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Комикс Кьеркегор

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 Миф о Сизифе

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 Миф о Сизифе

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Миф о Сизифе

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ХМ 15 Қайырбек Азамат

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Исследовательские вопросы

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Исследовательские вопросы

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1. Как философия экзистенциализма может помочь людям справиться с чувством бессмысленности и безысходности в современном мире?
2.  Как экзистенциализм влияет на восприятие человеком своего места в обществе и социальной роли?
3. Как экзистенциалистская философия может быть применена в практике психотерапии и помочь людям преодолеть свои эмоциональные проблемы и трудности?
4. Как выражается философия экзистенциализма в современное время и его влияние ?

5.      Какие последствия экзистенциалистской философии могут возникнуть в обществе, если ее принципы будут широко распространены и приняты в повседневной жизни?

6.      Как экзистенциализм может помочь нам понимать современные проблемы, такие как эмоциональное и психическое благополучие, технологический прогресс и экологические проблемы?
7. Как экзистенциализм влияет на нашу способность находить смысл в традиционных институтах, таких как семья, общество и религия?
8. Как влияет понимание экзистенциализма на нашу мораль и этику?

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ХМ 14 Қайырбек А

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ХМ-13 Қайырбек Азамат

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Бытие и Ничто

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Бытие и Ничто

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https://librebook.me/l__tre_et_le_n_ant/vol1/1

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Бытие и Ничто

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Индивидуальные работы

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Индивидуальные работы

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Индивидуальные работы добавлены каждого участника команды, собраны и хрестоматийные материалы и работы на занятиях.
У Анжелики проработано 11 хрестоматийных материалов.
У Сафиябону и Марии 12 хрестоматийных материалов.
Также у всех участников добавлены статьи, интеллектуальные карты выполняемые на занятиях.

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Рецензия

Общий план

План составлен логически и грамотно затрагивает основные темы и рассказывает тему изучения. Из недостатков возможно немного не видеться связь 2 и 4 исследовательского вопроса с планом, подпункты добавлены только до 6 пункта

Что я бы возможно добавил ( возможно интересные темы по теме исследования)

Платоническая любовь

Любовь в поп культуре

Любовь в современном мире

Любовные девиации

Высокая и низкая любовь

Любовь к ближнему ( по теме христианства)

Любовь в неодушевленному (искажение любви)

Что бы изменил

Любовь с точки зрения науки (химии, биологии)

Любовь в психиатрии

Влияние на искусство

Вред и польза любви

К первому пункту добавил бы понятие любви

Любовь в христианстве на любовь в религии

Материал по теме которые возможно могут подойти

Она 2013 Фильм

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ХМ 12 Қайырбек А

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Мини Комикс по философии А.Камю

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Мини Комикс по философии А.Камю

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Источники подобраны корректно и соответствуют плану. Все пункты плана подкреплены 4 источниками и на каждый источник написаны по 4 тезиса. Все тезисы подходят под представленные источники и прописаны ясно и понятно для читателя. Также есть первоисточники и указаны отдельно, что очень удобно для просмотра. Единственный нюанс заключается в отсутствии тезисов к первоисточникам, их необходимо прописать в комментариях.

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Ссылка на падлет команды

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Ссылка на падлет команды

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https://padlet.com/mariya_rakelkamariddinova/padlet-ornfv3wdfvw0y6n2

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1. Дизайн падлета пр

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1. Дизайн падлета привлекает внимание спокойными оттенками и соответствует теме и цели работы. В некоторых колонках не хватает согласованности в дизайне, таких как разный шрифт в комментариях(тезисы), неодинаковый цвет колонок, что может снизить общее впечатление от презентации.  Использование графических элементов в интеллектуальных картах гармонично сочетается и улучшает восприятие информации. Рекомендуется более подробно разработать тексты, чтобы они были понятны и без устного комментирования.

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Экзистенциализм и современное кино

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Экзистенциализм и современное кино

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https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/BouleExistentialism

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View Table of Contents

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A Sartrean Perspective

Edited by Jean-Pierre Boulé and Enda MacCaffrey

224 pages, bibliog., index

ISBN 978-0-85745-320-4 $135.00/£99.00 / Hb / Published (October 2011)

ISBN 978-1-78238-494-6 $34.95/£27.95 / Pb / Published (March 2014)

eISBN 978-0-85745-321-1 eBook
https://doi.org/10.3167/9780857453204
Buy the eBook! $34.95 info on epub format Request a Review or Examination Copy (in Digital Format)Recommend to your Library Available in GOBI®
Reviews

" One of the strengths of the volume overall is the breadth of approaches to and applications of Sartrean thinking, from the personal and political to the atheistic and artistic. There is also a refreshing selection of films under consideration...their edited collection is very welcome evidence in support of the proposition that thinking about Sartre and film together can produce stimulating and insightful film philosophy." · Journal of Contemporary European Studies

" As someone who teaches both French cinema and existentialism courses, I would expect students of existentialism in particular to be enthusiastic about discussing this intersection of familiar concepts and such recent films. The essays are thoughtful, informed and illuminating. While some of the interpretations of the philosophy, and at times of Sartre's imaginative texts, may be unorthodox, students and scholars will find much here with which to reflect and engage. Collectively, they certainly demonstrate the richness of an existentialist interrogation of meaning and purposefulness of action in the world, and the extent to which contemporary cinema continues to prove fertile material for philosophical enquiry." · H-France

"All of the essays here are fine pieces in their own right, and the collection certainly succeeds in its aim of showing the relevance of Sartre for the study of contemporary cinema. It whets the appetite for a more systematic consideration of what a Sartrean approach to cinema might be" · Modern & Contemporary France

"[This volume] will provide a useful tool, in particular for students seeking to learn about Sartre and existentialism but also for students exploring the application of philosophy to the understanding of cinema." · Douglas Morrey, University of Warwick

Description

At the heart of this volume is the assertion that Sartrean existentialism, most prominent in the 1940s, particularly in France, is still relevant as a way of interpreting the world today. Film, by reflecting philosophical concerns in the actions and choices of characters, continues and extends a tradition in which art exemplifies the understanding of existentialist philosophy. In a scholarly yet accessible style, the contributors exploit the rich interplay between Sartre's philosophy, plays and novels, and a number of contemporary films including No Country for Old Men, Lost in Translation and The Truman Show, with film-makers including the Dardenne brothers, Michael Haneke, and Mike Leigh. This volume will be of interest to students who are coming to Sartre's work for the first time and to those who would like to read films within an existentialist perspective.

Jean-Pierre Boulé is Professor of Contemporary French Studies at Nottingham Trent University and the author of a number of books, notably on Sartre, including Sartre médiatique (1992) and Sartre, Self-Formation and Masculinities (2005). He is the co-founder of the U.K. Sartre Society and executive editor of Sartre Studies International. He is coediting with Benedict O'Donohoe, Jean-Paul Sartre: Mind and Body, Word and Deed (2011) and preparing with Ursula Tidd a companion volume, Existentialism and Contemporary Cinema. A Beauvoirian Perspective (2013).

Enda McCaffrey is Professor of French Theory and Culture at Nottingham Trent University. He is the author of a number of books including The Gay Republic: Sexuality, Citizenship and Subversion in France (2005) and The Return of Religion in France: From Democratisation to Postmetaphysics (2009). He is has recently completed a new monograph entitled Bodies Without Organs: French Theory and Homosexuality (2015)
Subject Codes
LC: PN1995.9.E945E94 2011

BL: YK.2012.a.23188

BISAC:
PER004030 PERFORMING ARTS/Film & Video/History & Criticism;
FOR008000 FOREIGN LANGUAGE STUDY / French;
PHI006000 PHILOSOPHY/Movements/Existentialism

BIC:
APFA Film theory & criticism;
HPCF3 Phenomenology & Existentialism

Contents
Expand ToC
Acknowledgements

PART I: THE CALL TO FREEDOM

Chapter 1. Peter Weir's The Truman Show and SartreanFreedom
Christopher Falzon

Chapter 2. Michael Haneke and the Consequences of Radical Freedom
Kevin L. Stoehr

Chapter 3. Naked, Bad Faith and Masculinity
Mark Stanton

Chapter 4. Pursuits of Transcendence in The Man Who Wasn't There
Tom Martin

Chapter 5. Lorna's Silence: Sartre and the Dardenne Brothers
Sarah Cooper

PART II: FILMS OF SITUATION

Chapter 6. Being- Lost in Translation
Michelle R. Darnell

Chapter 7. If I Should Wake Before I Die: Existentialism as a Political Call to Arms in The Crying Game
Tracey Nicholls

Chapter 8. Crimes of Passion, Freedom and a Clash of Sartrean Moralities in the Coen Brothers' No Country for Old Men
Enda McCaffrey

Chapter 9. 'An Act of Confidence in the Freedom of Men': Jean-Paul Sartre and Ousmane Sembene
Patrick Williams

Chapter 10. Cédric Klapisch's The Spanish Apartment and Russian Dolls in Nausea's Mirror
Jean-Pierre Boulé

Chapter 11. Baz Luhrmann's William Shakespeare's Romeo + Juliet: The Nauseous Art of Adaptation
Alistair Rolls

Notes on Contributors
Index

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berghahn books academic scholarly publisher press social anthropology archaeology humanities refugee migration geography history film

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Existentialism and Contemporary Cinema: A Sartrean Perspective | Berghahn Books

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View Table of Contents Sign up for our email newsletters to get customized updates on new Berghahn publications. Click here to select your preferences 224 pages, bibliog., index ISBN 978-0-85745-320-4 $135.00/£99.00 / Hb / Published (October 2011) ISBN 978-1-78238-494-6 $34.95/£27.95 / Pb / Published (March 2014) eISBN 978-0-85745-321-1 eBook https://doi.org/10.3167/9780857453204 Buy the eBook!

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Индивидуальное видео

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Индивидуальное видео

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https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/folders/1XfSCGu-NFdw_SdE6Hjja4P2YWVW2sThV

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Get access to files anywhere through secure cloud storage and file backup for your photos, videos, files and more with Google Drive.

