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Japanese internment camps are yet another example of xenophobia in the United States where the government forced over 100,000 of Japanese-Americans to government internment camps.

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Executive Order 9066

On February 19, 1942, shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 with the stated intention of preventing espionage on American shores.

Military zones were created in California, Washington and Oregon-states with a large population of Japanese Americans. Then Roosevelt's executive order forcibly removed Americans of Japanese ancestry from their homes. Executive Order 9066 affected the lives about 120,000 people-the majority of whom were American citizens.

Canada soon followed suit, forcibly removing 21,000 of its residents of Japanese descent from its west coast. Mexico enacted its own version, and eventually 2,264 more people of Japanese descent were forcibly removed from Peru, Brazil, Chile and Argentina to the United States.

Anti-Japanese American Activity

Weeks before the order, the Navy removed citizens of Japanese descent from Terminal Island near the Port of Los Angeles.

On December 7, 1941, just hours after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the FBI rounded-up 1,291 Japanese American community and religious leaders, arresting them without evidence and freezing their assets.

In January, the arrestees were transferred to prison camps in Montana, New Mexico and North Dakota, many unable to inform their families and most remaining for the duration of the war.

Concurrently, the FBI searched the private homes of thousands of Japanese American residents on the West Coast, seizing items considered contraband.

One-third of Hawaii's population was of Japanese descent. In a panic, some politicians called for their mass incarceration. Japanese-owned fishing boats were impounded.

Some Japanese American residents were arrested and 1,500 people-one percent of the Japanese population in Hawaii-were sent to prison camps on the U.S. mainland.

Photos of Japanese American Relocation and Incarceration

John DeWitt

Lt. General John L. DeWitt, leader of the Western Defense Command, believed that the civilian population needed to be taken control of to prevent a repeat of Pearl Harbor.

To argue his case, DeWitt prepared a report filled with known falsehoods, such as examples of sabotage that were later revealed to be the result of cattle damaging power lines.

DeWitt suggested the creation of the military zones and Japanese detainment to Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Attorney General Francis Biddle. His original plan included Italians and Germans, though the idea of rounding-up Americans of European descent was not as popular.

At Congressional hearings in February 1942, a majority of the testimonies, including those from California Governor Culbert L. Olson and State Attorney General Earl Warren, declared that all Japanese should be removed.

Biddle pleaded with the president that mass incarceration of citizens was not required, preferring smaller, more targeted security measures. Regardless, Roosevelt signed the order.

War Relocation Authority

After much organizational chaos, about 15,000 Japanese Americans willingly moved out of prohibited areas. Inland state citizens were not keen for new Japanese American residents, and they were met with racist resistance.

Ten state governors voiced opposition, fearing the Japanese Americans might never leave, and demanded they be locked up if the states were forced to accept them.

A civilian organization called the War Relocation Authority was set up in March 1942 to administer the plan, with Milton S. Eisenhower from the Department of Agriculture to lead it. Eisenhower only lasted until June 1942, resigning in protest over what he characterized as incarcerating innocent citizens.

Relocation to 'Assembly Centers'

Army-directed removals began on March 24. People had six days notice to dispose of their belongings other than what they could carry.

Anyone who was at least 1/16th Japanese was evacuated, including 17,000 children under age 10, as well as several thousand elderly and disabled residents.

Japanese Americans reported to "Assembly Centers" near their homes. From there they were transported to a "Relocation Center" where they might live for months before transfer to a permanent "Wartime Residence."

Assembly Centers were located in remote areas, often reconfigured fairgrounds and racetracks featuring buildings not meant for human habitation, like horse stalls or cow sheds, that had been converted for that purpose. In Portland, Oregon, 3,000 people stayed in the livestock pavilion of the Pacific International Livestock Exposition Facilities.

The Santa Anita Assembly Center, just several miles northeast of Los Angeles, was a de-facto city with 18,000 incarcerated, 8,500 of whom lived in stables. Food shortages and substandard sanitation were prevalent in these facilities.

Life in 'Assembly Centers'

Assembly Centers offered work to prisoners with the policy that they should not be paid more than an Army private. Jobs ranged from doctors to teachers to laborers and mechanics. A couple were the sites of camouflage net factories, which provided work.

Over 1,000 incarcerated Japanese Americans were sent to other states to do seasonal farm work. Over 4,000 of the incarcerated population were allowed to leave to attend college.

Conditions in 'Relocation Centers'

There were a total of 10 prison camps, called "Relocation Centers." Typically the camps included some form of barracks with communal eating areas. Several families were housed together. Residents who were labeled as dissidents were forced to a special prison camp in Tule Lake, California.

Two prison camps in Arizona were located on Native American reservations, despite the protests of tribal councils, who were overruled by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Each Relocation Center was its own "town," and included schools, post offices and work facilities, as well as farmland for growing food and keeping livestock. Each prison camp "town" was completely surrounded by barbed wire and guard towers.

Net factories offered work at several Relocation Centers. One housed a naval ship model factory. There were also factories in different Relocation Centers that manufactured items for use in other prison camps, including garments, mattresses and cabinets. Several housed agricultural processing plants.

Violence in Prison Camps

Violence occasionally occurred in the prison camps. In Lordsburg, New Mexico, prisoners were delivered by trains and forced to march two miles at night to the camp. On July 27, 1942, during a night march, two Japanese Americans, Toshio Kobata and Hirota Isomura, were shot and killed by a sentry who claimed they were attempting to escape. Japanese Americans testified later that the two elderly men were disabled and had been struggling during the march to Lordsburg. The sentry was found not guilty by the army court martial board.

On August 4, 1942, a riot broke out in the Santa Anita Assembly Center, the result of anger about insufficient rations and overcrowding. At California's Manzanar War Relocation Center, tensions resulted in the beating of Fred Tayama, a Japanese American Citizen's League (JACL) leader, by six men. JACL members were believed to be supporters of the prison camp's administration.

Fearing a riot, police tear-gassed crowds that had gathered at the police station to demand the release of Harry Ueno. Ueno had been arrested for allegedly assaulting Tayama. James Ito was killed instantly and several others were wounded. Among those injured was Jim Kanegawa, 21, who died of complications five days later.

At the Topaz Relocation Center, 63-year-old prisoner James Hatsuki Wakasa was shot and killed by military police after walking near the perimeter fence. Two months later, a couple was shot at for strolling near the fence.

In October 1943, the Army deployed tanks and soldiers to Tule Lake Segregation Center in northern California to crack down on protests. Japanese American prisoners at Tule Lake had been striking over food shortages and unsafe conditions that had led to an accidental death in October 1943. At the same camp, on May 24, 1943, James Okamoto, a 30-year-old prisoner who drove a construction truck, was shot and killed by a guard.

Fred Korematsu

In 1942, 23-year-old Japanese-American Fred Korematsu was arrested for refusing to relocate to a Japanese prison camp. His case made it all the way to the Supreme Court, where his attorneys argued in Korematsu v. United States that Executive Order 9066 violated the Fifth Amendment.

Korematsu lost the case, but he went on to become a civil rights activist and was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1998. With the creation of California's Fred Korematsu Day, the United States saw its first U.S. holiday named for an Asian American. But it took another Supreme Court decision to halt the incarceration of Japanese Americans.

Mitsuye Endo

The prison camps ended in 1945 following the Supreme Court decision, Ex parte Mitsuye Endo. In this case, justices ruled unanimously that the War Relocation Authority "has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure."

