# data[].attributes.body
Chinese culture is heavily influenced by Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist philosophies. This is manifested in the way that Chinese people believe in spirituality and the importance of treating your parents well (among other virtues). In particular, I think confucianism plays the biggest role in shaping Chinese mentalities and ways of life. It promotes the idea that relationships between people are unequal and that everyone has defined hierarchical roles (for example, ruler and subject, husband and wife, father and son). When this natural inequality is accepted and respected, it becomes easier to maintain harmonious, stable relations between individuals and, therefore, in society as a whole. These core values are reflected in respect and a sense of duty towards others, as well as maintaining loyalty and honor for oneself and their family. A major part of daily life for Taiwanese is ancestor worship, as well as respecting their elders (i.e. filial piety). However, modernization and foreign influences have somewhat diminished the presence of these beliefs and philosophies, but I think that they will never really be done away with because they are passed down through generations.

# data[].attributes.body
Taiwan's transition from semi-authoritarian rule to a unitary semi-presidential republic is seen as a direct contrast to the increasingly authoritarian rule of PRC. Its shift to a representative, electoral republic in the 80s and 90s was seem as a major progress in its civil society. But the people and the party in Taiwan have their own unique perspective and challenges in the geopolitical domain. Identity politics, economic concerns, birth rates, job markets, the China challenge, and its unique status in the international domain makes its democratic institution some what of an anomaly within its geographical position. At the same time, its democratic process has shaped Taiwanese values, identity, and history.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Taiwan has gotten high marks when it comes to holding clean elections and protecting political rights. The public strongly supports democracy in principle and by and large approves the island's system in practice. When it comes to performance, however, the political system does not do so well. This is partly because of a set of structural factors. Selecting the president and legislature on a majoritarian basis fosters a degree of polarization and complicates the crafting of policy compromises. Periodically, social and political forces seek to circumvent the institutions of representative government (via mass protests, for example). They can block what they oppose but are unable to solve the problems that provoked their action in the first place. Another reason is that the issues to be addressed are not easy. Taiwan's economy is maturing; young people lack employment opportunities; the population is aging; and the birth rate is very low. The most challenging issue is China and its ambitions regarding Taiwan. So, the stakes for Taiwan's democracy are high. A failure to perform well would be a tragedy.

Introduction

Generally, Taiwan gets high marks for its democracy. It was a poster child for the global "third wave" of democratization that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Its transition from authoritarian rule to a representative, electoral system was gradual and peaceful. ¹ Today, U.S. government officials regularly praise the island's political progress. The State Department's annual report of human rights practices says that civil and political rights and the rule of law are well protected.

These positive ratings do have a basis. Elections are free, fair, and highly competitive. In presidential races, turnout usually exceeds 70%. There have been three presidential transfers of power, an indicator of democratic consolidation. The party system is institutionalized, with two large, distinctive parties - the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). ² Each is supported by small parties and groupings, producing two political camps. The KMT leads the Blue camp and the DPP the Green camp (named for the colors of their party flags). Civil society organizations have proliferated and pursue their objectives seriously. Polling organizations facilitate a permanent plebiscite on leaders and government policies.

Public views concerning the political system

Despite all these favorable attributes, the island's public has decidedly mixed views about their democratic system. In the World Values Survey in 2012, 40 to 60% of Taiwan expressed confidence in the central government, civil service, armed forces, and the courts, but rated the press at 28.4%, the Legislative Yuan (LY, the parliament) at 27.6%, and political parties at 22.4%. ³

The Asian Barometer Survey has conducted several surveys of public attitudes that probe the degree of satisfaction about Taiwan's democracy in various ways. The following is the set of responses in the 2014 "wave," the last one to be done, in declining levels of positivity:

88% supported the idea that democracy is still the best form of government, whatever its problems.

84% thought that "democracy is suitable for our country."

76% believed that democracy is capable of solving problems in society.

68% thought that Taiwan was a democracy, though some thought it had "minor problems."

63% were satisfied with the way democracy worked in Taiwan.

63% believed that "democracy was always preferable."

Unfortunately, these are the last iterations of the World Values Survey and the Asian Barometer Survey. Hence, it is impossible to know whether people in Taiwan have revised their views in the interim, for better or for worse. My best guess is that if opinion has changed, it would be in a negative direction, as politics on issues like China, pensions, same-sex marriage, and so on, became more contentious.

Performance

That two out of three respondents were generally satisfied with their political system is not a bad approval rate. Yet most intriguing were these responses to two other questions:

Only 23% thought that democracy was more important than economic development.

16% believed that protecting political freedom was more important than reducing economic inequality.

That is, performance is more important than process. Democracy is not valued for its own sake, but rather whether its outcomes satisfy what people value.

There is no denying that on a range of issues, the Taiwan political system's response to policy problems has been suboptimal.

That these survey questions imposed a forced choice on respondents may have biased the results against democratic process. But there is no denying that on a range of issues, the Taiwan political system's response to policy problems has been suboptimal. These include the government budget; maintaining economic competitiveness; ensuring good jobs for young people; energy security, preserving the environment, and food safety; the generosity of retiree pensions; marriage equality; transitional justice (how far to go in holding accountable the authoritarian KMT regime of the past); judicial reform; and, last but definitely not least, China. On each of these issues, the players - the political leadership, central and local government agencies, political parties, the business community, civil society, and the public - and how they interact varies, depending on the nature of the problem to be addressed. But the results are often policy swings, chronic contention, or even gridlock.

Structural factors

These issues often yield less than satisfactory outcomes because they are very difficult to solve. After all, as Taiwan's export-led economy matured, the growth rate has declined. As the population has aged and the birthrate dropped, the working population is shrinking in size relative to the number of children and retirees that depend on them. Companies did sustain profits by moving production to China, but changes in the Chinese business environment (e.g. increasing wage demands) have posed new business challenges. Moreover, Beijing seeks to change the status quo in its favor.

Majoritarianism and its consequences

Not only are policy issues substantively complex, certain structural features of Taiwan's democratic system affect the conduct of politics and complicate policy formulation. A key one is the majoritarian character of the legislature. Beginning with the 2008 election, members of the LY have been elected in two ways (each voter casts two ballots). 64.6% of the 113 members are elected from single-member districts on a "first-past-the-post" basis (the same system as in the United States). The remaining 35.4% are selected on a party basis. ⁴

The result has been a majoritarian system, which has some built-in advantages. The winner-take-all principle tends to produce fewer large parties. Fewer parties mean fewer policy programs from which voters must choose, while too many proposals can produce confusion and gridlock. Legislators chosen from single-member territorial districts are more likely to be responsive and accountable to their constituents than legislators who are picked in multi-member districts.

Yet an electoral system that combines single-member districts and a first-past-the-post rule is actually less representative of voters' preferences than some alternatives. It almost guarantees that candidates of two major parties will win most of the legislative seats, and that the winning party will get more seats than its share of the vote. Thus in 2016, the KMT and the DPP won 91% of the total LY seats. In the single-member races, DPP candidates got 44.6% of the vote, but won 68.5% of those seats. KMT candidates received 38.9% of this vote and 30.8% of the seats. The same distortion occurs to a lesser degree in the party vote. In 2016, the DPP won 44.1% of the party vote and got 52.9% of those seats. In this contest, the KMT secured 26.9% of the votes and 32.3% of the seats. The presidential election, which is held on the same day as the balloting for the LY, is also on a winner-take-all basis, which reinforces the majoritarian nature of the system. ⁵ Thus, the KMT controlled the presidency and the legislature from 2008 to 2016, and the DPP will do so from 2016 to 2024. ⁶

When one Taiwan party dominates the government for one or two presidential terms, it creates a number of incentives for political polarization, fostering phenomena that do not necessarily contribute to good, representative government:

The majority party is tempted to try to push through as much of its preferred policy agenda as possible and to eschew compromise with the minority.

As power shifts from the KMT to DPP and back again, there are fairly wide swings in policy on at least some issues, with each new administration trying to reverse the agenda of its predecessor, rather than making adjustments to a shared consensus position.

Politics is adversarial, as politicians in each party adopt a "you live, I die" (nihuo, wosi) attitude towards people in the other party.

