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Tehran Conference

Prior to the Yalta Conference, the three leaders met in November 1943 in Tehran, Iran, where they coordinated the next phase of war against the Axis Powers in Europe and the Pacific.

At the Tehran Conference, the United States and Britain had committed to launching an invasion of northern France in mid-1944, opening another front of the war against Nazi Germany. Stalin, meanwhile, had agreed in principle to join the war against Japan in the Pacific after Germany was defeated.

By February 1945, as Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin gathered again at Yalta, an Allied victory in Europe was on the horizon. Having liberated France and Belgium from Nazi occupation, the Allies now threatened the German border; to the east, Soviet Union troops had driven back the Germans in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania and gotten within 40 miles of Berlin.

This put Stalin at a distinct advantage during the meeting at the Black Sea resort, a location he himself had proposed after insisting his doctors had barred him from traveling long distances.

Pacific War

While the war in Europe was winding down, Roosevelt knew the United States still faced a protracted struggle against Japan in the Pacific War, and wanted to confirm Soviet support in an effort to limit the length of and casualties sustained in that conflict. At Yalta, Stalin agreed that Soviet forces would join the Allies in the war against Japan within "two or three months" after Germany's surrender.

In return for its support in the Pacific War, the other Allies agreed, the Soviet Union would gain control of Japanese territory it had lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, including southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) and the Kuril Islands.

Stalin also demanded that the United States grant diplomatic recognition of Mongolia's independence from China: the Mongolian People's Republic, founded in 1924, was a Soviet satellite.
WATCH VIDEO: FDR: The War Years
Division of Germany

At Yalta, the Big Three agreed that after Germany's unconditional surrender, it would be divided into four post-war occupation zones, controlled by U.S., British, French and Soviet military forces. The city of Berlin would also be divided into similar occupation zones.

France's leader, Charles de Gaulle, was not invited to the Yalta Conference, and Stalin agreed to include France in the post-war governing of Germany only if France's zone of occupation was taken from the US and British zones.

The Allied leaders also determined that Germany should be completely demilitarized and "denazified," and that it would assume some responsibility for post-war reparations, but not sole responsibility.

Poland and Eastern Europe

Stalin took a hard line on the question of Poland, pointing out that within three decades, Germany had twice used the nation as a corridor through which to invade Russia. He declared that the Soviet Union would not return the territory in Poland that it had annexed in 1939, and would not meet the demands of the Polish government-in-exile based in London.

Stalin did agree to allow representatives from other Polish political parties into the communist-dominated provisional government installed in Poland, and to sanction free elections there-one of Churchill's key objectives.

In addition, the Soviets promised to allow free elections in all territories in Eastern Europe liberated from Nazi occupation, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

In return, the United States and Britain agreed that future governments in Eastern European nations bordering Soviet Union should be "friendly" to the Soviet regime, satisfying Stalin's desire for a zone of influence to provide a buffer against future conflicts in Europe.

United Nations

At Yalta, Stalin agreed to Soviet participation in the United Nations, the international peacekeeping organization that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed to form in 1941 as part of the Atlantic Charter. He gave this commitment after all three leaders had agreed on a plan whereby all permanent members of the organization's Security Council would hold veto power.

Having discussed these key issues, the Big Three agreed to meet again after Germany's surrender, in order to finalize the borders of post-war Europe and other outstanding questions.

"There is no doubt that the tide of Anglo-Soviet-American friendship had reached a new high," wrote James Byrnes, who accompanied Roosevelt to Yalta, in his memoirs. Though Roosevelt and Churchill also considered the Yalta Conference an indication that their wartime cooperation with the Soviets would continue in peacetime, such optimism would prove to be short-lived.

Impact of the Yalta Conference

By March 1945, it had become clear that Stalin had no intention of keeping his promises regarding political freedom in Poland. Instead, Soviet troops helped squash any opposition to the provisional government based in Lublin, Poland. When elections were finally held in 1947, they predictably solidified Poland as one of the first Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe.

Many Americans criticized Roosevelt-who was seriously ill during the Yalta Conference and died just two months later-for the concessions he made at Yalta regarding Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia.

President Harry Truman, Roosevelt's successor, would be far more suspicious of Stalin that July, when the leaders of the Allied powers met again at the Potsdam Conference in Germany to hash out the final terms for ending World War II in Europe.

But with his troops occupying much of Germany and Eastern Europe, Stalin was able to effectively ratify the concessions he won at Yalta, pressing his advantage over Truman and Churchill (who was replaced mid-conference by Prime Minister Clement Attlee).

In March 1946, barely a year after the Yalta Conference, Churchill delivered his famous speech declaring that an " iron curtain" had fallen across Eastern Europe, signaling a definitive end to cooperation between the Soviet Union and its Western allies, and the beginning of the Cold War.
READ MORE: How the 'Big Three' Teed Up the Cold War at the 1945 Yalta Conference
Sources

The Yalta Conference 1945. Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State.
Terry Charman, "How Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin Planned to End the Second World War." Imperial War Museums, January 12, 2018.
The End of World War II and the Division of Europe. Center for European Studies, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

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Yalta Conference: Definition, Date & Outcome - HISTORY

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The Yalta Conference of 1945 was an historic meeting of three World War II allies: U.S. President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill and Soviet Premier Stalin.

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Henry Wallace, Secretary of Commerce, favoured co-operation with the Soviet Union. In private he disagreed with Harry S. Truman about what he considered to be an aggressive foreign policy. Wallace went public about his fears at a meeting in New York City in September, 1946. As a result, Truman sacked Wallace from his administration.

Harry S. Truman

On 12th March, 1947, Harry S. Truman, announced details to Congress of what eventually became known as the Truman Doctrine. In his speech he pledged American support for "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures". This speech also included a request that Congress agree to give military and economic aid to Greece in its fight against communism. Truman asked for $400,000,000 for this aid programme. He also explained that he intended to send American military and economic advisers to countries whose political stability was threatened by communism.

I plead for an America vigorously dedicated to peace - just as I plead for opportunities for the next generation throughout the world to enjoy the abundance which now, more than ever before, is the birthright of men.

To achieve lasting peace, we must study in detail just how the Russian character was formed - by invasions of Tarters, Mongols, Germans, Poles, Swedes, and French; by the intervention of the British, French and Americans in Russian affairs from 1919 to 1921. Add to all this the tremendous emotional power with Marxism and Leninism gives to the Russian leaders - and then we can realize that we are reckoning with a force which cannot be handled successfully by a "Get tough with Russia" policy. "Getting tough" never bought anything real and lasting - whether for schoolyard bullies or businessmen or world powers. The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get.

We must not let our Russian policy be guided or influenced by those inside or outside the United States who want war with Russia.

(2) President Truman, speech to Congress (12th March, 1947)

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedom. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

(3) Andrei Vyshinsky, Soviet Union spokesman at the United Nations, speech (18th September, 1947)

The so-called Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are particularly glaring examples of the manner in which the principles of the United Nations are violated, of the way in which the organization is ignored. This is clearly proved by the measures taken by the United States Government with regard to Greece and Turkey which ignore and bypass the United States as well as the measures proposed under the so-called Marshall Plan in Europe.

This policy conflicts sharply with the principles expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution of 11th December, 1946, which declares that relief supplies to other countries "should at no time be used as a political weapon". It is becoming more and more evident to everyone that the implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and political control of the United States.

The so-called Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are particularly glaring examples of the way in which the principles of the United Nations are violated, of the way in which the Organisation is ignored. As is now clear, the Marshall Plan constitutes in essence merely a variant of the Truman Doctrine adapted to the conditions of postwar Europe. In bringing forward this plan, the United States Government apparently counted on the cooperation of the Governments of the United Kingdom and France to confront the European countries in need of relief with the necessity of renouncing their inalienable right to dispose of their economic resources and to plan their national economy in their own way. The United States also counted on making all these countries directly dependent on the interests of American monopolies, which are striving to avert the approaching depression by an accelerated export of commodities and capital to Europe.

It is becoming more and more evident to everyone that the implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and political control of the United States and direct interference by the latter in the internal affairs of those countries. Moreover, this plan is an attempt to split Europe into two camps and, with the help of the United Kingdom and France, to complete the formation of a bloc of several European countries hostile to the interests of the democratic countries of Eastern Europe and most particularly to the interests of the Soviet Union. An important feature of this Plan is the attempt to confront the - countries of Eastern Europe with a bloc of Western European States including Western Germany. The intention is to make use of Western Germany and German heavy industry (the Ruhr) as one of the most important economic bases for American expansion in Europe, in disregard of the national interests of the countries which suffered from German aggression.

(4) , newspaper published in the Soviet Union (13th March, 1947)

Commenting on Truman's message to Congress, the New York Times proclaims the advent of the "age of American responsibility". Yet what is this responsibility but a smokescreen for expansion? The cry of saving Greece and Turkey from the expansion of the so-called "totalitarian states" is not new. Hitler used to refer to the Bolsheviks when he wanted to open the road for his own conquests. Now they want to take Greece and Turkey under their control, they raise a din about "totalitarian states".

The free nations want peace. However, peace is not had merely by wanting it. Peace has to be worked for and planned for. Sometimes it is necessary to take risks to win peace just as it necessary in war to take risks to win victory. The chances for peace are usually bettered by letting a potential aggressor know in advance where his aggression could lead him.

(6) George Kennan, Foreign Affairs Journal (July, 1957)

It is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is clear that the United states cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena.

Communists shared power with other parties. The Communists called these states "peoples' democracies" to distinguish them from the Soviet-model "dictatorship of the proletariat" and many Communist parties actually changed their name. Today when much attention is focused on the question of independent paths to socialism, as advocated by Tito in Yugoslavia and Gomulka in Poland, it is often overlooked that such ideas were officially condoned by Moscow between 1944 and 1947.

One year after Churchill's speech at Fulton, however, the lines became sharply drawn. The Truman Doctrine was launched for Greece and Turkey and to "contain Communism" everywhere; the Communists were ousted from the national unity governments of France and Italy (which they did not strongly resist, evidently preferring to go into opposition). In reply, the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and of eight countries in Eastern and Western Europe set up the Communist Information Bureau, popularly called the Cominform. Coalition governments in Eastern Europe were broken up and the Communists proceeded to take over full power and establish "dictatorships of the proletariat." Against this background, American Communist Party policy became still more narrow and self-defeating. In opposing the cold war, we placed the entire blame on the Truman policy and we would not concede that any share in responsibility for the tensions could be attributed to the policies of Moscow and the Cominform. It is my opinion-which I know many readers will not share-that powerful, reactionary forces here at home were mainly respon¬sible for the cold war; they did not conceal their opposition to peaceful coexistence and their active hostility to socialism. What I could not bring myself to see in those days was the considerable responsibility on the part of Moscow as a result of wrong policies of Stalin (and if I ever saw it, I considered it my bounden duty not to say so).

As policy hardened in the international communist movement, the Foster group increased the pressure to make everyone toe the mark. The Daily Worker which reflected the coalition policies to which the Dennis group still tried to cling, was the target of attacks from Foster, Thompson and Davis.

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Henry Wallace, Secretary of Commerce, favoured co-operation with the Soviet Union. In private he disagreed with Harry S. Truman about what he considered to be an aggressive foreign policy. Wallace went public about his fears at a meeting in New York City in September, 1946. As a result, Truman sacked Wallace from his administration.

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Against the backdrop of today's debate about America's role in the world, it is striking to re-read the speech by Secretary of State George C. Marshall announcing the Marshall Plan on the 70 th anniversary of its delivery.

The Marshall Plan, which helped rebuild the economies of Western Europe after World War II, is often seen as the model for American global leadership. Seen from that perspective, it is perhaps a little surprising to see that Secretary Marshall makes not a selfless appeal to support a new global order, but a calculated appeal to Americans' self-interest, accompanied by a sophisticated series of short films to explain its benefits.

My favorite of these films is " Your Eighty Dollars," a 27 minute black and white film that explains to Americans the return on investment from the $80 per capita spent on the Marshall Plan.

The film highlights Marshall's 1947 speech, in which he declares the plan "directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

The film's narrator warns Americans of the threats they face in 1947 when many European countries were in ruins- literally and economically- after World War II. It stresses the peril of old democracies falling into debt, the threat of communism, the grim civil war in Greece, and the divided city of Berlin where the emerging Cold War strained nerves.

But it also highlights results. It shows the United States helping clear Sardinia of malaria so its land could be used for agricultural production for the first time. It highlights Europeans learning from the latest developments in American agriculture and industry. Showcasing hard-working Europeans rebuilding their factories with our assistance, the film declares the goal is not simply to return to past levels, but to build even more.

In an echo of today's political debate, Marshall emphasizes that the plan is not a unilateral imposition of American values: "It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans." The plan should be a "joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations" for "Europeans to help themselves."

It is also careful to emphasize that this not a handout from the United States. Europeans matched American aid dollar for dollar and paid cash for the goods we sent into counterpart funds. Surplus generated from increases in economic production were exported as a way of increasing their own economic growth even further and ending dependence on American aid.

And it highlights appreciation for American assistance. The French Minister for Economic Affairs Robert Buron speaks directly to the camera twice to thank Americans, saying "we are all committed to the limits of our capacity just as you in America are."

Decades later, it is also a little surprising to hear the film's narrator frankly acknowledge skepticism about American motives, showing a propaganda poster portraying the Marshall Plan and America as a colonizing octopus. It responds by emphasizing American sincerity- the Marshall Plan might have sounded like another speech, but the general "believed" it - and commitment, as the narrator insists that it became clear to Europeans that Americans would not stop "until the job was done."

The commitment to explain why rebuilding other countries benefited our own country stands out. Between 1948 and 1951, the United States provided $13.3 billion ($150 billion in 2017 dollars) to 16 European countries. The appropriation for 1949 alone totaled about 12% of the U.S. federal budget. 70 years later, many of these countries are among our strongest trading partners, while the United States spends less than 1% on foreign assistance.

This short film explaining how "your eighty dollars" made a difference after World II reminds us today that Americans have always needed to be convinced of the benefits from fighting poverty and building economies in other countries. We knew how to do this in the past, and we must continue to do so today: to share the story that American foreign assistance makes a difference, for Americans and for people around the world.

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"Your Eighty Dollars": The Marshall Plan 70 Years Later

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Against the backdrop of today's debate about America's role in the world, it is striking to re-read the speech by Secretary of State George C. Marshall announcing the Marshall Plan on the 70 th anniversary of its delivery.

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For nearly one year, Stalin cut the West Berlin enclave off from all land and river transit. The Allies responded with an airlift that supplied the population with over two million tons of freight.

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Article 5 is the cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and states that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all of its members. But despite its importance, NATO has only invoked Article 5 once in its history-in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

NATO and Article 5 were established in 1949 in the aftermath of World War II when communist movements supported by the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to democratically elected governments all over a devastated Europe. In 1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia overthrew that nation's democratic government, while in Germany, Soviet authorities blockaded the Allied-controlled section of Berlin in an attempt to strengthen their position there.

The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. and British planes carried food, fuel and other vital supplies to the isolated citizens of West Berlin, marked an early victory for the West in the Cold War. And with the launch of the Marshall Plan, which provided economic aid to the war-ravaged countries of Europe, the United States had decisively abandoned its earlier policy of isolationism.

But at such a vulnerable time, it seemed clear that Europe required not just economic aid, but also military support, in order to counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union, prevent the revival of nationalist military movements (such as Nazism) and allow for political development along democratic lines.
VIDEO: The Formation of NATO
Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in the formation of key alliances that would endure throughout the Cold War.

In April 1949, representatives from 12 nations-the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, Iceland, Italy and Portugal-gathered in Washington, D.C. to sign the North Atlantic Treaty.

"Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny," President Harry S. Truman declared at the signing ceremony. "They can choose slavery or freedom-war or peace...If there is anything certain today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and for peace."

The treaty's key provision was Article 5, which began: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all..." While this commitment to collective defense lay at the heart of NATO, it was left to the judgment of each member state to decide how exactly it would contribute.

On September 12, 2001, the day after the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center and Pentagon, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history, committing its members to stand by the United States in its response to the attacks. In a four-paragraph resolution that passed unanimously, the organization reflected its understanding that the threats to global security had changed radically in the 52 years since the alliance was founded.
AUDIO: NATO Offers Aid to United States Following 9/11 Attacks
On October 2, 2001, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson holds a press conference to discuss the events of September 11, and pledges support of the 18 NATO allies in the campaign against international terrorism.

"The commitment to collective self-defence embodied in the Washington Treaty was entered into in circumstances very different from those that exist now," the statement read. "But it remains no less valid and no less essential today, in a world subject to the scourge of international terrorism."

In addition to participation in the war in Afghanistan, NATO's response to the 9/11 attacks under Article 5 included Operation Eagle Assist, in which NATO aircraft helped patrol the skies over the United States for seven months between 2001 and 2002, and Operation Active Endeavour, in which NATO naval forces were sent to perform counterterrorism activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Operation Active Endeavour, which began in October 2001 and later expanded to the entire Mediterranean region, didn't conclude until 2016.

Though Article 5 has only been officially invoked once, NATO has taken collective defensive measures in other situations, including deploying missiles on the border of Turkey and Syria in 2012. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the rise of ISIS in recent years led the organization to implement a huge increase in its collective defenses, including tripling the size of the NATO Response Force. In 2014, NATO member states agreed to try and spend 2 percent of their GDPs on defense, although most member states fail to meet this non-binding goal.

President Trump has been highly critical of NATO, calling it "obsolete" and criticizing other NATO members for not spending enough on defense. But he also affirmed U.S. commitment to Article 5 in June 2017, during a news conference with the president of Romania: "I'm committing the United States to Article 5, and certainly we are there to protect, and certainly that's one of the reasons that I want people to make sure we have a very, very strong force by paying the kind of money necessary to have that force."

Despite this commitment, Trump appeared to question U.S. responsibility to defend the newest of NATO's 29 member states, under Article 5 during a Fox News interview in July 2018. In response to a question about whether US forces should respond if Montenegro were attacked, Trump said that the tiny nation's "very aggressive people" might end up drawing NATO's members into a war with Russia.