The case was brought on behalf of Mitsuye Endo, the daughter of Japanese immigrants from Sacramento, California. After filing a habeas corpus petition, the government offered to free her, but Endo refused, wanting her case to address the entire issue of Japanese incarceration.

One year later, the Supreme Court made the decision, but gave President Truman the chance to begin camp closures before the announcement. One day after Truman made his announcement, the Supreme Court revealed its decision.

Reparations

The last Japanese internment camp closed in March 1946. President Gerald Ford officially repealed Executive Order 9066 in 1976, and in 1988, Congress issued a formal apology and passed the Civil Liberties Act awarding $20,000 each to over 80,000 Japanese Americans as reparations for their treatment.

Sources

Japanese Relocation During World War II. National Archives.
Confinement and Ethnicity: An Overview of World War II Japanese American Relocation Sites. J. Burton, M. Farrell, F. Lord and R. Lord.
Lordsburg Internment POW Camp. Historical Society of New Mexico.
Smithsonian Institute.

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Japanese Internment Camps: WWII, Life & Conditions | HISTORY

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Japanese internment camps were established during World War II by President Franklin D. Roosevelt through his Executive Order 9066. From 1942 to 1945, it was the policy of the U.S. government that people of Japanese descent, including U.S. citizens, be incarcerated.

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The strict caste system in India splits Hindus into four separate groups and makes it almost impossible to move up through the ranks of the system. The impoverished stay impoverished - and their descendants cannot move either.

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Department of Psychology, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland

School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK

The Indian caste system is a complex social structure wherein social roles like one's profession became 'hereditary,' resulting in restricted social mobility and fixed status hierarchies. Furthermore, we argue that the inherent property of caste heightens group identification with one's caste. Highly identified group members would protect the identity of the group in situations when group norms are violated. In this paper, we were interested in examining the consequence of caste norm violation and how an individual's status is mentally represented. High caste norms are associated with moral values while the lower caste norms are associated with immorality. We predicted a 'black sheep effect,' that is, when high caste individuals' group identity (caste norm violation condition) is threatened their salient high caste identity would increase, thereby resulting in devaluing the status of their fellow in-group member if the latter is perceived as perpetrator. We presented participants with a social conflict situation of a victim and a perpetrator that is ' Caste norm consistent' (Lower caste individual as a perpetrator and higher caste individual as a victim) and vice versa 'Caste norm inconsistent' condition (higher caste individual as perpetrator and lower caste individual as a victim). Then, participants had to choose from nine pictorial depictions representing the protagonists in the story on a vertical line, with varying degrees of status distance. Results showed evidence for the black sheep effect and, furthermore, revealed that no other identity (religious, national, and regional) resulted in devaluing the status of fellow in-group member. These results help us understand the 'black sheep' effect in the context of moral norms and status representation and are discussed in the framework of the Indian society.

Introduction

People in general belong to many social categories that could either be achieved, such as one's profession, or inherited, such as one's gender. The consequences of social categorizations are often not only seen in the dynamics of social interactions, but also in the way social status is represented. For the present research, the Indian/Hindu caste system is of interest, which is an integral feature of the Indian societal structure. The caste system provides a hierarchy of social roles that hold inherent characteristics and, more importantly, remain stable throughout life ( Dirks, 1989). An implicit status is attached to one's caste which historically changed from the social roles to hereditary roles. This, created status hierarchies on hereditary basis with limited social mobility. For instance, individuals born into the highest caste, that is, the Brahmin caste have usually been priests and scholars. Individuals born into the Kshatriya caste have been warriors and kings. Individuals born into the Vaishya caste have been merchants. Finally, individuals born into the Shudra caste have been laborers. Besides, there was an additional 'out-casted' group called the Dalits or the 'untouchables' who occupied the lowest step of the social ladder (see Ambedkar, 1925/1989; Pick and Dayaram, 2006). In modern India, the Indian government introduced a categorization scheme in which the untouchable castes were categorized as scheduled castes (SC), the backward tribes were categorized as scheduled tribes (ST) and the disadvantaged castes as other backward castes (OBC). The Forward caste (FC) community generally constitute the high caste group. The SC, ST, and OBC comprising the historically disadvantaged groups, were provided job opportunities by the government through affirmative action ( Sheth, 1987; Kumar, 2001; Gupta, 2005; Dreze and Khera, 2009). The FC has historically been and, continues to be, in a strong socioeconomic position with the highest status in society. Thus, one of the main objectives of the present research was to examine how status is cognitively represented in the Indian society as a consequence of the way caste is perceived. Even now, people in India continue to define their self-identity by means of the caste they belong to and the social group that they find themselves in. Caste membership is thus ingrained in the society and there is considerable reason to claim that caste as a type of social identity would probably be one of the most salient identities in the Indian context. This aspect is addressed by Social Identity Theory ( Tajfel and Turner, 1986), to which we now turn.

Social Identity as a Basis for Caste Identity

Social identity claims that people derive an important part of their identity from an affirmation of membership with the group they belong to. Tajfel and Turner (1986) suggested that any group (e.g., social class, family, football team etc.) can act as a source of pride and self-esteem, therefore, we tend to enhance our self-esteem by promoting and endorsing the status of the group we belong to, the so-called "in-group" (as opposed to "out-groups" being those groups that we do not belong to, see also Hogg and Turner, 1987). The Indian societal structure provides a fertile ground to examine the interactive roles of multiple identities like religious, national, regional (north vs. south), class and caste wherein one could discard or fuse these identities for the benefit of societal functioning ( Miller et al., 1990; Miller and Bersoff, 1992). But many researchers have stressed the importance and the influence of caste as an integral social identity among many South Asians compared to other social identities like gender and ethnicity (for example, Gayer, 2000; Mand, 2006). It has in fact been argued that caste identity may override other social identities, because of its primary importance for many South Asians ( Judge and Bal, 2008). We argue that in the context of status representation, caste identity (as opposed to religion, national and regional identities) would be the most prominent identity in explaining the differences in status perception, due to the inherent associations of caste and status. Thus, according to social identity theory, individuals would strive to maintain a positive image of their caste identity. We further argue below that caste identity will especially be more salient for high caste individuals.

A strong caste identity could provide feelings of belongingness or self-esteem, thereby relying on some caste norms. Particularly, it is known that high caste individuals see caste identity as a more stable construct wherein this identity is inherited at birth. They tend to essentialise their identity and this is predominantly attributed to the feelings of connectedness with previous generations of one's caste group. High caste individuals also develop feelings of temporal continuity, positive distinctiveness, and heightened self-esteem from essentialisation of their caste identity ( Jaspal, 2011). In fact, in a study conducted by Cotterill et al. (2014), it was argued that the caste system tends to be legitimized through the ideology of Karmic beliefs (beliefs that general good or bad deeds in one's life are rewarded or reprimanded by being born into a high or low caste in the next life) especially by those high on social dominance orientation (SDO), that is, those who demonstrate a general preference for hierarchical social relations ( Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 2000). Furthermore, when members of higher castes essentialise their caste identity ( Mahalingam, 2003) they permit themselves to stigmatize members of the lower castes. The low caste members or the Dalits on the other hand, do not believe that their caste identity is inherited and therefore do not essentialise it. They may thus enhance their self-efficacy, through the possibility of social mobility, based on the idea that caste identity can be seen as less permanent ( Mahalingam, 2003). We thus argue that caste identity is more salient amongst high caste individuals due to the belief they have about being privileged to have inherited this positive image of high caste at birth. Low caste individuals would not have a salient caste identity because they believe that this identity is not essentialised and belonging to this group has negative consequences.

