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(Difficult to come up with as most other grassroots organisations also fear persecution/blacklisting - so most of these will have to be based in another country for security)

Legal consulting for those interested in going to protests

Crowd-funding for bail-outs and otherwise legal/administrative costs

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Policeman: Well… You know what… What goal are you after with all your… We’ll find out. We are here already, fuck, everyone has been here already, has lied down already What’s your goal? *silence* I’m telling you, I’ll fucking keep increasing (?) exponentially. We don’t give a fuck. We’ll [do something to you]...

Detainee: Are you threatening me?

Policeman: Yes. I am threatening you. I am threatening you with physical abuse.

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Policeman: Yeah, that’s a freak. A fucking antisocial element. *unintelligible* We’ve been fucking told by Putin to fuck them the fuck up. Those dumbfucks.

Detainee: Wow.

Policeman: That’s it. Putin’s on our side. You are enemies of Russia. Fuck, you are enemies of the nation. We’ll fuck you up for good now, and that’ll be it. It’s in the bag. And we’ll get a bonus [salary] as well. *unintelligible*

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‘[W]hat made me particularly happy was to see that the Committee’s decision [to award him the Nobel Peace Prize] stressed the link between defense of peace and defense of human rights, emphasising that the defense of human rights guarantees a solid ground for genuine long-term international cooperation. … Granting the award to a person who defends political and civil rights against illegal and arbitrary actions means an affirmation of principles which play such an important role in determining the future of mankind. For hundreds of people, known or unknown to me, many of whom pay a high price for the defense of these same principles (the price being loss of freedom, unemployment, poverty, persecution, exile from one’s country) your decision was a great personal joy and a gift. I am aware of all this, but I am also aware of another fact: in the present situation, it is an act of intellectual courage and great equity to grant the award to a man whose ideas do not coincide with official concepts of the leadership of a big and powerful state.’

Andrei Sakharov

Acceptance Speech by the Nobel Peace Prize laureate 1975,

Read by his wife in his absence in Oslo, December 10, 1975, while Sakharov stood on the steps of a Soviet courtroom, awaiting for a sentence to be pronounced against Sergei Kovalyov, his closest friend, for committing the speech crime of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (he served 7 years in a labour camp)

‘I want journalists to die old.’

Antidote against tyranny, Nobel Lecture given by Nobel Peace Prize laureate 2021

Dmitry Muratov, Oslo, 10 December 2021.

The freedoms of speech and protest have been dying a long, slow death in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. What little remained has last week been dealt a mortal blow. After the EU’s decision to suspend the broadcasting licenses of RT and Sputnik within the Union, the Russian regulator Roskomnadzor blocked access to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other foreign outlets in Russia, partly on the basis that they were spreading false information about the war in Ukraine. While there is (today) no Great Russian Firewall akin to the Chinese one, and tech-savvy Russians can presumably use VPNs to evade a lot of the blocking, millions of ordinary citizens will now be cut off from large swathes of the Internet. One of the last independent media outlets, Ekho Moskvy, had to shut down after more than thirty years of operation; the TV station Dozhd (Rain) was also taken off the air:

Many thousands of individuals protesting against the war have been arrested all over Russia. And in a culmination of legal repression of speech, on Friday President Putin signed into law bills passed by the Duma amending the Russian Criminal Code and the Code on Administrative Offences (links at the bottom of the text). The amendments create new offences that punish discrediting the Russian armed forces, calling for sanctions against Russia, and disseminating false information about the armed forces. The Novaya Gazeta newspaper, seven of whose journalists were murdered over the past twenty years as a consequence of their work and whose editor-in-chief Dmitry Muratov was co-awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last year, suspended its coverage of the conflict due to (well-founded) fears of the new laws being applied to it and its journalists. Foreign journalists also ceased their reporting within Russia.

