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Details the history of the rise of Panzer Divisions starting in World War I to World War II. Talks about the equipment of the Panzer Divisions at the beginning of the war vs. the more traditional counterparts used in other countries.

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Like so many key historical developments of the 20th century, the birth of the Panzer division traces back to World War I. Armies on all sides had marched off to war in 1914 expecting a quick and decisive victory. What they got instead was a horrific bloodletting and stalemate. The fighting during the middle three years of the conflict (1915-17) was especially sterile. With infantry fighting from deeply echeloned trench systems, supported by machine guns and backstopped by a wall of artillery, the defense had all the advantages, and attacking across "no man's land"- the dead, blasted heath between the trenches-was nearly hopeless. Both sides had to learn the same hard lessons. The British on the Somme, the Germans at Verdun, the British again at Passchendaele in 1917: the experience was depressingly similar. Even the heaviest artillery bombardment could not suppress the defenses fully, and attacking infantry met the concentrated fire of enemy machine guns. Even if a handful of the attackers managed to reach the defender's position, they were too few and too disorganized to do much more than plopping down, exhausted.

It was a conundrum, but military officers are nothing if not problem solvers. The British, and then the French, experimented with a new armored tractor on caterpillar treads (code-named "tank") that carried its own artillery and machine guns. Tanks were able to crush barbed wire and cross trench lines, and late in 1917, at the battle of Cambrai, they showed their potential when used en masse, tearing a great hole in the German lines and sending 1000s of front-line German infantry reeling back in panic. But tanks were not yet war winners. They were cumbersome, too slow (with a top speed of 4-5 miles per hour), and prone to breakdown.

The Germans moved in a different direction, pursuing not a new piece of hardware, but new doctrine and tactics. They relied on shock troops ( Stosstruppen), highly trained independent squads with their own heavy weapons, who sought the weak spots that even the densest trench system possessed in abundance. Always pushing forward and ignoring threats to their flanks, the Stosstruppen proved able to shatter an entrenched enemy and break through into open country. In the great offensive of March 1918, Operation Michael, they did just that to the British 5th Army. But the Stosstruppen took heavy casualties in all their battle-even well-trained infantry are only flesh and blood, after all-and sustained combat robbed them of their edge. They too were unable to win the war on their own.

The interwar era found all the world's armies seeking a solution to the trench/machine gun/artillery deadlock. The debate revolved around the issue of military mechanization, that is, the role that the new weapons pioneered during World War I would play in a future conflict. Unfortunately, the answers were all over the map. It was obvious that airplanes and tanks were here to stay, but that was where agreement ended. Conservatives, including most of the world's general staffs, weren't all that impressed. The new machines were role players, certainly, but the battlefield still belonged to "the man and the horse." Radicals, usually younger officers like J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart in Britain, saw the combination of tank and aircraft as the key to future success. Fuller went so far as to call for the abolition of infantry altogether and the conversion of the entire army to tanks. In a clash of armor, he wrote, a foot soldier was nothing more than "an interested bystander." The rhetoric was often overheated on both sides, featuring ad hominem arguments, bitter invective, and predictions of doom if the other side won the argument.

The debate in Germany was different. Contrary to the common wisdom, the Germans had not emerged from World War I fundamentally disenchanted with their military tradition. Indeed, they felt they had come within an ace of winning the war in the opening campaign, before a combination of circumstances, bad luck, and weak leadership had robbed them of victory at the battle of the Marne in September 1914. The loss on the Marne fundamentally transformed the war from a highly mobile "war of movement" ( Bewegungskrieg) to a static "positional war" of trench lines and barbed wire ( Stellungskrieg). With neither side maneuvering, a war of attrition had begun, a brutal contest of firepower and killing in which the wealthier and better-armed Allies eventually triumphed, while the German people slowly starved to death under an Allied blockade.