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9.Критика философии экзистенциализма
9.1 Критика со стороны религий
9.2 Критика со стороны науки

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Интеллект карта

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Интеллект карта

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Критика экзистенциализма (3)

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https://padlet.com/alibekkabdossov/padlet-eyww060hueifk1uw

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инд первоист 2

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инд первоист 2

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Ф.М. Достоевский Записки из подполья (1) (1)

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инд первоист1

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инд первоист1

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Одна из основных тем творчества абсурдность и ирациональность бытия (1) (1)

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There is no difference between computer art and human art Oliver Roeder

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There is no difference between computer art and human art Oliver Roeder

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https://aeon.co/ideas/there-is-no-such-thing-as-computer-art-it-s-all-just-art

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Mural of John Coltrane by graffitti artist Omen. Photo by Deeboy/Flickr

In December 1964, over a single evening session in Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, John Coltrane and his quartet recorded the entirety of A Love Supreme. This jazz album is considered Coltrane's masterpiece - the culmination of his spiritual awakening - and sold a million copies. What it represents is all too human: a climb out of addiction, a devotional quest, a paean to God.

Five decades later and 50 miles downstate, over 12 hours this April and fuelled by Monster energy drinks in a spare bedroom in Princeton, New Jersey, Ji-Sung Kim wrote an algorithm to teach a computer to teach itself to play jazz. Kim, a 20-year-old Princeton sophomore, was in a rush - he had a quiz the next morning. The resulting neural network project, called d eepjazz, trended on GitHub, generated a buzz of excitement and skepticism from the Hacker News commentariat, got 100,000 listens on SoundCloud, and was big in Japan.

This half-century gulf, bracketed by saxophone brass and Python code, has seen a rise in computer-generated music and visual art of all methods and genres. Computer art in the era of big data and deep learning, though, is a reckoning for algorithms, capital-A. We must now embrace - either to wrestle or to caress - computer art.

In industry, there is blunt-force algorithmic tension - 'Efficiency, capitalism, commerce!' versus 'Robots are stealing our jobs!' But for algorithmic art, the tension is subtler. Only 4 per cent of the work done in the United States economy requires 'creativity at a median human level', according to the consulting firm McKinsey and Company. So for computer art - which tries explicitly to zoom into this small piece of that vocational pie - it's a question not of efficiency or equity, but of trust. Art requires emotional and phrenic investments, with the promised return of a shared slice of the human experience. When we view computer art, the pestering, creepy worry is: who's on the other end of the line? Is it human? We might, then, worry that it's not art at all.

Algorithms' promise holds potent popular allure. A search for the word 'algorithm' in the webpages of the empirically minded site FiveThirtyEight (where I'm on staff) returns 516 results, as I write. I'm personally responsible for more than a few of those. In the age of big data, algorithms are meant to treat disease, predict the decisions of the Supreme Court, revolutionise sports and predict the beauty of sunsets. They will also, it's said, prevent suicide, improve your arugula, predict police misconduct, and tell if a movie will bomb.

The more grandiose would-be applications of algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI) are often preceded by ostensibly more manageable proving grounds - games, say. Before IBM's question-answering computer, Watson, treats cancer, for example, it goes on the TV quiz show Jeopardy! Google's AlphaGo took on a top human Go champion in a 'grand challenge' for AI. But these contests aren't trivial stepping stones - they can be seen as affronts to humankind. One commentator, realising that Google's program would win a match, said he 'felt physically unwell'.

It's much the same for computer art projects. Kim and his friend Evan Chow, whose code is used in deepjazz, are members of the youngest generation of a long lineage of computer 'artists'. (These two aren't exactly starving artists, though. This summer, Kim's working at Merck, and Chow's at Uber.) As the three of us sat in a high-backed wooden booth in Cafe Vivian, on the Princeton campus, actual, honest-to-God human jazz played over the speakers - Rahsaan Roland Kirk's frenetic 'Pedal Up' (1973) - and as Kim played me samples generated by deepjazz from his laptop, we were awash in an unholy jazz + jazz = jazz moment.

'The idea is pretty profound,' Kim said, as I strained to decipher what was human in the cacophony. 'You can use an AI to create art. That's normally a process that we think of as immutably human.' Kim agreed that deepjazz, and computer art, is often a proving ground, but he saw ends as well as means. 'I'm not going to use the word "disruptive",' he said, then continued: 'It's crazy how AI could shape the music industry,' imagining an app built on tech like deepjazz. 'You hum a melody and the phone plays back your own custom, AI-generated song.'

Like a profitless startup, the value of many computer-art projects thus far is their perceived promise. The public deepjazz demo is limited, and improvises off just one song, 'And Then I Knew' (1995) by the Pat Metheny Group (Kim wasn't quite sure how to pronounce 'Metheny'). But the code is public, and it's been tweaked to noodle the Friends theme song, for example.

Of course it's not just jazz music, and not just deepjazz, that has gotten the computer treatment - jigs and folk songs, a 'Genetic Jammer', polyphonic music, and quite a bit else has been put through the algorithmic ringer.

Visual art, too, has been subjected to algorithms for decades now. Two engineers created this image - probably the first computer nude - at Bell Labs in Murray Hill, New Jersey, somewhere geographically between Coltrane and Kim, in 1966. The piece was exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art in 1968.

The New York Times reviewed one of the first exhibitions of computer art, in 1965 (just a few months after Coltrane's recording session) featuring work by two scientists and an IBM #7094 digital computer, at a New York gallery, now long shuttered. 'So far the means are of greater interest than the end,' the Times wrote. But the review, by the late Stuart Preston, goes on to strike a surprisingly enthusiastic tone:

No matter what the future holds - and scientists predict a time when almost any kind of painting can be computer-generated - the actual touch of the artist will no longer play any part in the making of a work of art. When that day comes, the artist's role will consist of mathematically formulating, by arranging an array of points in groups, a desired pattern. From then on, all will be entrusted to the deus ex machina. Freed from the tedium of technique and the mechanics of picture-making, the artist will simply 'create'.

The machine is just the brush - a human holds it. There are, indeed, examples of computers helping musicians to simply 'create'.

Emily Howell is a computer program. A 1990s creation of David Cope, now a professor emeritus at the University of California at Santa Cruz, 'she' was born out of Cope's frustrating struggle to finish an opera of his own. (Howell's compositions are performed by human musicians.)

This music is passable. It might even be good and, for me, is safely on the right bank of the uncanny valley. But another thing that makes it more interesting is the simple fact that it I know it was composed by a computer. I'm interested in that as a medium - an amplification of Cope's artistic expression, rather than a sublimation. But the tension persists.

I've fallen down other rabbit holes, too: for one, the work of Manfred Mohr, an early algorithmic art pioneer who is himself a (human) jazz musician, as well as an artist. Namely his painting, P‑706/B (2000), based on a six-dimensional hypercube. I spent the next hour reading about Mohr, the man.

Sometimes in 'computer music' it's also the other way around - humans name the tune, software dances to it. And in one of these cases, the market has spoken loudly. Vocaloids are singing synthesisers, developed by Yamaha, and anthropomorphised by the Japanese company Crypton. One popular Vocaloid, Hatsune Miku (the name translates to 'the first sound from the future'), headlined a barn-burning North American tour this year, where Miku appeared as a hologram, drawing lines around the block for $75 tickets at New York's Hammerstein Ballroom. Miku is a huge pop star, but not a human. 'She' also appeared on the Late Show with David Letterman.

So it's increasingly not just dorm-room hackers and cloistered academics pecking at computer art to show off their chops or get papers published. Last month, the Google Brain team announced Magenta, a project to use machine learning for exactly the purposes described here, and asked the question: 'Can we use machine learning to create compelling art and music?' (The answer is pretty clearly already 'Yes,' but there you go.) The project follows in the footsteps of Google's Deep Dream Generator, which reimagines images in arty, dreamy (or nightmarish) ways, using neural networks.

But the honest-to-God truth, at the end of all of this, is that this whole notion is in some way a put-on: a distinction without a difference. 'Computer art' doesn't really exist in an any more provocative sense than 'paint art' or 'piano art' does. The algorithmic software was written by a human, after all, using theories thought up by a human, using a computer built by a human, using specs written by a human, using materials gathered by a human, at a company staffed by humans, using tools built by a human, and so on. Computer art is human art - a subset rather than a distinction. It's safe to release the tension.

A different human commentator, after witnessing the program beat the human champ at Go, felt physically fine and struck a different note: 'An amazing result for technology. And a compliment to the incredible capabilities of the human brain.' So it is with computer art. It's a compliment to the human brain - and a complement to oil paints and saxophone brass.

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There is no such thing as computer art: it's all just art | Aeon Ideas

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'Computer art' makes no more sense than 'paint art' or 'piano art'. Computer art is just human art

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https://aeon.co/essays/what-drum-machines-can-teach-us-about-artificial-intelligence

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What drum machines can teach us about artificial intelligence | Aeon Essays

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As AI drum machines embrace humanising imperfections, what does this mean for ‘real’ drummers and the soul of music?

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Better Call Saul’s final episode is the end of the golden age of TV as we know it Siobhan Lyons

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Better Call Saul’s final episode is the end of the golden age of TV as we know it Siobhan Lyons

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https://theconversation.com/better-call-sauls-final-episode-is-the-end-of-the-golden-age-of-tv-as-we-know-it-188447

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When it was announced that the creators of Breaking Bad would be filming a prequel spin-off to their iconic series, few could have imagined the critical acclaim it would receive in its own right.

As Better Call Saul prepares to air its final episode, many have taken to calling it the greatest television show of all time.

It joins a list of other prestige TV shows that have come and gone in recent years: Game of Thrones, The Wire, The Sopranos, Mad Men, Dexter, and of course Breaking Bad.

Better Call Saul is often considered part of the new golden age of television, stretching roughly from 2000 to the present, characterised by high-quality, original shows with prolonged, complex story arcs, compelling visual aesthetics and morally ambiguous characters.

Thanks in part to cable networks like HBO, AMC and Showtime, television was elevated to high art, leading to HBO's famous slogan: "It's not TV, it's HBO."

Today, however, decade-defining shows are scarce. The streaming wars have inundated audiences with content, leaving them overwhelmed. Judy Berman, writing in Time, calls this "peak redundancy":

We may still be deluged with viewing options, many of exceptional quality. But we also have too many shows that feel interchangeable.

Better Call Saul remains the last of those defining, golden age shows, and will leave a poignant mark on the television landscape.

Law and chaos

As a prequel spin-off, Better Call Saul was always going to be compared to its beloved predecessor. But thanks to intelligent dialogue, skilful shifts in tone, and multifaceted characters, the show has established its own unique legacy under the guardianship of creators Vince Gilligan and Peter Gould.

Breaking Bad was notorious for fulminated-mercury explosions and gruesome deaths ( 271 deaths compared to 65 in Better Call Saul, as of the penultimate episode). Better Call Saul, by contrast, is renowned for its unhurried momentum and painstaking focus on the minutiae of the legal world.