Because the parliamentary minority grows frustrated at its ability to accomplish much of its program, it adopts tactics designed to disrupt regular legislative order and to create a fighting image in the media. Seizing control of the speaker's dais is a favored tactic.

Another countermeasure is creation of additional, small parties that put forward alternative agendas and seek to gain enough parliamentary seats to gain bargaining power over policy. Taiwan has had a series of third parties since 1993. Many are created as vehicles for the ambitions of an ambitious politician.⁷ (These parties have often begun well, but over time their influence subsides.)

A majority party that fears it is about to lose the next election may pass laws while it is still in power in order to make it harder for the opposing power to effectively govern should it win.

In addition, majoritarian rule fosters frustrations among groups outside the LY, in the broader political system at large. The consequences can complicate the operation of representative government.

First, when activist elements in the public oppose the policies of the majority party but see little hope of ending its dominance through electoral means, they have mounted large public protests in the name of the higher good. In these campaigns, they sometimes have the support of the opposition party.

Second, the DPP has long advocated the use of referendums to register the public will. Its initial assumption, no doubt, was that elections to the presidency and the LY were stacked in the KMT's favor. Legislation was passed in 2003 to authorize the use of referendums, but the two parties have argued over the value and rules for this mechanism ever since. When the DPP won the LY in 2016, it soon passed legislation making it easier to put policy ideas to a referendum vote. In 2018, however, the KMT hoisted the DPP on its own petard by proposing and winning referendums that undermined the Tsai administration's policies.

Third, from 2018 to 2020, Taiwan also saw a burst of populism, mainly in the form of a KMT politician named Han Kuo-yu. Han ran for mayor in Kaohsiung Municipality, pitting himself as the champion of the common people against Taiwan's political and economic elites. He won the mayor's race easily and then was picked as the KMT's candidate in the 2020 presidential race, where President Tsai Ing-wen defeated him handily.

Each of these gambits reflects a dissatisfaction with the performance of representative government under two-party dominance and attempts to circumvent the normal operation of government.

Factors reducing polarization

Yet Taiwan politics is not a society-wide battle between two sharply divided camps. The public is not as polarized as politicians are. On social values, there is broad uniformity. There is strong agreement that, in principle, democracy is the best political system. The World Values Survey in 2012 found that by and large respondents tended to take a centrist position on issues such as income inequality, private versus government ownership of business, and whether the government or the people themselves should be responsible for people's welfare. ⁸ People generally agree that economic development, education, and cross-Strait relations are the issues on which the government should focus.

Most significantly, on some issues there are divisions within the major parties which impede them from operating as a unified, disciplined bloc, at least on those issues. The Blue and Green camps are divided into subcamps, with the overall spectrum running from the Deep Blues, through the Light Blues and Light Greens, and then to the Deep Greens. The Deep factions tend to the extreme while the Light ones are more moderate. Within each camp, there have been struggles for power between "Deep" and "Light," and the results of those struggles can affect politics at large. If the Light factions in each major party are dominant, then inter-party cooperation becomes possible. If the Deep factions are dominant, then zero-sum confrontation is more likely. ⁹

The Deep-Light differences within the Green and Blue camp are not always significant. Generally, the policy issues under debate define which actors are involved and how politics are conducted. Some matters are negotiated within the legislature and between it and the executive, outside of the public eye. Others matters evoke polarization between the major parties. Still others create Light-Deep splits. But the issue that is most divisive within and between parties and at election time is how to address the challenge China poses to Taiwan. It is an issue that is substantively difficult and the one where the stakes are the highest.

The China issue

In a November 2019 report for Brookings's Global China project, I detailed Beijing's policy towards Taiwan. To summarize, Beijing seeks to transform the island into a special administrative region of the People's Republic of China (PRC), using the same formula that it employed for Hong Kong - "one country, two systems" (1C2S) - which would terminate the Republic of China government. It has hoped to achieve this end through persuasion but has not ruled out the use of force. Simultaneously, it has opposed what it perceived (or misperceived) as attempts by Taiwan leaders to create an independent country.

Beijing believed the election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's president in 2008 offered the best opportunity to begin movement to unification. It hoped to build on deepened economic interdependence to reach political understandings that eliminated ambiguities about Taiwan's legal status and the direction of cross-Strait relations. Ma deflected PRC requests for political talks, yet his economic policies stimulated concerns among Taiwan citizens about a dangerous slippery slope. Consequently, economic relations stalled. Then, in 2016, the DPP, led by Tsai, won the presidency and control of the LY, a significant setback for Beijing. China responded with neither accommodation nor military action, but by mounting a campaign of intimidation, pressure, marginalization, and penetration of Taiwan politics by providing support for political organizations and traditional media and manipulating social media. The goal may have been to secure Tsai's defeat in the 2020 election, but that didn't happen. So far, therefore, Beijing has failed to advance its policy objective.

Unquestionably, how Taiwan leaders formulate a strategy for preserving Taiwan equities in the face of Beijing's goals and tactics is not easy. Should it be a combination of accommodation, cooperation, and opposition to independence? Or should it be a mix of economic diversification (less dependence on the PRC market), closer reliance on the United States, improvement of Taiwan's military capabilities, and an emphasis on democracy to demonstrate the public's opposition to unification? These are tough calls. If there were an easy solution, it would have emerged long ago. The 2019-2020 crackdown on Hong Kong's protest movements has only increased opposition to any 1C2S arrangements.

Meeting the China challenge is made all the more difficult because decisions must be processed through Taiwan's democratic system... Yet divisions between and within camps constrain any effort to forge a coherent policy.

Yet meeting the China challenge is made all the more difficult because decisions must be processed through Taiwan's democratic system. Fundamentally, that is a good thing because it guarantees that any major change in the status quo will require public consent. ¹⁰ Yet divisions between and within camps constrain any effort to forge a coherent policy. The Blue camp has more confidence in its ability to manage the China risk, while the Greens have a darker view of PRC intentions (and of the commitment of the Blues to Taiwan's interests). Then there are divisions within the camps. The "Deep Blue" tend to adhere to the KMT's long-time anti-independence stance and favors unification of some sort, while the "Light Blue" are more comfortable with Taiwan's maintaining political distance from China, even as it secures benefits from economic ties with the mainland. The "Deep Green" favor a more radical approach to securing autonomy through measures that call for Taiwanese independence, while the "Light Green" are conscious about both the potential for conflict and the need to sustain the benefits of cross-Strait economic relations. The only thing the two camps generally agree is that they must rely on the United States to deter Beijing and keep Taiwan safe. ¹¹

Polarization and initiatives to circumvent representative government have affected policy towards China and complicated the formulation of effective policy. Consider these examples:

Generally, public discussion of China policy has been conducted on a simplistic basis, reducing it to arguments over identity (Chinese vs. Taiwanese vs. both) and over long-term outcomes (unification vs. independence vs. the status quo), without in either case defining the terms used. A key issue of debate within the two parties is whether the government should accommodate Beijing's demand that it accept the 1992 Consensus, an ambiguous formula concerning cross-Strait relations. (Less discussed is whether it is appropriate at all for the PRC to impose conditions on Taipei.)

In the 2008 election campaign, the DPP not only promoted Taiwanese identity, a staple of election contests, but by proposing a referendum on membership for Taiwan in the United Nations, which created concern in Beijing and Washington that it was moving to independence.

In 2014, the Sunflower Movement mobilized to oppose a draft cross-Strait agreement on trade in services out of fear it would ultimately induce Taiwan's political capitulation. With the DPP's aid, activists took over the seat of representative government, the chamber of the LY, and caused the agreement to be set aside. To end the occupation, the LY leadership agreed to pass a bill supervising the negotiation of any economic agreement with the mainland (as of late 2020, no legislation was enacted).

In 2018, the KMT promoted a referendum restricting the import of Japanese food products produced in the area of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, while elements in the DPP initiated one that would use "Taiwan" as the name of the island's Olympic team, in violation of an international understanding. The first passed and the second failed.