Social Identity Threat and Caste Norms

Social identity effects are based on the protection of self-concepts ( Tajfel and Turner, 1986) and thus any threat to this self-concept would be associated with strong identity effects. Research has shown that highly identified group members would find ways to protect their in-group identity (see Spears et al., 1997). However, Branscombe et al. (1999) claim that threat to one's social identity in fact depends on the degree of group identification. For instance, they suggest that those who are highly identified with their in-group are more likely to show defensive responses than those who are not so highly identified. We can assume that high caste individuals who legitimize their inherent high caste would also show strong high caste identity.

So, what specifically could elicit an identity threat related to caste? We claim that norms and expectations that are associated with caste membership, when questioned, could fundamentally be a source of threat. In fact, it is most commonly seen that a person engaging in any sort of norm violation (especially of the higher caste) is ostracized and devalued ( Mahalingam, 2007). One of the most deeply rooted caste norms relates to marriage. For instance, when people violate the norm of marrying within one's own caste by engaging in inter-caste marriage, the higher caste individual is believed to bring shame to the family and this norm transgression is considered to be immoral. Branscombe et al. (1999) argued that when an identity related to the morality value is threatened, high identifiers will show more defensive reactions. We therefore argue that the threat to one's own caste, if related to moral values or norms would motivate strong caste identifiers to alleviate this threat and protect their identity.

For many years, the high caste members in general had greater status in the society, and viewed themselves as living to higher moral standards and values, as compared to low caste individuals ( Mahalingam, 2003). It is generally believed that high caste individuals hold qualities related to wisdom, intelligence, honesty, austerity, and morality while low caste individuals possess qualities of dullness, stupidity, immorality, impurity, and other negative qualities ( Deshpande, 2010). These ancient established norms carried over into modern day Indian society and thus certain norms were explicitly attached to a caste type. Thus we can argue that morality is perhaps a significant value attached to one's caste and violating such a norm could be a source of threat particularly amongst high identifiers. As introduced earlier, inter-caste marriages can be seen as a typical norm-violation in India and are often viewed as 'polluting' the sanctity of the caste system ( Dube, 2001), thereby touching upon the value of morality. Marriages between high and low caste persons are especially harshly punished and sometimes lead to public lynching of couples or their relatives, murder (of the bride, groom or their relatives), rape, public beatings and other sanctions (NYU 2007, p. 11 as cited in Hoff et al., 2009). In fact, in Northern India, inter-caste marriages frequently result in family members choosing to kill the couple ( Flintoff, 2010; Goli et al., 2013). Thus, when a high caste member commits norm violation s/he is devalued in society. This effect can especially be understood by the 'Black sheep effect' (BSE) wherein people in general derogate deviant in-group members ( Marques and Paez, 1994).

Norm Violation Effects and Identity

When a norm is violated, members often perceive this deviant behavior as potentially threatening to the group identity, and therefore deal with the deviance in order to reduce the threat ( Jetten and Hornsey, 2014). However, research has shown that the tendency for a group to defend the threat depends on the extent to which an individual is identified with the group ( Marques and Paez, 1994). Those who are not as much identified with the group, are typically less motivated to protect one's social identity ( Spears et al., 1997; Rimal and Real, 2005). It can thus be understood that high identifiers would show greater motivation to engage in in-group protection to defend the threat ( Doosje et al., 1995). We argue that high caste individuals would be high identifiers with their caste, and low caste individuals would be low identifiers with their caste. However, we claim that in-group identity protection will be seen in the form of black sheep effect and not as in-group favoritism. In certain situations, in-group members are known to exclude undesirable members from the in-group in order to maintain a positive and distinctive social identity ( Marques and Paez, 1994). For instance, research by Otten (2009) claims that an aggressive social interaction between a victim and a perpetrator would lead to generally biased responses that could either lead to in-group favoritism or black sheep effect; the latter effect being most likely to occur in situations. More specifically it is said that in-group favoritism is particularly observed when the deviant behavior of the perpetrator was ambiguous or unintentional ( Duncan, 1976; Sagar and Schofield, 1980). However, when there is explicit evidence suggesting that in-group perpetrators deliberately "committed the crime" (see also Abrams et al., 2000; Marques et al., 2001) one would observe the black sheep effect. Wang et al. (2016) also found neural evidence showing that intentional aggressive interactions result in patterns of the black sheep effect. Thus, there is some evidence indicating that aggressive, intentional, and unambiguous interactions would lead to more in-group derogations.

Furthermore, this pattern of in-group derogation tends to be more distinct among individuals who are highly identified with their group ( Biernat et al., 1999) than those who are not. High-caste individuals would indeed be high identifiers, owing to the notion of 'being born into' one's high caste and thus would be especially motivated to protect one's in-group by excluding the undesirable member (see Branscombe et al., 1999). Furthermore, Castano et al. (2002) explain that well- established group members (high caste members) are especially aware of the pertaining rules and norms and therefore, any kind of deviance from such norms would pose a threat to one's group identity, which will be responded to by devaluating the perpetrating in-group member and seeing him/her as low in typicality. Research by Stamkou et al. (2016) further also add that especially those who highly identify with one's in-group perceive the in-group deviant as less typical of the in-group. Thus, in general, norm-deviating in-group members are seen as more negative than non-deviating members ( Marques et al., 1998, 2001; Pinto et al., 2010). Also, according to the threat classification by Branscombe et al. (1999), it is seen that in the face of moral value threat, high identifiers (high caste individuals) are most likely to respond to such a threat by engaging in defensive reactions (black sheep effect) and wanting to be different from the deviant member of the group. We would thus argue that high caste individuals who are also high identifiers with their caste would devalue another in-group member committing norm transgression (that is aggressive and intentional) and would find the transgression morally unacceptable in order to protect their threatened social identity.

Elaborating on the black sheep effect, according to subjective group dynamics theory (SGD; Marques et al., 1998; Abrams et al., 2000) group members are motivated to maintain a positive social identity. This motivation then results in positive evaluations of in-group conformers and negative evaluations of in-group deviants ( Marques et al., 1998, 2001). In a similar vein, Stamkou et al. (2016) found that higher ranked group members showed more preference for norm followers than norm violators. They suggest that this could be because higher ranked members were more threatened by the norm violator's challenge to the status quo. Thus we can argue that high caste individuals would be more motivated to protect one's in-group identity by making negative evaluations of the deviant member. Likewise, according to relational models theory (RMT, Fiske, 1991, 1992), a derogation of in-group member in order to protect a group identity and integrity is explained by a transgression of moral norms regulated by specific in-group relations. In our context it particularly refers to moral motives for unity and hierarchy. Unity is aimed at caring for and supporting the integrity of in-group by avoiding or eliminating threats of contamination. When a group member commits a moral violation, the whole group feels contaminated and shamed until it purifies itself. Hierarchy in turn is aimed at maintaining linear orderings of social status where subordinates are motivated to respect and obey, and superiors to guide, protect, but also take moral responsibility for the actions of their subordinates (for review of all moral motives see Rai and Fiske, 2011). Thus, high caste individuals who break the strongly ingrained high caste norm of morality, purity, self-control, and pastoral care must expect group aversion or even a punishment. We were therefore interested in identity threat in the form of caste norm violation, and the ensuing cognitive representations of caste and status, which could be identity-maintaining. We assume in this context only the caste-based identity will be activated whilst other identities, such as religion, national and regional affiliation, will not play a role.

