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Es considerado el filósofo más importante después de los antiguos filósofos griegos

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Fue una figura destacada de la filosofía moderna , se basó en el racionalismo y el empirismo.

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Nació el 22 de abril de 1724,Su padre fue un fabricante de arneses y sillas de montar, además; su madre quien fue su mentora y maestra fue la primera que creyó en Kant. A los 16 años empezó a estudiar en la universidad gracias a que un sacerdote observó el gran talento intelectual que Immanuel tenía.

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KANT en 15 minutos (Explicación ANIMADA punto por punto)

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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-science/

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His solution to the vis viva dispute is especially interesting, because it presages his later approach to philosophical controversy. Rather than offering a conclusive argument in favor of one position, Kant seeks to mediate between the two parties, Leibnizian and Cartesian. He argues that each measure of force is correct, but in different contexts. Kant distinguishes two ways of studying bodies, "mathematical" and "metaphysical," and claims that they presuppose distinct conceptions of body. According to mathematical mechanics, a body cannot accelerate unless an external cause acts on it; for that reason, Kant declares, the Cartesians' quantity is the only one appropriate measure of force in this context. "Natural bodies," in contrast, have features that mathematics brackets. One such feature is a capacity for "vivification," whereby a body increases by itself the force of motion that an external cause merely "awakens." In light of that, Kant concludes, the Leibnizian quantity mv ² is the correct measure of force in metaphysical considerations of "natural bodies" (1:140f).

Kant develops his account of the nature of substance in greater detail in A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition (1755). While the first two sections of this work undertake revisions of Wolff's principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason, the third section argues for two substantive principles that are alleged to follow from the principle of sufficient (or rather, following Crusius, determining) reason, namely the principles of succession and coexistence. The main thrust of the principle of succession is directed against Leibnizian pre-established harmony, arguing that only causal connections between substances can bring about changes in their states. Kant's position appears to be designed to account primarily for changes of bodily states (with changes in mental states being parasitic upon them, as was explicitly asserted in the True Estimation). For he maintains that mutual changes of state require mutual interaction, where it is clear that changes in motion are precisely the kind of mutual change that he has in mind (since one body cannot move closer to another without the other body moving closer to it). The principle of coexistence then argues that harmonious causal interaction between otherwise isolated, independently existing substances is possible only by means of God's coordination (just as Leibniz thought was required for harmonious relations between the states of such substances).

In addition to these works, which bridge the gap, as it were, between physics and metaphysics, during this period Kant is interested in a series of specific issues in cosmology and empirical physics. For example, Kant writes several short exclusively scientific essays between 1754 to 1757, including "Brief Outline of Certain Meditations on Fire," "Investigation of the question of whether the Earth has suffered changes in its axial Rotation," "The Question of the Aging of the Earth, considered physically" as well as three papers on earthquakes. Of much greater significance is his Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755), which represents an important contribution to science as such. For in it Kant explains how one can account for the formation of the solar system from an initial state, in which matter is dispersed like a cloud, solely by means of the interaction of attractive and repulsive forces. In 1796, Laplace, unaware of Kant's argument, would develop a very similar derivation, with the result that the view is now typically referred to as the Kant-Laplace nebular hypothesis.

Some of Kant's youthful insights have yielded long-lasting contributions to scientific knowledge. His intuition that tides slow down the Earth's rotation over time is correct. In his New Remarks toward an Elucidation of the theory of Winds, Kant correctly explained that North-South winds in our hemisphere suffer a Coriolis deflection due to the Earth's rotation. Moreover, broadly Kantian accounts of planetary formation have been the dominant model since the emergence of sophisticated nebular models in the 1970s (see, e.g., Safronov 1972 and Prentice 1978).

Later in his pre-Critical period (1763-1770), Kant attempts to build a comprehensive metaphysical account on the basis of the framework that he had established in his first works. Thus, in his The Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763) he attempts to extend his reasoning to fundamental issues in both philosophical theology and teleology, presenting, for the first time, his now famous criticisms of the three traditional arguments for the existence of God, while developing a new theistic proof, based on the idea that God is necessary as a real ground of the possibilities of things. After reading Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding in German translation sometime after 1755, Kant distinguishes between real and logical grounds/opposition in his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (1763) to avoid Hume's objection that there is no logical contradiction in the existence of one thing not following the existence of another. But in this work he is also interested in exploring the notion of a real ground/opposition further by applying it more widely, e.g., to bodies, mental states, etc. Also relevant is Kant's Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Distinction of the Directions in Space (1768) which modifies his earlier account of space insofar as he seems to hold that certain spatial properties - viz., chirality, or handedness - may not be able to be explained entirely in terms of direct relations between material substances. In his so-called Inaugural Dissertation (1770), Kant continues to develop a more comprehensive philosophical system, which would encompass the principles of both the sensible and the intelligible world, and in so doing modifies his account of space and time even further. Over the course of the next ten years, during which he published almost nothing, Kant would revise his views more systematically, with the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 representing the first major step in his "critical turn."

Adickes (1924), Harman (1982), Friedman (1992), Laywine (1993), Schönfeld (2000), Kuehn (2001), Lefevre & Wunderlich (2000), and Watkins (1997, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2013) have emphasized the importance of scientific issues in the development of Kant's thought during his pre-Critical period, as he reacted to Leibniz, Newton and other, more immediate predecessors (such as Christian Wolff, Christian August Crusius, Leonard Euler, Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, and Martin Knutzen). Smith (2013) reconstructs Kant's picture of matter in the Physical Monadology.

Though Kant discusses issues relevant to physics in various works throughout the Critical period (esp. the Critique of Pure Reason), his views on this topic are developed most explicitly in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786), which consists of a preface and four chapters.

In the Preface to the Metaphysical Foundations Kant (i) analyzes the concepts of nature and science so as to establish what conditions must be met for a body of knowledge to constitute natural science in the proper sense, (ii) explains why science so understood requires "a pure part" (4:469) and what criteria would have to be satisfied for such a pure part to exist, (iii) argues that chemistry and psychology cannot at present meet these criteria, and (iv) describes what procedure should be followed to satisfy these criteria and thus to provide the "pure part" that science proper requires.

The feature of Kant's conception of natural science proper that is most immediately striking is how restrictive it is. It requires that cognition (i) be systematically ordered (ii) according to rational principles and (iii) be known a priori with apodictic certainty, i.e., with "consciousness of their necessity" (4:468). Because properly scientific cognition must satisfy these strict conditions, it requires "a pure part on which the apodictic certainty that reason seeks can be based" (4:469). But since Kant identifies pure rational cognition that is generated from concepts with metaphysics, it follows that science proper requires a metaphysics of nature. He then specifies that such a metaphysics of nature could consist in either a "transcendental part," which discusses the laws that make possible the concept of a nature in general - "even without relation to any determinate object of experience" (4:469) - or a "special metaphysical" part, which concerns a "particular nature of this or that kind of things" for which an empirical concept is given.

