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Small Business Administration - Harita Vaddadi 

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Small Business Administration - Harita Vaddadi 

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Year established:

The SBA was created on July 30, 1953.

What led up to the creation:

The SBA was a result of the Federal Reserve Study that discovered that small businesses could not get the credit they needed to keep pace with technological advancement.

What is the purpose:

The SBA was created to aid, counsel, assist and protect the interests of small business concerns, preserve free competitive enterprise and maintain and strengthen the overall economy of our nation.

How it affects businesses:

The SBA helps businesses grow and develop more. They also help the local economies grow by bringing growth and new innovations to the community.

How it affects employees:

Employees can easily get jobs and can get a basic payroll and protect them from unfortunate things happening. The SBA also has helped entrepreneurs all over the nation with loans, contracts, counseling and other types of assistance.

How it affects consumers:

The SBA allows them to spend things in a safer environment and makes sure that there are no mistakes when they buy items. The SBA also allows them to create small businesses and maintain and strengthen the overall economy.

Revisions:

There are no revisions made for the SBA.

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:

1. https://www.legalteamusa.net/lawsuit-filed-against-sba-administrator-carranza-citing-failure-to-pay-10000-grants-promised-to-small-business-applicants/

2.https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-sba-halts-some-grants-under-injunction-lawsuit-filed-by-white-restaurant-2021-06-12/

3. https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-civil-rights-organizations-sue-small-business-administration-excluding-business

Sources (links):

https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/organization#:~:text=SBA%20was%20created%20in%201953,overall%20economy%20of%20our%20nation.

https://www.pubintlaw.org/cases-and-projects/civil-rights-organizations-sue-the-small-business-administration-for-excluding-business-owners-with-criminal-records-from-covid-19-relief/

https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/an%20analysis%20of%20small%20business%20and%20jobs(1).pdf

https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-sba-halts-some-grants-under-injunction-lawsuit-filed-by-white-restaurant-2021-06-12/

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-civil-rights-organizations-sue-small-business-administration-excluding-business

https://www.legalteamusa.net/lawsuit-filed-against-sba-administrator-carranza-citing-failure-to-pay-10000-grants-promised-to-small-business-applicants/

https://www.munsch.com/Newsroom/Blogs/129402/SBA-Faces-39Parade39-of-Lawsuits-Over-Handling-of-PPP

https://www.burr.com/blogs/tax-law-insights/2020/06/22/aclu-and-others-file-lawsuit-against-sba-challenging-sba-guidance-that-businesses-and-individuals-are-not-eligible-for-a-ppp-loan-if-they-have-criminal-history

https://topclassactions.com/coronavirus-covid-19/minority-owned-small-businesses-werent-able-to-apply-for-covid-19-aid/

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| Lucas Haynes
Name of Agency, Policy, Law or Regulation | Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
Year established | 1890
What led up to the creation of this agency, policy, law or regulation? | The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed to address concerns by consumers who felt they were paying high prices on essential goods and by competing companies who believed they were being shut out of their industries by larger corporations.
What is the purpose of this agency, policy, law or regulation? | The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is a federal statute which prohibits activities that restrict interstate commerce and competition in the marketplace.
Give examples of how this agency, policy, law or regulations affects businesses today.  | On Oct. 20, 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed an antitrust lawsuit against Google, alleging that the online giant engaged in anti-competitive conduct to preserve monopolies in search and search advertising. Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen compared the complaint to past uses of the Sherman Act to stop monopolistic practices by corporations.
Give examples of how this agency, policy, law or regulation affects employees today.  | United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, The purchase by the Union Pacific Railroad Company of forty-six percent of the stock of the Southern Pacific Company, with the resulting control of the latter's railway system by the former, is an illegal combination in restraint of interstate trade within the purview of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and must be dissolved. They didn’t allow them to combine so that there could be competition in the business and economic fairness.
Give examples of how this agency, policy, law or regulation affects consumers today.  | The Sherman Antitrust act effectively and responsibly enforce regulations and can save consumers billions of dollars yearly in illegal overcharges.
Has this agency, policy, law or regulation been revised? What are the details? What led up to the revision? | The Sherman Act was amended by the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914, which addressed specific practices that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not ban. The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 continues to regulate U.S. business practices today. Intended to strengthen earlier antitrust legislation, the act prohibits anticompetitive mergers, predatory and discriminatory pricing, and other forms of unethical corporate behavior.
How do you think this agency, policy, law or regulation will affect you in the industry that you chose to work in after you graduate? | The Sherman Antitrust Act forbids any type of price-fixing in any industry. As a result, the real estate industry operates on the principle that discussing fees between real estate brokers is illegal unless the brokers are cooperating on the same deal.
Citations - Place links to where you found your data - You change this to MLA format later.  | “United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912).” Justia Law, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/226/61/. Kenton, Will. “Sherman Antitrust Act Definition.” Investopedia, Investopedia, 15 Nov. 2021, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sherman-antiturst-act.asp. Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer. https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/800691/download. Segal, Troy. “Clayton Antitrust Act.” Investopedia, Investopedia, 26 Oct. 2021, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clayton-antitrust-act.asp#:~:text=The%20Clayton%20Antitrust%20Act%20of,forms%20of%20unethical%20corporate%20behavior. “Sherman Antitrust Act: Real Estate Exam.” Real Estate Exam - PrepAgent.com, https://www.prepagent.com/article/sherman-antitrust-act#:~:text=The%20Sherman%20Antitrust%20Act%20forbids,price%2Dfixing%20in%20any%20industry.&text=As%20a%20result%2C%20the%20real,cooperating%20on%20the%20same%20deal.

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Year established: 1972

What led up to the creation: In the mid 19th century, potentially poisonous chemicals became available to consumers through national mail-order distribution networks. As these became available, more accidental poisoning of children increased which then led to Congress creating the Consumer Product Safety Commission

What is the purpose: The purpose of the government agency is to protect the public against risks of injuries and deaths associated with Consumer Products

How it affects businesses: This agency reduces the risks of injuries and deaths from consumer products by developing voluntary standards to recalls and to ban products under certain circumstances.

How it affects employees: Since this agency bans or recalls the products and makes it safer for the consumers, it also protects employees because they aren't working with the hazardous products.

How it affects consumers: The agency is reducing the risk of injuries and deaths by recalling or banning the products under certain circumstances. This protects consumers from being able to purchase/get to potentially hazardous products with properties such as flammability, explosiveness, toxicity, etc.

Revisions: No revisions have been made to this agency.

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
1. https://casetext.com/case/zen-magnets-llc-v-us-consumer-prod-safety-commn
2. https://www.cpsc.gov/Newsroom/News-Releases/2021/CPSC-Sues-Amazon-to-Force-Recall-of-Hazardous-Products-Sold-on-Amazon-com
3. https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2007/toys-r-us-recalls-wooden-coloring-cases-due-to-violation-of-lead-paint-standard

Sources (links):
1. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45174.html#:~:text=Introduction-,The%20Consumer%20Product%20Safety%20Commission%20(CPSC%20or%20Commission)%20was%20established,entered%20the%20stream%20of%20commerce.

2. https://www.cpsc.gov/Safety-Education/Safety-Guides/General-Information/Who-We-Are---What-We-Do-for-You

3. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3698836/

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Year established:
Established on August 21, 1996

What led up to the creation:
What led up to the creation of this agency law was to simplify the administration of healthcare, eliminate wastage, prevent healthcare fraud, and ensure that employees could maintain healthcare coverage when between jobs.

What is the purpose:
The purpose of this policy was to keep the customers' information confidential and private since if this rule was not made anyone could claim they know you and get information on all healthcare.

How it affects businesses:
These agency regulations affect the businesses today by keeping everyone's healthcare private and only allowing their parents to know information about the patient which is if only you are a minor. Allowing people to know someone's health issues that they are not authorized to know can have a huge impact on someone's  life by their workplace, school, family, or friends judging them for their health issues. Many people don’t share their private life and problems with other people because you never know how it could affect them and this healthcare act provides them this privacy for not telling people who are not authorized to know

How it affects employees:
This affects the employees today by being sincere and not trying to outsmart the patients in desperate need. For example, a healthcare provider in Georgia, Elite Primary Care denied giving one of their patient’s access to his health records when he asked multiple times but he changed his healthcare which then his records were sent to his new healthcare provider. OCR concluded the delay in providing the patient with a copy of his requested records was in violation of the HIPAA Right of Access. The Elite Primary Care then had to pay a fine of $36,000 and start changing their system which will be checked by the OCR and if everything seems to be going right OCR will then provide training and will be checking in on them for 2 years.

How it affects consumers:
This affects consumers today by keeping their healthcare private. One HIPAA Violation Case in 2020 was how Premera Blue Cross, one of the largest healthcare companies, was found in multiple HIPAA violations such as failure to conduct a thorough risk analysis, risk management failures, and insufficient mechanisms to identify suspicious network activity, etc. This case was taken to the court and got settled down with $10,786,500 that would settle all the violations made against Premera Blue Cross.

Revisions:
Yes, HIPAA has been revised and it will still be revised in the future. In this policy what got revised was the privacy of substance abuse disorder where patients who seek treatment that is assigned to them federally need to improve the level of care that can be provided. It was revised twice and the send regulation was allowing other clinics then the one you go to be able to access your record which include the patients SUD records (confidentiality of substance use disorder).

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
1. https://www.hipaajournal.com/hipaa-violation-cases/
2.www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-scams-and-crimes/health-care-fraud.
3. https://www.hipaajournal.com/ocr-imposes-2nd-largest-ever-hipaa-penalty-of-6-85-million-on-premera-blue-cross/

Sources (links):
- HIPAA Journal. “What Is a HIPAA Violation?” HIPAA Journal, 14 Mar. 2018, www.hipaajournal.com/what-is-a-hipaa-violation/.

- HIPAA Journal. “HIPAA Violation Cases.” HIPAA Journal, 2017, www.hipaajournal.com/hipaa-violation-cases/.
“Health Care Fraud.” Federal Bureau of Investigation, www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-scams-and-crimes/health-care-fraud.

- “OCR Announces Its 19th HIPAA Penalty of 2020.” HIPAA Journal, 23 Dec. 2020, www.hipaajournal.com/ocr-announces-19th-hipaa-penalty-of-2020/.

- HIPAA Journal. “New HIPAA Regulations in 2019.” HIPAA Journal, 4 Mar. 2019, www.hipaajournal.com/new-hipaa-regulations/.

- “OCR Imposes 2nd Largest Ever HIPAA Penalty of $6.85 Million on Premera Blue Cross.” HIPAA Journal, 28 Sept. 2020, www.hipaajournal.com/ocr-imposes-2nd-largest-ever-hipaa-penalty-of-6-85-million-on-premera-blue-cross/.

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Federal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEOC)

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Federal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEOC)

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Year Established: 1965

What led up to the creation: At the time leading up to the formation of this agency , the battle for civil rights was raging hard. In 1963 The Equal Pay Act was passed for women. In 1964 the Civil Rights Act was passed which banned workplace discrimination.

What is the purpose: Enforces laws that ban workplace discrimination of any form. This includes race, age, sex, etc.. Other forms of discrimination include pregnancy, transgender, sexual orientation, or even national origin.

How it affects businesses: Bans them from discriminating against groups such as women, minorities, disabled, etc.. Discrimination can be any number of things. It can mean workplace discrimination such as treating them poorly and/or not considering them for promotions. It can also mean not hiring them based off these attributes.

How it affects employees: This agency is positive for all employees as it levels the playing field for all regardless of your race, gender, marital status, religion, and whether or not you're pregnant. It makes sure all employees feel included and apart of the company. The main group that has needed assistance of this agency has been women. They've filed for many lawsuits particularly in the '80s and '90s. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton the Supreme Court found that an employer can be held accountable for sexism of a supervisor.

How it affects consumers: This agency, while its' main focus is to protect employees, can also protect consumers from discrimination. The main way this agency protects consumers is making sure everyone is treated equally while attempting to get a bank loan. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) makes sure of this.

Revisions:
1967-  Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Griggs v Duke Power Co: The Supreme Court finds than certain job requirements were restricting minorities from getting jobs, made them illegal
1974- Cleveland Bd. of Ed v LaFleur: Finds that rules on maternity leave in Ohio schools was discriminatory against pregnant woman
1978- Pregnancy Discrimination Act
1990- Disabilities Act bans any form of discrimination against disabled people

Links to 3 Court Cases:
1. https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/414/632.html
2. https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/524/775.html
3. https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/401/424.html

Sources:
https://www.eeoc.gov/youth/timeline-important-eeoc-events

https://gradaustralia.com.au/diversity/what-does-equal-opportunity-in-the-workplace-mean

https://www.findlaw.com/civilrights/discrimination/employment-discrimination-u-s-supreme-court-cases.html

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Ethan Hollis

Year established:
established on 1910

What led up to the creation:

Many companies and businesses, even till this day, have the ability to false advertise a product for the benefit of more profit. This also can affect the consumer big time since they can buy something that is not label-intended. All of these illegal and indigenous acts resulted in the Truth in Advertising and Marketing Act to be made in order to protect fair label and sales.

What is the purpose:
The purpose of this law is to prevent these companies and businesses from false advertising to the public for personal profit gain. Many companies can easily access materials to make a false-advertised product that can be sold to the public. It is also an act to protect the customer from buying something they may be allergic to, cant eat, etc.

How it affects businesses:
This regulation has a good effect on most businesses today since the FTC takes law enforcement actions, provides consumer and business education, issues reports and policy guidance, leads workshops, and participates in other forums. This is a great action to take because it not only protects the consumer, but also to the public who can see these false advertisements.

How it affects employees:
This regulation effects every employee in the nation. This act will make sure that every employee in the country stocking up grocery shelves, making commercial ads, and selling certain products all have the right label on their products.

How it affects consumers:
This policy/regulation has a big effect on how consumers buy the product today because it tells the customers that the labels are correct and true to the product. And if a customer finds a label that is incorrect for scamming reasons, then they can sue with good purpose thanks to the regulation.

Revisions:
This regulation has been revised by making sure stores put true labels on their shelves, and companies make their labels on their products truthful. Many things that led up to this revision is that stores are now more high-tech with new technology, so making sure that every label is correct while stocking up shelves is important.

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
1.
https://www.pbwt.com/publications/supreme-court-clarifies-standing-for-false-advertising-cases/

2.
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/third-circuit-affirms-decision-to-reject-ftc-s-false-advertising-claims-against
3.
https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/dc-appeals-court-empowers-consumer-nonprofits-hormel-false-ad-case-2021-09-03/
Sources (links):
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/truth-advertising

https://www.fooddive.com/news/false-advertising-lawsuits-are-ramping-up-in-food-and-beverage/604615/

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/false_advertising

https://www.justia.com/consumer/deceptive-practices-and-fraud/false-advertising/

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Tayja Ghatahora
Year established: The Federal Trade Commision Act was created September 26th, 1914. It's doors were opened on March 16th, 1915.
What led up to the creation: The Sherman Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act inspired the FTC Act. Woodrow Wilson created the act in order to protect consumers by preventing what it deemed unfair methods of competition between businesses and deceptive business practices.
What is the purpose: The Federal Trade Commission's mission is to protect customers and promote competition.
How it affects businesses:

1.  Facebook had to pay a $5 billion penalty and submit to new restrictions and a modified corporate structure that will hold the company accountable for the decisions it makes about its users’ privacy. They violated a 2021 FTC order by deceiving users about their abilities to control the privacy of their personal information.

