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Sources B and E challenge the view by insinuating that it was the Philippines that took aggressive military actions against Malaysia.

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On the other hand, Sources B and E challenge the view that the Philippines sought peaceful resolution of the Sabah dispute with Malaysia as the Philippines refused to resolve the dispute without resorting to violent means by engaging in military confrontation.

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Both sources A and C support the view that the Philippines sought peaceful resolution of the Sabah dispute with Malaysia.

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Sources A, and C support the hypothesis as they say that Philippines sought peaceful resolution of the Sabah dispute with Malaysia

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Sources A, C and D support the view that the Philippines sought peaceful resolution of the Sabah dispute with Malaysia

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Sources A and D support the hypothesis that the Philippines sought peaceful resolution of the Sabah dispute with Malaysia.

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Source B states that ‘ I read in it a wilful and cynical design to set us on an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with Malaysia, a game of nerves likely to set the 2 countries on a fearsome collision course’ this shows that the aggression makes it hard to avoid the conflict initiated by the Philippines.
Source E says that ‘ they were to infiltrate into sabah after training to prepare groundwork for the takeover of sabah by force as the philippines believed it would now be impossible to obtain from malaysia a ‘legal statement’ in their claim to sabah’ this shows that the philippines was aggressive and wanted to use force to annex sabah from malaysia by making them the aggressors

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Source B states ‘Mr. Marcos has turned Sabah into a slogan of hate, a battle cry of indignation, a call to arms’. Similarly, Source E states that the Philippines government ‘has trained a number of Southern Filipino Muslims’, who were to ‘infiltrate into Sabah after training to prepare groundwork for the takeover of Sabah by force’. Both Sources B and E reflect how the Philippines state has made concerted efforts to pursue violent means to assert ownership over Sabah, thus directly provoking Malaysia instead of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Sabah dispute.

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This is evident in Source A, "The three Ministers agreed to intensify the joint and individual efforts of their countries to secure lasting peace" and that "In this context, Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories". This explains that the Philippines was interested in cooperating with Malaysia to solve the Sabah dispute, as long as Malaysia respected Sabah's views. Similarly, Source C states, "the Philippines will be prepared to abide by whatever decision that judicial body may render" as it is "committed to the principle of self-determination and would be prepared to ensure the observance of that principle in Sabah". This indicates that the Philippines was willing to solve the Sabah dispute very amicably, considering that they were willing to accept all conclusions and decisions made by an advisory as long as Sabah's voices are heard.

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I know this as it is mentioned in source A, " Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority." This implies that the Philippines have no objections to the formation of Malaysia as long as their requirements were met. While in source C, it was mentioned that, " In that case that Malaysia agrees to elevate the dispute to the International court of justice, the Philippines will be prepared to abide by whatever decision thatcthe judicial body May render." This implies that the Philippines we're willing to resolve the issue diplomatically with Malaysia as long as they have an agreement. After so, then they would accept the fact of Sabah being a part of Malaysia.Overall, the 'support' sources agree that the Philippines sought peaceful resolution of the Sabah dispute with Malaysia.

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Source A states that Indonesia and the Philippines agreed "they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority,". This suggests that Philippines was open to resolving the conflict diplomatically and fairly to all parties. Similarly in Source C, this is evident from how the Philippines was “prepared to abide by whatever decision that judicial body may render.” This reflects that the Philippines wished to bring this dispute up to the “International Court of Justice”, in hopes that tensions between them and Malaysia will be resolved, and will not retaliate if the outcome is not to their advantage. Moreover, D also states that General Romulo "agreed that in the spirit of goodwill and friendship diplomatic relations between Malaysia and Philippines will be normalised." This hughlights that philippines was willing to be the bigger party in the discussion and overlook the past altercations it had with malaysia in order to achieve regional stability for all.