Kant then uses the claim that science proper requires the construction of the concept of the object in a priori intuition to exclude the possibility that chemistry and psychology, at least as they were practiced at that time, could count as science proper. In the case of chemistry, the problem is that "no law of the approach or withdrawal of the parts of matter can be specified according to which ... their motions and all the consequences thereof can be made intuitive and presented a priori in space (a demand that will only with great difficulty ever be fulfilled)" (4:471). Since its principles are "merely empirical," it can, at best, be a "systematic art" (ibid.). The case of psychology is more complex, since Kant provides (at least) two separate reasons in the Preface for denying it the status of natural science proper. First, Kant claims that mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of inner sense and their laws, though he grants that the law of continuity (discussed, e.g., at A207-209/B253-255 and A228-229/B281 in the Critique of Pure Reason) ought to apply to changes in our representations as well. He downplays the significance of this application of the law of continuity, however, by noting that time has only one dimension, which does not provide enough material to extend our cognition significantly. Second, Kant also complains that empirical psychology cannot separate and recombine the phenomena of inner sense at will; rather, our inner observations can be separated "only by mere division in thought" (4:471). Kant's fuller views on chemistry and psychology will be discussed further below.

Second, in explaining how mathematics can be applied to bodies Kant asserts that "principles for the construction of the concepts that belong to the possibility of matter in general must first be introduced. Therefore a complete analysis of the concept of a matter in general [must be provided in which it] makes use of no particular experiences, but only that which it finds in the isolated (although intrinsically empirical) concept itself, in relation to the pure intuitions in space and time, and in accordance with laws that already essentially attach to the concept of nature in general" (4:472). Kant then explains that this means that the concept of matter must be determined according to the Critique of Pure Reason's categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality (4:474-476). Further, Kant holds that "a new determination" (4:476) must be added to the concept of matter in each chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations. This suggests not only that the principles argued for in the Metaphysical Foundations are to be developed "in accordance with" the principles defended in the Critique of Pure Reason, but also that both the concept of matter and the Metaphysical Foundations itself is structured according to the Critique of Pure Reason's table of categories.

The conception of science that Kant presents in the Preface has been the focus of considerable attention over the past several decades. In the German literature, the issues raised above have been discussed at length by Plaass (1965), Schäfer (1966), Hoppe (1969), Gloy (1976), and Cramer (1985). Pollok (2001) has recently produced a detailed and comprehensive textual commentary on the Metaphysical Foundations. Important work has also been done in the English literature by Walker (1974), Brittan (1978), Buchdahl (1968, 1969, and 1986), Parsons (1984), Butts (1986), and Watkins (1998a). Friedman (1992, 2001, 2002 and 2013) has been especially influential on these issues as well.

The first chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations, the Phoronomy, considers the quantity of motion of matter and how it is to be constructed in intuition a priori (so as to produce the kind of rules that are necessary for our experience of matter in motion). Since extension and impenetrability are not directly relevant to how different magnitudes (or degrees) of motion can be represented, Kant restricts his discussion in this chapter to matter considered as a point. Since the motion of a point in space can be represented straightforwardly, the main issue is how to represent the composition of two different motions. Kant's primary claim in this chapter is that due to the relativity of space (i.e., the fact that every motion can be viewed arbitrarily as either the motion of a body in a space at rest, or as a body in a state of rest in a space which is in motion in the opposite direction with the same velocity) "the composition of two motions of one and the same point can only be thought in such a way that one of them is represented in absolute space, and, instead of the other, a motion of the relative space with the same speed occurring in the opposite direction is represented as the same as the latter" (4:490). The proof of this Theorem considers the three possible cases for the composition of two motions: (i) The two motions are in the same direction; (ii) the two motions are in opposite directions; (iii) the two motions enclose an angle. Kant then shows how one can construct a priori in intuition a single motion out of the two motions described in cases (i)-(iii). The synthetic a priori outcome of this constructive procedure is a composition theorem that covers two fundamental results of classical physics: the parallelogram rule for velocity addition, and the Galilean kinematic transformations. The theorem is needed for architectonic reasons too, not just as a foundation for science. Kant uses the composition theorem as a premise in his Dynamics, so as to infer a priori to forces from the composite motions they cause (e.g., 4:497). And, he invokes the theorem explicitly in his Mechanics, in the course of "constructing the communication of motion," i.e. deriving the laws of impact (4:546).

Until recently, very little has been written directly on Kant's Phoronomy. (By contrast, Kant's philosophy of mathematics has long received considerable attention.) Palter (1972) first broached the Phoronomy from the modern standpoint of coordinate transformations between frames. Pollok (2001) is a historically rich commentary. Friedman (2013) untangles the complex strands of thought in Kant's chapter. His leading idea is that Kant's categories of quantity (of the First Critique) guarantee that motion is a magnitude, hence mathematics is applicable to the motions of bodies--as kinematics.

The second chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations, the Dynamics, considers how it is possible to experience matter as filling a determinate region in space. Propositions 1-4 are devoted to exhibiting the nature and necessity of repulsive forces. In Proposition 1 Kant argues that repulsive force is required for matter to fill space, since solidity, understood by "Lambert and others" as the property matter would have by means of "its mere existence " (4:497), cannot truly explain how one matter resists another matter's attempt to penetrate it. Kant then specifies several central features of repulsive forces in Propositions 2 and 3. Repulsive forces admit of degrees to infinity, since one must always be able to think of a slightly greater or lesser force, and although matter can be compressed to infinity, it can never be penetrated, since that would require an infinite compressing force, which is impossible.

Propositions 5-8 are all devoted to attractive force. In Proposition 5 Kant argues that matter must have an attractive force in order to fill space. Kant's argument is that if there were only repulsive forces, then matter "would disperse itself to infinity" (4:508) since neither space nor other matter could limit it. Proposition 6 argues that both attractive and repulsive forces must be considered essential to matter. That is, attractive forces alone are not sufficient to account for matter filling a space, since if matter consisted solely of attractive forces, there would be no force to counteract the attractive force being exercised and the universe would collapse into a single point. Together, Propositions 5 and 6 make up a 'balancing argument', which Kant had already used in the earlier Physical Monadology. (A balancing argument is an existence proof for a type of force. Its premises are (1) an accepted universal fact, viz. that a certain stable configuration obtains; and (2) a type of force independently known to exist. The argument seeks to prove that the stability in question is impossible unless a second kind of force exists to balance the first kind. In Kant's particular version of the balancing argument, the universal fact is the constancy of mass density in a control volume; and the given force is "original repulsion," whose existence he proves in Proposition 4.) Proposition 7 then specifies how attractive forces are to be understood, namely as the immediate action of matter on other matter through empty space (and therefore at a distance). Kant thus directly confronts the metaphysical question of how to understand attraction that Newton attempted to avoid by positing it merely mathematically. As Kant interprets the situation, Newton "abstracts from all hypotheses purporting to answer the question as to the cause of the universal attraction of matter ... [since] this question is physical or metaphysical, but not mathematical" (4:515). In response to the "most common objection to immediate action at a distance," namely "that a matter cannot act immediately where it is not " (4:513), Kant argues that action at a distance is no more problematic than action by contact (whether it be by collision or pressure), since in both cases a body is simply acting outside itself. Proposition 8 concludes by arguing that attractive forces act immediately to infinity and by adding a "preliminary suggestion" (4:518) as to how one might be able to construct the concept of cohesion (which Kant understands as attraction that is restricted to contact).