2. AT&T will pay $80 million to the FTC to provide refunds to consumers the company unlawfully billed for unauthorization third-party charges; also known as mobile cramming.

3. Google and its subsidiary YouTube will pay $170 million to settle allegations by the FTC and the New York Attorney General that the YouTube video sharing service illegally collected personal information from children without their parents’ consent. It required Google and YouTube to pay $136 million to the FTC and $34 million to New York for allegedly violating the COPPA Rule

How it affects employees: This law doesn't really impact employees. It mainly affects the business and the consumers.
How it affects consumers:

1. When Facebook violated the 2021 FTC order by deceiving users about their privacy on the platform, it affected Facebook’s consumers. The FTC was able to enforce new regulations that protect the consumers.

2. When AT&T illegally billed their consumers, the FTC helped refund everyone affected. The FTC was able to protect consumers from a company trying to take advantage of them.

3. When Google and YouTube were collecting personal information from children without their parent’s consent, the FTC was able to protect the consumers and required those companies to pay a hefty fine.

Revisions: In 1994, the act was amended, it amended the FTC Act to deny authority to the FTC to study, investigate, or prosecute agricultural cooperative for ant action not in violation of antitrust acts, or to study or investigate agricultura; marketing orders.
Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:

1. https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases
proceedings/2010065/richard-d-fairbank-us-v
2. https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1910153/board-dental-examiners-alabama-0
3. https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/202-3179/resident-home-llc-matter
Sources (links):

https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history

https://ballotpedia.org/Federal_Trade_Commission_Act_of_1914

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/what-ftc-does

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/683741/19670719_macintyre_presentation_._university_of_rhode_island.pdf

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement

https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/10/att-pay-80-million-ftc-consumer-refunds-mobile-cramming-case

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/09/google-youtube-will-pay-record-170-million-alleged-violations

https://www.thenjemploymentlawfirmblog.com/ftc-settles-case-alleging-collusion-among-employers-to-keep-pay-rates-low/

https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/2243

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Year established: 1884

What led up to the creation:
Prior to this policy, major occupations in Pennsylvania including factory work, coal mining, and farming resulted in life threatening injuries due to the lack of advanced technology. Social security and medicare did not exist until later, and the workers became a burden. To address the problem, governments around the world developed the system.

What is the purpose:
To protect employees from financial hardships related to injuries caused by work.

How it affects businesses:

1. Manager vs. McDonalds. A manager at McDonalds was under pressure to serve customers quickly, which made her unusually bend to catch the fries that were about to fall. She injured her neck. This can result in a drop of employees in the business, as they do not want to be under pressure while working.

2. Man vs. Pizza Hut. A pizza delivery man sustained a punctured lung due to a fight while delivering food. This resulted in a significant drop of deliverers.

3. The business failed to modify their duties after an injury that occured to Larry W. holland. The business even tried to terminate the job while he was on medical leave. This resulted in significant financial chargers.

How it affects employees:

1. Woman vs. Arby’s. Woman accidentally drinks Lye. An Arby’s employee drank from the wrong cup, a cup with lye in the break room. This caused third degree burns to her esophagus.

2. Amanda vs.Bar. Amanda was told to carry several large boxes during her shift, and pulled a muscle. She then broke her back.

3. This is an unusual one, but an old man broke his hip trying to get a snake at work due to the broken vending machine. This resulted in health problems.

How it affects consumers:
This law does not directly affect consumers.

Revisions:
Payments for workers’ compensation medical care had been increasing twice as much as those who were disabled. In response, Workers compensation adopted policies intended to improve program efficiency while controlling payments.

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
1.https://localhost:6543/block_screen.html?id=689b80e2-de45-4307-8be8-0eb290aaf427
found 2 with this link
2.https://www.thehartford.com/workers-compensation/history

Sources (links):
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n4/v65n4p7.html

https://amtrustfinancial.com/blog/small-business/the-history-of-workers-compensation-insurance

https://www.thehartford.com/workers-compensation/history

https://news.briotix.com/how-does-a-workers-comp-claim-affect-an-employer

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Why Does Workers' Comp Exist?

Having workers' compensation insurance is important if you have employees. It gives employees benefits to help them recover from work-related injuries or illnesses. You may have heard of this insurance referred to as workers' comp or workman's compensation. Regardless of what you call it, this insurance can help cover your employees':

Medical expenses

Lost wages

Ongoing care costs

Funeral expenses

If one of your employees gets workers' compensation benefits, they can't sue your business because of their injury or illness. Without this coverage, your business can end up in a lawsuit with expenses that you have to pay for out of pocket.

There's a long workers' compensation history that led to it becoming an important part of the U.S. workforce. Knowing how it started can help answer questions you may have, like " what is workers' compensation insurance?"

The History of Workers' Compensation

One of the earliest examples of a workers' compensation system dates back to 2050 B.C. ¹ A law in Ancient Sumeria paid workers for their injuries. Similar laws were in place in Ancient Greece, China and other parts of the world. 2 For example, under Ancient Arab law, if an injured worker hurt their ear, they got an amount of money based on surface area injured. ³

The Industrial Revolution & Workers' Compensation

The Industrial Revolution brought manufacturing to the forefront. This meant using factories and new machines to make goods at a large scale, but it also led to hazardous work conditions. 4 People worked in cramped, poorly ventilated spaces, facing risks such as injuries and exposure to toxic chemicals. ⁵

During this time, injured workers had to rely on the court system to get compensation, which rarely happened. Employers had three laws they could use to avoid liability. These laws became known as the "unholy trinity of defenses." 6

Contributory negligence meant an employer wasn't at fault if the worker was in any way responsible for their injury.

"Fellow Servant" Doctrine prevented employers from being held liable if another worker caused an employee's injury.

Assumption of risk was a doctrine that stated employees knew and accepted the risks involved with their work when signing a job application.

Because of these laws, it was rare for injured workers to get compensation. In fact, it was so uncommon that private organizations in Germany and England were created to offer disability insurance. ⁷

Workers' Compensation History in 19th Century Europe

In the late 19th century, Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck enacted the Sickness and Accident Laws. ⁸

Employers' Liability Law of 1871 gave limited protection to workers in certain factories, quarries, railroads and mines.

Workers' Accident Insurance of 1884 created a modern workers' compensation system.

Public Pension Insurance gave workers with a non-work-related illness money if they couldn't work.

Public Aid served as a safety net for workers who couldn't return to work because of a disability.

Unlike the unholy trinity of defenses, Bismarck's system valued employees. It covered medical care and rehabilitation costs if a worker got hurt on the job. It also created a precedent that injured employees couldn't sue their employers if they got workers' compensation.

Countries throughout Europe began adopting similar workers' compensation systems for their workers. For example, England's Parliament enacted the Workers' Compensation Act in 1897, which was similar to Prussia's law. 9

When Did Workers' Compensation Begin in the U.S.?

It took the United States 37 years for every state to pass its own workers' compensation law. Wisconsin was the first in 1911. That same year, nine other states had workers' compensation acts. In the next nine years, 36 states passed laws. Mississippi was the final state to enact a workers' compensation law in 1948.

The workers' compensation system in the U.S. is similar to Bismarck's.

U.S. Workers' Compensation Laws History

1908: Federal Employers Liability Act enacted. This gave railroad workers compensation if they proved negligence for their injury.

1911: Wisconsin passes the Wisconsin Workers' Compensation Act, the first state to do so.

1948: Mississippi is the last state to enact a workers' compensation law.

1990: Americans With Disabilities Act passes. This requires all workplaces to be handicap accessible and gives employees with a disability reasonable accommodations.

What Is the Purpose of Workers' Compensation Today?

Although specific laws vary, most states require employers to carry workers' compensation insurance. Without it, an employee who gets hurt or sick from their job wouldn't get benefits to help them recover.

Learn More About Workers' Compensation From The Hartford

There's a lot to know about when it comes to workers' compensation insurance. So, it's important to work with an insurance company you can rely on. We've offered workers' compensation insurance to businesses for over 100 years. Our specialists can help you understand the coverage requirements in your state. Whether you need a quote or help filing a claim, we've got your back. Get a workers' compensation quote today and see how we can help protect your business.

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Workers' Compensation History | History of Workers' Compensation

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Workers' compensation history and laws date back to ancient Greece and Rome. Discover the history of workers' compensation, when the coverage started in the United States and what the purpose of modern-day workers' compensation insurance is. Learn more from The Hartford today.

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Year established: The Federal Trade Commision Act was created September 26th, 1914. It's doors were opened on March 16th, 1915.
What led up to the creation: The Sherman Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act inspired the FTC Act. Woodrow Wilson created the act in order to protect consumers by preventing what it deemed unfair methods of competition between businesses and deceptive business practices.
What is the purpose: The Federal Trade Commission's mission is to protect customers and promote competition.
How it affects businesses:

1.  Facebook had to pay a $5 billion penalty and submit to new restrictions and a modified corporate structure that will hold the company accountable for the decisions it makes about its users’ privacy. They violated a 2021 FTC order by deceiving users about their abilities to control the privacy of their personal information.

2. AT&T will pay $80 million to the FTC to provide refunds to consumers the company unlawfully billed for unauthorization third-party charges; also known as mobile cramming.

3. Google and its subsidiary YouTube will pay $170 million to settle allegations by the FTC and the New York Attorney General that the YouTube video sharing service illegally collected personal information from children without their parents’ consent. It required Google and YouTube to pay $136 million to the FTC and $34 million to New York for allegedly violating the COPPA Rule

How it affects employees: This law doesn't really impact employees. It mainly affects the business and the consumers.
How it affects consumers:

1. When Facebook violated the 2021 FTC order by deceiving users about their privacy on the platform, it affected Facebook’s consumers. The FTC was able to enforce new regulations that protect the consumers.

2. When AT&T illegally billed their consumers, the FTC helped refund everyone affected. The FTC was able to protect consumers from a company trying to take advantage of them.

3. When Google and YouTube were collecting personal information from children without their parent’s consent, the FTC was able to protect the consumers and required those companies to pay a hefty fine.

Revisions: In 1994, the act was amended, it amended the FTC Act to deny authority to the FTC to study, investigate, or prosecute agricultural cooperative for ant action not in violation of antitrust acts, or to study or investigate agricultura; marketing orders.
Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:

1. https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases
proceedings/2010065/richard-d-fairbank-us-v
2. https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1910153/board-dental-examiners-alabama-0
3. https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/202-3179/resident-home-llc-matter
Sources (links):

https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history

https://ballotpedia.org/Federal_Trade_Commission_Act_of_1914

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/what-ftc-does

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/683741/19670719_macintyre_presentation_._university_of_rhode_island.pdf

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement

https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0157-background-checks

https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority

https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/advertising-marketing-internet-rules-road

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/09/ftc-approves-changes-five-fcra-rules

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/10/att-pay-80-million-ftc-consumer-refunds-mobile-cramming-case

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/09/google-youtube-will-pay-record-170-million-alleged-violations

https://www.thenjemploymentlawfirmblog.com/ftc-settles-case-alleging-collusion-among-employers-to-keep-pay-rates-low/

https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/2243

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Richard Fairbank, CEO of Capital One Financial Corp., has agreed to settleFederal Trade Commission charges that his March 8, 2018, acquisition of Capital One Financial (COF) stock violated the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Under a negotiated settlement, Fairbank will pay a $637,950 civil penalty. The complaint alleges that in 2018, Fairbank violated the notice and waiting period requirements of the HSR Act because he did not file before acquiring COF voting securities in excess of the $100 million filing threshold, as adjusted (which at the time was $168.8 million).

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Richard Fairbank, CEO of Capital One Financial Corp., has agreed to settleFederal Trade Commission charges that his March 8, 2018, acquisition of Capital One Financial (COF) stock violated the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Under a negotiated settlement, Fairbank will pay a $637,950 civil penalty.

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Year established: The Family and Medical Leave Act was established in 1993.

What led up to the creation: A family medical leave act was vetoed twice by President Bush. Once Bill Clinton became president, one of his main priorities was to have a law that protects family medical leave.

What is the purpose: The purpose of the Family and Medical Leave Act is designed to help employees balance their work and family responsibilities by allowing them to take a reasonable unpaid leave for certain family and medical reasons.

How it affects businesses: The Family and Medical Leave Act affects businesses on a daily basis as if an employee needs to take time off work for a medical or family issue, the company has to grant them the time off. An example is if an employee was pregnant, then she had the baby, the company has to grant her time off. In the Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms Inc., Maria Escriba took time off to care for her father in Guatemala. She did not tell the company how long she was going to be gone for. She eventually left for sixteen days and when she came back she was fired. The reason for her firing is because she did not tell them when she would return and broke the three days no call rule. The court favored the company as she did break a rule that the company had.

How it affects employees: The Family and Medical Leave Act affects employees on a daily basis as if they need to take time off work for a medical or family issue, then they will be able to take time off. It also affects them if another employee takes time off, then the workload may be more on them because of the lack of people. If someone is a doctor, and one of the doctors is on leave, then that doctor will have to do more work. In Coutard v. Municipal Credit Union, Coutard sued his former employer because he was denied leave to care for his grandfather. Coutard was raised by his grandfather. Coutard took time off anyway and was fired after two days. The court eventually ruled with Coutard as they felt the company should have asked about his relationship with his grandfather and given him the time off.

How it affects consumers: The Family and Medical Leave Act affects consumers as if a company has multiple employees on leave then the production of that company may decline. This will affect the consumer when they are an interested buyer. If a consumer goes to a restaurant and there is a lack of employees because they are on leave, then the consumer’s experience may not be as good.

Revisions: The Family and Medical Leave Act has been changed. A revision that was made was that a private-sector employer with fewer than 500 employees, must provide up to 12 weeks of job protected leave. Many companies were abusing the act and not letting employees have enough time off.

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
1. https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2014/02/25/11-17608.pdf
2. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/ohio/ohndce/3:2011cv02549/183062/34/
3.
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1776964.html

Sources (links):
1.

Jim Paretti, Michael Lotito. “Congress Makes Significant Changes to Proposed FMLA and Sick Leave Requirements in Covid-19 Bill.” Littler Mendelson P.C., 9 Apr. 2020, https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/congress-makes-significant-changes-proposed-fmla-and-sick-leave.
2.
“Family and Medical Leave Act.” United States Department of Labor, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fmla.
3.

“4 FMLA Rulings That Changed Everything.” Presagia, https://www.presagia.com/blog/4-fmla-rulings-that-changed-everything.
4.
Recent Case Law Gives Insight on Employer “Rights” and “Responsibilities” Under the FMLA, and Recent Case Law Gives Insight on Employer “Rights” and “Responsibilities” Under the FMLA. “Recent Case Law Gives Insight on Employer ‘Rights’ and ‘Responsibilities’ under the FMLA.” Franklin & Prokopik, P.C., 24 Apr. 2018, https://www.fandpnet.com/insight/recent-case-law-gives-insight-on-employer-rights-and-responsibilities-under-the-fmla/.

