# data[].attributes.body
This article explain that Venezuela is a "petrostate" which mean they rely heavily on revenue from natural resources such as oil reserves. The oil money is easily laundered to shell companies oftenly owned by high ranking officials and wealthy businessmen. It then explain what the corruption has done to the petrostate such as its inflation, crime, GDP, and growing autocracy.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Introduction

Venezuela, home to the world's largest oil reserves, is a case study in the perils of becoming a petrostate. Since it was discovered in the country in the 1920s, oil has taken Venezuela on an exhilarating but dangerous boom-and-bust ride that offers lessons for other resource-rich states. Decades of poor governance have driven what was once one of Latin America's most prosperous countries to economic and political ruin.

Venezuela has suffered economic collapse in recent years, with output shrinking by three-quarters and rampant hyperinflation contributing to a scarcity of basic goods. Meanwhile, government mismanagement and U.S. sanctions have led to a drastic decline in oil production and severe underinvestment in the sector. But Caracas hopes that Washington's 2022 decision to allow U.S. oil giant Chevron to resume operations in the country could signal a potential détente.

What is a petrostate?

Petrostate is an informal term used to describe a country with several interrelated attributes:

government income is deeply reliant on the export of oil and natural gas,

economic and political power are highly concentrated in an elite minority, and

political institutions are weak and unaccountable, and corruption is widespread.

Countries often described as petrostates include Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.

What's behind the petrostate paradigm?

Petrostates are thought to be vulnerable to what economists call Dutch disease, a term coined during the 1970s after the Netherlands discovered natural gas in the North Sea.

In an afflicted country, a resource boom attracts large inflows of foreign capital, which leads to an appreciation of the local currency and a boost for imports that are now comparatively cheaper. This sucks labor and capital away from other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and manufacturing, which economists say are more important for growth and competitiveness. As these labor-intensive export industries lag, unemployment could rise, and the country could develop an unhealthy dependence on the export of natural resources. In extreme cases, a petrostate forgoes local oil production and instead derives most of its oil wealth through high taxes on foreign drillers. Petrostate economies are then left highly vulnerable to unpredictable swings in global energy prices and capital flight.

The so-called resource curse also takes a toll on governance. Since petrostates depend more on export income and less on taxes, there are often weak ties between the government and its citizens. Timing of the resource boom can exacerbate the problem. "Most petrostates became dependent on petroleum while, or immediately after, they were establishing a democracy, state institutions, an independent civil service and private sector, and rule of law," says Terry Lynn Karl, a professor of political science at Stanford University and author of The Paradox of Plenty, a seminal book on the dynamics of petrostates. Leaders can use the country's resource wealth to repress or co-opt political opposition.

How does Venezuela fit the category?

Venezuela is the archetype of a failed petrostate, experts say. Oil continues to play the dominant role in the country's fortunes more than a century after it was discovered there. The oil price plunge from more than $100 per barrel in 2014 to under $30 per barrel in early 2016 sent Venezuela into an economic and political spiral, and despite rising prices in recent years, conditions remain bleak.

A number of grim indicators tell the story:

Oil dependence. Oil exports are expected to finance almost two-thirds of the government's budget in 2023, a slightly higher proportion compared to the previous year.

Falling production. Starved of adequate investment and maintenance, oil output has continued to generally decline, dropping by 2.5 percent in 2022 after increasing slightly the previous year. In 2020, it had reached its lowest level in decades.

Spiraling economy. Venezuela's gross domestic product (GDP) shrank by roughly three-quarters [PDF] between 2014 and 2021. However, the economy grew by an estimated 6 percent in 2022, and experts forecast additional growth of 6.5 percent in 2023.

Soaring debt. Venezuela has an estimated debt burden of $150 billion or higher.

Hyperinflation. Annual inflation skyrocketed to just over 130,000 percent in 2018, and though it has slowed in recent years, it remained at 234 percent in 2022.

Growing autocracy. Over the last decade, President Nicolas Maduro and his allies have violated basic tenets of democracy to maintain power. This includes restricting internet access and arbitrarily prosecuting and detaining political opponents and critics.

These issues-coupled with international sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic-have fueled a devastating humanitarian crisis, with severe shortages of basic goods such as food, drinking water, gasoline, and medical supplies. According to a November 2022 survey, 50 percent of Venezuela's 28 million residents live in poverty, though that is down from 65 percent the year before.

Since 2014, more than seven million Venezuelan refugees have fled to neighboring countries and beyond, where some governments have granted them temporary residency. However, about 150,000 Venezuelan migrants have returned home since the pandemic began, often after losing their jobs in other Latin American countries.