In the General Remark to Dynamics Kant addresses two main issues. First, Kant considers how it is that the specific varieties of matter (e.g., water as different from mercury) might be reduced, at least in principle, to the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion. The second issue concerns the fundamental distinction between the "mathematical-mechanical" and the "metaphysical-dynamical mode of explanation". The former mode of explanation, which is associated with the postulation of atoms and the void, employs nothing more than the shapes and motions of fundamental particles and empty interstices interspersed among them. It contrasts with the metaphysical-dynamical mode, which employs fundamental moving forces (e.g., attraction and repulsion) in its explanations. Kant grants that the mathematical-mechanical mode has an advantage over the metaphysical-dynamical mode, since its fundamental posits can be represented (indeed, "verified" (4:525)) mathematically, whereas he repeatedly admits that the possibility of fundamental forces can never be comprehended, i.e., their possibility can never be rendered certain. However, Kant thinks that this advantage is outweighed by two disadvantages. First, by presupposing absolute impenetrability, the mathematical-mechanical mode of explanation accepts an "empty concept" at its foundation. Second, by giving up all forces that would be inherent in matter, such a mode of explanation provides the imagination with more freedom "than is truly consistent with the caution of philosophy" (4:525).

Given that the bulk of Kant's matter theory is presented in the Dynamics, it is unsurprising that it has received the greatest amount of attention in the literature. Of particular note are discussions by Buchdahl (1968, 1969), Brittan (1978), Kitcher (1983), Butts (1986), Carrier (1990), Friedman (1990), Malzkorn (1998), Warren (2001, 2010), Pollok (2002), Holden (2004), and Engelhard (2005). Friedman (2013) is an extensive commentary, under the overarching theme that Kant in the Dynamics aims to explain how certain features of body - density, volume, static weight - become mathematizable, as Newton's dynamics illustrates paradigmatically.

The third chapter of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations, the Mechanics, concerns how it is possible to experience matter as having a moving force, that is, how one matter communicates its motion to another by means of its moving force. Kant begins, in Proposition 1, by clarifying how the quantity of matter is to be estimated before stating, in Propositions 2-4, three Laws of Mechanics.

In Proposition 2, Kant states his First Law of Mechanics: the total quantity of matter remains the same throughout all changes in matter (4:541). His proof seems to rely (i) on the principle of the First Analogy of Experience that no substance arises or perishes throughout any change in nature and (ii) on the identification of what in matter must be substantial. On this latter point, Kant quickly assumes that the ultimate subject of all accidents inhering in matter must be the movable in space, and that its quantity is the aggregate of the movable in space. In his remark to this proposition, Kant explicitly notes that there is a crucial difference between spatial and non-spatial substances, since the latter, unlike the former, could gradually fade away by degrees. (Kant cites the possibility of consciousness as a concrete example.) Kant uses this difference to argue that since the quantity of matter consists in a plurality of real things external to each other that cannot fade away (as consciousness might), the only way to decrease its quantity is by division.

Kant also asserts that the very possibility of natural science proper depends on the law of inertia, since the rejection of it would be hylozoism, "the death of all natural philosophy" (4:544). In a later remark in the Mechanics, Kant explicitly objects that "the terminology of inertial force ( vis inertiae) must be entirely banished from natural science, not only because it carries with it a contradiction in terms, nor even because the law of inertia (lifelessness) might thereby be easily confused with the law of reaction in every communicated motion, but primarily because the mistaken idea of those who are not properly acquainted with the mechanical laws is thereby maintained and even strengthened" (4:550). Kant goes on to point out that if inertia were to entail an active force of resistance, then it would be possible that when one moving body hits another, the moving body has to apply part of its motion solely to overcome the inertia of the one at rest and might not have any motion left over, as it were, to set the body at rest into motion, which is contrary to experience (and Proposition 2).

Kant's Third Law of Mechanics, expressed in Proposition 4, asserts the equality of action and reaction in the communication of motion. Kant formulates a version of the Third Analogy of Experience (according to which all external action in the world is interaction) and suggests that the main point at issue in mechanics is establishing that mutual action is necessarily reaction. Kant's argument for this law is based on the following line of thought: (i) if all changes of matter are changes of motion; (ii) if all changes of motion are reciprocal and equal (since one body cannot move closer to/farther away from another body without the second body moving closer to/farther away from the first body and by exactly the same amount); and (iii) if every change of matter has an external cause (a proposition that was established as the Second Law of Mechanics), then the cause of the change of motion of the one body entails an equal and opposite cause of a change of motion of the other body or, in short, action must be equal to reaction.

In Remark 1, Kant then shows how his position differs from that of other authors. Newton "by no means dared to prove this law a priori, and therefore appealed rather to experience " (4:449). Kepler likewise derived it from experience, though he went further, conceiving of it in terms of a special force of inertia. Certain unnamed "transfusionists" (presumably Locke and perhaps Descartes or Rohault) attempted to deny the law altogether by suggesting that motion could simply be transferred from one body to another in the communication of motion, a view Kant rejects on the grounds that explaining the communication of motion in terms of the transfer of motion is no explanation at all and also amounts to admitting that accidents could be literally transferred from one substance to another.

Kant's Laws of Mechanics have been discussed widely in the secondary literature. One can point to discussions by Palter (1972), Duncan (1984), Friedman (1989, 1992, and 1995), Brittan (1995), Westphal (1995), Carrier (2001), and Watkins (1997 and 1998b). Much of the modern tradition of scholarship used to regard Kant's laws of mechanics as derived from, or even identical with, Newton's three laws in the Principia. Watkins (1997; 1998b) showed that Kant's formulation and justification of his laws was strongly influenced by a philosophy of nature stemming from Leibniz not Newton. Stan (2013) further corroborated these findings. As a result, it is safe to say that Kant's foundations of mechanics were significantly shaped by post-Leibnizian rationalism too, not just Newton's mechanics. This fact is now reflected in Friedman (2013), the most recent and detailed account of Kant's interpretation of the conceptual foundations of mechanics. Stan (2014) examines the conceptual link between Kant's theory of matter and his laws of mechanics.