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Year established: 1938

What led up to the creation:  to eliminate “labor standards detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers,” and people were being taken advantage of and not being paid what they should for the work they were doing

What is the purpose: t was enacted to improve working conditions in the United States and give people fair wages and also make sure people are not being overworked and get the amount they deserve and it also affects small businesses . this act was very needed and it is a very good thing which affects workers all over the united states

How it affects businesses: t can give them a better reputation for how their working condition is for their employees. It affects how much they can pay their employees which is pretty obvious which also affects how much money they use. It's pretty hard to find examples for this one since it mainly is just about how much they pay their employees

How it affects employees: affects how much people get paid and just the general work conditions are a lot better today because of this act provides an exemption from both minimum wage and overtime pay for employees employed. And it also affects how long the youth can work for(youth is under 16). It's so they don't get overworked and get fair pay, once you are 16 or above there is no limit on how many hours you can work

How it affects consumers: It doesn't really affect consumers besides the fact that if the business has a good working condition the quality of your stuff will be better because everything in the work environment is good Product cost may differ from how much employees are getting paid which affect the consumers

Revisions: The FLSA initially established a 25-cent hourly minimum wage (now $7.25) and a 44-hour workweek (which was later reduced to 40 hours) but besides this there have not been many revisions, FLSA has been doing its job pretty well

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
1.https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/03-1238

2.https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1362

3.https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-417

Sources (links):https://www.nelp.org/commentary/fair-labor-standards-act-at-80-its-more-important-than-ever/#:~:text=more%20than%20ever.-,Congress%20enacted%20the%20FLSA%20to%20eliminate%20%E2%80%9Clabor%20standards%20detrimental%20to,method%20of%20competition%E2%80%9D%20against%20reputable

https://smallbusiness.chron.com/benefits-fair-labor-standards-act-2957.html#:~:text=The%20Fair%20Labor%20Standards%20Act%20benefits%20workers%20by%20regulating%20employment,possible%20civil%20or%20criminal%20violations

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa#:~:text=The%20Fair%20Labor%20Standards%20Act%20(FLSA)%20establishes%20minimum%20wage%2C,%2C%20State%2C%20and%20local%20governments.&text=Many%20states%20also%20have%20minimum%20wage%20laws

https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/flsa-after-80-years.aspx

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/posters/flsa

https://www.peoplekeep.com/blog/how-does-the-flsa-affect-small-business#:~:text=The%20FLSA%20provides%20an%20exemption,professional%20and%20outside%20sales%20employee.&text=Although%20the%20federal%20law%20doesn,state%20laws%20may%20require%20it

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A multimedia judicial archive of the Supreme Court of the United States.

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Fair Packaging and Labeling Act- Ariana Awan

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Fair Packaging and Labeling Act- Ariana Awan

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Year Established:
1967

What led up to the creation:
President Johnson was creating new acts and laws to improve the statuses of all Americans as the Vietnam War waged on.

What is the purpose:
To give consumers the amount of information needed to make the best decision for themselves as they compared the same product from different brands. The gov did this to create HEALTHY competition.

How it affects businesses:
Packaging and ingredient labels cannot be untruthful or misleading. For example if something has tree nuts in it it must explicitly state it does. JONES v. RATH PACKING CO.(1977)- The weight of the product was incorrect JOSEPH W JONES v. GENERAL MILLS: Flour was being sold with the weight not matching up to the packaging BIMONT v. UNILEVER- Deodorant weight was incorrect on the packaging and misleading.

How it affects employees:
Employees need to make packaging that is not misleading and even add labels such as, “enlarged to show texture” to make sure consumers are aware of what's in the package. They also need to be aware when packaging things that they are not mistakenly putting things that cannot be in the package in the package.

How it affects consumers:
Consumers are now more aware of what's in their products and are able to make better decisions for themselves and their families.

Revisions:
None.

Three links to court cases:

1.
https://openjurist.org/530/f2d/1317/general-mills-inc-v-w-jones-general-mills-inc

2.
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8846774/Wall.html?sequence=2

3.
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914f414add7b049349847da

Sources:

https://www.complianceonline.com/fair-packaging-and-labeling-act-fpla-background-summary-of-provisions-and-recent-amendments-12390-prdad#:~:text=The%20FPLA%20was%20enacted%20to,packaging%20of%20household%20consumer%20commodities.

https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3530&context=vlr

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Year established: 1914

What led up to the creation:

The Clayton Antitrust Act was created to address the weaknesses in the Sherman Antitrust Act by expanding the list of prohibited business practices that would prevent a level playing field for all businesses. Woodrow Wilson signed the Clayton Anti-trust act into law in 1914  to strengthen the Sherman anti-trust act.

What is the purpose:

The purpose of the Clayton antitrust act is to prevent unfair methods of competition. It was created to change some of the downsides of the Sherman Antitrust act. Aside from banning the practices of price discrimination and anti-competitive mergers, the new law also declared strikes, boycotts, and labor unions legal under federal law. The Clayton Anti-trust act works against creating a monopoly which is a single company that controls an entire industry.

How it affects businesses:

The Clayton Anti-Trust act affects businesses in many different ways such as anti-competitive mergers, predatory and discriminatory pricing, and other forms of unethical corporate behavior. Antitrust laws are often used by businesses to prevent monopolies from having a negative impact on consumers, such as fixed prices, a lack of product selection, and corporations collaborating to raise prices in specific areas.

How it affects employees:

The Clayton Anti-trust act prohibits employees from creating unfair competition found in the work area.

Employees are also allowed to conduct strikes, boycotts, and labor unions legally under federal law.

How it affects consumers:

The Clayton Antitrust act is very beneficial to consumers. For consumers, there is more access to different brands and companies to choose from. The availability to choose from different products and manufacturers is very important in the consumer mindset as they are not forced to gravitate toward a particular brand. For example, T-Mobile wanted to purchase Verizon after purchasing sprint, but the government did not allow it as it would be unfair competition. There need to be many brands that the consumer would go for or else it would be a monopoly.

Revisions:

The Clayton antitrust act has been revised. Two portions of the Clayton antitrust act were revised to strengthen its requirements by the Robinson-Patman Act and the Celler-Kefauver Act. The Robinson-Patman amendment strengthened Section 2, which addresses pricing and other types of customer discrimination. The Celler-Kefauver Act strengthened Section 7, which prohibits one firm from securing either the stocks or the physical assets of another firm when the acquisition would reduce competition.

The revision was needed because there were many loopholes found within the act. There needed to be revisions made to strengthen the act so that companies could not find a way to conduct their illegal activities.

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:

1. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/347/514/

2. https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/380/592.html

3. https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2011/11/jim-chen-att-antitrust/

Sources (links):

1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clayton-
antitrust-act.asp

2.https://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/15032424979

3. https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws

4. https://www.businessinsider.com/clayton-antitrust-act

5.  https://www.britannica.com/event/Clayton-Antitrust-Act

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Occupational Safety and Health Administration  By Anthony Talvy

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Occupational Safety and Health Administration  By Anthony Talvy

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Year established:Established on december 29th,1970

What led up to the creation:Economic expansion led to rising injury rates and the resulting political pressures led congress and helped them establish occupational safety and health administration.OSHA was created because of public outcry against rising injury and death rates on the job. Through the years the agency has focused its resources where they can have the greatest impact in reducing injuries, illnesses, and deaths in the workplace.

What is the purpose:To ensure safe and healthful working conditions for workers by setting and enforcing standards by providing training ,education,etc

How it affects businesses:Prevalent injuries,illnesses,improves compliances with laws,reduce cost etc.Makes businesses keep responsibility to keep the work environment and for workers and customers.

How it affects employees:Affect employees by keeping them safe in the workplace,manageing the work enviroment,and keeping a safe workable enviroment

How it affects consumers:Allows for the customer to be ensured that the product or item is safe and is safe to consume or have.Has to make sure the working environment is safe for customers

Revisions:  the policy has been revised.workplace fatalities have been cut by 60 percent, and occupational injury and illness rates, by 40 percent. At the same time, U.S. employment has nearly doubled from 56 million workers at 3.5 million worksites to 105 million workers at nearly 6.9 million sites.

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
1.https://www.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-1429
2.https://www.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-927
3.https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1634

Sources (links):.https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha/30-years

https://www.osha.gov/safety-management

https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-occupational-safety-and-health-act

“Department of Labor Logo United Statesdepartment of Labor.” OSHA's 30th Anniversary | Occupational Safety and Health Administration, https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha/30-years.

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US Supreme Court cases: Occupational Safety and Health Act

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Year established:
The CAN-SPAM Act was established in 2003 to address the issue of people getting unsolicited emails.

What led up to the creation:
The CAN-SPAM Act was created after a surge in online activities. Many of these activities included unsolicited chain emails and other scams sent to consumers.

What is the purpose:
The CAN-SPAM Act was created to control and regulate the number of unwanted advertisements and products sent to someone.

How it affects businesses:
It controls what they can send to potential consumers that haven't agreed to being sent things.

How it affects employees:
If employees that arent educated about the CAN-SPAM Act are asked by their employer to send out Ads from their personal Email, they could be fined up to 16,000$

How it affects consumers:
It protects them from getting unsolicited advertisements or explicit content.

Revisions:
The CAN-SPAM Act has not been revised due to it being introduced not too long ago

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
Gordon V. Virtumundo
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1117633.html

There are no other cases on file when I look them up.

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United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.

James S. GORDON, Jr., an individual doing business as gordonworks.com, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VIRTUMUNDO, INC., a Delaware corporation;  Adknowledge, Inc., a Delaware corporation;  and Scott Lynn, an individual, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 07-35487.

Decided: August 06, 2009
Before RONALD M. GOULD, RICHARD C. TALLMAN, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. Timothy J. Walton, Walton & Rose, LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for plaintiff-appellant James S. Gordon, Jr. Derek Newman (argued), Randall Moeller, Newman & Newman, Attorneys at Law, LLP, Seattle, WA, and Michael R. Geroe, General Counsel, Adknowledge, Inc., Santa Monica, CA, for defendants-appellees, Virtumundo, Inc., Adknowledge, Inc., and Scott Lynn. Shannon E. Smith, Deputy Attorney General, Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General of Washington, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae State of Washington. Jason K. Singleton, Richard E. Grabowski, Singleton Law Group, Eureka, CA, for Amicus Curiae ASIS Internet Services, Joel Householter, and Ritchie Phillips.
This case addresses unsolicited commercial e-mail, more commonly referred to as "spam."   While ignored by most and reviled by some, spam is largely considered a nuisance and a source of frustration to e-mail users who, at times, must wade through inboxes clogged with messages peddling assorted, and often unwanted, products and services.   The rising tide of spam poses an even greater problem to businesses, institutions, and other entities through network slowdowns, server crashes, and increased costs.   At the same time, commercial enterprise has staked its claim within the online world.   The Internet is a unique medium that offers legitimate businesses a low-cost means to promote themselves and their wares and in turn fosters competition in the marketplace.   Both consumers and Congress have come to view e-mail, when fairly employed, as an established and worthwhile device in the toolbox of accepted marketing practices.

After individual states initially wrestled with properly balancing the benefits and burdens of commercial e-mail, Congress enacted legislation in an effort to curb the negative consequences of spam and spamming practices without stifling legitimate commerce.   Through this opinion we review the federal statutory scheme of the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing ("CAN-SPAM") Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq., and assume the formidable task of determining the statutory standing requirements and the scope of federal preemption intended by Congress.

In the case before us, James S. Gordon, Jr. and his company, Omni Innovations, LLC ("Omni"), sued Virtumundo, Inc., Adknowledge, Inc., and Scott Lynn, the sole shareholder of both companies, seeking injunctive relief and significant damages based on the receipt of thousands of commercial e-mails.   Defendants are in the online marketing business and widely transmit e-mail advertisements and solicitations to potential consumers on behalf of third-party clients.   In the parlance of our time, they are "spammers."

Based on a dense record developed through substantial discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Virtumundo, Adknowledge, and Lynn (collectively, "Virtumundo") on all of Gordon's claims.   We have jurisdiction over Gordon's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   Having carefully and independently evaluated the issues in light of the evidence, we agree that summary judgment was proper and therefore affirm.

I

Gordon is the original registrant of the Internet domain "gordonworks.com," which he hosts on server space that Omni leases from GoDaddy, a domain registrar and web hosting company that also sells e-business related software and services, see http://​www.​godaddy.​com. The GoDaddy service allows users to virtually access the server through an ordinary Internet connection-in Gordon's case, a broadband connection from Verizon.   Through a virtual desktop called a "Plesk," Gordon is able to manage his domain.   He can post content on the Internet, create new e-mail accounts, and set user names and log-on passwords.   There are, of course, substantial restrictions regarding Gordon's usage of the leased server space.

It was through this vehicle that Gordon created a personal e-mail address:  "jim@​gordonworks.​com." Around September 2003, Gordon created additional e-mail accounts through the gordonworks.com domain for about six friends and family members, which he monitored for "data collection" and "research purposes."   Gordon registered jim@​gordonworks.​com and the gordonworks.com e-mail addresses of his "clients" in response to various online promotions and for numerous prize giveaways.   Gordon estimates that, in doing so, he subscribed, or "opted in," to e-mail mailing lists somewhere between 100 and 150 times.

Soon thereafter, these accounts began receiving e-mails from businesses marketing their goods and services.   Some of these messages were transmitted by online marketers, such as Virtumundo, on behalf of their clients.   At his instruction, Gordon's "clients" relinquished control of their e-mail accounts.   They then set up their own domains through GoDaddy, which they housed on the server space leased by Omni. This enabled these individuals to create their own e-mail addresses "@" personalized domain names-e.g., "anthonycentral.com," "jaykaysplace.com," and "chiefmusician.net"-rather than gordonworks.com.

Gordon continued to maintain and monitor the abandoned gordonworks.com e-mail accounts.   He described his ongoing efforts as "do[ing] research on the spam that comes through."   At some later point, Gordon configured the e-mail server to provide an automated response to all commercial e-mail sent to gordonworks.com accounts.   The response was titled "Notice of Offer to Receive Unsolicited Commercial Email (SPAM)" and purported to consummate a "binding contract" by which the sender agreed to either cease and desist or pay Gordon $500 for each additional unsolicited e-mail subsequently delivered to the account.   While he claims that online marketers, including Virtumundo, ignored his requests that all gordonworks.com e-mail addresses be removed from their mailing lists, Gordon does not provide evidence, apart from a general "belief," that he followed the "opt-out" procedure stated in the individual e-mail messages.   Not surprisingly, the e-mail accounts continued to receive spam, which over time accumulated in the unused inboxes.   At the time of his deposition in January 2007, these gordonworks.com e-mail accounts remained active.   However, the only persons who actually used a gordonworks.com account were Gordon and his wife.

