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ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 707-321B HK-2016 Cove Neck, NY

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A Boeing 707-321B passenger plane, registered HK-2016, was destroyed in an accident at Cove Neck, NY, United States of America. There were 149 passengers and nine crew members on board. The airplane operated on a flight from Rionegro/Medellín-José María Córdova Airport (MDE) to New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK).

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This Boeing 707 was built in 1967, it had old-style Turbo Jet engines which were outfitted with Hush Kits that increased fuel consumption by 5%. This would have made the ATC believe the plane's loiter time would be higher than what it actually was.

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The Avianca Flight 52 aircraft was a Boeing 707-321B ( registration number HK-2016). The aircraft was manufactured in June 1967 and was purchased by Avianca from Pan Am in 1977. By the time of the crash, the aircraft was 22 years old and had over 61,000 flight hours.

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Even though the aircraft was 40 miles from JFK airport, it was also 65 miles from Philadelphia Airport. It could have been rerouted to Philly for a safe landing. Delays due to severe northeast weather still an issue.

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But it is increasingly clear to the investigators that the plane's crew had reliable information throughout the flight about how much fuel was on board, how much would be needed under normal circumstances to reach Kennedy International Airport from Colombia and how much was consumed by repeated delays en route.

Based on interviews with the investigators, surviving passengers and airline pilots in Colombia and other knowledgeable people, here is the chronology of Avianca Flight 52.

The 23-year-old Boeing 707 jet began its trip in Bogota, the capital of Colombia, stopping in Medellin to pick up passengers and fuel.

A Few Smugglers on Board

It carried tourists and business executives, innocents and rogues. Many of the children on board were being adopted in the United States. Among the children were eight less than 2 years old. Among the adults were a few smuggling cocaine in their intestines, with the narcotic enclosed in condom-like containers.

The plane landed in Medellin at 2:04 P.M. after a half-hour hop. As it touched down, it carried 67,200 pounds of fuel, or about 10,000 gallons. (Airlines typically measure fuel in pounds, not gallons.) The 707 could hold 23,855 gallons of fuel, but the 2,400-mile trip to New York would not call for nearly that much. A standard flight plan for 707 flights from Medellin to New York, published by the International Civil Aviation Organization, calls for more than 11,000 gallons of fuel. That is enough to fly beyond Kennedy to an alternative airport 200 miles away, like the one at Boston, and to circle for at least a half hour.

To be on the safe side, Avianca pilots usually add 10 percent to the standard plan. In Medellin, Flight 52's crew took on 14,814 pounds, or more than 2,200 gallons. That put its fuel load at just over 82,000 pounds, or more than 12,000 gallons.

Planes can burn a lot of fuel on the runway, waiting to take off. But Flight 52 took off at 3:08 P.M., just a few minutes late, and its crew estimated at the time that it still had more than 12,000 gallons on board.

Weather in Northeast Presages Delays in Flight

As the plane took off, the northeastern United States was already having bad weather that would worsen throughout the day, affecting every major airport in the region. In Boston that afternoon and evening, 53 flights were delayed. At Kennedy, 99 planes were delayed. At Philadelphia, there were 161 delays, at La Guardia 200, and at Newark 203.

Flight 52 first checked in with the United States air traffic control system after passing Cuba. At high altitudes the crew had little communication with controllers in Miami or Jacksonville, Fla. When the plane entered airspace controlled by the regional station at Leesburg, Va. - the station known as the Washington En Route Center - the crew was told to circle because there was a growing backup of traffic at New York.

Flight 52 held for about 16 minutes near Norfolk, Va. The crew asked the Washington regional center if there would be any further delays. They were told to expect 30 minutes of delay in the New York area. Then they were directed to proceed up the coast to New Jersey.

The movie was about to end, and the long delays were about to begin.

When Flight 52 arrived near Atlantic City, it was only 80 miles from Kennedy, a distance it could have flown in a matter of minutes. But to get there, it would have to follow the aerial equivalent of spiral staircases in a grand mansion, moving from one floor to another only with the permission of controllers in various rooms of the house.