The final chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations, the Phenomenology, focuses on how the motion of matter can be experienced modally, that is, in terms of it being possibly, actually, or necessarily in motion. Its three Propositions specify (in accordance, Kant suggests, with the results of the three previous chapters) that (i) rectilinear motion is a merely possible predicate of matter, (ii) circular motion is an actual predicate of matter, and (iii) the equal and opposite motion of one matter with respect to another is a necessary motion of that matter. In the General Remark to the Phenomenology, Kant discusses the status of absolute space, which had been presupposed by the possible, actual, and necessary motions of matter at issue in the three main propositions, and explains that since it is not itself an object of experience, it must be represented by means of an idea of reason (in Kant's technical sense of "idea", namely as a concept for which a corresponding object could never be given to us in intuition). Though we can never know absolute space, it nonetheless functions as a regulative principle that guides us in our scientific practice by forcing us to look for further conditions for the conditioned objects we meet with in experience. Kant's view that ideas of reason can function as regulative principles is developed in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Friedman's interpretation (1992) of the Phenomenology deserves special mention. According to him, in light of Kant's rejection of Newton's absolute space and time, he must give an account of the concept of true motion - as change of true place over time - presupposed by classical mechanics. To this end, Kant "views the laws of motion as definitive or constitutive of the spatio-temporal framework of Newtonian theory," hence these laws "count as a priori" for him (p. 143). The reason Kant takes them as constitutive is the following. In Kant's Phenomenology, the three Newtonian laws define a concept of true motion: the true motions of bodies just are those that obey the dynamical laws. Moreover, the concept must be given "objective meaning in experience," viz. measured empirically. To do so, Kant views Newton's three laws as holding primarily in a privileged system of reference, namely the center-of-mass (CM) frame of the system of the world, which the CM-frame of our Solar System approximates to a very good degree. Thus, by measuring the motions of bodies relative to this frame, we produce objective experience of these motions. However, this frame must first be located. To do so, Kant thinks, we must likewise count the law of universal gravitation as a priori, not empirical-inductive. If we know a priori that all bodies in the Solar System necessarily attract each other, from their observable, mutually-induced accelerations we can infer their masses. In turn, knowing their masses will enable us to locate the CM-frame of the system. (In a system of bodies, the center of mass is the point relative to which the bodies' distances are in inverse proportion to their masses.) With respect to this distinguished frame, the motions of bodies count as their true motions, Friedman claims. Hence, immediate and essential gravitation "cannot be straightforwardly obtained from our experience of matter and its motions - by some sort of inductive argument, say" - because universal gravitation is "necessarily presupposed in making an objective experience of matter and its motions possible in the first place" (pp. 157-158). However, the CM-frame of the Solar System is just approximately an inertial frame. Scientific inquiry must ultimately look beyond it, to better and better approximations of an inertial frame. And, Kant's absolute space is just the concept that directs our search for such approximations. More recently, Friedman updated and expanded his interpretation in (2013). In view of recent scholarship, Friedman has now made a convincing case that it is Kant's laws of mechanics - not Newton's three laws, as claimed in (1992) - that define the privileged frame (Kantian absolute space) relative to which bodies have true motions, in the Phenomenology.

Apart from Friedman's interpretation, there is relatively little secondary literature that discusses Kant's Phenomenology. Palter (1971) interprets Kant's doctrine of absolute space and motion in terms of transformation groups for Galilean kinematics. Carrier (1992) provides an alternative to Friedman's account of Kant on absolute space. Stan (forthcoming) is an alternative to Friedman's reading of Kant's doctrine of circular motion, and its relation to Newton's dynamics.

Kant's interest in physics continued after the publication of the Metaphysical Foundations, in fact, until the very end of his productive years. Though Kant never completed a manuscript that could be put forward as a publication, the various notes, sketches, and drafts on topics in physics that he was working on intensively during this time (especially after 1796) were gathered together over a century after his death and published as his so-called Opus postumum.

Despite the fragmentary nature of the Opus postumum, Kant makes it clear that it is designed to fill an important gap in his system. Just as the Metaphysical Foundations had attempted to connect the transcendental principles of the Critique of Pure Reason and the principles that explain how matter is possible, the Opus postumum undertakes the task of effecting a transition from the special metaphysics of nature contained in the Metaphysical Foundations to physics itself. However, Kant does not clarify adequately what systematic principles would guide this transition project, nor is it clear whether he takes the project to yield substantive principles or heuristic guidelines. On the one hand, in a note that stems from a period shortly after the publication of the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant suggests that one could "follow the clue given by the categories and bring into play the moving forces of matter according to their quantity, quality, relation, and modality" (21:311), a procedure that could be similar to that of the Metaphysical Foundations. On the other hand, if the Metaphysical Foundations already presupposes an empirical concept (namely matter), the transition to be carried out in the Opus postumum cannot be understood as moving from something non-empirical to something empirical. As Kant struggles with the problems that result from trying to account for now much more specific features of matter, it is unclear that (or how) the categories are supposed to be of help in structuring Kant's argument. Thus, the precise argumentative structure of the Opus postumum (i.e., its relationship to Kant's other works and its fundamental presuppositions) remains problematic. Equally problematic is the exact nature of Kant's transition project. Given his stated aim to account for specific features of matter-e.g., particular aggregation states, special forces-one would think that such contingent features are a problem for empirical science not philosophy, since Kant sees the latter as pursuing knowledge that is, in various senses, necessary.

The Opus postumum has long been a topic of interest especially insofar as it offers the hope of clarification and development of central issues in Kant's Critical philosophy. While much of the original literature focussing on it was in German (Adickes 1920, Hoppe 1969, Tuschling 1971, and, more recently, Blasche, 1991 and Emundts, 2004), it has received increased attention of late in English with discussions by Friedman (1992, chapter 5), Förster (2000), Edwards (2000), Guyer (2001), and Hall (2006, 2009).

Kant was interested not only in the inanimate bodies studied by physics, but also in living organisms, which he viewed as deserving of additional philosophical scrutiny due to their special status, for two reasons. First, the symmetries and regularities of their structure and workings make them "in the highest degree contingent" (5: 360) and "mechanically inexplicable." Second, organisms come from their own kind; grow their own functional parts, or organs, and repair them if they become damaged; and do in general exhibit homeostasis. These facts about them prompt Kant to claim that an organism is "cause and effect of itself" (5: 370). In a sense, a living entity is self-caused, and indeed by a causality that we can grasp solely "under the idea of purposes as a principle" (5: 383). Organisms, in other words, are "natural purposes," or naturally occurring ensembles of parts purposefully fitted and working in unity.