Caste and Social Consequences

One of the most common social problems of the caste system was the discrimination of low caste members as explained earlier. In 1950, independent India's constitution banned caste-based discrimination and in order to compensate for historical injustices the authorities introduced quotas in government jobs and educational institutions to improve the quality of life of low castes ( "What is India's caste system?", 2016, February 26., para. 13). A reservation system was introduced wherein a certain number of seats were reserved for members of the lower castes at places of higher education and government jobs. However, this legislation was soon met with a lot of resistance from the high caste community who felt that the system was not meritocratic, and provided an unjust advantage to the low caste members (e.g., Siddique, 2011). We believe that the reservation system is one of the most important social consequences of the caste system in modern times, and attitudes toward the system would have to be a reflection of one's caste identity.

The Present Research

It was argued that social identity would play an integral role in the way people represent status. Threat to one's social (caste identity) in the form of norm violations would thus result in engaging in in-group protection. It is important to note that we refer to norm violations as behavior of fellow in-group members and not to one's own norm violations. Therefore, the aim of this study was to examine the role of caste-norm inconsistent (violating) vs. caste norm-consistent (non-violating) situations in making mental representations of status. Furthermore, we also wanted to examine how high caste and low caste individuals make moral judgments in situations of norm violation vs. non-violation. We predict that caste identity threat would be most salient for high caste individuals because these individuals in general have higher levels of caste identity. In general, we predicted that high caste individuals would show a black sheep effect when caste norm violations are introduced. We thus expected that in the face of identity threat, in a norm-inconsistent condition, there will be salient caste identity resulting in a mental representation that reflects the devaluation of an in-group perpetrator (black sheep effect), and lowered moral acceptability of an in-group perpetrator's action, particularly amongst high caste individuals. Moreover, we expect that this black sheep effect is mediated by high caste identity (and not mediated by regional, religious or national identity).

In this study, we used vignettes describing a social conflict situation which comprised norms of violence and morality, as reflecting common norms in the Indian context. The social conflict situation always entailed an intentional aggressive interaction between a victim and a perpetrator. Participants read two stories that depicted two protagonists as either a victim or perpetrator. The protagonists were either of high or low caste which was depicted using implicit stimuli of names and faces (pre-tested). They then had to choose and pick, as a response, one out of nine pictorial depictions that represented the protagonists in the story on a vertical line with varying degrees of status distance. At the end of each story participants also had to rate the moral acceptability of the behavior that took place between the protagonist and the victim. This procedure was chosen based on the general idea that status judgments are supported by an automatic simulation of vertical location ( von Hecker et al., 2013; see also Schubert, 2005 for the same argument on social power). We assume that abstract concepts such as status can be mentally represented in an embodied way ( Niedenthal et al., 2005). Giessner and Schubert (2007) showed that information about a leader's power influenced participants' vertical positioning of the leader. The paradigm used here involves such status representations via the vertical dimension. In this study, we interpret black sheep effect in the form of status evaluations wherein the in-group member is not necessarily excluded but devalued in status instead. That is, when the perpetrator is portrayed as someone from their in-group (high caste), they would then derogate that individual by representing him as having lower status. Low caste individuals on the other hand would not differ in the way they represent status regardless of the condition, that is, they would generally show the trend of depicting a perpetrator as having greater status than a victim regardless of whether the perpetrator is of high or low caste. Finally, we also predict that high caste identity will also mediate the relationship between caste affiliation and social outcomes of caste like endorsement of affirmative action. Thus, high caste individuals' opposing attitude toward educational affirmative action will be mediated by high caste identity.

Materials and Methods

Participants

One hundred and two South Indians from various parts of Chennai, India, were recruited in person by choosing a convenience sampling technique. The participants were approached from various parts of the city and explained the study with examples and in the local language - Tamil. As a cover story, they were informed that the survey was part of a large research project that would help in understanding the Indian society better. The test materials were administered using paper and pencil. The researcher stayed in the area until the participants had completed the survey and they answered questions if necessary. Participants volunteered to participate for free in this research (age M = 33.25, SD = 12.46; 56 female; 45 high caste). Descriptive details of participant demographics are outlined in Table 1.

Design and Procedure

All participants completed the demographic questions and were then instructed that they would be reading a few stories and were required to answer a few questions based on them. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. (i) caste-norm consistent, wherein the perpetrator was of a low caste and the victim was of high caste, and (ii) caste-norm inconsistent, wherein the perpetrator was of high caste and the victim was of low caste. Participants then read the stories pertaining to each condition and answered questions on status representation and moral acceptability for each story. This was then followed by answering questions on attitudes toward affirmative action, about their national, regional, caste and religious identities and, finally, the manipulation check. At the end of the questionnaire all participants were debriefed.

Materials and Measures

Caste Stimuli Materials

Names and faces were pre-tested, from which four names and faces emerged; two belonging to low caste and two belonging to high caste from South India. The names contained the first name and a surname, indicative of a certain caste. The length of the name was not controlled since certain surnames are more indicative of the caste than others. The low caste names included Selvaraj Mani and Kannan Pandian. The high caste names included Murali Raman and Ravi Krishnamurthy. The characteristic features used to distinguish faces belonging to different caste included (i) Skin color, wherein a high caste face typically had lighter skin color and a low caste face had a darker skin color (ii) Facial hair, wherein a higher caste face would have less to no facial hair while a lower caste face would have more facial hair, and (iii) General grooming, wherein a high caste face looked more groomed than a low caste face. Participants were never explicitly informed that the people in stories were either of high or low caste.

Social Conflict Stories

Participants read two stories that described a social threat situation wherein two protagonists in a story were either a victim or a perpetrator. The particular conflict situations, involving issues of violence and morality, were chosen because of their commonness in the Indian society and because such issues are heavily rooted in distinguishing high and low caste characteristics. In the caste norm-consistent condition all participants read two stories in a South Indian context, wherein the victim was portrayed as a high caste member and the perpetrator was portrayed as a low caste member, based on the caste associations which names and faces would elicit. For example, "At the junction of Mount Road there was a huge traffic jam where two cars collided. While nobody got hurt, the drivers jumped out of their cars and started hurling verbal abuses at each other. That quarrel soon turned into a proper fight when Selvaraj Mani jumped out from his car and attacked Murali Raman. Murali Raman was pulled out of his car and was punched hard by Selvaraj Mani. Murali Raman finally fell to the ground and shouted apologies, but Selvaraj Mani did not stop kicking him until the police came and pulled the two drivers apart." In the caste norm-inconsistent condition, participants also read two South Indian stories wherein the victim was portrayed as a low caste member and the perpetrator was portrayed as a high caste member. For example, "At the junction of Mount Road there was a huge traffic jam where two cars collided. While nobody got hurt, the drivers jumped out of their cars and started hurling verbal abuses at each other. That quarrel soon turned into a proper fight when Murali Raman jumped out from his car and attacked Selvaraj Mani. Selvaraj Mani was pulled out of his car and was punched hard by Murali Raman. Selvaraj Mani finally fell to the ground and shouted apologies, but Murali Raman did not stop kicking him until the police came and pulled the two drivers apart." At the end of each story, two photos were presented of the faces and their respective names below the photos. Thus, the low caste name was presented below the low caste photo and the high caste name was presented below the high caste photo. Two different conflict situations were chosen. One was about a traffic jam situation and the second was about a situation in the office where two colleagues get into a dispute (see Appendix 1 for all stories). The stories were counterbalanced within the South Indian context and also between conditions. All stories were in Tamil.

