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The war has killed at least 134,000 Iraqi civilians and may have contributed to the deaths of as many as four times that number, according to the Costs of War Project by the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University.

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The anti-Iraqi Coalition sent 177,194 troops into Iraq during the initial invasion phase, which lasted from 19 March to 9 April 2003. About 130,000 arrived from the USA alone, with about 45,000 British soldiers, Australia (2,000), and Poland (194). 36 other countries were involved in its aftermath. In preparation for the invasion, 100,000 U.S. troops assembled in Kuwait by 18 February.

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According to U.S. President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, the coalition aimed "to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people."

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Tal Afar, about 55km (35 miles) to the west of Mosul, was always going to be next on the "to do" list for Iraqi forces.

Just as the fighting for Mosul moved from east to west over the course of many months, the Iraqi military is now moving westwards towards the Syrian border.

Although much smaller in size, Tal Afar has been a so-called Islamic State (IS) stronghold that the jihadist group has used as a strategic "base" since 2014.

And Tal Afar has had ruthless rulers before - between late 2004 and early 2006, the city was controlled by al-Qaeda in Iraq, a precursor to IS.

Before it fell to IS, the city's population of 200,000 was predominantly ethnic Turkmen, a Turkic people who have their own language and customs. The majority were also Sunni Muslims.

Tal Afar's residents are not viewed as helpless victims by many in the region; for a relatively small population, security sources say a disproportionate number of men from the city filled the ranks of IS as commanders, judges and members of their vicious religious police.

The battle for Tal Afar could also escalate tensions between Iraq, its ethnic Kurdish minority, Turkey and Syria.

Turkey refuses to close or move its military base near Mosul, claiming it could be needed to protect Iraqi Turkmen as well as the Turkish border. The mere idea of Turkish military action on Iraqi soil has been enough to cause many, from Washington to Baghdad, to lose sleep.

Kurdish leaders in Irbil are also keeping their eyes wide open as well - juggling the real or perceived threats from Sunni Arab insurgents, Turkish forces and an ever-growing number of Shia Arab militiamen.

Tal Afar is a two hour drive from the Turkish border, and the main road from Mosul to Syria runs through the city. It is, in many ways, the perfect location - and the right time - for a perfect storm.

The military assault on Tal Afar might seem clear cut, but the combination of forces involved invites complications on the ground.

Approximately 40,000 troops are taking part in the fighting - three Iraqi Army divisions, Iraqi and US-led coalition special forces personnel, as well as "government-backed" paramilitary fighters from the Popular Mobilisation (Hashd al-Shaabi).

The Popular Mobilisation is an umbrella organisation under whose banner are militias like Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), Moqtada al-Sadr's Saraya al-Salam - the current incarnation of the Mehdi Army - and the Badr Organisation.

The Popular Mobilisation's ranks also include fighters from Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a group trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force that has been accused of a number of kidnappings and attacks in Iraq.

The factions in the Popular Mobilisation are predominantly Shia and many are backed and funded by Iran. When you speak to them, many of their fighters do not try to hide their deep-seated disdain for Iraqi's Sunni population.

Regardless of fears, internally and internationally, about the size and ultimate intentions of the Popular Mobilisation, it is not going away any time soon. It is needed, many argue.

Once Tal Afar has been recaptured, this menagerie of forces will face a tougher operation on a wider scale that could last for months.

A case can be made that the number of ground troops available to take part in it will be as important as their weaponry and air support.

Mosul defeat a blow to IS, but not the end

Where is IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?

The Iraqi towns still under IS control

About 290km (180 miles) south-west of Mosul, IS also holds a string of towns along the Iraqi part of the River Euphrates in Anbar province.

These villages are known collectively as "al-Qaim", and they are connected by the Euphrates to the last IS stronghold in Syria - Deir al-Zour province.

Deir al-Zour is now the heart of the "caliphate" proclaimed by IS three years ago.

Accurate figures are hard to come by, but there are an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 IS fighters on the Iraqi and Syrian sides of the Euphrates valley.

Simply pushing the IS extremists over the Syrian border from Iraq will not be enough - and is likely to add to the problem of IS in Syria - but there is little more than inaudible rumblings about how Iraqi forces will maintain security once they have retaken al-Qaim.

One solution may be to leave the Popular Mobilisation in the area as a substitute police force, because it has enough manpower and will need a new task, and also because Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has spoken out against disbanding them.

In this scenario, Iraqi border security would be handled by forces that are heavily involved with Iran, yet backed by the government in Baghdad - which in turn, is backed by the US government and other powers.

Iraqi regular forces, as they work their way back to Baghdad, will have another problem to deal with; a large pocket of IS territory in the middle of the country that has been contained primarily for three years by Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

The fight for the city of Hawija may be as deadly as any so far, as it is a cut-off viper's nest. The IS fighters holding it truly have nowhere to run, should they try.

The minute the smoke clears from Hawija, the Iraqi military will be looking across the battlefield at the Peshmerga.

They distrust each other with equal fervour, and the only thing they have agreed on is need to the defeat IS.

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Tal Afar, about 55km (35 miles) to the west of Mosul, was always going to be next on the "to do" list for Iraqi forces. Just as the fighting for Mosul moved from east to west over the course of many months, the Iraqi military is now moving westwards towards the Syrian border.

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In a January 2003 CBS poll, 64% of Americans had approved of military action against Iraq; however, 63% wanted Bush to find a diplomatic solution rather than go to war, and 62% believed the threat of terrorism directed against the U.S. would increase due to war.

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Let's just say that the Iraq army isn't exactly anchoring a democratic awakening in Middle East.

Earlier this week, Iraq's armed forces in Mosul - trained and supplied by United States to secure the wellbeing of its people and institutions - reportedly dropped their guns, shed their uniforms, and surrendered to black-flag waving Sunni insurgents in a mere four days. No Thermopylae here. And around a half a million civilians have left the second largest city in Iraq to flee what is surely going to become a hotbed of beheadings and other assorted acts of Jihad. And now, according to CNN, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria also has almost complete control of Tikrit." al-Qaida (or something very much like it) is definitely on the run - right toward our allies.

Not that we should be surprised. Back in 2010, Army Gen. George Casey warned that the 130,000-strong Iraqi police and soldiers lacked leaders, were deserting by thousands, were hampered by corruption, displayed little will to fight and would probably never be able to fend off insurgents. Obviously, not much has changed, despite President Obama's assertion in 2011 that that war had ended and "Iraqis have taken full responsibility for their country's security." Put it this way: Prime Minister Nouri al-Malikihad's crack "Crisis Unit," which consists of civilian volunteers, is preparing a counteroffensive to the north. A makeshift militia is what ten years, thousands of American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars buys in those parts.

Still, it's difficult to believe any administration would allow the fall of Iraq to happen. America would be leaving a nation with an army that can't defend itself from nomadic terror groups much less powerful neighbors. If the United States doesn't stop the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' (and, incidentally, Islamists should really find a name that's a little less derivative), we would be allowing a budding terror state to emerge in Iraq. And in some ways it was our intervention, coupled with the inability of Iraqis to form a cohesive nation, that helped created the vacuum and political environment that allows militant army ( one that Ayman al Zawahiri believes is too uncompromising) to stake out an Islamic state which including now Iraq's largest oil refinery. This ending would, to say the least, make a decade 0f sacrifice appear counterproductive.

Doing nothing is another choice. This probably means the Sunni-Shia split will continue to descend into violence, radicalism will proliferate, and destabilize the region. Thousands of civilians will, doubtlessly, perish.

Some will, no doubt, argue that doing nothing (and we might very well be doing something soon) means that more than 4,400 U.S. troops and over $700 billion had been wasted in a war that ended but was not won. Perhaps. But a more important matter is this: would the death of another 4,000, or 400, or four, bring about a preferable outcome or a set of conditions that allow the United States to convincingly declare victory? If a decade of nation building brought us this, what could we possible gain by seriously reengaging? Clearly, to make it work the American people would need to be prepared to make a generational commitment - and polls don't tell us that we're in the mood for an open-ended conflict in the Middle East.