R-thesis:
All generation of material things and their forms must be judged as possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws.

R-antithesis:
Some products of material nature cannot be judged as possible according to merely mechanical laws (judging them requires an entirely different law of causality, namely that of final causality) (5: 387).

A great deal of scholarship has aimed to elucidate this antinomy, and in the last decade these interpretive efforts have gained new momentum (see also the entry "Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology" in this encyclopedia). In particular, sustained attention has been given to three questions: In what sense are organisms inexplicable mechanically, for Kant? What exactly is the contradiction that generates the Antinomy? And precisely how does Kant solve it?

Third, Kant's solution to the Antinomy has received sustained attention. In the first two Critiques, his general approach is to argue, for each antinomy, that both thesis and antithesis presuppose Transcendental Realism, insofar as they make claims about things in themselves; and to adduce Transcendental Idealism as the vantage point from which the initial contradiction is solved. However, that is not Kant's approach to the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment. Accordingly, interpreters have sought to reconstruct a different solution on Kant's behalf. Quarfood (2004) and Förster (2008) take the notion of an intuitive understanding (expounded at 5: 401-10) as the key to Kant's answer. In particular, Förster explains, intellects like ours are discursive: they grasp objects through concepts as 'parts' assembled in temporally-extended judgments, and so mechanistically, he alleges. Hence, we need the concept 'purpose' to judge organisms solely because we have discursive intellects. However, an intuitive understanding could grasp organisms without purpose-concepts and regulative principles about judging teleologically. Hence, for this understanding, the R-thesis and R-antithesis need not be true, and so no antinomy arises. Breitenbach (2008) contends that the Antinomy is solved, or rather dissolved, if we note that thesis and antithesis are not really contradictory but complementary. They govern (reflecting) acts of judging in different contexts: the mechanistic R-thesis regulates explanatory conduct in empirical biology, whereas the R-antithesis governs ordinary judging about living nature as experienced in everyday, pre-theoretical encounters with it. The two principles epitomize "two different views on nature," and are compossible (466). They just appear to be in contradiction; in fact, they complement each other, indispensably. McLaughlin (1990) submits that the Antinomy does not arise simpliciter but only under a special assumption, viz. that everything in nature is objectively explainable by us (162). Reject the assumption, and the contradiction vanishes, insofar as the R-thesis and the R-antithesis can both be true, but for different domains: the former holds for phenomena explainable by us, the latter for phenomena not so explainable. McLaughlin does not offer a general criterion for 'explicability by us' attributable to Kant, however, apart from mechanical explicability. Ginsborg (2008) focuses on how the contradiction might be resolved in the context of scientific investigation rather than in abstract, general philosophical terms. Building on Kant's remark about subordinating mechanism to teleology (5: 414), Ginsborg contends that natural historians and physiologists may well explain the origin and workings of organisms 'mechanistically,' purely by physico-chemical laws, provided they apply them not to "crude" but to "organized" matter, i.e. organic stuff already endowed with a "formative drive," a generic disposition to grow, reproduce and self-maintain. In turn, this organized matter itself is unintelligible without appeal to purpose and design terms. Thus, biologists 'subordinate' mechanism to teleology, and so the antinomic conflict between them is removed.

While these interpretive proposals collectively advance our understanding of how the Antinomy might be defused, each has its share of philosophical difficulties, as spelled out in Watkins (2009). Moreover, few of these construals heed close to Kant's words, which suggest strongly that his solution relies indispensably on a "supersensible ground" (5: 413), or explanatory principle located in the noumenal world. That ground could unite both mechanism and teleology, by making both antinomic theses jointly derivable or explainable from it. However, since humans can have "no positive determinate" knowledge of any supersensible entity, the Antinomy is solvable in principle rather than solved in fact. Kant (at least in his official solution) does not seem to provide the details for an actual account of how the conflict at the heart of biological explanation is removed. The limitations that beset our understanding of Kant's philosophy of biology so far, some of which we have expounded above, continue to drive interpretive efforts to cast more light on that part of his doctrine, as exemplified in Goy and Watkins (forthcoming).

In addition to the works mentioned above, Kant's Antinomy of Teleological Judgment has been usefully discussed in Allison (1991), Cohen (2004), Ginsborg (2001), Kreines (2005), Steigerwald (2006), Zanetti (1993) and Zumbach (1984); see also the entry "Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology" in this encyclopedia.

Kant's views on chemistry have not been widely discussed in the secondary literature. However, outstanding discussions of Kant's views on the topic can be found in Carrier (1990, 2001) and Friedman (1992, chapter 5, III). Lequan (2000) is a philosophical survey of Kant's thought on chemistry throughout his development. McNulty (forthcoming) explains why Kant takes chemistry to miss the threshold for proper science - specifically, the sense in which chemistry is not mathematizable, in Kant's view.

Kant's views on psychology are intimately bound up with his more general position in the philosophy of mind. (See the separate entry on this topic.) Still, one can take note of the fact that Kant distinguishes between rational and empirical psychology and, in the Critique of Pure Reason's Paralogisms, denies that rational psychology contains arguments that could justify any substantive principles (especially concerning our immortality). Thus, only empirical psychology, it seems, could be possible as a science. However, if Kant continues to maintain that science requires a pure part, and denies that rational psychology contains any substantive knowledge that might constitute the pure part of psychology, then it follows that empirical psychology cannot qualify as science proper either.

Just as Kant held that chemistry could either be scientific in less than the strictest sense or perhaps become science proper (depending on how it develops), the same could be said for psychology. For one, Kant may simply be objecting to psychology as it was practiced in the 18th century, e.g., as based on introspection (a method that both rules out the application of mathematics and gives rise to other difficulties, 4:471). Further, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant holds that although objects can never be given in intuition that would correspond to ideas of reason, such ideas never the less function as regulative principles that direct our understanding with regard to what it should inquire into next. Thus, our idea of the world as a totality is supposed to drive us to look for smaller and smaller parts to bodies and objects in further regions of space and at earlier moments of time. But if we have an idea of our soul, then it too should guide our scientific inquiry into our own representations, which seems to imply that psychology is a legitimate scientific practice (even if it does ultimately fall short of being science proper).

Unsurprisingly, Kant influenced empirical theory in early 19th-century Germany. (However, it was his transcendental psychology in the Critique of Pure Reason, not his views on empirical psychology, that proved to be most influential.) In particular, his doctrine of space and time as forms of sensibility was given a naturalistic construal in the physiology and psychology of perception. Since for Kant an a priori form of intuition need not be innate, it could unfold in the course of sensory experience. This led J.G. Steinbuch (1811) and C. Th. Tourtual (1827) to investigate empirically how spatial representation arises - specifically, how particular subjects become able to see things as arrayed in space, perceive objects as three-dimensional, and represent spatial structures more generally. Hatfield (1990, Chapter 4) surveys these post-Kantian developments in more detail.