How did Venezuela get here?

A number of economic and political milestones mark Venezuela's path as a petrostate.

Discovering oil. In 1922, Royal Dutch Shell geologists at La Rosa, a field in the Maracaibo Basin, struck oil, which blew out at what was then an extraordinary rate of one hundred thousand barrels per day. In a matter of years, more than one hundred foreign companies were producing oil, backed by dictator General Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935). Annual production exploded during the 1920s, from just over a million barrels to 137 million, making Venezuela second only to the United States in total output by 1929. By the time Gómez died in 1935, Dutch disease had settled in: the Venezuelan bolívar had ballooned, and oil shoved aside other sectors to account for over 90 percent of total exports.

Reclaiming oil rents. By the 1930s, just three foreign companies-Royal Dutch Shell, Gulf, and Standard Oil-controlled 98 percent of the Venezuelan oil market. Gómez's successors sought to reform the oil sector to funnel funds into government coffers. The Hydrocarbons Law of 1943 was the first step in that direction, requiring foreign companies to give half of their oil profits to the state. Within five years, the government's income had increased sixfold.

Punto Fijo pact. In 1958, after a succession of military dictatorships, Venezuela elected its first stable democratic government. That year, Venezuela's three major political parties signed the Punto Fijo pact, which guaranteed that state jobs and, notably, oil rents would be parceled out to the three parties in proportion to voting results. While the pact sought to guard against dictatorship and usher in democratic stability, it ensured that oil profits would be concentrated in the state.

OPEC. Venezuela joined Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia as a founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. Through the cartel, which would later include Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Congo, the world's largest producers coordinated prices and gave states more control over their national industries. That same year, Venezuela established its first state oil company, the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation, and increased oil companies' income tax to 65 percent of profits.

The 1970s boom. In 1973, a five-month OPEC embargo on countries backing Israel in the Yom Kippur War quadrupled oil prices and made Venezuela the country with the highest per-capita income in Latin America. Over two years, the windfall added $10 billion to state coffers, giving way to rampant graft and mismanagement. Analysts estimate that as much as $100 billion was embezzled between 1972 and 1997 alone.

PDVSA. In 1976, amid the oil boom, President Carlos Andrés Pérez nationalized the oil industry, creating state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) to oversee all exploring, producing, refining, and exporting of oil. Pérez allowed PDVSA to partner with foreign oil companies as long as it held 60 percent equity in joint ventures and, critically, structured the company to run as a business with minimal government regulation.

The 1980s oil glut. As global oil prices plummeted in the 1980s, Venezuela's economy contracted and inflation soared; at the same time, it accrued massive foreign debt by purchasing foreign refineries, such as Citgo in the United States. In 1989, Pérez-reelected months earlier-launched a fiscal austerity package as part of a financial bailout by the International Monetary Fund. The measures provoked deadly riots. In 1992, Hugo Chávez, a military officer, launched a failed coup and rose to national fame.

Chávez's Bolivarian revolution. Chávez was elected president in 1998 on a socialist platform, pledging to use Venezuela's vast oil wealth to reduce poverty and inequality. While his costly "Bolivarian missions" expanded social services and cut poverty by 20 percent, he also took several steps that precipitated a long and steady decline in the country's oil production, which peaked in the late 1990s and early 2000s. His decision to fire thousands of experienced PDVSA workers who had taken part in an industry strike in 2002-2003 gutted the company of important technical expertise. Beginning in 2005, Chávez provided subsidized oil to several countries in the region, including Cuba, through an alliance known as Petrocaribe. Over the course of Chávez's presidency, which lasted until 2013, strategic petroleum reserves dwindled and government debt more than doubled [PDF].

Chávez also harnessed his popularity among the working class to expand the powers of the presidency and edged the country toward authoritarianism: he ended term limits, effectively took control of the Supreme Court, harassed the press and closed independent outlets, and nationalized hundreds of private businesses and foreign-owned assets, such as oil projects run by ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips. The reforms paved the way for Maduro to establish a dictatorship years after Chávez's death.

Descent into dictatorship. In mid-2014, global oil prices tumbled, and Venezuela's economy went into free fall. As unrest brewed, Maduro consolidated power through political repression, censorship, and electoral manipulation. In 2018, he secured reelection in a race widely condemned as unfair and undemocratic. Nearly sixty countries, including the United States, subsequently recognized opposition figure Juan Guaidó, head of the National Assembly, as Venezuela's interim leader.