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Article 5 is the cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and states that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all of its members. But despite its importance, NATO has only invoked Article 5 once in its history-in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

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China watcher Graham Hutchings' latest book explores the people and events behind the Chinese civil war to reveal how and why the Communists won in 1949.

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1. The Presidency

2. Historical Moments

3. The Age of Eisenhower

McCarthyism and the Red Scare

In the end, President Eisenhower had no choice but to fight back against Senator Joseph McCarthy-and he did

Senator Joseph McCarthy

In the early 1950s, American leaders repeatedly told the public that they should be fearful of subversive Communist influence in their lives. Communists could be lurking anywhere, using their positions as school teachers, college professors, labor organizers, artists, or journalists to aid the program of world Communist domination. This paranoia about the internal Communist threat-what we call the Red Scare-reached a fever pitch between 1950 and 1954, when Senator Joe McCarthy of Wisconsin, a right-wing Republican, launched a series of highly publicized probes into alleged Communist penetration of the State Department, the White House, the Treasury, and even the US Army. During Eisenhower's first two years in office, McCarthy's shrieking denunciations and fear-mongering created a climate of fear and suspicion across the country. No one dared tangle with McCarthy for fear of being labeled disloyal.

Any man who has been named by a either a senator or a committee or a congressman as dangerous to the welfare of this nation, his name should be submitted to the various intelligence units, and they should conduct a complete check upon him. It's not too much to ask.
Senator Joseph McCarthy, 1953

It has long been a subject of debate among historians: Why didn't Eisenhower do more to confront McCarthy? Journalists, intellectuals, and even many of Eisenhower's friends and close advisers agonized over what they saw as Ike's timid approach to McCarthyism. Despite his popularity and his enormous political capital, they believed, Ike refused to engage directly with McCarthy. By avoiding the Red-hunting senator, some have argued, Eisenhower allowed McCarthyism to continue unchecked.

In this letter to his brother Milton, Eisenhower explains, "As for McCarthy. Only a short-sighted or completely inexperienced individual would urge the use of the office of the presidency to give an opponent the publicity he so avidly desires."

By contrast, later scholars working from the documentary record perceived a design in Eisenhower's strategy with McCarthy. Ike adopted an "indirect approach." Instead of going right at McCarthy, Eisenhower worked behind the scenes to undercut and stymie the senator and his attacks. The political scientist Fred Greenstein, for example, argued that Eisenhower's handling of McCarthy provides evidence of a "hidden hand" approach to government. In this interpretation, Ike rode above the fray of politics while secretly pulling levers and using White House influence to obstruct McCarthy and his allies.

President read my text with great irritation, slammed it back at me and said he would not refer to McCarthy personally-'I will not get in the gutter with that guy.'
C. D. Jackson, Eisenhower speechwriter, 1953

Late in his first presidential campaign, Eisenhower excised a defense of General George C. Marshall from a speech he gave in McCarthy's home state of Wisconsin. He addressed the issue more abstractly, stating, "The right to question a man's judgment carries with it no automatic right to question his honor."

Looking at all the evidence, the clearest conclusion is that Eisenhower did not want to confront Joe McCarthy at all. And during 1953, he tried to avoid the whole issue, hoping the Senate would silence the explosive senator. McCarthy was a Republican, after all, and many fellow senators supported him. Ike needed to keep his party unified to pass bills in other areas; battling McCarthy would only stir up a civil war inside the GOP.

Furthermore, Eisenhower did not want to appear "soft" on the problem of internal subversion. There had, after all, been real spies who penetrated into the State Department, notably Alger Hiss.

Alger Hiss

And Communist agents had stolen classified secrets from the wartime Manhattan Project that built the atomic bomb. When Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were condemned to die in the electric chair as punishment for their theft of atomic secrets, Eisenhower did not for a moment consider granting them clemency. On June 19, 1953, they were both put to death.

Eisenhower in 1953 improvised in dealing with McCarthy, at first trying to ignore him, then trying to outdo him in the Red-hunting business. Then he tried to seduce him with promises of new legislation to destroy Communism in America. None of these tactics worked.
'The Age of Eisenhower,' chapter 6

The first two paragraphs of the March 13, 1954 New York Times story on McCarthy, Cohn, and David Schine

But at the start of 1954, the picture changed. Joe McCarthy turned his investigatory resources on the US Army and on members of the administration itself. Eisenhower had no choice but to fight back. The first move the White House made was to try to discredit the men around McCarthy, notably the lawyer Roy Cohn, who was leading the investigation, and Cohn's assistant David Schine, who had recently been drafted into the Army.

The Army compiled a damaging dossier of dirt on Cohn, showing that he used threats and intimidation to demand that Schine be given plum assignments and easy duty. The White House leaked this dossier to the press and Congress. McCarthy and Cohn now stood accused of abuse of power.

A 2003 report from NBC News reviewed newly released documents related to the McCarthy hearings

Ike went one step further. In order to close down McCarthy's reckless use of subpoenas to compel witnesses to testify before his committee, Eisenhower invoked executive privilege.

In this May 17, 1954 memo to the Secretary of Defense, Eisenhower ordered, "You will instruct employees of your Department that in all of their appearances before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Operations regarding the inquiry now before it, they are not to testify to any such conversations or communications or to produce any such documents or reproductions. This principle must be maintained regardless of who would be benefitted by such disclosures."

In May 1954, Ike simply said that administration officials and all executive branch employees would ignore any call from McCarthy to testify. Eisenhower explained his action, declaring that "it is essential to efficient and effective administration that employees of the executive branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising with each other on official matters," without those conversations being subject to Congressional scrutiny.

It was a bold and daring move, and it worked. McCarthy, his credibility in tatters and now starved of witnesses, hit a brick wall-and his fellow senators turned against him. In early December 1954, the Senate passed a motion of condemnation, in a vote of 67 to 22. McCarthy was ruined-and within three years he was dead from alcohol abuse. The era of McCarthyism was over. Ike had helped bring it to a bitter end.

Senate Resolution 301 censured McCarthy for conduct that "tends to bring the Senate into disrepute"

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McCarthyism and the Red Scare | Miller Center

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The paranoia about the internal Communist threat-what we call the Red Scare-reached a fever pitch between 1950 and 1954, when Senator Joe McCarthy of Wisconsin, a right-wing Republican, launched a series of highly publicized probes. Journalists, intellectuals, and even many of Eisenhower's friends and close advisers agonized over what they saw as Ike's timid approach to McCarthyism.

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Polish Art Center - Postcard: Plac Konstytucji 1955 Warsaw - Life in the PRL (Polish People's Republic) Historical Photo Series

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Constitution Square, Warsaw 1955. Historical Black and White Photo Postcard by Boleslaw Miedza.

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While the World Wide Web was initially invented by one person (see: What was the First Website?), the genesis of the internet itself was a group effort by numerous individuals, sometimes working in concert, and other times independently. Its birth takes us back to the extremely competitive technological contest between the US and the USSR during the Cold War.

The Soviet Union sent the satellite Sputnik 1 into space on October 4, 1957. Partially in response, the American government created in 1958 the Advanced Research Project Agency, known today as DARPA-Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The agency's specific mission was to

...prevent technological surprises like the launch of Sputnik, which signaled that the Soviets had beaten the U.S. into space. The mission statement has evolved over time. Today, DARPA's mission is still to prevent technological surprise to the US, but also to create technological surprise for our enemies.

To coordinate such efforts, a rapid way to exchange data between various universities and laboratories was needed. This bring us to J. C. R. Licklider who is largely responsible for the theoretical basis of the Internet, an "Intergalactic Computer Network." His idea was to create a network where many different computer systems would be interconnected to one another to quickly exchange data, rather than have individual systems setup, each one connecting to some other individual system.

He thought up the idea after having to deal with three separate systems connecting to computers in Santa Monica, the University of California, Berkeley, and a system at MIT:

For each of these three terminals, I had three different sets of user commands. So if I was talking online with someone at S.D.C. and I wanted to talk to someone I knew at Berkeley or M.I.T. about this, I had to get up from the S.D.C. terminal, go over and log into the other terminal and get in touch with them.... I said, oh man, it's obvious what to do: If you have these three terminals, there ought to be one terminal that goes anywhere you want to go where you have interactive computing. That idea is the ARPAnet."

So, yes, the idea for the internet as we know it partially came about because of the seemingly universal human desire to not have to get up and move to another location.

With the threat of a nuclear war, it was necessary to decentralize such a system, so that even if one node was destroyed, there would still be communication between all the other computers. The American engineer Paul Baran provided the solution to this issue; he designed a decentralized network that also used packet switching as a means for sending and receiving data.

Sputnik 1

Many others also contributed to the development of an efficient packet switching system, including Leonard Kleinrock and Donald Davies. If you're not familiar, "packet switching" is basically just a method of breaking down all transmitted data-regardless of content, type, or structure-into suitably sized blocks, called packets. So, for instance, if you wanted to access a large file from another system, when you attempted to download it, rather than the entire file being sent in one stream, which would require a constant connection for the duration of the download, it would get broken down into small packets of data, with each packet being individually sent, perhaps taking different paths through the network. The system that downloads the file would then re-assemble the packets back into the original full file.

The platform mentioned above by Licklider, ARPANET was based on these ideas and was the principle precursor to the Internet as we think of it today. It was installed and operated for the first time in 1969 with four nodes, which were located at the University of California at Santa Barbara, the University of California at Los Angeles, SRI at Stanford University, and the University of Utah.

The first use of this network took place on October 29, 1969 at 10:30 pm and was a communication between UCLA and the Stanford Research Institute. As recounted by the aforementioned Leonard Kleinrock, this momentous communiqué went like this:

We set up a telephone connection between us and the guys at SRI... We typed the L and we asked on the phone,
"Do you see the L?"

"Yes, we see the L," came the response.

We typed the O, and we asked, "Do you see the O."

"Yes, we see the O."

Then we typed the G, and the system crashed... Yet a revolution had begun.

By 1972, the number of computers that were connected to ARPANET had reached twenty-three and it was at this time that the term electronic mail (email) was first used, when a computer scientist named Ray Tomlinson implemented an email system in ARPANET using the "@" symbol to differentiate the sender's name and network name in the email address.

Alongside these developments, engineers created more networks, which used different protocols such as X.25 and UUCP. The original protocol for communication used by the ARPANET was the NCP (Network Control Protocol). The need for a protocol that would unite all the many networks was needed.

In 1974, after many failed attempts, a paper published by Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn, also known as "the fathers of the Internet," resulted in the protocol TCP (Transmission Control Protocol), which by 1978 would become TCP/IP (with the IP standing for Internet Protocol). At a high level, TCP/IP is essentially just a relatively efficient system for making sure the packets of data are sent and ultimately received where they need to go, and in turn assembled in the proper order so that the downloaded data mirrors the original file. So, for instance, if a packet is lost in transmission, TCP is the system that detects this and makes sure the missing packet(s) get re-sent and are successfully received. Developers of applications can then use this system without having to worry about exactly how the underlying network communication works.

On January 1, 1983, "flag day," TCP/IP would become the exclusive communication protocol for ARPANET.

Also in 1983, Paul Mockapetris proposed a distributed database of internet name and address pairs, now known as the Domain Name System (DNS). This is essentially a distributed "phone book" linking a domain's name to its IP address, allowing you to type in something like todayifoundout.com, instead of the IP address of the website. The distributed version of this system allowed for a decentralized approach to this "phone book." Previous to this, a central HOSTS.TXT file was maintained at Stanford Research Institute that then could be downloaded and used by other systems. Of course, even by 1983, this was becoming a problem to maintain and there was a growing need for a decentralized approach.

This brings us to 1989 when Tim Berners-Lee of CERN (European Organization for Nuclear Research) developed a system for distributing information on the Internet and named it the World Wide Web.

What made this system unique from existing systems of the day was the marriage of the hypertext system (linked pages) with the internet; particularly the marriage of one directional links that didn't require any action by the owner of the destination page to make it work as with bi-directional hypertext systems of the day. It also provided for relatively simple implementations of web servers and web browsers and was a completely open platform making it so anyone could contribute and develop their own such systems without paying any royalties. In the process of doing all this, Berners-Lee developed the URL format, hypertext markup language (HTML), and the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).

Around this same time, one of the most popular alternatives to the web, the Gopher system, announced it would no longer be free to use, effectively killing it with many switching to the World Wide Web. Today, the web is so popular that many people often think of it as the internet, even though this isn't the case at all.

Also around the time the World Wide Web was being created, the restrictions on commercial use of the internet were gradually being removed, which was another key element in the ultimate success of this network.

Next up, in 1993, Marc Andreessen led a team that developed a browser for the World Wide Web, named Mosaic. This was a graphical browser developed via funding through a U.S. government initiative, specifically the "High Performance Computing and Communications Act of 1991.″

This act was partially what Al Gore was referring to when he said he "took the initiative in creating the Internet." All political rhetoric aside (and there was much on both sides concerning this statement), as one of the "fathers of the internet," Vincent Cerf said, "The Internet would not be where it is in the United States without the strong support given to it and related research areas by the Vice President [Al Gore] in his current role and in his earlier role as Senator... As far back as the 1970s, Congressman Gore promoted the idea of high speed telecommunications as an engine for both economic growth and the improvement of our educational system. He was the first elected official to grasp the potential of computer communications to have a broader impact than just improving the conduct of science and scholarship... His initiatives led directly to the commercialization of the Internet. So he really does deserve credit." (For more on this controversy, see: Did Al Gore Really Say He Invented the Internet?)

As for Mosaic, it was not the first web browser, as you'll sometimes read, simply one of the most successful until Netscape came around (which was developed by many of those who previously worked on Mosaic). The first ever web browser, called WorldWideWeb, was created by Berners-Lee. This browser had a nice graphical user interface; allowed for multiple fonts and font sizes; allowed for downloading and displaying images, sounds, animations, movies, etc.; and had the ability to let users edit the web pages being viewed in order to promote collaboration of information. However, this browser only ran on NeXT Step's OS, which most people didn't have because of the extreme high cost of these systems. (This company was owned by Steve Jobs, so you can imagine the cost bloat... ;-))

In order to provide a browser anyone could use, the next browser Berners-Lee developed was much simpler and, thus, versions of it could be quickly developed to be able to run on just about any computer, for the most part regardless of processing power or operating system. It was a bare-bones inline browser (command line / text only), which didn't have most of the features of his original browser.

Mosaic essentially reintroduced some of the nicer features found in Berners-Lee's original browser, giving people a graphic interface to work with. It also included the ability to view web pages with inline images (instead of in separate windows as other browsers at the time). What really distinguished it from other such graphical browsers, though, was that it was easy for everyday users to install and use. The creators also offered 24 hour phone support to help people get it setup and working on their respective systems.

And the rest, as they say, is history.

Bonus Internet Facts:

The first domain ever registered was Symbolics.com on March 15, 1985. It was registered by the Symbolics Computer Corp.

The "//" forward slashes in any web address serve no real purpose according to Berners-Lee. He only put them in because, "It seemed like a good idea at the time." He wanted a way to separate the part the web server needed to know about, for instance "www.todayifoundout.com", from the other stuff which is more service oriented. Basically, he didn't want to have to worry about knowing what service the particular website was using at a particular link when creating a link in a web page. "//" seemed natural, as it would to anyone who's used Unix based systems. In retrospect though, this was not at all necessary, so the "//" are essentially pointless.

Berners-Lee chose the "#" for separating the main part of a document's url with the portion that tells what part of the page to go to, because in the United States and some other countries, if you want to specify an address of an individual apartment or suite in a building, you classically precede the suite or apartment number with a "#". So the structure is "street name and number #suite number"; thus "page url #location in page".

Berners-Lee chose the name "World Wide Web" because he wanted to emphasize that, in this global hypertext system, anything could link to anything else. Alternative names he considered were: "Mine of Information" (Moi); "The Information Mine" (Tim); and "Information Mesh" (which was discarded as it looked too much like "Information Mess").

Pronouncing "www" as individual letters "double-u double-u double-u" takes three times as many syllables as simply saying "World Wide Web."

Most web addresses begin with "www" because of the traditional practice of naming a server according to the service it provides. So outside of this practice, there is no real reason for any website URL to put a "www" before the domain name; the administrators of whatever website can set it to put anything they want preceding the domain or nothing at all. This is why, as time goes on, more and more websites have adopted allowing only putting the domain name itself and assuming the user wants to access the web service instead of some other service the machine itself may provide. Thus, the web has more or less become the "default" service (generally on port 80) on most service hosting machines on the internet.

The earliest documented commercial spam message on an internet is often incorrectly cited as the 1994 "Green Card Spam" incident. However, the actual first documented commercial spam message was for a new model of Digital Equipment Corporation computers and was sent on ARPANET to 393 recipients by Gary Thuerk in 1978.

The famed Green Card Spam incident was sent April 12, 1994 by a husband and wife team of lawyers, Laurance Canter and Martha Siegal. They bulk posted, on Usenet newsgroups, advertisements for immigration law services. The two defended their actions citing freedom of speech rights. They also later wrote a book titled "How to Make a Fortune on the Information Superhighway", which encouraged and demonstrated to people how to quickly and freely reach over 30 million users on the Internet by spamming.

Though not called spam, back then, telegraphic spam messages were extremely common in the 19th century in the United States particularly. Western Union allowed telegraphic messages on its network to be sent to multiple destinations. Thus, wealthy American residents tended to get numerous spam messages through telegrams presenting unsolicited investment offers and the like. This wasn't nearly as much of a problem in Europe due to the fact that telegraphy was regulated by post offices in Europe.

The word "internet" was used as early as 1883 as a verb and adjective to refer to interconnected motions, but almost a century later, in 1982, the term would, of course, be used to describe a worldwide network of fully interconnected TCP/IP networks.

In 1988, the very first massive computer virus in history called "The Internet Worm" was responsible for more than 10 percent of the world's Internet servers shutting down temporarily.