These are horrible choices, indeed. While millions of civilians no longer experience life under the regime of Saddam Hussein, and we should not forget the sacrifice thousands of soldiers made to allow that to happen, it gets increasingly difficult to imagine that the United States has gained anything worthwhile from its invasion of Iraq. It's difficult to understand how spending another five or ten years sorting out a sectarian civil war can possible be in our best interests.
Follow David Harsanyi on Twitter.

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Let's just say that the Iraq army isn't exactly anchoring a democratic awakening in Middle East. Earlier this week, Iraq's armed forces in Mosul - trained and supplied by United States to secure the wellbeing of its people and institutions - reportedly dropped their guns, shed their uniforms, and surrendered to black-flag waving Sunni insurgents in a mere four days.

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US Marines Real Combat in Afghanistan - Furious Firefights and Heavy Clashes with Taliban

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Please open the description for more information. *DISCLAIMER* This footage is part of an war archive of the war in Afghanistan and should be viewed as educational. This footage is not meant to glorify war or violence. I am only sharing this footage for the purposes of news reporting and educating.

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NEW YORK (Reuters) - The U.S. war in Iraq has cost $1.7 trillion with an additional $490 billion in benefits owed to war veterans, expenses that could grow to more than $6 trillion over the next four decades counting interest, a study released on Thursday said.

The war has killed at least 134,000 Iraqi civilians and may have contributed to the deaths of as many as four times that number, according to the Costs of War Project by the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University.

When security forces, insurgents, journalists and humanitarian workers were included, the war's death toll rose to an estimated 176,000 to 189,000, the study said.

The report, the work of about 30 academics and experts, was published in advance of the 10th anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003.

It was also an update of a 2011 report the Watson Institute produced ahead of the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks that assessed the cost in dollars and lives from the resulting wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

The 2011 study said the combined cost of the wars was at least $3.7 trillion, based on actual expenditures from the U.S. Treasury and future commitments, such as the medical and disability claims of U.S. war veterans.

That estimate climbed to nearly $4 trillion in the update.

The estimated death toll from the three wars, previously at 224,000 to 258,000, increased to a range of 272,000 to 329,000 two years later.

Excluded were indirect deaths caused by the mass exodus of doctors and a devastated infrastructure, for example, while the costs left out trillions of dollars in interest the United States could pay over the next 40 years.

The interest on expenses for the Iraq war could amount to about $4 trillion during that period, the report said.

The report also examined the burden on U.S. veterans and their families, showing a deep social cost as well as an increase in spending on veterans. The 2011 study found U.S. medical and disability claims for veterans after a decade of war totaled $33 billion. Two years later, that number had risen to $134.7 billion.

FEW GAINS

The report concluded the United States gained little from the war while Iraq was traumatized by it. The war reinvigorated radical Islamist militants in the region, set back women's rights, and weakened an already precarious healthcare system, the report said. Meanwhile, the $212 billion reconstruction effort was largely a failure with most of that money spent on security or lost to waste and fraud, it said.

Former President George W. Bush's administration cited its belief that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's government held weapons of mass destruction to justify the decision to go to war. U.S. and allied forces later found that such stockpiles did not exist.

Supporters of the war argued that intelligence available at the time concluded Iraq held the banned weapons and noted that even some countries that opposed the invasion agreed with the assessment.

"Action needed to be taken," said Steven Bucci, the military assistant to former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the run-up to the war and today a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington-based think-tank.

Bucci, who was unconnected to the Watson study, agreed with its observation that the forecasts for the cost and duration of the war proved to be a tiny fraction of the real costs.

"If we had had the foresight to see how long it would last and even if it would have cost half the lives, we would not have gone in," Bucci said. "Just the time alone would have been enough to stop us. Everyone thought it would be short."

Bucci said the toppling of Saddam and the results of an unforeseen conflict between U.S.-led forces and al Qaeda militants drawn to Iraq were positive outcomes of the war.

"It was really in Iraq that 'al Qaeda central' died," Bucci said. "They got waxed."

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Iraq war costs U.S. more than $2 trillion: study

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The U.S. war in Iraq has cost $1.7 trillion with an additional $490 billion in benefits owed to war veterans, expenses that could grow to more than $6 trillion over the next four decades counting interest, a study released on Thursday said.

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 2013 was the deadliest since 2008, the height of the war.

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 2013 was the deadliest since 2008, the height of the war.

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The Iraq War was fought between th USA, the U.K., Australia, Poland, and Peshmerga - who fought against the Republic of Iraq.

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In central Iraq units of the Republican Guard—a heavily armed paramilitary group connected with the ruling party—were deployed to defend the capital of Baghdad.

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In March 2003, U.S. forces invaded Iraq vowing to destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and end the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein. When WMD intelligence proved illusory and a violent insurgency arose, the war lost public support. Saddam was captured, tried, and hanged and democratic elections were held. In the years since, there have been over 4,700 U.S. and allied troop deaths, and more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed. Meanwhile, questions linger over Iraq's fractious political situation.

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In March 2003, U.S. forces invaded Iraq vowing to destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and end the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein. When WMD intelligence proved illusory and a violent insurgency arose, the war lost public support. Saddam was captured, tried, and hanged and democratic elections were held.

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Many violent insurgent groups were supported by Iran and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The United States responded with a troop surge in 2007.

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Tal Afar, about 55km (35 miles) to the west of Mosul, was always going to be next on the "to do" list for Iraqi forces.

Just as the fighting for Mosul moved from east to west over the course of many months, the Iraqi military is now moving westwards towards the Syrian border.

Although much smaller in size, Tal Afar has been a so-called Islamic State (IS) stronghold that the jihadist group has used as a strategic "base" since 2014.

And Tal Afar has had ruthless rulers before - between late 2004 and early 2006, the city was controlled by al-Qaeda in Iraq, a precursor to IS.

Before it fell to IS, the city's population of 200,000 was predominantly ethnic Turkmen, a Turkic people who have their own language and customs. The majority were also Sunni Muslims.

Tal Afar's residents are not viewed as helpless victims by many in the region; for a relatively small population, security sources say a disproportionate number of men from the city filled the ranks of IS as commanders, judges and members of their vicious religious police.

The battle for Tal Afar could also escalate tensions between Iraq, its ethnic Kurdish minority, Turkey and Syria.

Turkey refuses to close or move its military base near Mosul, claiming it could be needed to protect Iraqi Turkmen as well as the Turkish border. The mere idea of Turkish military action on Iraqi soil has been enough to cause many, from Washington to Baghdad, to lose sleep.

Kurdish leaders in Irbil are also keeping their eyes wide open as well - juggling the real or perceived threats from Sunni Arab insurgents, Turkish forces and an ever-growing number of Shia Arab militiamen.

Tal Afar is a two hour drive from the Turkish border, and the main road from Mosul to Syria runs through the city. It is, in many ways, the perfect location - and the right time - for a perfect storm.

The military assault on Tal Afar might seem clear cut, but the combination of forces involved invites complications on the ground.

Approximately 40,000 troops are taking part in the fighting - three Iraqi Army divisions, Iraqi and US-led coalition special forces personnel, as well as "government-backed" paramilitary fighters from the Popular Mobilisation (Hashd al-Shaabi).

The Popular Mobilisation is an umbrella organisation under whose banner are militias like Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), Moqtada al-Sadr's Saraya al-Salam - the current incarnation of the Mehdi Army - and the Badr Organisation.

The Popular Mobilisation's ranks also include fighters from Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a group trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force that has been accused of a number of kidnappings and attacks in Iraq.

The factions in the Popular Mobilisation are predominantly Shia and many are backed and funded by Iran. When you speak to them, many of their fighters do not try to hide their deep-seated disdain for Iraqi's Sunni population.