For over a decade, Washington has imposed sweeping sanctions against Caracas, the most significant of which have blocked oil imports from PDVSA and prevented the government from accessing the U.S. financial system. Still, Venezuela has retained oil-trading partners, and analysts say that support from China, Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Turkey is keeping the Maduro regime afloat.

In January 2021, Maduro and his allies took leadership of what was the last opposition-controlled power center in the government, the National Assembly, after claiming victory in legislative elections. The opposition, including Guaidó, boycotted the vote, alleging that it was fraudulent, a charge reaffirmed by the Joe Biden administration and other foreign governments and international bodies, including Canada, the European Union, and the Organization of American States. However, regional elections that November further cemented Maduro's power and saw the fractured opposition win only three of twenty-three available governorships. Then in December 2022, after years of waning support, the opposition voted to remove Guaidó and dissolve his government, with plans to hold fresh presidential primaries in October 2023.

Meanwhile, there are some signs of a thaw. In November 2022, in part to help offset rising global energy prices due to the war in Ukraine, the United States permitted U.S. oil giant Chevron to resume limited operations in the country. In exchange, the Maduro government and the opposition agreed to continue dialogue following a yearlong stalemate. Still, given the dilapidated state of its industry, experts say it could be years before Venezuela's oil exports rise significantly.

Is there a path away from the oil curse?

A country that discovers a resource after it has formed robust democratic institutions is usually better able to avoid the resource curse, analysts say. For example, strong institutions in Norway have helped the country enjoy steady economic growth since the 1960s, when vast oil reserves were discovered in the North Sea, Karl writes in her book. In 2023, officials project that the petroleum sector will account for 33 percent of Norway's GDP. Strong democracies with an independent press and judiciary help curtail classic petrostate problems by holding government and energy companies to account.

If a country strikes oil or another resource before it develops its state infrastructure, the curse is much harder to avoid. However, there are remedial measures that low-income and developing countries can try, provided they are willing. For instance, a government's overarching objective should be to use the oil earnings in a responsible manner "to finance outlays on public goods that serve as the platform for private investment and long-term growth," says Columbia University's Jeffrey Sachs, an expert on economic development. This can be done financially, with broad-based investing in international assets, or physically, by building infrastructure and educating workers. Transparency is essential in all of this, Sachs says.

Many countries with vast resource wealth, such as Norway and Saudi Arabia, have established sovereign wealth funds (SWF) to manage their investments. Globally, SWFs manage more than $10 trillion worth of assets.

Analysts anticipate that a global shift from fossil fuel energy to renewables such as solar and wind will force petrostates to diversify their economies. Nearly two hundred countries, including Venezuela, have joined the Paris Agreement, a binding treaty that requires states to make specific commitments to mitigate climate change.

Economic diversification will be an especially difficult climb for Venezuela given the scale of its economic and political collapse over the last decade. The country would likely need to revitalize its oil sector before it could cultivate and develop other important industries. But this would take enormous investment, which analysts say would be hard to come by given Venezuela's unstable political environment, trends in oil demand, and rising concerns about climate change.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.keywords[]
opec (organization of the petroleum exporting countries)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Venezuela's descent into economic and political chaos in recent years is a cautionary tale of the dangerous influence that resource wealth can have on developing countries.

# data[].attributes.body
This article is transparent on where Venezuela ranks among all country in corruption and transparency. It rank 177/180 in corruption perception index, has a transparency score of 14/100, and 50% of all public workers took a bribe within the past year

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Find out more about corruption in Venezuela: Latest news, Corruption Perceptions Index score & local chapter's contact information.

# data[].attributes.body
Here the article mentions a US-Venezuela businessman who is head of procurement at citgo petroleum. He plead guilty for money laundering and accepting bribes from other Venezuelan businessmen. He took bribes and made sure those people paying him received the contract from citgo.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
A dual U.S.-Venezuelan citizen and former official at Citgo Petroleum Corporation, a Houston-based subsidiary of Venezuela's state-owned and state-controlled energy company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), pleaded guilty Monday in connection with his role in laundering millions of dollars in bribes and corruptly providing business advantages to multiple individuals who obtained contracts with Citgo and PDVSA.

According to court documents, between approximately 2013 and 2019, Jose Luis De Jongh Atencio (De Jongh), 48, a former procurement officer and manager in Citgo's Special Projects Group, accepted more than $7 million in bribe payments from businessmen including Jose Manuel Gonzalez Testino (Gonzalez), a dual U.S.-Venezuelan citizen, and Tulio Anibal Farias Perez (Farias), a Venezuelan national and Houston resident, and others in exchange for assisting the businessmen and related companies in procuring contracts with Citgo, and providing them with other business advantages.