As David Segal of The New York Times put it:

For decades, law firms have been portrayed on television as realms of glamour and intrigue. The reality can be pretty awful.

While Breaking Bad felt slick and gritty, Better Call Saul feels painfully real. Jimmy is not the romanticised anti-hero Walter White is. He is not a Dexter Morgan or a Tony Soprano. If anything, Jimmy is one of life's losers, struggling to hold onto his individuality in a corporate system that thrives on conformity.

We like Jimmy because he is kind, irreverent, resourceful and idealistic. His girlfriend-turned-wife, Kim Wexler (Rhea Seehorn) remains the primary voice of reason until the end of season five, when she succumbs to the lure of Jimmy's scheming ways.

Like Jimmy, Kim is torn between the stability of corporate life and her passion for public defender cases. She, too, realises that law and justice are not always the same thing.

Better Call Saul resonates because it's filled with characters who feel smothered by dead-end compromises, like Ignacio "Nacho" Varga (Michael Mando) and Mike Ehrmantraut (Jonathan Banks), both of whom are caught in the orbit of the drug cartel. Like Jimmy, their tragic arcs are amplified by the choices they feel they are forced to make.

We pity Jimmy in particular as he tries in vain to be accepted by the corporate mainstream. But his past as a small-time conman makes this transition impossible. No matter how much Jimmy tries to appease the establishment, and his brother, Chuck (a formidable Michael McKean), he can never quite shake his reputation as "Slippin' Jimmy".

For Berman, this is where Better Call Saul excels, in showing us the hypocrisy of the American judicial system, where "even the attorneys who uphold this system don't really believe in second chances."

Jimmy and his clients, she says, are

shut out of institutions they've earned the right to re-enter - and so they do whatever it takes to survive outside of those institutions.

Read more: Mad Men, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, and the 'Golden Age' of television

Faced with these untenable conditions, Jimmy descends further into the world of the con, gradually forsaking his idealism and fulfilling a destiny that others - institutions, colleagues, his brother - have written for him.

This is what makes Jimmy's slow transformation into Saul Goodman so despairing, and yet so relatable. Unable to be himself, and yet unable to affect real change by the book, the corporate world eats away at his resolve until there's nothing left but the thrill of the scam.

As Odenkirk himself noted:

I think one of the themes of Better Call Saul is that real, fundamental change of a person is driven by some pretty hard and powerful forces. You have to really crunch the psyche of a person to get them to change fundamentally."

Read more: Three reasons Better Call Saul works: a scriptwriter's perspective

End of an era

Like its predecessors, Better Call Saul combines strong, cinematic visuals with methodical storytelling to give audiences a complex portrait of the land of opportunity's shadow-world.

As it comes to an end, so does the golden age of TV. In the streaming era, we seem to be losing the patience for such storytelling, with shows constantly one-upping each other for shock value, from The Witcher to rise-and-fall dramas Super Pumped and WeCrashed.

As Taylor Antrim of Vogue explains: "Saul looks like nothing else on TV."

He writes that

its meticulous shabbiness inspires nostalgia for a slightly less overheated TV era, when shows didn't have to jostle and compete and shout 'look at me!' for attention.

The universe that Gilligan and Gould created is not one we are likely to forget, its departure signalling the end of a truly great era of television.

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Better Call Saul's final episode is the end of the golden age of TV as we know it

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When it was announced that the creators of Breaking Bad would be filming a prequel spin-off to their iconic series, few could have imagined the critical acclaim it would receive in its own right. As Better Call Saul prepares to air its final episode, many have taken to calling it the greatest television show of all time.

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Застрял с душой

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Статья: Роберт Кейн - Поступать по собственной свободной воле

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Статья: Роберт Кейн - Поступать по собственной свободной воле

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https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/postupat-po-svoey-sobstvennoy-svobodnoy-vole-sovremennye-razmyshleniya-o-drevney-filosofskoy-probleme/viewer

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Поступать "по своей собственной свободной воле": современные размышления о древней философской проблеме

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Статья: Бертран Рассел и аргументы в пользу Философии для всех

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Статья: Бертран Рассел и аргументы в пользу Философии для всех

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https://theconversation.com/bertrand-russell-and-the-case-for-philosophy-for-everyone-58859

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Bertrand Russell's 'Philosophy for Laymen' invites everyone to engage philosophically. Flickr , CC BY

One of the interesting questions we face as philosophers who are attempting to make philosophical ideas accessible for a general audience, is whether or not everyone can or should 'do philosophy'.

Some philosophers wish to leave philosophy in the academy or university setting. Whereas others claim the downfall of modern philosophy came in the late 19th century when the subject was institutionalized within the research university setting. By condemning philosophy as only appropriate as a serious subject of study, philosophers have lost much widespread support and public recognition for its value.

Philosophers working in the public arena, such as those contributing to The Conversation and Cogito Philosophy Blog will defend the argument in favour of 'philosophy for everyone'.

Bertrand Russell's 'Philosophy for Laymen'

In 1946 Bertrand Russell wrote an essay entitled Philosophy for Laymen, in which he defends the view that philosophy should be 'a part of general education'. He proposes that,

even in the time that can easily be spared without injury to the learning of technical skills, philosophy can give certain things that will greatly increase the student's value as a human being and as a citizen.

Clare Carlisle refers to Russell when she writes,

Russell revives an ancient conception of philosophy as a way of life in insisting that questions of cosmic meaning and value have an existential, ethical and spiritual urgency. (Of course, what we might mean by such terms is another issue for philosophers to grapple with.)

We see here the idea of philosophy as a praxis; something that we do, and a way of thinking that is beneficial for every rational human being. As Russell puts it,

To endure uncertainty is difficult, but so are most of the other virtues. For the learning of every virtue there is an appropriate discipline, and for the learning of suspended judgment the best discipline is philosophy.

Russell believes that philosophy can be taught to 'laymen' readers which will assist them to think more objectively about emotive issues. Carlisle concedes that this is easier to do when one is not faced with a stressful moral dilemma or the burden of making a quick decision while in an emotional state.

Yet, the idea is that we practice the habit of philosophical thinking, and that we get better at it.

Philosophy with young people

I recently attended the 2016 Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations (FAPSA) Conference in Wellington, New Zealand and was struck by the conversation surrounding the idea of what kind(s) of philosophy should be taught to everyone, and particularly to young people.

The presenters and attendees at this conference are all committed to offering philosophy as a subject to school aged children, from ages 3 to 17. I have previously written about Philosophy for Children (P4C) and the benefits of teaching philosophy to young people.

Namely, P4C offers students the chance to learn and practice not just critical thinking skills, but also caring, collaborative and creative thinking skills. It does this using the Community of Inquiry (CoI) pedagogy favoured by P4C practitioners. The CoI involves students engaging in dialogue with one another in an inclusive and democratic manner. Such dialogue is facilitated by their teachers using age appropriate philosophical texts and stimulus materials in the classroom.

But should every student study 'all' philosophy?

One of the papers given at the FAPSA Conference, presented by Michael Hand from the University of Birmingham argued that, well, perhaps not. Hand says,

Not only in philosophy, but in all branches of academic study there is a distinction between what has cultural value and what is only of professional interest.

It must be noted that Hand defends the teaching of philosophy to young people and also to offering it as an option for school aged students. He notes that it is 'easy' to defend the inclusion of Philosophy as an option on the curriculum because,

like other academic subjects, it is an intrinsically worthwhile activity

like other academic subjects, it is instrumentally valuable in cultivating intellectual virtues and improving the quality of thinking

Yet, when asked whether we can defend the inclusion of philosophy as a compulsory subject within the curriculum, we would need to prove that it offers every student a distinct benefit that they would not otherwise get.

The distinct benefit gained by studying philosophy

Note that Carrie Winstanley does defend such a claim. She, in a book co-edited with Hand, claims that even if other subjects also teach critical thinking skills, philosophy is the best subject to teach students critical thinking skills, precisely because critical thinking is the essence of philosophy.

Philosophy is the best possible subject for helping children to become effective critical thinkers. It is the subject that can teach them better than any other how to assess reasons, defend positions, define terms, evaluate sources of information, and judge the value of arguments and evidence.

Yet if other subjects also teach critical thinking skills to students, why should we make room in a crowded curriculum for philosophy?

Hand considers this point and suggests that what would be uniquely beneficial for students would be to study moral and political philosophy. He tells us that,

Moral and political philosophy do not, of course, tell us the best way to live. But they do enable us to think more deeply and rigorously about the choices we make and the goals we pursue. And they do justify certain moral and political constraints within which we must make our choices and pursue our goals.

Hand concludes that,

moral and political philosophy confers on those who study it the distinctive benefit of being able to think intelligently about how they will live and the moral and political constraints on their conduct... [and] everyone has a strong interest in this benefit because everyone faces the problem of how to live and the responsibility of complying with moral and political constraints.

This results in an argument in favour of teaching moral and political philosophy as a compulsory subject in schools, even if other areas of philosophy (aesthetics, formal logic, epistemology, and ontology) are additional or optional extras.

Philosophy for everyone

When it comes to who should be doing philosophy, I believe that everyone can 'have a go' as reasonable citizens who reflect on the meaning they make of their lives. Yes, philosophy is best suited to the university setting in which experts are trained. Yes, philosophy can be done with children in classrooms. And yes, surely philosophy is something everyone can and should do, albeit at differing levels of competence.

But I am also sympathetic to Hand's focus on moral philosophy, and ethics in particular. When speaking about ethics, philosophers regain their foothold in the public arena in which they can demonstrate how careful thinking skills can be usefully applied to difficult and complex scenarios.

Sure, there is not 'one perfect answer' to these moral dilemmas, but, critical, caring, creative and collaborative thinking skills are valuable in ruling out the worst answers. Such philosophical thinking skills also help guide decision makers towards better policies, public understanding, and widespread engagement with issues that affect people's lives.

To extend philosophical dialogue into schools and public spaces is to engage and encourage careful consideration of fundamentally important 'big' questions that have always occupied human thought. And centrally, these days, those questions are moral and political, as these effect our individual autonomy and our collective humanity.

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Bertrand Russell and the case for 'Philosophy for Everyone'

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One of the interesting questions we face as philosophers who are attempting to make philosophical ideas accessible for a general audience, is whether or not everyone can or should 'do philosophy'. Some philosophers wish to leave philosophy in the academy or university setting.