In this essay I will examine the new Russian offences, and show how they impermissibly infringe on free expression on matters of public interest, as protected by Article 10(1) ECHR and Article 19(2) ICCPR, a freedom ‘to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.’ To call these criminal offences infringements on free speech is actually a colossal understatement – in their context, they are a negation of the whole idea that people should be able to express themselves freely.

The new offences

Offences under the Code on Administrative Offences (CAO, КоАП) are essentially misdemeanours subject to summary judgment. Under new Article 20.3.3 CAO, it is an administrative offence to commit ‘[p]ublic actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, maintaining international peace and security, including public calls to prevent the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for these purposes.’ The offence is subject to a fine of up to 50,000 rubles for ordinary citizens (about 370 euros as of the time of writing, and a bit lower than the average monthly salary in Russia), but the fine is doubled (para. 2) if ‘accompanied by calls for holding unauthorized public events.’

Under new Article 20.3.4 CAO it is an offence for a Russian citizen to call for the imposition of sanctions by a foreign state (and its various emanations) against the Russian Federation, Russian nationals, or Russian legal entities (such as companies). No defence whatsoever is provided to this offence – no matter what the Russian state or legal or natural person has done, it is always prohibited to call for the imposition of restrictive measures on them. The prescribed fines are the same as in Art. 20.3.3(1) above.

These two administrative offences will be applied en masse to the thousands of anti-war protesters now being arrested across Russia each day. But then come the amendments to the Criminal Code (CC, УК). Two new crimes replicate and supplement the administrative offences examined above. First, the criminal offence in Article 280.3 CC follows Art. 20.3.3 CAO in prohibiting ‘public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces … including public calls to prevent their use.’ It can only be applied, however, if a person has already been convicted once of the administrative offence in Art. 20.3.3 CAO in the past year. Criminal liability comes with greatly increased penalties – up to 300,000 rubles in fines, or by forced labour or imprisonment of up to 3 years. A stricter form of the offence (under Art. 280.3(2) CC) applies if the ‘public actions’ led to several prohibited consequences, including mass disruptions of public order or disruptions of infrastructure, and is punishable by a fine of up to a million rubles and 5 years of imprisonment. In other words – if mass protests result from prohibited ‘public actions’, including any kind of attempt at civil disobedience (e.g. trying to stop military convoys etc), the punishment can be very grave indeed.

Second, similarly, the criminal offence in Article 284.2 CC traces the administrative offence in Article 20.3.4 CAO (calling for the imposition of sanctions), and can only be applied to a person if they have already been convicted for that administrative offence in the past year. It also comes with elevated punishments – up to 500,000 rubles in fines, or up to 3 years of imprisonment. Again the basic idea of these two criminal offences is that they will be applied to repeat offenders who are not deterred from speaking out against the war by fines meted out under CAO.

Then we come to the new ‘fake news’ offence in Article 207.3 CC, which follows on two similar mis/disinformation offences (Arts. 207.1 and 207.2) introduced during the Covid-19 pandemic. The new crime punishes the ‘public dissemination, under the guise of a truthful message, of knowingly false information including facts on the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, maintaining international peace and security.’ The ordinary form of the offence (para. 1) is punishable by a 500,000 ruble fine and up to 3 years of imprisonment. A stricter form of the offence (para. 2) applies if it is committed in various circumstances, including by a group of persons or out of profit motives, and is punishable by a fine of up to 5 million rubles and from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment. And a third, strictest form of the offence applies (para. 3) if the dissemination of false information causes (entirely undefined) ‘grave consequences’ (тяжкие последствия), with the only penalty being 10 to 15 years of incarceration.

Wholly unjustifiable restrictions on freedom of expression

The freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Expression can justifiably be restricted if (1) the restriction on expression is provided for by law; (2) pursues a legitimate aim; (3) and is necessary and proportionate to achieve that aim (see generally Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34). All of the new administrative and criminal offences in Russian law are undoubtedly restrictions on speech; the constituent elements of each offence can also be met through speech alone. And it is simply manifest that the new Russian legislation fails all three parts of the justifiability test.