But the Germans believed that it could have all gone differently, if only they had won the war early. The German army therefore spent the interwar era looking for ways to increase its mobility, to hit its enemies faster and harder early on in the fighting, and to make sure it would win some future, hypothetical battle of the Marne. The tank seemed to be one possible way to keep armies moving and to avoid a future stalemate.

The German search for mobility differed fundamentally from what was taking place elsewhere. The interwar period was the age of the breathless military enthusiast, singing the praises of this or that new weapon or doctrine-tanks, strategic bombing, airborne troops-and swearing that technology had changed war forever. By and large, the Germans were immune to such happy talk. The nature of war had not changed, they believed. Like their patron saint and philosopher of war, Karl von Clausewitz, they believed that war "was an act of violence to force our enemy to do our will." No one in the German army of the 1920s, the Reichswehr, ever suggested abolishing the infantry, and no one believed in the then-widespread idea that vast fleets of bombers could win a war on their own in the first ten minutes of a conflict. Indeed, German officers prided themselves on avoiding such Einseitigkeit (one-sidedness), and to call someone "one-sided" was the harshest criticism in the German military vocabulary.

This disdain for one-sidedness tempered German enthusiasm for the tank. The Germans could see that for all the potential of the tank, it also had serious weaknesses. Tanks were better at attacking than defending; they couldn't hold ground on their own; and if they came across unsuppressed enemy artillery or antitank guns, they became easy targets for enemy fire. Tanks could succeed, but only if they worked in harmony with the other weapon systems in a close, cooperative, combined arms arrangement: the tank to take ground, the infantry to hold it, and the artillery to suppress enemy weapons that might harm the tank.

With these views as their bedrock, the Germans spent the interwar era carrying out a comprehensive series of maneuvers, exercises, and wargames, all designed to test the possibilities of combined arms mechanized warfare. Colonel Oswald Lutz, the Reichwehr's Inspector of Motorized Troops, and his Chief of Staff, Major Heinz Guderian, were on point, overseeing a key series of exercises in 1931-32 at the Jüterbog and Grafenwöhr training grounds. With Germany still officially disarmed, these test runs involved faux tanks-trucks with papier mache or cardboard tank chassis placed over them. Even with these constraints, the Germans found that establishing close cooperation between the tank and the other arms was tougher than it sounded. Lutz and Guderian soon uncovered what we might call tank warfare's "first principle": in order to support the tank, the other arms had to be mobile enough to keep up. Infantry and artillery had to move as rapidly, reliably, and relentlessly as the tank, and chaining the tank to the pace of the infantry was a fundamental mistake.

All well and good, but one element was still missing. One of the major problems that Lutz, Guderian, and the entire officer corps had experienced in World War I-a problem that contributed mightily to the eventual stalemate-was the realm of command and control. The telegraph had been a great technological breakthrough back in its day, but it was far too rigid to control mass armies spread out over hundreds of miles of terrain. Identifying and locating every enemy unit in the field was often impossible, and in fact it was hard enough figuring out where your own units were, especially if they had invaded enemy territory or were in contact with the enemy. Providing friendly units with up to date orders based on the current situation was impossible.

On the Jüterbog and Grafenwöhr training grounds, the Germans soon learned that high velocity of tank warfare had only made things worse. With mechanized units careening around the battlefield at speed, and aircraft now inserted into the mix, command and control was lurching towards chaos. Thankfully, a new technological solution was at hand: the radio. While the tank was the obsession of most contemporary military discourse, radio was the real military breakthrough of the period. The days of the primitive Morse code were over, replaced by direct voice messages from the commander to subordinate and vice versa, in something approaching real time.

The Germans had no monopoly on radio technology, but they recognized its military importance more clearly than anyone else. Once again, the Reichswehr staged a series of maneuvers and wargames, culminating in a great "Radio Exercise" ( Funkübung) in 1932. The hypothetical situation, a surprise Czechoslovakian invasion of Germany from the southeast, with German units hastily assembling in the theater from all over the Reich, challenged the participants to get a corps-level radio net up and running within a single day. The game showed how important it was that the radioman be more than a mere technician. He had to immerse himself in the mission and in the overall operational situation, so that he could separate the wheat from the chaff, prioritize key messages, and delay those less pressing until later.