Demographic Questions

Participants completed a survey that included several demographic questions indicating one's religion, perceived socio-economic status, education and caste. The caste categories included most backward caste (MBC), backward class (BC), ST, SC, and FC. Participants were asked to indicate their caste by choosing one of the categories. For the purpose of the research, MBC, BC, ST, and SC were grouped together as low caste and FC remained as high caste. Table 1 shows all frequencies and percentages for other demographic variables.

Status Representation

After reading the stories participants had to choose one out of nine pictorial representations which, according to them, best depicted the social status between the two protagonists in the story. Each picture comprised a vertical line with two circles representing each of the protagonists with varying degrees of status. A wider distance between the two circles on the vertical dimension indicated a greater status difference (see Figure 1 for details). The first and the ninth picture represented greatest status distance but in different directions, for instance, the victim on the lower part of the vertical line and the perpetrator on the upper part of the vertical line, or the positions of victim and perpetrator reversed. Picture 5 had two circles merged into one on a vertical line, indicating equal status. These meanings were explained to participants. Distance was scored based on the picture whereby the picture representing the greatest distance got a score of 4 and the picture representing least distance got a score of 1. The picture representing equal status got a score of 0. Positive distance values were scored for congruent representation of status and stories, that is, victim at lower position and perpetrator at higher position. Negative distance values were assigned for incongruent representation of status and stories, that is, victim at higher position and perpetrator at lower position. Each participant received a score for each of the stories. All chosen distances pertaining to the South Indian stories were combined together, to yield a distance score.

Moral Acceptability

After choosing status representations for all stories, participants were asked to indicate on a scale (1 = extremely unacceptable to 5 = extremely acceptable) to what extent they perceived the behavior between the protagonist and the victim in the scenarios as morally acceptable.

Attitudes toward Reservation System

Participants rated a question on whether they supported or opposed the affirmative action policy (Indian quota system) on a scale (1 = strongly oppose to 5 = strongly support).

Multiple Identities

Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they identified themselves with being Indian, south Indian, high caste, low caste, and being religious on a scale (1 = strongly do not identify to 5 = strongly identify). All items were answered in Tamil.

Manipulation Check

At the end of the study participants were presented with all eight names of the protagonists and were asked to indicate which caste they belonged to by choosing high caste, low caste, or an unsure option.

Results

Descriptive statistics of the manipulation check results are presented in Table 2 which shows the response category frequencies for each of the protagonists. In general, the majority of participants categorized both South Indian high caste protagonists as belonging to the high caste and South Indian low caste protagonists as belonging to the low caste. Thus, we can assume that the names and faces of the protagonists were sufficient to identify the caste. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of identity variables are presented in Table 3. For the purpose of the current study the status distances from the South Indian story 1 ( M = 0.92, SD = 2.23) and South Indian story 2 ( M = 0.61, SD = 2.49) were averaged and used since the sample was a South Indian sample. All participants read the stories and made individual status depiction for each story. To test our predictions, we checked whether caste-norm consistency (coded 0 as cast norm-inconsistent, 1 as caste norm-consistent) was associated with high-caste identity (mediator). In turn, high-caste identity was expected to predict status representation (DV) and moral acceptability (DV), but only amongst high caste members as compared to low caste members (moderator), as depicted in the theoretical model in Figures 2, 3, respectively. That is, we predicted a caste norm inconsistent condition would lead to incongruent status representations (victim seen as of higher status and perpetrator seen as of lower status), as mediated by high-caste identity, but that this effect might be seen only amongst high caste individuals. Similarly, we predicted that a caste-norm inconsistent condition would lead to less moral acceptability of the high-caste perpetrator, as mediated by greater high caste identity, and again only amongst high-caste individuals. We used model 5 in Process macro for SPSS ( Hayes, 2013) to test these moderated mediation effects. In each case 20,000 bootstrap samples were used, 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals and unstandardized coefficients are reported. Religion, education, gender, perceived socioeconomic class, national, regional, and religious identities were all controlled for. Furthermore, since we wanted to examine the role of one identity in particular, it was essential to control for these other identities.

In line with our predictions, we found that caste norm condition was related to status representation through the indirect effect of high-caste identity ( IE = 0.24, 95% CI [0.06; 0.54]). The results showed that caste norm condition negatively predicted high-caste identity ( b = -0.68, t = -2.81, p = 0.006, 95% CI [-1.17, -0.20]) and high-caste identity negatively predicted status distance ( b = -0.35, t = -2.98, p = 0.004, 95% CI [-0.58, -0.12]). Thus, we see that caste norm inconsistency leads to higher caste identity which in turn results in incongruent status distances, however, only amongst high caste individuals. The conditional direct effect of caste norm condition on status representation was significant only among high-caste individuals ( b = 4.84, t = 11.47, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [4.00, 5.68]) but not among low-caste individuals, ( b = 0.39, t = 1.37, p = 0.175, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.95]). The interaction between condition and caste on status representation is graphically presented in Figure 4. The interaction between condition and caste is significant ( b = 4.46, t = 8.52, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [3.42, 5.49]) wherein there is a significant difference between caste norm consistent and inconsistent condition amongst high-caste individuals ( b = 0.37, t = 14.97, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [4.79, 6.26]) but no significant difference amongst low-caste individuals ( b = 0.32, t = 1.10, p = 0.273, 95% CI [-0.26, 0.91]). In addition, results showed high caste individuals showed more status incongruent representations compared to low caste individuals in the norm inconsistent condition ( b = -5.83, t = -17.87, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-6.47, -5.17]). The analyses were repeated for each of the other identities (religious, national, regional, and low caste) that were used as mediators while controlling for the other. The indirect effects for lower caste identity ( IE = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.09; 0.07]), South Indian identity ( IE = -0.00, 95% CI [-0.07; 0.04]), national identity ( IE = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.03; 0.08]) and religious identity ( IE = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.16; 0.06]) were not significant.

We also found a replication of the moderated mediation model wherein caste norm condition was related to moral acceptability through the indirect effect of high-caste identity ( IE = 0.11, 95% CI [0.01; 0.30]) while controlling for other identities. The results revealed that caste norm condition negatively predicted high-caste identity ( b = -0.57, t = -2.53, p = 0.013, 95% CI [-1.02, -0.12]) and high caste identity negatively predicted moral acceptability ( b = -0.19, t = -2.12, p = 0.039, 95% CI [-0.37, -0.01]). The conditional direct effect of caste norm condition on moral acceptability was again significant only among high-caste individuals ( b = 1.84, t = 5.63, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [1.19, 2.48]) but not among low-caste individuals, ( b = 0.13, t = 0.58, p = 0.561, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.56]). The interaction between condition and caste on status representation is graphically presented in Figure 5. The interaction between condition and caste is significant ( b = 1.71, t = 4.17, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [0.90, 2.52]). Thus, we see that caste norm inconsistency leads to more high-caste identity which in turn results in lesser moral acceptability, however, only amongst high-caste individuals. The analyses were repeated for each of the other identities (religious, national, regional, and low caste) that were used as mediators while controlling for the other. The indirect effects for low-caste identity ( IE = -0.04, 95% CI [-0.03; 0.11]), South Indian identity ( IE = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.10; 0.04]), national identity ( IE = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.03; 0.05]) and religious identity ( IE = -0.00, 95% CI [-0.09; 0.01]) were again not significant.