In 2019, the DPP became worried that it was going to lose the 2020 presidential and LY elections and that a KMT government would make excessive concessions to Beijing. It used its majority to pass a law that made it almost impossible for any government to negotiate political agreements.¹²

These actions addressed important policy matters, but their effect has made policymaking more difficult. Whatever the substantive problems with the service trade agreement, effectively suspending the approval process was a poor way to solve them. The KMT's 2018 referendum delayed for two years new economic agreements with Japan, which would have helped diversify the Taiwan economy. Although the Olympic referendum failed, it created unnecessary alarms in Beijing and a serious, albeit temporary, division within the DPP.

In different ways, Taiwan's executive branch has been constrained from negotiating with Beijing, even if it might be in Taiwan's interests to do so and even if the issue of the 1992 Consensus were dealt with. Economic talks are unlikely as long as the bill promised in 2014 on supervision of economic agreements is passed or abandoned (intra-DPP disagreements have kept it in limbo). The 2019 law regulating the negotiation of political agreements creates such a high bar it is doubtful one could ever get approved. These obstacles can only raise concerns in China that Taipei is not serious about addressing cross-Strait differences.

Conclusion

As noted, intra- and inter-party splits, protests, referendums, and populism reflect dissatisfaction with the performance of Taiwan's system of representative democracy. This is not unique to Taiwan, of course. Other democracies share this performance dysfunction, including the United States. Taiwan does face an array of policy problems, some stemming from its being an advanced economy and aging society. The government budget must somehow allocate scarce resources among economic competitiveness, pensions and health care, and defense. On energy security, debates over conflicting priorities - ensuring supply for manufacturing, reducing environmental pollution, finding the right mix between fossil fuels and renewables, limiting emission of greenhouse gasses, and keeping energy prices low - have stymied formulation of a sustainable policy.

China's policy ambitions add a unique and weighty layer of difficulty. Debates fester over the degree to which China constitutes a threat; what mix of accommodation, self-assertion, deterrence, and alignment with the United States is appropriate; what definition of Taiwan's legal status is appropriate; how to sustain a coherent policy over time; and how to ensure sufficient resources and political support for the strategy adopted. It is a welcome development that a series of presidential elections have strengthened the consensus supporting a cautious, status-quo policy, yet the simplistic approach to public discussion of the China challenge limits serious discussion of the dilemmas involved. In short, difficult problems do not easily yield easy solutions, but an open yet divided political system makes it much harder.

Despite the high marks that Taiwan's democratic system often receives for its election system and protection of political rights, it must be assessed in light of the policy challenges it faces and what is at stake. High stakes increase the need for superior performance. And without question, the PRC's ambitions for Taiwan imposes a high-stakes challenge for the island's leaders and its people. The outcome will likely define the island's long-term future. That being the case, does Taiwan's democratic system mitigate difficult policy dilemmas or exacerbate them? Does it facilitate consensus on how to approach the challenges of the future, or does it intensify the disagreements and create gridlock?

This analysis of Taiwan's polarized and majoritarian system and the ways in which that at least some citizens have expressed their dissatisfaction with representative democracy suggests that on the tough issues, the public could be better served by its elected politicians. That statement is not meant to impugn their character, but rather to point to features of the system that make it harder for them to tackle the tough issues. That a majoritarian system overrepresents the majority and underrepresents the minority does not facilitate compromise, particularly when the minority party is weak. The history of the KMT's past authoritarian rule, memories of which still shape the political consciousness of the older generation, exacerbates polarization. There is a structural character to the island's political dysfunction.

There are, however, times when Taiwan's system performs well. Far and away the best example is the response to the spread of the coronavirus. At the end of 2020, Taiwan, with a population of 23 million people, had registered about 800 cases and only 7 deaths. Much of the credit goes to the public health authorities, which successfully employed border controls, testing, contact tracing, and quarantines to keep the number of cases low. They had learned from problems in dealing with the SARS epidemic of 2003. In addition, the leadership of the Tsai administration was united, serious, and transparent. Members of the public, who had been socialized to use masks when they get a cold, did not need official persuasion to do the same when it came to the coronavirus. Members of the LY did not politicize the issue, perhaps because they understood the stakes. In short, the political leadership, the technocracy, politicians, and the public worked together to create an exemplary result. All concerned understood the stakes of failure.

Taiwan's structural impediments to good policy performance are not easily fixed. Any alternative to majoritarianism would have its own defects, and it would require a constitutional amendment to institute (a non-starter). If there is a way to mitigate the current division, it probably will require the leaders of the two political parties to set boundaries on their competition: in assessing the nature of policy problems, particularly with respect to China; in working harder to forge compromises to address those problems; and in setting aside the prevailing zero-sum political culture. This way out seems unlikely, given the chronic, interparty contention over the China issue. Yet the stakes involved are very high and the cost of failure would be severe. If chronic political strife makes a consensus policy decision impossible, a decision has been made anyway.

Bringing about Taiwan's democratic transition thirty years ago was far from easy, but it gave citizens a say on their future that they had never had. Difficult as today's policy challenges are, it would be a tragedy if the system of representative government was unable to chart a favorable path forward for the people the system is supposed to serve.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Taiwan's democracy and the China challenge

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Taiwan has gotten high marks when it comes to holding clean elections and protecting political rights. The public strongly supports democracy in principle and by and large approves the island's system in practice. When it comes to performance, however, the political system does not do so well.

# data[].attributes.headline
Taiwanese Culture: Multifaceted and  Vibrant

# data[].attributes.subject
Taiwanese Culture: Multifaceted and  Vibrant

# data[].attributes.body
I first watched Our Times in my Chinese class, at the time my first exposure to the media of that country. I found that the elements of the movie at once made Taiwanese culture feel more familiar, but at the same time introduced me to unique parts of the culture that are not found in my native culture. Some of the common themes found in the movie include nostalgia for earlier time periods. Taiwan has in recent years become a very high-tech society, and the movie brings viewers back to a time before Taiwan had achieved the levels of tech adoption and modernization seen today. Pressures to fit in and work hard, versus rebelling and falling in love are definitely familiar to an American audience. It is certainly interesting to see these familiar themes against a backdrop of a different culture, with its own norms and views of growing up. Also, Taiwanese culture interacts and coexists within a larger East Asian media space. This movie, in particular, did well in Singapore and Mainland China. For these reasons, I felt as though this movie represents nostalgic and youthful themes that are salient to the discussion of Taiwanese culture.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Our Times Official US Trailer HD - Chopflix

# data[].attributes.body
I think Taiwanese culture is the culture of the entity of the Republic of China, which largely differentiated itself from the People's Republic of China in the 90s after democratization and the presidency of Lee Teng-hui. It used to have a strong Hoklo-nationalist strain, but I don't think that's true anymore. I think the outlying islands have their own subidentities as well, which isn't unique to Taiwan. A lot of the shifts are generational with the old guard of the KMT waishengren dying out. There are a lot of attempts to rationalize Taiwan as a distinct political identity are based in linguistics and anthropology that I don't personally think hold up. I don't there is a more coherent conception of distinct national identity other than politics, there isn't really a coherent basis for a strong Indian or Indonesian national identity (or really any postcolonial country), but they exist now for historical and political reasons. I don't really think "Chinese" as a national identity makes a whole lot of sense either.

Democracy is by far the most important differentiating cultural element. Also Taiwan is significantly more friendly to Japan than China culturally. It's significantly more liberal as a country overall, being the first Asian country to legalize gay marriage. I think liberal democracy really defines Taiwanese culture more than anything else.

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
By Photo by CEphoto, Uwe Aranas or alternatively © CEphoto, Uwe Aranas, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=25937100

# data[].attributes.body
Taiwanese culture is a unique blend of tradition and modern ideas influenced greatly by the blend of cultures in its ruling history. While great importance is imposed on nuclear and extended families, traditional tribes, and historical ideologies, recent western influence on the nation has led a shift into a modern era, dragging older identities along with it. While other countries and cultures are the product of complete and total shifts in ideology, Taiwan maintains a strict appreciation for its heritage and acknowledgement of its entire history from aboriginal tribes through Chinese rule into the modern era, with the exception perhaps of the harsh rule of imperial Japan in the 20th century.

# data[].attributes.body
What is in Taiwanese Culture?

I know food is a big part, especially night markets and street foods. There's also a heavy importance placed on family, both living and ancestral. There's even a national holiday set aside to clean the tombs and pray to ancestors. I remember learning about Confucius and his ideals, and it relates to filial duties that we owe to our parents and family.