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Source A supports the view that the Philippines sought peaceful resolution through diplomatic methods as seen where the Philippines would “welcome the formatio of Malaysia procided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertainrd by an independent and impartial authority”. This indicated the Philippines’ willingness to resolve their conflicts over Sabah peacefully.
Source D corroborates Source A’s claim to resolve conflict through diplomatic discussions. This can be seen in Source D, “as a result of discussions with General Romulo, it is agreed that in the spirit of goodwill and friendship diplomatic relations between Malaysia and Philippines will be normalised.” supports Source A’s claim to resolve disputes such as the formation of Malaysia, including Sabah.

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My contextual knowledge challenges sources A and C because although Sabah joined the Malaysia federation, the Philippines refused to recognize the existence of Malaysia till 1966. Moreover, the Marcos constitution of 1972, openly defined Sabah as part of the Philippines territory. Hence, it can be seen that Sources A and C are highly unreliable as Philippines did not honour the agreements.

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Source A may seem reliable as it is taken from the manila accords on 31 July 1963, since it is an international agreement signed by Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, the contents inside is ascertained by all parties and recognised as factual. Source C is largely not credible as it is a speech by the Philippines Foreign Secretary to the United Nations General Assembly on 15 October 1968 who is likely to portray Philippines more favourably and amicable on the international stage in order to build a good and friendly image of themselves. This way they can appeal to other countries to eecognise Philippines' claim on Sabah under the decision made in the 1968 congress. D is by tunku abdul rahman, PM of malaysia's address at the third ASEAN ministerial meeting in Cameron highlands in december 1969. To ensure continued regional stability and the maintenance of the status quo, tunku abdul rahman may downplay the aggressive and hostile actions of philippines and only focus on their attempts to reconcile. hence D is also less reliable.

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My contextual knowledge corroborates Source E as  the Corregidor affair in March 1968 + failed negotiations at ASEAN committee meeting in Bangkok showed that the ultimate obstacle to the complete resolution of the problem is the lack of renunciation of The Philippines’ part to completely give up its claim to Sabah.

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Source A is taken from the 1963 Manila Accords which was largely not upheld by the Philippines as cross referred to Source E that depicts Macapagal and Sukarno tearing up the Manila Accord agreement. While on paper the Philippines seems agreeable with the formation of Malaysia, contextual knowledge corroborates that the Philippines were not happy about it in reality, seen by how they refused to recognize the existence of Malaysia till 1966. Hence, despite what source A suggests, it largely deviates with the reality of the Sabah dispute, making source A largely unreliable. Source C is unreliable because contextual knowledge shows that in the same year the speech was made, it was found that the Philippine army had been sponsoring a training camp for an intended Sabah separatist rebellion in Corregidor, opposing the view that the Philippines were truly committed to letting an international body regulate the dispute.

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Source A appears to be credible (but you just used ck to say A is unreliable - pls keep your story straight) as it is an extract from the Manila Accord signed on 31 July 1963, it is an official document of the agreements between Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines. Source C appears to be less credible as it was a speech made by the Philippines Foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos to the United Nations General Assembly on 15 October 1968. Ramos may have had a vested interest in portraying Philippines in a good light to the members of the Assembly, and hence may have portrayed Philippines to be non-confrontational in that speech.(you might also want to take note of the year of the source to make further inferences as to the intentions of the author)

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The 'support' sources are largely unreliable when compared with contextual knowledge. Source A is taken from the Manila Accords in 1963 which states that the phillipines did not have much disagreements with the formation of malaysia. However, from my contextual knowledge, the philippines did not uphold their part of the agreement in the Manila Accords as they passed a law in 1968, affirming claim on Sabah and also openly defined Sabah as part of Philippine territory in the Marcos Constitution of 1972 which suggests the philippines were actually not agreeable with the formation of Malaysia, hence implying that Source A is largely unreliable. Similarly, source C is largely unreliable because it does not match with my contextual knowledge. In source C, the philippines seemed to be cooperative and peaceful in response to the formation of Malaysia. However, in 1968, the same year the speech was made, the philippine army under Marcos attempted to pursue its claim by sponsoring a training camp for an intended Sabah separatist rebellion in Corregidor. Hence, the 'support' sources is largely unreliable according to contextual knowledge.