The term "virus," as referring to self-replicating computer programs, was coined by Frederick Cohen who was a student at California's School of Engineering. He wrote such a program for a class. This "virus" was a parasitic application that would seize control of the computer and replicate itself on the machine. He then specifically described his "computer virus" as: "a program that can 'infect' other programs by modifying them to include a possibly evolved copy of itself." Cohen went on to be one of the first people to outline proper virus defense techniques. He also demonstrated in 1987 that no algorithm could ever detect all possible viruses.

Though it wasn't called such at the time, one of the first ever computer viruses was called "Creeper" and was written by Bob Thomas in 1971. He wrote this virus to demonstrate the potential of such "mobile" computer programs. The virus itself wasn't destructive and simply printed the message "I'm the creeper, catch me if you can!" Creeper spread about on ARPANET. It worked by finding open connections and transferring itself to other machines. It would also attempt to remove itself from the machine that it was just on, if it could, to further be non-intrusive. The Creeper was ultimately "caught" by a program called "the reaper" which was designed to find and remove any instances of the creeper out there.

While terms like "Computer Worm" and "Computer Virus" are fairly commonly known, one less commonly heard term is "Computer Wabbit." This is a program that is self-replicating, like a computer virus, but does not infect any host programs or files. The wabbits simply multiply themselves continually until eventually causing the system to crash from lack of resources. The term "wabbit" itself references how rabbits breed incredibly quickly and can take over an area until the environment can no longer sustain them. Pronouncing it "wabbit" is thought to be in homage to Elmer Fudd's pronunciation of "rabbit."

Computer viruses/worms don't inherently have to be bad for your system. Some viruses are designed to improve your system as they infect it. For instance, as noted previously, the Reeper, which was designed to go out and destroy all instances of the Creeper it found. Another virus designed by Cohen would spread itself on a system to all executable files. Rather than harm them though, it would simply safely compress them, freeing up storage space.

Al Gore was one of the so called "Atari Democrats." These were a group of Democrats that had a "passion for technological issues, from biomedical research and genetic engineering to the environmental impact of the greenhouse effect." They basically argued that supporting development of various new technologies would stimulate the economy and create a lot of new jobs. Their primary obstacle in political circles, which are primarily made up of a lot of "old fogies," was simply trying to explain a lot of the various new technologies, in terms of why they were important, to try to get support from fellow politicians for these things.

Gore was also largely responsible for the "Information Superhighway" term becoming popular in the 1990s. The first time he used the term publicly was way back in 1978 at a meeting of computer industry workers. Originally, this term didn't mean the World Wide Web. Rather, it meant a system like the Internet. However, with the popularity of the World Wide Web, the three terms became synonymous with one another. In that speech, Gore used the term "Information Superhighway" to be analogous with Interstate Highways, referencing how they stimulated the economy after the passing of the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956. That bill was introduced by Al Gore's father. It created a boom in the housing market; an increase in how mobile citizens were; and a subsequent boom in new businesses and the like along the highways. Gore felt that an "information superhighway" would have a similar positive economic effect.

More from Today I Found Out

This article originally appeared at Today I Found Out. Copyright 2015. Like Today I Found Out on Facebook.

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The Soviets' 1957 launch of Sputnik (sort of) inspired the creation of the Internet

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While the World Wide Web was initially invented by one person (see: What was the First Website?), the genesis of the internet itself was a group effort by numerous individuals, sometimes working in concert, and other times independently. Its birth takes us back to the extremely competitive technological contest between the US and the USSR during the Cold War.

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In the final days of 1958, ragged rebels began the process of driving out forces loyal to Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. By New Year's Day 1959, the nation was theirs, and Fidel Castro, Ché Guevara, Raúl Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos, and their companions rode triumphantly into Havana and history, but the revolution had begun long before. The eventual rebel triumph came only after many years of hardship, propaganda campaigns, and guerrilla warfare.

Batista Seizes Power

The seeds of the revolution were sown when former Army Sergeant Fulgencio Batista seized power during a hotly contested election. When it became clear that Batista-who had been president from 1940 to 1944-would not win the 1952 election, he seized power prior to the voting and canceled the elections outright. Many people in Cuba were disgusted by his power grab, preferring Cuba's democracy, as flawed as it was. One such person was rising political star Fidel Castro, who would likely have won a seat in Congress had the 1952 elections taken place. Castro immediately began plotting Batista's downfall.

Assault on Moncada

On the morning of July 26, 1953, Castro made his move. For a revolution to succeed, he needed weapons, and he selected the isolated Moncada barracks as his target. The compound was attacked at dawn by 138 men. It was hoped that the element of surprise would make up for the rebels' lack of numbers and arms. The attack was a fiasco almost from the start, and the rebels were routed after a firefight that lasted a few hours. Many were captured. Nineteen federal soldiers were killed; those remaining took out their anger on captured rebels, and most of them were shot. Fidel and Raul Castro escaped but were later captured.

'History Will Absolve Me'

The Castros and surviving rebels were put on public trial. Fidel, a trained lawyer, turned the tables on the Batista dictatorship by making the trial about the power grab. Basically, his argument was that as a loyal Cuban, he had taken up arms against the dictatorship because it was his civic duty. He made long speeches and the government belatedly tried to shut him up by claiming he was too ill to attend his own trial. His most famous quote from the trial was, "History will absolve me." He was sentenced to 15 years in prison but had become a nationally recognized figure and a hero to many poor Cubans.

Mexico and the Granma

In May 1955, the Batista government, bending to international pressure to reform, released many political prisoners, including those who had taken part in the Moncada assault. Fidel and Raul Castro went to Mexico to regroup and plan the next step in the revolution. There they met up with many disaffected Cuban exiles who joined the new "26th of July Movement," named after the date of the Moncada assault. Among the new recruits were charismatic Cuban exile Camilo Cienfuegos and Argentine doctor Ernesto "Ché" Guevara. In November 1956, 82 men crowded onto the tiny yacht Granma and set sail to Cuba and revolution.

In the Highlands

Batista's men had gotten wind of the returning rebels and ambushed them. Fidel and Raul made it into the wooded central highlands with only a handful of survivors from Mexico-Cienfuegos and Guevara among them. In the impenetrable highlands, the rebels regrouped, attracting new members, collecting weapons, and staging guerrilla attacks on military targets. Try as he might, Batista could not root them out. The leaders of the revolution permitted foreign journalists to visit and interviews with them were published around the world.

The Movement Gains Strength

As the July 26th Movement gained power in the mountains, other rebel groups took up the fight as well. In the cities, rebel groups loosely allied with Castro carried out hit-and-run attacks and nearly succeeded in assassinating Batista. Batista boldly decided to send a large portion of his army into the highlands in the summer of 1958 to try and flush out Castro once and for all-but the move backfired. The nimble rebels carried out guerrilla attacks on the soldiers, many of whom switched sides or deserted. By the end of 1958, Castro was ready to deliver the coup de grâce.

Castro Tightens the Noose

In late 1958, Castro divided his forces, sending Cienfuegos and Guevara into the plains with small armies; Castro followed them with the remaining rebels. The rebels captured towns and villages along the way, where they were greeted as liberators. Cienfuegos captured the small garrison at Yaguajay on December 30. Defying the odds, Guevara and 300 weary rebels defeated a much larger force at the city of Santa Clara in a siege that lasted from December 28-30, capturing valuable munitions in the process. Meanwhile, government officials were negotiating with Castro, trying to salvage the situation and halt the bloodshed.

Victory for the Revolution

Batista and his inner circle, seeing that Castro's victory was inevitable, took what loot they could gather up and fled. Batista authorized some of his subordinates to deal with Castro and the rebels. The people of Cuba took to the streets, joyfully greeting the rebels. Cienfuegos and Guevara and their men entered Havana on January 2, 1959, and disarmed the remaining military installations. Castro made his way into Havana slowly, pausing in every town, city, and village along the way to give speeches to the cheering crowds, finally entering Havana on January 9, 1959.

Aftermath and Legacy

The Castro brothers quickly consolidated their power, sweeping away all remnants of the Batista regime and muscling out all of the rival rebel groups that had aided them in their rise to power. Raul Castro and Ché Guevara were put in charge of organizing squads to round up the Batista-era "war criminals" who'd engaged in torture and murder under the old regime in order to bring them to trial and execution.

Although Castro initially positioned himself as a nationalist, he soon gravitated toward communism and openly courted the leaders of the Soviet Union. Communist Cuba would be a thorn in the side of the United States for decades, triggering international incidents such as the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States imposed a trade embargo in 1962 that led to years of hardship for the Cuban people.

Under Castro, Cuba has become a player on the international stage. The prime example is its intervention in Angola: thousands of Cuban troops were sent there in the 1970s to support a leftist movement. The Cuban revolution inspired revolutionaries throughout Latin America as idealistic young men and women took up arms to try and change hated governments for new ones. The results were mixed.

In Nicaragua, rebel Sandinistas eventually did overthrow the government and come to power. In the southern part of South America, the upswing in Marxist revolutionary groups such as Chile's MIR and Uruguay's Tupamaros led to right-wing military governments seizing power (Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet is a prime example). Working together through Operation Condor, these repressive governments waged a war of terror on their own citizens. The Marxist rebellions were stamped out, however, many innocent civilians died as well.

Cuba and the United States, meanwhile, maintained an antagonistic relationship well into the first decade of the 21st century. Waves of migrants fled the island nation over the years, transforming the ethnic makeup of Miami and South Florida. In 1980 alone, more than 125,000 Cubans fled in makeshift boats in what came to be known as the Mariel Boatlift.

After Fidel

In 2008, the aging Fidel Castro stepped down as president of Cuba, installing his brother Raul in his stead. During the next five years, the government gradually loosened its tight restrictions on foreign travel and also began allowing some private economic activity among its citizens. The U.S. also began to engage Cuba under the direction of President Barack Obama, and by 2015 announced that the long-standing embargo would gradually be loosened.

The announcement resulted in a surge of travel from the U.S. to Cuba and more cultural exchanges between the two nations. However, with the election of Donald Trump as president in 2016, the relationship between the two countries is in flux. Fidel Castro died on November 25, 2016. Raúl Castro announced municipal elections for October 2017, and Cuba's National Assembly officially confirmed Miguel Díaz-Canel as Cuba's new head of state.

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Essential Facts About the Cuban Revolution

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Learn about Fidel Castro, Ché Guevara, and the other leaders of the Cuban revolution, and discover how the island has changed since the 1950s revolt.

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John F. Kennedy Election - JFK Campaign Photos

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In 1960 Sen. John F. Kennedy, 43, captured the Democratic presidential nomination despite his youth, his perceived lack of foreign policy experience and his Catholic faith.

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Bay of Pigs Invasion

Part of the Cold War

Counter-attack by Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces near Playa Girón, 19 April 1961

Belligerents

Cuba

Commanders and leaders

Units involved

U.S. Navy

Strength

1,500 ground forces[b]

16 B-26 bombers

8 C-46 transport planes.

6 C-54 transport planes.

5 M41 tanks, plus artillery, mortars, jeeps and trucks

5 supply ships

Casualties and losses

Cuban Armed Forces:

176 killed

400 - 500 wounded[c]

National Militia:

2,000 killed and wounded[vague ]

1 B-26 bomber shot down

1 Hawker Sea Fury shot down

unknown number of T-34 tanks and SU-100 guns destroyed

Brigade 2506:

118 killed

360 wounded[d]

1,202 captured (including wounded)[e]

Hundreds executed[6]

5 B-26 bombers shot down

United States:

4 killed

2 B-26 bombers shot down

2 supply ships lost

The Bay of Pigs Invasion ( Spanish: invasión de bahía de Cochinos; sometimes called invasión de playa Girón or batalla de Girón, after the Playa Girón) was a failed landing operation on the southwestern coast of Cuba in 1961 by Cuban exiles who opposed Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolution, covertly financed and directed by the U.S. government. The operation took place at the height of the Cold War, and its failure led to major shifts in international relations among Cuba, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

In 1952, American ally General Fulgencio Batista led a coup against President Carlos Prío and forced Prío into exile in Miami, Florida. Prío's exile inspired the creation of the 26th of July Movement against Batista by Castro. The movement successfully completed the Cuban Revolution in December 1958. Castro nationalized American businesses-including banks, oil refineries, and sugar and coffee plantations-then severed Cuba's formerly close relations with the United States and reached out to its Cold War rival, the Soviet Union. In response, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower allocated $13.1 million to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in March 1960, for use against Castro. With the aid of Cuban counter-revolutionaries, the CIA proceeded to organize an invasion operation.

After Castro's victory, Cuban exiles who had traveled to the U.S. had formed the counter-revolutionary military unit Brigade 2506. The brigade fronted the armed wing of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (DRF), and its purpose was to overthrow Castro's government. The CIA funded the brigade, which also included some U.S. military personnel, and trained the unit in Guatemala.

Over 1,400 paramilitaries, divided into five infantry battalions and one paratrooper battalion, assembled and launched from Guatemala and Nicaragua by boat on 17 April 1961. Two days earlier, eight CIA-supplied B-26 bombers had attacked Cuban airfields and then returned to the U.S. On the night of 17 April, the main invasion force landed on the beach at Playa Girón in the Bay of Pigs, where it overwhelmed a local revolutionary militia. Initially, José Ramón Fernández led the Cuban Army counter-offensive; later, Castro took personal control. As the invaders lost the strategic initiative, the international community found out about the invasion, and U.S. President John F. Kennedy decided to withhold further air support. The plan devised during Eisenhower's presidency had required involvement of both air and naval forces. Without air support, the invasion was being conducted with fewer forces than the CIA had deemed necessary. The invading force was defeated within three days by the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias - FAR) and the invaders surrendered on 20 April. Most of the invading counter-revolutionary troops were publicly interrogated and put into Cuban prisons.

The invasion was a U.S. foreign policy failure. The invasion's defeat solidified Castro's role as a national hero and widened the political division between the two formerly-allied countries. It also pushed Cuba closer to the Soviet Union, setting the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

Since the middle of the 18th century, Cuba had been part of the Spanish colonial empire. In the late 19th century, Cuban nationalist revolutionaries rebelled against Spanish dominance, resulting in three liberation wars: the Ten Years' War (1868-1878), the Little War (1879-1880) and the Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898). In 1898, the United States government proclaimed war on the Spanish Empire, resulting in the Spanish-American War. The U.S. subsequently invaded the island and forced the Spanish army out. Of note, a special operations attempt to land a group of at least 375 Cuban soldiers on the island succeeded in the Battle of Tayacoba. On 20 May 1902, a new independent government proclaimed the foundation of the Republic of Cuba, with U.S. Military Governor Leonard Wood handing over control to President Tomás Estrada Palma, a Cuban-born U.S. citizen. Subsequently, large numbers of U.S. settlers and businessmen arrived in Cuba, and by 1905, 60% of rural properties were owned by non-Cuban-born North American citizens. Between 1906 and 1909, 5,000 U.S. Marines were stationed across the island, and returned in 1912, 1917 and 1921 to intervene in internal affairs, sometimes at the behest of the Cuban government.

Until Castro, the US was so overwhelmingly influential in Cuba that the American ambassador was the second most important man, sometimes even more important than the Cuban president.

- Earl E. T. Smith, former American Ambassador to Cuba, during 1960 testimony to the US Senate

In March 1952, a Cuban general and politician, Fulgencio Batista, seized power on the island, proclaimed himself president, and deposed the discredited president Carlos Prío Socarrás of the Partido Auténtico. Batista canceled the planned presidential elections and described his new system as "disciplined democracy." Although Batista gained some popular support, many Cubans saw it as the establishment of a one-man dictatorship. Many opponents of the Batista regime took to armed rebellion in an attempt to oust the government, sparking the Cuban Revolution. One of these groups was the National Revolutionary Movement ( Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario), a militant organization containing largely middle-class members that had been founded by the Professor of Philosophy Rafael García Bárcena. Another was the Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil, which had been founded by the Federation of University Students President José Antonio Echevarría. However, the best known of these anti-Batista groups was the " 26th of July Movement" (MR-26-7), founded by Fidel Castro. With Castro as the MR-26-7's head, the organization was based upon a clandestine cell system, with each cell containing ten members, none of whom knew the whereabouts or activities of the other cells.

Between December 1956 and 1959, Castro led a guerrilla army against the forces of Batista from his base camp in the Sierra Maestra mountains. Batista's repression of revolutionaries had earned him widespread unpopularity, and by 1958 his armies were in retreat. On 31 December 1958, Batista resigned and fled into exile, taking with him an amassed fortune of more than US$300,000,000. The presidency fell to Castro's chosen candidate, the lawyer Manuel Urrutia Lleó, while members of the MR-26-7 took control of most positions in the cabinet. On 16 February 1959, Castro took on the role of Prime Minister. Dismissing the need for elections, Castro proclaimed the new administration an example of direct democracy, in which the Cuban populace could assemble en masse at demonstrations and express their democratic will to him personally. Critics instead condemned the new regime as undemocratic.

Soon after the success of the Cuban Revolution, militant counter-revolutionary groups developed in an attempt to overthrow the new regime. Undertaking armed attacks against government forces, some set up guerrilla bases in Cuba's mountainous regions, leading to the six-year Escambray Rebellion. These dissidents were funded and armed by various foreign sources, including the exiled Cuban community, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Rafael Trujillo's regime in the Dominican Republic. No quarter was given during the suppression of the resistance in the Escambray Mountains, where former rebels from the war against Batista took different sides. On 3 April 1961, a bomb attack on militia barracks in Bayamo killed four militia and wounded eight more. On 6 April, the Hershey Sugar factory in Matanzas was destroyed by sabotage. On 14 April 1961, guerrillas led by Agapito Rivera fought Cuban government forces in Villa Clara Province, where several government troops were killed and others wounded. Also on 14 April 1961, a Cubana airliner was hijacked and flown to Jacksonville, Florida; resultant confusion then helped the staged 'defection' of a B-26 and pilot at Miami on 15 April.