I thought I'd share this pretty fun song. It's made by a Malaysian singer Namewee and one of the biggest rappers, Dwagie (whose rap part is in Taiwanese)

# data[].attributes.body
A key feature of Taiwanese culture- be it implicit or explicit- is the resilience exhibited by its people. For more than a century, the country’s citizens have persevered through hardship. Beginning in 1895 and lasting for more than fifty years, the island was occupied by Imperial Japan. With Japanese colonization came multiple challenges, including suppression of language and culture, as well as forced support of the new regime. Just a few years after Japan ceded control of the island nation, a period of martial law known as the “White Terror” began in the country, which would last for more than four decades. At present, talk of “reunifying” the island with the Chinese mainland continues to threaten peace there; however, the people there have never shied away from such challenges.

# data[].attributes.body
Culture is whatever the people say it is. Culture is a fluid summary of the interests, history, and values of a people group that changes as the people change. People influence the culture and culture influences the people like a symbiotic relationship. Whenever a historical event occurs the culture will change, even if only slightly; but the traditions of the people's past will mesh with the newfound interests from the modern people to create a full culture.

# data[].attributes.body
This is a video that went around Taiwan a few years ago. It was made by this channel BadTime Stories (床编故事）and they have made a whole series of videos with characters like this. The linked video above is the first main video with that chick character 小鸡支. You can also buy stickers of these characters on Line to send to people. Here is the follow up video if you're interested: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EON5x7mUHFM

# data[].attributes.body
A big part of Taiwanese culture is not only their music, but also its origins and how it came to be as the music we know today. This video showcases a variety of methods for making music, all of which reflect the rich and diverse history that originates from the Taiwanese culture. To think that all of these methods of making music came from a small island is mind-blowing to me!!

# data[].attributes.body
Taiwanese culture is like a smoothie. I will stick with this analogy because I find the more common food ones distasteful. Like you add many different things to a smoothie, the current Taiwanese culture, while it may be dominated by a particular ethnic group/culture, is made of up of an amalgamation of languages, customs, traditions, religions/beliefs, races, and ethnicities. Taiwan is home to many different groups of people and for that very reason it has many facets or flavors of culture to explore.
-Alexander Wimmer

# data[].attributes.body
Directions:
Make sure to create a separate post responding to the following question. I encourage you to use your time to write as many words as you like, do research online, and add pictures, videos, songs, gifs, etc. In your new post, make sure to write TAIWANESE and your name in the title :)

Question: What is Taiwanese culture?

# data[].attributes.body
Taiwan has the highest density of convenience stores in all of Asia Pacific, at about 1 convenience store to every 2,300 people. This has allowed convenience stores to not only be places where you can fill up on gas and cheap food, but also to expand in quality from their American counterparts. For instance, 7/11 in America is a relatively normal convenience mart with .99c hot dogs and slushies, but 7/11s in Taiwan are more akin to a grocery store open 24/7 (even during typhoons!) with AC and a variety of prepared foods, instant noodles, alcohol, and even copiers/printers and places to pick up packages. There is usually an impressive array of food, from fresh fruit, onigiris, frozen treats, and Taiwanese puddings to drinks like yogurt and beer. Also, because convenience stores are so ubiquitous, the government also utilizes them to perform services like collecting parking fees, utility bills, and even credit card payments.

The biggest chains are FamilyMart, OKMart, Million, Hi-life, and of course 7-Eleven, with the average Taiwanese resident averaging 137 visits/yr. You can find interesting flavors of soft serve at Family Marts that are apparently very good, like cactus and oolong tea. Many 7-Elevens are even themed, like a Hello Kitty 7-Eleven, Coca Cola (resembling an American diner), etc. They're also great places to work, with 24/7 wifi and a sitting area.

Other notable things:
-freshly brewed tea eggs at each 7-Eleven (for 10NT each)
-7-Eleven has their own makeup and beauty lines, with face masks and nail polish
-they automatically print lottery numbers on your receipt
-there is a sticker rewards system where you collect stickers with each purchase
-mini hotpot usually with fish balls and tofu
-unique potato chip flavors like charcoal sea salt

# data[].attributes.body
Directions:
Make sure to create a separate post responding to the following question. I encourage you to use your time to write as many words as you like, do research online, and add pictures, videos, songs, gifs, etc.

Question: What is Chinese culture?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Higher Brothers x Famous Dex - Made In China (Prod. Richie Souf)

# data[].attributes.body
Something to think about...

# data[].attributes.body
A cool part of Chinese culture is the Chinese Zodiac. The Chinese Zodiac is a tradition in China that, based on the lunar calendar, assigns and an animal and that animal's attributes to each year. Every Chinese year is represented by an animal, so whatever year you are born in, you take on that year's zodiac animal. The Chinese zodiac ascribes a person's personality or the events that take place in their life to their zodiac sign. The 12 Chinese zodiac signs are: rat, ox, tiger, rabbit, dragon, snake, horse, goat, monkey, rooster, dog, and pig.

# data[].attributes.body
China is a huge place. As such, its cultural practices and values vary greatly across the country. One major aspect of Chinese culture I chose to focus on was the major holidays like Lunar/Chinese New Year (春节).

# data[].attributes.body
Chinese culture is many things. It is the culmination of thousands of years of civilization, of development, of rises and falls of kingdoms, and of wars. It was in China that one of the first civilized, human societies developed, and it has not stopped growing and changing since then.
We have Chinese culture to thank for countless inventions, including but not limited to gunpowder, paper, and silk. If it were not for the importance of literacy, knowledge, and intelligence to Chinese emperors and systems of government, these inventions may never have existed.
Additionally, several schools of thought and systems of government were created in China, that many Western nations now teach, such as daoism and the concept of a meritocracy.
In all, we can thank Chinese culture for many of the concepts, inventions, and art that we have today, since Chinese civilization has existed for so long, and has contributed so much to the world we know today.

# data[].attributes.body
Chinese Culture is a multitude of things, food, music, speaking patterns, views on different situations, and many more. For example, in China the majority of people look at things as a whole and at what would create the most benefit for a group of people, whether it is their family or friends. This is just one side of what Chinese culture has grown to be.

# data[].attributes.body
China has a history of around five thousand years, which is an exceptionally lengthy span of time. Despite the passage of time, family virtues, serious, working attitudes, a sense of fairness, and the ancient Confucian tradition have been profoundly ingrained in the Chinese people.
Every Chinese values his or her family life. Chinese families are extremely tight. Children prefer to stay with their parents even after they marry and have children of their own, thus three or four generations can often be seen living under the same roof, in contrast to other cultures where the grown-up children must depart. However, inside this small family, everyone is highly structured; each member of the family helps each other when there is difficulty, and they will suffer together.

# data[].attributes.body
The biggest thing about Chinese Culture is how IMMENSE it truly is. I think someone could spend their entire life studying China and still only understand a small fraction of what it's about. China has a long history that has affected its culture in many ways.

# data[].attributes.headline
CHINESE: Romance of the Three Kingdoms (三国演义）

# data[].attributes.subject
CHINESE: Romance of the Three Kingdoms (三国演义）

# data[].attributes.body
One of the most important pieces of Chinese literature. The book covers actual history, but with a strong dose of mythology. It is the source of dozens of idioms and sayings, and is frequently adapted in modern media.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Romance of the Three Kingdoms ( traditional Chinese: 三國演義; simplified Chinese: 三国演义; pinyin: Sānguó Yǎnyì ) is a 14th-century historical novel attributed to Luo Guanzhong. It is set in the turbulent years towards the end of the Han dynasty and the Three Kingdoms period in Chinese history, starting in 169 AD and ending with the reunification of the land in 280 by Western Jin. The novel is based primarily on the Records of the Three Kingdoms (), written by Chen Shou.

Romance of the Three Kingdoms is acclaimed as one of the Four Great Classical Novels of Chinese literature; it has a total of 800,000 words and nearly a thousand dramatic characters (mostly historical) in 120 chapters. The novel is among the most beloved works of literature in East Asia, and its literary influence in the region has been compared to that of the works of Shakespeare on English literature. It is arguably the most widely read historical novel in late imperial and modern China. Herbert Giles stated that among the Chinese themselves, this is regarded as the greatest of all their novels.