Kitcher (1990) presents a detailed argument for the role of transcendental psychology within Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Sturm (2001) argues that Kant's critical comments about psychology are primarily directed against introspection-based conceptions of psychology. Hatfield (1990) is an acute discussion of the complexities of psychology as a science in Kant's view.

Kant's views on history are discussed by Yovel (1980) and, more recently, Kleingeld (1995 and 1999). Kant's Physical Geography has been discussed by Adickes (1911). Brandt (1999), Wood (1999), and Makkreel (2001) have recently published important discussions of Kant's anthropology. Sturm (2009) is a comprehensive monograph on Kant's philosophy of psychology and anthropology.

Adickes, E., 1911, Untersuchungen zu Kants Physischer Geographie, Tübingen: Mohr.

---, 1920, Kants Opus postumum, dargestellt und beurteilt, Berlin: Reuther & Reichard.

---, 1924-1925, Kant als Naturforscher, (2 vols.) Berlin: De Gruyter.

Allison, H., 1991, "Kant's Antinomy of Teleological Judgment," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 30 (Supplement): 25-42.

Blasche, S. (ed.), 1991, Übergang. Untersuchungen zum Spätwerk Immanuel Kants, Frankfurt: Klostermann.

Brandt, R., 1999, Kritischer Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.

Breitenbach, A., 2008, "Two Views on Nature: A Solution to Kant's Antinomy of Mechanism and Teleology," British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 16: 351-369.

Brittan, G., 1978, Kant's Theory of Science, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

---, 1995, "The Continuity of Matter," in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, H. Robinson (ed.), Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, vol. I/2 , pp. 611-618.

Buchdahl, G., 1968, "Gravity and Intelligibility: Newton to Kant," in The Methodological Heritage of Newton, R. Butts & J. Davis (eds.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 74-102; reprinted in Buchdahl 1992.

---, 1969, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, Cambridge: Belknap Press.

---, 1986, "Kant's 'Special Metaphysics' and The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science," inKant's Philosophy of Physical Science, R. Butts (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 127-161.

---, 1992, Kant and the Dynamics of Reason, Oxford and Malden: Blackwell.

Butts, R., 1986, "The Methodological Structure of Kant's Metaphysics of Science," in Kant's Philosophy of Physical Science, R. Butts (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 163-199.

---, 1986, (ed.), Kant's Philosophy of Physical Science, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

Carrier, M., 1990, "Kants Theorie der Materie und ihre Wirkung auf die zeitgenössische Chemie," Kant-Studien, 81: 170-210.

---, 1992, "Kant's Relational Theory of Absolute Space," Kant-Studien, 83: 399-416.

---, 2001, "Kant's Theory of Matter and His Views on Chemistry," in Kant and the Sciences, E. Watkins (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 205-230.

Cohen, A, 2004, "Kant's Antinomy of Reflective Judgment: A Re-evaluation," Theorema, 23: 183-97.

Cramer, K., 1985, Nicht-reine synthetische Urteile a priori. Ein Problem der Transzendentalphilosophie Immanuel Kants, Heidelberg: Winter.

Duncan, H., 1984, "Inertia, the Communication of Motion, and Kant's Third Law of Mechanics," Philosophy of Science, 51: 93-119.

Edwards, J., 2000, Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge: On Kant's Philosophy of Material Nature, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Emundts, D., 2004, Kants Übergangskonzeption im Opus postumum, Berlin: De Gruyter.

Engelhard, K., 2005, Das Einfache und die Materie, Berlin: De Gruyter.

Förster, E., 2000, Kant's Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus postumum, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

---, 2008, "Von der Eigentümlichkeit unseres Verstandes in Ansehung der Urteilskraft (§§ 74-78)," Immanuel Kant: Kritik der Urteilskraft, eds. O. Höueffe and I. Goy, 259-74, Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

Friedman, M., 1989, "Kant on Laws of Nature and the Foundations of Newtonian Science," in Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress, G. Funke and T. Seebohm (eds.), Washington: University Press of America, Vol. II/2, pp. 97-107.

---, 1990, "Kant and Newton: Why Gravity is Essential to Matter," in Philosophical Perspectives on Newtonian Science, P. Bricker and R.I.G. Hughes (eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 185-202.

---, 1992, Kant and the Exact Sciences, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

---, 1995, "Matter and Material Substance in Kant's Philosophy of Nature: The Problem of Infinite Divisibility," in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Vol. I/2, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, pp. 595-610.

---, 2001, "Matter and Motion in the Metaphysical Foundations and the First Critique: The Empirical Concept of Matter and the Categories," inKant and the Sciences, E. Watkins (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 53-69.

---, 2002, "Kant on Science and Experience," in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung, V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horstmann, and R. Schumacher (eds.), Berlin: De Gruyter, Vol. I, pp. 233-245.

---, 2012, "Newton and Kant: Quantity of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science," in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50: 482-503.

---, 2013, Kant's Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ginsborg, H., 2001, "Kant on Understanding Organisms as Natural Purposes," Kant and the Sciences, E. Watkins (ed.), 231-58, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

---, 2004, "Two Kinds of Mechanical Inexplicability in Kant and Aristotle," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 42: 33-65.

Gloy, K., 1976, Die Kantische Theorie der Naturwissenschaft. Eine Strukturanalyse ihrer Möglichkeit, ihres Umfangs und ihrer Grenzen, Berlin: de Gruyter.

Goy, I. and Watkins, E., eds., (forthcoming), Kant's Theory of Biology, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter.

Guyer, P., 2001, "Organisms and the Unity of Science," in Kant and the Sciences, E. Watkins (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 259-281.

Hall, B., 2006, "A Reconstruction of Kant's Ether Deduction in Übergang 11," British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 14: 719-746.

---, 2009, "'Effecting a Transition': How to Fill the Gap in Kant's System of Critical Philosophy,"Kant-Studien, 1002, 187-211.

Harman, P., 1982, Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy, Brighton/Sussex: Harvester Press.

Hatfield, G., 1990, The natural and the normative: theories of spatial perception from Kant to Helmholtz, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

---, "Empirical, rational, and transcendental psychology: Psychology as science and as philosophy," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. P. Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 200-227.

Holden, Th., 2004, The Architecture of Matter: Galileo to Kant, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hoppe, H., 1969, Kants Theorie der Physik. Eine Untersuchung über das Opus postumum von Kant, Frankfurt: Klostermann.

Kitcher, P., 1990, Kant's Transcendental Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press.

Kitcher, Ph., 1983, "Kant's Philosophy of Science," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy VIII: Contemporary Perspectives on the History of Philosophy, P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 387-408.