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Статья: Застрял с душой

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Статья: Застрял с душой

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https://aeon.co/essays/why-are-most-of-us-stuck-with-a-belief-in-the-soul

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Few ideas are as unsupported, ridiculous and even downright harmful as that of the 'human soul'. And yet, few ideas are as widespread and as deeply held. What gives? Why has such a bad idea had such a tenacious hold on so many people? Although there is a large literature on the costs and benefits - psychological and economic - of traditional religion, there is a dearth of comparable research on religion's near-universal handmaiden, the soul. As with Justice Potter Stewart's non-definition of pornography - 'I may not be able to define it, but I know it when I see it' - the soul is slippery and, even though it cannot be seen (or smelled, touched, heard or tasted), soul-certain people seem to agree that they know it when they imagine it. And they imagine it in everyone.

Viewed historically and cross-culturally, there is immense variation regarding the soul, although some patterns can be discerned and are nearly universal. Souls are said to reside inside their associated bodies and are pretty much defined as immaterial, thereby contrasted with their fleshy habitations. Immortality is another close, but not quite universal, characteristic. Also widespread, but not invariant, is the soul's ability to travel independent of its body, sometimes after death but often during sleep. Dreams are widely seen as demonstrating not only that the soul is 'real', but that it occupies its own unique plane of reality.

Jewish doctrine says almost nothing about the soul. '[T]here is no way on earth,' wrote the influential Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides, 'that we can comprehend or know it.' This agnostic attitude is consistent with Judaism's lack of specificity regarding the afterlife generally and of heaven and hell in particular. By contrast, Christianity and Islam are clear when it comes to the soul, conceiving it as immaterial as well as immortal, the two perspectives being, as it were, soulmates. Although Islam has a variety of views when it comes to the soul, there is greater diversity within Christianity - between Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox conceptions - and also within Protestantism, ranging from evangelical fundamentalism to the more relaxed and philosophical approaches of modern-day Quakers and Unitarians.

The Hindu soul resembles its Abrahamic counterpart with regard to immateriality and immortality, but with two major differences. For one, the soul ( atman, or 'self') is conceived as a personalised part of a greater world-soul ( brahman, closer to the Western 'God'). Second, the Hindu soul is subject to regular reincarnations following the death of its body, including excursions into different kinds of animals, depending on its accumulated karma. The final desired destination of this process of repetitive birth and rebirth - oversimplified as nirvana - somewhat resembles the Western concept of heaven, although it is conceived more as a respite from the cycle of birth and rebirth than as an abode of ongoing bliss.

When trekking in the Himalayas, I often followed the sherpa advice that one should pause every third day, 'to let your soul catch up with your body.' It made a kind of intuitive sense. One needn't be a Buddhist or travelling at extreme elevation to appreciate this wisdom. As a metaphor for mind, consciousness, one's deeper beliefs and desires, the soul is serviceable. But its appeal goes beyond linguistic or conceptual utility.

Whatever else the soul is supposed to be, it is immaterial: ie, lacking physical substance. That doesn't necessarily mean it doesn't exist, because other 'things' without structural reality are real as immaterial concepts: love, fear, hope, and so forth. Some things exist only as genuine objects, rather than in the realm of the ideal or the conceptual: chairs, fire hydrants, trombones. There is no reason to discount the soul simply because there is no universally accepted sense of what it is. Just as one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter, one person's conception of the soul as possessing a spark of the divinely supernatural may be another's mind, free will, conscience, and so forth.

But no one claims that personal memories or the Pythagorean theorem are imbued with a God-given spark, or that they exist in the sense that they can be bartered and commodified like the soul, which can by some accounts be sold to the devil (suggesting that it is at least somewhat concrete). Nor are immaterial concepts supposed to reside within each person, to disappear - and then re-emerge elsewhere - after the death of the body. Soul-zealots do not accept that it exists only in a hazy, ectoplasmic plane: our unique dose of fairy dust. It is purportedly real, albeit not quite like the body in which it resides.

Immateriality - especially when blindly accepted but not seriously interrogated - is useful to the soul's mythology, because failure to see, hear, smell, touch or taste that which is immaterial isn't a dispositive argument against it. For believers, the fact that the soul cannot be perceived by the senses becomes an argument for its superiority, because it doesn't partake of the messiness and dross of our everyday, fallen world. That is one of the soul's great attractions.

Modern science hasn't yet come up with an alternative answer to what, precisely, makes something alive

It is also deeply flattering to be told that part of oneself is a chip off the old divine block, all the more so given that the devil is desperate to get it from you, while religion - acting as God's representative - is equally eager to save it for you. How empowering to be told that we possess something uniquely our own and, moreover, that it is of inestimable value, no matter one's station in life. Like the Colt-45 in the Wild West, souls are great equalisers. At the same time, souls are paradoxically delicate and must be guarded like a Victorian maiden's virginity, lest it be lost and you ruined - not merely excluded from a secular marriage market, but consigned to ruination that is potentially eternal, deprived of union with God and, in the worst case, consigned to eternal torment.

The soul's alleged immateriality offers yet more psychological appeal. For one thing, the difference between alive and dead is profound. The eyes are bright and busy, then dull and unresponsive. Movement occurs, then ceases. No wonder life itself has long been associated with a kind of magic substance: now you've got it, now you don't. And, when you don't, it's because your life-force, your soul, has departed. Or maybe it departs because you've died, and your soul is obliged to move on. In many conceptions, the soul is that which breathes life into a body, and even modern science hasn't yet come up with an alternative answer to what, precisely, makes something alive. (Worth mentioning at this point: soul-believers are inclined to point to what-science-doesn't-know as evidence for the supernatural. This is the 'God of the gaps' argument, namely that God is posited to explain gaps in our scientific knowledge, a viewpoint that is discomfiting to theologians because it brings two big problems. For one, attributing what we don't understand to God hardly suffices as an explanation. And, for another, as science expands, the gaps shrink - and in the process, so does God.)

Life-death transition isn't the only popular testimony for the existence of some sort of immaterial, internal component of the self. Cartesian dualism, whereby mind is believed to be somehow distinct from body, is uniformly rejected by scientists and even by much of the lay public insofar as they acknowledge that mental activity derives strictly from the brain. And yet we experience ourselves as something different from our material body, speaking of 'our thoughts', 'our desires', 'our memories' and the like, as though each of us resides inside ourselves, along with a concatenation of thoughts, desires, memories, rather than the disconcerting truth that there is no 'self' separate from the material functioning of our neurons.

Add to this the universal experience of feeling disconnected from our bodies, not as a result of psychosis, but just in daily life. The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak: 'we' might have plans, but our body disagrees. On occasion, an erection (or its absence) is inconvenient; ditto for a nursing woman's letdown reflex, or any number of cases in which it appears that one's body doesn't cooperate with what we perceive as our hopes, inclinations and desires. Given all this, it's hard not to be a dualist, hence hard not to feel that there's something about ourselves that is distinct from our bodies, the Cheshire Cat's grin after the cat's body has disappeared.

Moreover, we know our bodies to have been mutable, while also feeling that our inner self has remained independent of any merely meaty transitions. Our memories yield a kind of mental continuity, a persistence of personal identity that feels separate from whatever happens to our bodies. This is why, even as we recognise the absurdity of Gregor Samsa being transformed into a giant insect, or Odysseus' crew into pigs, we also readily accept that Samsa et al somehow remain themselves underneath, or inside. Even those of us who don't accept that souls exist, that they commute, transmute or travel, can nonetheless find such ideas emotionally comprehensible. Somewhere (deep in our souls?) we are intuitive soul-sympathisers.

But we are also intuitive flat-Earthers. Our intuitions are often wrong, whether about the magical elixir that seems necessary to underlie life or the immaterial, dualistic intervention that jumps the gap between neurons and mind. This intuitive misconstrual contributes to why even the most sceptical observers unthinkingly resonate with the soul's immateriality, and also helps explain why belief in the soul is so widespread.

There is more. The allure of the soul goes beyond its attractive immateriality. Take death. Admittedly, most of us would rather leave it, and that's the point.

Immortality is a big deal. It is impossible, at least in the Abrahamic traditions, to imagine a soul that isn't immortal. A consistent defining feature is that, whatever else it is (how it arises, when it arises, where it resides, what it does to facilitate the functions of our body, where it goes after that body's death, whether or not it is corruptible), a major appeal of soul-belief - probably its greatest - is that it promises eternal life. Not for the body, of course, but for itself, and thus, somehow, for each of us. No one would yearn for immortality if it were not for death and the near-universal desperation to avoid it, or at least to transcend it by having some part of ourselves persist afterward. Somehow. Somewhere. Some time.

Even the most devout believers in a truly divine afterlife do what they can to keep from dying. ('That's the last thing I'll do,' quipped Groucho Marx.) And those who don't, or who claim that they don't, announce that they don't have to, because death isn't such a big deal. In his 'Holy Sonnet 10' (1609), John Donne proclaimed:

Death, be not proud, though some have called thee
Mighty and dreadful, for thou are not so;
For those whom thou think'st thou dost overthrow
Die not, poor Death, nor yet canst thou kill me.

The poem ends: 'And death shall be no more; Death, thou shalt die.' It may be churlish to point this out, but Donne did in fact die, while death didn't. Although the evidence is now overwhelming that many different species of animals such as elephants and chimpanzees are aware of death when it befalls others, and some even appear to mourn when a relative or sometimes an unrelated group member dies, it does not seem that any animal except ourselves is afflicted with awareness that someday they, too, will die. Despite numerous Donne-like assertions about overcoming the fear of death - not to mention transcending death itself - the effort, energy and hope thereby expended speak eloquently of how real and threatening is that fear. Hence the paradox that even those who deny its importance go to great lengths to delay if not prevent it. Moreover, even the most religiously devout are most concerned to establish and reinforce confidence that eternal life is available, unspeakably delightful, and just around that final corner. Just waiting for their souls to get there.

Ghosts bad; souls good. Both are inseparable from the fear of death

In many non-Western traditions, funerary rituals are required for the deceased's soul to make it to heaven. I have witnessed ' sky burials ' in Tibet and northern Nepal, in which the corpse is laid out on a high, flat plateau, its body ritually sliced open and made available to vultures, while mourners chant encouragement to the deceased's soul, which is thought to take flight along with the newly engorged birds, thence to proceed, after taking its obligatory tour in the upper air, to relocate itself in other bodies, either human or non-. When I asked one of the celebrants what would happen to the soul of the dear-departed if these procedures were not followed, the response was that it would remain trapped within the decaying body, where it wouldn't be happy. And that, despite being eternally imprisoned, it would somehow exact revenge upon those who let it down. (Another English-speaking Tibetan said, with a wry smile, that she thought the only unhappiness would be some underfed vultures.)