The Germans learned one other lesson from their radio exercises. The radio was more than a novelty, a desirable asset, a shiny toy. For command and control of the new mobile formations, it was absolutely indispensable. As one German officer put it, "It is part of the unique character of motorized and mechanized units that they can only be commanded with the assistance of technical means of communication." From the start, the German principal for mechanized units was a radio in each vehicle, from the smallest motorcycle to the heaviest tank, with command vehicles designed to carry radio equipment, both senders and receivers. Tank warfare on the scale envisioned by the Germans was unthinkable without radio.

By the early 1930s, the Germans were well on their way to designing a new military formation that met all their criteria. The last piece of the puzzle was political. Adolf Hitler came to power in January 1933, destroyed the Weimar Republic within months, and created a one-party Nazi dictatorship. In May 1935, he announced German rearmament; technically, he declared that Germany would no longer feel bound by the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. He created a new armed force, the Wehrmacht: an army of 36 divisions, a sizable Luftwaffe, or air force, and a small but modern navy.

Criticizing Hitler as a military commander and strategist is like shooting fish in a barrel, but he did have a certain amateur's intuition in this early period of his rule. As an old ground-pounder and trench warrior, he was naturally interested in the tank. In early 1933, Guderian staged a demonstration of modern weapons for the new chancellor. For 30 minutes, Hitler sat and watched the various units go through their paces: a motorcycle platoon, an anti-tank platoon of 37mm guns, the German standard at the time; one platoon of light armored cars, followed by a platoon of heavy ones; and finally, a platoon of light tanks.

The tank that Hitler saw was the German Mark I. Originally intended as a trainer, it actually saw service in the field through the early years of the war. It was no King Tiger! Its armament consisted of two machine guns in a small turret on the right hand side of the vehicle, and its armor (8 to 15mm) could barely protect the two-man crew against small arms fire. But according to Guderian, Hitler was beside himself, repeatedly exclaiming, "Now that I can use! That's what I want!" as the little machines zigged and zagged in front of him.

In October 1935, the Wehrmacht organized its first three Panzer Divisions: the 1st, under General Maximilian Freiherr von Weichs; 2nd (Guderian); and 3rd (General Ernst Fessmann). True to the German belief in combined arms, each division paired a Panzer brigade with a motorized infantry brigade. The Panzer brigade contained four battalions, each with a strength of 128 tanks. Counting command tanks, the division had some 561 in all, enough to satisfy even the most diehard tank fanatic. The infantry component was just as strong, however, consisting of a two-battalion motorized infantry regiment and a motorcycle battalion. The true hallmark of the division, however, was the full cast of supporting arms: a motorized artillery regiment, a motorized antitank battalion, a motorized pioneer company (later expanded into a battalion), and a motorized reconnaissance detachment, consisting of armored cars and motorcycles.

The new Panzer division was a model of flexibility and finesse, rather than brute force. Massed formations of tanks punched a hole through the defenders at certain, carefully selected points, backed by massed air attack. As the tanks broke through, mechanized infantry moved up to hold the ground the tanks had seized, while mobile artillery massed for the initial assault, shifted positions to avoid enemy counter-battery fire, then raced forward to keep pace with the advance. Above all, the division was flexible. It could attack and defend, penetrate and pursue, in one seamless process, and its integral radio command allowed it to turn on a dime, providing an agility that was simply not typical of other military formations of the day.