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Source A provides a more credible view as contextual knowledge corroborates the Philippines recognition of Sabah’s inclusion in the formation of Malaysia in 1966. This is due to the fact that the formation of Malaysia would have paved the way to the formation of ASEAN in 1967, which they believed would have been a defence mechanism specifically due to the rising threat of communist expansionism in Southeast Asia at the time.
Source D can be seen as less credible. Contextual knowledge undermines Source D’s claims on the peaceful relations between Philippines and Malaysia, as in 1972 the Philippines constitution openly defines Sabah as part of the Philippines. This contradicts Source D’s claim of overcoming problems such as the dispute over Sabah.

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Source B appears to offer a less credible perspective because Source B is by Philippine senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr who would have incentive to portray Marcos as being aggressive since they are political rivals. However, with Source B's audience being the citizens of the Philippines, the source would lean more towards addressing the needs and concerns of the citizens. With Marcos' aggressive military actions, it poses a threat to the citizens should war break out and thus makes the source more about the citizens than the political rivalry between Benigno and Marcos, the source being more reliable. Source E appears to be less reliable as Source E was an extract from a book by Datu Abdullah Ahmad, a political advisor to the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and so it is incentivised to paint Malaysia as a victim and put the totality of the conflict onto the Philippines. Nevertheless, Source E is ultimately more reliable since it was published in 1985 and is able to take into account more events compared to Source A in 1963.

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Source B was a speech by Philippine Senator Benigno S Aquino Jr. As he was a senator who often spoke out against the authoritarian rule of President Marcos since coming to power in 1967, he would likely be critical of Marcos by portraying him as an aggressive leader who had escalated tensions between Malaysia and Philippines. Furthermore, this speech was delivered on 5 October 1968, following the Corregidor incident in March 1968. Thus, Senator Aquino Jr would have a higher incentive to highlight the threat that Marcos poses as a leader as the incident can be considered  an act of aggression from Philippines. By delivering this speech to a civic group, he aims to persuade Filipinos to stop supporting Marcos as president.
For source E, it was a book published by the political advisor to Malaysian Deputy Prime minister Tun Razak. As a political advisor who supported Tun Razak’s political party, he would aim to defend Malaysia by portraying themselves as the more compliant party who was willing to negotiate peacefully. In doing so, it would push the blame onto Philippines for their failure to come to a peaceful resolution.

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Although Source A was taken from the Manila Accord, which is a formal and official document of agreement in terms of cooperating with one another by the Ministers of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, the Philippines would have been incentivised to publicly agree to making peaceful efforts, in order to work together with the 2 other states. This is done in order to make the Philippines look like a very cooperative and harmonious country, thus putting the country in a much better light.

Furthermore, source C is a speech made by the Philippines’ foreign secretary to the United Nations General Assembly so it is unlikely that he would want to paint the Philippines as uncompromising to representatives from countries around the world. Hence, the foreign secretary would be more inclined to state that the Philippines always wanted to refer the case to the ICJ to make themselves sound more impartial and amicable.

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Source A can be seen as credible due to it being an extract from the Manila Accord and official document signed on 31 July 1963, by the Ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines. Source D can be seen as less credible as it is an address by the Malaysian Prime Minister this suggests that Source D had intended to uphold a peaceful facade to ensure the survival of ASEAN, which was only 2 years old at the time.

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When using contextual knowledge, the purposeful omission of Malaysian aggression does undermine the reliability of the 2 sources. Where the Malaysian government did offer tacit support to the Moro guerrillas like acting as a supply base for secessionist Moro training camps in 1980 which only compounded to the conflict and by not mentioning it served to further the misleading narrative which reduces the reliability of the sources. That said, source B is supported by contextual knowledge where in 1968 the corregidor incident showed that the Philippine army under Marcos attempted to pursue its claim by sponsoring a training camp for an intended sabah separatist rebellion in corregidor, enhancing its reliability.