Investigators and air traffic controllers say the plane was held three times: once at Norfolk for 16 minutes, once near Atlantic City for 27 minutes, and once 40 miles south of Kennedy for 46 minutes, or a total of 89 minutes, all because of the backup at New York. It then took another 37 minutes to get to Kennedy, and after the crew missed their first attempt to land, the jet spent another 10 minutes circling for a second attempt before it crashed.

But it is simpler to envision the plane moving progressively down the spiral staircase of the control system, passing from the control of one station to another as it approached the ground floor at Kennedy's runway.

That would take a long time, because other aircraft - emerging from other corridors in the same mansion - were all planning to use the same single, narrow staircase to the ground. Because of the bad weather that day, Kennedy Airport had just one runway open. Thirty-three planes were trying to land there each hour.

Crew Checks Fuel As Long Delays Begin

At each major navigational fix during the voyage, the flight engineer was supposed to look at the plane's fuel gauges and mark consumption on a printout of the flight plan. His notations showed that when the plane reached the holding point off Atlantic City, it had 2,500 gallons. At 7:42 P.M., the plane was cleared to begin descending from 37,000 feet.

Passengers say it was shortly afterward - perhaps around 8 P.M. - that a crew member announced that the flight would be delayed for 20 minutes.

''He never talked to us again,'' Mr. Lozano recalled from his hospital bed.

At about 8 P.M. the plane had descended several thousand feet and had moved about 40 miles closer to Kennedy into a new holding pattern. The lower altitude was a sign that the flight was nearing its end. And because of the change in altitude, the control of the plane was handed from the Washington regional center to controllers in the New York regional center, near Islip, L.I.

One of those controllers was handling four aircraft in a holding pattern, including Flight 52. His plan was to let each plane descend in a gentle spiral, then to hand them off in turn to local controllers managing the approach to Kennedy. But the local controllers were overwhelmed by traffic arriving from other directions, and the regional controller repeatedly told Flight 52 that it would have to keep circling.

As the plane circled, passengers began to worry. ''It was getting close to 9 o'clock,'' Mr. Lozano said. ''I started to get nervous, because we had been circling for over an hour.''

Other Avianca pilots, interviewed in Colombia, said such long delays are not common. Capt. Pedro Tapias of Avianca, who often flies to Kennedy, said that the normal holding time is ''a maximum of 20 to 30 minutes, but never one hour and 30 minutes. Never, never, never. In a 727, 707, 747, 767, never, never.''

At about 8:46, the Avianca plane's crew sought an end to the holding patterns.

''I think we need priority,'' a crew member, most likely the first officer, said to the regional controller.

''How long can you hold and what is your alternate?'' the controller asked, thinking that because of the crowding at Kennedy, it might be necessary to divert the plane to another airport.

''We'll be able to hold about five minutes, that's all we can do,'' the crew member responded. Asked repeatedly by the controller about his alternative destination, he finally responded: ''It was Boston, but we can't do it now; we would run out of fuel now.''

Experts say that response indicates that the crew, calculating that it would take 20 minutes to reach the Boston area and another half hour to approach the airport there, knew that they no longer had more than 50 minutes of fuel on board.

Avianca pilots say their standard practice is to seek priority rather than to declare an emergency in such a situation. Captain Tapias said the pilots would declare ''minimum fuel'' only when they had less than 1,000 pounds, or less than 150 gallons, of fuel in each tank. ''You are in a real, real emergency,'' he said. ''In that case you are No. 1 one to land.''

In any event, the plane was immediately cleared to leave the holding pattern at 11,000 feet at a speed of 180 knots, and the crew was advised to get in touch with local controllers handling approaching traffic for Kennedy and other nearby airports.

However, the regional controllers never passed along the crucial information provided by the Avianca crew: that the plane was so short of fuel that it could not make Boston.

Indeed, local controllers may have gotten the opposite impression from the regional controllers, one of whom said Flight 52 ''can only do five more minutes in the hold; do you think you can take him or do I offer him his alternate?''

The Avianca pilots were not put first in line to land at Kennedy. Indeed, because of the bad weather, they were put at the end of a line that was longer than usual.