Kleingeld, P., 1995, Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants, Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann.

---, 1999, "Kant, History, and the Idea of Moral Development," History of Philosophy Quarterly, 16: 59-80.

Kreines, J., 2005, "The Inexplicability of Kant's Naturzweck: Kant on Teleology, Explanation and Biology,"Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 87: 270-311.

Kuehn, M., 2001, "Kant's Teachers in the Exact Sciences," in Kant and the Sciences, E. Watkins (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 11-30.

Laywine, A., 1993, Kant's Early Metaphysics and the Origins of the Critical Philosophy, Vol. 3 in North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company.

Lefevre, W., and Wunderlich, F., 2000, Kants naturtheoretische Begriffe (1747-1780), Berlin: De Gruyter.

---, 2001, (ed.) Between Leibniz, Newton and Kant: Philosophy and Science in the 18th Century, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Lequan, M., 2000. La chimie selon Kant, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Makkreel, R., 2001, "Kant on the Scientific Status of Psychology, Anthropology, and History," in Kant and the Sciences, E. Watkins (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 185-201.

Malzkorn, W., 1998, "Kant über die Teilbarkeit der Materie," Kant-Studien, 89: 385-409.

McLaughlin, P., 1990, Kant's Critique of Teleology in Biological Explanation, Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.

McNulty, M.B., forthcoming, "Kant on chemistry and the application of mathematics in natural science," Kantian Review.

Palter, R., 1972, "Kant's Formulation of the Laws of Motion," Synthese, 24: 96-111.

---, 1971, "Absolute Space and Absolute Motion in Kant's Critical Philosophy," Synthese, 23: 47-62.

Parsons, C., 1984, "Remarks on Pure Natural Science," in Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, A. Wood (ed.), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 216-27.

Plaass, P., 1965, Kants Theorie der Naturwissenschaft. Eine Untersuchung zur Vorrede von Kants 'Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft', Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht; available in English translation,Kant's Theory of Natural Science, A. Miller and M. Miller (translators), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994.

Pollok, K., 2001, Kants 'Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft'. Ein kritischer Kommentar, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.

---, 2002, "Fabricating a World in Accordance with Mere Fantasy...? The Origins of Kant's Critical Theory of Matter," Review of Metaphysics, 56: 61-97.

Prentice, A.J.R., 1978, "Origin of the solar system," Earth, Moon, and Planets, 19(3): 341-98.

Quarfood, M., 2004, Transcendental Idealism and the Organism, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Safronov, V. S., 1972, Evolution of the Protoplanetary Cloud and Formation of the Earth and the Planets, Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations/Keter Publishing House.

Schäfer, L., 1966, Kants Metaphysik der Natur, Berlin: De Gruyter.

Schönfeld, M., 2000, The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project, New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, S., 2013, "Kant's Picture of Monads in the Physical Monadology," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 44: 102-11.

Stan, M., 2013, "Kant's Third Law of Mechanics: the Long Shadow of Leibniz," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 44: 493-504.

---, 2014, "Unity for Kant's Natural Philosophy,"Philosophy of Science, 81(3): 423-43.

---, forthcoming, "Kant, Newton, and the Riddle of Rotation,"Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy (Volume 7).

Steigerwald, J., 2006, "Kant's Concept of Natural Purpose and the Reflecting Power of Judgement," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (Part C), 37: 712-734.

Teufel, Th., 2011, "What Is the Problem of Teleology in Kant's Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment?," SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy, 12(2): 198-236.

Sturm, T., 2001, "Kant on Empirical Psychology: How Not to Investigate the Human Mind," in Kant and the Sciences, E. Watkins (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 163-184.

---, 2009, Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Paderborn: Mentis.

Tuschling, B., 1971, Metaphysische und Transzendentale Dynamik in Kants Opus postumum, Berlin: De Gruyter.

Walker, R.C.S., 1974, "The Status of Kant's Theory of Matter", in Kant's Theory of Knowledge, L.W. Beck (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 151-156.

Warren, D., 2001, Reality and Impenetrability in Kant's Philosophy of Nature, London: Routledge.

---, 2010, "Kant on Attractive and Repulsive Forces: the Balancing Argument," in M. Domski and M. Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science, LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, pp. 193-242.

Watkins, E., 1997, "The Laws of Motion from Newton to Kant," Perspectives on Science, 5: 311-348.

---, 1998a, "The Argumentative Structure of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,"Journal of the History of Philosophy, 36: 567-593.

---, 1998b, "Kant's Justification of the Laws of Mechanics," in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29: 539-60.

---, 2001, (ed.), Kant and the Sciences, New York: Oxford University Press.

---, 2001, "Kant on Force and Extension: Critical Appropriations of Leibniz and Newton," in Between Leibniz, Newton and Kant: Philosophy and Science in the 18th Century, W. Lefevre (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 111-127.

---, 2003, "Forces and Causes in Kant's Early Pre-Critical Writings," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 33: 5-27.

---, 2006, "On the Necessity and Nature of Simples: Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and the pre-Critical Kant," Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, 3: 261-314.

---, 2009, "The Antinomy of Teleological Judgment," Kant Yearbook, 1: 197-221.

---, 2013, "The early Kant's (anti-)Newtonianism," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 44: 429-437.

Westphal, K., 1995, "Does Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, fill a gap in the Critique of Pure Reason?," Synthese, 103: 43-86.

Wood, A., 1999, Kant's Ethical Thought, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zanetti, V., 1993, "Die Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft," Kant-Studien, 83: 341-355.

Zumbach, C., 1984, The Transcendent Science, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Yovel, Y., 1980, Kant and the Philosophy of History, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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His solution to the vis viva dispute is especially interesting, because it presages his later approach to philosophical controversy. Rather than offering a conclusive argument in favor of one position, Kant seeks to mediate between the two parties, Leibnizian and Cartesian. He argues that each measure of force is correct, but in different contexts.

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Kant no consideraba que la psicología pudiera ser una ciencia empírica exacta

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Kant: Teoría del conocimiento - Educatina

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Introdujo la idea de que la mente humana estructura activamente la experiencia, anticipando teorías cognitivas.

Crítica a la introspección: argumentó que la mente no puede estudiarse a sí misma

Influenció a Wilhelm Wundt

Tuvo impacto en lo que hoy conocemos como: Psicología cognitiva, psicología del desarrollo, psicología experimental.

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Teoría de la libertad, paz perpetua, derechos humanos

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Estudió del ser humano en su contexto cultural y natural lo que ayudó en el futuro a las ciencias humanas y sociales

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https://strictlyanything.com/the-ideas-and-philosophies-of-immanuel-kant/

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The Ideas and Philoscopies of Immanuel Kant

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Dive into the captivating world of Immanuel Kant. Uncover and understand The Ideas and Philoscopies of Immanuel Kant that shaped modern philosophy.