First, while the restrictions on speech are provided for by domestic law, the laws in question do not satisfy the qualitative criterion of foreseeability, i.e. they are in many respects impermissibly vague. The best example of such vagueness is the entirely nebulous reference to ‘grave consequences’ in Art. 207.3(3) CC, potentially leading to 15 years of imprisonment. Literally nobody, including the authors of this law, can know what consequences exactly can lead to so severe a punishment. But the other offences are similarly vague (viz. the idea of ‘aimed at discrediting’ (направленные на дискредитацию) the Russian Armed Forces, which can be interpreted as including any form of criticism).

Second, it is crystal clear from the overall context that these laws are motivated by an ulterior purpose, that of suppressing any form of political pluralism and dissent. While protecting national security can be a legitimate aim for restricting speech, this is not what these laws are really about. They are simply meant to stifle any form of public protect or critical journalism, which is exactly what their effect has been so far. It should be noted in that regard that the European Court has already found in prior cases that Russian authorities acted with such ulterior purposes (Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 2), App. no. 43734/14, 9 April 2019, §§ 96-98 (the Court relying on ‘converging contextual evidence’ to establish that the restrictions on the applicant’s liberty were implemented with the ulterior purpose of ‘suppress[ing] political pluralism’)).

Third, even if we accepted arguendo that Russia pursued a legitimate aim in enacting the new laws, there is simply no way of reasonably arguing that these laws are necessary and proportionate. In particular, they are almost entirely divorced from addressing specific harms caused by speech, and they are so overbroad that they generate a veritable storm of chilling effects on speech in the public interest (indeed, that’s their whole point). Thus, under the new laws, it would potentially be criminal for a Russian citizen to

1. Call for foreign sanctions against the Russian state or an odious oligarch regardless of what they have done, and regardless of the fact that the imposition of the sanctions by foreign states has literally nothing to do with any such public calls within Russia.

2. Say that the Russian armed forces committed war crimes in Syria.

3. Say that the Russian armed forces are indiscriminately bombing cities in Ukraine.

4. Say that the Russian armed forces should not be used in Ukraine.

5. Say that the Russian armed forces have suffered defeats in Ukraine.

6. Say that the Russian armed forces are unprofessional or incompetent in some respects.

7. Sing ‘Imagine’ or ‘Give Peace a Chance.’

8. Wear or carry a peace sign, depending on the context.

Moreover, journalists could routinely be subjected to an even more severe punishment than ordinary citizens, because they are normally working as part of a ‘group’ and are paid to do so (cf. Art. 207.3(2) CC, with up to 10 years of imprisonment). Note how the ‘fake news’ offence does not require prior convictions for any administrative offence.

Criminal punishments on speech are only appropriate if less restrictive means are unavailable or ineffective (General Comment 34, para. 34). There is simply no evidence that any alleged social harms caused by public criticism of the Russian state or the armed forces could not be mitigated through more (supposedly) good, truthful speech by Russian officials (who of course control an enormous apparatus capable of disseminating such speech), and that criminal punishment is genuinely necessary. It is nothing short of perverse to criminalize anti-war messages and protests. And what, exactly, can be the ‘pressing social need’ to send someone to prison for 3 years simply for saying that Roman Abramovich’s foreign assets should be seized? Even a civil penalty would be hard to justify in this case, let alone a criminal one (cf. the Israeli Anti-Boycott Law, which controversially allows for a civil suit in tort against boycott advocates – see Human Rights Committee 2014 Concluding Observations on Israel, para. 22: ‘The Committee is concerned at the chilling effect that the Boycott Law (5771-2011), which provides that a call for economic, cultural, or academic boycott of people or institutions in the State party or the OPT for political reasons is a civil offence, and the so-called “Foreign Funding Law” (5771-2001),which imposes mandatory disclosure of foreign funds received by any association or company, may have on the freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of association (arts.19 and 22).’)