De Jongh admitted to directing bribe payments from Gonzalez, Farias, and others into bank accounts in the names of shell companies that he controlled in Panama and Switzerland. In some instances, he also directed the creation of fake invoices to justify the payments. De Jongh laundered the bribe proceeds through U.S. and international bank accounts and used the funds to purchase real property located in the Houston area. In addition to monetary payments, De Jongh also received bribes in the form of gifts and other things of value from Gonzalez, Farias, and others including tickets to a 2014 World Series Game, Super Bowl XLIX in 2015, and a U2 concert. Gonzalez and Farias also entered guilty pleas in connection with the case.

"Jose Luis De Jongh Atencio accepted millions of dollars in bribe payments - placing law-abiding individuals and companies at a competitive disadvantage - and then laundered those bribe payments into the United States to fund his lavish lifestyle," said Acting Assistant Attorney General Nicholas L. McQuaid of the Justice Department's Criminal Division. "This guilty plea demonstrates the commitment of the department and our law enforcement partners to hold accountable individuals who engage in corruption and use our financial system to promote and launder the proceeds of their crimes."

"Foreign bribery schemes like this pose a significant threat to the public trust and fair-trade practices," said Special Agent in Charge Mark Dawson of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Houston. "This plea is a step in the right direction, but we will continue to level the playing field for companies and consumers by aggressively investigating individuals and corporations who violate the FCPA and misuse our financial system."

De Jongh pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. He is scheduled to be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Gray H. Miller on Aug. 19, and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. Judge Miller will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors. In addition, as part of his plea, De Jongh also agreed to forfeit over $3 million seized from his bank accounts and 15 properties that he purchased with his corrupt proceeds.

To date, the Justice Department has announced charges against 28 individuals, 22 of whom have pleaded guilty, as part of a larger, ongoing investigation by the U.S. government into bribery at PDVSA.

HSI Houston is conducting the ongoing investigation with assistance from HSI Boston and Miami.

Trial Attorney Sarah E. Edwards and Assistant Chief Sonali D. Patel of the Criminal Division's Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Robert S. Johnson and John P. Pearson of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas are prosecuting the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Kristine E. Rollinson is handling the forfeiture aspects of the case.

The Justice Department's Office of International Affairs, the Swiss Federal Office of Justice and the Office of the Attorney General of Panama also provided assistance.
The Fraud Section is responsible for investigating and prosecuting all Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) matters. Additional information about the Justice Department's FCPA enforcement efforts can be found at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Former Venezuelan Official Pleads Guilty in Connection with International Bribery and Money Laundering Scheme

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
A dual U.S.-Venezuelan citizen and former official at Citgo Petroleum Corporation, a Houston-based subsidiary of Venezuela's state-owned and state-controlled energy company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), pleaded guilty Monday in connection with his role in laundering millions of dollars in bribes and corruptly providing business advantages to multiple individuals who obtained contracts with Citgo and PDVSA.

# data[].attributes.body
In this article, it explains Hugo Chavez who was the president from 1994-2006 who completed used his presidential title as a vehicle to destroy the diplomacy of Venezuela by replacing elected officials with his loyal friends which led to corruption, national debt, and a downfall of economic growth. Reason for the downfall include the pocketing of oil and gold revenue directly into Chavez pockets.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Hugo Chavez was elected president of Venezuela in December 1998 on the strength of three main promises: convening a Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution and improve the state, fighting poverty and social exclusion, and eliminating corruption. Nine years later, it has become evident that the Constituent Assembly primarily was a vehicle to destroy all existing political institutions and replace them with a bureaucracy beholden to his wishes. Poverty and social exclusion remain as prominent as before, while the levels of government corruption are higher than ever.

# data[].attributes.body
In this article, it explains the corruption in armed forces and police forces. They are know to allow drug shipments via car/plane are allowed into the country. Police allowing certain prisoners to escape and attributing to kidnappings. It mentions that about 70% of police are viewed as negative or corrupt.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The people entrusted with enforcing the law in Venezuela regularly make the headlines as suspects or alleged accomplices, facilitators or perpetrators of serious crimes, a sign of the advanced deterioration and corruption of the country's security forces.

Corrupt officials -- especially police and military -- play an essential role in the penetration and growth of organized crime in Venezuela, which is reflected in alarming crime statistics.

The cases have ranged from officers of the Bolivarian Armed Forces accused of transporting drug shipments in military vehicles, facilitating the passage of drug planes or managing gasoline smuggling to Colombia. Even the recently named interior minister has been accused by the United States of facilitating drug shipments when he was head of the country's anti-narcotics effort, a charge he denies.

