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Points out the experience of Nikole Hannah-Jones and the issues surrounding her process of earning tenure-track promotion, as well as her decision to decline the tenure offer at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill and accept the Knight Chair appointment at Howard University. With Hannah-Jones's case as an entry point, the authors demonstrate through further narratives and experiences how Black women in academia are consistently oppressed by institutions. Hannah-Jones’s experience serves as an example of "displays of epistemic violence against Black women intellectuals and scholars," as well as of epistemic agency. Additionally, the authors aim to highlight the various ways individuals engage with Black feminist epistemologies, research, and praxis. They also consider that the narratives presented will illustrate how Black women’s epistemology and praxis are intertwined.

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With the goal of providing mechanisms to identify situations in which marginalized groups are systematically silenced, Dotson expands on Gayatri Spivak's concept of epistemic violence to frame it inside communicative situations. She highlights the importance of communicative reciprocity from the audience (i.e., that the audience show understanding the speaker's words and what the speaker is trying to communicate with them). In simpler terms, "to communicate we all need an audience willing and capable of hearing us" (p. 238). Epistemic violence is effected when groups of people are deprived of such reciprocity. [See more on Dotson's definition of epistemic violence on post that will appear below opening activity.]

The author then details two kinds of silencing that speakers from oppressed groups experience: testimonial quieting (when the audience refuses to recognizer the speaker as a "knower") and testimonial smothering (when the speaker chooses silence about certain topics because the audience "demonstrates testimonial incompetence* for unsafe, risky testimony owing to pernicious ignorance" (p. 251)). Both occur to due the audience's pernicious ignorance, and as such, constitute epistemic violence.

*Testimonial incompetence is the audience's failure to show they will "find potential testimony accurately intelligible" (p. 245), i.e., that they will be able to understand said testimony and what the speaker intends to communicate with it.

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Answer both questions

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In this chapter Patricia Hill Collins problematizes Eurocentric claims of objectivity and truth by arguing that Black women and Black feminism have a distinct epistemology, with specific ways of assessing and validating knowledge claims as methodologically adequate. The ways or dimensions of this process are i) lived experience as criterion of meaning (i.e., personal experience counts as evidence, even more than scientific knowledge); ii) the use of dialogue (i.e., "connectedness" over separation: knowledge claims are developed and validated in community; iii) the ethic of caring (expressiveness, emotions, and empathy are part of the validation process; style of delivery is as important as content); and iv) the ethic of personal accountability ("emotion, ethics, and reason (...) values lie at the heart of the knowledge validation process such that inquiry always has an ethical aim" (p. 266)).

Collins also discusses the hurdles Black women and Black feminist academics face in their knowledge claims: the dominant knowledge validation process (which requires objectification of subjects, unbiased motivations, and rejects claims that differ from traditional ones), including the groups who control education and publication; and other Black women, both non-academic (who evaluate them with the four dimensions above) and academic (who may have been forced to use Eurocentric epistemologies). Therefore, Black women scholars have to "grappl[e] with multiple interpretive communities" (p. 268), although translation of knowledge from one to the other(s) may not always be possible.

Collins ends by asserting the value of Black feminist epistemology to "enrich our understanding of how subordinate groups create knowledge that fosters both their empowerment and social justice" (p. 269).

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Collins argues that in Black communities of women and among Black feminists, lived experience validates knowledge claims and gives them credibility. In your field of study, what determines the validity of knowledge claims? What struggles do you see with marginalized groups (as researchers or research participants)?

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Collins argues that in Black communities of women and among Black feminists, lived experience validates knowledge claims and gives them credibility. In your field of study, what determines the validity of knowledge claims? What struggles do you see with marginalized groups (as researchers or research participants)?

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What do you think of the new approach to objectivity and validation of knowledge claims Collins suggests in pp. 270-271 (starting in the third paragraph)? Could it be implemented? Even further, do you think it could prevent/redress epistemic violence?

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What do you think of the new approach to objectivity and validation of knowledge claims Collins suggests in pp. 270-271 (starting in the third paragraph)? Could it be implemented? Even further, do you think it could prevent/redress epistemic violence?

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Hooks uses her personal experience (as a Black woman from a working-class family in Kentucky) to illustrate her identification of the margin as a space for resistance.  She writes that “marginality is much more than a site of radical possibility.” She also mentions how she always had to fight and resist the dominant culture when she participated in a white, male, middle/upper class-led academic circle.

· Distinguishes between “useful knowledge that I might get from the dominating group” and “participation in ways of knowing that would lead to estrangement, alienation, and worse assimilation and co-option” (p. 21). In that way, she presents an alternative to the perception of the marginalized. In other words, to create a counter-hegemonic space, hooks asserts that the margin is in fact central, where the marginalized (oppressed people) come to voice.

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In connection to the previous question, we could talk of competing epistemologies or theories of knowledge, leading to competing versions of the truth. Do you think she sufficiently address how to evaluate those different claims? How do we treat competing epistemologies and knowledge claims in coalitional work between marginalized groups with different social positionalities? What would you suggest?

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In connection to the previous question, we could talk of competing epistemologies or theories of knowledge, leading to competing versions of the truth. Do you think she sufficiently address how to evaluate those different claims? How do we treat competing epistemologies and knowledge claims in coalitional work between marginalized groups with different social positionalities? What would you suggest?

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Dotson attributes a lot of agency to the audience - it may seem that the speaker has very little power to change the reception of their testimony.  What would other authors say?

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Dotson attributes a lot of agency to the audience - it may seem that the speaker has very little power to change the reception of their testimony.  What would other authors say?

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Considering the first two texts, where do you see epistemic violence (as the recurrent practice of silencing) in the case of Hannah-Jones? What are the dynamics at play in this case? In what other instances do you see epistemic violence happening nowadays? Do you identify any pattern in the exercise of power in those cases?

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Considering the first two texts, where do you see epistemic violence (as the recurrent practice of silencing) in the case of Hannah-Jones? What are the dynamics at play in this case? In what other instances do you see epistemic violence happening nowadays? Do you identify any pattern in the exercise of power in those cases?

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What are the characteristics of resistance from the space of the margin according to bell hooks?

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What are the characteristics of resistance from the space of the margin according to bell hooks?

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"I make a definite distinction between that marginality which is imposed by oppressive structures and that marginality one chooses as site of resistance - as location of radical openness and possibility. This site of resistance is continually formed in that segregated culture of opposition that is our critical response to domination" (p. 23). Do you agree that those spaces are fundamentally different? Can we choose to be in one or the other?

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"I make a definite distinction between that marginality which is imposed by oppressive structures and that marginality one chooses as site of resistance - as location of radical openness and possibility. This site of resistance is continually formed in that segregated culture of opposition that is our critical response to domination" (p. 23). Do you agree that those spaces are fundamentally different? Can we choose to be in one or the other?

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How do the other authors propose to break the silence? And what would you suggest?  

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How do the other authors propose to break the silence? And what would you suggest?  

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Porter, Sulé, and Croom, in contrast, offer the concept of "epistemic agency" (p. 7). It "requires surfacing our knowledge and valid realities, as well as our praxes as valuable possibility models for ideological, cultural, and structural shifts in the academy and beyond." How do you think we can enact epistemic agency? What conditions would need to be met?

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Porter, Sulé, and Croom, in contrast, offer the concept of "epistemic agency" (p. 7). It "requires surfacing our knowledge and valid realities, as well as our praxes as valuable possibility models for ideological, cultural, and structural shifts in the academy and beyond." How do you think we can enact epistemic agency? What conditions would need to be met?