It is interesting to note the difference between the German approach and that of the two western adversaries. The British, too, assembled an "Armoured division," but it was absurdly top-heavy with tanks (six battalions worth, supported by a single infantry battalion). An Armoured division could do little but charge against enemy fire, usually unsuccessfully, as the British discovered to their grief in North Africa. The French designed some decent tanks and had insight into the problems of combined arms battle, but they essentially viewed tanks as an adjunct to the foot soldier, parceled out to meeting the needs of the infantry and moving at a stately pace in a "methodical battle" that unfolded carefully and systematically. Their "Armored division" ( Division Cuirassée) was designed accordingly, with heavy tanks and slow speed.

The Germans, by contrast, landed squarely in the middle ground. Unlike the French, they concentrated their tanks en masse, along the lines of Guderian's classic aphorism, "Kick 'em, don't spray 'em," rather than parceling them out to the infantry. They also unchained the tanks from the pace of the walking man, allowing them to roam free and independently. Contrary to the British, the Germans enmeshed the tank in an intricate web of combined arms, where the strengths of one weapon system would balance the weaknesses of the other.

In September 1936, the new Wehrmacht carried out its first fall maneuvers. None of the three Panzer Divisions were ready to take part. While the Hitler regime was literally throwing money into a rearmament program, production bottlenecks meant that the divisions still had not received their full complement of tanks and vehicles. A lone tank regiment did take part, however, launching a successful attack against a strongly held hill on day one of the exercise, but suffering such heavy losses that the regiment was ruled out of play on the second day. On the final, third day, the tanks transferred to the other side, and the entire regiment-all 140 machines-carried out a spectacular massed attack against a line of entrenched infantry.

The full Panzer division would have to wait a full year for its real coming out party: the Wehrmacht's fall maneuvers of 1937. The largest field exercises held in Germany since the end of World War I, they were also the first field test of the mechanized formations, and excitement was in the air. Hitler was there in person, along with his new best friend Benito Mussolini, then in the midst of a triumphal tour across Nazi Germany. Together, the two dictators watched from the grandstands, chatting animatedly as the action unfolded.

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institute for the study of war and democracy

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The Rise of the Panzer Division | The National WWII Museum | New Orleans

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Like so many key historical developments of the 20th century, the birth of the Panzer division traces back to World War I. Armies on all sides had marched off to war in 1914 expecting a quick and decisive victory. What they got instead was a horrific bloodletting and stalemate.

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The "Ghost Division", a Panzer Division that changed the course of the war.

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The "Ghost Division", a Panzer Division that changed the course of the war.

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The "Ghost Division" is the most notable Panzer Division of World War 2. Erwin Rommel used the panzers to perform an extreme version of the German Blitzkrieg tactic at the beginning of the war. After crossing the Meuse river, he performed an armored night attack a 11:00 pm. This stunned the defenders of the Maginot line because an armored night attack that has never even been attempted in history. After doing so, the continued to push through France covering a total of 15o miles in 24 hours!

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Why Erwin Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division Was Called the “Ghost Division”

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Due to its seemingly impossible and audacious advances, Erwin Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division quickly became known as the “Ghost Division.”

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Above: A Panzer F2                                                     Source: “Tanks, A century of tank warfare”By Oscar E. Gilbert & Romain Cansiere   

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The Panzer IV series was considered the best tank of World War II for it's amazing combination of speed, firepower, and armor. The F2 variant shown above has a 75 mm KwK40 L43 cannon, like most of the series being able to penetrate all the tanks it fought when it was introduce. But was outmatched by M4 Shermans and Churchills which came later. Another problems was that even though they could easily kill T-34's the Russians had an exponential amount of them being able to swarm the Panzers attacking with odds around 1 to 10.

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The Tiger tank was vastly superior to the allied counterparts with 100mm frontal plate and a 88mm KwK36 cannon capable of piercing 165mm of armor in 10 meters and 117mm at 2,000 meters out. It could even kill American Shermans and British Cromwells past the 2,000 meter mark.