Police officers have been known to allow prisoners to escape, or to support or participate in kidnapping and extortion rings. There have been cases of security force members providing weapons and information to criminal groups and even procuring grenades for prison mafias.

As Latinobarometro has noted, police corruption is one of the principal problems in Latin America, and public perception of its extent is a big issue for regional law enforcement. The belief that police are corrupt in Latin America runs from 90 percent in Mexico to 47 percent in Uruguay, and 70 percent of people polled in Venezuela have a negative view of their authorities. In addition, 56 percent of Venezuelan respondents say they believe the police are involved in organized crime.

In 2009, Interior Minister Tarek El Aissami said that 20 percent of crimes in Venezuela are committed by police officers and, despite a lack of statistics, general perception is that those numbers have since increased. That perception has been fed by cases like the January 2015 arrest of 11 judicial police officers who were holding a local merchant for ransom in their police station.

Publicity surrounding that case led to a "restructuring" of the detective corps and the creation of a presidential commission tasked with developing a new model for the police, the third reform effort since 2006. The commission submitted a report that included a series of legislative bills on police reform. However, the legal project was never debated, much less voted on, despite the governing party's majority in congress. The two previous reform efforts -- in 2006 and 2012 -- met with similar fates.

Venezuela's Bolivarian National Guard (Guardia Nacional Boliviariana - GNB) has long been tainted by corruption. The responsibilities of this fourth branch of the Venezuelan Armed Forces include border surveillance, ports, airports, oil facilities, parks and maintaining public order. In recent years, officers of the GNB -- as well as member of all the nation's defense and security agencies -- have been implicated in drug trafficking, kidnappings and other illegal practices.

Testimonials of mid-level GNB officers who spoke on condition of anonymity indicate that officers pay their superiors for assignments in the "most profitable" areas of the country, as determined by potential for collecting bribes. The bribe money is divided according to rank, with operational troops in the field getting 30 percent, intermediate officers getting 20 percent and commanders raking in 50 percent.

These "commissions," as they are called, are collected for allowing contraband gasoline shipments through to Colombia, allowing cocaine to be placed on an aircraft or turning off a radar to let a suspicious flight go by undetected.

Members of the Bolivarian National Police have said that some officers pay their superiors to be assigned to area's where merchants sell basic goods on the black market. These areas are prime jurisdictions for collecting bribes.

Similarly, criminal detainees, defense lawyers and even public prosecutors know the "rates" charged by detectives to alter police records or "mistakenly" change one digit of a suspect's ID number, which can indefinitely delay a case. They also know the "cost" of removing evidence or "misplacing" an entire case file.

SEE ALSO: Venezuela News and Profiles

The director of security for the state of Guárico was replaced in November 2015 after he was accused of passing information to Venezuela's most wanted criminal, gang leader José Tovar Colina, alias "El Picure." Police finally caught up with Tovar and killed him in May 2016.

The occasional dismissal of officers caught in the act of corruption, however, is not enough to restore public confidence in the police forces. Only profound changes in the functioning and efficiency of the Venezuelan police can do that.

InSight Crime Analysis

The Venezuelan media reports on a daily basis cases of military officials who are suspected or are alleged accomplices, facilitators or perpetrators of serious crimes. The jobs performed by police officers puts them in more direct contact with criminals than any other sector of society. As a result, they constantly are exposed to temptation or are targeted by attempts to corrupt them.