Regardless of fears, internally and internationally, about the size and ultimate intentions of the Popular Mobilisation, it is not going away any time soon. It is needed, many argue.

Once Tal Afar has been recaptured, this menagerie of forces will face a tougher operation on a wider scale that could last for months.

A case can be made that the number of ground troops available to take part in it will be as important as their weaponry and air support.

Mosul defeat a blow to IS, but not the end

Where is IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?

The Iraqi towns still under IS control

About 290km (180 miles) south-west of Mosul, IS also holds a string of towns along the Iraqi part of the River Euphrates in Anbar province.

These villages are known collectively as "al-Qaim", and they are connected by the Euphrates to the last IS stronghold in Syria - Deir al-Zour province.

Deir al-Zour is now the heart of the "caliphate" proclaimed by IS three years ago.

Accurate figures are hard to come by, but there are an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 IS fighters on the Iraqi and Syrian sides of the Euphrates valley.

Simply pushing the IS extremists over the Syrian border from Iraq will not be enough - and is likely to add to the problem of IS in Syria - but there is little more than inaudible rumblings about how Iraqi forces will maintain security once they have retaken al-Qaim.

One solution may be to leave the Popular Mobilisation in the area as a substitute police force, because it has enough manpower and will need a new task, and also because Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has spoken out against disbanding them.

In this scenario, Iraqi border security would be handled by forces that are heavily involved with Iran, yet backed by the government in Baghdad - which in turn, is backed by the US government and other powers.

Iraqi regular forces, as they work their way back to Baghdad, will have another problem to deal with; a large pocket of IS territory in the middle of the country that has been contained primarily for three years by Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

The fight for the city of Hawija may be as deadly as any so far, as it is a cut-off viper's nest. The IS fighters holding it truly have nowhere to run, should they try.

The minute the smoke clears from Hawija, the Iraqi military will be looking across the battlefield at the Peshmerga.

They distrust each other with equal fervour, and the only thing they have agreed on is need to the defeat IS.

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Tal Afar, about 55km (35 miles) to the west of Mosul, was always going to be next on the "to do" list for Iraqi forces. Just as the fighting for Mosul moved from east to west over the course of many months, the Iraqi military is now moving westwards towards the Syrian border.

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Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 ended in Iraq’s defeat by a U.S.-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War (1990–91).

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Tal Afar, about 55km (35 miles) to the west of Mosul, was always going to be next on the "to do" list for Iraqi forces.

Just as the fighting for Mosul moved from east to west over the course of many months, the Iraqi military is now moving westwards towards the Syrian border.

Although much smaller in size, Tal Afar has been a so-called Islamic State (IS) stronghold that the jihadist group has used as a strategic "base" since 2014.

And Tal Afar has had ruthless rulers before - between late 2004 and early 2006, the city was controlled by al-Qaeda in Iraq, a precursor to IS.

Before it fell to IS, the city's population of 200,000 was predominantly ethnic Turkmen, a Turkic people who have their own language and customs. The majority were also Sunni Muslims.

Tal Afar's residents are not viewed as helpless victims by many in the region; for a relatively small population, security sources say a disproportionate number of men from the city filled the ranks of IS as commanders, judges and members of their vicious religious police.

The battle for Tal Afar could also escalate tensions between Iraq, its ethnic Kurdish minority, Turkey and Syria.

Turkey refuses to close or move its military base near Mosul, claiming it could be needed to protect Iraqi Turkmen as well as the Turkish border. The mere idea of Turkish military action on Iraqi soil has been enough to cause many, from Washington to Baghdad, to lose sleep.

Kurdish leaders in Irbil are also keeping their eyes wide open as well - juggling the real or perceived threats from Sunni Arab insurgents, Turkish forces and an ever-growing number of Shia Arab militiamen.

Tal Afar is a two hour drive from the Turkish border, and the main road from Mosul to Syria runs through the city. It is, in many ways, the perfect location - and the right time - for a perfect storm.

The military assault on Tal Afar might seem clear cut, but the combination of forces involved invites complications on the ground.

Approximately 40,000 troops are taking part in the fighting - three Iraqi Army divisions, Iraqi and US-led coalition special forces personnel, as well as "government-backed" paramilitary fighters from the Popular Mobilisation (Hashd al-Shaabi).

The Popular Mobilisation is an umbrella organisation under whose banner are militias like Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), Moqtada al-Sadr's Saraya al-Salam - the current incarnation of the Mehdi Army - and the Badr Organisation.

The Popular Mobilisation's ranks also include fighters from Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a group trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force that has been accused of a number of kidnappings and attacks in Iraq.

The factions in the Popular Mobilisation are predominantly Shia and many are backed and funded by Iran. When you speak to them, many of their fighters do not try to hide their deep-seated disdain for Iraqi's Sunni population.

Regardless of fears, internally and internationally, about the size and ultimate intentions of the Popular Mobilisation, it is not going away any time soon. It is needed, many argue.

Once Tal Afar has been recaptured, this menagerie of forces will face a tougher operation on a wider scale that could last for months.

A case can be made that the number of ground troops available to take part in it will be as important as their weaponry and air support.

Mosul defeat a blow to IS, but not the end

Where is IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?

The Iraqi towns still under IS control

About 290km (180 miles) south-west of Mosul, IS also holds a string of towns along the Iraqi part of the River Euphrates in Anbar province.

These villages are known collectively as "al-Qaim", and they are connected by the Euphrates to the last IS stronghold in Syria - Deir al-Zour province.

Deir al-Zour is now the heart of the "caliphate" proclaimed by IS three years ago.

Accurate figures are hard to come by, but there are an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 IS fighters on the Iraqi and Syrian sides of the Euphrates valley.

Simply pushing the IS extremists over the Syrian border from Iraq will not be enough - and is likely to add to the problem of IS in Syria - but there is little more than inaudible rumblings about how Iraqi forces will maintain security once they have retaken al-Qaim.

One solution may be to leave the Popular Mobilisation in the area as a substitute police force, because it has enough manpower and will need a new task, and also because Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has spoken out against disbanding them.

In this scenario, Iraqi border security would be handled by forces that are heavily involved with Iran, yet backed by the government in Baghdad - which in turn, is backed by the US government and other powers.

Iraqi regular forces, as they work their way back to Baghdad, will have another problem to deal with; a large pocket of IS territory in the middle of the country that has been contained primarily for three years by Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

The fight for the city of Hawija may be as deadly as any so far, as it is a cut-off viper's nest. The IS fighters holding it truly have nowhere to run, should they try.

The minute the smoke clears from Hawija, the Iraqi military will be looking across the battlefield at the Peshmerga.

They distrust each other with equal fervour, and the only thing they have agreed on is need to the defeat IS.

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Tal Afar, about 55km (35 miles) to the west of Mosul, was always going to be next on the "to do" list for Iraqi forces. Just as the fighting for Mosul moved from east to west over the course of many months, the Iraqi military is now moving westwards towards the Syrian border.

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The United States Army, major branch of the United States armed forces charged with the preservation of peace and security and the defense of the country. The army furnishes most of the ground forces in the U.S. military organization.

In the early months of the American Revolution, the first regular U.S. fighting force, the Continental Army, was organized by the Second Continental Congress on June 14, 1775. It comprised the 22,000 militia troops then besieging Boston and an additional 5,000 militiamen in New York. It was placed under the control of a five-member civilian board, and U.S. military forces have remained in civilian control ever since. George Washington formally took command of these colonial troops on July 3, 1775, and soon discovered that the militiamen were largely accustomed to going home whenever a particular danger was past. In January 1776 the Continental Congress partially responded to Washington's urgent appeals by establishing a single standing force directly raised from all of the colonies, distinct from the several colonial militias. These "Continentals" were enlisted for longer terms and were trained more thoroughly than the militias; they provided Washington with a small but stable nucleus with which to work and proved to be his chief reliance in the dark hours of the war. They were the beginning of the regular army.