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The impenetrable armour, powerful gun and huge size of the Tiger made it a legend in its time. It struck terror into the hearts of Allied tank crews when it first appeared in 1942. The armour was 100mm thick at the front, making it impervious to Allied guns. Yet a shot from the 88mm gun could penetrate 100mm armour at ranges of up to 1,000 metres.

The tank did have its problems. It was unreliable and caught fire easily. It first went into action on the Eastern Front against Russia, then in North Africa and all other major European battlefronts.

Tiger 131

Tiger 131 is the world's only running Tiger I tank. It was captured on 24th April 1943 on Point 174 on the way between Medjez el Bab and Montarnaud in Tunisia, by 142nd Battalion RAC and 2nd Sherwood Foresters.

It runs at the Museum's annual Tiger Day events.

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The impenetrable armour, powerful gun and huge size of the Tiger made it a legend in its time. It struck terror into the hearts of Allied tank crews when it first appeared in 1942. The armour was 100mm thick at the front, making it impervious to Allied guns.

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Towards 1943 the American M10 Tank Destroyer was a formidable enemy, being able to easily destroy Panzer VI and III's. Germany designed a tank meant to look similar to the M10 in hope of infiltrating the American lines and inflicting damage. The Ersatz M10, a modified hull that looked similar but had the same suspension as the Panther. This suspension system was different than the easily visible American version. It had a 88 cm gun instead of the 75 making it able to penetrate the most armored allied vehicles during the time. In reality so few of these were even made, with less seeing combat. Some of the features were so different the Allies, it was easy to tell it was axis.

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Nazi Germany (1944)
Medium Tank - 10 Disguised

Over centuries of war, elaborate disguises have been used many times to hide a combatant's true force or intention. This spans from the famous Trojan Horse of the Trojan Wars to the fake spying trees of the First World War. In World War Two, the German Wehrmacht employed such tactics in quite an elaborate fashion.
In winter 1944, the Battle of the Bulge was in full swing. As part of a special operation, codenamed Greif, the Germans employed an even more elaborate deception. This involved taking multiple Panzerkampfwagen V Panthers and disguising them as the American M10 'Wolverine' Tank Destroyer. To quote the fictional Captain George Mainwaring; "this is just the sort of shabby trick the Nazis would play".

Background, Operation Greif

The brainchild of Adolf Hitler and commanded by Waffen-SS Commando Otto Skorzeny, Operation Greif (meaning Griffin) was part of an elaborate special operation during the Battle of the Bulge in the winter of 1944. Skorzeny had become one of Hitler's most trusted operatives, especially after he succeeded in the rescue of Benito Mussolini in the autumn of 1943.

A head-on view of one of the disguised Panther's after it was knocked out. Note the crudely painted American stars and unit markings on the bow. Photo: lonesentry.com
Skorzeny was ordered to form Panzer Brigade 150 whose role would be to capture as many bridges over the Meuse river as possible. The twist to the operation was that the troops in the Brigade would be disguised as British and American troops and also use the enemy's equipment, vehicles, and tanks. The hope was that it would lead to catastrophic confusion.
The SS Commando was concerned, however. With his men in disguise, they were in breach of the Hague Convention of 1907 (Part IV, Section II, Chapter II). This meant, that if any of his troops were to be captured in the uniforms of British or American soldiers, they could be shot as spies.