Both informal and institutional regulation of police forces is essential in any democracy. But in Venezuela, the controls that existed have been systematically dismantled, facilitating the strengthening of organized crime.
Internal Supervision
In an effective system of police hierarchy, higher ranking officers are expected to play a significant role in controlling the conduct of their subordinates. In the Venezuelan police forces, advancement through the ranks is based on loyalty and political sympathy rather than training, experience or merit.
Internal Affairs
Most police forces have an internal affairs office in change of investigating improper or illegal activity carried out by members of the police. While Venezuela's National Police Board has mandated such offices in all police agencies, that mandate has not be carried out in practice. The lack of effective internal controls was highlighted by the reform commission appointed by President Nicolás Maduro in 2014, which called on the creation of a national internal affairs office. As noted, that reform effort was shelved.
Citizen Control
Venezuelan law provides for a degree of citizen participation in regulation of the police, via the Citizens Police Control Committees (Comités Ciudadanos de Control Policial - CCCP), community councils and any other legitimate community-based organization. But polarization of Venezuelan politics at all levels -- and majority control of the governing party at the community level -- has made citizen control of police functions ineffective. Government control of a high-level and little-known General Police Council, whose members are appointed by the interior minister, limits its effectiveness and independence.
The National Assembly
Although the National Assembly has a legal mandate to perform a watchdog function with regard to other government institutions, it has failed to do so. Despite a series of disturbing developments in recent years involving increased crime and violence, weapons being smuggled into prisons and reports of serious human rights abuses, the National Assembly failed to hold any enquiries or call on any senior officials to testify in hearings between 2005 and 2015.
The Attorney General of the Republic
No unit dedicated to investigating police corruption or crimes committed by officials exists in the Attorney General's Office. The proceedings against military or police officers are assigned according to the nature of the charges to the different departments of public prosecutor's office: Drugs; Anti-Corruption; Anti Extortion and Kidnapping; Defense of Women; Protection of Fundamental Rights; etc. The attorney general reported that in 2015, 1,312 officials from different security forces were suspected of wrongdoing and 959 of them were formally charged with committing crimes. The report did not specify what crimes they were charged with, making it impossible to establish how many are related to police corruption.
The Ombudsman
The majority of the National Assembly from 2005 to December 2015, which had little understanding that the Ombudsman exists to limit the abuses of the authorities, appears to have decided that it should appoint someone who is prepared to protect the state, regardless of its actions. In December 2014, the National Assembly appointed Tarek William Saab, a recognized leader of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela - PSUV) and deputy governor of Anzoátegui. Tarek Saab has taken a much more active approach than his predecessors. He nonetheless finds himself in the difficult position of trying to restore the dignity of the office while also remaining a politician.
Non-Governmental Organizations and Human Rights Defenders
In an ideal context, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should receive support from their governments to help carry out their activities. In a "normal" context, NGOs should be allowed to carry out their activities with freedom and respect. In Venezuela, however, the context has been hostile, slowing the ability of NGOs to act, as the authorities refuse to accept their reports, recommendations or complaints. In some cases, the authorities have even targeted the leaders of NGOs. This has prevented them from fulfilling their role as a watchdog of police corruption, among other things.
Media
The press is an essential element in the fight against police corruption, as it is in many ways the eyes and ears of society. Unfortunately, the attitude of the Venezuelan government toward media reports has been similar to its attitude toward NGOs.

***

The police situation in Venezuela is complex, especially when analyzed in the context of the social, economic, political, and public safety crises facing the country. Police agents and their families suffer equally from shortages of food and basic goods, as well as from the permanent threat of being killed by criminals looking to steal their weapon or even items like their bicycle.

In short, Venezuela's police forces are not subject to any kind of control, be it formal or informal, internal or external. They have awful labor conditions, work in high-risk environments, and the few punishments handed down to corrupt officers fail to improve the situation of a country in crisis. It should not be surprising then, however troubling it may be, that police corruption in Venezuela continues to grow.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Military and Police Corruption: Venezuela's Growing Evil

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The people entrusted with enforcing the law in Venezuela regularly make the headlines as suspects or alleged accomplices, facilitators or perpetrators of serious crimes, a sign of the advanced deterioration and corruption of the country's security forces.

# data[].attributes.body
In this article, it explains the situation with Alex Saab, the Columbian businessman who has infiltrated Venezuela and implemented corruption. He has ties of stealing funds from federal governments such as Venezuela and the US .He has been arrested and the USA is trying to extradited here.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
June 24, 2020

On June 12, authorities in Cape Verde arrested Alex Saab, a Colombian businessman who has been implicated in several corruption schemes involving the Maduro regime. U.S. prosecutors indicted Saab in 2019 after he allegedly helped Nicolás Maduro and other high-level Venezuelan officials launder hundreds of millions of dollars in corruption proceeds.

On June 19, the Future of Venezuela Initiative hosted a public webinar regarding the Saab case and, more broadly, the corruption networks that sustain the Maduro regime. That webinar can be viewed here.

In this piece, the authors recap the key points discussed at this event. If Saab is extradited to the United States, the extradition will be a slow and delicate process. In the meantime, the Saab case can illustrate how pervasive corruption has become in Venezuela while the country experiences an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. This case could also show the limitations of indictments within a foreign policy context.

Venezuela as a Mafia State

Venezuela is a mafia state. Both corruption and organized crime are widespread throughout the government and have a major impact on internal political dynamics. The country ranks 173rd out of 180 in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. Two of Maduro's closest confidants-Tarreck El Aissami and Diosdado Cabello-have been implicated in a massive drug trafficking operation known as the Cartel of the Suns ( Cartel de los Soles). That cartel involves at least 123 current and former senior regime officials who have held various posts in the executive branch, the armed forces, municipal governments, the judiciary, and the legislative branch.