Tricky Winds Reported On Approach to Airport

Not only was just one runway open, but the winds were tricky. The crew of a DC-10 jet near the airport at the time had clocked the winds at an altitude of 2,000 feet at 70 knots, coming from 260 degrees, nearly due west. At the runway, the winds were 20 knots, coming from 190 degrees, or nearly due south. Planes approaching the single runway would be heading in at 220 degrees, and the crews could expect the blustery wind to swing across the jet's nose and to change speed. The visibility on the runway was less than half a mile. The cloud ceiling was as low as 200 feet.

Planes were feeding into a single line of approach from four converging files. The path the Avianca jet took was northward over Long Island in a huge hook. As it passed along the North Shore of the Island, heading west, it had to follow air traffic control instructions putting it several miles behind the preceding airplane. Other flights would be folded into its path, slowing its progress even more.

About 15 minutes after getting in line, the crew members spoke among themselves about their dwindling fuel supply. What they said is not yet known; a cockpit recording of the flight's last half hour will be released in several weeks. But they did not talk to air traffic controllers about their worry. The time was about 9:10.

The plane just ahead of Flight 52, an American Airlines jet, also had fuel problems. Its crew told controllers that in 14 minutes they planned to declare a fuel emergency.

A Missed Landing Adds to the Delays

The Avianca jet's final minutes went swiftly. Following an electronic beacon toward the runway, the crew could not see the runway below. Warning devices told them they were dropping too fast.

At 9:24 the pilot decided he was unable to land. He added power to the engines and began to climb. At low altitude, this maneuver burned fuel fast.

Immediately he was given detailed instructions by air traffic controllers: Climb to 3,000 feet and make four left turns, first to a heading of 80 degrees, then 340 degrees, and then 250 degrees, at which point he would intercept the airport's approach path and turn a final time to 220 degrees.

Twice in these moments, the crew told controllers that they were running low on fuel. But they did not declare an emergency, nor did they object to their newly assigned route, which although it was a tighter circle than the first approach, still took them out over the Long Island Sound.

''Did you tell them we have an emergency?'' the pilot asked his co-pilot, who was handling communications with the controllers.

''I told them we're low on fuel,'' he answered. A source, who was not identified, recounted the exchange to The Associated Press.

Flight 52's last ''squawk'' from its internal tracking beacon put it at 2,900 feet. The time was 9:32. Amateur radio operators who happened to be listening heard the crew say that two engines had failed and that fuel was running out.

Inside the plane, soft music played until 9:34, passengers said. Before Flight 52 clipped the treetops of Cove Neck, passengers had no warning other than silence and a few moments of darkness in the cabin.

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Avianca Flight 52: The Delays That Ended in Disaster

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But it is increasingly clear to the investigators that the plane's crew had reliable information throughout the flight about how much fuel was on board, how much would be needed under normal circumstances to reach Kennedy International Airport from Colombia and how much was consumed by repeated delays en route.

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Too much time circling

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27 years ago today, Avianca Flight 52 (HK-2016) was a scheduled passenger flight from El Dorado International Airport, Colombia to John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York with a stopover at José María Córdova International Airport, Colombia. The Boeing 707-321B was carrying 149 passengers & 9 crew members. HK-2016, the accident aircraft involved. ACCIDENT
Avianca Flight 52 departed El Dorado at 13:10 EST, five minutes ahead of schedule. The flight landed at its stopover at José María Córdova and prepared to fly to John F. Kennedy. The aircraft landed with 67,000lbs of fuel. At 15:08 EST Avianca Flight 52 took off from José María Córdova with approximately 81,000lbs of fuel on board.

When arriving near New York, the aircraft entered 3 holding patterns due to poor weather conditions. The first for 19 minutes over Norfolk, the second for 29 minutes over New Jersey and the third pattern over the CAMRN intersection for 29 minutes. Over CAMRN the aircraft descended from 14,000 ft to 11,000 ft. At 20:44:43, while holding at CAMRN for 26 minutes, the New York ARTCC radar controller advised Avianca Flight 52 to expect further clearance at 21:05. At that moment the Avianca crew advised ATC that they could only hold for 5 more minutes and that their alternate Boston, couldn't be reached anymore due to the low state of fuel.