The one redeeming quality of the definition of the ‘fake news’ offence in Art. 207.3 CC is that it applies only to knowingly false information (заведомо ложной информации), which is coupled with the default culpability requirement of intention in Russian law (Art. 24 CC). That is, under the text of the law, a person who genuinely believed in the information he disseminated about the Russian armed forces could not be criminally liable, even if the information was objectively false (no such escape valve exists for the other offences). But there is little room for confidence that, in the current climate, Russian criminal courts would apply this definition and its high culpability requirement with sufficient rigour, nor is there a similar culpability requirement with regard to any harm that the false speech supposedly causes. On the contrary, the mere fact that the fake news law is on the books, and with such severe, life-changing penalties to be administered by a long-subservient judiciary, is sufficient to generate unacceptable chilling effects on speech on matters of public interest.

Shelling free speech

The new administrative and criminal offences in Russian law are nothing less than a concerted attempt by state authorities to eradicate what’s left of the free press and free speech in Russia. They are not only an indiscriminate assault on the right of journalists and ordinary citizens to speak critically of the government, but also on the right of their listeners to ‘seek and receive’ information and ideas of all kinds. They are nothing less than a cynical attempt by the systematic purveyors of ‘fake news’ to use ‘fake news’ legislation to hide their own lies.

And they are also nothing new under the sun. We, in Russia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have been here before, and so have many other peoples. Criminal laws punishing ‘fake news’ have long existed in autocracies, and are now proliferating worldwide. What is happening now in Russia certainly can happen and has happened elsewhere. As Sergei Kovalyov, who spent seven years in a Soviet penal colony without losing his belief ‘that sooner or later lies punish themselves’, presciently told us in 2015:

Another common and dangerous idea is that Russia’s immorality and political barbarism are solely Russia’s internal affair. That isn’t true. In our present interdependent world, serious problems become global and affect everyone. Russian (and not only Russian) totalitarian tendencies are fraught with catastrophic global consequences. No one knows how to deal with this challenge, but many people realize that not to face it is shameful and dangerous.

Even in the worst times of Soviet repression, courageous dissidents like Sakharov and Kovalyov spoke out, often at great risk to themselves, because they could not stand the shame of staying silent. Their successors are speaking out today, and will do so tomorrow, equal in their dignity and bravery to Ukrainian citizens fighting for their country’s survival. Because this is exactly what the thousands of Russians who will be prosecuted under the new repressive laws are really doing; they are fighting not only for peace, but for the survival of a different Russia.

Notes:

1. The photograph of is of Andrei Sakharov’s grave in Moscow, January 1990; image credit.

2. My colleague Philippa Webb and I have co-authored a report on criminal laws dealing with false speech for the High Level Panel on Media Freedom; the analysis in the post draws from that report, which will be available publicly in a few months.

3. Because the websites of the Duma and the Kremlin are under continuing cyber attack by pro-Ukrainian hacktivists, the official texts are inaccessible there, but I managed to find them here. Direct links to the amendments:

Федеральный закон от 4 марта 2022 г. N 32-ФЗ “О внесении изменений в Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации и статьи 31 и 151 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса Российской Федерации”

Федеральный закон от 4 марта 2022 г. N 31-ФЗ “О внесении изменений в Кодекс Российской Федерации об административных правонарушениях”

For versions of the two Codes previously in force, see here.

All translations mine, with a bit of help from Google Translate and friends who are native Russian speakers.

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The Legal Death of Free Speech in Russia

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'[W]hat made me particularly happy was to see that the Committee's decision [to award him the Nobel Peace Prize] stressed the link between defense of peace and defense of human rights, emphasising that the defense of human rights guarantees a solid ground for genuine long-term international cooperation. ...