In addition to drug trafficking, corruption is rampant in the government's contracts and social programs. Saab, for example, was instrumental in creating the Local Committees for Supply and Production ( Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción, CLAP), a politically driven subsidized food distribution program in Venezuela. Through a series of shell companies, Saab and others purchased poor quality food items in bulk from countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Turkey and sold them to the Venezuelan government at inflated prices.

"[Saab] was a key figure in the pillaging of the national reserves, profiting off the suffering of the people and increasingly criminalizing and providing those international networks for the Maduro regime."

- Vanessa Neumann, Ad honorem Representative of the Venezuelan Interim Government to the United Kingdom & Ireland

Saab replicated this scheme in other industries, including oil and gold. In 2015, Trading Energy and Coal (Trenaco), a shell company linked to Saab, was awarded a $4.5 billion contract with state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). Saab also helped the regime export gold of dubious origin to Turkey, Iran, and other countries. These activities have been lucrative for Maduro and other officials, catapulting Saab into a high-level, though secretive, position within the regime.

These schemes are the tip of the iceberg. Between 2004 and 2014, an estimated $11 billion in funds went missing from PDVSA, according to a 2016 investigation by the Venezuelan National Assembly. In the Southern District of Florida, former regime officials pleaded guilty to converting a $40 million loan to PDVSA into a $600 million windfall through a currency-exchange system only available to regime insiders. Similar corrupt operations can be found in other sectors, including construction and transportation. And yet those schemes do not account for drug trafficking profits or the sums flowing out of the Amazonas and Orinoco regions, where the regime facilitates criminal groups plundering the country's mineral deposits.

" When you add [estimated corruption proceeds], it's something in the [range of] $6 or $7 billion a year. In 2019, Venezuela's GDP was $70 billion. So we're saying that 10 percent of Venezuela's GDP, at a minimum, is going to state-sanctioned corruption."

- Fernando Cutz, Former National Security Council Acting Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs

The Impact of Saab's Arrest

In the short term, Saab's arrest will likely lead to cash-flow issues for the regime. After all, Saab has long played a vital role in establishing and maintaining the illicit financial networks that facilitate corruption, and Maduro reportedly entrusted him with his personal wealth. If Saab came under U.S. custody, there would be an opportunity for U.S. authorities to receive detailed information about the illicit activities that sustain the regime. This could help better understand the regime's criminal networks and improve sanction efforts. This arrest is not a silver bullet, however. Without a bilateral extradition treaty between Cape Verde and the United States, bringing Saab into custody will require careful diplomacy.

As discussed during the event, the Saab case highlights how indictments can have mixed results within foreign policy. On the one hand, indictments could complicate efforts to convince Maduro and his inner circle to leave power, as negotiation may seem futile to an official who is facing multiple charges and who, under the most lenient of circumstances, would still face a lengthy prison sentence. On the other hand, these indictments could give the international community and the Venezuelan opposition more leverage to restore the country's democracy. By indicting corrupt officials, the United States is also signaling that justice will prevail. Such a message is crucial in Venezuela, where political leaders and civil society have long decried the rampant corruption that has sustained the Maduro regime.

" The United States is a country known for the rule of law, and that gives us incredible power to deliver justice around the world. But using those tools entails huge risks if they are abused."

-Joshua Goodman, Latin America Correspondent, Associated Press

Ultimately, however, indictments should not be used to prop up foreign policy objectives. Doing so could jeopardize the sanctity of the United States' judicial system, which enjoys global legitimacy and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Saab was indicted because there was enough evidence against him to issue an indictment. That evidence was gathered for years by the Drug Enforcement Administration and other agencies, which worked with the Department of Justice to prosecute the case. As the case continues, that independence ought to be preserved.
Moises Rendon is director of the Future of Venezuela Initiative and a fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Claudia Fernandez is a research associate with the CSIS Future of Venezuela Initiative.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Corruption in Venezuela: The Alex Saab Case

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
On June 12, authorities in Cape Verde arrested Alex Saab, a Colombian businessman who has been implicated in several corruption schemes involving the Maduro regime. U.S. prosecutors indicted Saab in 2019 after he allegedly helped Nicolás Maduro and other high-level Venezuelan officials launder hundreds of millions of dollars in corruption proceeds.