In 2004, Gordon began filing lawsuits in state and federal court against persons and companies who sent solicitations or advertisements to e-mail accounts hosted on Omni's leased server space.   In February 2006, Gordon filed this lawsuit against Virtumundo in the Western District of Washington.   He asserted various causes of action for violations of the CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq., the Washington Commercial Electronic Mail Act ("CEMA"), Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.010 et seq., the Washington Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"), Wash. Rev.Code § 19.86.010 et seq., and the Washington "Prize Statute," Wash. Rev.Code § 19.170.010 et seq.   As relevant to this appeal, Gordon contends that Virtumundo sent, according to his most recent estimate, approximately 13,800 materially misleading or otherwise unlawful commercial e-mail messages to e-mail accounts hosted through gordonworks.com. Gordon sought injunctive relief, several millions of dollars in statutory and treble damages, and his attorney's fees and costs.

In December 2006, the Honorable John C. Coughenour granted in part and denied in part Virtumundo's motion to dismiss for pleading deficiencies.   The order dismissed Gordon's Prize Statute claims, in their entirety, and his CEMA and CPA claims to the extent they related to the gathering of "personally identifying information."  Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.080. The court gave leave to amend the complaint to cure pleading deficiencies, but Gordon never did so.

Virtumundo then moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims, which consisted of Gordon's CAN-SPAM Act claims and the surviving CEMA and CPA claims.   By Order dated May 15, 2007, the district court granted the defense motion, see Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., No. 06-0204, 2007 WL 1459395 (W.D.Wash. May 15, 2007).   Judge Coughenour concluded that both Gordon and Omni lacked standing to pursue a private action under the CAN-SPAM Act and that the state law claims failed as a matter of law based in part on federal preemption grounds.

Gordon alone now appeals this grant of summary judgment.

II

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, and may affirm on any basis supported by the record.  Burrell v. McIlroy, 464 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir.2006).   Our review is governed by the same standard used by the trial court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.  Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir.1999).  "Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law."  Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

A determination of standing is a question of law that we review de novo, see Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 542 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir.2008), as is a finding of federal preemption, see Indus. Truck Ass'n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir.1997).

III

A

We first turn to Gordon's CAN-SPAM Act claims.   The CAN-SPAM Act became effective on January 1, 2004, and was enacted in response to mounting concerns associated with the rapid growth of spam e-mails.   Congress determined:

(1) there is a substantial governmental interest in regulation of commercial electronic mail on a nationwide basis;

(2) senders of commercial electronic mail should not mislead recipients as to the source or content of such mail;  and

(3) recipients of commercial electronic mail have a right to decline to receive additional commercial electronic mail from the same source.

15 U.S.C. § 7701(b).  The Act does not ban spam outright, but rather provides a code of conduct to regulate commercial e-mail messaging practices.   Stated in general terms, the CAN-SPAM Act prohibits such practices as transmitting messages with "deceptive subject headings" or "header information that is materially false or materially misleading."   See 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1), (2).   The Act also imposes requirements regarding content, format, and labeling.   For instance, unsolicited e-mail messages must include the sender's physical postal address, indicate they are advertisements or solicitations, and notify recipients of their ability to decline further mailings.  15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(5).   Moreover, in order to comply with the Act, each message must have either a functioning return e-mail address or a comparable mechanism that allows a recipient to "opt out" of future mailings.   15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(3).

The CAN-SPAM Act's enforcement provision empowers the Federal Trade Commission, state attorneys general, and other state and federal agencies to pursue legal actions to enforce the Act's provisions.  15 U.S.C. § 7706(a), (b), (f).  Congress also provided a limited private right of action, which states:  A "provider of Internet access service adversely affected by a violation of" § 7704(a)(1), (b), or (d), or "a pattern or practice that violates" § 7704(a)(2) through (5) of the Act "may bring a civil action in any district court" to enjoin further violation by a defendant or to recover either actual or statutory damages, whichever is greater.  15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(1).   Statutory damages under the CAN-SPAM Act are substantial and can equal as much as $300 per unlawful e-mail.  15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3).   The Act also authorizes an award of attorneys' fees and costs against any party at the district court's discretion.  15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(4).

Therefore, in any private action claiming CAN-SPAM Act violations, a threshold issue is whether the plaintiff satisfies the statutory standing requirements.   On its motion for summary judgment, Virtumundo challenged Gordon's and Omni's ability to pursue a private action under § 7706(g)(1).   The district court conducted a thorough analysis of the existing case law, the CAN-SPAM Act itself, and the legislative history.   Based upon the well-developed facts of the summary judgment record, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated adequate harm-i.e., an "adverse effect," as the district court called it-and therefore lacked standing with respect to these federal claims.  Gordon, 2007 WL 1459395, at *8.

We agree that Gordon lacks standing to bring a private action under the CAN-SPAM Act. We commend the district court's pioneering analysis in this uncharted territory, and reach a similar conclusion based on our assessment of the CAN-SPAM Act's statutory standing requirement and the appellate record.

B

As recognized by several courts, the case law regarding the relevant legal standards under the CAN-SPAM Act is "scant," ASIS Internet Servs. v. Optin Global, Inc., No. 05-05124, 2008 WL 1902217, at *15 (N.D.Cal. Apr.29, 2008), and few courts have construed the standing provision, ASIS Internet Servs. v. Active Response Group, No. 07-6211, 2008 WL 2952809, at *2 (N.D.Cal. July 30, 2008).   Neither we nor any of our sister circuits have comprehensively addressed this issue.   We endeavor to do so here, at least in part.

1

We begin by acknowledging that the CAN-SPAM standing inquiry involves two general components:  (1) whether the plaintiff is an "Internet access service" provider ("IAS provider"), and (2) whether the plaintiff was "adversely affected by" statutory violations.   See, e.g., Brosnan v. Alki Mortgage, LLC, No. 07-4339, 2008 WL 413732, at *1-*2 (N.D.Cal. Feb.13, 2008).   Beyond that, however, the statutory standing provision read as a whole is ambiguous-a point upon which all parties agree.   We therefore employ familiar techniques of statutory construction to evaluate Congress's intent with regard to both components and their relation to one another.

While over time courts have developed various canons to assist with statutory interpretation, this "is an area in which absolutist rules do not [always] lead to sensible or accurate results."  Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9th Cir.1992).  "[I]t is," after all, "the duty of a court in construing a law to consider the circumstances under which it was passed and the object to be accomplished by it."  United States v. Curtis-Nev. Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1280 n. 1 (9th Cir.1980) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 76 U.S. 56, 65-66, 19 L.Ed. 615 (1869));  accord Callejas v. McMahon, 750 F.2d 729, 731 (9th Cir.1984).   Therefore, especially in this highly technical and evolving field, "[c]ommon sense not dogma is what is needed in order to explore the actual meaning of legislative enactments."  Mt. Graham Red Squirrel, 954 F.2d at 1453.

There are a few points that heavily influence our analysis, which we identify at the outset.   First, despite what Gordon and likeminded anti-spam enthusiasts might contend, the purpose of the CAN-SPAM Act was not to stamp spam out of existence.   While Gordon is likely not alone in his deep-seated hostility toward spam and those who profit from it, there are beneficial aspects to commercial e-mail, even bulk messaging, that Congress wanted to preserve, if not promote.   Indeed, the Act recognizes e-mail's value as a worthwhile commercial tool:

Electronic mail has become an extremely important and popular means of communication, relied on by millions of Americans on a daily basis for personal and commercial purposes.   Its low cost and global reach make it extremely convenient and efficient, and offer unique opportunities for the development and growth of frictionless commerce.

15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1);  see also S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 2 (2003), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349 ("Unlike direct mail delivered through the post office to consumers, [e-mail] can reach millions of individuals at little to no cost and almost instantaneously.").   The tailored regulations, which target deceptive and predatory practices and attempt to alleviate the negative effects of spam without unduly stifling lawful enterprise, embody the fine balance struck by Congress.

Second, Congress conferred standing only on a narrow group of possible plaintiffs:  the Federal Trade Commission, certain state and federal agencies, state attorneys general, and IAS providers adversely affected by violations of the CAN-SPAM Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 7706(a), (b), (f), (g).  The decision to restrict the right of action does not reflect an indifference or insensitivity to the effects of spam on consumers.   The contrary is true.   The CAN-SPAM Act's express findings and legislative history are littered with references to the burdens shouldered by individuals, businesses, and other institutions.   The Act itself recognizes the "costs to recipients ․ for the storage of [unsolicited commercial e-mail], or for the time spent accessing, reviewing, and discarding such mail, or both."  15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3).   We surmise that Congress's intent was to limit enforcement actions to those best suited to detect, investigate, and, if appropriate, prosecute violations of the CAN-SPAM Act-those well-equipped to efficiently and effectively pursue legal actions against persons engaged in unlawful practices and enforce federal law for the benefit of all consumers.

Third, our review of the congressional record reveals a legitimate concern that the private right of action be circumscribed and confined to a narrow group of private plaintiffs:  "[Section 7706](g) provides for a limited right of action by bona fide Internet service providers."  150 Cong. Rec. E72-02 (Jan. 28, 2004) (remarks of Rep. Dingell) (emphasis added);  accord id. at E73-01 (remarks of Rep. Tauzin).   It is perhaps a sad reality that Congress must specify a bona fide IAS provider, as possibly distinct from a non-genuine IAS provider.   But this demonstrates to us that lawmakers were wary of the possibility, if not the likelihood, that the siren song of substantial statutory damages would entice opportunistic plaintiffs to join the fray, which would lead to undesirable results.   While Congress did not intend that standing be limited to fee-for-service operations, we think it did intend to exclude plaintiffs who, despite certain identifying characteristics, did not provide the actual, bona fide service of a legitimate operation.   See 150 Cong. Rec. E72-02 ("[W]e intend that Internet access service providers provide actual Internet access service to customers.").   We believe that Congress's clear intention to restrict private action remains of great importance and guides the proper standing analysis.

Fourth and finally, we must factor into the calculus the unique nature of the subject matter at issue.   Especially in this arena, the engine of innovation moves far more quickly and nimbly than the methodical pace of legislation.   That is readily apparent here.   In the few years since the CAN-SPAM Act became effective, the uses of the Internet and the prevalence and variety of available online services have multiplied exponentially.   The marketplace has developed a panoply of related products and services not available when Congress authored the federal legislation.   Significantly, no longer are typical Internet users primarily limited to accessing e-mail accounts and searching for content or information.   With the rise of social networking sites, blogs, and other user-driven websites, the ability to post content on the Internet or to create forums for others to do so is no longer a privilege reserved for the technologically savvy or the financially elite.   The rate of development will only accelerate.   As this inevitably occurs and the gateway to the online world further widens for the masses, courts should be mindful that the lines Congress intended to draw when drafting the statutory text might lose clarity.

With these principles in mind, we apply a standing analysis that encapsulates Congress's will when it provided a limited private right of action.

2

We first address whether Gordon is a "provider of Internet access service" who, if adversely affected by a statutory violation, has private standing to bring CAN-SPAM Act claims.   The CAN-SPAM Act defines "Internet access service" by reference to the Communications Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 7702(11), which provides:

The term "Internet access service" means a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of services offered to consumers.   Such term does not include telecommunications services.

47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(4).   We have not previously spoken "as to who is an 'Internet access service' provider" within the meaning of the CAN-SPAM Act, see Ferguson v. Quinstreet, Inc., No. 07-5378, 2008 WL 3166307, at *5 (W.D.Wash. Aug.5, 2008), and note the ambiguity of this statutory definition.

District courts in our circuit have interpreted the definition of "Internet access service" broadly to encompass a wide range of services, and not merely traditional Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")-i.e., the service that connects customers to the Internet itself.   See Hypertouch, Inc. v. Kennedy-Western Univ., No. 04-05203, 2006 WL 648688, at *3 (N.D.Cal. March 8, 2006) (stating that "a provider of e-mail service alone, without any other services, qualifies" as an IAS provider under the CAN-SPAM Act).   For instance, one such court reasoned that, although the definition "appears primarily to contemplate services that provide consumers their initial connection point to the Internet, the language is broad enough to encompass entities such as Facebook," a popular social networking site, "that provide further access to content and communications between users for persons who may initially access the Internet through a conventional [ISP]." Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU LLC, 489 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1094 (N.D.Cal.2007);  see also MySpace, Inc. v. The Globe.com, Inc., No. 06-3391, 2007 WL 1686966, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Feb.27, 2007) (holding that MySpace had standing under the CAN-SPAM Act and interpreting the definition of "Internet access service" broadly to "include[ ] traditional [ISPs], any email provider, and even most website owners").   Gordon claims IAS-provider status, asserting that through the gordonworks.com domain and the leased server space he enables users to access Internet content and e-mail.   On a superficial level, this proposition is hard to dispute.   In the most general terms, a "service that enables users to access" online content or e-mail could encompass the proprietor of an Internet coffee shop or, as one district court suggested, "any person who allows another person to use their computer to access the Internet," Ferguson, 2008 WL 3166307, at *5. Indeed, at some level, common utility services play a role in enabling users to access Internet content.   Without question, this was not what Congress intended when it was defining the private right of action.

While we agree that statutory standing is not limited to traditional ISPs, we reject any overly broad interpretation of "Internet access service" that ignores congressional intent.   Contrary to Gordon's suggestion, providing e-mail accounts cannot alone be sufficient.   Many employers and institutions, for example, provide their employees or members with e-mail accounts and service-including our court.   The findings codified in the statute note Congress's concern pertaining to the growth of unsolicited commercial e-mail and its imposition of "monetary costs on providers of Internet access services," which have standing to sue, as well as on "businesses, and educational and nonprofit institutions that carry and receive such mail."   15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(6).   Clearly, Congress viewed IAS providers as distinct from entities that merely "carry [or] receive such mail."   Standing under the CAN-SPAM Act requires more.   See, e.g., White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 373 (5th Cir.2005) ("[W]e are hard-pressed to find that providing email accounts and email access does not bring [the University of Texas] within the statutory definition ․" (emphasis added)).   There may well be a technical or hardware component implicit in the definition.   But, we find the parties' briefing on the topic inadequate to reach an informed decision here.   Because it is not necessary to our holding, we decline this opportunity to set forth a general test or define the outer bounds of what it means to be a provider of "Internet access service."

Nevertheless, we conclude that Gordon does not fit any reasonable definition of "Internet access service" provider.   Gordon is a registrant of a domain name, which he, through Omni, hosts on leased server space.   He neither has physical control over nor access to the hardware, which GoDaddy owns, houses, maintains, and configures.   From our review of the record, Gordon's service appears to be limited to using his "Plesk" control panel, which he accesses via an ordinary Internet connection through an ISP, to set up e-mail accounts and log-in passwords and to execute other administrative tasks.   Verizon enables his online access.   GoDaddy provides the service that enables ordinary consumers to create e-mail accounts, register domain names, and build personalized web pages.   Gordon has simply utilized that service for himself and on behalf of others.   It matters not that he entered the keystrokes or clicked the mouse.   Nor is it relevant that he created gordonworks.com e-mail addresses for family and friends, and not merely himself.   While Verizon and GoDaddy might have a compelling argument that they are IAS providers within the meaning of the CAN-SPAM Act, Gordon's claim that he holds such elite status is unconvincing.

In addition to his nominal role in providing Internet-related services, we are also troubled by the extent to which Gordon fails to operate as a bona fide e-mail provider.   As discussed in greater detail below, Gordon has purposefully avoided taking even minimal efforts to avoid or block spam messages.   Instead, Gordon devotes his resources to adding his "clients' " e-mail addresses to mailing lists and accumulating spam through a variety of means for the purpose of facilitating litigation.