Castro's government began a crackdown on this opposition movement, arresting hundreds of dissidents. Though it rejected the physical torture Batista's regime had used, Castro's government sanctioned psychological torture, subjecting some prisoners to solitary confinement, rough treatment, hunger, and threatening behavior. After conservative editors and journalists began expressing hostility towards the government following its leftward turn, the pro-Castro printers' trade union began to harass and disrupt editorial staff actions. In January 1960, the government proclaimed that each newspaper was obliged to publish a "clarification" by the printers' union at the end of every article that criticized the government. These "clarifications" signaled the start of press censorship in Castro's Cuba.

Popular uproar across Cuba demanded that those figures who had been complicit in the widespread torture and killing of civilians be brought to justice. Although he remained a moderating force and tried to prevent the mass reprisal killings of Batistanos advocated by many Cubans, Castro helped to set up trials of many figures involved in the old regime across the country, resulting in hundreds of executions. Critics, in particular from the U.S. press, argued that many of these did not meet the standards of a fair trial, and condemned Cuba's new government as being more interested in vengeance than justice. Castro retaliated strongly against such accusations, proclaiming that "revolutionary justice is not based on legal precepts, but on moral conviction." In a show of support for this "revolutionary justice," he organized the first Havana trial to take place before a mass audience of 17,000 at the Sports Palace stadium. When a group of aviators accused of bombing a village was found not guilty, he ordered a retrial, in which they were instead found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. On 11 March 1961, Jesús Carreras Zayas and American William Alexander Morgan (a former Castro ally) were executed after a trial.

Castro's Cuban government ordered the country's oil refineries - then controlled by U.S. corporations Esso, Standard Oil and Shell - to process crude oil purchased from the Soviet Union, but under pressure from the U.S. government, these companies refused. Castro responded by expropriating the refineries and nationalizing them under state control. In retaliation, the U.S. canceled its import of Cuban sugar, provoking Castro to nationalize most U.S.-owned assets, including banks and sugar mills. Relations between Cuba and the U.S. were further strained following the explosion and sinking of a French vessel, the , in Havana Harbor in March 1960. The cause of the explosion was never determined, but Castro publicly mentioned that the U.S. government was guilty of sabotage. On 13 October 1960, the U.S. government then prohibited the majority of exports to Cuba - the exceptions being medicines and certain foodstuffs - marking the start of an economic embargo. In retaliation, the Cuban National Institute for Agrarian Reform took control of 383 private-run businesses on 14 October, and on 25 October a further 166 U.S. companies operating in Cuba had their premises seized and nationalized, including Coca-Cola and Sears Roebuck. On 16 December, the U.S. ended its import quota of Cuban sugar.

The U.S. government was becoming increasingly critical of Castro's revolutionary government. At an August 1960 meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) held in Costa Rica, U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter publicly proclaimed that Castro's administration was "following faithfully the Bolshevik pattern" by instituting a single-party political system, taking governmental control of trade unions, suppressing civil liberties, and removing both the freedom of speech and freedom of the press. He furthermore asserted that international communism was using Cuba as an "operational base" for spreading revolution in the western hemisphere, and called on other OAS members to condemn the Cuban government for its breach of human rights. In turn, Castro lambasted the treatment of black people and the working classes he had witnessed in New York City, which he ridiculed as that "superfree, superdemocratic, superhumane, and supercivilized city." Proclaiming that the U.S. poor were living "in the bowels of the imperialist monster," he attacked the mainstream U.S. media and accused it of being controlled by big business. Superficially the U.S. was trying to improve its relationship with Cuba. Several negotiations between representatives from Cuba and the U.S. took place around this time. Repairing international financial relations was the focal point of these discussions. Political relations were another hot topic of these conferences. The U.S. stated that they would not interfere with Cuba's domestic affairs but that the island should limit its ties with the Soviet Union.

Tensions percolated when the CIA began to act on its desires to snuff out Castro. Efforts to assassinate Castro officially commenced in 1960, though the general public did not become aware of them until 1975, when the Senate Church Committee, set up to investigate CIA abuses, released a report entitled "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders". Some methods that the CIA undertook to assassinate Castro were creative, for example: "poison pills, an exploding seashell, and a planned gift of a diving suit contaminated with toxins." More traditional ways of assassinating Castro were also planned, such as elimination via high-powered rifles with telescopic sights.

In August 1960, the CIA contacted the Cosa Nostra in Chicago with the intention to draft a simultaneous assassination of Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro and Che Guevara. In exchange, if the operation were a success and a pro-U.S. government were restored in Cuba, the CIA agreed that the Mafia would get their "monopoly on gaming, prostitution and drugs." In 1963, at the same time the Kennedy administration initiated secret peace overtures to Castro, Cuban revolutionary and undercover CIA agent Rolando Cubela was tasked with killing Castro by CIA official Desmond Fitzgerald, who portrayed himself as a personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy.

The U.S. had initially recognized Castro's government following the success of the Cuban Revolution in ousting Batista, but the relationship quickly soured as Castro repeatedly condemned the U.S. in his speeches for its misdeeds in Cuba over the previous 60 years. Many U.S. officials began to view Castro as a threat to national security as he legalized the Communist Party, nationalized property owned by U.S. citizens totaling $1.5 billion, and strengthened ties with the Soviet Union. By early 1960, President Eisenhower had begun contemplating ways to remove Castro, in the hopes that he might be replaced by a Cuban government-in-exile, though none existed at the time. In accordance with this goal, he approved Richard Bissell's plan which included training the paramilitary force that would later be used in the Bay of Pigs Invasion.

Cuba became a focal point in the 1960 U.S. presidential election, with both candidates promising to "get tough with the Communists". Kennedy in particular attacked Nixon and the Eisenhower administration for allowing communism to flourish so close to the U.S. In response, Nixon revealed plans for an embargo against Cuba, but the Democrats criticized it as ineffective. Ultimately, Nixon lost the election, convinced that Cuba had brought him down, and Kennedy inherited the thorny issue near the height of its prominence.

Despite the focus on Cuba in the elections and deteriorating relations between Cuba and the U.S.-exacerbated when Castro accused most of the U.S. State Department personnel in Havana of being spies and subsequently ordering them to leave the country, to which Eisenhower responded by withdrawing recognition of Castro's government-Kennedy hesitated to commit to the CIA's plans. Under Dulles and Bissell's insistence of the increasingly urgent need to do something with the troops being trained in Guatemala, Kennedy eventually agreed, although to avoid the appearance of American involvement, he requested the operation be moved from the city of Trinidad, Cuba to a less conspicuous location. Thus, the final plan was for an invasion at the Bay of Pigs.

The idea of overthrowing Castro's government emerged within the CIA in early 1960. Founded in 1947 by the National Security Act, the CIA was "a product of the Cold War", having been designed to counter the espionage activities of the Soviet Union's own national security agency, the KGB. As the perceived threat of international communism grew larger, the CIA expanded its activities to undertake covert economic, political, and military activities that would advance causes favourable to U.S. interests, often resulting in brutal dictatorships that favored U.S. interests. CIA Director Allen Dulles was responsible for overseeing covert operations across the world, and although widely considered an ineffectual administrator, he was popular among his employees, whom he had protected from the accusations of McCarthyism. Recognizing that Castro and his government were becoming increasingly hostile and openly opposed to the United States, Eisenhower directed the CIA to begin preparations of invading Cuba and overthrow the Castro regime. Richard M. Bissell Jr. was charged with overseeing plans for the Bay of Pigs Invasion. He assembled agents to aid him in the plot, many of whom had worked on the 1954 Guatemalan coup six years before; these included David Philips, Gerry Droller and E. Howard Hunt.

Bissell placed Droller in charge of liaising with anti-Castro segments of the Cuban-American community living in the United States, and asked Hunt to fashion a government in exile, which the CIA would effectively control. Hunt proceeded to travel to Havana, where he spoke with Cubans from various backgrounds and discovered a brothel through the Mercedes-Benz agency. Returning to the U.S., he informed the Cuban-Americans with whom he was liaising that they would have to move their base of operations from Florida to Mexico City, because the State Department refused to permit the training of a militia on U.S. soil. Although unhappy with the news, they conceded to the order.

President Eisenhower had meetings with President-elect Kennedy at the White House on 6 December 1960 and 19 January 1961. In one conversation, Eisenhower stated that since March 1960, the U.S. government had trained "in small units-but we had done nothing else-[...] some hundreds of refugees" in Guatemala, "a few in Panama, and some in Florida." However, Eisenhower also expressed disapproval of the idea of Batista returning to power and was waiting for the exiles to agree on a leader who was opposed to both Castro and Batista.

On 17 March 1960, the CIA put forward their plan for the overthrow of Castro's administration to the U.S. National Security Council, where President Eisenhower lent his support, approving a CIA budget of $13,000,000 to explore options to remove Castro from power. The first stated objective of the plan was to "bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention." Four major forms of action were to be taken to aid anti-communist opposition in Cuba at the time. These included providing a powerful propaganda offensive against the regime, perfecting a covert intelligence network within Cuba, developing paramilitary forces outside of Cuba, and acquiring the necessary logistical support for covert military operations on the island. At this stage, however, it was still not clear that an invasion would take place. Contrary to popular belief, however, documents obtained from the Eisenhower Library revealed that Eisenhower had not ordered or approved plans for an amphibious assault on Cuba.

By 31 October 1960, most guerrilla infiltrations and supply drops directed by the CIA into Cuba had failed, and developments of further guerrilla strategies were replaced by plans to mount an initial amphibious assault, with a minimum of 1,500 men. The election of John Kennedy as U.S. president sped up preparations for the invasion; Kennedy had specifically denied any support for Batista supporters: "Batista murdered 20,000 Cubans in seven years - a greater proportion of the Cuban population than the proportion of Americans who died in both World Wars, and he turned Democratic Cuba into a complete police state - destroying every individual liberty." On 18 November 1960, Dulles and Bissell first briefed President-elect Kennedy on the outline plans. Having experience in actions such as the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, Dulles was confident that the CIA was capable of overthrowing the Cuban government. On 29 November 1960, President Eisenhower met with the chiefs of the CIA, Defense, State, and Treasury departments to discuss the new concept. None expressed any objections, and Eisenhower approved the plans with the intention of persuading John Kennedy of their merit. On 8 December 1960, Bissell presented outline plans to the " Special Group" while declining to commit details to written records. Further development of the plans continued, and on 4 January 1961 they consisted of an intention to establish a "lodgement" by 750 men at an undisclosed site in Cuba, supported by considerable air power.

Meanwhile, in the 1960 presidential election, both main candidates, Richard Nixon of the Republican Party and John F. Kennedy of the Democratic Party, campaigned on the issue of Cuba, with both candidates taking a hardline stance on Castro. Nixon - who was vice president - insisted that Kennedy should not be informed of the military plans, to which Dulles conceded. To Nixon's chagrin, the Kennedy campaign released a scathing statement on the Eisenhower administration's Cuba policy on 20 October 1960 which said that "we must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces [...] who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro", claiming that "Thus far these fighters for freedom have had virtually no support from our Government." At the last election debate the next day, Nixon called Kennedy's proposed course of action "dangerously irresponsible" and even lectured Kennedy on international law, in effect denigrating the policy Nixon favored.

On 28 January 1961, President Kennedy was briefed, together with all the major departments, on the latest plan (code-named Operation Pluto), which involved 1,000 men landed in a ship-borne invasion at Trinidad, Cuba, about 270 km (170 mi) south-east of Havana, at the foothills of the Escambray Mountains in Sancti Spiritus province. Kennedy authorized the active departments to continue and to report progress. Trinidad had good port facilities, it was closer to many existing counter-revolutionary activities, and it offered an escape route into the Escambray Mountains. That scheme was subsequently rejected by the State Department because the airfield there was not large enough for B-26 bombers and, since B-26s were to play a prominent role in the invasion, this would destroy the façade that the invasion was just an uprising with no American involvement. Secretary of State Dean Rusk raised some eyebrows by contemplating airdropping a bulldozer to extend the airfield. Kennedy rejected Trinidad, preferring a more low-key locale. On 4 April 1961, President Kennedy approved the Bay of Pigs plan (also known as Operation Zapata), because it had a sufficiently long airfield, it was farther away from large groups of civilians than the Trinidad plan, and it was less "noisy" militarily, which would make denial of direct U.S. involvement more plausible. The invasion landing area was changed to beaches bordering the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) in Las Villas Province, 150 km southeast of Havana, and east of the Zapata Peninsula. The landings were to take place at Playa Girón (code-named Blue Beach), Playa Larga (code-named Red Beach), and Caleta Buena Inlet (code-named Green Beach).

Top aides to Kennedy, such as Dean Rusk and both joint chiefs of staff, later said that they had hesitations about the plans but muted their thoughts. Some leaders blamed these problems on the "Cold War mindset" or the determination of the Kennedy brothers to oust Castro and fulfill campaign promises. Military advisers were skeptical of its potential for success as well. Despite these hesitations, Kennedy still ordered the attack to take place. In March 1961, the CIA helped Cuban exiles in Miami to create the Cuban Revolutionary Council, chaired by José Miró Cardona, former Prime Minister of Cuba. Cardona became the de facto leader-in-waiting of the intended post-invasion Cuban government.

In April 1960, the CIA began to recruit anti-Castro Cuban exiles in the Miami area. Until July 1960, assessment and training was carried out on Useppa Island and at various other facilities in South Florida, such as Homestead Air Force Base. Specialist guerrilla training took place at Fort Gulick and Fort Clayton in Panama. The force that became Brigade 2506 started with 28 men, who initially were told that their training was being paid for by an anonymous Cuban millionaire émigré, but the recruits soon guessed who was paying the bills, calling their supposed anonymous benefactor "Uncle Sam", and the pretense was dropped. The overall leader was Dr. Manuel Artime while the military leader was José "Pepe" Peréz San Román, a former Cuban Army officer imprisoned under both Batista and Castro.

For the increasing number of recruits, infantry training was carried out at a CIA-run base code-named JMTrax. The base was on the Pacific coast of Guatemala between Quetzaltenango and Retalhuleu, in the Helvetia coffee plantation. The exiled group named themselves Brigade 2506 ( Brigada Asalto 2506). In summer 1960, an airfield (code-named JMadd, aka Rayo Base) was constructed near Retalhuleu, Guatemala. Gunnery and flight training of Brigade 2506 aircrews was carried out by personnel from Alabama Air National Guard under General Reid Doster, using at least six Douglas B-26 Invaders in the markings of the Guatemalan Air Force. An additional 26 B-26s were obtained from U.S. military stocks, 'sanitized' at 'Field Three' to obscure their origins, and about 20 of them were converted for offensive operations by removal of defensive armament, standardization of the 'eight-gun nose', addition of underwing drop tanks and rocket racks. Paratroop training was at a base nicknamed Garrapatenango, near Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. Training for boat handling and amphibious landings took place at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. Tank training for the Brigade 2506 M41 Walker Bulldog tanks, took place at Fort Knox, Kentucky and Fort Benning, Georgia. Underwater demolition and infiltration training took place at Belle Chasse near New Orleans. To create a navy, the CIA purchased five cargo ships from the Cuban-owned, Miami-based Garcia Line, thereby giving " plausible deniability" as the State Department had insisted no U.S. ships could be involved in the invasion. The first four of the five ships, namely the Atlantico, the Caribe, the Houston and Río Escondido were to carry enough supplies and weapons to last thirty days while the Lake Charles had 15 days of supplies and was intended to land the provisional government of Cuba. The ships were loaded with supplies at New Orleans and sailed to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua. Additionally, the invasion force had two old Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) ships, the Blagar and Barbara J from World War II that were part of the CIA's "ghost ship" fleet and served as command ships for the invasion. The crews of the supply ships were Cuban while the crews of the LCIs were Americans, borrowed by the CIA from the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). One CIA officer wrote that MSTS sailors were all professional and experienced but not trained for combat. In November 1960, the Retalhuleu recruits took part in quelling an officers' rebellion in Guatemala, in addition to the intervention of the U.S. Navy. The CIA transported people, supplies, and arms from Florida to all the bases at night, using Douglas C-54 transports.

On 9 April 1961, Brigade 2506 personnel, ships, and aircraft started transferring from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas. Curtiss C-46s were also used for transport between Retalhuleu and a CIA base (code-named JMTide, aka Happy Valley) at Puerto Cabezas. Facilities and limited logistical assistance were provided by the governments of General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes in Guatemala, and General Luis Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua, but no military personnel or equipment of those nations was directly employed in the conflict. Both governments later received military training and equipment, including some of the CIA's remaining B-26s.

In early 1961, Cuba's army possessed Soviet-designed T-34 medium tanks, IS-2 heavy tanks, SU-100 tank destroyers, 122mm howitzers, other artillery and small arms plus Italian 105mm howitzers. The Cuban air force armed inventory included B-26 Invader light bombers, Hawker Sea Fury fighters and Lockheed T-33 jets, all remaining from the Fuerza Aérea del Ejército de Cuba, the Cuban air force of the Batista government. Anticipating an invasion, Che Guevara stressed the importance of an armed civilian populace, stating: "all of the Cuban people must become a guerrilla army; each and every Cuban must learn to handle and if necessary use firearms in defense of the nation".

In April 1960, FRD ( Frente Revolucionario Democratico - Democratic Revolutionary Front) rebels were taken to Useppa Island, Florida, which was covertly leased by the CIA at the time. Once the rebels had arrived, they were greeted by instructors from U.S. Army special forces groups, members from the U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard, and members of the CIA. The rebels were trained in amphibious assault tactics, guerrilla warfare, infantry and weapons training, unit tactics and land navigation. At the head of the death squad was Joaquin Sanjenis Perdomo, former police chief in Cuba, intelligence officer Rafael De Jesus Gutierrez. The group included David Atlee Philips, Howard Hunt and David Sánchez Morales. The recruiting of Cuban exiles in Miami was organized by CIA staff officers E. Howard Hunt and Gerry Droller. Detailed planning, training and military operations were conducted by Jacob Esterline, Colonel Jack Hawkins, Félix Rodríguez, Rafael De Jesus Gutierrez and Colonel Stanley W. Beerli under the direction of Richard Bissell and his deputy Tracy Barnes.