To test the effects of actual caste on the social consequences of the caste system, such as attitudes toward affirmative action as mediated through upper caste identity, a mediation analysis was conducted (Process model 4, Hayes, 2013) as theoretically depicted in Figure 6. Again, in line with our predictions, the results showed that actual caste positively predicted high caste identity ( b = 1.10, t = 4.78, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [0.65, 1.56]) and high caste identity negatively predicted the affirmative action attitudes ( b = -0.39, t = -8.76, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-0.53, -0.25]). We found an indirect effect of caste on affirmative action attitude partially mediated by high caste identity ( IE = -0.43, 95% CI [0.07; 0.46]). The direct effect of actual caste on affirmative action attitudes was also significant ( b = -1.56, SE = 0.18, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-1.91, -1.21]). Thus, high caste leads to opposition of affirmative action partially due to heightened upper caste identity. The analyses were repeated for each of the other identities while controlling for the other. The indirect effects for lower caste identity ( IE = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.20; 0.23]), South Indian identity ( IE = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.06; 0.16]), national identity ( IE = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.08; 0.15]) and religious identity ( IE = -0.00, 95% CI [-0.08; 0.09]) were also not significant.

Discussion

In this research, we apply a well-established theoretical framework incorporating social identity theory ( Tajfel and Turner, 1986), the black sheep effect ( Marques et al., 1988) and moral motives derived from relational models theory ( Fiske, 1991; Rai and Fiske, 2011) to understand a small part of a complex social structure, namely the Indian caste system. It is important to state that we are not claiming that this study answered all the nuances seen in exploring the caste system but has paved the way toward a better understanding of this concept. Overall, we found support for our argument that group membership to a particular caste has consequences in the way one perceives status amongst fellow members in the society. More specifically, we validated that when high-caste individuals learn that their fellow in-group member engaged in norm-violating behavior then they devalue the status of that in-group member. Thus, for instance, when a high-caste member marries a low caste member, this high caste member will be devalued by his fellow in-groupers owing to norm-violation. Moreover, we find that this trend is particularly observed as a consequence of heightened high-caste identity. Our results show that in a situation of norm violation, high caste identity predicts the way people make status representations. We argue that this norm violation induces identity threat, especially among high-caste individuals and as a result of the threat they heighten their high-caste identity, thereby engaging in status devaluation. The stories in the study also depict an intentional aggressive, deviant behavior and in line with previous research ( Abrams et al., 2000; Marques et al., 2001) this behavior led to black sheep effects in the form of status devaluation by high-caste members. Classic studies by Branscombe et al. (1993) and Biernat et al. (1999) show that highly identified individuals show more in-group derogation especially when one's identity is threatened. Moreover, we also claim that since high-caste members tend to see caste identity as inherited at birth and also tend to essentialise their caste ( Dube, 2001; Mahalingam, 2007) a high-caste identity will be more salient amongst the high-caste individuals than low caste-identity amongst the low-caste individuals. Thus, high caste members would especially defend the identity threat to maintain positive social identity due to heightened identification with the group ( Marques and Paez, 1994) and would perceive the in-group deviant as less typical of the in-group ( Castano et al., 2002).

Thus, in the present study we were able to show how status is represented without explicit information about the protagonist's caste. The information people received was merely the person's name and a photograph and yet it is evident that existing knowledge about caste was activated. As seen in the manipulation check, in general, most high-caste protagonist names were identified as belonging to the high caste and low-caste protagonist names as belonging to the low caste. Moreover, the study incorporated a novel method to measure perception of status by means of a projective task using the vertical dimension, as this dimension has been shown to be used in reasoning to simulate power ( Schubert, 2005) and social status ( von Hecker et al., 2013), in order to generate judgments on these characteristics. Therefore, when participants were depicting relations in such a way that a perpetrator was represented on the bottom of the vertical line and the victim on top, we believe the abstract concept of status and in-group derogation was clearly embodied.

It is important to understand that the reason a norm-violating social situation was chosen to induce identity threat was because in the Indian context caste norm violation is perhaps the most salient identity threat situation. Deshpande (2010) explains that caste has acquired hereditary characteristics in the Indian society which comes with certain norms that evolved from ancient scriptures. Thus, when these norms are violated in the society, it is received with punitive costs. The threat used in this context violated the basic morality values of the caste and according to Branscombe et al. (2000), threat to moral values leads to defensive reactions and perceived in-group heterogeneity, especially amongst high identifiers. Thus, when the high caste moral code of being virtuous and non-aggressive was violated, highly identified high caste members strengthened their identity and showed in-group derogation by devaluing the status of the in-group deviant. This reasoning was further confirmed when high-caste individuals in the norm-inconsistent (violating) condition showed lower moral acceptability of the behavior when the perpetrator was a high-caste member.

Secondly, the results also show that only high-caste individuals seem to be affected by the norm violation identity threat in making status representations but not the low-caste individuals. In fact, the low-caste individuals seem to show no differences in the way they represent status and moreover they seem to do so in a status-congruent direction, that is, the perpetrator is always depicted as having high status and a victim is always depicted as having low status. This could possibly be the case because historically low-caste individuals are the stigmatized low status groups ( Mahalingam, 2003). Therefore, they probably do not experience the same amount of identity threat in a norm-violation condition as the high-caste individuals. The low caste individuals, due to the belief that their caste was not acquired through birth ( Dube, 2001) and the lack of an established status, probably also showed lesser identification with their low-caste. Thus, when a low- caste individual reads a story about a norm-violating low-caste member who is in fact a victim, there is no threat that is activated probably because they do not show high identification. Furthermore, being portrayed as a victim does not threaten the image of the in-group of low caste individuals, thereby lowering the need to protect the in-group image.

Another important outcome of this study was that only high-caste identity seemed to play an integral role in predicting status effects and moral acceptability. As already explained by Judge and Bal (2008), caste identity dominates over all other identities in the Indian context, probably because of the inherent characteristics the concept of caste entails. As seen in the correlations (Table 2), only high caste and low caste identities seem to negatively correlate with each other; understandably because those with greater high caste identities would have lesser low caste identities. Interestingly, low-caste identity did not act as a significant mediator in predicting status relationships or understanding moral acceptability. Understandably because previous studies have shown that caste identity is essentialised and legitimized ( Dube, 2001; Mahalingam, 2007) particularly by high caste individuals; thus possessing high-caste identity could result in understanding and representing status differences more than having low-caste identity. Our results also show that none of the other identities - national, regional or religious played an important role in predicting status distances or moral acceptability. While India is a complex social structure with an interactive role of multiple identities, we have reasonable evidence to believe that perhaps in the context of status representation, hierarchies and caste-related social outcomes, other identities are not as salient, so perhaps people discard these identities when being involved in status-relevant situations. Thus, it seems like in the context of how individuals see status in the society, only high-caste identity seems to be activated while alternative identities might be discarded. This is a very important finding because whilst studies have shown that caste identity is the most salient identity ( Gayer, 2000), perhaps heightening other identities like regional or national identities could result in reducing caste-based status hierarchies or status representations. Interventions such as this could be seen in the work by Brewer and Gaertner (2008) where they speak of cross-categorization as a technique to overcome prejudice. A typical example could be seen in the sporting context when athletes all over the country from different socioeconomic backgrounds and castes come together as a team to play for the country. The heightened in-group national identity perhaps diminishes existing caste based identities that could potentially create situations of prejudice amongst various players. While there are many religious and regional conflicts we see that caste based discrimination is the most salient form when it involves differentiating groups of varied status.