Gordon's arguments of technical compliance with this standing component, without any regard for the overarching congressional purpose, are not compelling.   The record here is sufficiently developed.   We hold that Gordon is not an "Internet access service" provider within the meaning of the CAN-SPAM Act.

3

We next turn to the "adversely affected by" component of the CAN-SPAM Act's standing inquiry.   Gordon has undoubtedly encountered a large volume of commercial e-mail.   This, however, is not enough to establish statutory standing.   In order to pursue a private right of action, an IAS provider must demonstrate that it has been "adversely affected by a violation of ․ or a pattern or practice that violates" the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(1) (emphasis added).   As with other issues on this appeal, we find little guidance in existing case law as to the meaning of the nebulous text.

a

The CAN-SPAM Act itself does not delineate the types of harm suggested by the "adversely affected by" language.   The district court, acknowledging this ambiguity, confronted the question by reference to traditional methods of statutory interpretation and ultimately concluded that the harm "must be both real and of the type uniquely experienced by IASs for standing to exist."   Gordon, 2007 WL 1459395, at *7 (emphasis added).  To our knowledge, all courts that have addressed the issue have similarly concluded that the type of harm envisioned by Congress did not encompass the ordinary inconveniences experienced by consumers and end users.   See Active Response, 2008 WL 2952809, at *5. We have considered the statutory text and the legislative record, and we agree.

It is notable that Congress conferred standing only on adversely affected IAS providers, but not adversely affected consumers.   Logically, the harms redressable under the CAN-SPAM Act must parallel the limited private right of action and therefore should reflect those types of harms uniquely encountered by IAS providers.   The Committee Report identified the cost of "investing in new equipment to increase capacity and customer service personnel to deal with increased subscriber complaints ․ [and] maintaining e-mail filtering systems and other anti-spam technology on their networks to reduce the deluge of spam" as undesirable consequences facing the typical ISP. S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 6. "All courts that have construed the statute" have similarly defined the harms upon which standing may be predicated to include "network crashes, higher bandwidth utilization, and increased costs for hardware and software upgrades, network expansion and additional personnel."   Active Response, 2008 WL 2952809, at *5. We conclude that these sorts of ISP-type harms are what Congress had in mind.

We do not purport to enumerate each and every harm that might satisfy the CAN-SPAM Act's standing provision.   Nor do we suggest that the list is finite.   At minimum, however, the harm must be both real and of the type experienced by ISPs. While the harm need not be significant in the sense that it is grave or serious, the harm must be of significance to a bona fide IAS provider-something beyond the mere annoyance of spam and greater than the negligible burdens typically borne by an IAS provider in the ordinary course of business.   In most cases, evidence of some combination of operational or technical impairments and related financial costs attributable to unwanted commercial e-mail would suffice.   See Hypertouch, 2006 WL 648688, at *4 (finding evidence of "decreased server response and crashes," "higher bandwidth utilization," and "expensive hardware and software upgrades" sufficient harm for statutory standing).

Courts must of course be careful to distinguish the ordinary costs and burdens associated with operating an Internet access service from actual harm.   We expect a legitimate service provider to secure adequate bandwidth and storage capacity and take reasonable precautions, such as implementing spam filters, as part of its normal operations.   Courts should take an especially hard look at the cited harm if it suspects at the outset that a plaintiff is not operating a bona fide Internet access service, as is the case here.

Defining the type of harm required for CAN-SPAM Act standing is, however, only one part of the equation.  Section 7706(g)(1) also inquires whether the contemplated harm is attributable to the type of practices circumscribed by the Act-i.e., whether an IAS provider was adversely affected by misconduct.   After all, network slowdowns, server crashes, increased bandwidth usage, and hardware and software upgrades bear no inherent relationship to spam or spamming practices.   On the contrary, we expect these issues to arise as a matter of course and for legitimate reasons as technology, online media, and Internet services continue to advance and develop.   Therefore, evidence of what could be routine business concerns and operating costs is not alone sufficient to unlock the treasure trove of the CAN-SPAM Act's statutory damages.

To give the statutory text meaning there must be, at bare minimum, a demonstrated relationship between purported harms and the type of e-mail practices regulated by the Act-i.e., a showing that the identified concerns are linked in some meaningful way to unwanted spam and, in turn, represent actual harm.   The e-mails at issue in a particular case must, at the very least, contribute to a larger, collective spam problem that caused ISP-type harms.

We note, in passing, that the threshold of standing should not pose a high bar for the legitimate service operations contemplated by Congress.   In some civil actions-where, for example, well-recognized ISPs or plainly legitimate Internet access service providers file suit-adequate harm might be presumed because any reasonable person would agree that such entities dedicate considerable resources to and incur significant financial costs in dealing with spam.   See S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 2-3 (recounting reports by America Online, Microsoft, and Earthlink regarding the effects of increasing volumes of spam).   Where, by comparison, a private plaintiff's status as an IAS provider is questionable and reasonably contested, courts should not only inquire into the plaintiff's purported Internet-related service operations but also closely examine the alleged harms attributable to spam.   We have confidence in our district courts to review the individual characteristics of the plaintiffs on a case-by-case basis and make a reasoned decision whether a purported IAS provider is truly the type of bona fide IAS provider adversely affected by commercial e-mail messaging that Congress envisioned when it enacted the CAN-SPAM Act.

b

In opposition to Virtumundo's summary judgment motion, Gordon argued that he had been adversely affected by spam because he and his "clients" had been "forced to wade through thousands of e-mails sent by" Virtumundo that "clogged" his service.   Applying the proper interpretation of the CAN-SPAM Act's standing provision, we conclude that Gordon also fails the "adversely affected by" component.   It is readily apparent that Gordon, an individual who seeks out spam for the very purpose of filing lawsuits, is not the type of private plaintiff that Congress had in mind when it fashioned § 7706(g)(1)'s standing provision.   While many anti-spam enthusiasts may applaud his zealous counter-attack against alleged spammers, Gordon's passion for the cause does not displace the will of Congress in drafting a narrow private right of federal action.

Gordon has failed to argue, let alone come forth with evidence, that, even if he was an IAS provider, he has suffered any real harm contemplated by the CAN-SPAM Act. He has not hired additional personnel, nor has he experienced technical concerns or incurred costs that can be necessarily attributed to commercial e-mail.   It is also compelling that Gordon purposefully refuses to implement spam filters in a typical manner or otherwise make any attempt to block allegedly unwanted spam or exclude such messages from users' e-mail inboxes.   In fact, Gordon acknowledges that he was able to "blacklist" domain names at the server level, so that the GoDaddy server would reject e-mails from online marketers such as Virtumundo. Still, even without taking even basic precautions, he has not "come close" to using the 500 gigabytes of bandwidth available to him through GoDaddy.   He has presented nothing beyond the negligible burdens typically experienced by bona fide IAS providers.   As the district court concluded, Gordon has "suffered no harm related to bandwidth, hardware, Internet connectivity, network integrity, overhead costs, fees, staffing, or equipment costs."  Gordon, 2007 WL 1459395, at *8. Indeed, given his heavy dependence on the services and hardware of third parties, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to incur many of these harms.

Gordon's claimed harms almost exclusively relate to litigation preparation, not to the operation of a bona fide service.   Gordon made no real effort to avoid, block, or delete commercial e-mail, but instead has voluntarily assumed the role of a spam sleuth.   He expends time and resources seeking out and capturing massive volumes of spam, which he collects and then organizes for use in his prolific lawsuits.   He admits setting up domains as "spam traps" with the sole purpose of snagging as many e-mail marketing messages as possible.   The record reveals that gordonworks.com was one such trap.   He is not alone in his litigation enterprise.   His "clients" also use their personalized domains to gather commercial e-mails, which they then send to Gordon in enormous unsorted batches of 10,000 to 50,000 messages to fuel his various anti-spam lawsuits.  In exchange, Gordon's "clients" share in settlement proceeds.   Gordon apportions the bounty according to each individual's contribution to the particular lawsuit-i.e., the number of e-mails provided to Gordon for use against a specific defendant.

Gordon admits operating an anti-spam business, which entails, in his words, "[n]otifying spammers that they're violating the law" and filing lawsuits if they do not stop sending spam.  As Gordon concedes, he is a professional plaintiff.   Reply Br. of Appellant at 5. Since at least 2004, Gordon has held no employment.   He has never been compensated for any of his purported Internet services, and his only income source has come from monetary settlements from his anti-spam litigation campaign.   Likewise, his company, Omni, generates no revenue and is financed strictly through these lawsuits against e-mail marketers.   While the term "professional," as in "professional plaintiff," is not a "dirty word," see Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir.2006), and should not itself undermine one's ability to seek redress for injuries suffered, Gordon's status is uniquely relevant to the statutory standing question here.   Cf. Hypertouch, 2006 WL 648688, at *4 n. 2 (rejecting defendant's argument that Hypertouch was a "professional plaintiff" that entered the ISP business for the sole purpose of bringing anti-spam lawsuits).

Because we are tasked with determining whether Gordon has been adversely affected by conduct regulated by the CAN-SPAM Act, it is highly significant that the burdens Gordon complains of are almost exclusively self-imposed and purposefully undertaken.   Here, Gordon acknowledges that he benefits from the receipt of spam through his research and monetary settlements.   The fact that Gordon derives substantial financial benefit but endures no real ISP-type harm from commercial e-mail, coupled with his unusual efforts to seek out and accumulate-rather than avoid or block-spam, demonstrates that he has not been adversely affected by alleged violations of the federal act in any cognizable way.

We do not discount the harmful effects spam and spamming practices, both lawful and unlawful, have upon businesses and consumers, and we recognize the need of bona fide IAS providers, both small and large, for a legal remedy against law-breaking spammers.   We, like Congress, are sympathetic to legitimate operations hampered by a deluge of unwanted e-mail marketing.   Our record, however, conclusively demonstrates that this is not the case before us.   Gordon has created a cottage industry where he and his "clients" set themselves up to profit from litigation.   The CAN-SPAM Act was enacted to protect individuals and legitimate businesses-not to support a litigation mill for entrepreneurs like Gordon.

As discussed above, it is undisputed that Gordon encounters huge quantities of commercial e-mail.   Nevertheless, he is neither a bona fide IAS provider nor has he been adversely affected by alleged violations of the CAN-SPAM Act. We conclude that Gordon lacks standing to pursue claims under § 7706(g)(1), and affirm the district court's summary judgment dismissal of all his federal claims.

IV

Gordon also appeals the adverse summary judgment dismissing his claims for alleged violations of CEMA, Washington's statute regulating commercial e-mail messages.   See Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.010 et seq.   Like many other states, Washington has enacted legislation that seeks to curb e-mail abuses.   CEMA states in relevant part:

(1) No person may initiate the transmission, conspire with another to initiate the transmission, or assist the transmission, of a commercial electronic mail message from a computer located in Washington or to an electronic mail address that the sender knows, or has reason to know, is held by a Washington resident that:

(a) Uses a third party's internet domain name without permission of the third party, or otherwise misrepresents or obscures any information in identifying the point of origin or the transmission path of a commercial electronic mail message;  or

(b) Contains false or misleading information in the subject line.

Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.020. The statute also prohibits certain practices aimed at inducing a person to reveal personally identifying information.   Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.080. Like its federal counterpart, CEMA provides for sizeable statutory damages or actual damages, whichever is greater.  Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.040.

A

At the outset, we must frame the issue as it comes to us.   First, Virtumundo does not contest Gordon's standing to bring CEMA claims.   In contrast to the more restrictive standing requirement of the CAN-SPAM Act, CEMA authorizes a recipient of a commercial e-mail message or an "interactive computer service" to bring a private action.  Id.

Of Gordon's various CEMA claims on appeal, only his claim relating to allegedly deficient headers requires detailed discussion. Gordon has no viable CEMA claim based on the body of the e-mail messages at issue.   Unlike the CAN-SPAM Act, CEMA "does not regulate the body of the e-mail."  State v. Heckel, 122 Wash.App. 60, 93 P.3d 189, 194 (2004), review denied, 153 Wash.2d 1021, 108 P.3d 1229 (2005) ("Heckel II ").   Similarly, the state statute does not purport to regulate "opt-out" mechanisms.   Therefore, Gordon's CEMA claims, by nature of the state statute, are limited to the information contained in the e-mail headers and subject lines.

We further conclude, however, that summary judgment was properly granted on Gordon's claim that Virtumundo's e-mail subject lines are deceptive.   In opposition to Virtumundo's summary judgment motion, Gordon failed to identify or describe any specific e-mail or subject line text and simply countered that "Gordon contests" the position that the subject lines are not misleading.   Gordon does not attempt to better articulate this claim on appeal.

The "party opposing summary judgment must direct [the court's] attention to specific, triable facts," S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.2003), and the reviewing court is "not required to comb through the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment," Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Forsberg v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir.1988)).   See Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.2003) ("[The nonmoving party] cannot defeat summary judgment with allegations in the complaint, or with unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements.").   Because Gordon has failed to present a prima facie case in opposition to summary judgment, his claim that Virtumundo's subject lines violate CEMA fails as a matter of law, and summary judgment was appropriate.

Therefore, the sole remaining CEMA claim that we must address relates to the headers of Virtumundo's e-mails.   Gordon argues that the header information misrepresents or obscures the identity of the sender, and therefore violates CEMA, see Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.020(1)(a).   We review the district court's conclusion that this claim is preempted pursuant to the CAN-SPAM Act's express preemption clause, 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b).

B

1

As a preliminary matter, the Attorney General for the State of Washington ("State"), appearing here as amicus curiae, insists that we need not reach the preemption issue.   See Atel Fin. Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co., 321 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir.2003) ("We may affirm a district court's judgment on any ground supported by the record, whether or not the decision of the district court relied on the same grounds or reasoning we adopt.").   The State argues that we may affirm summary judgment with respect to this CEMA claim because Gordon's allegations regarding the header information do not satisfy "Washington's well-developed deceptiveness standard," as a matter of law.   We have surveyed the legal landscape and note a fatal shortcoming in the State's proposition.   CEMA prohibits the sending of commercial e-mail that "misrepresents or obscures any information in identifying the point of origin or the transmission path."  Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.020(1)(a).   The standard for "deception" under Washington law is thus only relevant to the extent courts so limit the broad language of CEMA-a critical step that the State overlooks entirely.

In Benson v. Oregon Processing Service, Inc., 136 Wash.App. 587, 150 P.3d 154 (2007), review denied, 162 Wash.2d 1004, 175 P.3d 1092 (2007), the state appellate court interpreted the previously undefined terms "misrepresent" and "obscure" according to their ordinary dictionary meaning-i.e., "misrepresent" to mean "representing incorrectly:  to give a false, imperfect or misleading representation," and "obscure" to mean "to conceal or hide from view as by or as if covering wholly or in part:  make difficult to discern."  Id. at 156 (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1445 & 1557 (2003)).   These broad definitions extend CEMA's prohibitive reach and purport to regulate a vast array of non-deceptive acts and practices.   As subsequent courts reviewing CEMA have recognized, without further clarification, "a sender of commercial email could be potentially held liable under [CEMA] for unintentional clerical errors," Ferguson, 2008 WL 3166307, at *8, imperfect representations, or immaterial misstatements.