Despite all the Christian gospel (derived from the Old English for 'good news') about post-mortem souls cavorting happily in heaven, there persists a widespread assumption, also cross-cultural, that after death the deceased's spirit becomes frightening, as witnessed by the expectation that anyone whose sky burial is ignored or inadequately carried out will revenge themselves on the living. Ghosts are nearly always feared and unwelcome, except when they are made the butt of humour. Ghosts bad; souls good. Both are inseparable from the fear of death and the hope that mortality can somehow be avoided or at least shoehorned into eternal life, via our undying souls.

In 'Aubade' (1977), perhaps the finest poem of the many written on the subject, Philip Larkin noted that, when it comes to death, there is 'nothing more terrible, nothing more true'. He goes on:

This is a special way of being afraid
No trick dispels. Religion used to try,
That vast moth-eaten musical brocade
Created to pretend we never die ...

Larkin sombrely concludes that: 'Most things may never happen: this one will.' Managing this situation is challenging. Thank God - and our credulity - for our immortal souls! Our body, like John Brown's, will lie 'a-moldering in the grave', but our soul will '[go] marching on.' Hallelujah!

Once again, there is more. Whereas the allures just described are largely neutral, or even beneficial to individual psyches, two others are especially congenial to institutions, and both are largely malign. One is the widespread presumption that souls are uniquely possessed by human beings, leaving all other living things bereft of divine connection and accordingly, denied moral legitimacy. To be sure, there are laws against abusing animals, but for the most part they are half-hearted and not zealously enforced. Scratch the surface, and much of the underlying substructure justifying maltreatment of animals derives from the unspoken but widespread instructions provided, for example, by the Hebrew Bible, in which Homo sapiens is given dominion over the Earth's creatures, a dichotomous distinction that is keyed to the theological distinction of soulful vs soul-less.

The most fundamental take-home message from evolution is the continuity of living things. We share more than 98 per cent of our DNA with other apes, and around 90 per cent with cats. And yet one of the most consistent messages of monotheistic religion, and one that relies heavily on the concept of the soul, is discontinuity: there are human beings, and then there is everything else, never mind that we share basic patterns of anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, neurobiology, embryology and the like with the rest of the organic world. As Rudyard Kipling's Mowgli understood: 'We be of one blood, ye and I.' We converge with the rest of life in every way imaginable, except, we are told, when it comes to souls. Never mind that basic biology demands that either souls are fictitious and no one has them, or we have souls and other animals do, too, perhaps to varying degrees: if each person has 100 per cent of a soul, then do chimps and bonobos luxuriate in perhaps 99 per cent, gorillas 98 per cent, and cats 90 per cent? No matter. When it comes to souls, we have 'em and they don't, so we can round them up, keep them in inhumane conditions, skin them and eat them.

The second malign allure involves the threat of eternal punishment. The soul has been an especially useful arrow in the quiver of religious institutions, inducing terrified followers to do as they are told, or else: 'Nice soul you've got there. A shame if it ends up in hell.' A long tradition, especially in Christian and Islamic theology, anticipates that evil-doers will get it in the end, if not in this life, then in the next. The Hindu and to a lesser extent Buddhist concepts of karma apply here as well, although with somewhat less terrifying resonance: be good, and your soul will end up in a happy, admirable body, or perhaps even achieve nirvana. Be bad, and you (ie, your atman) will find itself stuck inside a cockroach or a snake.

There could be no suffering in hell without some sort of something that is available to be punished

In the Abrahamic world, it is entirely possible that holding hell over the heads of malefactors results in behaviour that is more prosocial than it would be otherwise, leading many to claim that without God and the threats that he imposes, morality would be defunct. (Cue Ivan Karamazov.) If so, then the soul serves many masters in addition to satisfying a need for immateriality, immortality and facilitating our abuse of other animals. The hard-working, multitasking soul provides a handle whereby the major religions induce people to do their bidding, not merely to avoid disappointing God but to keep eternal damnation at bay.

When hell is invoked literally, as it has been for most of the past 2,000 years, notably in the Christian and Islamic worlds, it is taken seriously indeed. It is worth emphasising that damnation after death presumes that souls are real because there could be no suffering in hell without some sort of, well, something that persists after death and is available to be punished. Those truly lost souls must carry with them responsibility for sins committed when their bodies were alive. So, let's not lose sight of the conceptual realities hiding in plain sight: no sinning, no torments. No soul to have sinned, nothing to punish post-mortem. In short: the soul is a necessary, sufficient and convenient handle whereby religious authorities browbeat their followers, whether - according to doctrine - for the salvific benefit of those souls or for the functional benefit of those authorities.

Soul-based admonitions have traditionally focused on the prospect of misery after death rather than during life, mostly because it is all too apparent that bad people often do well in this life, while good people suffer, with no sign that justice ultimately triumphs. Hence, it can be helpful to think that sinners and other evil-doers will eventually 'get theirs', while the righteous will receive their just rewards. Perhaps claims of a punishing afterlife satisfy a widespread need to balance the scales of justice, to make the Universe fair when our mortal life isn't.

As a way of manipulating the living, its power has long been recognised, by, among others, non-Christians such as Voltaire, whose sardonic Philosophical Dictionary (1764) includes the following reply to someone who had the effrontery to question the existence of hell: 'I no more believe in the eternity of hell than yourself; but recollect that it may be no bad thing, perhaps, for your servant, your tailor, and your lawyer, to believe in it.' The narrator goes on to observe the following:

[T]o those philosophers who in their writings deny a hell; I will say to them: - Gentlemen, we do not pass our days with Cicero, Atticus, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus ... In a word, gentlemen, all the world are not philosophers. We are obliged to hold intercourse and transact business, and mix up in life with knaves possessing little or no reflection, - with vast numbers of persons addicted to brutality, intoxication, and rapine. You may, if you please, preach to them that there is no hell, and that the soul of man is mortal. As for myself, I will be sure to thunder in their ears that if they rob me they will inevitably be damned.

More than two centuries before the Protestant Reformation, a popular focus on hell and its punishments had been especially intense, of which the most renowned and influential depiction was (and still is) Dante Alighieri's magnificent poem The Divine Comedy (1308-21). It is interesting that Inferno, with its exuberantly graphic depiction of the tortures of hell, has always been read more widely and enthusiastically than Purgatorio or Paradiso, the other two parts of Dante's masterpiece, although the latter are written with no less verve and brilliance.

Maybe this is testament to a deep-seated fascination with the grotesque, combined with a hefty dose of Schadenfreude along with genuine concern about what might be awaiting the sinful, even though - in its specificity - Inferno simply reveals the immense imagination of Dante and his yearning to get even with his Florentine enemies rather than any particular teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, then or now.

Robert Burton's 17th-century treatise The Anatomy of Melancholy is a prescient account of what today is labelled depression. In it, Burton noted: '[I]f there be a hell upon earth, it is to be found in a melancholy man's heart.' For all the presumed psychological payoffs provided by soul-belief, it seems that one way to increase human melancholy is to bring hell upon Earth by threatening one's soul with a forthcoming helluva hard time.

So, where does this leave those of us who maintain in our hearts and non-existent souls that the whole business is a load of nonsense and hurtful to boot? Let's face it: soul-belief is liable to persist about as long as souls themselves are purported to endure. Soul-sceptics can make their arguments but should probably also recognise that this concept fits so neatly into the human psyche that it will not be readily dislodged. We're not stuck with souls, but most people are likely stuck with believing in them.

Parts of this Essay are based on the book Threats: Intimidation and its Discontents (Oxford University Press, 2020) by David P Barash.

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Why are most of us stuck with a belief in the soul? | Aeon Essays

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The idea of the soul is obviously a nonsense, yet its immaterial mysterious nature has deep hooks in the human psyche

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Христианство и экзистенциализм - Кристофер Джонсон

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Христианство и экзистенциализм - Кристофер Джонсон

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https://www.academia.edu/39540013/Christianity_and_Existentialism

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Бытие и ничто - Жан-Поль Сартр

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Бытие и ничто - Жан-Поль Сартр

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https://librebook.me/l__tre_et_le_n_ant/vol1/1

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Бытие и Ничто

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"Миф о Сизифе"

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"Миф о Сизифе"

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Миф о Сизифе

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https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/17C4q-ZIgOCHMBUBWzJx4R9W71GKPVOGH

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АЛИБЕК КАБДОСОВ

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Кабдосов Алибек, Қайырбек Азамат, Сапарбек Нұржан, Болат Аймерей

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10. Философи

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10. Философия экзистенциализма в современное время
10.1 Как выражается экзистенциализм в современном мире?
10.2 Влияние экзистенциализма на современный мир
10.3 Оценка экзистенциализма в современном мире

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9.1. Томас Флинн - Экзистенциализм: очень краткое введение

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9.1. Томас Флинн - Экзистенциализм: очень краткое введение

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https://polanco.jesuits-africa.education/jspui/bitstream/123456789/10/1/Existentialism%20-%20A%20Very%20Short%20Introduction.pdf

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ХМ 11 Қайырбек А

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 "Экзистенциализм - это гуманизм"

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 "Экзистенциализм - это гуманизм"

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Экзистенциализм - это гуманизм (3)

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Одна из основных тем творчества абсурдность и ирациональность бытия (1)

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"Записки из подполья"

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"Записки из подполья"

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Ф.М. Достоевский Записки из подполья (1)

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Франц "Кафка Процесс"

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Франц "Кафка Процесс"

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http://loveread.ec/read_book.php?id=15499&p=1

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Глава первая. АРЕСТ. РАЗГОВОР С ФРАУ ГРУБАХ, ПОТОМ С ФРОЙЛЯЙН БЮРСТНЕР

Кто-то, по-видимому, оклеветал Йозефа К., потому что, не сделав ничего дурного, он попал под арест. Кухарка его квартирной хозяйки, фрау Грубах, ежедневно приносившая ему завтрак около восьми, на этот раз не явилась. Такого случая еще не бывало. К. немного подождал, поглядел с кровати на старуху, живущую напротив, - она смотрела из окна с каким-то необычным для нее любопытством - и потом, чувствуя и голод, и некоторое недоумение, позвонил. Тотчас же раздался стук, и в комнату вошел какой-то человек. К. никогда раньше в этой квартире его не видел. Он был худощав и вместе с тем крепко сбит, в хорошо пригнанном черном костюме, похожем на дорожное платье - столько на нем было разных вытачек, карманов, пряжек, пуговиц и сзади хлястик, - от этого костюм казался особенно практичным, хотя трудно было сразу сказать, для чего все это нужно.