Stories about the heroes of the Three Kingdoms were the basis of entertainment dating back to the Sui and Tang dynasty (6th-10th centuries). By the Song dynasty (10th-13th centuries), there were several records of professional oral storytellers who specialized in the Three Kingdoms hero cycles. The earliest written work to combine these stories was a pinghua, Sanguozhi Pinghua ( simplified Chinese: 三国志平话; traditional Chinese: 三國志平話; pinyin: Sānguózhì Pínghuà ; 'Records of the Three Kingdoms in plain speech'), published sometime between 1321 and 1323.

Romance of the Three Kingdoms is traditionally attributed to Luo Guanzhong, a playwright who lived sometime between 1315 and 1400 (late Yuan to early Ming period) known for compiling historical plays in styles which were prevalent during the Yuan period. It was first printed in 1522 as Sanguozhi Tongsu Yanyi (三國志通俗演義/三国志通俗演义) in an edition which bore a perhaps spurious preface date 1494. The text may well have circulated before either date in handwritten manuscripts.

Regardless of when it was written or whether Luo was the writer, the author made use of several available historical records, primarily the Records of the Three Kingdoms compiled by Chen Shou. The Records of the Three Kingdoms covered events ranging from the Yellow Turban Rebellion in 184 to the unification of the Three Kingdoms under the Jin dynasty in 280. The novel also includes material from Tang dynasty poetic works, Yuan dynasty operas and his own personal interpretation of elements such as virtue and legitimacy. The author combined this historical knowledge with his own storytelling skills to create a rich tapestry of personalities.

Several versions of the expanded Sanguozhi are extant today. Luo Guanzhong's version in 24 volumes, known as the Sanguozhi Tongsu Yanyi, is now held in the Shanghai Library in China, Tenri Central Library in Japan, and several other major libraries. Various 10-volume, 12-volume and 20-volume recensions of Luo's text, made between 1522 and 1690, are also held at libraries around the world. However, the standard text familiar to general readers is a recension by Mao Lun and his son Mao Zonggang.

In the 1660s, during the reign of the Kangxi Emperor in the Qing dynasty, Mao Lun and Mao Zonggang significantly edited the text, fitting it into 120 chapters, and abbreviating the title to Sanguozhi Yanyi. The text was reduced from 900,000 to 750,000 characters; significant editing was done for narrative flow; use of third-party poems was reduced and shifted from conventional verse to finer pieces; and most passages praising Cao Cao's advisers and generals were removed. Scholars have long debated whether the Maos' viewpoint was anti-Qing (identifying Southern Ming remnants with Shu-Han) or pro-Qing.

The famous opening lines of the novel, " The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been" (話說天下大勢．分久必合，合久必分 Huàshuō tiānxià dàshì. Fēnjiǔbìhé, hé jiǔ bì fēn), long understood to be Luo's introduction and cyclical philosophy, were actually added by the Maos in their substantially revised edition of 1679. None of the earlier editions contained this phrase. In addition, Mao also added Yang Shen's The Immortals by the River as the famous introductory poem (which began with "The gushing waters of the Yangzi River pour and disappear into the East") (滾滾長江東逝水) to the novel. The earlier editions, moreover, spend less time on the process of division, which they found painful, and far more time on the process of reunification and the struggles of the heroes who sacrificed for it.

One of the greatest achievements of Romance of the Three Kingdoms is the extreme complexity of its stories and characters. The novel contains numerous subplots. The following consists of a summary of the central plot and some well-known highlights in the novel.

Cao Cao escaped from Luoyang, returned to his hometown and sent out a fake imperial edict to various regional officials and warlords, calling them to rise up against Dong Zhuo. Under Yuan Shao's leadership, 18 warlords formed a coalition army and launched a punitive campaign against Dong Zhuo. Dong Zhuo felt threatened after losing the battles of Sishui Pass and Hulao Pass, so he evacuated Luoyang and moved the imperial capital to Chang'an. He forced Luoyang's residents to move together with him and had the city set aflame. The coalition eventually broke up due to poor leadership and conflicting interests among its members. Meanwhile, in Chang'an, Dong Zhuo was betrayed and murdered by his foster son Lü Bu in a dispute over the maiden Diaochan as part of a plot orchestrated by the minister Wang Yun.

Meanwhile, the ambush set by Liu Biao on Yuan Shao's orders violently concluded Sun Jian's life. His eldest son, Sun Ce, delivered the Imperial Seal as a tribute to the rising pretender, Yuan Shu, in exchange for troops and horses. Sun Ce secured himself a state in the rich riverlands of Jiangdong ( Wu), on which the state of Eastern Wu was founded later. Tragically, Sun Ce also died at the pinnacle of his career from illness under stress of his terrifying encounter with the ghost of Yu Ji, a venerable magician whom he had falsely accused of heresy and executed in jealousy. However, Sun Quan, his younger brother and successor, proved to be a capable and charismatic ruler. With assistance from Zhou Yu, Zhang Zhao and others, Sun Quan found hidden talents such as Lu Su to serve him, built up his military forces and maintained stability in Jiangdong.

Liu Bei and his oath brothers Guan Yu and Zhang Fei swore allegiance to the Han Empire in the Oath of the Peach Garden and pledged to do their best for the people. However, their ambitions were not realised as they did not receive due recognition for helping to suppress the Yellow Turban Rebellion and participating in the campaign against Dong Zhuo. After Liu Bei succeeded Tao Qian as the governor of Xu Province, he offered shelter to Lü Bu, who had just been defeated by Cao Cao. However, Lü Bu betrayed his host, seized control of the province and attacked Liu Bei. Liu Bei combined forces with Cao Cao and defeated Lü Bu at the Battle of Xiapi. Liu Bei then followed Cao Cao back to the imperial capital, Xu, where Emperor Xian honoured him as his "Imperial Uncle". When Cao Cao showed signs that he wanted to usurp the throne, Emperor Xian wrote a secret decree in blood to his father-in-law, Dong Cheng, and ordered him to get rid of Cao. Dong Cheng secretly contacted Liu Bei and others and they planned to assassinate Cao Cao. However, the plot was leaked out and Cao Cao had Dong Cheng and the others arrested and executed along with their families.

In 200, Dong Cheng, an imperial relative, received a secret edict from Emperor Xian to assassinate Cao Cao. He collaborated with Liu Bei and some other high-ranking officials on this effort, but Cao Cao soon found out about the plot and had Dong Cheng and his conspirators executed, with only Liu Bei and Governor of Liang Province Ma Teng surviving. With Liu Bei fleeing to join Yuan Shao in the north and Ma Teng returning to his own province.

After settling the nearby provinces, including a rebellion led by former Yellow Turbans, and internal affairs with the court, Cao Cao turned his attention north to Yuan Shao, who himself had eliminated his northern rival Gongsun Zan that same year. Yuan Shao, himself of higher nobility than Cao Cao, amassed a large army and camped along the northern bank of the Yellow River.

In the summer of 200, after months of preparations, the armies of Cao Cao and Yuan Shao clashed at the Battle of Guandu (near present-day Kaifeng). Cao Cao's army was heavily outnumbered by Yuan Shao. Due to a raid in Yuan's supply train, Yuan's army fell into disorder as they fled back north.

Cao Cao took advantage of Yuan Shao's death in 202, which resulted in division among his sons, and advanced to the north. In 204, after the Battle of Ye, Cao Cao captured the city of Ye.

By the end of 207, after a victorious campaign beyond the frontier against the Wuhuan culminating in the Battle of White Wolf Mountain, Cao Cao achieved complete dominance of the North China Plain. He now controlled China's heartland, including Yuan Shao's former territory, and half of the Chinese population.

Since 200, Liu Biao put Liu Bei in charge of Xinye, where Liu Bei visited Zhuge Liang thrice and recruited him as an tactician. He also built up his forces at the encouragement of Zhuge Liang in preparation for war against Cao Cao.

Following his unification of central and northern China under his control, Cao Cao, having been appointed Imperial Chancellor by Emperor Xian, led his forces on a southern campaign to eliminate Liu Bei and Sun Quan.