Already, Fidel Castro was known as, and addressed as, the commander-in-chief of Cuban armed forces, with a nominal base at "Point One" in Havana. In early April 1961, his brother Raúl Castro was assigned command of forces in the east, based in Santiago de Cuba. Che Guevara commanded western forces, based in Pinar del Río. Major Juan Almeida Bosque commanded forces in the central provinces, based in Santa Clara. Raúl Curbelo Morales was head of the Cuban Air Force. Sergio del Valle Jiménez was Director of Headquarters Operations at Point One. Efigenio Ameijeiras was the Head of the Revolutionary National Police. Ramiro Valdés Menéndez was Minister of the Interior and head of G-2 (Seguridad del Estado, or state security). His deputy was Comandante Manuel Piñeiro Losada, also known as 'Barba Roja'. Captain José Ramón Fernández was head of the School of Militia Leaders (Cadets) at Matanzas.

Other commanders of units during the conflict included Major Raúl Menéndez Tomassevich, Major Filiberto Olivera Moya, Major René de los Santos, Major Augusto Martínez Sánchez, Major Félix Duque, Major Pedro Miret, Major Flavio Bravo, Major Antonio Lussón, Captain Orlando Pupo Peña, Captain Victor Dreke, Captain Emilio Aragonés, Captain Ángel Fernández Vila, Arnaldo Ochoa, and Orlando Rodríguez Puerta. Soviet-trained Spanish advisors were brought to Cuba from Eastern Bloc countries. These advisors had held high staff positions in the Soviet armies during World War II and became known as "Hispano-Soviets," having long resided in the Soviet Union. The most senior of these was the Spanish communist veterans of the Spanish Civil War, Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, Enrique Líster and Cuban-born Alberto Bayo. Ciutat de Miguel (Cuban alias: Ángel Martínez Riosola, commonly referred to as "Angelito"), was an advisor to forces in the central provinces. The role of other Soviet agents at the time is uncertain, but some of them acquired greater fame later. For example, two KGB colonels, Vadim Kochergin and Victor Simanov were first sighted in Cuba in about September 1959.

The Cuban security apparatus knew the invasion was coming, in part due to indiscreet talk by members of the brigade, some of which was heard in Miami and repeated in U.S. and foreign newspaper reports. Nevertheless, days before the invasion, multiple acts of sabotage were carried out, such as the El Encanto fire, an arson attack in a department store in Havana on 13 April that killed one shop worker. The Cuban government also had been warned by senior KGB agents Osvaldo Sánchez Cabrera and 'Aragon', who died violently before and after the invasion, respectively. The general Cuban population was not well informed of intelligence matters, which the US sought to exploit with propaganda through CIA-funded Radio Swan. As of May 1960, almost all means of public communication were under public ownership.

On 29 April 2000, a Washington Post article, "Soviets Knew Date of Cuba Attack", reported that the CIA had information indicating that the Soviet Union knew the invasion was going to take place and did not inform Kennedy. On 13 April 1961, Radio Moscow broadcast an English-language newscast, predicting the invasion "in a plot hatched by the CIA" using paid "criminals" within a week. The invasion took place four days later.

David Ormsby-Gore, the British ambassador to the U.S., stated that British intelligence analysis made available to the CIA indicated that the Cuban people were overwhelmingly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections.

From June to September 1960, the most time-consuming task was the acquisition of the aircraft to be used in the invasion. The anti-Castro effort depended on the success of these aircraft. Although models such as the Curtiss C-46 Commando and Douglas C-54 Skymaster were to be used for airdrops and bomb drops as well as for infiltration and exfiltration, they were looking for an aircraft that could perform tactical strikes. The two models that were going to be decided on were the Navy's Douglas AD-5 Skyraider or the Air Force's light bomber, the Douglas B-26 Invader. The AD-5 was readily available and ready for the Navy to train pilots, and in a meeting among a special group in the office of the Deputy Director of the CIA, the AD-5 was approved and decided upon. After a cost-benefit analysis, word was sent that the AD-5 plan would be abandoned and the B-26 would take its place.

Under cover of darkness, the invasion fleet set sail from Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua and headed towards the Bay of Pigs on the night of 14 April. After on-loading the attack planes in Norfolk Naval Base and taking on prodigious quantities of food and supplies sufficient for the seven weeks at-sea to come, the crew knew from the hasty camouflage of the ship's and aircraft identifying numbers that a secret mission was on hand. Combatants were supplied with forged Cuban local currency, in the form of 20 Peso bills, identifiable by the serial numbers F69 and F70. The aircraft carrier group of the USS Essex had been at sea for nearly a month before the invasion; its crew was well aware of the impending battle. En route, Essex had made a night time stop at a Navy arms depot in Charleston, South Carolina, to load tactical nuclear weapons to be held ready during the cruise. The afternoon of the invasion, one accompanying destroyer rendezvoused with Essex to have a gun mount repaired and put back into action; the ship displayed numerous shell casings on deck from its shore bombardment actions. On 16 April Essex was at general quarters for most of a day; Soviet MiG-15s made feints and close range fly overs that night.

During the night of 14/15 April, a diversionary landing was planned near Baracoa, Oriente Province, by about 164 Cuban exiles commanded by Higinio 'Nino' Diaz. Their mother ship, named La Playa or Santa Ana, had sailed from Key West under a Costa Rican ensign. Several U.S. Navy destroyers were stationed offshore near Guantánamo Bay to give the appearance of an impending invasion fleet. The reconnaissance boats turned back to the ship after their crews detected activities by Cuban militia forces along the coastline. As a result of those activities, at daybreak, a reconnaissance sortie over the Baracoa area was launched from Santiago de Cuba by an FAR Lockheed T-33, piloted by Lt Orestes Acosta and it crashed fatally into the sea. On 17 April, his name was falsely quoted as a defector among the disinformation circulating in Miami.

The CIA, with the backing of the Pentagon, had originally requested permission to produce sonic booms over Havana on 14 April to create confusion. The request was a form of psychological warfare that had proven successful in the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. The point was to create confusion in Havana and have it be a distraction to Castro if they could "break all the windows in town." The request was denied, however, since officials thought such would be too obvious a sign of involvement by the United States.

On 15 April 1961, at about 6:00 am Cuban local time, eight B-26B Invader bombers in three groups simultaneously attacked three Cuban airfields at San Antonio de los Baños and at Ciudad Libertad (formerly named Campo Columbia), both near Havana, plus the Antonio Maceo International Airport at Santiago de Cuba. The B-26s had been prepared by the CIA on behalf of Brigade 2506 and had been painted with the false flag markings of the FAR. Each came armed with bombs, rockets, and machine guns. They had flown from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua and were crewed by exiled Cuban pilots and navigators of the self-styled Fuerza Aérea de Liberación (FAL). The purpose of the action (code-named Operation Puma) was reportedly to destroy most or all of the armed aircraft of the FAR in preparation for the main invasion. At Santiago, the two attackers destroyed a C-47 transport, a PBY Catalina flying boat, two B-26s and a civilian Douglas DC-3 plus various other civilian aircraft. At San Antonio, the three attackers destroyed three FAR B-26s, one Hawker Sea Fury and one T-33, and one attacker diverted to Grand Cayman because of low fuel. Aircraft that diverted to the Caymans were seized by the United Kingdom since they were suspicious that the Cayman Islands might be perceived as a launch site for the invasion. At Ciudad Libertad, the three attackers destroyed only non-operational aircraft such as two Republic P-47 Thunderbolts. One of those attackers was damaged by anti-aircraft fire and ditched about 50 km (31 mi) north of Cuba, with the loss of its crew Daniel Fernández Mon and Gaston Pérez. Its companion B-26, also damaged, continued north and landed at Boca Chica Field, Florida. The crew, José Crespo and Lorenzo Pérez-Lorenzo, were granted political asylum, and made their way back to Nicaragua the next day via Miami and the daily CIA C-54 flight from Opa-locka Airport to Puerto Cabezas Airport. Their B-26, purposely numbered 933, the same as at least two other B-26s that day for disinformation reasons, was held until late on 17 April.

About 90 minutes after the eight B-26s had taken off from Puerto Cabezas to attack Cuban airfields, another B-26 departed on a deception flight that took it close to Cuba but headed north towards Florida. Like the bomber groups, it carried false FAR markings and the same number 933 as painted on at least two of the others. Before departure, the cowling from one of the aircraft's two engines was removed by CIA personnel, fired upon, then re-installed to give the false appearance that the aircraft had taken ground fire at some point during its flight. At a safe distance north of Cuba, the pilot feathered the engine with the pre-installed bullet holes in the cowling, radioed a mayday call, and requested immediate permission to land at Miami International airport. He landed and taxied to the military area of the airport near an Air Force C-47 and was met by several government cars. The pilot was Mario Zúñiga, formerly of the FAEC (Cuban Air Force under Batista), and after landing, he masqueraded as 'Juan Garcia' and publicly claimed that three colleagues had also defected from the FAR. The next day he was granted political asylum, and that night he returned to Puerto Cabezas via Opa-Locka. This deception operation was successful at the time in convincing much of the world media that the attacks on the FAR bases were the work of an internal anti-Communist faction and did not involve outside actors.

At 10:30 am on 15 April at the United Nations, Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa accused the U.S. of aggressive air attacks against Cuba and that afternoon formally tabled a motion to the Political (First) Committee of the UN General Assembly. Only days earlier, the CIA had unsuccessfully attempted to entice Raúl Roa into defecting. In response to Roa's accusations before the UN, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson stated that U.S. armed forces would not "under any conditions" intervene in Cuba and that the U.S. would do everything in its power to ensure that no U.S. citizens would participate in actions against Cuba. He also stated that Cuban defectors had carried out the attacks that day, and he presented a UPI wire photo of Zúñiga's B-26 in Cuban markings at Miami airport. Stevenson was later embarrassed to realize that the CIA had lied to him.

President Kennedy supported the statement made by Stevenson: "I have emphasized before that this was a struggle of Cuban patriots against a Cuban dictator. While we could not be expected to hide our sympathies, we made it repeatedly clear that the armed forces of this country would not intervene in any way".

On 15 April, the Cuban national police, led by Efigenio Ameijeiras, started the process of arresting thousands of suspected anti-revolutionary individuals and detaining them in provisional locations such as the Karl Marx Theatre, the moat of Fortaleza de la Cabana, and the Principe Castle, all in Havana, and the baseball park in Matanzas. In total, between 20,000 and 100,000 people would be arrested.

On the night of 15/16 April, the Nino Diaz group failed in a second attempted diversionary landing at a different location near Baracoa. On 16 April, Merardo Leon, Jose Leon, and 14 others staged an armed uprising at Las Delicias Estate in Las Villas, with only four surviving.

Following the airstrikes on the Cuban airfields on 15 April, the FAR prepared for action with its surviving aircraft which numbered at least four T-33 jet trainers, four Sea Fury fighters and five or six B-26 medium bombers. All three types were armed with machine guns (except the Sea Furies which had 20mm cannon) for air-to-air combat and for strafing of ships and ground targets. CIA planners had failed to discover that the U.S.-supplied T-33 trainer jets had long been armed with M-3 machine guns. The three types could also carry bombs and rocket pods for attacks against ships and tanks.

No additional airstrikes against Cuban airfields and aircraft were specifically planned before 17 April, because B-26 pilots' exaggerated claims gave the CIA false confidence in the success of 15 April attacks, until U-2 reconnaissance photos taken on 16 April showed otherwise. Late on 16 April, President Kennedy ordered the cancellation of further airfield strikes planned for dawn on 17 April, to attempt plausible deniability of direct U.S. involvement.

Late on 16 April, the CIA/Brigade 2506 invasion fleet converged on 'Rendezvous Point Zulu', about 65 kilometres (40 mi) south of Cuba, having sailed from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua where they had been loaded with troops and other materiel, after loading arms and supplies at New Orleans. The U.S. Navy operation was code-named Bumpy Road, having been changed from Crosspatch. The fleet, labeled the 'Cuban Expeditionary Force' (CEF), included five 2,400-ton (empty weight) freighter ships chartered by the CIA from the Garcia Line, and subsequently outfitted with anti-aircraft guns. Four of the freighters, Houston (code name Aguja), Río Escondido (code name Ballena), Caribe (code name Sardina), and Atlántico (code-name Tiburón), were planned to transport about 1,400 troops in seven battalions of troops and armaments near to the invasion beaches. The fifth freighter, Lake Charles, was loaded with follow-up supplies and some Operation 40 infiltration personnel. The freighters sailed under Liberian ensigns. Accompanying them were two LCIs outfitted with heavy armament at Key West. The LCIs were Blagar (code-name Marsopa) and Barbara J (code-name Barracuda), sailing under Nicaraguan ensigns. After exercises and training at Vieques Island, the CEF ships were individually escorted (outside visual range) to Point Zulu by US Navy destroyers USS Bache, USS Beale, USS Conway, USS Cony, USS Eaton, USS Murray, and USS Waller. US Navy Task Group 81.8 had already assembled off the Cayman Islands, commanded by Rear Admiral John E. Clark onboard aircraft carrier USS Essex, plus helicopter assault carrier USS Boxer, destroyers USS Hank, USS John W. Weeks, USS Purdy, USS Wren, and submarines USS Cobbler and USS Threadfin. Command and control ship USS Northampton and carrier USS Shangri-La were also reportedly active in the Caribbean at the time. USS San Marcos was a Landing Ship Dock that carried three Landing Craft Utility (LCUs) which could accommodate the Brigades M41 Walker Bulldog tanks and four Landing Craft, Vehicles, Personnel (LCVPs). San Marcos had sailed from Vieques Island. At Point Zulu, the seven CEF ships sailed north without the USN escorts, except for San Marcos that continued until the seven landing craft were unloaded when just outside the 5 kilometres (3 mi) Cuban territorial limit.

During the night of 16/17 April, a mock diversionary landing was organized by CIA operatives near Bahía Honda, Pinar del Río Province. A flotilla containing equipment that broadcast sounds and other effects of a shipborne invasion landing provided the source of Cuban reports that briefly lured Fidel Castro away from the Bay of Pigs battlefront area.

At about 00:00 on 17 April 1961, the two LCIs Blagar and Barbara J, each with a CIA 'operations officer' and an Underwater Demolition Team of five frogmen, entered the Bay of Pigs (Bahía de Cochinos) on the southern coast of Cuba. They headed a force of four transport ships ( Houston, Río Escondido, Caribe and Atlántico) carrying about 1,400 Cuban exile ground troops of Brigade 2506, plus the brigade's M41 tanks and other vehicles in the landing craft. At about 01:00, Blagar, as the battlefield command ship, directed the principal landing at Playa Girón (code-named Blue Beach), led by the frogmen in rubber boats followed by troops from Caribe in small aluminum boats, then the LCVPs and LCUs with the M41 tanks. Barbara J, leading Houston, similarly landed troops 35 km further northwest at Playa Larga (code-named Red Beach), using small fiberglass boats. The unloading of troops at night was delayed, because of engine failures and boats damaged by unseen coral reefs; the CIA had originally believed that the coral reef was seaweed. As the frogmen came in, they were shocked to discover that the Red Beach was lit with floodlights, which led to the location of the landing being hastily changed. As the frogmen landed, a firefight broke out when a jeep carrying Cuban militia happened by. The few militias in the area succeeded in warning Cuban armed forces via radio soon after the first landing, before the invaders overcame their token resistance. Castro was awakened at about 3:15 am to be informed of the landings, which led him to put all militia units in the area on the highest state of alert and to order airstrikes. The Cuban regime planned to strike the brigadistas at Playa Larga first as they were inland before turning on the brigadistas at Girón at sea. El Comandante departed personally to lead his forces into battle against the brigadistas.

At daybreak around 6:30 am, three FAR Sea Furies, one B-26 bomber and two T-33s started attacking those CEF ships still unloading troops. At about 6:50, south of Playa Larga, Houston was damaged by several bombs and rockets from a Sea Fury and a T-33, and about two hours later Captain Luis Morse intentionally beached it on the western side of the bay. About 270 troops had been unloaded, but about 180 survivors who struggled ashore were incapable of taking part in further action because of the loss of most of their weapons and equipment. The loss of Houston was a great blow to the brigadistas as that ship was carrying much of the medical supplies, which meant that wounded brigadistas had to make do with inadequate medical care. At about 7:00, two FAL B-26s attacked and sank the Cuban Navy Patrol Escort ship El Baire at Nueva Gerona on the Isle of Pines. They then proceeded to Girón to join two other B-26s to attack Cuban ground troops and provide distraction air cover for the paratroop C-46s and the CEF ships under air attack. The M41 tanks had all landed by 7:30 am at Blue Beach and all of the troops by 8:30 am. Neither San Román at Blue Beach nor Erneido Oliva at Red Beach could communicate as all of the radios had been soaked in the water during the landings.

At about 7:30, five C-46 and one C-54 transport aircraft dropped 177 paratroops from the parachute battalion in an action code-named Operation Falcon. About 30 men, plus heavy equipment, were dropped south of the Central Australia sugar mill on the road to Palpite and Playa Larga, but the equipment was lost in the swamps, and the troops failed to block the road. Other troops were dropped at San Blas, at Jocuma between Covadonga and San Blas, and at Horquitas between Yaguaramas and San Blas. Those positions to block the roads were maintained for two days, reinforced by ground troops from Playa Girón and tanks. The paratroopers had landed amid a collection of militia, but their training allowed them to hold their own against the ill-trained militiamen. However, the dispersal of the paratroopers as they landed meant they were unable to take the road from the sugar mill down to Playa Larga, which allowed the government to continue to send troops down to resist the invasion.