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¡Webinar gratuito! El próximo miércoles 25/10 analizaremos las claves de los 75 años del conflicto árabe-israelí junto al catedrático Ignacio Alvárez-Ossorio Alvariño. ¡Plazas limitadas!

Una de las historias más populares sobre Immanuel Kant dice que su vida era tan estricta y regular que sus vecinos ajustaban sus relojes al verlo salir para su paseo de las tres y media de la tarde, siempre puntual hiciera el tiempo que hiciese. Este capítulo no deja de ser una manifestación anecdótica de un carácter profundamente metódico y abierto a la crítica constante: después de que le plantearan varias carencias de sus primeras obras, Kant estuvo diez años sin publicar para dedicarlos a la reflexión y regresar con la primera de sus obras plenamente maduras, la Crítica de la razón pura.

Immanuel Kant buscó, por encima de todo, enseñar al ser humano a pensar por sí mismo y a rechazar los dogmas de todo tipo, que destruyen la razón y someten el libre pensamiento a ideas fijas. No por ello negaba la importancia del conocimiento previo, al contrario, lo consideraba imprescindible como punto de partida.

En este sentido, logró combinar el racionalismo -para el cual la razón es el motor principal en la búsqueda del conocimiento- con el empirismo -que acentúa el papel de la experiencia y la evidencia comprobable-, como caminos complementarios y no excluyentes. El pensamiento kantiano se convirtió así en uno de los más influyentes de la Ilustración.

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El maestro Kant

Emanuel Kant nació el 1724 en Königsberg (actual Kaliningrado), entonces perteneciente a la Prusia Oriental, en el seno de una familia profundamente religiosa de la que recibió una educación muy estricta y dogmática. A pesar de que su pensamiento lo llevaría en dirección opuesta, siempre conservó un gran cariño por su familia. Con 16 años ingresó en la Universidad Albertina de Königsberg para estudiar filosofía y ciencias; por desgracia, el infarto y posterior muerte de su padre lo llevaron a abandonar la universidad siete años más tarde, aunque no los estudios, que prosiguió por su cuenta. Tras aprender hebreo, cambiaría su nombre a Immanuel.

Immanuel Kant buscó, por encima de todo, enseñar al ser humano a pensar por sí mismo y a rechazar los dogmas de todo tipo

Kant empezó a trabajar entonces como profesor privado, gozando de una notable popularidad. Solía decir que no enseñaba filosofía, sino el arte de pensar: le molestaba que sus estudiantes tomasen apuntes de forma mecánica en vez de intentar entender lo que explicaba y debatir sobre ello. Hombre de una gran cultura, daba también clases de otras materias tan variadas como matemáticas, ciencias naturales o ética: para él, el conocimiento debía ser inclusivo. Prueba de ello es su variada obra en los 23 años que ejerció como profesor privado, en los que publicó tratados que iban desde la astronomía a la teología.

A este periodo pertenecen las obras del llamado periodo precrítico. En 1770 le ofrecieron una cátedra de Lógica y Metafísica en la Universidad Albertina, la única en la que aceptó enseñar. Con ocasión de este hito largamente esperado escribió su Disertación inaugural, que habría de suponer un punto de inflexión inesperado: varios comentarios de alumnos y colegas académicos le hicieron replantearse sus conceptos filosóficos hasta el momento y el prestigioso maestro entró en un paréntesis de diez años en los que no publicaría para dedicarse a reflexionar sobre sus ideas.

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Las críticas de la razón

Este período le permitió madurar su pensamiento y publicar en 1781 la primera de sus obras plenamente maduras y seguramente la más famosa: Crítica de la razón pura, que en su momento no tuvo muy buena acogida, principalmente por su estilo denso y pesadamente académico. Era la primera parte de una serie de obras a la que seguirían Crítica de la razón práctica (1788) y Crítica del juicio (1790). La segunda fue la más influyente en vida del autor y un nuevo comienzo para una rica producción que, sin embargo, continuó encontrando grandes resistencias por el estilo tremendamente complicado.

La inclinación de Kant a cuestionarlo todo le valió enemistades importantes: el rey prusiano Federico Guillermo II le instó a moderar el contenido de sus obras, especialmente tras la Revolución Francesa. Incluso después de su muerte, el papa Pío VIII prohibió la lectura de Crítica de la razón pura bajo amenaza de excomunión. A pesar de vivir en el apogeo de la Ilustración, Kant veía con pesimismo que esa época de mayor conocimiento no conducía a un mundo mejor, sino que las viejas estructuras de poder eran reemplazadas por otras nuevas: por pocos meses no llegaría a ver a Napoleón proclamarse emperador.

Immanuel Kant 2

Las clases de Kant, tanto privadas como posteriormente en la universidad, eran muy populares. El filósofo estimulaba a sus estudiantes a cuestionarse cualquier idea preconcebida y a pensar por sí mismos, fomentando su participación en el debate.

Un carácter extremamente metódico

Lo que más trascendió de la vida personal de Kant fue su carácter meticuloso y disciplinado, rayando lo maniático e hipocondríaco: razones para lo último no le faltaban ya que su salud fue delicada desde pequeño, lo que contrastaba con inflexibles costumbres que a veces le eran perjudiciales, como dormir poco y salir siempre a dar a su paseo de la tarde sin importar el tiempo que hiciera.

No siempre fue así; en esta faceta influyó su amistad con el comerciante Joseph Green, británico de hábitos escrupulosamente ingleses, de quien se dice que un día le dio una lección extrema: Kant se presentó un minuto tarde a una cita y su amigo, ni corto ni perezoso, se marchó al no verlo llegar a la hora justa a la que habían quedado, dejando a Kant corriendo tras su coche.

Kant era famoso por su carácter meticuloso y disciplinado, rayando lo maniático e hipocondríaco, lo que contrastaba con inflexibles costumbres que a veces le eran perjudiciales

Entrado en la vejez ,su salud física y mental empeoró notablemente a causa de una arterioesclerosis cerebral, posiblemente agravada por el exceso de trabajo y el sueño escaso que caracterizaban su rutina. En los últimos años los síntomas eran evidentes: falta de equilibrio, problemas para caminar, narcolepsia y señales de demencia. Aun así siguió escribiendo hasta un año antes de su muerte, cuando ya contaba casi 80 años. Finalmente murió el 12 de febrero de 1804 en la misma Königsberg donde había transcurrido su vida, dejando tras de sí uno de los legados más importantes de la filosofía moderna.

Para saber más

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"Dos cosas llenan mi ánimo de creciente admiración y respeto, cuanto más reflexiono sobre ellas: el cielo estrellado sobre mí y la ley moral dentro de mí".

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Introducción a la filosofía moderna | VII Filosofía moderna 01 | T07 E01