In 208, although Liu Bei managed to repel two attacks by Cao Cao at Xinye, he was eventually forced to flee due to the overwhelming strength of the enemy forces. Cao Cao and his cavalry caught up to Liu Bei's congregation at Changban, Dangyang, and Liu Bei had to flee for his life, galloping away south with Zhang Fei, Zhao Yun and Zhuge Liang, while leaving his family and the populace behind. Cao Cao's forces captured most of the unarmed civilians and Liu Bei's baggage. In the chaos, Zhao Yun disappeared to the north, but he came back with Liu Bei's infant son Liu Shan along with Lady Gan.

Turning east from Changban, Liu Bei and the remnants of his party had crossed the Han River to the east where Liu Qi, Liu Biao's elder son, still held control of Jiangxia Commandery. They met Guan Yu's fleet and over 10,000 men led by Liu Qi at Han Ford. Together, they sailed down the river to Xiakou.

Cao Cao did not follow up in immediate pursuit. Partially because his main objective of his drive to the south had been the base at Jiangling County, and he pressed on south to secure that base first; partially because he feared a trap set by the renowned tactician Zhuge Liang.

In 208, After the Battle of Changban. Liu Bei sent Zhuge Liang to meet Sun Quan and discuss the formation of a Sun-Liu alliance to counter Cao Cao. Sun Quan agreed and placed Zhou Yu in command of his army in preparation for war with Cao Cao. Zhuge Liang remained temporarily in Wu territory to assist Zhou Yu. Zhou Yu felt that Zhuge Liang would become a threat to Sun Quan in the future and attempted to kill him on a few occasions but ultimately failed due to huge Liang's superior intuition, and ended up having no choice but to cooperate with Zhuge Liang. The Sun-Liu forces scored a decisive victory over Cao Cao at the Battle of Red Cliffs.

Liu Bei died in Baidicheng from illness a few months later. On his deathbed, Liu Bei granted Zhuge Liang permission to take the throne if his son and successor, Liu Shan, proved to be an inept ruler. Zhuge Liang firmly refused and swore to remain faithful to the trust Liu Bei had placed in him.

In Shu, Jiang Wei inherited Zhuge Liang's legacy and continued to lead another nine campaigns against Wei for three decades, but ultimately failed to achieve any significant success. The Shu emperor Liu Shan also turned out to be an incompetent ruler who trusted corrupt officials. Shu gradually declined under Liu Shan's rule and was eventually conquered by Wei forces. Jiang Wei attempted to restore Shu with the help of Zhong Hui, a Wei general dissatisfied with Sima Zhao, but their plan failed and Zhong Hui was killed by Wei troops, while Jiang Wei committed suicide. Shortly after the fall of Shu, Sima Zhao died and his son, Sima Yan, forced the last Wei emperor, Cao Huan, to abdicate the throne to him. Sima Yan then established the Jin dynasty to replace the state of Cao Wei.

The novel draws from Chen Shou's Records of the Three Kingdoms as the main historical source. Other major influences include Liu Yiqing's A New Account of the Tales of the World ( Shishuo Xinyu), published in 430, and the Sanguozhi Pinghua, a chronological collection of eighty fictional sketches starting with the peach garden oath and ending with Zhuge Liang's death.

Some 50 or 60 Yuan and early Ming plays about the Three Kingdoms are known to have existed, and their material is almost entirely fictional, based on thin threads of actual history. The novel is thus a return to greater emphasis on history, compared to these dramas. The novel also shifted towards better acknowledgement of southern China's historical importance, while still portraying some prejudice against the south. The Qing dynasty historian Zhang Xuecheng famously wrote that the novel was "seven-parts fact and three-parts fiction." The fictional parts are culled from different sources, including unofficial histories, folk stories, the Sanguozhi Pinghua, and also the author's own imagination. Nonetheless, the description of the social conditions and the logic that the characters use is accurate to the Three Kingdoms period, creating "believable" situations and characters, even if they are not historically accurate.

Romance of the Three Kingdoms, like the dramas and folk stories of its day, features Liu Bei and his associates as the protagonists; hence the depiction of the people in Shu Han was glorified. The antagonists, Cao Cao, Sun Quan and their followers, on the other hand, were often denigrated. This suited the political climate in the Ming dynasty, unlike in the Jin dynasty when Cao Wei was considered the legitimate successor to the Han dynasty.[citation needed ]

Some non-historical scenes in the novel have become well-known and subsequently became a part of traditional Chinese culture.

In the introduction to the 1959 reprint of the Brewitt-Taylor translation, Roy Andrew Miller argues that the novel's chief theme is "the nature of human ambition", to which Moody adds the relationship between politics and morality, specifically the conflict between the idealism of Confucian political thought and the harsh realism of Legalism, as a related theme. Other dominant themes of the novel include: the rise and fall of the ideal liege (Liu Bei); finding the ideal minister (Zhuge Liang); the conflict between the ideal liege (Liu Bei) and the consummate villain (Cao Cao); and the cruelties and injustice of feudal or dynastic government.

The opening lines of the novel, "The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been", added by Mao Lun and Mao Zonggang in their recension, epitomise the tragic theme of the novel. One recent critic notes that the novel takes political and moral stands and lets the reader know which of the characters are heroes and which villains, yet the heroes are forced to make a tragic choice between equal values, not merely between good and evil. The heroes know that the end of the empire is ordained by this cosmic cycle of division and unity, yet their choices are moral, based on loyalty, not political.

Plaks states the novel deals with the "cyclical theories of dynastic decline," and relates the "breakdown of order" at the end of the Han dynasty to "the improper exercise of imperial authority, the destabilisation influence of special-interest groups (eunuchs, imperial clansmen), the problem of factional and individual idealism carried to the point of civil strife-all of which eventually surface in the body of the narrative." He goes on to say, the "overlapping claims to legitimacy and multiple spheres of power," give the novel a "sense of epic greatness" with its "combination of grandeur and futility.": 385, 403, 495

Besides the famous Peach Garden Oath, many Chinese proverbs in use today are derived from the novel:

Translation

Chinese

Interpretation

Brothers are like limbs, wives and children are like clothing. Torn clothing can be repaired; how can broken limbs be mended?

simplified Chinese: 兄弟如手足，妻子如衣服。衣服破，尚可缝； 手足断，安可续？; traditional Chinese: 兄弟如手足，妻子如衣服。衣服破，尚可縫； 手足斷，安可續？

It means that wives and children, like clothing, are replaceable if lost but the same does not hold true for one's brothers (or friends).

Liu Bei "borrows" Jing Province - borrowing without returning.

simplified Chinese: 刘备借荆州--有借无还; traditional Chinese: 劉備借荆州--有借無還
simplified Chinese: 刘备借荆州，一借无回头; traditional Chinese: 劉備借荆州，一借無回頭

This proverb describes the situation of a person borrowing something without the intention of returning it.

Speak of Cao Cao and Cao Cao arrives.

simplified Chinese: 说曹操，曹操到; traditional Chinese: 說曹操，曹操到
simplified Chinese: 说曹操曹操就到; traditional Chinese: 說曹操曹操就到

Equivalent to speak of the devil. Describes the situation of a person appearing precisely when being spoken about.

Three reeking tanners (are enough to) overcome one Zhuge Liang.

simplified Chinese: 三个臭皮匠，胜过一个诸葛亮; traditional Chinese: 三個臭皮匠，勝過一個諸葛亮
simplified Chinese: 三个臭皮匠，赛过一个诸葛亮; traditional Chinese: 三個臭皮匠，賽過一個諸葛亮
simplified Chinese: 三个臭裨将，顶个诸葛亮; traditional Chinese: 三个臭裨将，頂個諸葛亮

Three inferior people can overpower a superior person when they combine their strengths. One variation is "subordinate generals" ( simplified Chinese: 裨将; traditional Chinese: 裨將; píjiàng) instead of "tanners" (皮匠; píjiàng).

Eastern Wu arranges a false marriage that turns into a real one.

simplified Chinese: 东吴招亲--弄假成真; traditional Chinese: 東吳招親--弄假成真

When a plan to falsely offer something backfires with the result that the thing originally offered is appropriated by the intended victim of the hoax.