Finally, the results also confirm the social consequences of a caste-based system in terms of affirmative action. As pointed out by Siddique (2011), affirmative action policies were introduced to improve the quality of life of low-caste individuals. However, it was soon met with opposition from the high-caste community. Sometimes caste is not always related to class, so it is possible that someone of low caste could be of high class and therefore have sufficient means and opportunities at places of education and government jobs. Thus, the present results confirmed that high-caste individuals would generally oppose affirmative action, whereby this link was partially mediated through high-caste identity. More importantly, again, none of the alternative identities played a role in determining attitudes toward affirmative action. This is unsurprising because affirmative action was introduced as an outcome of revisiting the consequence of the caste system for low-caste individuals. Therefore, other identities do not seem to play a vital role in predicting these effects.

The present study, however, has some limitations especially with respect to sample size and the sampling technique (convenience sampling). While only single-item measures were used for measuring identity, as a follow-up study caste-based identity should also be measured on its own using a questionnaire and relate this to the present findings. The present findings should also be extended to other norm-violating instances apart from the victim-perpetrator context. In India, several other norm violations exist, for instance, consuming beef in a purely 'Hindu' state, or women dressed in 'western' clothes, or engaging in inter-caste marriage, the latter being the most predominant caste-norm transgression. Furthermore, it would be essential to re-run the study, this time manipulating the class of the protagonists using different professions (without names), in order to rule out the influence of class in these processes. It would also be essential to replicate these findings with a North Indian sample. Finally, it is important to note that when a high caste individual is engaged in a norm-violation, there is a greater negative connotation as a high caste individual's consistent norm is that of purity and morality ( Deshpande, 2010). The low caste individuals' consistent norm, however, is that of impurity and immorality, therefore, a negative expectation of their behavior is already established as a norm and therefore in a norm-violation condition, wherein they are portrayed as a victim, they are probably not as threatened as high-caste individuals. A positive connotation attached to a norm-violation perhaps does not induce as much threat and therefore low-caste individuals remain unaffected by the two conditions. This limitation is something that needs to be addressed in future studies.

Conclusion

The present study tried to utilize basic social identity theories in explaining one outcome of a very complex social system, such as the Indian caste system. It also touched upon the most dominant identity that is useful in predicting status differences in the Indian society. Considering the complexity of the Indian caste system, it was crucial to look into a small consequence of the caste system rather than the whole structure on its own. This study also paves the way into the understanding of the black sheep effect as seen in status representation as supposed to general in-group derogation attitudes. It is fundamental to expand this study by examining other aspects of social identity threat in the Indian context, such as religion, to gain some more understanding of how multiple identities interact with each other in the functioning of the Indian society.

Ethics Statement

The study was approved by the Scientific Research and Ethics Committee at the Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland (the date of the record July 2, 2014). All participants signed the informed consent form and were told that they were free to withdraw from the study at any time.

Author Contributions

SS and UvH initially conceptualized the idea. SS and MS developed the idea and primarily designed the study. SS was mainly involved in data collection and data analyses. SS and MS were involved in data interpretation and UvH contributed to the discussion. SS was involved in writing the paper draft of the paper. Both MS and UvH were involved in the revised versions of paper.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Usha Sankaran from Chennai, India who volunteered to collect data for this study and helped coding the questionnaire responses on excel. This research is carried out as part of the FUGA grant (2016/20/S/HS6/00317) awarded to SS from the National Centre for Science, Poland (2016-2019). The publication costs are supported by Cardiff University.

Supplementary Material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00487/full#supplementary-material

Footnotes

1. Caste is not always related to socioeconomic class even though the two constructs are connected. For instance, a high caste and a high class individual could be a university professor while a high caste and a low class individual could be a Brahmin temple priest. Similarly, a politician could be a low caste and a high class individual and a typical example of a low caste, low class individual would be household help or a flower seller.

2. The terms backward and forward are used based on the official classification issued by the government of India and recognized in the Constitution of India. Essentially the backward caste groups comprise of historically disadvantaged people in India while the forward caste comprise those of the more privileged high caste individuals. These terms by no means denote in the linguistic sense of moving forward or backward.

3. We would like to argue that participants in fact have a pre-disposed idea of status based on information about caste. Thus, while the stories in the vignettes do imply a power relation, this pre-disposed notion of status has short term influence in making status representations. We argue that the transgression as an outcome of power relation is still evaluated based on which person is perpetrator -the high or low caste individual.

4. Apart from the two South Indian stories, all participants also had to respond to two other stories that were pertaining to the North Indian context. Since the participants were all from Chennai, Tamil Nadu in South India we did not include the distance and moral acceptability scores of the North Indian stories. Furthermore, the manipulation check reveled that when asked to classify the protagonists as belonging to a particular caste, most North Indian protagonists were classified in the 'unsure' category. Thus we only used the data pertaining to the South Indian context.

References

Cotterill, S., Sidanius, J., Bhardwaj, A., and Kumar, V. (2014). Ideological support for the indian caste system: social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism and karma. J. Soc. Polit. Psychol. 2, 98-116. doi: 10.5964/jspp.v2i1.171

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The Role of Indian Caste Identity and Caste Inconsistent Norms on Status Representation

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The Indian caste system is a complex social structure wherein social roles like one's profession became 'hereditary,' resulting in restricted social mobility and fixed status hierarchies. Furthermore, we argue that the inherent property of caste heightens group identification with one's caste. Highly identified group members would protect the identity of the group in situations when group norms are violated.

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The killing of several thousand minority Tutsis by the majority Hutus - the genocide was deemed a "method of ethnic cleansing"

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In just 100 days in 1994, about 800,000 people were slaughtered in Rwanda by ethnic Hutu extremists. They were targeting members of the minority Tutsi community, as well as their political opponents, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

Warning: Contains graphic images.

How did the genocide start?

About 85% of Rwandans are Hutus but the Tutsi minority has long dominated the country. In 1959, the Hutus overthrew the Tutsi monarchy and tens of thousands of Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries, including Uganda.

A group of Tutsi exiles formed a rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which invaded Rwanda in 1990 and fighting continued until a 1993 peace deal was agreed.

On the night of 6 April 1994 a plane carrying then-President Juvenal Habyarimana, and his counterpart Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi - both Hutus - was shot down, killing everyone on board.

Hutu extremists blamed the RPF and immediately started a well-organised campaign of slaughter. The RPF said the plane had been shot down by Hutus to provide an excuse for the genocide.

With meticulous organisation. Lists of government opponents were handed out to militias who went and killed them, along with all of their families.

Neighbours killed neighbours and some husbands even killed their Tutsi wives, saying they would be killed if they refused.

At the time, ID cards had people's ethnic group on them, so militias set up roadblocks where Tutsis were slaughtered, often with machetes which most Rwandans kept around the house.

Thousands of Tutsi women were taken away and kept as sex slaves.

Why was it so vicious?

Rwanda has always been a tightly controlled society, organised like a pyramid from each district up to the top of government. The then-governing party, MRND, had a youth wing called the Interahamwe, which was turned into a militia to carry out the slaughter.

Weapons and hit-lists were handed out to local groups, who knew exactly where to find their targets.