In short, we cannot conclude, as the State presumes, that CEMA's prohibitions extend only to acts of deception.   The Washington Legislature or state courts may ultimately mold CEMA's broad language so as to cabin its breadth or interpret the law in conformity with federal legislation.   This task is, however, a matter for the State, as sovereign, to resolve.

2

We therefore turn, as we must, to whether summary judgment was proper under the doctrine of preemption.   As recently noted by a district court, "[t]here is no Ninth Circuit authority on whether Plaintiff's claim under the provision of CEMA ․ is preempted by CAN-SPAM."  Ferguson, 2008 WL 3166307, at *7. Indeed, the scope of the CAN-SPAM Act's preemption is an issue of first impression in this circuit.   See Asis Internet Servs. v. Consumerbargaingiveaways, LLC, No. 08-04856, 2009 WL 1035538, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Apr.17, 2009).

The concept of preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land;  ․ any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."   U.S. Const. art.   VI, cl. 2. "Consistent with that command, we have long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are 'without effect.' " Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 538, 543, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981)).   Courts typically identify three circumstances in which federal preemption of state law exists:

(1) express preemption, where Congress explicitly defines the extent to which its enactments preempt state law;  (2) field preemption, where state law attempts to regulate conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal law exclusively to occupy;  and (3) conflict preemption, where it is impossible to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress.

Indus. Truck Ass'n, 125 F.3d at 1309 (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-80, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990)).   When interpreting the scope of an express preemption clause, as is the case here, we must "identify the domain expressly pre-empted" by its language.  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992)).

Although the analysis of the scope of preemption begins with the text, "interpretation of that language does not occur in a contextual vacuum."  Id. at 484-85.   Rather, this inquiry is guided by two principles about the nature of preemption.   First, there is a presumption against supplanting "the historic police powers of the States" by federal legislation "unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."  Id. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240.  "This presumption against preemption leads us to the principle that express preemption statutory provisions should be given narrow interpretation."  Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Inst. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 410 F.3d 492, 496 (9th Cir.2005).   Second, the preemption analysis is guided by the "oft-repeated comment ․ that the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case."   Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (quotations and brackets omitted).  "As a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on a fair understanding of congressional purpose," and calls for courts to consider not only the language of the statute itself but also the "statutory framework" surrounding it and the "structure and purpose of the statute as a whole."  Id. at 485-86, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (quotations omitted);  accord Altria Group, 129 S.Ct. at 543 ("Congress may indicate pre-emptive intent through a statute's express language or through its structure and purpose.").

With this framework in mind, we review the preemption clause of the CAN-SPAM Act, which states in relevant part:

This chapter supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to the extent that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or information attached thereto.

15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1).   The following subsection adds further clarity:  Congress reiterated that the preemption clause "shall not be construed to preempt the applicability of-(A) State laws that are not specific to electronic mail, including State trespass, contract, or tort law;  or (B) other State laws to the extent that those laws relate to acts of fraud or computer crime."  15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(2) (emphasis added).   Thus, the express language of § 7707(b) demonstrates Congress's intent that the CAN-SPAM Act broadly preempt state regulation of commercial e-mail with limited, narrow exception.   Congress carved out from preemption state laws that proscribe "falsity or deception" in commercial e-mail communications.

To date, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348 (4th Cir.2006), is the only federal circuit court decision addressing preemption of state law claims by the CAN-SPAM Act. In Omega, Mummagraphics alleged violations of the CAN-SPAM Act and Oklahoma law, see Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 776.1(A), based on e-mail messages that contained a variety of inaccuracies.  Omega, 469 F.3d at 351.   The Fourth Circuit reviewed the scope of the CAN-SPAM Act's preemption provision and concluded that Congress could not have intended, by way of the carve-out language, to allow states to enact laws that prohibit "mere error" or "insignificant inaccuracies."  Id. at 354-55.   The court reasoned that a materiality component comported with the policy pursued by the federal legislation as a whole, further noting that a contrary reading "would upend [the] balance [struck by Congress] and turn an exception to a preemption provision into a loophole so broad that it would virtually swallow the preemption clause itself."  Id. at 355.   Ultimately, the court determined that the challenged e-mails could not be actionable under the Oklahoma statutes "because allowing a state to attach liability to bare immaterial error in commercial e-mails would be inconsistent with the federal Act's preemption text and structure, and, consequently, with a 'fair understanding of congressional purpose.' " Id. at 359 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486, 116 S.Ct. 2240).

Having independently analyzed the CAN-SPAM Act's text, structure, and legislative purpose, we reach the same conclusion as the district court and the Fourth Circuit, and interpret the CAN-SPAM Act's express preemption clause in a manner that preserves Congress's intended purpose-i.e., to regulate commercial e-mail "on a nationwide basis," 15 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1), and to save from preemption only "statutes, regulations, or rules that target fraud or deception," S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 21 (emphasis added).

As with any issue of statutory interpretation, we start with the text itself.   The CAN-SPAM Act's preemption clause makes an exception for state laws that prohibit "falsity or deception" in commercial e-mail communication.  15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1).   Because those terms are not defined in the statute, they should be given their ordinary meaning.  Emmert Indus. Corp. v. Artisan Assocs., Inc., 497 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir.2007).   Whereas the word "deception" certainly denotes something more than immaterial inaccuracies or inadvertent mistakes, the word "falsity" is susceptible to differing dictionary meanings.   "Falsity" means "quality or state of being false," which is not itself informative. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 451 (11th ed.2005).   The term "false" is defined, however, not only as "not true" but also as "intentionally untrue," "adjusted or made so as to deceive," and "intended or tending to mislead."  Id. We therefore acknowledge facial ambiguity in the statutory text.   See Bryan A. Garner, Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 348 (2d ed.1995) (stating that "false" "is potentially ambiguous", since the word may mean either "erroneous, incorrect" or "purposely deceptive");  Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Modern Am. Usage 339 (2003) (same).

Recognizing the same ambiguity, the Fourth Circuit applied the maxim of noscitur a sociis, a canon of statutory construction that "counsels that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated."  United States v. Williams, --- U.S. ----, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1839, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008).   Reading "falsity" in conjunction with "deception," which connotes a type of tort action based on misrepresentations, we are likewise persuaded that the exception language, read as Congress intended, refers to "traditionally tortious or wrongful conduct."  Omega, 469 F.3d at 354.   We find further support for this reading in the statutory text, which counsels against any interpretation that preempts laws relating to "acts of fraud."   See 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(2).   Indeed, the Committee explained that while "a State law requiring some or all commercial e-mail to carry specific types of labels, or to follow a certain format or contain specified content, would be preempted[,] ․ a State law prohibiting fraudulent or deceptive headers, subject lines, or content in commercial e-mail would not be preempted."  S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 21 (emphasis added);  see also 150 Cong. Rec. at E73-01 (recognizing broad preemption, except state laws prohibiting falsification techniques and deception).   The Committee's repeated reference to "fraud" and "deception" is telling and confirms that Congress did not intend that states retain unfettered freedom to create liability for immaterial inaccuracies or omissions.

Further scrutiny of congressional intent solidifies our reading of the preemption clause.   As discussed supra, the CAN-SPAM Act prohibits only deceptive subject line headings or materially false or materially misleading header information.   See 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a);  accord 15 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2) ("[S]enders of commercial electronic mail should not mislead recipients as to the source or content of such mail." (emphasis added)).   Significantly, Congress intended this standard to regulate commercial e-mail messaging practices "on a nationwide basis."   15 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1).   It was because the patchwork of state laws had proven ineffective that Congress sought to implement "one national standard," S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 21, applicable across jurisdictions.   The CAN-SPAM Act expresses this goal:

Many states have enacted legislation intended to regulate or reduce unsolicited commercial electronic mail, but these statutes impose different standards and requirements.   As a result, they do not appear to have been successful in addressing the problems associated with unsolicited commercial electronic mail, in part because, since an electronic mail address does not specify a geographic location, it can be extremely difficult for law-abiding businesses to know with which of these disparate statutes they are required to comply.

15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(11);  see also S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 21-22 ("[I]n contrast to telephone numbers, e-mail addresses do not reveal the State where the holder is located.   As a result, a sender of e-mail has no easy way to determine with which State law to comply.").   Moreover, a single e-mail could instantaneously implicate the laws of multiple jurisdictions as it journeys through cyberspace, traveling over various facilities before reaching its intended recipient, whose location is often unknown.   Therefore, "one state's Internet laws may impose compliance costs on businesses throughout the country."  Omega, 469 F.3d at 356 (citing PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 239-41 (4th Cir.2004)).   The CAN-SPAM Act was designed to ensure that "legitimate businesses would not have to guess at the meaning of various state laws when their advertising campaigns ventured into cyberspace."   Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-2406, 2007 WL 1518650, at *3 (C.D.Cal. May 23, 2007) (concluding that the CAN-SPAM Act preempted California state law claims).

It would be logically incongruous to conclude that Congress endeavored to erect a uniform standard but simultaneously left states and local lawmakers free to manipulate that standard to create more burdensome regulation.   We are compelled to adopt a reading of the preemption clause that conforms with the statute's structure as a whole and the stated legislative purpose.   See 15 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1).   The CAN-SPAM Act established a national standard, but left the individual states free to extend traditional tort theories such as claims arising from fraud or deception to commercial e-mail communication.   To find otherwise would create "an exception to preemption [that] swallow[s] the rule and undermine[s] the regulatory balance that Congress established," Omega, 469 F.3d at 356, and which would once again subject legitimate businesses to inconsistent and possibly incompatible state regulations.

Applying its proper reading, the CAN-SPAM Act's preemption clause applies here and undermines Gordon's remaining CEMA claim.   Although he admits he was not in any way misled or deceived, Gordon argues that the headers in the e-mails at issue-specifically, the "from lines"-violate CEMA because they fail to clearly identify Virtumundo as the e-mails' sender and therefore misrepresent or obscure the identity of the sender.   See Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.020(1)(a).   The "from lines" at issue contain two components:  a "from name" field, which typically references a topic or subject matter of the advertisement, and a domain name.   Examples of "from lines" condemned by Gordon include "Criminal​Justice@​vm-​mail.​com," "Public​Safety​Degrees@​vmadmin.​com," and "Trade​In@​vm-​mail.​com."

There is of course nothing inherently deceptive in Virtumundo's use of fanciful domain names.   See 15 U.S.C. § 7702(4);  S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 3 (recognizing Microsoft's "msn" and "hotmail" domains used for e-mail services).   Gordon agrees that the domains from which these e-mails were sent-e.g., "vmmail.com," "vmadmin.com," "vtarget.com," and "vmlocal.com"-were properly registered to Virtumundo.   Gordon further concedes that a WHOIS search, or a similar reverse-look-up database, accurately identifies Virtumundo as the domain registrant and provides other identifying information.  Gordon complains that in order to ascertain the actual identity of the e-mails' sender a recipient must either review the message content or consult a WHOIS-type database.   He insists that any practice that requires consumers to engage in an extra step violates CEMA.

Nothing contained in this claim rises to the level of "falsity or deception" within the meaning of the CAN-SPAM Act's preemption clause.   Gordon offers no proof that any headers have been altered to impair a recipient's ability to identify, locate, or respond to the person who initiated the e-mail.   Nor does he present evidence that Virtumundo's practice is aimed at misleading recipients as to the identity of the sender.   Cf. Aitken v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 496 F.Supp.2d 653, 667 (E.D.Va.2007) (holding that "it is inappropriate to conclude, as a matter of law, that the misleading header information is immaterial" where the defendant misappropriated identities of managers to send "pro-union" e-mails to employees).   As stated by our district court, Gordon's claim is "for, at best, 'incomplete' or less than comprehensive information" regarding the sender.  Gordon, 2007 WL 1459395, at *12.   Such technical allegations regarding the header information find no basis in traditional tort theories and therefore fall beyond the ambit of the exception language in the CAN-SPAM Act's express preemption clause.

Gordon further suggests that the only information that could be used in the "from name" field that would not misrepresent is the name of the "person or entity who actually sent the e-mail, or perhaps ․ the person or entity who hired the [sender] to send the email on their behalf."   In other words, he argues that CEMA's provisions require that "Virtumundo" or a client's name expressly appear in the "from lines."   The CAN-SPAM Act does not impose such a requirement.   To the extent such a content or labeling requirement may exist under state law, it is clearly subject to preemption.   See S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 21-22 ("State law requiring some or all commercial e-mail to carry specific types of labels ․ or contain specified content, would be preempted.");   see also Kleffman, 2007 WL 1518650, at *3 ("[T]he claim that the failure to include Vonage's name in the email is clearly preempted.").

In sum, Gordon's alleged header deficiencies relate to, at most, non-deceptive statements or omissions and a heightened content or labeling requirement.   Regardless of the merits of his arguments, assuming they are actionable under CEMA, such state law claims falter under the weight of federal preemption.   Summary judgment was properly entered on Gordon's CEMA claims.

V

Gordon also appeals summary judgment of his claim that Virtumundo violated the Washington CPA, which generally prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."  Wash. Rev.Code. § 19.86.020. A plaintiff must typically prove five elements to establish a CPA violation:  (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in trade or commerce, (3) that impacts the public interest, (4) which causes injury to the party in his business or property, and (5) the injury must be causally linked to the unfair or deceptive act.  Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash.2d 778, 719 P.2d 531, 535-37 (1986).   A violation of CEMA, however, likely constitutes a per se CPA violation.  See Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.030;  Heckel I, 24 P.3d at 407 ("RCW 19.190.030 makes a violation of [CEMA] a per se violation of the [CPA]․").

Gordon primarily relies upon alleged CEMA violations to establish his CPA claim.   Because his CEMA claims fail as a matter of law, his CPA claims, to the extent grounded in CEMA violations, are likewise inadequate and were properly dismissed.

To the extent that Gordon also brings independent CPA claims, they too fail.   Gordon has failed to identify an act or practice that "misleads or misrepresents something of material importance."  Nguyen v. Doak Homes, Inc., 140 Wash.App. 726, 167 P.3d 1162, 1166 (2007) (emphasis added);  accord Robinson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 106 Wash.App. 104, 22 P.3d 818, 824 (2001) ("[K]nowing failure to reveal something of material importance is 'deceptive' within the CPA.").   Because Gordon's CPA claims are not predicated on unfair or deceptive conduct that has "the capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public," Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 535, summary judgment was appropriate.   See Carlile v. Harbour Homes, Inc., 147 Wash.App. 193, 194 P.3d 280, 289 (2008) (confirming that whether an act is unfair or deceptive is a question of law).

Additionally, in order to succeed on a CPA claim, "[a] plaintiff must establish that, but for the defendant's unfair or deceptive practice, the plaintiff would not have suffered an injury."  Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 162 Wash.2d 59, 170 P.3d 10, 22 (2007).   Here, Gordon seeks only statutory damages and, despite more than adequate opportunity, has made no attempt to show that Virtumundo proximately caused him actual harm.   Because Gordon has failed in his burden to provide sufficient evidence to establish an essential element of this cause of action, his CPA claims must also fail as a matter of law.   See River City Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Foods West, Inc., 960 F.2d 1458, 1462 (9th Cir.1992).