Losing the lady and crippling the army.

simplified Chinese: 周郎妙计安天下，赔了夫人又折兵; traditional Chinese: 周郎妙計安天下，賠了夫人又折兵

The "lady" lost here was actually Sun Quan's sister Lady Sun. Zhou Yu's plan to capture Liu Bei by means of a false marriage proposal failed and Lady Sun really became Liu's wife (see above). Zhou Yu later led his troops in an attempt to attack Liu Bei but fell into an ambush and suffered a crushing defeat. This saying is now used to describe the situations where a person either makes double losses in a deal or loses on both sides of it.

Every person on the street knows what is in Sima Zhao's mind.

simplified Chinese: 司马昭之心，路人皆知; traditional Chinese: 司馬昭之心，路人皆知

As Sima Zhao gradually rose to power in Wei, his intention to usurp state power became more obvious. The young Wei emperor Cao Mao once lamented to his loyal ministers, "Every person on the street knows what is in Sima Zhao's mind (that he wanted to usurp the throne)." This saying is now used to describe a situation where a person's intention or ambition is rather obvious.

The young should not read Water Margin, and the old should not read Three Kingdoms.

simplified Chinese: 少不读水浒, 老不读三国; traditional Chinese: 少不讀水滸, 老不讀三國

The former depicts the lives of outlaws and their defiance of the social system and may have a negative influence on adolescent boys, as well as the novel's depiction of gruesome violence. The latter presents every manner of stratagem and fraud and may tempt older readers to engage in such thinking.

The writing style adopted by Romance of the Three Kingdoms was part of the emergence of written vernacular during the Ming period, as part of the so-called "Four Masterworks" ( si da qishu).

Romance of the Three Kingdoms recorded stories of a Buddhist monk called Pujing (普净), who was a friend of Guan Yu. Pujing made his first appearance during Guan's arduous journey of crossing five passes and slaying six generals, in which he warned Guan of an assassination plot. As the novel was written in the Ming dynasty, more than 1,000 years after the era, these stories showed that Buddhism had long been a significant ingredient of the mainstream culture and may not be historically accurate.[clarification needed ] Luo Guanzhong preserved these descriptions from earlier versions of the novel to support his portrait of Guan as a faithful man of virtue. Guan has since then been respectfully addressed as "Lord Guan" or Guan Gong.

Create Something from Nothing: A strategy to make an audience believe of something's existence, when it in fact does not exist. On the flip side, it can be used to convince others that nothing exists, when something does exist. (Ch. 36)

Beauty Trap: Send the enemy beautiful women to cause disorder at his site. This trick can work in three ways: firstly, the ruler can become so entranced with the feminine allure that he neglects all else. Secondly, the men will start competing for the females' attention, which will cause friction and rifts, and hinders cooperation and eradicates morale. And lastly, other women motivated by jealousy will begin to plot, only worsening the entire situation. Also known as the "Honey Trap". (Ch. 55-56)

Empty City: When the enemy is superior in numbers and you are expecting to be attacked at any moment, drop all pretenses of seeming like you're preparing something militarily and act calm, so the enemy will think twice and will think you're setting a trap or an ambush. It is best used sparingly, and only if one has the military aptitude to do so. It's also best used if one's enemy is an over-thinker. (Ch. 95)

The Jurchen chief and Khan Nurhaci read the Chinese novels Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin learning all he knew about Chinese military and political strategies from them.

The book was translated into Manchu as Möllendorff: ilan gurun-i bithe. During the Qing dynasty, Chinese military manuals were eagerly translated by the Manchus, who were also attracted to the military content in Romance of the Three Kingdoms.

The Romance of the Three Kingdoms has been translated into English by numerous scholars.

The first known translation was performed in 1907 by John G. Steele and consisted of a single chapter excerpt that was distributed in China to students learning English at Presbyterian missionary schools. Z. Q. Parker published a 1925 translation containing four episodes from the novel including the events of the Battle of Red Cliffs, while Yang Xianyi and Gladys Yang published excerpts in 1981, including chapters 43-50. In 1976, Moss Roberts published an abridged translation containing one fourth of the novel including maps and more than 40 woodblock illustrations from three Chinese versions of the novel. Roberts' abridgement is reader-friendly, being written for use in colleges and to be read by the general public.

Unabridged

1. A complete and faithful translation of the novel was published in two volumes in 1925 by Charles Henry Brewitt-Taylor, a long time official of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. The translation was well written, but lacked any supplementary materials such as maps or character lists that would aid Western readers; a 1959 reprint was published that included maps and an introduction by Roy Andrew Miller to assist foreign readers.

2. After decades of work, Moss Roberts published a full translation in 1991 complete with an afterword, eleven maps, a list of characters, titles, terms, and offices, and almost 100 pages of notes from Mao Zonggang's commentaries and other scholarly sources. Roberts' complete translation remains faithful to the original; it is reliable yet still matches the tone and style of the classic text. Yang Ye, a professor in Chinese Literature at the UC Riverside, wrote in Encyclopedia of Literary Translation into English (1998) that Roberts' translation "supersedes Brewitt-Taylor's translation and will no doubt remain the definitive English version for many years to come". Roberts' translation was republished in 1995 by the Foreign Languages Press without the illustrations.

3. In 2014, Tuttle published a new, three-volume translation of the novel, translated by Yu Sumei and edited by Ronald C. Iverson (ISBN 978-0804843935). According to its publisher, this translation is an unabridged "dynamic translation" intended to be more readable than past English translations of the novel.

The story of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms has been retold in numerous forms including television series, manga and video games.

Luo, Guanzhong, attributed to, translated from the Chinese with afterword and notes by Moss Roberts (1991). Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel. Berkeley; Beijing: University of California Press; Foreign Languages Press. ISBN 0520068211.

Hsia, Chih-tsing,"The Romance of the Three Kingdoms," in The Classic Chinese Novel: A Critical Introduction (1968) rpr. Cornell East Asia Series. Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1996.

Luo, Guanzhong (2002) [1925]. Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Vol. 1. English translation by Charles H. Brewitt-Taylor, Introduction by Robert E. Hegel. Singapore: Tuttle Publishing. ISBN 9780804834674.

Luo, Guanzhong (2002) [1925]. Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Vol. 2. English translation by Charles H. Brewitt-Taylor, Introduction by Robert E. Hegel. Singapore: Tuttle Publishing. ISBN 9780804834681.

Li Chengli, Zhang Qirong, Wu Jingyu. Romance of the Three Kingdoms (illustrated in English and Chinese) (2008) Asiapac Books. ISBN 978-981-229-491-3

Besio, Kimberly Ann and Constantine Tung, eds., Three Kingdoms and Chinese Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. ISBN 0791470113. Essays on this novel's literary aspects, use of history, and in contemporary popular culture.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Romance of the Three Kingdoms - Wikipedia

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Romance of the Three Kingdoms ( traditional Chinese: 三國演義; simplified Chinese: 三国演义; pinyin: Sānguó Yǎnyì ) is a 14th-century historical novel attributed to Luo Guanzhong. It is set in the turbulent years towards the end of the Han dynasty and the Three Kingdoms period in Chinese history, starting in 169 AD and ending with the reunification of the land in 280 by Western Jin.

# data[].attributes.headline
CHINESE: What is Chinese Culture? - Allen Moy

# data[].attributes.subject
CHINESE: What is Chinese Culture? - Allen Moy

# data[].attributes.body
In my experience, Chinese culture is a dynamic blend of practices and beliefs sometimes rooted in stories and history. Chinese culture has changed throughout the years and has incorporated foreign cultures and ideas. In a way, Chinese culture can be seen in different components, such as traditional or modern, yet both are prevalent with practices such as giving 红包, specific dishes, celebrating certain holidays with family traveling miles to return home for dinners, tea ceremonies during weddings, or even the way society operates with a rising reintroduction of Confucian principles. Thus, Chinese culture is essentially what each Chinese person perceives it as, since some retained certain values and practices and others do not, as well as the interpretations of culture varying widely between Chinese and non-Chinese who may have grown up with a different and sometimes warped perception. All in all, Chinese culture is a blend that is really defined by the ebbs and flows of how Chinese and non-Chinese people view and interact with each other.