The flight left the holding pattern at 20:47 and the crew contacted the New York TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) who guided Avianca 52 for a runway 22L ILS approach. On finals, at 21:15 the crew contacted JFK Tower and they were cleared to land four minutes later. Due to the bad weather (300 ft ceiling, 400 m visibility, runway visual range of 2400 ft and wind shear of 10 kt) the crew had to carry out a missed approach at 21:23. ATC vectored the crew for another approach.

At about 21:32, 12 miles South East of JFK, engines 3 and 4 flamed out. Shortly afterward followed by the remaining two. At 21:34, heading 250 and flaps at 14 and gear up, the aircraft impacted on a hillside in a wooded residential area on the north shore of Long Island. The starboard side of the forward fuselage impacted and fractured the wooden deck of a residential home.

Of the 158 people on board, 73 died as a result of the crash. The lead flight attendant was the only crew member to survive. Of the surviving passengers, 73 adults and children over three years sustained serious injuries, while two sustained minor injuries. Of the 11 infants, two sustained minor injuries, eight were seriously injured and one, Kenneth Fernando Martinez, the four-month-old son of Gloria L. Martinez, died. The most common serious injuries were multiple lower leg fractures and dislocations, spinal fractures, hip fractures, head injuries and multiple lacerations and contusions.
INVESTIGATION
The investigation into the crash of Avianca Flight 52 was led by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

The NTSB found severe damage on the floor of the cabin, leading many passengers seats to fracture where the legs met the floor track. This fracturing permitted many of the seats to come loose during the impact and aggravated the passengers' injuries. The report posits that the passengers' legs hit the lower seat frames in front of them. At the same time, the seat collapsed and twisted downward and to the left, likely causing hip and spinal fractures. As the impact progressed, the seats now separated, flung passengers forward into each other as well as into the other wreckage, causing head injuries and laceration.

Passengers holding onto infants reported being unable to either prevent their children from being ejected from their grasp in the impact or locate their children in the darkness afterward. The NTSB held that, had the children been in FAA-approved child seats, many injuries might have been mitigated. Rescuers remarked that some infants were found smiling or seemingly unharmed. The NTSB was unable to accurately chart where individual passengers were seated because Avianca only assigned seats to few passengers and many who were assigned reported moving after takeoff.

The cockpit was severely damaged in the impact. It struck an oak tree which penetrated the area occupied by Klotz and Moyano. All the seats occupied by the flight crew were found outside the cockpit. Neither of the pilots' had shoulder straps as were required by United States domestic passenger flights. At least one flight crew member was airlifted to Nassau County Medical Center. The NTSB report states that all of the flight crew "died from blunt force head and upper torso trauma." Five flight attendants also died from blunt force trauma to the limbs, abdomen, chest and head.

They concluded that the probable cause was the failure of the flight crew to adequately manage the aircraft fuel load and their failure to communicate an emergency fuel situation to air traffic control before fuel exhaustion occurred. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew failure to use an airline operational control dispatch system to assist them during the international flight into a high-density airport in poor weather.

Also contributing to the accident was inadequate traffic flow management by the FAA and the lack of standardized understandable terminology for pilots and controllers for minimum and emergency fuel states. The safety board also determines that windshear, crew fatigue, and stress were factors that led to the unsuccessful completion of the first approach and thus contributed to the accident.
Article By: @AirCrashMayday
Sources: Wikipedia, AviationSafety

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#OnThisDay in 1990, Avianca Flight 52 runs out of fuel over New York - Aviation news and services

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27 years ago today, Avianca Flight 52 (HK-2016) was a scheduled passenger flight from El Dorado International Airport, Colombia to John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York with a stopover at José María Córdova International Airport, Colombia. The Boeing 707-321B was carrying 149 passengers & 9 crew members.

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Language Barriers and Lack of Systems Thinking

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Language Barriers and Lack of Systems Thinking

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Flight crew could not accurately communicate fuel level condition to ATC. Lack of defined terminology for pilots and controllers for minimum and emergency fuel states.

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Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to use an airline operational control dispatch system to assist them during the international flight into a high-density airport in poor weather.