At about 8:30, a FAR Sea Fury piloted by Carlos Ulloa Arauz crashed in the bay after encountering a FAL C-46 returning south after dropping paratroops. By 9:00, Cuban troops and militia from outside the area had started arriving at the sugar mill, Covadonga and Yaguaramas. Throughout the day they were reinforced by more troops, heavy armour and T-34 tanks typically carried on flat-bed trucks. At about 9:30, FAR Sea Furies and T-33s fired rockets at Rio Escondido, which then 'blew up' and sank about 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) south of Girón. Rio Escondido was loaded with aviation fuel, and as the ship started to burn, the captain gave the order to abandon ship with the ship being destroyed in three explosions shortly afterward . Rio Escondido carried fuel along with enough ammunition, food, and medical supplies to last ten days and the radio that allowed the brigade to communicate with the FAL. The loss of the communications ship Rio Escondido meant that San Román was only able to issue orders to the forces at Blue Beach, and he had no idea of what was happening at Red Beach or with the paratroopers. A messenger from Red Beach arrived at about 10:00 am asking San Román to send tank and infantry to block the road from the sugar mill, a request that he agreed to. It was not expected that government forces would be counter-attacking from this direction.

At about 11:00, Castro issued a statement over Cuba's nationwide network saying that the invaders, members of the exiled Cuban revolutionary front, have come to destroy the revolution and take away the dignity and rights of men. At about 11:00, a FAR T-33 attacked and shot down a FAL B-26 (serial number 935) piloted by Matias Farias, who then survived a crash landing on the Girón airfield, his navigator Eduardo González already killed by gunfire. His companion B-26 suffered damage and diverted to Grand Cayman Island; pilot Mario Zúñiga (the 'defector') and navigator Oscar Vega returned to Puerto Cabezas via CIA C-54 on 18 April. By about 11:00, the two remaining freighters Caribe and Atlántico, and the LCIs and LCUs, started retreating south to international waters, but still pursued by FAR aircraft. At about noon, a FAR B-26 exploded from heavy anti-aircraft fire from Blagar, and pilot Luis Silva Tablada (on his second sortie) and his crew of three were lost.

By noon, hundreds of Cuban militia cadets from Matanzas had secured Palpite and cautiously advanced on foot south towards Playa Larga, suffering many casualties during attacks by FAL B-26s. By dusk, other Cuban ground forces gradually advanced southward from Covadonga, southwest from Yaguaramas toward San Blas, and westward along coastal tracks from Cienfuegos towards Girón all without heavy weapons or armour. At 2:30 pm a group of militiamen from the 339th Battalion set up a position, which came under attack from the brigadista M41 tanks, which inflicted heavy losses on the defenders. This action is remembered in Cuba as the "Slaughter of the Lost Battalion" as most of the militiamen perished.

Three FAL B-26s were shot down by FAR T-33s, with the loss of pilots Raúl Vianello, José Crespo, Osvaldo Piedra and navigators Lorenzo Pérez-Lorenzo and José Fernández. Vianello's navigator Demetrio Pérez bailed out and was picked up by USS Murray. Pilot Crispín García Fernández and navigator Juan González Romero, in B-26 serial 940, diverted to Boca Chica, but late that night they attempted to fly back to Puerto Cabezas in B-26 serial 933 that Crespo had flown to Boca Chica on 15 April. In October 1961, the remains of the B-26 and its two crew were found in the dense jungle in Nicaragua. One FAL B-26 diverted to Grand Cayman with engine failure. By 4:00, Castro had arrived at the Central Australia sugar mill, joining José Ramón Fernández whom he had appointed as battlefield commander before dawn that day.

At about 5:00, a night air strike by three FAL B-26s on San Antonio de Los Baños airfield failed, reportedly because of incompetence and bad weather. Two other B-26s had aborted the mission after take-off. Other sources allege that heavy anti-aircraft fire scared the aircrews. As night fell, Atlantico and Caribe pulled away from Cuba to be followed by Blagar and Barbara J. The ships were to return to the Bay of Pigs the following day to unload more ammunition, however the captains of the Atlantico and Caribe decided to abandon the invasion and head out to open sea fearing further air attacks by the FAR. Destroyers from the U.S. Navy intercepted Atlantico about 110 miles (180 km) south of Cuba and persuaded the captain to return, but Caribe was not intercepted until she was 218 miles (351 km) away from Cuba, and she was not to return until it was too late.

During the night of 17-18 April, the force at Red Beach came under repeated counter-attacks from the Cuban Army and militia. As casualties mounted and ammunition was used up, the brigadistas steadily gave way. Airdrops from four C-54s and 2 C-46s had only limited success in landing more ammunition. Both the Blagar and Barbara J returned at midnight to land more ammunition, which proved insufficient for the brigadistas. Following desperate appeals for help from Oliva, San Román ordered all of his M41 tanks to assist in the defense. During the night fighting, a tank battle broke out when the brigadista M41 tanks clashed with the T-34 tanks of the Cuban Army. This sharp action forced back the brigadistas. At 10:00 pm, the Cuban Army opened fire with its 76.2mm and 122mm artillery guns on the brigadista forces at Playa Larga, which was followed by an attack by T-34 tanks at about midnight. The 2,000 artillery rounds fired by the Cuban Army had mostly missed the brigadista defense positions, and the T-34 tanks rode into an ambush when they came under fire from the brigadista M41 tanks and mortar fire, and a number of T-34 tanks were destroyed or knocked out. At 1:00 am, Cuban Army infantrymen and militiamen started an offensive. Despite heavy losses on the part of the Cuban forces, the shortage of ammunition forced the brigadistas back and the T-34 tanks continued to force their way past the wreckage of the battlefield to press on the assault. The Cuban forces numbered about 2,100, consisting of about 300 FAR soldiers, 1,600 militiamen and 200 policemen supported by 20 T-34s who were faced by 370 brigadistas. By 5:00 am, Oliva started to order his men to retreat as he had almost no ammunition or mortar rounds left. By about 10:30 am, Cuban troops and militia, supported by the T-34 tanks and 122mm artillery, took Playa Larga after Brigade forces had fled towards Girón in the early hours. During the day, Brigade forces retreated to San Blas along the two roads from Covadonga and Yaguaramas. By then, both Castro and Fernández had relocated to that battlefront area.

As the men from Red Beach arrived at Girón, San Román and Oliva met to discuss the situation. With ammunition running low, Oliva suggested that the brigade retreat into the Escambray Mountains to wage guerilla warfare, but San Román decided to hold the beachhead. At about 11:00 am, the Cuban Army began an offensive to take San Blas. San Román ordered all of the paratroopers back in order to hold San Blas, and they halted the offensive. During the afternoon, Castro kept the brigadistas under steady air attack and artillery fire but did not order any new major attacks.

At 2:00 pm, President Kennedy received a telegram from Nikita Khrushchev in Moscow, stating the Russians would not allow the U.S. to enter Cuba and implied swift nuclear retribution to the United States heartland if their warnings were not heeded.

At about 5:00, FAL B-26s attacked a Cuban column of 12 private buses leading trucks carrying tanks and other armor, moving southeast between Playa Larga and Punta Perdiz. The vehicles, loaded with civilians, militia, police, and soldiers, were attacked with bombs, napalm, and rockets, suffering heavy casualties. The six B-26s were piloted by two CIA contract pilots plus four pilots and six navigators from the FAL. The column later re-formed and advanced to Punta Perdiz, about 11 km northwest of Girón.

During the night of 18 April, a FAL C-46 delivered arms and equipment to the Girón airstrip occupied by brigade ground forces and took off before daybreak on 19 April. The C-46 also evacuated Matias Farias, the pilot of B-26 serial '935' (code-named Chico Two) that had been shot down and crash-landed at Girón on 17 April. The crews of the Barbara J and Blagar had done their best to land what ammunition they had left onto the beachhead, but without air support the captains of both ships reported that it was too dangerous to be operating off the Cuban coast by day.

The final air attack mission (code-named Mad Dog Flight) comprised five B-26s, four of which were manned by American CIA contract aircrews and volunteer pilots from the Alabama Air Guard. One FAR Sea Fury (piloted by Douglas Rudd) and two FAR T-33s (piloted by Rafael del Pino and Alvaro Prendes) shot down two of these B-26s, killing four American airmen. Combat air patrols were flown by Douglas A4D-2N Skyhawk jets of VA-34 squadron operating from USS Essex, with nationality and other markings removed. Sorties were flown to reassure brigade soldiers and pilots and to intimidate Cuban government forces without directly engaging in acts of war. At 10 am, a tank battle had broken out, with the brigadista holding their line until about 2:00 pm, which led Olvia to order a retreat into Girón. Following the last air attacks, San Román ordered his paratroopers and the men of the 3rd Battalion to launch a surprise attack, which was initially successful but soon failed. With the brigadistas in disorganized retreat, the Cuban Army and militiamen started to advance rapidly, taking San Blas only to be stopped outside of Girón at about 11 am. Later that afternoon, San Román heard the rumbling of the advancing T-34s and reported that with no more mortar rounds and bazooka rounds, he could not stop the tanks and ordered his men to fall back to the beach. Oliva arrived afterward to find that the brigadistas were all heading out to the beach or retreating into the jungle or swamps. Without direct air support, and short of ammunition, Brigade 2506 ground forces retreated to the beaches in the face of the onslaught from Cuban government artillery, tanks and infantry.

Late on 19 April, destroyers USS Eaton (code-named Santiago) and USS Murray (code-named Tampico) moved into Cochinos Bay to evacuate retreating Brigade soldiers from beaches, before fire from Cuban army tanks caused Commodore Crutchfield to order a withdrawal.

From 19 April until about 22 April, sorties were flown by A4D-2Ns to obtain visual intelligence over combat areas. Reconnaissance flights are also reported of AD-5Ws of VFP-62 and/or VAW-12 squadron from USS Essex or another carrier, such as USS Shangri-La that was part of the task force assembled off the Cayman Islands.

On 21 April, Eaton and Murray, joined on 22 April by destroyers USS Conway and USS Cony, plus submarine USS Threadfin and a CIA PBY-5A Catalina flying boat, continued to search the coastline, reefs, and islands for scattered Brigade survivors, about 24-30 being rescued.

67 Cuban exiles from Brigade 2506 were killed in action, plus 10 on the firing squad, 10 on the boat Celia trying to escape, 9 captured exiles in the sealed truck container on the way to Havana, 4 by accident, 2 in prison, and 4 American aviators, for a total of 106 deaths. Aircrews killed in action totaled 6 from the Cuban air force, 10 Cuban exiles and 4 American airmen. Paratrooper Eugene Herman Koch was killed in action, and the American airmen shot down were Thomas W. Ray, Leo F. Baker, Riley W. Shamburger, and Wade C. Gray. In 1979, the body of Thomas "Pete" Ray was repatriated from Cuba. In the 1990s, the CIA admitted he was linked to the agency and awarded him the Intelligence Star.

The final toll for Cuban armed forces during the conflict was 176 killed in action. This figure includes only the Cuban Army and it is estimated that about 2,000 militiamen were killed or wounded during the fighting. Other Cuban forces casualties were between 500 and 4,000 (killed, wounded or missing). The airfield attacks on 15 April left 7 Cubans dead and 53 wounded.

In 2011, the National Security Archive, under the Freedom of Information Act, released over 1,200 pages of documents. Included within these documents were descriptions of incidents of friendly fire. The CIA had outfitted some B-26 bombers to appear as Cuban aircraft, having ordered them to remain inland to avoid being fired upon by American-backed forces. Some of the planes, not heeding the warning, came under fire. According to CIA operative Grayston Lynch, "we couldn't tell them from the Castro planes. We ended up shooting at two or three of them. We hit some of them there because when they came at us... it was a silhouette, that was all you could see."

Havana gleefully noted the wealth of the captured invaders: 100 plantation owners, 67 landlords of apartment houses, 35 factory owners, 112 businessmen, 179 lived off unearned income, and 194 ex-soldiers of Batista.

On 19 April, at least seven Cubans plus two CIA-hired U.S. citizens (Angus K. McNair and Howard F. Anderson) were executed in Pinar del Rio province, after a two-day trial. On 20 April, Humberto Sorí Marin was executed at La Cabaña, having been arrested on 18 March following infiltration into Cuba with 14 tons of explosives. His fellow conspirators Rogelio González Corzo (alias "Francisco Gutierrez"), Rafael Diaz Hanscom, Eufemio Fernandez, Arturo Hernandez Tellaheche and Manuel Lorenzo Puig Miyar were also executed.

Between April and October 1961, hundreds of executions took place in response to the invasion. They took place at various prisons, including the Fortaleza de la Cabaña and Morro Castle. Infiltration team leaders Antonio Diaz Pou and Raimundo E. Lopez, as well as underground students Virgilio Campaneria, Alberto Tapia Ruano, and more than one hundred other insurgents were executed.

About 1,202 members of Brigade 2506 were captured, of whom nine died from asphyxiation during their transfer to Havana in an airtight truck container. In May 1961, Castro proposed to exchange the surviving brigade prisoners for 500 large farm tractors, later changed to US$28,000,000. On 8 September 1961, 14 Brigade prisoners were convicted of torture, murder and other major crimes committed in Cuba before the invasion. Five were executed and nine others imprisoned for 30 years. Three confirmed as executed were Ramon Calvino, Emilio Soler Puig ("El Muerte") and Jorge King Yun ("El Chino"). On 29 March 1962, 1,179 men were put on trial for treason. On 7 April 1962, all were convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. On 14 April 1962, 60 wounded and sick prisoners were freed and transported to the U.S. In 2021 was discovered that the government of João Goulart intervened on behalf of the United States to avoid the death penalty for prisoners.

On 21 December 1962, Castro and James B. Donovan, a U.S. lawyer aided by Milan C. Miskovsky, a CIA legal officer, signed an agreement to exchange 1,113 prisoners for US$53 million in food and medicine, sourced from private donations and from companies expecting tax concessions. On 24 December 1962, some prisoners were flown to Miami, others following on the ship African Pilot, plus about 1,000 family members also allowed to leave Cuba. On 29 December 1962, President Kennedy and his wife Jacqueline attended a "welcome back" ceremony for Brigade 2506 veterans at the Orange Bowl in Miami, Florida.

The failed invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy administration and made Castro wary of future U.S. intervention in Cuba. On 21 April, in a State Department press conference, Kennedy said: "There's an old saying that victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan... Further statements, detailed discussions, are not to conceal responsibility because I'm the responsible officer of the Government..."

The initial U.S. response concerning the first air attacks was of a dismissive quality. Adlai Stevenson denied any involvement in the first wave of airstrikes, stating before the United Nations, "These charges are totally false and I deny them categorically." Stevenson continued to promote a story of two Cuban planes that had reportedly defected to the United States, apparently unaware that they were in fact U.S. planes piloted by U.S.-backed Cuban pilots to promote a false story of defection.

In August 1961, during an economic conference of the OAS in Punta del Este, Uruguay, Che Guevara sent a note to Kennedy via Richard N. Goodwin, a secretary of the White House. It read: "Thanks for Playa Girón. Before the invasion, the revolution was weak. Now it's stronger than ever". Additionally, Guevara answered a set of questions from Leo Huberman of Monthly Review following the invasion. In one reply, Guevara was asked to explain the growing number of Cuban counter-revolutionaries and defectors from the regime, to which he replied that the repelled invasion was the climax of counter-revolution and that afterward such actions "fell drastically to zero." Regarding the defections of some prominent figures within the Cuban government, Guevara remarked that this was because "the socialist revolution left the opportunists, the ambitious, and the fearful far behind and now advances toward a new regime free of this class of vermin."

As Allen Dulles later stated, CIA planners believed that once the troops were on the ground, Kennedy would authorize any action required to prevent failure - as Eisenhower had done in Guatemala in 1954 after that invasion looked as if it would collapse. Kennedy was deeply depressed and angered with the failure. Several years after his death, The New York Times reported that he told an unspecified high administration official of wanting "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." However, following a "rigorous inquiry into the agency's affairs, methods, and problems... [Kennedy] did not 'splinter' it after all and did not recommend Congressional supervision." Kennedy commented to his journalist friend Ben Bradlee, "The first advice I'm going to give my successor is to watch the generals and to avoid feeling that because they were military men their opinions on military matters were worth a damn."

The aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion and events involving Cuba that followed caused the U.S. to feel threatened by its neighbor. Prior to the events at Playa Girón, the U.S. government imposed sanctions that limited trade with Cuba. An article appearing in The New York Times dated 6 January 1960 called trade with Cuba "too risky." About six months later in July 1960, the U.S. reduced the import quota of Cuban sugar, leaving the U.S. to increase its sugar supply using other sources. Immediately following the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Kennedy Administration considered a complete embargo. Five months later, the president was authorized to do so.

According to author Jim Rasenberger, the Kennedy administration became very aggressive in regards to overthrowing Castro following the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, reportedly doubling its efforts. Rasenberger elaborated on the fact that almost every decision that was made by Kennedy following the Bay of Pigs had some correlation with the destruction of the Castro administration. Shortly after the invasion ended, Kennedy ordered the Pentagon to design secret operations to overthrow the Castro regime. Also, President Kennedy persuaded his brother Robert to set up a covert action against Castro which was known as " Operation Mongoose." This clandestine operation included sabotage and assassination plots.

On 22 April 1961, President Kennedy asked General Maxwell D. Taylor, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke and CIA Director Allen Dulles to form the Cuba Study Group, to report on lessons to learn from the failed operation. General Taylor submitted the Board of Inquiry's report to President Kennedy on 13 June. It attributed the defeat to lack of early realization of the impossibility of success by covert means, to inadequate aircraft, to limitations on armaments, pilots, and air attacks set to attempt plausible deniability - and, ultimately, to loss of important ships and lack of ammunition. The Taylor Commission was criticized, and bias implied. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy the President's brother, was included in the group, and the commission collectively was seen to be more preoccupied with deflecting blame from the White House than concerned with realizing the real depth of mistakes that promoted the failure in Cuba. Jack Pfeiffer, who worked as a historian for the CIA until the mid-1980s, simplified his own view of the failed Bay of Pigs effort by quoting a statement which Raúl Castro, Fidel's brother, had made to a Mexican journalist in 1975: "Kennedy vacillated," Raúl Castro said. "If at that moment he had decided to invade us, he could have suffocated the island in a sea of blood, but he could have destroyed the revolution. Lucky for us, he vacillated."