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Following the invasion of Ukraine on the 24 February, 2022, the Russian Federation has passed multiple decrees banning the spread of information about the war in Ukraine, banning keywords such as "war", "invasion", "attack", and for claiming that Russia has invaded Ukraine. Despite this, many Russians have taken it upon themselves to protest the war in public protests, many of which have ended brutally with police violence. Among those arrested, many have been assaulted by the police during questionings and trials, thereby decreasing the turnout in protests.

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TW: Violence, beating, torture, degrading treatment, violent language

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TW: Violence, beating, torture, degrading treatment, violent language

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Freedom of Speech (or lackthereof) and Police Violence in Russia

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Freedom of Speech (or lackthereof) and Police Violence in Russia

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By Laura Bicker
BBC News, Seoul

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,
Hundreds of South Korean men organized an Anti-#MeToo rally in 2018

Park Min-young, 29, spends most of his day talking to angry young men in Seoul.

His fingers relentlessly tap the keyboard as he replies to dozens of their messages at his desk in the centre of a busy campaign office for one of South Korea's main presidential candidates, Yoon Suk-yeol.

"Nearly 90% of men in their twenties are anti-feminist or do not support feminism," he tells me.

South Korea has one of the worst women's rights records in the developed world. And yet it is disgruntled young men who have been the focus of this country's presidential election.

Many do not see feminism as a fight for equality. Instead they resent it and view it as a form of reverse discrimination, a movement to take away their jobs and their opportunities.

It is a disparaging development for the tens of thousands of young women who took to the streets of Seoul in 2018 to shout "Me Too" after several high profile criminal cases involving sexual harassment and spy camera crimes known as "molka".

But now that cry is being drowned out by men shouting "Me First".

The country's gender politics is a minefield the country's next leader will have to navigate - if they can first win the battle to get into office.

The contest

Conservative candidate Mr Yoon and his liberal rival Lee Jae-myung are neck and neck in a contest to become the next leader of Asia's fourth largest economy.

Voters' top concerns are skyrocketing house prices, stagnant economic growth, and stubborn youth unemployment.

Neither have any experience as legislators in the National Assembly which is a first in South Korea's democratic history.

And neither appear to have a strong female voting base. Both parties have been accused of misogyny.

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,
Yoon Suk-yeol (R) and Lee Jae-myung (L) are both neck and neck in the contest

Mr Lee's ruling Democratic Party has seen a number of high-profile sexual harassment scandals, with the mayor of Busan sent to prison for sexual assault.

Mr Yoon, of the People's Power Party, has made abolishing the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family a central pledge of his campaign.

The ministry largely provides family-based services, education, and social welfare for children and spends around 0.2% of the nation's annual budget - less than 3% of which goes towards the promotion of equality for women. But Yoon knows this move will be popular among a key demographic - young men.

A survey last year by a local newspaper found that 79% of young men in South Korea feel "seriously discriminated against" because of their gender.

As I walk with Min-young to a cafe to meet some of these young men, he tells me that "feminism has been going in the wrong direction".

He says many men he's spoken to feel "let down", adding that he believes it is "necessary to pacify, to convince and to appease them first".

These men claim that they are not trying to drown out the voices of women, but simply to amplify the voices of young men.

One of their biggest issues is that all men must serve 18 months in the military before they are 30 years old.

"There is no reward. Just sacrifice," says Min-young. "The military is a huge fear for Korean men… that they are forced to go to this place they can't resist for one year and six months. And to have to compete with women after returning from the military.

"This country's patriarchy system also gives women the burden of child rearing, [which means the] men have the burden [of proving] their economic capabilities."

The men I'm introduced to do stump speeches for Mr Yoon who has declared that there is no systemic gender discrimination in South Korea.

The facts do not support that argument.

The average monthly wage for a South Korean woman in 2020 was 67.7% of that of a man, according to the Ministry of Employment and Labour. This is the biggest wage gap among developed countries.

Feminists living in fear

Women make up only 5% of boards in South Korea's corporate world.