As the Revolution drew to a close, the Continental Congress asked Washington for his recommendations for a peacetime military force. In response, he prepared Sentiments on a Peace Establishment (May 1, 1783), a sweeping assessment of the strategic situation facing the new country. Washington believed that the United States needed only a small regular army to deal with Indian threats and to provide a nucleus for expansion by "a well-organized militia" in time of foreign war. Instead of the independent and diverse militia forces of the individual states, which had proved so unreliable during the Revolution, Washington recommended that the state contingents be organized as elements of a single national militia so that all would be similarly trained and equipped. He also recommended the development of war industries and arsenals, along with the establishment of a military school system. Congress ignored this blueprint for a national military policy, and on November 2, 1783, the entire army was disbanded except "twenty-five privates to guard the stores at Fort Pitt and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point." Indian disturbances on the frontier, however, almost immediately forced an increase in the standing force. When Washington was inaugurated as president in 1789, the number of men in service was 595.

Washington, George: resigning commission Architect of the Capitol

The Constitution (1787) placed the military forces under the control of the president as commander in chief, and in 1789 the civilian Department of War was established to administer the military forces. One of the first tasks Washington assigned to the secretary of war, Maj. Gen. Henry Knox, was to prepare legislation for a military policy as outlined in his Sentiments. The principal element of this proposed legislation-establishment of a centrally coordinated militia system-was rejected by Congress in the Militia Act of 1792. This decision by the lawmakers was partly because of fear that Knox's proposal would concentrate too much power in the hands of the federal government and partly because state militia officers feared that centralization would diminish their own power and prestige. Washington was, however, able to persuade Congress to expand the small regular army to deal with increasing Indian disorders on the frontier. Until 1812 the army passed through swift periods of expansion and reduction, depending upon the immediacy of the Indian and foreign threats. From a single regiment in 1789, it changed to 3 in 1791, 5 in 1792 (in the wake of Saint Clair's Defeat), 9 in 1798 (during the XYZ Affair and quasi-war with France), 6 in 1800, 3 in 1802, and 11 in 1808.

During the War of 1812, the inadequacy of the Militia Act of 1792 was clearly demonstrated. A total of about 60,000 men served in the regular army during the almost three years of war. This force bore the brunt of conflict with about 70,000 British regulars, 2,000 efficient Canadian militia, and about 10,000 Indians, many of the last of whom were part of Tecumseh 's confederation. At one time or another, nearly 460,000 American militiamen were under arms, but few saw battle. Typical of those who did see action were the 6,500 militiamen at Bladensburg, Maryland, who were tasked with defending the national capital but fled in panic after one volley from 1,500 British regulars.

After the War of 1812, the regular army was reduced to 10,000 men and was still further reduced in 1821 to 6,127. It gradually rose to 7,958 by 1838, when the combination of the Second Seminole War and the expansion of the western frontier caused Congress to authorize an increase to 12,577. With the end of the Second Seminole War in 1842, however, the army was decreased to 8,613 (occupying over 100 posts), and that was still its authorized strength at the outbreak of the Mexican-American War in 1846.

The Mexican-American War and the Civil War

One significant aspect of the Mexican-American War was the virtual abandonment of the militia concept for war purposes. The regular army was increased to more than 30,000 troops, and approximately 60,000 additional volunteers were recruited. Most of the new regulars and many volunteers actually served in Mexico during the war. The army acquitted itself exceptionally well during the campaign. The main invasion force under Gen. Winfield Scott landed at Veracruz in March 1847 and scored a string of victories culminating in the capture of Mexico City in September 1847. Many of the most-recognizable commanders of the American Civil War-including Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, Stonewall Jackson, George McClellan, James Longstreet, and George Pickett -served as junior officers during the Mexican-American War.

A Little More Grape, Capt. Bragg Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Approximately 12,000 militiamen had been called up at the beginning but served only three months and contributed nothing to the war effort. In 1848 the authorized strength of the army was reduced to 10,320, scattered over the immense area of the growing country. The task of dealing with Native Americans in the Far West, however, brought a gradual increase in strength. On December 20, 1860, when South Carolina seceded, the army numbered 16,367 officers and men.

The U.S. Army underwent an enormous expansion during the Civil War (1861-65), growing from a peacetime strength of about 16,000 troops in December 1860 to a maximum size of 1,000,000 by 1865. The Confederate army may have reached a strength of 500,000 troops at its height. The volunteer system was again substituted for the unworkable militia concept, and most militiamen served as volunteers in federal service. Both sides initially relied on voluntary enlistments, but both had eventually to resort to conscription to maintain their vast armies in the field. On July 17, 1862, Congress passed the Second Confiscation and Militia Act, which, among other things, legalized the enlistment of African American soldiers in the Union army (black volunteers were already serving in the United States Navy and had served with distinction in the American Revolution and the War of 1812). When Pres. Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, recruitment of black soldiers began in earnest, and by the end of the war nearly 180,000 black troops had enlisted.

The Army Reorganization Act of 1866 (formally, An Act to increase and fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States) provided for a regular army of 54,000 men, but this figure was gradually decreased until 1874, when authorized strength was set at 25,000, where it remained until the Spanish-American War. About 19,000 troops were stationed in the South to support the military governments of the Reconstruction period. Because of the threat posed by the rule of Maximilian in Mexico, Gen. Philip Sheridan was sent to the border with a large command. The remainder of the army dealt with increasingly violent Plains Wars in the West.

Doughboys abroad: the U.S. Army at the turn of the 20th century

Pay and other conditions of service were so poor in the U.S. Army that in 1878 its effective strength was less than 20,000 men, the smallest force in proportion to the total U S. population at any time since Washington's first term. The army was well trained, however, because it saw almost constant combat service in the Indian Wars.

ledger drawing The Newberry Library, Gift of Edward E. Ayer, 1911

During the Spanish-American War, the army was again augmented by volunteers rather than militia units. Calls for volunteers increased its size to 216,029 troops by August 31, 1898; 50,000 of these were regulars. Because of the Philippine-American War (1899-1902), the president was authorized to keep the strength of the regular army at a maximum of 65,000 members, and in 1901 this figure was raised to 100,000. The hasty expansion of the army at the outset of the war with Spain had been chaotic. The War Department was revealed as scandalously inefficient in administration, organization, and operational direction.

In 1899, when Elihu Root was appointed secretary of war, he immediately set about correcting these deficiencies. He succeeded in reorganizing and revitalizing not only the War Department but U.S. military policy as a whole. In the process he strengthened the traditional concept of civilian control over the military. His greatest contribution was the establishment of an efficient general staff in 1903. Related to this was the development of an extensive and integrated system of postgraduate military education for all levels of responsibility from lieutenant to general. Root was also largely responsible for the establishment in 1903 of the Joint Board, comprising senior army and navy officers, to avoid future failures in coordination of strategic planning and tactical operations such as had occurred in the Spanish-American War.

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

When war came again in 1917, the U.S. Army was better prepared than at any previous time in American history. There were four main reasons: the existence of an efficient general staff for planning and coordination purposes; the combat experience which most American regular army officers had gained during the Philippine-American War; the mobilization of an expanded regular army and 65,000 national guardsmen for duty along the Mexican border; and the repeal of the Militia Act of 1792. A federally coordinated National Guard, with components in each state, was established, as was an Organized Reserve Corps, completely under federal authority. For all practical purposes, Washington's Sentiments on a Peace Establishment had been adopted, in a modernized form.

James Montgomery Flagg- Leslie-Judge Co., N.Y./Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (LC-USZC4-3859)

During World War I the army expanded in 18 months to 3,685,000 troops, about three-fourths of whom were conscripted under the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917. About 2,000,000 troops were sent to France to serve in Gen. John J. Pershing's American Expeditionary Force. The efficiency of this tremendous expansion and the decisive role played by U.S. forces in the final Allied victory in November 1918 were clear evidence of the effectiveness of the innovations made by Root only 15 years earlier.