In November 1961, CIA Inspector-General Lyman B Kirkpatrick authored a report, "Survey of the Cuban Operation", that remained classified until 1998. Conclusions were:

1. The CIA exceeded its capabilities in developing the project from guerrilla support to overt armed action without any plausible deniability.

2. Failure to realistically assess risks and to adequately communicate information and decisions internally and with other government principals.

3. Insufficient involvement of leaders of the exiles.

4. Failure to sufficiently organize internal resistance in Cuba.

5. Failure to competently collect and analyze intelligence about Cuban forces.

6. Poor internal management of communications and staff.

7. Insufficient employment of high-quality staff.

8. Insufficient Spanish-speakers, training facilities, and material resources.

9. Lack of stable policies and/or contingency plans.

In spite of vigorous objections by CIA management to the findings, CIA Director Allen Dulles, CIA Deputy Director Charles Cabell, and Deputy Director for Plans Richard M. Bissell Jr. were all forced to resign by early 1962. In later years, the CIA's behavior in the event became the prime example cited for the psychology paradigm known as groupthink syndrome. Further study shows that among various components of groupthink analyzed by Irving Janis, the Bay of Pigs Invasion followed the structural characteristics that led to irrational decision making in foreign policy pushed by deficiency in impartial leadership. An account on the process of invasion decision reads,

At each meeting, instead of opening up the agenda to permit a full airing of the opposing considerations, [President Kennedy] allowed the CIA representatives to dominate the entire discussion. The president permitted them to refute each tentative doubt immediately that one of the others might express, instead of asking whether anyone else had the same doubt or wanted to pursue the implications of the new worrisome issue that had been raised.

Looking at both the Survey of the Cuban Operation and Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes by Irving Janis, it identifies the lack of communication and the mere assumption of concurrence to be the main causes behind the CIA and the president's collective failure to efficiently evaluate the facts before them. A considerable amount of information presented before President Kennedy proved to be false in reality, such as the support of the Cuban people for Fidel Castro, making it difficult to assess the actual situation and the future of the operation. The absence of the initiative to explore other options of the debate led the participants to remain optimistic and rigid in their belief that the mission would succeed, being unknowingly biased in the group psychology of wishful thinking as well.

In mid-1960, CIA operative E. Howard Hunt had interviewed Cubans in Havana; in a 1997 interview with CNN, he said, "...all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."

For many Latin Americans, the Bay of Pigs Invasion served to reinforce the already widely held belief that the U.S. could not be trusted. The invasion also illustrated that the U.S. could be defeated, and thus the failed invasion encouraged political groups across the Latin American region to find ways to undermine U.S. influence. Historians often attest the Bay of Pigs fiasco made Castro even more popular, adding nationalistic sentiments in support of his economic policies. Following the air attacks on Cuban airfields on 15 April, he declared the revolution " Marxist-Leninist". After the invasion, he pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for protection, that helped pave the way for the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Castro was then increasingly wary of further U.S. intervention and more open to Soviet suggestions of placing nuclear weapons on Cuba to ensure its security.

In March 2001, shortly before the 40th anniversary of the invasion, a conference took place in Havana, attended by about 60 American delegates. The conference was titled Bay of Pigs: 40 Years After. The conference was co-sponsored by the University of Havana, Centro de Estudios Sobre Estados Unidos, Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Centro de Investigaciones Históricas de la Seguridad del Estado; Centro de Estudios Sobre America, and the U.S.-based National Security Archive. It commenced on Thursday 22 March 2001 at the Hotel Palco, Palacio de las Convenciones, La Habana. On 24 March, following the formal conference, many of the delegates and observers travelled by road to Australia sugar mill, Playa Larga, and Playa Girón, the site of the initial landing in the invasion. A documentary film was made of that trip, titled Cuba: The 40 Years War, released on DVD in 2002. A Cuban FAR combatant at the Bay of Pigs, José Ramón Fernández, attended the conference, as did four members of Brigade 2506, Roberto Carballo, Mario Cabello, Alfredo Duran, and Luis Tornes.

There are still yearly nationwide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (Defense Day), to prepare the population for an invasion.

Many who fought for the CIA in the conflict remained loyal after the event; some Bay of Pigs veterans became officers in the U.S. Army in the Vietnam War, including 6 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels, 9 majors, and 29 captains. By March 2007, about half of the brigade had died. In April 2010, the Cuban Pilot's Association unveiled a monument at the Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport in memory of the 16 aviators for the exile side killed during the battle. The memorial consists of an obelisk and a restored B-26 replica aircraft atop a large Cuban flag.

Only 3 percent of Americans supported military action in 1960. According to Gallup, 72% of people had a negative view of Fidel Castro in 1960. After the conflict, 61% of Americans approved of the action, while 15% disapproved and 24% were unsure. This poll was taken by Gallup in late April 1966. A week after the invasion of Cuba, Gallup took another series of polls to sample three possible ways of opposing Castro. The policy that most resembled the Bay of Pigs (if the US "should aid the anti-Castro forces with money and war materials") was still favored by a narrow margin, 44% approval to 41% rejecting this policy.

Kennedy's general approval rating increased in the first survey after the invasion, rising from 78 percent in mid-April to 83 percent in late April and early May. Dr. Gallup's headline for this poll read, "Public Rallies Behind Kennedy in Aftermath of Cuban Crisis." In 1963 a public opinion poll showed 60 percent of Americans believed that Cuba is "a serious threat to world peace," yet 63 percent of Americans did not want the U.S. to remove Castro.

After the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the construction of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy believed that another failure on the part of the United States to gain control and stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S. credibility with its allies and his own reputation. Kennedy was thus determined to "draw a line in the sand" and prevent a communist victory in the Vietnam War. He told James Reston of The New York Times immediately after his Vienna meeting with Khrushchev, "Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place."

Ambrose, Stephen E. (2007). Eisenhower: Soldier and President. American Political Biography Press. ISBN 978-0945707394.

Bohning, Don (2005). The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959-1965. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books. ISBN 978-1574886764.

Bourne, Peter G. (1986). Fidel: A Biography of Fidel Castro. New York City: Dodd, Mead & Company. ISBN 978-0396085188..

Castro, Fidel (2009). My Life: A Spoken Autobiography. Interviewed by Ramonet, Ignacio. New York: Scribner. ISBN 978-1416562337..

Coltman, Leycester (2003). . New Haven and London: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0300107609.

Franqui, Carlos (1984). Family portrait with Fidel. Random House. ISBN 0394726200, 978-0394726205. pp. 111-28.

Fineman, Mark (1998). "Bay of Pigs: the Secret Death of Pete Ray."

Gleijeses, Piero (February 1995). "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs". Journal of Latin American Studies. 27 (1): 1-42. doi:10.1017/S0022216X00010154. ISSN 0022-216X. JSTOR 158201. S2CID 146390097.

Glennon, John P. (ed.). Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960: Volume VI: Cuba. U.S. Department of State.

Hunt, E. Howard (1973). Give Us This Day. Arlington House. ISBN 978-0870002281.

Kellner, Douglas (1989). Ernesto "Che" Guevara (World Leaders Past & Present). Chelsea House Publishers. p. 112. ISBN 978-1555468354.

Kornbluh, Peter (1998). Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. The New Press. ISBN 1565844947, 978-1565844940.

Lagas, Jacques (1964). Memorias de un capitán rebelde. Editorial del Pácifico. Santiago, Chile.

Lynch, Grayston L. (1998). Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs. Brassey's. ISBN 1574881485.

Pfeiffer, Jack B. (September 1979). Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation. Central Intelligence Agency.

Quirk, Robert E. (1993). Fidel Castro. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0393034851..

Quesada, Alejandro de (2009). The Bay of Pigs: Cuba 1961. Elite series #166. Illustrated by Stephen Walsh. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1846033230..

Rodríguez, Juan Carlos (1999). Bay of Pigs and the CIA. Ocean Press. ISBN 978-1-875284986..

Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. (1965, 2002). A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Houghton Mifflin ISBN 1579124496, 978-1579124496.

Jean Edward Smith (Apr. 13, 1964). Bay of Pigs: The Unanswered Questions. , pp. 360-63.

Somoza Debayle, Anastasio and Jack Cox. 1980. Nicaragua Betrayed. Western Islands. pp. 169-80. ISBN 0882792350, 978-0882792354.

Szulc, Tad, and Karl E. Meyer (1962). The Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster. Praegar.

Szulc, Tad (1986). Fidel: A Critical Portrait. Hutchinson ISBN 0091726026.

Thomas, Hugh (1971, 1986). The Cuban Revolution. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. (Shortened version of Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom, includes all history 1952-1970). ISBN 0297789546.

Triay, Victor Andres (2001). Bay of Pigs: An Oral History of Brigade 2506. University Press of Florida ISBN 0813020905, 978-0813020907.

Von Tunzelmann, Alex (2011). Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder, and the Cold War in the Caribbean. New York City: Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 978-0805090673.

Wyden, Peter. 1979. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. Simon & Schuster ISBN 0671240064, 0224017543, 9780671240066

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Bay of Pigs Invasion Part of the Cold War Counter-attack by Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces near Playa Girón, 19 April 1961 Belligerents Cuba Commanders and leaders Units involved U.S. Navy Strength 1,500 ground forces[b] 16 B-26 bombers 8 C-46 transport planes. 6 C-54 transport planes.

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East German workers near the Brandenburg Gate reinforce the Berlin Wall in 1961. (Photo/research.archives.gov)

The man's voice choked with emotion as he recounted how as a child, his family would gather each year on Aug. 14 to celebrate his birthday.

Until 1961, when everything changed.

On Aug. 13, his family heard on the news that the border between East and West Germany had been closed.

"The next day we got a phone call from my aunt saying, 'We can't come to visit, we can't get across.' So we drove to the border," said the man who is speaking German in the 2011 documentary Behind the Wall. His family was now divided.

That was very sad, to see how there was this border suddenly. There was nothing but barbed wire and we couldn't cross anymore.

Speaker in Behind the Wall

"That was very sad, to see how there was this border suddenly. There was nothing but barbed wire and we couldn't cross anymore."

The scene was one of many moving first-person accounts featured in the film, screened at the University Park Campus to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Behind the Wall documents what life was like on both sides of the wall as seen through the eyes of a diverse range of ordinary citizens from East and West Germany. The psychological impact of the Wall, as well as the jubilation of November 1989 and its aftermath, are explored, along with the positive and negative effects of reunification.

Eyewitness testimony

Projected onto the brick wall of the courtyard of LiteraTea at Doheny Library, flickering black and white images showed East German border guards unrolling barbed wire, watched by solemn Berliners. Those 1961 scenes and many more historical images from subsequent years were interspersed with contemporary footage, including eyewitness testimony.

Organized by the USC German Studies Program and sponsored by the German Consulate, the USC Max Kade Institute for Austrian-German-Swiss Studies and USC's Feuchtwanger Memorial Library, the event featured opening remarks by Britta Bothe, associate professor of German at USC Dornsife. It also included talks by Robert English, associate professor and director of international relations, and Cristina Cuevas-Wolf, resident historian at the Wende Museum in Los Angeles and a Max Kade Institute scholar.

Cuevas-Wolf showed artifacts from the museum, including a wedge-shaped, graffiti-sprayed chunk of the wall and an East German border guard's cap.

The documentary was followed by a question-and-answer session with English, Cuevas-Wolf, Bothe and Paul Lerner, associate professor of history and director of the Max Kade Institute.

A cruel barrier

For the German people, the fall of the Berlin Wall spelled the end of this artificial division of their nation into two states.

Robert English

"For the German people, the fall of the Berlin Wall spelled the end of this artificial division of their nation into two states," English said. "It meant the end of travel restrictions that had divided friendships, families and even marriages. The Berlin Wall was a horrific aberration, a cruel barrier that caused great suffering."

The most important milestone marking the end of the Cold War - the dominant geopolitical struggle of the late 20th century - the fall of the Berlin Wall has the power to inspire us today, English and Bothe noted.

"It marked the first major event in history where an entrenched conflict abruptly ended without tremendous bloodshed and loss of life," Bothe said. "The involvement of individual citizens did count and ultimately helped bring about change."

The wall was erected on the night of Aug. 12, 1961, to isolate the postwar allied western sectors of the former German capital from Soviet occupied East Berlin. The barbed wire that formed the initial barrier was swiftly covered with bricks and mortar. It was later reinforced multiple times to become an impenetrable 12-foot high concrete wall, roughly 100 miles long.

Berliners were shocked when they woke up Aug. 13. The relatively fluid border, which had allowed some 60,000 East Germans to commute daily to well-paying jobs in the West, to visit friends and loved ones, attend soccer matches and concerts, or go to the theater, was gone. Whichever side of the border one had gone to sleep on Aug. 12 was where one was stuck for the next 28 years.

"Officially known in East Germany as the Anti-Fascist Protection Barrier, it was in fact meant, not to keep out Western spies and infiltrators, but to keep the citizens of East Germany in," English said. From the end of World War II until the wall's erection in 1961, some three and a half million East Germans had escaped to the West - about 20 percent of the East German population.

"After the wall's construction, between 1961 and 1989, an additional 5,000 people attempted to escape the so-called 'workers paradise' in socialist East Germany, with at least 200 fatalities," English said.

Gorbachev's perestroika

The fall of the Berlin Wall came as reform demands and mass protests quickly spread in response to Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika - the Soviet leader's "restructuring" of the Soviet Union's political and economic system to become more open.

"November 1989 is a tribute to both Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the American and Soviet leaders, who had begun cutting arms, lowering tension and negotiating a few years previously," English added.

"The chaotic decision to open the barriers and allow East Germans to flood west and the concerted decision of the Soviet leadership not to interfere or use military force to halt the exodus became the pivotal climatic turning point in the long Cold War's final end.

"The joyous crowds chanting 'We are one people' celebrated not only the long hoped-for reunification of the German nation which subsequently has been largely successful, but also the even longer dreamed-of reconciliation of Russia with Europe and the West, a project that recent events have cast in doubt."

Sober reality

However, initial joy became tinged with bittersweet nostalgia for many East Germans.

After reunification, many Germans woke up to the sober reality of the complicated process of uniting two countries that had existed as separate entities for 28 years.

Britta Bothe

"After reunification, many Germans woke up to the sober reality of the complicated process of uniting two countries that had existed as separate entities for 28 years," said Bothe.

In the documentary, many East Germans spoke of the loss of community after reunification and their previously unknown fear of unemployment. Some felt they were treated as second-class citizens by West Germans.

USC German Studies Club President Margaret "M.E." Purnell, an international relations major with a German studies minor at USC Dornsife, said she was moved by the film.

"It was great to get some perspective on the positive aspects of East Germany, which we don't hear so much about."

More stories about: German Studies, History

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Remembering the night the Berlin Wall went up - and when it came down - USC News

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The man's voice choked with emotion as he recounted how as a child, his family would gather each year on Aug. 14 to celebrate his birthday. Until 1961, when everything changed. On Aug. 13, his family heard on the news that the border between East and West Germany had been closed.

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In late September 1962, U.S. spy planes flying over Cuba discovered the presence of Soviet-made medium-range nuclear missiles on the island. The result, played out through the month of October, was the most serious foreign policy crisis of the Kennedy White House-indeed, probably the most serious foreign policy crisis in the history of the Cold War. Cuba was a mere ninety miles from the coast of Florida, and missiles fired from there could easily strike targets in the United States as far north as Cincinnati, and as far west as San Antonio-and with minimal warning time. Perhaps even more importantly, Kennedy felt that American prestige (as well as his own) was on the line; as recently as September 4 the president had given a speech in which he warned the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, against placing any such weapons in Cuba. That Khrushchev had done so in spite of this warning seemed to demand a response.

While most Americans remained blissfully unaware of the situation, the CIA formally presented its findings to President Kennedy and his "ExComm" (short for "Executive Committee," made up of several cabinet members and other major advisers) on October 16. The group considered a range of options for responding to the challenge, from opening face-to-face negotiations with the Soviets to launching an all-out invasion of Cuba. In the end they settled on a blockade of the Cuban coast-although for purposes of international law it was referred to as a "quarantine" rather than a blockade. Until the missile sites had been dismantled U.S. warships would stop and search all ships approaching the island for equipment related to the missiles. Those that were found to be carrying such equipment would be turned back.

Kennedy announced his decision to the American people in a radio broadcast on October 22, and U.S. warships immediately began stopping Soviet vessels bound for Cuban shores. For the next several days it seemed that the world hovered on the brink of a nuclear war, while feverish negotiations continued between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Finally, on October 27 a deal was struck-the Soviets agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba in return for promises from the United States not to invade Cuba, and to pressure NATO into withdrawing its medium-range missiles from Turkey. On November 20, convinced that the last missile sites had been dismantled, Kennedy ordered an end to the "quarantine."

The crisis had several long-range effects. Fidel Castro, the pro-Soviet president of Cuba, felt betrayed by the Soviet leadership, since he had not been consulted at all on the settlement. More importantly, leaders in both the United States and the Soviet Union seemed genuinely rattled at how close they had come to nuclear conflict. In the months ahead they agreed to the installation of a telephone "hotline" connecting the White House and the Kremlin and allowing for instantaneous negotiation between the two. In addition, the two sides began the first steps toward limiting the nuclear arms race, working toward a treaty-eventually signed in August 1963-banning the above-ground testing of nuclear weapons.

NCSS.D2.His.1.9-12. Evaluate how historical events and developments were shaped by unique circumstances of time and place as well as broader historical contexts.

NCSS.D2.His.2.9-12. Analyze change and continuity in historical eras.

NCSS.D2.His.3.9-12. Use questions generated about individuals and groups to assess how the significance of their actions changes over time and is shaped by the historical context.

NCSS.D2.His.4.9-12. Analyze complex and interacting factors that influenced the perspectives of people during different historical eras.

NCSS.D2.His.14.9-12. Analyze multiple and complex causes and effects of events in the past.

NCSS.D2.His.15.9-12. Distinguish between long-term causes and triggering events in developing a historical argument.

NCSS.D2.His.16.9-12. Integrate evidence from multiple relevant historical sources and interpretations into a reasoned argument about the past.