- Ты кто такой? - спросил К. и приподнялся на кровати.

Но тот ничего не ответил, как будто его появление было в порядке вещей, и только спросил:

- Вы звонили?

- Пусть Анна принесет мне завтрак, - сказал К. и стал молча разглядывать этого человека, пытаясь прикинуть и сообразить, кто же он, в сущности, такой? Но тот не дал себя особенно рассматривать и, подойдя к двери, немного приоткрыл ее и сказал кому-то, очевидно стоявшему тут же, за порогом:

- Он хочет, чтобы Анна подала ему завтрак.

Из соседней комнаты послышался короткий смешок; по звуку трудно было угадать, один там человек или их несколько. И хотя незнакомец явно не мог услыхать ничего для себя нового, он заявил К. официальным тоном:

- Это не положено!

- Вот еще новости! - сказал К., соскочил с кровати и торопливо натянул брюки. - Сейчас взгляну, что там за люди в соседней комнате. Посмотрим, как фрау Грубах объяснит это вторжение.

Правда, он тут же подумал, что не стоило высказывать свои мысли вслух, - выходило так, будто этими словами он в какой-то мере признает за незнакомцем право надзора; впрочем, сейчас это было неважно. Но видно, незнакомец так его и понял, потому что сразу сказал:

- Может быть, вам лучше остаться тут?

- И не останусь, и разговаривать с вами не желаю, пока вы не скажете, кто вы такой.

- Зря обижаетесь, - сказал незнакомец и сам открыл дверь.

В соседней комнате, куда К. прошел медленнее, чем ему того хотелось, на первый взгляд со вчерашнего вечера почти ничего не изменилось. Это была гостиная фрау Грубах, загроможденная мебелью, коврами, фарфором и фотографиями; пожалуй, в ней сейчас стало немного просторнее, хотя это не сразу было заметно, тем более что главная перемена заключалась в том, что там находился какой-то человек. Он сидел с книгой у открытого окна и сейчас, подняв глаза, сказал:

- Вам следовало остаться у себя в комнате! Разве Франц вам ничего не говорил?

- Что вам, наконец, нужно? - спросил К., переводя взгляд с нового посетителя на того, кого назвали Франц (он стоял в дверях), и снова на первого. В открытое окно видна была та старуха: в припадке старческого любопытства она уже перебежала к другому окну - посмотреть, что дальше.

- Вот сейчас я спрошу фрау Грубах, - сказал К. И, хотя он стоял поодаль от тех двоих, но сделал движение, словно хотел вырваться у них из рук, и уже пошел было из комнаты.

- Нет, - сказал человек у окна, бросил книжку на столе и встал: - Вам нельзя уходить. Ведь вы арестованы.

- Похоже на то, - сказал К. и добавил: - А за что?

- Мы не уполномочены давать объяснения. Идите в свою комнату и ждите. Начало вашему делу положено, и в надлежащее время вы все узнаете. Я и так нарушаю свои полномочия, разговаривая с вами по-дружески. Но надеюсь, что, кроме Франца, никто нас не слышит, а он и сам вопреки всем предписаниям слишком любезен с вами. Если вам и дальше так повезет, как повезло с назначением стражи, то можете быть спокойны.

К. хотел было сесть, но увидел что в комнате, кроме кресла у окна, сидеть не на чем.

- Вы еще поймете - какие это верные слова, сказал Франц, и вдруг оба сразу подступили к нему. Второй был много выше ростом, чем К. Он все похлопывал его по плечу. Они стали ощупывать ночную рубашку К., приговаривая, что теперь ему придется надеть рубаху куда хуже, но эту рубашку и все остальное его белье они приберегут, и, если дело обернется в его пользу, ему все отдадут обратно.

- Лучше отдайте вещи нам, чем на склад, - говорили они. - На складе вещи подменяют, а кроме того, через некоторое время все вещи распродают - все равно, окончилось дело или нет. А вы знаете, как долго тянутся такие процессы, особенно в нынешнее время! Конечно, склад вам в конце концов вернет стоимость вещей, но, во-первых, сама по себе сумма ничтожная, потому что при распродаже цену вещи назначают не по их стоимости, а за взятки, да и вырученные деньги тают, они ведь что ни год переходят из рук в руки.

Но К. даже не слушал, что ему говорят, ему не важно было, кто получит право распоряжаться его личными вещами, как будто еще принадлежавшими ему; гораздо важнее было уяснить свое положение; но в присутствии этих людей он даже думать как следует не мог: второй страж - кто же они были, как не стражи? - все время толкал его, как будто дружески, толстым животом, но когда К. подымал глаза, он видел совершенно не соответствующее этому толстому туловищу худое, костлявое лицо с крупным, свернутым набок носом и перехватывал взгляд, которым этот человек обменивался через его голову со своим товарищем. Кто же эти люди? О чем они говорят? Из какого они ведомства? Ведь К. живет в правовом государстве, всюду царит мир, все законы незыблемы, кто же смеет нападать на него в его собственном жилище? Всегда он был склонен относиться ко всему чрезвычайно легко, признавался, что дело плохо, только когда действительно становилось очень плохо, и привык ничего не предпринимать заранее, даже если надвигалась угроза. Но сейчас ему показалось, что это неправильно, хотя все происходящее можно было почесть и за шутку, грубую шутку, которую неизвестно почему - может быть, потому, что сегодня ему исполнилось тридцать лет? - решили с ним сыграть коллеги по банку. Да, конечно, это вполне вероятно; по-видимому, следовало бы просто рассмеяться в лицо этим стражам, и они рассмеялись бы вместе с ним; а может, это просто рассыльные, вполне похоже, но почему же тогда при первом взгляде на Франца он твердо решил ни в чем не уступать этим людям? Меньше всего К. боялся, что его потом упрекнут в непонимании шуток, зато он отлично помнил - хотя обычно с прошлым опытом и не считался - некоторые случаи, сами по себе незначительные, когда он в отличие от своих друзей сознательно пренебрегал возможными последствиями и вел себя крайне необдуманно и неосторожно, за что и расплачивался полностью. Больше этого с ним повториться не должно, хотя бы теперь, а если это комедия, то он им подыграет. Но пока что он еще свободен.

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Процесс | Франц Кафка | LoveRead.ec - читать книги онлайн бесплатно

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Глава первая. АРЕСТ. РАЗГОВОР С ФРАУ ГРУБАХ, ПОТОМ С ФРОЙЛЯЙН БЮРСТНЕР Кто-то, по-видимому, оклеветал Йозефа К., потому что, не сделав ничего дурного, он попал под арест. Кухарка его квартирной хозяйки, фрау Грубах, ежедневно приносившая ему завтрак около восьми, на этот раз не явилась. Такого случая еще не бывало. К.

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ХМ 10 Қайырбек А

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Ф.М. Достоевский "Записки из подполья"

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Ф.М. Достоевский "Записки из подполья"

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7.Влияние эк

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7.Влияние экзистенциализма на другие области
7.1 искусство
7.2 политика
7.3 психология
7.4 литература

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2.    Религиозный и атеистический экзистенциализм

2.1. Почему экзистенциализм разделился на религиозный и атеистический?

2.2.  Понятия религиозного экзистенциализма

2.3.  Понятия атеистического экзистенциализм

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Ж.П.Сартр "Экзистенциализм — это гуманизм"

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Ж.П.Сартр "Экзистенциализм — это гуманизм"

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6. Философы 

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6. Философы экзистенциализма
6.1 Камю
6.2 Сартр
6.3 Ницше
6.4 Хайдеггер
6.5 Кьеркегор

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1.  Введение в экзистенциализм
1.1. Что такое экзистенциализм?
1.2. Основные идеи экзистенциализма
1.3. История и развитие экзистенциализма

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ХМ 9 Қайырбек А

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ХМ 8 Қайырбек А

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Актуальность проекта

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Актуальность проекта

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Экзистенциализм является актуальной до сих пор, так как она предлагает глубокий анализ человеческой жизни и ее смысла. Многие люди сталкиваются с чувством потери смысла жизни, одиночеством, разочарованием и стрессом, а философия экзистенциализма может помочь им разобраться в этих проблемах и найти свой путь в жизни. Экзистенциализм подчеркивает необходимость бороться за свободу и защиту прав личности, а также помогает людям осознать свою ответственность за мир, в котором они живут.

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жизнь людей в непостижимой вселенной (1)

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Black shadows and Halloween question Instagram Post (1)

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Экзистенциализм в эп

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Экзистенциализм в эпоху средневековья.

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Средневековья

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Экзистенциализм в античности

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Статья: Насколько вы действительно свободны?                                                                Автор: Питер Лукас      

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Статья: Насколько вы действительно свободны?                                                                Автор: Питер Лукас      

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https://theconversation.com/to-what-extent-are-you-truly-free-71188

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In the early 21st century, Western-style freedoms are often presented as an ideal template for the rest of the world. Yet supposedly free democracies are also marked by substantial and growing disparities of wealth, power and status. Fellow citizens seem to be increasingly socially-disengaged, individualistic and narcissistic, and suffer record levels of psychological ill-health, reflected in (among other things) high suicide rates. So is this vaunted freedom simply an illusion?

Many would argue that the gross inequalities characteristic of Western societies compromise its freedom. Upbringing, education and family background still dramatically affect the opportunities available to citizens, and it may seem that the underprivileged are inevitably less free. But tempting though it may be to equate freedom with opportunity, and desirable though equality of opportunity may be as a general political goal, freedom and opportunity are not the same.

My freedom is not measured by the breadth of the options available to me, but by how I am equipped to choose between those options: am I in reality the author of my own choices? Hence Sartre's initially paradoxical-sounding remark: "Never were we freer than under the German occupation." Liberté and égalité are both worth fighting for, but they are not the same.

Philosophers have long questioned whether freedom, thus understood, is even possible. Human acts are events in the physical world and all such events are held to have determining physical causes. Every natural event follows from other precursor events, such that if the precursors occur the event must follow. Modern physicists have complicated this debate by arguing that nature is ruled by chance rather than causal necessity. But neither the advocates of chance nor the advocates of necessity have so far succeeded in persuading us that we are not really the authors of our own actions.

In recent decades, philosophers have sidestepped these somewhat sterile debates by asking a more subtle question: freedom is something we say we want, but what sort of freedom would be worth wanting?