VI

We briefly address Gordon's remaining arguments and assignments of error on appeal.   His claim that summary judgment violated the Seventh Amendment is devoid of merit.  "As the Supreme Court held, over one hundred years ago, a summary judgment proceeding does not deprive the losing party of its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial."  In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir.2008) (citing Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21, 23 S.Ct. 120, 47 L.Ed. 194 (1902)).   Further, Gordon, dissatisfied with the result in the Western District of Washington, cannot now challenge his initial choice of venue on appeal.   See generally Olberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340, 74 S.Ct. 83, 98 L.Ed. 39 (1953) (noting that the plaintiff relinquishes his right to object to venue by bringing his lawsuit in a particular district).   Finally, we decline to entertain Gordon's poorly articulated argument that the CAN-SPAM Act is unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.   See Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 430 (9th Cir.1996).   This constitutional challenge was neither raised before the district court, nor pressed in the reply brief or at oral argument.   We reject these and any additional arguments possibly buried in Gordon's briefing not expressly addressed herein.   See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir.2003) (repeating the now familiar maxim:  "[j]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs" (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991))).

VII

In summary, Gordon lacks statutory standing to bring a private action for alleged violations of the CAN-SPAM Act. His state law claims fail as a matter of law because they are precluded by the Act's express preemption clause and because he has failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists.   Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order of summary judgment.

All parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED.

The most pertinent conclusion for me in this case, one that I reach after a careful evaluation of the district court's comprehensive factual findings and cogent legal analysis, is that Gordon was seeking to use the CAN-SPAM Act to build a litigation factory for his personal financial benefit.   For the reasons amply explained by Judge Tallman's fine opinion, the ways in which Gordon inserted himself into legal controversy here require conclusions that he is not an Internet access service ("IAS") provider and that he was not adversely affected by spam.   Each of these conclusions is independently sufficient to deny Gordon statutory standing to assert his claims, and each conclusion requires our affirmance of the district court's summary judgment order.

I write separately to add this comment.   In the long course of Anglo-American law, development of the common law has normally occurred in ways that gave legal remedies to persons who cried out for relief against a perceived injustice.   See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 37 (Dover Pubs.1991) (1881) ("[T]he various forms of liability known to modern law spring from the common ground of revenge.").   The body of the common law that we know as contract law developed from the need to provide remedies when certain promises were broken and more ancient common law writs were inadequate.   See id. at 274-75 (tracing history of contracts to the writ of "trespass on the case," which developed because "there were many cases which did not exactly fall within the definition of trespass, but for which it was proper that a remedy should be furnished").   Similarly, tort law has for centuries expanded  to cover new types of claims where wrong had caused damage.   See id. at 162-63 (stating that tort law is "continually adding to its specific rules" based on "[t]he tendency of a given act to cause harm under given circumstances," rules "which must be determined by experience").

In both contract and tort claims for damages, the common law always required a showing of damages proximately caused by the wrong as an element of the claim.   See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854) (holding that contract damages must either "aris[e] naturally" or "reasonably be supposed to have been ․ the probable result of the breach of [the contract]");  Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 377 (2001) ("In personal injury cases, the normal remedy is compensatory damages ․ for all losses that have proximately resulted from the tort and all losses that will so result in the future.").   The branch of the common law known in England as chancery jurisdiction, which also developed in the colonies and in the early United States, was concerned with providing an equitable remedy to injured persons when common law damage remedies were inadequate.   See Joseph Story, Chancery Jurisdiction:  An Article Written for the North American Review, in 1820, on the Reports of Mr. Johnson, The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story 165 (William W. Story ed., 2000) (1852) (stating that courts of equity are necessary because "[t]here are many cases in which the parties are without remedy at law, or in which the remedy is wholly inadequate to the attainment of justice").

Thus the common law developed ample remedies for persons who had suffered grievous harms, but, as I understand the history of our common law, it did not develop remedies for people who gratuitously created circumstances that would support a legal claim and acted with the chief aim of collecting a damage award.  See Charles T. McCormick, Law of Damages § 33 (1935) ("[T]he rules for awarding damages should be such as to discourage even persons against whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering economic loss which could be averted by reasonable efforts, or from actively increasing such loss where prudence would require that such activity cease.").   I believe that the same principles that animated the common law influenced Congress when it enacted the CAN-SPAM Act. That Congress explicitly limited claims to a subset of individuals or entities who were "adversely affected" by the proscribed conduct shows that Congress did not aim to provide a remedy to anyone or any entity who sought out a position where the alleged harm might inevitably occur.   But, for a person seeking to operate a litigation factory, the purported harm is illusory and more in the nature of manufactured circumstances in an attempt to enable a claim.   In my view, manufactured claims should not be tolerated absent a clear endorsement from Congress.   Such claims would not likely have been recognized at common law, and Congress here wisely excluded them.

Judge Tallman's opinion rightly focuses on language in the legislative history stating that only bona fide IAS providers should have statutory standing.   I would presume a bona fide requirement even without this legislative history because Congress provided a private right of action for CAN-SPAM violations but expressly limited it to certain individuals and entities.   Given this limited private right of action, statutory standing should be denied to plaintiffs such as Gordon who purposely structure themselves to look like one of the limited entities eligible to sue but do so for the primary purpose of collecting damages and settlements from litigation.   Such individuals trying to game the system do not fall into the limited class to which Congress made available a private remedy, and ordinarily they should be denied statutory standing.   That the legislative history specifies bona fide IAS providers strengthens our conclusion that Gordon's suit should be dismissed, but the legislative history is not necessary to reach this conclusion in light of the common-law antecedents that do not favor manufactured claims.

There are a few areas in which our developing statutory law has embraced the concept of permitting claims by those who insert themselves in the controversy for the express purpose of creating a lawsuit.   One of the best examples is that we accord standing to those who "test" for discrimination in housing by feigning interest in a housing site.   See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982).   There may be good reasons for allowing this practice as a way to strengthen the enforcement of housing discrimination laws, and Congress provided a broad standing provision for private actors.   In permitting standing for testers, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress "conferred on all 'persons' a legal right to truthful information about available housing" and "plainly omitted" a "bona fide " requirement for standing when it explicitly required one elsewhere in the same section of the fair housing statute.  Id.

Similarly, we accord standing to individuals who sue defendants that fail to provide access to the disabled in public accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), even if we suspect that such plaintiffs are hunting for violations just to file lawsuits.   See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1061-62 (9th Cir.2007) (per curiam) ("For the ADA to yield its promise of equal access for the disabled, it may indeed be necessary and desirable for committed individuals to bring serial litigation advancing the time when public accommodations will be compliant with the ADA.").   There, too, however, Congress provided standing to "any person" subjected to disability discrimination in violation of the ADA, and it also did not expressly require a showing of injury or adverse effect from the discrimination.  42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1);  accord Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir.2007).

We should not extend the concept of "tester" standing to an area where we do not have confidence that Congress intended to empower anyone to make claims.   Unlike the broad standing provisions in the housing discrimination laws and the ADA, here the CAN-SPAM statutory language grants a private right of action not to "all persons" regardless of injury, but only to IAS providers who suffer adverse effect.   These requirements make clear that a litigation-seeking party in Gordon's circumstances has no standing to proceed under the CAN-SPAM Act.

FOOTNOTES

1.  While "spam" in this context does not have a precise definition, it is typically understood to refer broadly to unsolicited e-mail messages (or "junk" e-mail), typically commercial in nature.   See United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir.2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting).The term "SPAM" originated as the trademark name for a canned pre-cooked meat product manufactured by Hormel Foods Corporation.   See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500 (2d Cir.1996).   The e-mail-related connotation has its roots in a popular 1970 sketch by the British comedy troupe Monty Python's Flying Circus, in which the word "spam" is repeated to the point of absurdity.  Kelley, 482 F.3d at 1056 n. 2 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (citing CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1015, 1018 n. 1 (S.D.Ohio 1997)).   A waitress recites menu items, which, to the restaurant patrons' dismay, involve increasingly repetitive mention of SPAM, only to be periodically interrupted by a group of Vikings chanting a chorus about SPAM until normal dialogue is impossible.   David Crystal, Language and the Internet 53-54 (2001) (citing to Monty Python's Flying Circus, 2d series, episode 25 (BBC television broadcast Dec. 15, 1970)).   Thus, in the context of the Internet, "spam" has come to symbolize unwanted, and perhaps annoying, repetitious behavior that drowns out ordinary discourse.   The term was first used in the electronic messaging context to describe the practice of sending advertisements to many recipients, particularly on newsgroup forums.  Id. But see S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 2 n.1 (2003), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2348 (noting that "[i]t all started in early Internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games where someone repeating the same sentence or comment was said to be making 'spam.' ").

2.  Unless otherwise specified, we use the term "Gordon" in the recitation of the facts to collectively refer to both plaintiffs, Gordon and Omni. Omni has no employees, and Gordon is its manager and sole member.

3.  Gordon further admits subscribing to various mailing lists as part of his "reconnaissance" activities in preparation for his pending and potential lawsuits.   For example, Gordon would register his e-mail address in order to gain access to corporate information about potential defendants.

4.  For example, in his motion for partial summary judgment, which the district court denied, Gordon sought statutory damages in the amount of $10,257,000, plus attorney's fees and costs, based on 7,890 allegedly unlawful e-mails.

5.  A notice of appeal was filed on behalf of both Gordon and Omni. Gordon and trial counsel parted ways following the district court's summary judgment order, and Gordon proceeded pro se.   Upon the filing of Gordon's opening brief, we dismissed Omni from this appeal as an improper pro se corporate appellant.

6.  The CAN-SPAM Act defines "commercial electronic mail message" to mean "any electronic mail message the primary purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or service (including content on an Internet website operated for a commercial purpose)," excluding transactional or relationship messages.  15 U.S.C. § 7702(2).

7.  The CAN-SPAM Act also delineates "aggravated violations" for various spamming practices such as e-mail harvesting and dictionary server attacks, see 15 U.S.C. § 7704(b), which are not at issue in this lawsuit.

8.  Statutory damages are calculated by multiplying the number of violations (i.e., the number of unlawful e-mail messages) by up to $100 in the case of a violation of § 7704(a)(1), or by up to $25 for any other violation.  15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3).   The court may consider the defendant's conduct in setting the statutory damage award and, if it determines that violations are aggravated, may increase the damage award up to three times the amount otherwise available.  Id.

9.  In support of its summary judgment motion, Virtumundo argued that, as providers of free services, Gordon and Omni did not qualify as IAS providers.   The district court correctly rejected this argument because Congress expressly discussed free Internet services when it enacted the CAN-SPAM Act. See S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 3 (mentioning Microsoft's free e-mail service when discussing effects of the increasing volume of spam).

10.  The district court further reasoned that if the limited private right of action is to have any traction at all, "[n]ot only must CANSPAM private plaintiffs allege a particular type of harm, the adverse effect they allege must be significant."  Gordon, 2007 WL 1459395, at *8 (emphasis added).   The court did not explain the meaning of the term "significant."   As discussed herein, we believe that Congress intended that the alleged harm be something of significance to an IAS provider.   To this extent, we agree with the district court's reasoning that harm be significant.

11.  In their amicus brief, ASIS Internet Services, Joel Householter, and Ritchie Phillips (collectively, "ASIS") argue that "harm" for CAN-SPAM standing purposes is merely "the cost of carrying SPAM emails over the [Internet access provider]'s facilities."   This view contradicts the plain text of the statute and the legislative goal of limiting the private right of action.   No court has adopted this position, and we reject it as well.   Congress stated that the private standing provision of § 7706(g)(1) "could include a service provider who carried unlawful spam over its facilities, or who operated a website or online service from which recipient e-mail addresses were harvested in connection with a violation."  S.Rep. No. 108-102, at 21 (emphasis added).   In this context, the term "could," which has a different meaning than "would," see Rosas v. Monroe County Tax Claim Bureau, 323 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2004) ("There is a clear difference between the plain meaning of the words 'could', 'might' and 'will.' "), implies that encountering spam is merely a component of the standing equation.   Some qualifying harm must follow.

12.  Whether a private plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant's particular e-mails caused ISP-type harms has been a point of conflict among district courts.   While summary judgment in our case did not turn on a lack of causation, the district court's order has contributed to the confusion within our circuit.   In finding a lack of "adverse effect" to support standing, the district court remarked that Gordon and Omni "have alleged absolutely no financial hardship or expense due to e-mails they received from Defendants."  Gordon, 2007 WL 1459395, at *8 (emphasis added).   Subsequent courts have interpreted this language to impose upon private plaintiffs the burden of showing that a defendant's e-mails directly caused the harm alleged.   See Optin Global, 2008 WL 1902217, at *17 ("While there is some evidence that spam generally has imposed costs on ASIS over the years, there is no evidence that the Emails at issue in this action resulted in adverse effects to ASIS․");  Brosnan, 2008 WL 413732, at *2-*3 (dismissing sua sponte plaintiff's CAN-SPAM Act claims for lack of standing and citing Gordon for the proposition that "[t]he plaintiff must have suffered actual adverse effects as a result of Defendant's actions").As some subsequent courts have cautioned, we are troubled by the possibility that imposing a direct causation requirement, although not inconsistent with the statutory text, might create an unworkable standard for private plaintiff standing given the impracticability of tracing a harm to a specific e-mail or batch of e-mails.   See Active Response, 2008 WL 2952809, at *5. This reading erects a barrier that could in some situations insulate wrongdoers, especially less prolific spammers, from private enforcement actions.   Nevertheless, our holding today does not foreclose this possible interpretation of § 7706(g)(1).   We reserve this determination for another case where the issue is squarely presented to us and adequately briefed by the parties.

13.  We also note that there may be significance in distinguishing Gordon from Omni, a non-party to this appeal.   See Real Marketing Servs., LLC v. Protocol Commc'ns, Inc. (In re Real Marketing Servs., LLC), 309 B.R. 783, 788 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.2004) (holding that managing member lacked standing to bring claims for damages of LLC), relied upon in Finley v. Takisaki, No. 05-1118, 2006 WL 1169794, at *2-*3 (W.D.Wash. Apr.28, 2006) (holding that, under Washington law, LLC members lacked standing because their claimed loss derived solely from their membership in the LLC);  see generally United States v. Stonehill, 83 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir.1996) ("Well-established principles of corporate law prevent a shareholder from bringing an individual direct cause of action for an injury done to the corporation or its property by a third party.").   The record is murky as to the distinction, due largely to Gordon's inability to distinguish himself as an individual from his capacity as Omni's agent.   Because Omni has been dismissed from this appeal, Gordon's claims are even weaker.

14.  Gordon has filed and continues to file numerous actions in state and federal courts against various defendants, often representing himself pro se.   As the district court noted, in 2006 and 2007, Omni was a party to 10 other lawsuits pending in the Western District of Washington alone.

15.  As should be apparent here, "the law" that Gordon purportedly enforces relates more to his subjective view of what the law ought to be, and differs substantially from the law itself.

16.  CEMA provides for greater per-violation statutory damages than the CAN-SPAM Act. A recipient of commercial e-mail or electronic text messages may recover $500 per violation, and an "interactive computer service" may recover $1,000 per violation.  Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.040. An "interactive computer service" is defined as "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions."   Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.010(8).