When it comes to sexual crimes against women, sentencing has been traditionally low. In the last 10 years 41.4% of perpetrators were given probation, around 30% were given a fine.

That means just over 28% of those found guilty were sent to prison.

The pains of young women however, have been largely ignored in this election. Until now.

A writer for the Korea Herald, Yim Hyun-su noted in an article at the weekend that both candidates have refreshed their appeal to women on social media.

Mr Lee has pledged to tackle discrimination and Mr Yoon declared a "war on sex crimes".

In such a close race, it seems they have realised that young women may now hold the deciding votes.

But it will be a tough sell for those who fight for equality in South Korea. They are now scared to reveal their identities.

We spoke to a group of two men and two women who wanted to face away from our cameras. We have given them fake names to protect them.

Image caption,
The interviewees say identifying yourself as a feminist has unimaginable consequences

"As a feminist to reveal your face and speak out has such unimaginable consequences," says Ji-eun, a YouTuber who is in her early 20s.

"When we upload a video on feminism on our YouTube channel, male communities organise an attack and say things like 'You are a feminist? Feminists should all die.'

I have seen these comments for myself. This malicious online bullying can have terrible consequences.

In January, YouTuber BJ Jammi ended her life having endured years of abuse after trolls accused her of being a "man-hating feminist".

But amidst the deepening divisions, there is understanding too. Especially when it comes to men having to serve in the military.

"I sympathise with that and the fact that only males have to go is an unjust structure," said Ji-eun.

"But the responsibility for this should be on the government and the history of this divided country - but to say to women in their twenties 'Well, you don't go to the military' is very unjust."

This anti-feminist backlash will be a challenge for whoever steps into the presidential office known as the Blue House.

South Korea is at a cultural crossroads. It has a tech-savvy young generation who do not share the patriarchal views of their parents or their grandparents. Both genders will likely keep pushing and are looking at those in charge to bring real change.

But Ji-eun still feels hopeless about her future.

"If the hate was coming from the older generation, I might hope that at some point when my generation is in power or in places of importance in society, it could change. But the anti-feminists and those who don't care about women's rights and spewing hate are in my generation.

"It's hard to picture a bright future even far ahead."

More on this story

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Why misogyny is at the heart of South Korea’s presidential elections

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Disgruntled young men who resent feminism are the focus of candidates vying to be president.

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One of the concerns of South Korean men is that women do not have serve in the military, while men have to complete an 18 month military conscription period. The military is notoriously in a bad condition, and the long service means that young men miss out on educational and career growth opportunities, fueling their resentment towards women.

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App to report domestic violence

Domestic violence identification/recognition courses

Self-defense courses for women

Legal, financial, and psychological support for victims

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Combatting gender-based violence in South Korea

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Combatting gender-based violence in South Korea

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The proportion of conservative men in the country has been steadily rising, including not only men from. Conservative sentiments amongst men have significantly increased especially in men in their 20s

Overall decline in trust in women in high positions of power following the impeachment of Park Geun-Hye in 2016 following her corruption scandal.

Women are seen as incompetent to be in high positions of power.

Election of conservative leader Yoon has fueled conservative sentiments among men as well.

In his election campaign, he emphasised his intention to dismiss and dissolve the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, which garnered him many votes

Patriarchal standards in Korea, especially with regards to family plans and career opportunities

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Despite Korea being considered one of the most technologically developed and advanced countries and its cultural power throughout the Asian continent, there is still a growing concern about the rights and protection given to women. Following the election of conservative, far-right leader Yoon Sukyeol, there is a growing concern for women in the country as they feel more and more threatened that the government and law enforcement will be further and further away from them.

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71.7% of women in relationships with men feel "controlled" by their partner

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22.4% experienced physical violence by their partner

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37.9% experienced sexual harassment/misdemeanour by their partner

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36.6% felt emotionally or psychologically abused by their partner