World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War

After World War I the army experienced its usual postwar contraction: for most of the period from 1919 to 1939, the army's strength was about 125,000 troops, the smallest by far of all the great powers. After Nazi Germany successfully invaded France in May 1940, however, the U.S. government reinstituted conscription, thereby raising the army's strength to 1,640,000 by the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. With the United States' entry into the war, the army went through a further process of expansion, this time to 8,300,000 troops, of whom about 5,000,000 saw service overseas. Of particular note were Nisei servicemen, second-generation Japanese Americans who enlisted by the thousands, despite the fact that many of their families had been forcibly interned. The 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team (the two were later merged) were all-Nisei units that achieved renown for having displayed remarkable bravery in spite of crippling losses. The 442nd was the most-decorated unit of its size in U.S. history.

Unlike the situation in World War I, where the army had served primarily in France, in World War II it fought all over the globe-in North Africa, the Mediterranean, western Europe, across the Pacific Ocean, and in parts of mainland Asia. During the war the army was reorganized into three main commands: the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces. Overall responsibility for handling an armed force of such unprecedented magnitude and complexity lay with Gen. George C. Marshall, who served as army chief of staff for the entire duration of the war.

World War II marked revolutionary changes in the conduct of war and in supporting the war from the home front. Because of these changes, representatives of the political, economic, industrial, diplomatic, and military communities of the country-combined and individually-began making adjustments and rearrangements in the country's overall defense organization even before the war drew to a close. However, with Japan's surrender in August 1945, public pressure caused an immediate and hasty demobilization of the army despite its occupation responsibilities in Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. From a strength of over 8,000,000 in August 1945, the army declined to less than 3,000,000 by January 1946 and to 554,000 troops by March 1948. The drop in combat capability was even more rapid, as most veterans, except for the relatively few career soldiers, were discharged and replaced by inexperienced recruits.

The advent of the Cold War, however, soon stimulated efforts to restore military effectiveness, and the peacetime conscription established in 1940 was reinstituted in 1948 and periodically renewed thereafter. Army strength stabilized at about 600,000 troops in 1949-50. Meanwhile, the technological and military developments which had begun during World War II had increased the country's vulnerability by reducing the protective significance of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Partially in recognition of this fact and partially to correct organizational faults revealed during the war, the defense structure was fundamentally altered by the National Security Act of 1947. One major change was the establishment of an independent U S. Air Force, created from the Army Air Forces. In subsequent years-as the three service branches struggled to stretch their budgets to meet widespread military commitments and also tried to adjust to their new relationships and to the tremendous changes in the nature of war-there arose considerable dissension among them regarding their respective roles and missions. Among the more important interservice issues were: how air power was to be adapted to war on land and sea as well as in the air; how long-range missiles were to be incorporated into the fighting forces; and what was to be done about the application of nuclear power to combat. On July 26, 1948, Pres. Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9981 abolishing racial segregation in the U.S. military. Although the army's top leadership initially resisted this change, the situation in Korea would soon force their hand.

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 occasioned another expansion of the army, this time to 1,500,000 troops by 1951. But even after the Korean War ended in 1953, the army maintained peacetime levels of strength that were unprecedented in the country's history. By the end of 1960, for example, army strength totaled 860,000. The need for such a large standing army was explained by the United States' leadership role in the Cold War and its need to maintain substantial armed forces in readiness in western Europe in case of a Soviet invasion. After the Korean War, army strength dwindled, while most of the defense budget was devoted to the long-range nuclear forces of the navy and the air force. More serious than the drop in the number of army personnel in the eyes of many strategic planners was a decline in combat efficiency because of lack of funds to modernize equipment and weapons. The army had 14 divisions, but only 11 were organized and equipped for combat.

Korean War: U.S. soldiers Harry S. Truman Library/NARA

Vietnam and the move to an all-volunteer army

The army's fortunes improved during the 1960s, as the doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. made it evident that there was far more likelihood of limited conventional wars than of a nuclear holocaust. Thus, more attention was focused on increasing the army's capability to fight quickly and effectively in small or large wars anywhere around the globe. Army strength increased to nearly 1,000,000 troops, even before commitment of forces in the Vietnam War, and to 1,463,000 at the height of that conflict. At the same time, there was great improvement in weapons and equipment. Army organization was substantially revised to ensure effective flexible employment of troops in a variety of combat tasks. With the completion of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, the peacetime draft was ended, and the army was returned to volunteer status.

During the Persian Gulf War in early 1991, the allied coalition against Iraq reached a strength of more than 700,000 troops, including 539,000 American personnel. After a massive allied air war lasting several weeks, the allies sent in large numbers of ground troops to destroy Iraqi fortifications, weapons stockpiles, and tanks. Within four days the allies had destroyed most of Iraq's elite Republican Guard, and Pres. George H.W. Bush declared a cease-fire. After the war, proposals were made by Congress to cut the total armed forces by some 22 percent over the next five years.

In 1993 Pres. Bill Clinton signed " Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT), a law directing that on matters of homosexuals serving in the U.S. military, military personnel "don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue, and don't harass." When it went into effect on October 1, 1993, the policy theoretically lifted a ban on homosexual service that had been instituted during World War II, though in effect it continued a statutory ban. Under the terms of the law, homosexuals serving in the military were not allowed to talk about their sexual orientation or engage in sexual activity, and commanding officers were not allowed to question service members about their sexual orientation. For a variety of reasons, the policy did little to change the behaviour of commanders; gay and lesbian soldiers continued to be discharged from service.

The U.S. Army in the 21st century

Afghanistan and the war on terrorism

The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States were a spectacular example of the asymmetrical warfare that conventional 20th-century armies were ill equipped to combat. As a result, the CIA initially took the lead in Afghanistan, using local tribesmen as a force multiplier to overturn the Taliban regime that hosted al-Qaeda. As the focus of the administration of Pres. George W. Bush shifted to Iraq in 2003, Afghanistan was treated in some ways as "the forgotten war." The Taliban used this reprieve to regroup and rebuild its strength, while the remaining U.S. troops assisted with "nation-building" efforts. As the war in Iraq wound down in 2009, lessons learned by insurgents there were exported to Afghanistan, and U.S. casualties jumped sharply. A "surge" of 30,000 additional troops authorized by Pres. Barack Obama in 2009-10 allowed Afghan forces the opportunity to rebuild and ultimately assume some of the security burden. Although an international force of more than 10,000 troops remained in the country in an advisory capacity, the U.S. and NATO formally ended their combat mission in Afghanistan on December 28, 2014.

When U.S. troops returned to Iraq in March 2003, they did so in numbers that were a fraction of those deployed in 1991. This "light footprint" strategy relied heavily on the overwhelming technological edge enjoyed by the U.S.-led coalition. This advantage was on full display in the "shock and awe" bombardment that opened the war. Although this demonstration did not lead to the immediate capitulation of Iraqi forces, the U.S. advance on Baghdad was slowed more by the weather than it was by effective and concentrated Iraqi resistance. Bush declared an end to major combat operations on May 1, 2003, but the war in Iraq was far from over.

With Iraq's ruling Baʿth Party purged from the government and security forces, no domestic force was capable of enforcing order, and criminality and sectarian violence spiraled out of control. U.S. forces, unable to find the weapons of mass destruction that served as the war's rationale, found themselves engaged in a civil war between rival Shīʿite and Sunni militias. As the U.S. death toll climbed, recruitment numbers dropped, and the army was forced to adopt alternative methods to bolster its thinning ranks. National Guard units were deployed to Iraq, and thousands of reservists were called up to active duty. A controversial measure, known as stop-loss, prevented troops scheduled for deployment from leaving the military. Tens of thousands of active-duty soldiers and reservists were affected by the policy, which was criticized by some as a "back door draft." As the security situation in Iraq became more tenuous and criticism of the U.S. occupation increased, a "surge" of U.S. troops was implemented in early 2007. This action is thought to have been one possible factor in the declining level of violence.