# data[].attributes.body
In this article, it explains the power crisis of the president Juan Guiado from 2013-2018 after the death of Hugo Chavez. He went for reelection in 2018 and either jail or oust his competition. Half of the country says Juan Guiado is president and the other is the non-elected official Nicholas Muarido.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
In Venezuela, the government of President Nicolás Maduro and the opposition are engaged in a bitter power struggle.

The South American country has been caught in a downward spiral for years with growing political discontent further fuelled by skyrocketing hyperinflation, power cuts, and shortages of food and medicine.

More than 5.6 million Venezuelans have left the country in recent years. So what exactly is behind the crisis rocking Venezuela?

Who's the president?

This would be an unusual question to ask in most countries, but in Venezuela many want to know exactly that after opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared himself acting president on 23 January 2019.

The move was a direct challenge to the power of President Maduro, who had been sworn in to a second six-year term in office just two weeks previously.

Not surprisingly, President Maduro did not take kindly to his rival's move, which he condemned as a ploy by the US to oust him.

He also said that he was the constitutional president and would remain so.

Despite attempts by Mr Guaidó to get the military to switch their allegiance to him, the armed forces have remained largely loyal to President Maduro, whose socialist party has also got a firm grip on the electoral body and the supreme court.

Why is the presidency disputed?

Nicolás Maduro was first elected in April 2013 after the death of his socialist mentor and predecessor in office, Hugo Chávez. At the time, he won by just 1.6 percentage points.

During his first term, the economy went into freefall and many Venezuelans blame him and his socialist government for the country's decline.

Mr Maduro was re-elected to a second six-year term in May 2018 in highly controversial polls, which most opposition parties boycotted.

Many candidates had been barred from running while others had been jailed or fled the country for fear of being imprisoned, and the opposition parties argued that the poll was neither free nor fair.

Mr Maduro's re-election was not recognised by the opposition-controlled National Assembly, which labelled Mr Maduro a "usurper" and argued that the presidency was vacant.

Citing articles in the constitution which in such cases call for the leader of the National Assembly to step in, Juan Guaidó declared himself acting president.

More than 50 countries recognised Mr Guaidó as the legitimate president, among them the US and many nations in Latin America. But Russia and China, among others, stood by President Maduro.

Despite his broad international support, Mr Guaidó does not wield much power in practical terms.

The security forces have so far remained loyal to Mr Maduro, who has rewarded them with frequent pay rises and put high-ranking military men in control of key posts and industries.

Mr Maduro remains in the presidential palace and some Venezuelans have become disillusioned by the failure of Mr Guaidó to dislodge his rival from power.

Talks between the government and the opposition held in 2019 made no progress.

The US has imposed sweeping sanctions on Venezuela and on Mr Maduro and his inner circle but they have failed to weaken Mr Maduro enough to drive him from office. Some analysts argue that they offer the Maduro government a convenient scapegoat to blame for the dire state of the economy.

Some of the problems go back a long time. However, it is President Maduro and his predecessor Hugo Chávez who are the target of much of the current anger.

When Mr Chávez became president in 1999, he promised, among other things, to drive down Venezuela's huge levels of inequality.

While he managed to reduce inequality during his time in power, some of the socialist polices he brought in backfired. Take price controls, for example, which were aimed at making basic goods more affordable to the poor by capping the price of flour, cooking oil and toiletries. The controls meant that many Venezuelan businesses stopped production because they no longer made a profit, eventually resulting in shortages.

A loosening of foreign currency controls originally brought in by President Chávez in 2003 has eased those shortages as traders can sell goods in dollars but that means they have again become largely unaffordable to the poor or those without access to the US currency.

Years of lack of investment in infrastructure further exacerbated by the more recent US sanctions on Venezuela's oil sector have crippled this key industry, which provides almost all of Venezuela's government revenue.

Venezuela has been in the grip of an economic crisis for years now with hyperinflation one of the main problems.

Business news website Bloomberg has been tracking the price of a cup of coffee in the Venezuelan capital, Caracas, to show how prices have increased. It has measured an increase of 2,597% in the 12 months to 1 August 2021 with a cup of coffee costing 7.8 million bolivares.

How have Venezuelans reacted?

According to figures compiled by the United Nations, more than 5.6 million Venezuelans have left the country since the crisis started to bite in 2014.

The government has disputed the figures, saying they are inflated by "enemy countries".

The majority of those leaving have crossed into neighbouring Colombia, from where some move on to Ecuador, Peru and Chile. Others have gone south to Brazil.

The mass migration is one of the largest forced displacements in the western hemisphere.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Venezuela crisis: How the political situation escalated

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
A closer look at what is behind the country's spiralling political and economic crisis.