# data[].attributes.body
I think Chinese culture is the way Chinese people interacting with others, what they value, and how the approach different situations. For example Chinese people really value, as many of us know Chinese New year. There are so many traditions that they have just for Chinese New Year. As for approaching different situations, school in Chinese is much different. It is more intense and more rigorous. Lastly, for interaction with others from experience in being in China it is just different. More fast-paced in a way.

# data[].attributes.body
When I think of Chinese culture, I imagine a family eating together sharing from the big plates in the middle of the table. I also think about one's drive to do right by his family. It seems to be a motivator in every aspect of Chinese life.

# data[].attributes.body
The Chinese culture is like any other culture. What I mean is that when we look at culture, we look at their beliefs, traditions, food, expectations, and how people go about their everyday lives. We try to separate each culture from the other because they come from different countries, which makes them sound more different from each other than they really are. The way I look at it is that culture makes the country unique because of their ways of going about life.

Though that is my perspective on it, I think that the Chinese culture definition is simple. It is something that plays a significant role in someone's everyday life as it shapes their perspective and view of the world, consciously and subconsciously.

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
Thousands of years of territories that people nowadays might collectively refer to as constituting "China"

# data[].attributes.headline
CHINESE: "What is Chinese Culture?" response 

# data[].attributes.subject
CHINESE: "What is Chinese Culture?" response 

# data[].attributes.body
"China" itself is a relatively modern concept — China's borders have changed constantly throughout history, and prior to the modern era, people didn't describe themselves as zhongguoren, but rather using the names of the particular emperors or rulers contemporaneously in power. Only in interacting with the Westphalian nation-state system emanating from Western Europe and its colonies did "China" (zhongguo) really start to exist as a concept, and only then could it become a basis of identity for Chinese citizens.

Even still, after this shift, there remain autonomous regions maintaining extremely distinct cultures — Tibetan and Mongolian cultures are different to a degree and manner that Beijing's and Sichuan's are not. Plus, questions abound as to whether Hong Kong has a unique and distinct culture from the closest mainland province, as to extent to which Taiwanese and Chinese culture are compatible, and as to what constitutes a shared culture for the "five races". Not to mention the river of art works trying to grapple with the meaning of the words "Chinese culture" when applied to the Chinese diaspora.

Likewise, what can we find that's consistent between the members of the oldest generations still in China (or who've since left), which lived under and even before the Cultural Revolution and Mao era subsided, and those who've only known a China formed by Deng's era of economic reforms (gaige kaifang)? The same applies for those who've only experienced adult life after widespread marketization and the proliferation of special economic zones, for those who only came of age after Xi's rise to power, for those who only know a China connected by technology and VC-funded social media platforms, for those who do or don't access the internet outside the Great Firewall, and so forth. What's more, all the aforementioned variation (minus that about the autonomous and separate regions) is intra-regional — adding on the differences between provinces, between rural and urban centers, between high- and low-income and status groups, etc. makes things even more complicated.

All this said, we can maybe arrive at an idea of Chinese culture by asking the (very loaded and complex question): what are the meanings and associations, the shared concepts and semantic assumptions, the default behaviors and expectations, the understandings of personal identity and interpersonal relationship, the received views of (national) history and culture and its relation to the broader world (and so forth) that, if not shared by all people living in China's borders, at least would be recognized by cultural outsiders and Chinese people themselves as distinguishing a certain shared way of living and *being* from those shared and developed by other groups of people deemed to be "cultural units"?

The question is of course unanswerable with a tool as clumsy and imprecise as natural or constructed language; it would take too long to try to explain even if we knew everything we waned to say, and there would always be a gap between what we can verbalize and express to others or ourselves and what we can personally and implicitly know or feel ("Polanyi's paradox" and Wittengstein's "private language" speculations) — and even then another equally unbridgeable gap between what we can know, feel, and represent and what actually *is* (cf. Derrida's concept of différance, or Kant's philosophy of cognition and their relation to putatively real "things in themselves").

However, knowing that this is, one some level, the question we're trying to answer in considering Chinese culture primes us for what to pay attention to and what to absorb when we begin exploring specific contexts where the answers to these questions—which exist in some (possibly/likely unrepresentable/ineffable) embodied way within all social agents and may also find their way into abstract ideological and concrete legal-institutional social structures—exert some guiding or even coercive influence on intersubjective action and, in so doing, expose themselves to our perception.

Why this is required to understand culture is related to the reason why culture exists everywhere and in so many different forms: at base, we have at any given moment (in theory) total freedom about what to do, be, think, feel, etc. Again, this is true of literally *every moment* of our lives. Our brains and bodies cannot handle choosing from among an uncountably infinite range of options — the cognitive load is too great, and there's also always the threat of devolving into nihilism when we begin to realize just how groundless we are as individual subjects. The situation is untenable, so we have to reduce the degrees of freedom somehow. (Cf. Sartre and other French existentialists views, and social scientists ideas about "coordination problems" and first-order theories of social construction.)

The selection of a particular set of default actions, thoughts, feelings, etc., or of default algorithms for the generation of such ideas/thoughts/feelings/units/actions/practices/people etc. all help us survive this existentialist freedom as each of us an individual — and together as well, once the inculcation of other individuals and the institutionalization within enduring social structures of those defaults begins. Moreover, that these defaults are being created (and performed, modified, reinterpreted, retrospectively legitimated, etc.) intersubjectively (and by something we perceive to be a community) offers the side benefit of bridging those gaps of ineffability separating individuals conscious experiences, as well as emotional tethering us to the others, both of which serve to imbue all those contingent, even random and potentially fungible, choices of defaults with a sense of import beyond themselves (which derives ultimately from recognition of shared authorship and subjectivity over this part of our existence and a resultant communion in lived experience — cf. Hegel's Geist).

(To be fair, the physical environment also exerts some level of influence by conditioning the still uncountably infinite choices available — Sichuan food culture could not exist and would certainly not have developed had the Sichuan pepper not been a part of the physical environment in which that culture developed, and its presence in that region no doubt contributed to distinguishing that region; likewise, natural and inherited built environments also stimulate or reinforce certain aspects of culture, not least in the form of socializing us into certain aesthetics.)

Anyway, if we bring this back down to earth and focus on China, we can get away with saying that "Chinese culture" is an vast web of symbolic and embodied arrangements (between both abstract and concrete things) originally given form, continually lived, and progressively developed by those for whom the symbol "Chinese" constitutes a part of their identity. Foods, cultural icons, accepted hierarchies, thought and communication patterns, etc. all exist within this web.

Will individuals differ on what constitutes Chinese culture depending on their relative placement within that web to others belonging to that social unit? Yes, but that's a feature, not a bug. What matters more is that specific features will be understood by many to distinguish Chinese culture from others, and indeed, features with that characteristic are often the most cherished by or important to members of that culture precisely because of the fact that they help distinguish their group from others while at the same time unifying their group against a foil (cf. Bateson's idea of 'schizmogenesis', also used by Graeber).

This I think is the only comprehensive context in which we can understand the relationship between those distinctive points: huoguo/malaxiangguo, kaoya, and yuebing; shufa, jingju, and sishuwujing/sidamingzhu; kongzi/rujiao, feizi/fajiao, and laozi/zhuangzi/daojiao; xiaoshun, mianzi, guanxi — all these artifacts are constitutive of "Chinese culture" not because they are things in themselves that are naturally/necessarily Chinese, but it's also not the case that they "just happen to be Chinese" (and that they're therefore nothing special). Rather, they exist interrelatedly within that web and have a connection with actual embodied and conscious Chinese people past and present, serving to congeal their (collective) inaccessible, ephemeral, and limitless spirits in external, enduring, and intersubjectively accessible "things".

# data[].attributes.body
I think Chinese culture, much like other cultures is the history. social norms, country values, etc. that make up their culture. Surface level, but China especially is one of the oldest modern civilizations with a deeply complex system with many interconnections in the country. As such, the history plays a big part on the modern values seen today such as gender roles, manners, modesty, etc. However, I think China's culture is also the interesting mix of the interconnected parts of the country that each have their own distinct ways of life. Much Like America their different regions hold different values that lay under the umbrella of Chinese culture :))

# data[].attributes.attachment_caption
Peking opera masks - a beautiful and unique type of theatre in China