17.  We acknowledge, however, that the State's proposed interpretation is not unfounded.   Some state court decisions imply a narrow interpretation of CEMA. See State v. Heckel, 143 Wash.2d 824, 24 P.3d 404, 412-13 (2001) (en banc) ("Heckel I ") (commenting that "[CEMA] reaches only those deceptive [unsolicited commercial e-mail] messages directed to a Washington resident or initiated from a computer located in Washington");  Heckel II, 93 P.3d at 193-94 (affirming the judgment and permanent injunction in favor of the State and remarking that "the Act is narrowly tailored to regulate only deceptive commercial speech, which is not protected by the First Amendment").   Moreover, the provision at issue is titled "Unpermitted or misleading electronic mail," Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.020 (emphasis added), which suggests that CEMA's prohibition extends only to deceptive commercial e-mail.   See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947) (noting that the title of a statute and the heading of a section may help "shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase").   This reading also finds support in the statute's intersection with Washington's consumer protection laws.   See Wash. Rev.Code §§ 19.190.030(3) and 19.190.100.   Logic dictates that by equivocating violations of CEMA to violations of the CPA, the Washington Legislature intended to adopt the CPA's deceptiveness standard.

18.  The Oklahoma statute prohibited the initiation of an e-mail message that the sender knows or has reason to know "[m]isrepresents any information in identifying the point of origin or the transmission path of the electronic mail message," "[d]oes not contain information identifying the point of origin or the transmission path of the electronic mail message," or "[c]ontains false, malicious, or misleading information which purposely or negligently injures a person."  Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 776.1(A).

19.  As a matter of clarity, the district court's summary judgment order mistakenly refers to Mummagraphics as the "plaintiff."   Mummagraphics was a defendant in the underlying lawsuit and had alleged violations of the CAN-SPAM Act and Oklahoma law as counterclaims against plaintiff, Omega World Travel.  Omega, 469 F.3d at 352.

20.  Our reliance on Omega is limited to the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the CAN-SPAM Act's preemption clause.   We pass no judgment on whether summary judgment was appropriate based on the unique facts of that particular case.

21.  The State argues that this policy goal does not extend to illegitimate commercial behavior, such as unfair or deceptive business practices.   This argument, however, begs the question.   Whether the exception language of § 7707(b) permits states to prohibit e-mail activity that is not unfair or deceptive is precisely the issue before us.

22.  WHOIS is a publically available online database through which users can access information regarding domains, including the registrant's name, address, phone number, and e-mail address.   See Definitions, Implementation, and Reporting Requirements Under the CAN-SPAM Act, 70 Fed.Reg. 25,426, 25,446 n.233 (proposed May 12, 2005) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R pt. 316).   WHOIS data is compiled by registrars from information submitted by registrants.

23.  The State argues against preemption, citing Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F.Supp.2d 523 (D.Md.2006).   The district court there denied defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the CAN-SPAM Act did not preempt Maryland's Commercial Electronic Mail Act, Md.Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-3001 et seq.  ("MCEMA"), a statute modeled after Washington's CEMA. Id. at 532 n. 11 & 537-38.   The State, without offering much in the way of independent analysis or explanation, contends that "[b]ecause CEMA is substantially identical to MCEMA, this Court should apply the same preemption analysis and find that CEMA is not preempted by CAN-SPAM."   We decline this invitation.Notwithstanding the non-precedential nature of a district court opinion from another circuit, see United States v. Ensminger, 567 F.3d 587, 591 (9th Cir.2009), we find Beyond Systems to be of no persuasive value here.   Unlike the Maryland district court, we are reviewing summary judgment on a well-developed record.   More significantly, however, we view its preemption analysis as flawed.   Without considering the factual allegations underlying the plaintiff's claims, the court there held that MCEMA was not inconsistent with the goals of the CAN-SPAM Act and that "insofar as a state statute is not inconsistent with CAN-SPAM, it will not be deemed pre-empted."  Beyond Sys., 422 F.Supp.2d at 537-38.   The Maryland court not only fundamentally misconstrued the legislative purpose of the federal act, its analysis also belies the doctrine of express preemption.   Indeed, the sole authority upon which the court relied dealt with field preemption-not, as was the case before it (or as is the case here), express preemption.   See Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 723, 83 S.Ct. 1022, 10 L.Ed.2d 84 (1963) (finding "no express or implied [congressional] intent to bar state legislation in this field" and upholding a state statute barring discriminatory hiring practices by airlines).

24.  The CAN-SPAM Act does not preempt CPA claims generally.   The preemption clause states that the federal act will not preempt the applicability of state laws not specific to commercial e-mail.  15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(2).

25.  Section 19.190.030 states, in relevant part:(1) It is a violation of the consumer protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW, to conspire with another person to initiate the transmission or to initiate the transmission of a commercial electronic mail message that:(a) Uses a third party's internet domain name without permission of the third party, or otherwise misrepresents or obscures any information in identifying the point of origin or the transmission path of a commercial electronic mail message;  or(b) Contains false or misleading information in the subject line.Wash. Rev.Code § 19.190.030.

1.  An example of this expansion is seen in Judge Cardozo's famous opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which did much to influence the demise of the privity barrier and opened the way for claims by any person injured by a manufacturer's negligence.   See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 353 (2001) ("Judge Cardozo substantially abolished the privity rule for negligence cases in the famous MacPherson case․").

2.  Here of course we deal with a statute, the CAN-SPAM Act, and it is sometimes thought that statutory law is separate from the common law.   However, on close examination, many distinctions between common law and statutory law disappear.   The English common law, for example, was built in part upon ancient statutory law which, even once it was no longer applicable, had created usages and customs from which the common law developed.   See, e.g., Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England, ch. 1, (Charles M. Gray ed., 1971) (1713) ("[M]any of those Things that now obtain as Common Law, had their Original by Parliamentary Acts or Constitutions, made in Writing by the King, Lords and Commons;  though those Acts are now either not extant, or if extant, were made before Time of Memory․");  2 Sir William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law 145-46 (3d ed.1922) (discussing formation of English common law after the Norman Conquest and concluding that "the influence of the civil and canon law is perhaps the most important of all the external influences which have shaped the development of English law").   Similarly, when we consider statutory law, the United States Supreme Court has told us that we are to presume that Congress has acted with knowledge of the prior common law.   See Astoria Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991) ("Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles.").

3.  Evergreen Dynasty also involved state disability claims under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.Code § 51 et seq., and the standing provisions under that statute are similarly broad.   See Cal. Civ.Code § 52(a) (holding that violators of the Act are liable to "any person denied the rights" guaranteed by the Act);  Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that under the Unruh Act, "proof of actual damages is not a prerequisite to recovery of statutory minimum damages");  cf.  Evergreen Dynasty, 500 F.3d at 1060 n. 6 (citing cases suggesting that in general "statutory damages do not require proof of injury").

Opinion by Judge TALLMAN; Concurrence by Judge GOULD.

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FindLaw's United States Ninth Circuit case and opinions.

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James S. GORDON, Jr., an individual doing business as gordonworks.com, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VIRTUMUNDO, INC., a Delaware corporation;  Adknowledge, Inc., a Delaware corporation;  and Scott Lynn, an individual, Defendants-Appellees. Before RONALD M. GOULD, RICHARD C. TALLMAN, and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. Timothy J. Walton, Walton & Rose, LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for plaintiff-appellant James S.

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Nikhil Giridharan - Fair Credit Reporting Act

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Nikhil Giridharan - Fair Credit Reporting Act

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Year established:
It was established in 1970.

What led up to the creation:
It was made to make the personal information in credit reporting agency files be accurate and private. They also wanted it to be evaluated fairly. There was a big issue of people inaccurately reporting for their own personal benefit and this solves that issue.

What is the purpose:
The purpose of this act is to regulate the reporting of consumers credit information. It also protects reporting agencies such as medical information companies, credit bureaus, and tenant services from harm. It helps to create accuracy and fairness of the files that are collected.

How it affects businesses:
This act affects businesses today by helping to collect certain kinds of data. A person's past loans, bill history, and debt are all different kinds of data collected. An example of where this happened is for businesses like Equifax, Experian and TransUnion because they gather and sell consumers financial history. An example of a court case where this happened would be Experian vs People. In this case people filed a lawsuit due to identity theft taking place. One of the people in the case was denied a home loan due to the fake account not being deleted by Experian business. He had to pay higher interests on his loans and he had emotional stress as well.

How it affects employees:
This act impacts employees by giving their employment information, present and previous addresses, bankruptcy or child support information, and any arrest record. An example of where this happened is when an employer had to apply for a teaching position but they had a criminal background. The person went to court to argue their case but they got rejected because the Fair Credit Reporting Act had their information stored. An example of a court case where this happened would be Spokeo Inc vs Robins because in this case Thomas Robins sued the Spokeo business. He claimed that the company had violated FCRA because it published false information about him on their website.

How it affects consumers:
It helps the consumers by verifying the accuracy of their report. They will also be aware if the information in their file has been used against them. This usually happens when people apply for credit or other transactions. It also helps to remove outdated information. An example of a court case that happened was TransUnion LLC vs Ramirez. Sergio Ramirez could not buy a car after TransUnion mistakenly wrote on his credit report that his name was found in the U.S. list of suspected terrorists and criminals. He decided to sue them because they didn't follow the right procedures according to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Revisions:
Recently, a number of new regulations associated with the Fair Credit Reporting Act have been started due to COVID 19 have been enacted to help the current financial burden many Americans were facing. An example would be the Fannie Mae Freddie Mac and Veterans Administration announced significant policy changes for credit reporting loans which helped homeowners unable to pay their mortgage.

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
1.
http://kittell-law.com/recent-lawsuits/recent-fair-credit-r eporting-act-cases/
2. https://www.esrcheck.com/wordpress/2021/06/28/u-s-su preme-court-rules-fcra-case/
3. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/13-1339

Sources (links):
1) https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fair-credit-reporti ng-act-fcra.asp.
2) https://www.natlawreview.com/article/recap-changes-tofair-credit-reporting-act-wake-unprecedented-covid-19-p andemic
3) https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/consumers-and-commu nities/consumer-protection/credit-reporting/index-creditreporting.html
4) https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-297_4 g25.pdf

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Year established:
1969

What led up to the creation:
Over the entirety of the twentieth century, American corporations and the government itself were expanding with heavy industrialization. In the 50’s and especially 60’s, American citizens and political leaders were responding by voicing concern for environmental conservation/protection. This included the establishing of several national parks, several failed bills for environmental protection, and eventually NEPA.

What is the purpose:
Also called the “Magna Carta,” the Nixon-signed bill was passed for the purpose of holding federal projects accountable for their environmental impact following pollution in Colorado rivers among other pollutive federal projects. Ensuring that government projects don’t do more harm than good in shoving aside the environment for a specific goal.

How it affects businesses:
This act was used to halt the expansion of environmentally costly, corporately backed transmission lines in the James river in Virginia in the Dominion Energy vs Virginia case. Forced review of environmental factors have also lead to impressive transportation infrastructure on Colorado’s I-70 Mountain Corridor following the Sierra club vs Colorado case. It has also streamlined transportation through its influence in constructing the Everglades Parkway and it’s interconnecting roads during the City Of Miami vs Florida Development case.

How it affects employees:
This policy has halted many projects to the detriment of construction workers in the case of the James River project mentioned above. For the Colorado project, the forced review likely saved lives from being lost doing shoddy work on volatile terrain. Employees are also able to travel freely across the Everglades Parkway.

How it affects consumers:
It has prevented unnecessary pollution in the James river, it has created safer road systems on Colorado’s I-70, and it has done lots for common transport via the Everglades Parkway.

Revisions:
This legislation was amended in 1970 in response to public criticism that it did not do enough to protect the jeopardized air quality in many major cities like New York. Beyond that, the policy has remained largely unchanged, serving as a broad measure to ensure accountability and due diligence for all American projects that affect the environment.

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
1. https://protectnepa.org/alligator-alley-75-extension-everglades-parkway/
2. https://protectnepa.org/colorado-interstate-70/
3. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/benefits-nepa-environmental-review-empowers-communities-produces-better-projects/

Sources (links):
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/16/2020-15179/update-to-the-regulations-implementing-the-procedural-provisions-of-the-national-environmental

https://www.historylink.org/File/9903

https://ceq.doe.gov/

https://www.gsa.gov/real-estate/environmental-programs/national-environmental-policy-act

https://www.americanprogress.org/article/benefits-nepa-environmental-review-empowers-communities-produces-better-projects/

https://protectnepa.org/colorado-interstate-70/

https://protectnepa.org/alligator-alley-75-extension-everglades-parkway/

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Alligator Alley: the I-75 extension through the Everglades

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Thanks to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the I-75 extension included numerous design elements tailored to minimize impacts on the natural environment.

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Everglades Parkway: the I-75 extension through Alligator Alley

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Year established: 1972

What led up to the creation: The Consumer Product Safety Commission  was established in 1972 with the passage of the Consumer Product Safety Act.

What is the purpose: The primary responsibility of the CPSC is to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury that could occur during the use of consumer products.

How it affects businesses: Issuing and enforcing mandatory standards; banning consumer products if no standard would adequately protect the public.

How it affects employees: By making these products being manufactured safer for the general public it is also making them less dangerous for the employees manufacturing them. This is only true for some of the products because of the limited jurisdiction of the CPSC.

How it affects consumers: The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) protects the public from unreasonable risks of serious injury or death from thousands of types of consumer products under its jurisdiction, including products that pose a fire, electrical, chemical, or mechanical hazard or can injure children. The complaint filed against Dr.Reddy states that his laboratories violated the Consumer Product Safety Act by manufacturing drugs that did not meet the requirements.

Revisions: There are no court cases regarding the revision of the agency because there is no need because the only revision that takes place is the changing of bosses. For the first time since February 2017, when then-Chairman Elliot Kaye stepped down as leader of the agency, the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has a permanent chairman. On October 7, 2021, the U.S. Senate confirmed Alexander Hoehn-Saric as Chairman (and Commissioner) of the CPSC by voice vote. Some accomplishments are that in 2010, CPSC created the Office of Education, Global Outreach, and Small Business Ombudsman to coordinate and provide outreach to various domestic and international stakeholders, including manufacturers, retailers, resellers, small businesses, and foreign governments.  The office is dedicated to addressing the questions and concerns of the regulated community. CPSC created a full-time Small Business Ombudsman position in FY 2011 to serve the nation’s many small businesses in the area of product safety.

Links to three (3) court cases that have involved this agency, policy, law, or regulation:
1. The complaint filed against Dr.Reddy states that his laboratories violated the Consumer Product Safety Act by manufacturing drugs that did not meet the requirements.

2. The Consumer Product Safety Commission has sued Amazon to pressure the retail giant to recall hundreds of thousands of potentially hazardous products
3. Sarah L. Wilson Lawsuit against chicken manufactures

Sources (links): https://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/consumer-product-safety-commission-cpsc.html#:~:text=The%20Consumer%20Product%20Safety%20Commission,the%20use%20of%20consumer%20products.

https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/consumer-product-safety-commission

https://www.cpsc.gov/Safety-Education/Safety-Guides/General-Information/Who-We-Are---What-We-Do-for-You