Panzer Brigade 150

With the Ardennes Offensive looming on the horizon, Skorzeny only had a matter of weeks to assemble his brigade. 3,300 troops were requested in total to fill three battalions. Part of the request was that the troops have general knowledge of the English language or American dialects. The Western German Army Command (OB West) was charged with finding the needed US and British equipment. This included 15 tanks, 20 self-propelled guns, 20 armored cars, 100 jeeps, 40 motorcycles and 120 trucks. They were also tasked with collecting as many British and American Uniforms as possible. Once gathered, the equipment would be sent to the Brigade's training ground which was set up in eastern Bavaria at Grafenwöhr.
What was delivered to the training ground fell far short of Skorzeny's requests. Of the 3,300 men requested, only around 400 spoke any kind of English. The best English speakers, 150 of them, were formed into a commando unit known as Einheit Stielau. To fill the gaps in the infantry, Skorzeny recruited from other corps such as the SS-Jagdverbände, SS-Fallschirmjäger, Paratroopers and tank crews from other Panzer Regiments and Brigades. This still did not meet the desired 3,300 men, 2,500 would be all Skorzeny had to deploy. The Brigade was scaled back to two battalions to cope with the smaller than anticipated number of infantry.
Infantry numbers were not the only disappointment. Far fewer captured Allied vehicles were available than anticipated. Just 49 unarmored vehicles were delivered. The shortfall was met with German Army vehicles repainted in the American Olive-Drab. What was worse, however, was that of the 15 requested captured Allied tanks or 'Beutepanzers,' only two American M4 Shermans in an ill state of repair were delivered.
To cover the gap left by these decrepit M4s, Skorzeny employed five of Germany's own tanks, the Panzer V Panther. But, to blend in with the operation, modifications had to be made.

45-ton Cuckoo

Defined as a medium tank, the Panzerkampfwagen V Panther entered service in 1943 in response to the Soviet T-34. It had armor of up to 80mm, with the upper glacis sloped at 35 degrees. The tank was powered by a Maybach HL230 P30 V-12 rated at 690 hp, producing a top speed of up to 34 mph (55 km/h).
The Panther was armed with the 7.5 cm (75mm) KwK 42 L/70 which could penetrate up to 199mm of armor at 1000 yards. It also had a bow and coaxially mounted MG 34 7.92mm Machine Guns. It was operated by a five-man crew; Commander, Gunner, Loader, Driver, Bow Gunner/Radio-Operator.
The particular Panthers chosen for Operation Greif were Ausfuhrung Gs. The Ausf. G was produced from March 1944. It was the last model of Panther to be produced in large numbers and featured a number of changes over the previous models that were originally intended for introduction on the canceled Panther II. This included thicker side armor, the addition of a wedge on the bottom of the mantlet to eliminate the shot trap, and the deletion of the driver's vision port in exchange for a rotating periscope above his position.

Modifications

For the Panthers to assume the appearance of the Allies' M10 Tank Destroyer, a number of cosmetic changes had to be made.
The description of the changes is based on information from the issue 57 of the U.S. War Department publication Tactical and Technical Trends, published in April 1945. As it is a wartime intelligence publication, some data may be missing or may be inaccurate.

Turret

The turret saw the heaviest application of this 'camoflage'. To replicate the M10's unique turret shape, five sections of sheet metal around 3.4 mm thick were cut. Two pieces were cut to mirror the turret sides. These were flanged and bent into shape, supported by iron bars. Two more pieces were placed on the rear of the turret to represent the lower bustle and counterweight and were strengthened with iron bars. This counter weight piece is mysterious, as there appears to be no visual record of it. These four pieces were then attached together, and the frame work welded to the turret. Even the smallest M10 turret details were closely studied and replicated, including the lifting eyes, brackets and the attachment points for appliqué armor.
A false gun shield was manufactured and welded to the Panther's own. A hole was made for the coaxial machine gun, something the original M10 did not require as it did not have one.
The most drastic change to the turret came with the removal of the iconic German Commander's cupola. Having been cut out, it was replaced by a simple two-piece hatch. Each piece was hinged for opening. No vision devices were added, so the commander was now effectively blind when buttoned down.