Self-determination

Take freedom of movement for instance. Whether or not I might end up living in another country is of relatively little interest to me if that outcome can only come about through some deterministic (or alternatively random) process that I am powerless to influence. The freedom I want is the freedom to make my own thought-through decisions about where I live; and these decisions must make sense from my own particular standpoint. To generalise, then, the type of freedom worth wanting appears to be self-determination or "autonomy".

Construing freedom as autonomy seems to chime with the way we understand our freedoms in practice. I am free to give money to charity, or withhold it, in line with what I consider to be important. My list of favoured charities may have nothing in common with yours, but neither of us gives or withholds our contributions randomly. Equally, I am free to engage in extreme sports, to drink alcohol and smoke cigarettes, despite the serious attendant risks and the possible disapproval of others, if doing so makes sense from my standpoint.

The philosopher who provided the main theoretical foundations for modern liberalism - John Stuart Mill - famously argued in On Liberty (1859) that it is the mark of a civilised society that it only seeks to actively curtail the options available to people where taking up those options would risk significant harm to others. Are societies that succeed, as far as possible, in abiding by Mill's principle, consequently free?

There is an important further factor we need to consider. As Mill recognised, the "liberty of thought and discussion" has a vital role to play in any free society. If my freedom consists of being able to select those options that make most sense from my standpoint, I will be free only insofar as my choices are properly informed.

Freedom of thought

Mill championed freedom of speech on the basis that the airing of unpopular and controversial views will ultimately enhance freedom. He reasoned that the critical public discussion that follows will lead us all closer to the truth and equip us to make better-informed choices. Here Mill seems to have been dangerously overoptimistic.

In this era of "post-truth" - and more recently the proliferation of "fake news" - reliable information on the issues that matter most ( for example, climate change) seems harder and harder to come by. Many of our most important choices seem to be made on the basis of more or less deliberate misinformation.

Bizarrely, such misinformed choices are sometimes themselves defended in the name of freedom. But there is a world of difference between a well-informed choice that we happen not to agree with and a choice that is significantly misinformed. I may (conceivably) respect your choice to smoke 40 cigarettes and drink a bottle of whisky every day if I am persuaded that you understand the risks involved, but I cannot respect your choice if I know that you have been seriously misinformed about those risks.

Our choices are free only if our thought is free, and our thought is free only if it is properly informed.

Freedom of thought does not, it seems, arise naturally from freedom of discussion. The idea that it does may stem from confusing the freedom of thought (which consists in making good sense of the world) with freedom of speech (which seems to be interpreted as an entitlement to say whatever we want, within the limits of legality, however misleading it may be).

We cannot properly assess the quality of our freedom until we have established whether and to what extent the choices we make are based on adequate understanding. Perhaps, then, the roots of the apparent two-facedness of Western-style freedoms lie in this: that while the majority of people in those societies have access to a wider range of choices than their grandparents could have imagined, this development has been accompanied by a growing disregard for individual and collective abilities to properly understand those choices and their broader context.
Read more in our series, On Freedom.

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In the early 21st century, Western-style freedoms are often presented as an ideal template for the rest of the world. Yet supposedly free democracies are also marked by substantial and growing disparities of wealth, power and status. Fellow citizens seem to be increasingly socially-disengaged, individualistic and narcissistic, and suffer record levels of psychological ill-health, reflected in (among other things) high suicide rates.

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Mind Map Whiteboard in Blue and Yellow Simple Brainstorm Style (1)

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1. Введение в экзистенциализм
1.1 Что такое экзистенциализм
1.2 Основные идеи экзистенциализма
1.3 История и развитие экзистенциализма
2. Религиозный и атеистический экзистенциализм
2.1 Почему экзистенциализм разделился на религиозный и атеистический?
2.2 Понятия религиозного экзистенциализма
2.3 Понятия атеистического экзистенциализм
3. Основные темы
3.1 Смысл жизни
3.2 Абсурд и иррациональность бытия
3.3 Смерть и смертность
3.4 Отчуждение и одиночество
4. Радикальный индивидуализм, свобода и ответственность
4.1 Детерминизм и свобода воли
4.2 Ответственность за собственный выбор
5. Предшественники экзистенциализма
5.1 Достоевский
5.2 Кафка
6. Философы экзистенциализма
6.1 Камю
6.2 Сартр
6.3 Ницше
6.4 Хайдеггер
6.5 Кьеркегор
7 Влияние экзистенциализма на другие области
7.1 искусство
7.2 политика
7.3 психология
7.4 литература
8 Проблематика экзистенциального кризиса
8.1 Сущность экзистенциального кризиса
8.2 Современные причины экзистенциального кризиса
9 Критика философии экзистенциализма
9.1 Критика со стороны религий
9.2 Критика со стороны науки
10 Философия экзистенциализма в современном мире
10.1Как выражается философия экзистенциализма в современном мире?
10.2 Влияние философии экзистенциализма на современный мир
10.3 Оценка философии экзистенциализма в современном мире

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Статья: Шкала свободной воли.              Автор: Стивен Кейв

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Статья: Шкала свободной воли.              Автор: Стивен Кейв

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https://aeon.co/essays/free-will-is-back-and-maybe-this-time-we-can-measure-it

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The cat is crouched low to the ground, whiskers brushing grass. It inches forward in minute movements, eyes drilling towards two sparrows just ahead. It tenses, set to spring. The birds prance like sparring boxers, unaware. But then the cat's muscles relax. The moment wasn't quite right - something in the angle or the air. It creeps another inch closer, and another, tautens again, then bursts forwards.

Cats make decisions. And they make decisions about similar kinds of things to us: whom to hang out with and whom to avoid, what to have for dinner tonight and where to get it from. By the standards of most life on Earth, cats have highly sophisticated brains. This gives them a range of behavioural options - a degree of freedom, we might say.

It is often thought that science has shown that there is no such thing as free will. If all things are bound by the same impersonal cosmic laws, then (the story goes) our paths are no freer than those of rocks tumbling down a hill. But this is wrong. Science is giving us a very powerful and clear way to understand freedom of the will. We have just been looking for it in the wrong place. Instead of using an electron microscope or a brain-scanner, we should go to the zoo.

There we will find animals using a wide range of skills that give them options for what to do - skills that we share. These abilities have evolved through natural selection because they are essential for survival: animals need to weigh different factors, explore available options, pursue new alternatives when old strategies don't work. Together these abilities give all animals, including humans, an entirely natural free will, one that we need precisely because we are not rocks. We are complex organisms actively pursuing our interests in a changing environment.

And we are starting to understand the cognitive abilities that underpin this behavioural freedom. Like most evolved capacities, they are a matter of degree. Take, for example, the ability to delay gratification. For a hungry cat, this means being able to hold back from pouncing until it is sure the sparrow is within range and looking the other way. Experimenters measure this ability by testing how long an animal can resist a small treat in return for a larger reward after a delay. Chickens, for example, can do this for six seconds. They can choose whether to wait for the juicier titbit or not - but only if that titbit comes very soon. A chimpanzee, on the other hand, can wait for a cool two minutes - or even up to eight minutes in some experiments. I am guessing that you could manage a lot longer.

The chimpanzee therefore has more options: if a juicier treat became available after six seconds, a chimp would be free to choose whether to wait for it, but a chicken would not. If you can delay gratification even longer, you have still more options: whether to turn down dessert because you are on a diet, or to forego all pleasure in this world in the hope of a heavenly reward.

As we start to understand, and learn to measure, the capacities that underlie behavioural freedom, we can begin to put this natural free will on a scale. Paralleling the measurement of intelligence, we could call it the freedom quotient: FQ. Such a scale should give us new insights into the factors that hinder or enhance our efforts to shape our lives. In other words, FQ should tell us how free we are - and how we can become even more so.

We desperately need a new way of thinking about free will. The concept lies at the heart of how we see ourselves: assumptions about the extent to which we choose our own fate inform everything from social policy and criminal justice to our personal motivations and sense of life's meaningfulness. But common conceptions are a muddle, mostly stemming from a pre-scientific age.

One prevalent idea is that freedom requires a supernatural ability to transcend the laws of nature, because otherwise we would appear to be mere puppets of cause and effect. This makes free will into something mysterious, which would set us apart from the rest of creation. As this notion contradicts everything we know about the world, it is no surprise that ever more people are concluding that free will must be an illusion.

Yet all around us, every day, we see a very natural kind of freedom - one that is completely compatible with determinism. It is the kind that living things need to pursue their goals in a world that continually presents them with multiple possibilities. Our intuitive sense that we have free will is based upon this behavioural freedom. And unlike the old mystical idea, this natural ability to shape our future is central to our own wellbeing and that of society. This is what FQ sets out to capture.

A few thinkers have been working towards a naturalistic approach to free will since the 1970s. But in recent years their number has mushroomed - to the point where we might now talk about a small but significant revolution in ideas. There is not yet one single dominant view or definition: different scholars from different traditions tend to emphasise different aspects. But when we join the available dots we get a fairly clear sketch of what FQ might aspire to measure. And it is simply this: the ability to generate options for oneself, to choose, and then to pursue one or more of those options.

Each of these parts is important. First: the capacity to generate options. We are not inclined to ascribe much free will to the creature that sees only one possible course of action, particularly in situations where that course is failing to deliver the goods. That is the kind of behaviour we might associate with an automaton - with the robot whose axles keep turning even though the wheels have fallen off. In 1982 the American cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter called such behaviour 'sphexish' after the digger wasp Sphex ichneumoneus that allegedly follows very inflexible behavioural routines (and is therefore easily tricked by mean entomologists). It is disputed whether the wasps really are so unbending, but the name has stuck to denote a mechanistic pursuit of a single course of action.

Of course, the number of available options will depend partly upon the circumstances - but also partly on a creature's creativity and flexibility. In one test to get a treat out of a complex box, for example, chimps tried up to 38 different ways of solving the problem, whereas baboons managed just a handful.

Much of what is required to see decisions through corresponds to processes that we traditionally associate with the will

So we want the ability to generate multiple options. But secondly, we also want to be able to choose between them in a meaningful way. Choosing meaningfully means something like weighing up the pros and cons. If a creature were able to generate six options for itself in any given situation, we might be impressed. But we would be less impressed if it arbitrarily chose which option to take. We would probably conclude that this creature was driven more by randomness than by a genuinely free will. Of course there will be times when we might just as well toss a coin, either because the options are identical (to go foraging in either of two equally laden blackberry bushes) or because we do not have the information to make an informed choice (to explore either of two equally unknown paths in the forest). But most of the time, we want to weigh the options and choose between them in the light of our interests and values (the blackberry bush farthest from the bear's den).