By the time U.S. troops left Iraq in December 2011, almost 4,500 Americans had been killed and some 30,000 had been wounded, with the army accounting for the overwhelming majority in both categories. One very concrete change for the army that was spurred by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was the replacement for the venerable M16 rifle. The M4 carbine, a rifle that shared the AR-15 platform with the M16, was adopted as the army's standard infantry weapon. The M16's ability to accurately shoot at distances of more than 550 yards (500 metres) was largely wasted in the short-range engagements that were typical of modern wars. The smaller size of the M4 also made it better suited for the army's patrol doctrine, which involved frequently mounting and dismounting from vehicles

Changing policies for a changing army

By the 15-year anniversary of " Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in 2008, more than 12,000 soldiers and officers had been discharged from the military for refusing to conceal their homosexuality. When Obama campaigned for the presidency in 2008, he pledged to overturn "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military. In December 2010 both the House of Representatives and the Senate voted to repeal the policy, and Obama signed the legislation on December 22. The policy officially ended on September 20, 2011.

Beginning in World War II, women had begun to occupy an increasingly conspicuous role in the United States Army. More than 150,000 women served in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (later the Women's Army Corps [WAC]), working as nurses, mechanics, clerks, and intelligence analysts. In the massive demobilization that followed the war, most of these women returned to civilian life, but the success of the WAC led to its integration into the regular army. The WAC existed as a separate corps within the army until 1978, when it was abolished and women were integrated into all aspects of army life except combat duty. That distinction became increasingly suspect given the nature of asymmetrical warfare in the 21st century. No longer could personnel serving in traditional noncombat roles be considered outside the theatre of combat, as there were no fixed front lines. As a result, more than 130 female troops from various branches of service were killed in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Faced with this reality, in January 2013 the Department of Defense lifted the ban on women in combat. As combat experience is a significant consideration for promotion at virtually all ranks, the change was seen as a boost to the advancement prospects for women throughout the army.

Administrative structure

The current administrative structure of the U.S. Army was established by the National Security Act of 1947 and amendments to it in 1949. The Department of the Army is organized as a military section of the Department of Defense. It is headed by the Office of the Secretary of the Army. The army staff gives advice and assistance to the secretary and administers civil functions, including the civil works program of the Corps of Engineers.

The army's responsibilities are divided among 3 Army Commands (ACOM), 10 Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), and 13 Direct Reporting Units (DRU), all organized under the headquarters of the Department of the Army. The United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is an ACOM that supervises Active Army and Army Reserve troops in the continental United States. Headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the command oversees the bulk of the army's operational force. FORSCOM is also in charge of the training of units of the Army National Guard. Other responsibilities include the development of plans for mobilization. The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is an ACOM that directs combat training programs for forces of both the Active Army and the Army Reserve. It is headquartered at Fort Eustis, Virginia. The United States Army Materiel Command (AMC) is an ACOM in charge of the equipment used by the army. Its responsibilities include development, procurement, storage, delivery, and maintenance.

The U.S. Army Cyber Command (USARCYBER) is an ACOM responsible for the electronic and information warfare and cybersecurity operations. The United States Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) is a DRU that provides health services for army personnel and supervises medical training and education. The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) performs intelligence and security functions above the corps level. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) is an ASCC that controls the movement of freight, personal property, and passengers for the Department of Defense. Another duty of the SDDC is the administration of highways for national defense. The United States Army Military District of Washington (MDW), which supports the activities of the army and of the Department of Defense, is the DRU primarily responsible for protecting the nation's capital. Other duties include arranging state funerals and supervising military participation in ceremonies for foreign dignitaries. The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) is responsible for all criminal investigations that are conducted by the army, including those overseas. It operates a criminal intelligence element. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is a DRU responsible for both military engineering projects and civil works programs. The United States Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) is a DRU responsible for testing and evaluation of military systems. The United States Army Acquisition Support Center (USAASC) is a DRU that oversees the conceptualization, development, and acquisition of military systems. The United States Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM) maintains services and facilities for army personnel and their families.

In addition to these commands, there are six army regional Component Commands. The United States Army Africa (USARAF) is headquartered in Vicenza, Italy. The United States Army Europe (USAREUR) is headquartered in Weisbaden, Germany. The United States Army Central (Third Army/ARCENT) oversees central Asia and the Middle East and is headquartered at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. The United States Army North (Fifth Army/ARNORTH) and the United States Army South (ARSO) oversee North and South America, respectively, and both are headquartered at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) oversees the Pacific region and is headquartered at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. Other DRUs include Arlington National Cemetery (ANC), the United States Army Accessions Support Brigade (USAASB), the United States War College (USWC), and the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York. Additional ASCCs include the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT).

US Army Photo

Besides its purely military functions, the army also administers federal programs of environmental protection and development; provides military assistance to federal, state, and local governmental agencies; assists in times of natural disaster; and provides emergency medical air transportation.

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United States Army | History, Generals, Battles, & Structure

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The United States Army, major branch of the United States armed forces charged with the preservation of peace and security and the defense of the country. The army furnishes most of the ground forces in the U.S. military organization. In the early months of the American Revolution, the first regular U.S.

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U.S. Marines in Battle of Fallujah - Urban Combat Footage | Iraq War

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The First Battle of Fallujah, also known as Operation Vigilant Resolve, was an operation to root out extremist elements of Fallujah and an act of retaliation to, as well as an attempt to apprehend the perpetrators of, the killing of four U.S. contractors in April 2004.

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https://www.thebalance.com/cost-of-iraq-war-timeline-economic-impact-3306301

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Yes, the Iraq War was a war for oil, and it was a war with winners: Big Oil.

It has been 10 years since Operation Iraqi Freedom's bombs first landed in Baghdad. And while most of the U.S.-led coalition forces have long since gone, Western oil companies are only getting started.

Before the 2003 invasion, Iraq's domestic oil industry was fully nationalized and closed to Western oil companies. A decade of war later, it is largely privatized and utterly dominated by foreign firms.

From ExxonMobil and Chevron to BP and Shell, the West's largest oil companies have set up shop in Iraq. So have a slew of American oil service companies, including Halliburton, the Texas-based firm Dick Cheney ran before becoming George W. Bush's running mate in 2000.

The war is the one and only reason for this long sought and newly acquired access.

Oil was not the only goal of the Iraq War, but it was certainly the central one, as top U.S. military and political figures have attested to in the years following the invasion.

"Of course it's about oil; we can't really deny that," said Gen. John Abizaid, former head of U.S. Central Command and Military Operations in Iraq, in 2007. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan agreed, writing in his memoir, "I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil." Then-Sen. and now Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the same in 2007: "People say we're not fighting for oil. Of course we are."

For the first time in about 30 years, Western oil companies are exploring for and producing oil in Iraq from some of the world's largest oil fields and reaping enormous profit. And while the U.S. has also maintained a fairly consistent level of Iraq oil imports since the invasion, the benefits are not finding their way through Iraq's economy or society.

These outcomes were by design, the result of a decade of U.S. government and oil company pressure. In 1998, Kenneth Derr, then CEO of Chevron, said, "Iraq possesses huge reserves of oil and gas-reserves I'd love Chevron to have access to." Today it does.

In 2000, Big Oil, including Exxon, Chevron, BP and Shell, spent more money to get fellow oilmen Bush and Cheney into office than they had spent on any previous election. Just over a week into Bush's first term, their efforts paid off when the National Energy Policy Development Group, chaired by Cheney, was formed, bringing the administration and the oil companies together to plot our collective energy future. In March, the task force reviewed lists and maps outlining Iraq's entire oil productive capacity.

Planning for a military invasion was soon under way. Bush's first Treasury secretary, Paul O'Neill, said in 2004, "Already by February (2001), the talk was mostly about logistics. Not the why (to invade Iraq), but the how and how quickly."

In its final report in May 2001 (PDF), the task force argued that Middle Eastern countries should be urged "to open up areas of their energy sectors to foreign investment." This is precisely what has been achieved in Iraq.