A close up look of the modifications to the turret. Photo: lonesentry.com

Hull

Bow: The hull saw the heaviest application of fabricated M10 parts. Roughly four pieces of sheet metal, all 3.5mm thick, were carefully formed and welded into place to replicate the iconic bulbous transmission housing on the bow of M4 derived tanks. A further sheet of metal was welded over the upper glacis. A trap door attached to a chain was cut into the piece to allow use of the bow MG 34 Machine Gun. As with the turret, the appropriate towing eyes and brackets were applied to these pieces.
Sides: In an attempt to replicate the sloping side armor of the M10 which overlaps the return of the track, a long piece of sheet metal was cut and welded horizontally along the flanks, replacing the Schurzen side armor. Three blocks of spare track links were also added along the sides replicating the stowage pattern used on the M10. All external stowage such as the pioneer tools, ramming staff water cans and jacks were removed.
Rear: The rear of the Panther saw the addition of a false rear. A box like frame was welded together from 4-5 pieces of sheet metal and welded to the rear of the tank. This was attached in place of the two large stowage boxes to replicate the overhanging tail of the M10. Holes were cut in the seam along the top for the exhaust pipes. On the top of this box, a replica of the M10s fixed gun rest was also welded into place.
Paint: Paintwork was the final step in the disguise. The entire tank was painted in a reproduction of the typical American Olive Drab paint. Allied star markings were applied to the upper glacis and also to the sides and roof of the turret. False unit markings were also applied to the bow and rear.

Undisguised Parts

There were parts of the Panther that were too hard to disguise too. The biggest issue, of course, being the classic German overlapping road wheels which looked nothing like the VVSS (Vertical Volute Spring Suspension) of the M10. The tracks were also much thicker. Another was the muzzle brake of the L/70 which had to be retained for the gun to operate safely and effectively. Apart from the British 17-Pdr Achilles variant, the M10 did not have a muzzle brake. The overall size of the Panther was an issue too, as it was wider, longer and taller than the M10.

The overlapping road wheels were impossible to mask, as displayed by this knocked out disguised Panther. Photo: SOURCE

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One of the 10 Panther Ausf. Gs that was disguised as an Allied M10 Tank Destroyer. Operation Grief, December 1944. (Click to see full image)

A standard allied M10 "Wolverine" for comparison. This is the appearance that the 150 were aiming for.

Standard Panther Ausf. G for comparison. With this, you can see the how extensive the modifications were.
All illustrations are by Tank Encyclopedia's own David Bocquelet.
Action

In action, the disguised Panthers used a number of methods to signify to surrounding German forces that it was indeed a friendly vehicle. This included painting a subtle yellow triangle on the rear of the tank. Another method was that all the disguised tanks would have their guns aligned in certain direction.
Before the operation started, rumours began to spread among the troops about the Brigade's purpose. The troops believed they would be reinforcing besieged towns such as Dunkirk, Lorient, another was that they were to capture Antwerp. The most elaborate speculation was that their orders were to capture the Allied Supreme Command at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe (SHAFE) in Paris. Not even Skorzeny's own commanders knew about the true plan. Just 4 days before the beginning of the operation on the 10th of December, would they know.
On the 14th of December, the 150th Brigade was assembled near the historic town of Bad Münstereifel moving out on the 16th. The aim was to capture two or more bridges over the River Meuse at Amay, Huy and Andenne. The brigade was supported by three Panzer divisions; 1st SS Panzer Division, 12th SS Panzer Division, 12th Volksgrenadier Division. The bridges were divided between the three battle-groups that would each hold a bridge until they could be destroyed, which would prevent the Allies from crossing. It was hoped that the confusion caused by the Allies receiving fire from what appeared to be friendly vehicles and troops would play into the hands of the Wehrmacht, and in turn increasing the likelihood of success.
However, the brigade became delayed by two days after the 1st SS Panzer Division failed to link up at the starting point. With this 48 hour delay, Skorzeny realized that the original plan was now doomed. As a result of this failure, Skorzeny attended a meeting at the 6th Panzer Army's Headquarters where he suggested that his brigade take on the role of a normal army panzer unit. This was approved, and the Commander was ordered to assemble his forces south of the Belgian municipality of Malmedy.

