republicans (61%) say morality is not contingent on belief in God.

Nearly three-quarters of Democrats (73%) say it is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral, while 26% say this belief in God is necessary. Liberal Democrats particularly stand out for this view. An overwhelming majority of liberal Democrats (86%) say it is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values; that compares with a smaller majority (61%) of conservative and moderate Democrats.

Among Democrats, wide racial and ethnic differences on belief in God and morality

Among Democrats, there are stark racial and ethnic differences in the importance of belief in God for morality.

While roughly nine-in-ten white Democrats (89%) say it is "not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral," a much narrower majority of Hispanic Democrats (57%) say the same. Among black Democrats, a 55% majority says it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral, while 44% of black Democrats say that morality is not linked to belief in God.

Public divided in views of Islam and violence

The public is evenly divided in opinions about whether the Islamic religion is more likely than others to encourage violence among its believers. About half of Americans say Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its believers, while as many say that the religion does not encourage violence more than others (48% each).

As in the past, partisanship is a major factor in these attitudes. By a wide margin (72% to 25%), Republicans say Islam is more likely to encourage violence. Democrats, by nearly the same margin (69% to 28%), say Islam does not encourage violence more than other religions.

There are also wide ideological divisions within partisan groups. Conservative Republicans (81%) are more likely than moderate and liberal Republicans (59%) to say Islam encourages violence among its believers. Among Democrats, a greater share of liberal Democrats than conservative and moderate Democrats say Islam does not encourage violence more than other religions (78% vs. 62%).

These views also differ by age, level of educational attainment and religion. A majority of those under age 50 (55%) say Islam does not encourage violence more than other religions; 55% of those 50 and older say it is more likely to encourage violence.

Adults with postgraduate degrees (37%) are less likely to say that Islam encourages violence than those with a bachelor's degree (44%), some college experience (49%) or those with a high school diploma or less education (54%).

Two-thirds of white Protestants - 55% of white non-evangelical Protestants and 74% of white evangelical Protestants - say Islam is more likely to encourage violence among its believers. However, black Protestants are more likely to say the opposite: 66% say Islam does not encourage violence more than other religions.

Among Catholics, more say that the Islamic religion encourages violence (52%) than say that it does not (44%). About six-in-ten of those who are not affiliated with a religion (61%) say the Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than other religions; 37% of those in this group say Islam does encourage violence.

Long-term opinion trends: Views of Islam and violence, importance of belief in God

In recent years, Pew Research Center has transitioned from probability-based telephone surveys to the American Trends Panel, a probability-based online panel. The transition from phone surveys conducted with an interviewer to online self-administered surveys brings with it the possibility of mode differences - differences arising from the method of interviewing.

This section includes opinion measures on whether Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence and whether it is necessary to believe in God to be a moral person. Both questions, which have long-standing telephone trends, were included on a survey conducted in September on the American Trends Panel (ATP), on which this report is largely based, and a contemporaneous telephone survey.

On the American Trends Panel, 48% say the Islamic religion is more likely than others to encourage violence among its followers, while an identical share says it is not. On the telephone survey, 40% say Islam is more likely to encourage violence, while 49% say it is not. As is typically the case, the share offering no opinion is much higher on the phone survey (11%) than on the online survey (just 4%).

There are wide partisan differences evident in both modes. The telephone trend shows that these differences have increased substantially since the question was first asked in 2002. On the American Trends Panel survey, 72% of Republicans and Republican leaners say the Islamic religion encourages violence more than other religions, compared with just 28% of Democrats and Democratic leaners. The partisan gap in the shares in each party saying Islam is more likely to encourage violence is similar on the ATP (44 percentage points) and the contemporaneous phone survey (46 points).

On the American Trends Panel survey, 63% say it is not necessary to believe in God to be moral; 36% say belief in God is necessary for morality. A majority (59%) on the phone survey says belief in God is not necessary to be moral, while 39% say it is necessary.

Partisan differences on this question also have widened in recent years. In the survey conducted on the ATP, 73% of Democrats and Democratic leaners say belief in God is not a prerequisite for being moral and having good values, while 53% of Republicans and GOP leaners say the same. This partisan gap was much narrower a decade ago.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Gender, family and marriage, same-sex marriage and religion

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Americans generally believe that women continue to face obstacles that make it more difficult for them to get ahead than men. While there are sizable gender differences in these opinions, the partisan divide is even more pronounced. Overall, 57% of adults say that "significant obstacles still make it harder for women to get ahead than men."

# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 15

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
ERROR: The request could not be satisfied

# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 14

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Divorce can be especially tough on kids. But there's plenty you can do to help them cope.

# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 11: Parenting

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The future of families: four discoveries that change everything | George Carey | TEDxNaperville

# data[].attributes.body
Chapter 14

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
09 Changing Family Patterns (Divorce & Marriage)