The State Department Future of Iraq Project's Oil and Energy Working Group met from February 2002 to April 2003 and agreed that Iraq "should be opened to international oil companies as quickly as possible after the war."

The list of the group's members was not made public, but Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum -- who was appointed Iraq's oil minister by the U.S. occupation government in September 2003 -- was part of the group, according to Greg Muttitt, a journalist and author of "Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq." Bahr al-Uloum promptly set about trying to implement the group's objectives.

At the same time, representatives from ExxonMobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips and Halliburton, among others, met with Cheney's staff in January 2003 to discuss plans for Iraq's postwar industry. For the next decade, former and current executives of western oil companies acted first as administrators of Iraq's oil ministry and then as "advisers" to the Iraqi government.

Before the invasion, there were just two things standing in the way of Western oil companies operating in Iraq: Saddam Hussein and the nation's legal system. The invasion dealt handily with Hussein. To address the latter problem, some both inside and outside of the Bush administration argued that it should simply change Iraq's oil laws through the U.S.-led coalition government of Iraq, which ran the country from April 2003 to June 2004. Instead the White House waited, choosing to pressure the newly elected Iraqi government to pass new oil legislation itself.

This Iraq Hydrocarbons Law, partially drafted by the Western oil industry, would lock the nation into private foreign investment under the most corporate-friendly terms. The Bush administration pushed the Iraqi government both publicly and privately to pass the law. And in January 2007, as the ''surge" of 20,000 additional American troops was being finalized, the president set specific benchmarks for the Iraqi government, including the passage of new oil legislation to "promote investment, national unity, and reconciliation."

But due to enormous public opposition and a recalcitrant parliament, the central Iraqi government has failed to pass the Hydrocarbons Law. Usama al-Nujeyfi, a member of the parliamentary energy committee, even quit in protest over the law, saying it would cede too much control to global companies and "ruin the country's future."

In 2008, with the likelihood of the law's passage and the prospect of continued foreign military occupation dimming as elections loomed in the U.S. and Iraq, the oil companies settled on a different track.

Bypassing parliament, the firms started signing contracts that provide all of the access and most of the favorable treatment the Hydrocarbons Law would provide -- and the Bush administration helped draft the model contracts.

Upon leaving office, Bush and Obama administration officials have even worked for oil companies as advisers on their Iraq endeavors. For example, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad's company, CMX-Gryphon, "provides international oil companies and multinationals with unparalleled access, insight and knowledge on Iraq."

The new contracts lack the security a new legal structure would grant, and Iraqi lawmakers have argued that they run contrary to existing law, which requires government control, operation and ownership of Iraq's oil sector.

But the contracts do achieve the key goal of the Cheney energy task force: all but privatizing the Iraqi oil sector and opening it to private foreign companies.

They also provide exceptionally long contract terms and high ownership stakes and eliminate requirements that Iraq's oil stay in Iraq, that companies invest earnings in the local economy or hire a majority of local workers.

Iraq's oil production has increased by more than 40% in the past five years to 3 million barrels of oil a day (still below the 1979 high of 3.5 million set by Iraq's state-owned companies), but a full 80% of this is being exported out of the country while Iraqis struggle to meet basic energy consumption needs. GDP per capita has increased significantly yet remains among the lowest in the world and well below some of Iraq's other oil-rich neighbors. Basic services such as water and electricity remain luxuries, while 25% of the population lives in poverty.

The promise of new energy-related jobs across the country has yet to materialize. The oil and gas sectors today account directly for less than 2% of total employment, as foreign companies rely instead on imported labor.

In just the last few weeks, more than 1,000 people have protested at ExxonMobil and Russia Lukoil's super-giant West Qurna oil field, demanding jobs and payment for private land that has been lost or damaged by oil operations. The Iraqi military was called in to respond.

Fed up with the firms, a leading coalition of Iraqi civil society groups and trade unions, including oil workers, declared on February 15 that international oil companies have "taken the place of foreign troops in compromising Iraqi sovereignty" and should "set a timetable for withdrawal."

Closer to home, at a protest at Chevron's Houston headquarters in 2010, former U.S. Army Military Intelligence officer Thomas Buonomo, member of Iraq Veterans Against the War, held up a sign that read, " Dear Chevron: Thank you for dishonoring our service" (PDF).

Yes, the Iraq War was a war for oil, and it was a war with losers: the Iraqi people and all those who spilled and lost blood so that Big Oil could come out ahead.

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why the war in iraq was fought for big oil - cnn

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Why the war in Iraq was fought for Big Oil

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Yes, the Iraq War was a war for oil, and it was a war with winners: Big Oil. It has been 10 years since Operation Iraqi Freedom's bombs first landed in Baghdad. And while most of the U.S.-led coalition forces have long since gone, Western oil companies are only getting started.

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Iraq War, also called Second Persian Gulf War

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Iraq War, also called Second Persian Gulf War

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The invasion began on 20 March 2003, with the US, joined by the United Kingdom and several coalition allies, launching a "shock and awe" bombing campaign.

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Since the Korean war, the United States has been fighting wars across the globe. Some of these were justified, some of these were not. During the Cold War, it was to stop the spread of communism, a tactic that led us into Vietnam. We fought a proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, ultimately leading to the current situation in Afghanistan. Today, the American war machine grinds on, a war machine that in the recent past has only caused destruction and devastation.

In 2003, the Bush administration justified the Iraq War on the grounds that Saddam Hussein, a brutal dictator, had obtained WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction). While there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein committed a plethora of human rights abuses and repressed his own people, the Iraq we see today is arguably worse than Saddam's Iraq. At least under Saddam, the ethnic tensions were controlled, Al Qaeda had not taken root, and people had a more stable security situation. So knowing this, what have the United States, and more importantly the Iraqi people, gained from this war?

According to the British charity Oxfam, around "28 percent of Iraqi children are malnourished, " and "70 percent lack clean drinking water." This is actually an increase since 2003, when hard sanctions crippled the regime's food distribution system. The United States spent billions, with some estimates putting it at over 2 trillion on this war which has cost ordinary Iraqis severely.

This is money that could have gone into education, health care and infrastructure, rather than creating chaos abroad. Instead of 'creating democracy', as the Bush administration claimed, we have created an utter mess that is near impossible to resolve. Organizations like Freedom House do not view Iraq as a functioning democracy, rather as a system that functions on corruption. Critics will claim that at least it is more democratic than under Saddam, which, while true, is by no means worth the human sacrifice.

The best comparison to the Iraq War is the Vietnam War. The Center for Public Integrity claimed that the Bush administration manipulated intelligence records, for the ultimate goal of removing Saddam Hussein from power. This sounds quite similar to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which led the United States to enter Vietnam under false premises. Interestingly enough, the United States had previously pledged support for Saddam Hussein, having assisted in funding his war machine in the Iraq-Iran War. We wanted control over Iraq for their vast oil reserves and a strategic ally against Iran, not for liberation from a tyrant. At least in Vietnam, we had a somewhat legitimate reason for entering, a principle that was based on mitigating the spread of communism as far as possible. While I would argue that the policy was flawed and led to international consequences, at least it was grounded in a semi-legitimate policy plan, as opposed to a principle that was based upon pure greed, manipulation, and geographical domination.

Obama was criticized for leaving Iraq in 2009, even though reports do show that he had desired to continue the war, but troops were ultimately forced out by the Iraqi government.

John Mccain recently claimed that the power struggle between insurgents and the government was brought about by US troops leaving Iraq, instead of recognizing that entering Iraq truly began this problem. As bad as Saddam Hussein may have been, at least under his authoritarian regime the country held together.

Finally, on the weapons of mass destruction claim, is there not a nation which actually has threatened to use nuclear weapons against us? This nation is a nation that we are still technically at war with: North Korea. So one nation threatens to nuke us and has literally captured an American ship, while another nation committed none of these acts. Of course, it would be a disaster to go to war with North Korea and, while there is little doubt of a US victory, it would be a bloodbath. North Korea will continue to proliferate nuclear weapons, with only sanctions placed upon them, and that is all we within the international community should do. There are constantly arguments about the power of sanctions and whether they cripple the government or the people but, nevertheless, they are still one of the few means the international community can use to try to force its hand without political interference.

