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The domination of the discourse of securitisation has resulted in many aspects of everyday life becoming something deemed as in need of securing, protecting, mitigating, or simply ‘keeping an eye on’ (Corry, 2011; Krahmann, 2011). However, the concept of “crises” has, to some extent, always possessed some form of “extraordinary” quality due to their oft-associated low-probability, high-impact consequences (Weick, 1988). With the rise of a society premised on elucidating and seeking risks in the everyday life, it is worthwhile investigating whether the concept of a crisis has remained in its own ‘extraordinary bubble’, or whether it, too, has been a victim of conceptual stretching and become usurped by security practitioners to substantiate commodification of certain security-affiliated practices. Whether one adheres to the logic of a risk society or the logic of usurping risk as a means of governance, it is hard to dispute that risk has become a central manifestation in today’s society (Corry, 2011).

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The aim of this second-order analysis is to extrapolate the extent to which the concept of crises has been stretched and framed, thereby justifying expenditures related to security and safekeeping. As Corry (2011) argues, there is increasingly a conceptual blur between the terms “threats” and “risks” with regard to the process of securitisation. The question is, just as risks are, arguably, being “played up” to commodify them (Krahmann, 2011), are crises being “downplayed” to imbue a sense of predictability, thus creating the opportunity for profitability? It is especially relevant to look at different types of security-affiliated organisational structures to answer this question, which is why Control Risks (a consultant company), Aon (a professional services firm), and the Danish Refugee Council (a non-governmental organization) have been chosen as a representative sample for analysis.

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To what extent is the concept of “crises” being stretched and commodified when used by security practitioners?

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A second-order analysis in the lens of Quentin Skinner, associated with the Cambridge School, will be deployed in order to answer the research question at hand regarding the possible stretching of the concept of crises. This relies on a close analysis of intentions of ‘authors’, and an investigation into how concepts are used, as opposed to their surface meaning, in addition to paying close attention in a pointillistic manner – contrasting to Koselleck’s focus on “long-term transformations” (Skinner, 2012, p. 181). Skinner relies on notions of contextualism in order to dissect specific aims and purposes of authors, adhering to a “contextual conception of the history of political thought” (Browning, 2016, p. 68). However, specifically with regard to agency and power, the analysis will draw on some thoughts articulated by Foucault (who also shares an aversion to transhitoricism, as Skinner).

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The consultant company, Control Risks, interestingly adopts a fairly proactive approach to crises at certain points, something which could be considered fairly perplexing taking into account the concept’s predominantly reactive attributes. Namely, if one accepts its definition of being a low-probability, high-impact event, crises are less than likely to be predictable, thus laying the ground for crisis management mainly being something that occurs ex-post, as opposed to ex-ante. An example of this can be seen on the Control Risks website, where it is written that “A key component of being ready for crises and incidents is the clear identification, understanding and management of the risks that pose the greatest threat to your organisation's operations, reputation and brand.” As per definition, crises are much more concerned with what is least expected, as opposed to the risks one already knows pose great threats. However, in another instance, Control Risks writes their crisis management team is there to “bring order to chaos”, clearly implying that such management does indeed take place ex-post.

Nonetheless, as will naturally be the case, crisis management (as offered by security practitioners) will entail a multi-facetted approach to crises, encompassing measures taken before, during, and after such an event. It is nevertheless useful to highlight the variation in the framing of the concept, not just between different organisations, but within organisations themselves. This is interesting to point out due to its problematization of conceptual clarity, alluding to something Antoine Meillet refers to as “semantic bleaching” (as cited in Richter & Richter, 2006, p. 353). This is to say, the distinctive marker that ‘should’ be in place to differentiate crisis management from, say, risk management could be said to be lacking.

Contrastingly, Aon’s approach to the concept of crisis is, quite explicitly, more in line with traditional notions of crises. Take the following quotation, from their Crisis Management Brochure, as an example: “[The Aon team is responsible for] Identifying and understanding these unfamiliar risks and impacts to make better risk vs. reward decisions” (Aon, 2014, p. 33). The use of the adjective ‘unfamiliar’ is congruent with Weick’s definition of crisis, insinuating unpredictability, surprise, and a lack of avenue for systematic quantification of such unfamiliar risks. To further this more nuanced approach to crises, Aon (2014) also makes two more interesting statements: 1) “A crisis may be unpredictable, but it should not be unforeseeable” (p. 3) and 2) “Not all crisis events can be prevented” (p. 31).

DRC adopts a similar approach to Aon in the sense that there is a clear mix between a reactive and proactive stance towards crises. This stance is reflected in the student reports produced for the DRC case, as can be seen in the following example from Team Alpha: “In a situation of a hostile environment and possibly compromised communication channels, the CMT requires reliable ways for crisis communication”. This clearly represents an approach to crises premised on reacting in the present, as opposed to prior such a critical incident occurs.

When one looks from the angle of the student reports produced for Control Risks and Aon, interestingly, there is no mention of crisis management, or mention of crisis in the light of something that can be commodified. Take for example Team Echo’s Control Risks analysis; in this report, the concept of crisis is merely associated with national crises, such as “the ongoing economic crisis in Lebanon”. Of course, this report was tasked to specifically identify threats that might impede organisational operations. Nonetheless, the lack of reference to management of crises stands in stark contrast to Control Risks’s stance themselves.

Similarly, in Team Charlie’s Aon report, the only reference to “crisis” arises in reference to COVID-19. Thus, there is a clear discrepancy between the way the concept of crisis is utilized by security practitioners, on the one hand, and the student reports, on the other.

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“Crisis situations disrupt the status quo, create dilemmas, and produce a fluid environment in which power relations can be re-codified” (Newsander, 2012, p. 557). This power dynamic, stemming from the utilization of the concept of crises by security practitioners,  has been the subject of analytical gaze in this second-order analysis. Of course, as an organisation offering some form of security service, their main value propositions are going to revolve around the ability to “resolve”, “manage”, or “control” crises. Nevertheless, the purpose of this analysis was to look at the varying ways that heterogeneous organisational structures approach this and in what ways the concept of a crisis is conveyed. The most interesting juxtaposition rose between the two private companies Control Risks and Aon. Whereas the former adopts a fairly proactive approach, straying from the widely-used interpretation of crises, the latter has a fairly nuanced approach, more congruent with crises being characterised by their low-predictability and high-impact nature. The two companies also stand in contrast to the student reports produced for them, that only refer to crises with regard to a national or even global nature. This multilayered dimension of the concept of crisis is not a driver of conceptual stretching as much as security practitioners’ framing of such.

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