Activity 1. The Discovery of the Missiles

How did Fidel Castro come to power? Why did Castro oppose U.S. involvement in Cuba? Why did he form an alliance with the Soviet Union? These questions and the road to the Cuban Missile Crisis are addressed in the above episode of the documentary series on the Cold War that focuses on Cuba (1959-1962). The episode includes original television reports, photographs and maps of the missiles in Cuba, and interviews with those who were living in Cuba and working in the U.S. government at the time.

The first activity will have students, either individually or in groups, take on the role of analysts for the CIA. First have them read the following statement that Kennedy made on September 4, 1962, warning the Soviets against placing missiles in Cuba.

Next they should study the following documents, most of which the CIA presented to Kennedy in his briefings during the early days of the crisis. These include:

Note that documents 2-6 are actually images, so teachers might choose to recreate the tension of this event by using a projector to show them to the entire class.

As CIA analysts, the students' job is to draft a memorandum for the president, in which they must explain to him why the presence of these missiles presents a threat to U.S. national security. (Students might be asked to do this individually, or in small groups, at the teacher's discretion.) A worksheet with the documents and directions-including an excerpt from the last document (#7), which in its complete form is quite lengthy-is included as pages 1-2 of the PDF Text Document accompanying this lesson. Because some of these materials include technical terms related to Soviet weaponry, a brief glossary has been provided on page 3 of the PDF Text Document.

Activity 2. Days of Decision

Now that students have determined that the presence of the missiles constitutes a threat to national security, the second activity will put them, either individually or in groups, into the role of President Kennedy through the use of the interactive exercise. They will be presented with a menu of possible options, and then will have the opportunity to consult with advisers before choosing one of the options. By scrolling over the photograph of Kennedy and his cabinet, the names of certain advisers will appear. By clicking on a name a brief list of statements by that individual will appear at the bottom of the screen. After they have done this, students should next read the "Special Intelligence Estimate" prepared by the CIA; this will appear when the "Special Intelligence Estimate" tab is clicked.

After students have consulted the cabinet and the Special Intelligence Estimate, they should make a decision regarding how to respond to the missiles in Cuba, and click on the option that most closely resembles their choice. This will produce a brief narrative explaining whether or not this was also the decision reached by the president, and why or why not. Once students have completed the exercise, teachers should conduct a class discussion about why they chose the options they did. After they have done so the class will move on to the third activity, which deals with Kennedy's actual response.

A worksheet to help guide students through this exercise is available on pages 4-5 of the PDF Text Document.

Activity 3. Kennedy's "Quarantine" Speech

By October 22 President Kennedy had made his decision; it was now time to announce it to the world. For the third activity students will read the text of Kennedy's radio and television address to the nation, in which he announced the "quarantine" of Cuba. The full text is available at the website of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (accessible via the EDSITEment-reviewed site POTUS). Located at the same site is an audio version of the document, which teachers might wish to have students listen to. An excerpted version, which includes the most important sections of the speech, is also available on pages 6-8 of the PDF Text Document.

After reading or viewing the speech (or its excerpts), students should answer the following questions (included on a worksheet on page 8 of the PDF Text Document):

What, according to Kennedy, was the purpose of the missile sites in Cuba?

Why, according to Kennedy, did the presence of the missiles pose a threat to the United States?

Kennedy referred to the 1930s. To what was he referring and, more importantly, what was to be learned from it?

Kennedy's first action was to institute a "strict quarantine." What did he mean by this?

What other steps did Kennedy plan to take?

Teachers may wish to conclude this activity with a class discussion of the speech; i.e., whether Kennedy made the right choice, what its implications were, and how effective the speech was in conveying the seriousness of the situation.

Activity 4. Resolving the Crisis

It was on October 22 that the crisis began in earnest, for on that day Kennedy revealed to the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev-and to the rest of the world-that he was aware of the missiles in Cuba. The result was a week of furious negotiation between the two sides, while U.S. warships began stopping Soviet vessels off the Cuban coast. In the fourth and final activity students will read excerpts from the following seven documents-correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev, in which the two sides negotiate a deal for the removal of the missiles. This exchange may be found in its entirety at the EDSITEment-reviewed site " The Avalon Project." Excerpts have been provided on pages 9-13 of the PDF Text Document that accompanies this lesson.

Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, October 22, 1962

Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 24, 1962

Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, October 25, 1962

Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, October 26, 1962

Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962

Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, October 27, 1962

Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 28, 1962

The above video is an excerpt from a BBC series on the Cold War. Unique to this excerpt is inclusion of the perspectives of Soviet citizens on what was taking place in Cuba and how the decisions being made in Washington, D.C. might affect those in the Soviet Union.

Students might be asked to do this reading on their own as homework. Alternatively teachers might select students to read particular sections aloud in class. Either way, the activity should conclude with an in-class discussion focusing on the following questions:

What did Kennedy agree to do to end the crisis?

What did Khrushchev agree to do to end the crisis?

On balance, did either side "win" in the end? If so, which one, and why?

After completing this lesson, students should be able to write brief (1-2 paragraphs) essays answering the following questions:

Why was the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba a problem for the United States?

What options did Kennedy and his advisers consider in response to the missiles?

What course did Kennedy choose, and why?

How was the crisis ultimately resolved?

For more advanced students these four might be combined into a single, longer essay:

Why did the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba trigger an international crisis, and how was that crisis resolved?

Finally, to encourage critical thinking about this episode, students might be asked to write an essay in response to the following:

Evaluate President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Teachers who have additional time to devote to this subject might want to show their students the 2000 Hollywood film Thirteen Days, which is a dramatization of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Afterward students can discuss how the events in the film compared to what they have learned in this lesson. For one historian's take on the film, see " Thirteen Days' Doesn't Add Up," located at the EDSITEment-reviewed resource History Matters.

In the wake of the crisis Kennedy and Khrushchev both agreed that some more efficient means of communications had to be found between Washington and Moscow in order to prevent future crises from escalating. This led to the installation of a "hotline" in which either the President of the United States could pick up a telephone and be immediately connected with his counterpart in the Soviet Union, or vice versa. Teachers may wish to have students read the memorandum that established this hotline, available at the EDSITEment-reviewed resource The Avalon Project at Yale University. It might be worth asking why both sides might, as the result of the crisis, have considered this to be important. Having students look back at the correspondence between JFK and Khrushchev (see Activity #4)-paying particular attention to the fact that it took place over a seven-day period-might help them better understand the two men's reasoning.

Teachers might also wish to have students construct a timeline of the events surrounding the crisis. An online template for this is available at "Read-Write-Think." An excellent source of information to help students fill in the gaps is " The World on the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis," an online exhibit of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The Missiles of October

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Most historians agree that the world has never come closer to nuclear war than it did during a thirteen-day period in October 1962, after the revelation that the Soviet Union had stationed several medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. This lesson will examine how this crisis developed, how the Kennedy administration chose to respond, and how the situation was ultimately resolved.

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Table of Contents

1. Lee Harvey Oswald's Earlier Life

2. President and Governor Shot in Motorcade

3. Lyndon B. Johnson Sworn In

4. Lee Harvey Oswald Shot

5. JFK Funeral

6. Investigation Ends, Conspiracy Theories Begin

President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, at 12:30 p.m. while riding in a motorcade in Dallas during a campaign visit. Shots rang out as Kennedy's motorcade turned past the Texas School Book Depository at Dealey Plaza, with crowds lining the streets. The driver of the president's Lincoln limousine, with its top off, raced to nearby Parkland Memorial Hospital, but after being shot in the neck and head, Kennedy was pronounced dead at 1 p.m. He was 46 years old. A generation of Americans would forever remember where they were when they heard about the president's assassination, as it would have a profound political and cultural impact on the nation.

By 2:15 p.m., Lee Harvey Oswald, a new employee at the Book Depository, was arrested for JFK's assassination, as well as for the fatal 1:15 p.m. shooting of Dallas patrolman J.D. Tippit. Two days later, on Nov. 24, Oswald would be murdered by local nightclub owner and police informant Jack Ruby at point-blank range and on live TV.

Lee Harvey Oswald's Earlier Life

Oswald was born in New Orleans in 1939. His father died of a heart attack two months before he was born. After living off and on in orphanages as a boy, he moved with his mother to New York at age 12, where he was sent to a youth detention center for truancy. It was during this time that he became interested in socialism. After moving back to New Orleans, Oswald joined the Marines in 1956, where he earned a sharpshooter qualification, and discovered Marxism.

Upon receiving an early honorable discharge from the Marines in 1959, he defected to the Soviet Union for two and a half years, where he was denied citizenship, but allowed to stay in the country-and was monitored by the KGB. Upon learning that Oswald had wanted to defect, the Marines downgraded his 1959 discharge from "honorable" to "undesirable" in 1962. Later that year, Oswald returned to Texas with his Soviet wife and young daughter.

Kennedy

Watch the three-episode documentary event, Kennedy. Available to stream now.

One year later, Oswald would purchase, by mail, a rifle with telescopic sight and a .38 revolver. That year, he attempted to shoot retired United States Major General Edwin A. Walker who had been a staunch critic of communism. Later in 1963, Oswald was denied passage to Cuba and the U.S.S.R. during a trip to Mexico City. He returned to Texas and started a job at the Texas School Book Depository in Dallas.

In an interview with " Frontline," investigative journalist Gerald Posner said Oswald's hatred wasn't for Kennedy. "What he did hate was the system and what Kennedy stood for," Posner tells the PBS show. "He despised America. He despised capitalism. When he eventually had the opportunity to strike against Kennedy, it was that symbol of the system that he was going after."

President and Governor Shot in Motorcade

According to the official investigation, Oswald acted alone, firing three bullets from a sixth-floor window at the southeast corner of the Book Depository. Kennedy was struck once in the upper back and once in the head and slumped over onto his wife, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy. Texas Governor John B. Connally Jr., who was also in the limo with his wife, was shot once in the back. He later recovered from his injuries. After killing Tippit, Oswald was arrested a few minutes later in the back of a movie theater.

"The man is 24-year-old Lee Oswald, espouser of leftist causes, an active member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, an avowed admirer of Russia and of Cuba's Fidel Castro, a man who once lived in Russia," Dan Rather reported on CBS News at the time.

During his interrogation, Oswald denied any guilt. "I didn't shoot anybody, no sir ... I'm just a patsy," he told reporters.

Lyndon B. Johnson Sworn In

The first lady and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had been three cars behind Kennedy in the motorcade, returned to Air Force One at Dallas Love Field with Kennedy's body, in a bronze casket.

Johnson was sworn in at 2:38 p.m. as the 36th president of the United States while aboard the airplane prior to takeoff. Jacqueline Kennedy, still in a pink suit splattered with blood, stood at Johnson's side. An autopsy on Kennedy's body was performed at Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland.

"This is a sad time for all people. We have suffered a loss that cannot be weighed," Johnson said in his first public statement as president. "For me, it is a deep personal tragedy. I know that the world shares the sorrow that Mrs. Kennedy and her family bear. I will do my best. That is all I can do. I ask for your help-and God's,"

On November 23, 1963, Johnson declared November 25 a national day of mourning.

Lee Harvey Oswald Shot

On Sunday morning, November 24, in front of the press, Oswald was being led to be transferred to the county jail from Dallas Police Headquarters. "The Dallas police were extremely worried for the safety of their prisoner," KRLD radio reporter Bob Huffaker, who was there, told CBS News. "We knew that Oswald was the most hated suspect of the 20th century."

Ruby shot Oswald point-blank in the stomach with a small-caliber pistol. Oswald died at Parkland Hospital, where Kennedy had died two days earlier.

Ruby was indicted on November 26 and convicted of murdering Oswald and sentenced to death by electric chair. The ruling was overturned on appeal, but Ruby died of a pulmonary embolism stemming from lung cancer in 1967 before a new trial could take place.

JFK Funeral

On November 25, a horse-drawn caisson carried Kennedy's flag-draped coffin to St. Matthew's Catholic Cathedral from the Capitol Rotunda. More than 800,000 people lined Pennsylvania Avenue to watch the procession, according to the Washington Post.

"The president's caisson was drawn by four horses, including the riderless horse named Black Jack, a 'magnificent black gelding,' according to the JFK Library, which carried an empty saddle and saber," the newspaper reported. "Boots were reversed in the stirrups. 'The riderless horse,' the JFK Library explained, 'is one of the highest military honors bestowed upon the fallen.' "

Kennedy was buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery, following the requiem mass, with leaders from dozens of nations in attendance. Jacqueline Kennedy lit the eternal flame that has continued to flicker since JFK's death.

Investigation Ends, Conspiracy Theories Begin

The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy-known as the Warren Commission -concluded "the shots which killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally were fired from the sixth-floor window at the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository." It also said, "The shots which killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally were fired by Lee Harvey Oswald."

Despite the official finding, many believe Oswald didn't act alone, or that other conspirators-from the world of organized crime to the CIA to Cuban exiles-are responsible for Kennedy's assassination. A 2017 poll by FiveThirtyEight, found just 33 percent of Americans believe Oswald alone killed Kennedy. Some 30,000 never-before-seen or un-redacted documents were released to the public by the National Archives in 2017 and 2018.

Sources

" November 22, 1963: Death of the President," John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum

" Who Was Lee Harvey Oswald? " Frontline, PBS

" The Warren Commission Report," National Archives

" The day John F. Kennedy was killed: How America mourned a fallen president," The Washington Post

" Accused JFK assassin is arrested, then gunned down," CBS News

Fact Check

We strive for accuracy and fairness. But if you see something that doesn't look right, click here to contact us! HISTORY reviews and updates its content regularly to ensure it is complete and accurate.

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Assassination of John F. Kennedy - Facts, Investigation, Photos | HISTORY

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Facts about President John. F. Kennedy's assassination in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963-and the investigation and conspiracy theories that followed.

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JFK's Pledge Leads to Start of Apollo Program

The American effort to send astronauts to the moon had its origins in an appeal President Kennedy made to a special joint session of Congress on May 25, 1961: "I believe this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to Earth."

At the time, the United States was still trailing the Soviet Union in space developments, and Cold War-era America welcomed Kennedy's bold proposal. In 1966, after five years of work by an international team of scientists and engineers, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducted the first unmanned Apollo mission, testing the structural integrity of the proposed launch vehicle and spacecraft combination.

Then, on January 27, 1967, tragedy struck at Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida, when a fire broke out during a manned launch-pad test of the Apollo spacecraft and Saturn rocket. Three astronauts were killed in the fire.

President Richard Nixon spoke with Armstrong and Aldrin via a telephone radio transmission shortly after they planted the American flag on the lunar surface. Nixon considered it the "most historic phone call ever made from the White House."

Despite the setback, NASA and its thousands of employees forged ahead, and in October 1968, Apollo 7, the first manned Apollo mission, orbited Earth and successfully tested many of the sophisticated systems needed to conduct a moon journey and landing.

In December of the same year, Apollo 8 took three astronauts to the far side of the moon and back, and in March 1969 Apollo 9 tested the lunar module for the first time while in Earth orbit. That May, the three astronauts of Apollo 10 took the first complete Apollo spacecraft around the moon in a dry run for the scheduled July landing mission.

Timeline of the 1969 Moon Landing

At 9:32 a.m. EDT on July 16, with the world watching, Apollo 11 took off from Kennedy Space Center with astronauts Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin and Michael Collins (1930-) aboard. Armstrong, a 38-year-old civilian research pilot, was the commander of the mission.

After traveling 240,000 miles in 76 hours, Apollo 11 entered into a lunar orbit on July 19. The next day, at 1:46 p.m., the lunar module Eagle, manned by Armstrong and Aldrin, separated from the command module, where Collins remained. Two hours later, the Eagle began its descent to the lunar surface, and at 4:17 p.m. the craft touched down on the southwestern edge of the Sea of Tranquility. Armstrong immediately radioed to Mission Control in Houston, Texas, a now-famous message: "The Eagle has landed."

At 10:39 p.m., five hours ahead of the original schedule, Armstrong opened the hatch of the lunar module. As he made his way down the module's ladder, a television camera attached to the craft recorded his progress and beamed the signal back to Earth, where hundreds of millions watched in great anticipation.

At 10:56 p.m., as Armstrong stepped off the ladder and planted his foot on the moon's powdery surface, he spoke his famous quote, which he later contended was slightly garbled by his microphone and meant to be "that's one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind."

Aldrin joined him on the moon's surface 19 minutes later, and together they took photographs of the terrain, planted a U.S. flag, ran a few simple scientific tests and spoke with President Richard Nixon (1913-94) via Houston.

By 1:11 a.m. on July 21, both astronauts were back in the lunar module and the hatch was closed. The two men slept that night on the surface of the moon, and at 1:54 p.m. the Eagle began its ascent back to the command module. Among the items left on the surface of the moon was a plaque that read: "Here men from the planet Earth first set foot on the moon-July 1969 A.D.-We came in peace for all mankind."

At 5:35 p.m., Armstrong and Aldrin successfully docked and rejoined Collins, and at 12:56 a.m. on July 22 Apollo 11 began its journey home, safely splashing down in the Pacific Ocean at 12:50 p.m. on July 24.

How Many Times Did the US Land on the Moon?

There would be five more successful lunar landing missions, and one unplanned lunar swing-by. Apollo 13 had to abort its lunar landing due to technical difficulties. The last men to walk on the moon, astronauts Eugene Cernan (1934-2017) and Harrison Schmitt (1935-) of the Apollo 17 mission, left the lunar surface on December 14, 1972.

The Apollo program was a costly and labor-intensive endeavor, involving an estimated 400,000 engineers, technicians and scientists, and costing $24 billion (close to $100 billion in today's dollars). The expense was justified by Kennedy's 1961 mandate to beat the Soviets to the moon, and after the feat was accomplished, ongoing missions lost their viability.

HISTORY Vault: Moon Landing: The Lost Tapes

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1969 Moon Landing - Date, Facts, Video | HISTORY

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On July 20, 1969, two American astronauts landed on the moon and became the first humans to walk on the lunar surface. The event marked the culmination of a nearly decade-long intense push to meet a challenge posed by President John F. Kennedy.