This is exactly what should have been done in Iraq and was done for a period of time. In the Iraq War, it was easy to defeat the organized government. However, if there is no incentive to support the American occupation by the people, we cannot win. We cannot win the hearts and minds of a people who view the US as a perpetrator of human rights abuses and supporter of corruption. Sadly, that is what we have shown the Iraqi people. If we truly want to establish democracy and further human rights, the United States should not respond militarily towards oppressive regimes but instead try to move them to democracy through diplomacy. There is no doubt that this will not be 100 percent successful, but this should be the purpose of the United States within the world sphere.

We must remember that both the American and Iraqi people deserve better than the current scenario. Given the new civil war between the Iraqi government and ISIS, we need to come up with a plan, a plan that provides for the future. Either inaction or action will have consequences, consequences that we have unfortunately created over ten years ago by starting an unnecessary and perpetual cycle of war.

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Since the Korean war, the United States has been fighting wars across the globe. Some of these were justified, some of these were not. During the Cold War, it was to stop the spread of communism, a tactic that led us into Vietnam.

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iraq war terrorism george w. bush saddam hussein haditha shoe seventh anniversary timeline

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Seven Years in Iraq: An Iraq War Timeline - TIME

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A Brief History of the War - Month By Month, Quote By Quote...

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Iran-Iraq War - Facts & Summary - HISTORY.com

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Find out more about the history of Iran-Iraq War, including videos, interesting articles, pictures, historical features and more. Get all the facts on HISTORY.com

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What was the cause of the Iraq War?

When did the Iraq War begin?

Which United States president started the Iraq War?

When did the Iraq War end?

Iraq War, also called Second Persian Gulf War, (2003-11), conflict in Iraq that consisted of two phases. The first of these was a brief, conventionally fought war in March-April 2003, in which a combined force of troops from the United States and Great Britain (with smaller contingents from several other countries) invaded Iraq and rapidly defeated Iraqi military and paramilitary forces. It was followed by a longer second phase in which a U.S.-led occupation of Iraq was opposed by an insurgency. After violence began to decline in 2007, the United States gradually reduced its military presence in Iraq, formally completing its withdrawal in December 2011. American military casualties in the conflict included some 4,500 service members killed and some 32,000 others wounded.
(Read Britannica's interview with Jimmy Carter on the Iraq War and world affairs.)

Prelude to war

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 ended in Iraq's defeat by a U.S.-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War (1990-91). However, the Iraqi branch of the Baʿath Party, headed by Saddam Hussein, managed to retain power by harshly suppressing uprisings of the country's minority Kurds and its majority Shiʿi Arabs. To stem the exodus of Kurds from Iraq, the allies established a "safe haven" in northern Iraq's predominantly Kurdish regions, and allied warplanes patrolled "no-fly" zones in northern and southern Iraq that were off-limits to Iraqi aircraft. Moreover, to restrain future Iraqi aggression, the United Nations ( UN) implemented economic sanctions against Iraq in order to, among other things, hinder the progress of its most lethal arms programs, including those for the development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. ( See weapon of mass destruction.) UN inspections during the mid-1990s uncovered a variety of proscribed weapons and prohibited technology throughout Iraq. That country's continued flouting of the UN weapons ban and its repeated interference with the inspections frustrated the international community and led U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton in 1998 to order the bombing of several Iraqi military installations (code-named Operation Desert Fox). After the bombing, however, Iraq refused to allow inspectors to reenter the country, and during the next several years the economic sanctions slowly began to erode as neighbouring countries sought to reopen trade with Iraq.

In 2002 the new U.S. president, George W. Bush, argued that the vulnerability of the United States following the September 11 attacks of 2001, combined with Iraq's alleged continued possession and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction (an accusation that was later proved erroneous) and its support for terrorist groups-which, according to the Bush administration, included al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks-made disarming Iraq a renewed priority. UN Security Council Resolution 1441, passed on November 8, 2002, demanded that Iraq readmit inspectors and that it comply with all previous resolutions. Iraq appeared to comply with the resolution, but in early 2003 President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that Iraq was actually continuing to hinder UN inspections and that it still retained proscribed weapons. Other world leaders, such as French Pres. Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, citing what they believed to be increased Iraqi cooperation, sought to extend inspections and give Iraq more time to comply with them. However, on March 17, seeking no further UN resolutions and deeming further diplomatic efforts by the Security Council futile, Bush declared an end to diplomacy and issued an ultimatum to Saddam, giving the Iraqi president 48 hours to leave Iraq. The leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and other countries objected to this buildup toward war.

The 2003 conflict

When Saddam refused to leave Iraq, U.S. and allied forces launched an attack on the morning of March 20; it began when U.S. aircraft dropped several precision-guided bombs on a bunker complex in which the Iraqi president was believed to be meeting with senior staff. This was followed by a series of air strikes directed against government and military installations, and within days U.S. forces had invaded Iraq from Kuwait in the south (U.S. Special Forces had previously been deployed to Kurdish-controlled areas in the north). Despite fears that Iraqi forces would engage in a scorched-earth policy-destroying bridges and dams and setting fire to Iraq's southern oil wells-little damage was done by retreating Iraqi forces; in fact, large numbers of Iraqi troops simply chose not to resist the advance of coalition forces. In southern Iraq the greatest resistance to U.S. forces as they advanced northward was from irregular groups of Baʿath Party supporters, known as Saddam's Fedayeen. British forces-which had deployed around the southern city of Basra -faced similar resistance from paramilitary and irregular fighters.

In central Iraq units of the Republican Guard-a heavily armed paramilitary group connected with the ruling party-were deployed to defend the capital of Baghdad. As U.S. Army and Marine forces advanced northwestward up the Tigris-Euphrates river valley, they bypassed many populated areas where Fedayeen resistance was strongest and were slowed only on March 25 when inclement weather and an extended supply line briefly forced them to halt their advance within 60 miles (95 km) of Baghdad. During the pause, U.S. aircraft inflicted heavy damage on Republican Guard units around the capital. U.S. forces resumed their advance within a week, and on April 4 they took control of Baghdad's international airport. Iraqi resistance, though at times vigorous, was highly disorganized, and over the next several days army and Marine Corps units staged raids into the heart of the city. On April 9 resistance in Baghdad collapsed, and U.S. soldiers took control of the city.

On that same day Basra was finally secured by British forces, which had entered the city several days earlier. In the north, however, plans to open up another major front had been frustrated when the Turkish government refused to allow mechanized and armoured U.S. Army units to pass through Turkey to deploy in northern Iraq. Regardless, a regiment of American paratroopers did drop into the area, and U.S. Special Forces soldiers joined with Kurdish peshmerga fighters to seize the northern cities of Kirkuk on April 10 and Mosul on April 11. Saddam's hometown of Tikrīt, the last major stronghold of the regime, fell with little resistance on April 13. Isolated groups of regime loyalists continued to fight on subsequent days, but the U.S. president declared an end to major combat on May 1. Iraqi leaders fled into hiding and were the object of an intense search by U.S. forces. Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, 2003, five months after his two sons, Uday and Qusay Hussein, who were central figures in their father's brutal 24-year rule, had been killed in a shoot-out with American troops after the brothers had been found hiding in a private residence. Saddam was subsequently convicted of crimes against humanity and was executed on December 30, 2006.

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Iraq War | Summary, Causes, Dates, Combatants, Casualties, & Facts

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Iraq War, conflict in Iraq (2003-11) that consisted of two phases: a conventionally fought war in March-April 2003, in which a combined force of troops primarily from the United States and Great Britain invaded Iraq and defeated Iraqi military forces, and a second phase consisting of a U.S.-led occupation of Iraq.