A disguised Panther knocked out by American forces, coincidentally under a 'Chevrolet' sign. Photo: SOURCE
Under Skorzeny's command, the Brigade moved out on the 21st of December 1944 in an attempt to take Malmedy. The 150th tried several times to take the town, but they were repelled by the defending American forces, including the 120th Infantry Division, every time with heavy artillery support. Private Francis Currey of the 120th received the Congressional Medal of Honor after he managed to knock one of the tanks out with a Bazooka.
The artillery pummeled the 150th into submission, taking a heavy toll on the brigade. Even Skorzeny himself was wounded by shrapnel. Skorzeny's unit would be the German's only attempt to take Malmedy during the Battle of the Bulge.

Aftermath

Operation Greif succeeded in causing a great deal of confusion in American and Allied forces. Spies were thought to be everywhere. It was even thought at one point that there may be an attempt to kidnap General Eisenhower. This paranoia spawned from a German commando team which was captured on the 17th of December where one of the commandos told their captors that there was a plan to capture the general.
A number of friendly-fire incidents also occurred as a result of the confusion. On the 20th of December, two American GIs were shot at a checkpoint by a military policeman in a case of mistaken identity. Such incidents continued to happen into early 1945, when two more were killed and several injured when the US 6th Armored Division engaged the 35th Infantry Division by mistake near Bastogne.

A group of civilians pose for a photo next to one of the knocked out Panthers. Photo: SOURCE

Investigating the Tanks

In total, four of the Ersatz M10s were knocked out during the battle. After the action, the Ordnance Intelligence department investigated the hulks of these Trojan Horses.
From numbers found on the tanks, it was thought that there were at least ten converted vehicles. The destroyed vehicles they studied had the identifying numbers of B-4, B-5, B-7, and B-10. In the more intact wrecks, investigators found American uniforms including overcoats, helmets, and trousers.
The investigators surmised that had the tanks been deployed with a bit more care and cover, they would've been extremely effective and dealt considerable damage. Not much is known about the tanks from this point on. After the investigation, they were likely scrapped. None of the Ersatz M10s survive today.

These Photos: SOURCE

An article by Mark Nash
For our U.K. readers, this article can also be found in the August 2018 issue of ' Classic Military Vehicle ' Magazine.

Dimensions (L-w-h)

6.87/8.66 x3.27 x2.99 m (22.54/28.41 x10.73 x9.81 ft)

Total weight, battle ready

44.8 tons max. (98,767 lbs)

Armament

Main: 75 mm (2.95 in) KwK 42 L/70, 79 rounds
Sec: 2x 7.9 mm (0.31 in) MG 34, 5100 rounds

Armor

Sloped, from 15 to 120 mm (0.59-4.72 in)

Crew

5 (commander, driver, gunner, loader, radioman/machine gunner)

Propulsion

V12 Maybach HL230 P2 gasoline, 690 hp (515 kW)

Transmission

ZF AK 7-200 7-forward/1-reverse gearbox

Suspensions

Double torsion bars and interleaved wheels

Speed (late model)

48 km/h (29 mph)

Operational range

250 km (160 mi)

For information about abbreviations check the Lexical Index

Links, Resources & Further Reading

Panzer Tracts No.5-3, Panzerkampfwagen "Panther" Ausfuehrung G, Thomas L. Jentz & Hilary L. Doyle.
Osprey Publishing, New Vanguard #22: Panther Variants 1942-45
Stackpole Military History Series, Battle of the Bulge, Vol. 2: Hell at Bütgenbach / Seize the Bridges, Hans J. Wijers
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 57, April 1945 ( READ HERE)

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Ersatz M10 - Panthers in Disguise - Tank Encyclopedia

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Over centuries of war, elaborate disguises have been used many times to hide a combatant's true force or intention. This spans from the famous Trojan Horse of the Trojan Wars to the fake spying trees of the First World War. In World War Two, the German Wehrmacht employed such tactics in quite an elaborate fashion.