The Hutu extremists set up a radio station, RTLM, and newspapers which circulated hate propaganda, urging people to "weed out the cockroaches" meaning kill the Tutsis. The names of prominent people to be killed were read out on radio.

Even priests and nuns have been convicted of killing people, including some who sought shelter in churches.

By the end of the 100-day killing spree, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been killed.

The UN and Belgium had forces in Rwanda but the UN mission was not given a mandate to stop the killing.

A year after US troops were killed in Somalia, the US was determined not to get involved in another African conflict. The Belgians and most UN peacekeepers pulled out after 10 Belgian soldiers were killed.

The French, who were allies of the Hutu government, sent a special force to evacuate their citizens and later set up a supposedly safe zone but were accused of not doing enough to stop the slaughter in that area.

Paul Kagame, Rwanda's current president, has accused France of backing those who carried out the massacres - a charge denied by Paris.

How did it end?

The well-organised RPF, backed by Uganda's army, gradually seized more territory, until 4 July 1994, when its forces marched into the capital, Kigali.

Some two million Hutus - both civilians and some of those involved in the genocide - then fled across the border into the Democratic Republic of Congo, at the time called Zaire, fearing revenge attacks. Others went to neighbouring Tanzania and Burundi.

Human rights groups say RPF fighters killed thousands of Hutu civilians as they took power - and more after they went into DR Congo to pursue the Interahamwe. The RPF denies this.

In DR Congo, thousands died from cholera, while aid groups were accused of letting much of their assistance fall into the hands of the Hutu militias.

What happened in DR Congo?

The RPF, now in power in Rwanda, embraced militias fighting both the Hutu militias and the Congolese army, which was aligned with the Hutus.

The Rwanda-backed rebel groups eventually marched on DR Congo's capital, Kinshasa, and overthrew the government of Mobutu Sese Seko, installing Laurent Kabila as president.

But the new president's reluctance to tackle Hutu militias led to a new war that dragged in six countries and led to the creation of numerous armed groups fighting for control of this mineral-rich country.

An estimated five million people died as a result of the conflict which lasted until 2003, with some armed groups active until now in the areas near Rwanda's border.

Has anyone faced justice?

Instead, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Tanzanian town of Arusha to prosecute the ringleaders.

A total of 93 people were indicted and after lengthy and expensive trials, dozens of senior officials in the former regime were convicted of genocide - all of them Hutus.

Within Rwanda, community courts, known as gacaca, were created to speed up the prosecution of hundreds of thousands of genocide suspects awaiting trial.

Correspondents say up to 10,000 people died in prison before they could be brought to justice.

For a decade until 2012, 12,000 gacaca courts met once a week in villages across the country, often outdoors in a marketplace or under a tree, trying more than 1.2 million cases.

Their aim was to achieve truth, justice and reconciliation among Rwandans as "gacaca" means to sit down and discuss an issue.

What is Rwanda like now?

President Kagame has been hailed for transforming the tiny, devastated country he took over through policies which encouraged rapid economic growth. He has also tried to turn Rwanda into a technological hub and is very active on Twitter.

But his critics say he does not tolerate dissent and several opponents have met unexplained deaths, both in the country and abroad.

The genocide is obviously still a hugely sensitive issue in Rwanda, and it is illegal to talk about ethnicity.

The government says this is to prevent hate speech and more bloodshed but some say it prevents true reconciliation.

Charges of stirring up ethnic hatred have been levelled against some of Mr Kagame's critics, which they say is a way of sidelining them.

He won a third term in office in the most recent election in 2017 with 98.63% of the vote.

All photographs belong to the copyright holders as marked

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In just 100 days in 1994, some 800,000 people were slaughtered in Rwanda by ethnic Hutu extremists - how did the genocide happen?

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As recently as 2017, the United States experienced an egregious display of xenophobia in the form of a "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, VA. Neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and KKK members converged to send a clear message of anger, violence, and hate towards anyone who wasn't white.

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Charlottesville: Race and Terror – VICE News Tonight on HBO

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Apartheid: Blacks were denied citizenship, access to quality health care, public services, education, and all amenities which had long been declared as basic human rights

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Instances of xenophobia are numerous. The following are some examples of what racial segregation and discrimination can do the human race.

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The Holocaust is perhaps the most prominent example of Xenophobia in the history of humanity where millions of Jews were murdered by the infamous nazi regime.

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Jewish and Christian leaders prayed over the ruins of gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau as some leaders warned Friday on International Holocaust Remembrance Day of rising xenophobic hatred against Jews and others, including Muslims.

Dozens of survivors gathered with political leaders and representatives of Poland's Jewish community at the site where Germany murdered about 1.1 million people during World War II, mostly Jews from across Europe, but also Poles, Roma, Soviet prisoners of war and others.

Poland's Prime Minister Beata Szydlo, who is from the Polish town where the Auschwitz memorial and museum is located, recalled the "destruction of humanity" and the "ocean of lost lives and hopes" in Oswiecim.

"It's an open wound that may close sometimes but it shall never be fully healed and it must not be forgotten," she said.

Dozens of Auschwitz survivors began a day of commemorations by placing wreaths and flowers at the infamous execution wall on the 72nd anniversary of the camp's liberation by Soviet soldiers. The United Nations recognized Jan. 27 as International Holocaust Remembrance Day in 2005, and many commemorative events were taking place across the world on Friday.

"Tragically, and contrary to our resolve, anti-Semitism continues to thrive," U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said in a statement made in New York on Thursday, and which was read out at the U.N. headquarters in Geneva on Friday. "We are also seeing a deeply troubling rise in extremism, xenophobia, racism and anti-Muslim hatred. Irrationality and intolerance are back."

Guterres vowed to "be in the front line of the battle against anti-Semitism and all other forms of hatred."

In Germany, outgoing Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said his nation sticks by its obligation to take responsibility for the crimes committed by the Nazi regime of Adolf Hiltler.

Noting the political instability in the world today, Steinmeier said, "History should be a lesson, warning and incentive all at the same time. There can and should be no end to remembrance."

In Croatia, the Jewish community boycotted official commemorations, saying the country's conservative government is not doing enough to curb pro-Nazi sentiments there.

Community leader Ognjen Kraus, the coordinator of the Jewish communities in Croatia, said the decision was made after authorities failed to remove a plaque bearing a World War II Croatian pro-Nazi salute from the town of Jasenovac - the site of a wartime death camp where tens of thousands of Jews, Serbs and Roma perished.

Elderly survivors at Auschwitz, which today is a museum and partially preserved memorial, paid homage to those killed by wearing striped scarves to symbolize the uniforms prisoners were given when they arrived at the concentration camp.

(Maurizio Gambarini / AFP/Getty Images)

They walked slowly beneath the notorious gate with the words "Arbeit Macht Frei" (Work Will Set You Free) and made their way as a group to the execution wall, where they lighted candles and prayed.

Janina Malec, a Polish survivor whose parents were killed at the execution wall, described her yearly visit as a "pilgrimage" and told the PAP news agency that "as long as I live I will come here."

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Warnings of rising xenophobia on Holocaust Remembrance Day

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Jewish and Christian leaders prayed over the ruins of gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau as some leaders warned Friday on International Holocaust Remembrance Day of rising xenophobic hatred against Jews and others, including Muslims. Dozens of survivors gathered with political leaders and representatives of Poland's Jewish community at the site where Germany murdered about 1.1 million people during World War II, mostly Jews from across Europe, but also Poles, Roma, Soviet prisoners of war and others.