Thirdly, we want to carry out the choices we have made. Admittedly, much of this depends on things that go on outside of our heads: my decision to eat blackberries could easily be thwarted by finding that they are rotten. But a lot of what is required to see our decisions through also corresponds to processes inside our heads, processes that we traditionally associate with the will. Being free to write an essay, for example, requires that I have the concentration and self-control to stop myself from surfing the web instead.

This three-phased approach is a simplified sketch: the messy reality is that these phases overlap and interact with each other (and with a lot else besides). But it does provide a loose framework within which to consider the kind of underlying capacities that we need in order to exercise natural free will. The first phase, in which we generate options for ourselves, is associated with creativity and innovativeness; perhaps also a kind of openness or intellectual adventurousness. By contrast, the second phase, the ability to weigh options, is what we ordinarily consider to be the capacity to reason. The third phase, pursuing the chosen option, requires different capacities again - mostly what goes under the heading of willpower, such as the ability to delay gratification, which for chickens means up to a six‑second limit and for great apes, including humans, somewhat longer.

If you are able to imagine a number of options for yourself, weigh them with regard to your interests, and then commit yourself to the one that seems the best, you are exercising your free will. Of course, all of these are tasks you might be able to perform better or worse. If you have an abundant imagination, for example, and can think of 20 potential places to forage whereas others can only think of 10, then you have more options and will therefore be freer. If, on the other hand, you are weak-willed, then options that require you to delay gratification - such as walking 10 miles to the juiciest blackberry bush - might be closed, and so you will be less free. These are the variations that an FQ scale should reflect.

At present, we are some way from being able to measure FQ in a generalised sense. Some of the capacities central to this idea of natural free will have established tests, like the American psychologist Walter Mischel's 1970s 'marshmallow test' for self-control (one marshmallow is placed in front of you; if you manage to not eat it for 15 minutes, you get a second one - and are allowed to eat both). But the measurement of, say, creativity remains controversial, although tests do exist (eg, how many uses can you think of for a jellybean?). And once all the component capacities do have reliable tests, there would then come the tricky problem of how to weight them in order to come to an overall score. Is someone who considers few options but is very good at seeing their decision through freer than someone who conjures a host of creative options but is poor at implementing them?

Fortunately, compilers of psychometric tests are used to making such tricky decisions. And it might be that different weightings prove useful for different purposes. In this sense, FQ would be no different from IQ, the intelligence quotient. Like free will, intelligence is a useful but rather fuzzy-edged idea that on closer inspection has many components. IQ tests reflect this: they are composed of sub-tests that measure such different abilities as verbal comprehension, spatial reasoning and working memory. FQ, too, would be a broad summary of a range of component abilities reflecting the different phases of decision-making.

And as with IQ, the usefulness of an FQ scale will depend on whether it correlates with anything else of interest. We would expect someone with, for example, a high IQ to be better at solving difficult engineering problems, learning new languages or constructing complex arguments in law courts. If high IQ did not correlate with these things, we would wonder if it was a meaningful reflection of what we ordinarily consider to be intelligence. Similarly with FQ: we would expect those scoring highly to be good decision-makers, with a strong sense of ownership of their actions and control over their fate; whereas those scoring lowly would be those who see few options for themselves, who feel compelled or addicted, and who are unable to meet their goals or stick to their plans.

Once up and running, we can imagine the kinds of applications and consequences that FQ, as a measure of natural free will, might have. First, we usually hold people accountable for acts that they made freely: if a person lashed out while having an epileptic fit, we would not blame them as we would if they punched someone after cool reflection. But there is no agreed basis for assessing which acts are free. Different countries - and even different states within countries - approach this differently, using a muddle of factors from psychology, psychiatry and neuroscience without a coherent framework. At the same time, many are dissuaded from thinking too deeply about underlying causes, because in the old paradigm this implies a determinism that undermines all accountability.

A measure such as FQ could help to bring some clarity to these discussions - though the implications for deciding who should be punished, when and why, are complex. But it is a fair prediction that most current prison inmates have a lower FQ than average (in one New Zealand study, for example, 40 per cent of those with the lowest level of self-control had criminal convictions by the age of 32) - and so in that sense could be considered less accountable. And whether or not prisons are an effective deterrent, it is a reasonable prediction that they are further lowering the inmates' FQ: making responsible decisions depends on a set of skills, but prisons are (mostly) highly regulated, low-stimulation environments, with few opportunities to develop any such skills. No wonder that reoffending rates are high.

Second, FQ could help us to better understand the complex relationship between free will and social and political freedom. It is clear that states can restrict the freedom of their citizens through laws and other measures. But a state could also limit freedom by hindering the development of FQ, for example, by restricting access to education or brainwashing with propaganda. The long and shameful history of book-banning reflects attempts to diminish a people's freedom not through chains or walls, but through limiting the options and ideas that occur to them.

it is a good guess that prison populations will have lower than average FQs and that raising FQs would reduce crime

But a person's FQ will be affected by his environment even without such explicit manipulation. Someone's sense of whether a wide range of options are available to her will depend upon the attitudes of her parents, teachers and the messages she receives from broader society. Girls in the US, for example, tend to have a lower sense of their competence in maths and sciences than boys, regardless of their actual grades - and consequently fewer girls see careers in these areas as an option. African Americans have a lower sense that their fate is in their own hands than do white Americans - a sense (called locus of control) that is associated with higher academic attainment.

It will always be the case that some people have a freer will than others, and some of that will come down to genes and fortune. But much of that inequality will also stem from systemic advantages and disadvantages: say, the difference between a privileged upbringing with the best education and a community that says everything is possible versus an upbringing that stunts a person's innate capacities and tells him he is a loser. Some people are lucky, developing the will and opportunities to succeed despite a tough start. But for others, a low FQ will make it difficult for them to improve their lot.

Attempting to smooth out inequalities in FQ - and to raise the FQ of everyone - should therefore be a goal of schools and of social policy. This ties in with the idea of 'positive liberty' - the idea that a person should be free, not just from restraints, but through having the skills and opportunities to actively pursue a fulfilling life. Of course, all this assumes that a higher FQ is a thoroughly good thing. But we have good reason to think that this is indeed so, both from society's point of view, and for each of us individually.

Roy Baumeister, a psychologist at Florida State University and a leading advocate of a naturalised approach to free will, has argued that our capacities for reason, self-control and so forth evolved to enable us to live in complex societies. The notion that we need a significant part of our free will in order to follow rules might at first sound counter-intuitive. But it is actually a familiar idea: we know, for example, that a strong will is required to resist temptation. Often those temptations are to do things that violate social norms, such as coveting your neighbour's ass or punching him if he covets yours. Hence it is a good guess that prison populations will have lower than average FQs and - equally - that raising FQs would reduce crime.

As well as being broadly socially desirable in the sense that it helps us to manage our behaviour so that we can all get along, a higher FQ should also bring personal benefits. Certainly some of its component elements do correlate with good things. The personality trait known as openness to experience, which includes curiosity and imagination and is therefore crucial to the option-generating phase, has been associated with higher job satisfaction, happiness and quality of life. Or self-control, which is essential to putting one's choice into effect, correlates with higher educational attainment, more stable relationships and lower frequencies of drug use or criminal conviction.

Once we understand the particular set of capacities that contribute to a free will, we can each individually think about how we might become freer. We can expand our possibilities by learning to be more creative and to explore more options; we can learn techniques that help us to better choose between those options; and we can strengthen the capacities, such as focus and willpower, that allow us to pursue our choices. This might not guarantee happiness and self-fulfillment, but it should make them more likely. Certainly it would put us more in control of our lives: that is, better able to align our everyday actions with our deepest goals and values.

I have claimed that FQ - the freedom quotient - is a measure of our natural freedom of the will. But some people will ask whether these psychological capacities are really free will: for some, a really free will is one that is not determined by anything - one that stands outside the causal chains of nature. Such a person might feel cheated when offered instead a set of capacities that we share (to a degree) with cats and chickens.

We could of course use a different name for what FQ is describing: perhaps 'psychological freedom', 'inner freedom', 'autonomy' or 'agency'. But I think there are good reasons to stick with the old term. Although there is one strand of thinking in which free will is juxtaposed with determinism, there are also other, more everyday uses that are much less metaphysical. One recent study, for example, found that 'the folk concept of free will is defined by the capacity to choose based on one's desires and free from constraints'. Another found that 'conscious, rational choice and self-control seem to be integral parts of what people perceive as free'.

Even the freest will is still limited, and everyone is ultimately a part of life's great web of causes and connections

Even when theologians use the term 'free will', they are still referring to something very close to what FQ describes. It is with our will, they might say, that we choose to give into temptation or instead to take the path of righteousness. I agree. The difference is that in the Christian tradition, our wills must be absolutely free - not caused by anything such as genes or environment - as only then could it possibly be warranted to send sinners to hell for eternity. With FQ, by contrast, we can recognise that even the freest will is still limited, and that everyone is ultimately a part of life's great web of causes and connections.

Here again the comparison with intelligence is revealing. For much of the past 2,000 years in the West, intelligence was conceived in terms of a God-given faculty of reason that set humans wholly apart from other creatures. 'Intellect' and 'will' were seen by the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas, for example, as the two pre‑eminent faculties of the soul, which did not depend at all on the body.

Now we know differently: we know that we have evolved through a long process of natural selection and that we share our faculties to varying degrees with other animals. Upon realising this, we did not conclude that there wasn't really any such thing as intelligence - rather, psychologists set about putting it on a scientific footing. Similarly, we should not say that there is no such thing as free will, just because it is not how the theologians imagined; rather, it is time we put it, too, on a scientific footing.

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Free will is back, and maybe this time we can measure it - Stephen Cave | Aeon Essays

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The cat is crouched low to the ground, whiskers brushing grass. It inches forward in minute movements, eyes drilling towards two sparrows just ahead. It tenses, set to spring. The birds prance like sparring boxers, unaware. But then the cat's muscles relax. The moment wasn't quite right - something in the angle or the air.

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5. Предшеств

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5. Предшественники экзистенциализма
5.1 Достоевский
5.2 Кафка

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Влияние экзистенциализма на другие области

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Религиозный и атеистический экзистенциализм

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Миродократия (1)

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«Немного экзистенциализма для того, что вас беспокоит»

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«Немного экзистенциализма для того, что вас беспокоит»

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https://theconversation.com/a-bit-of-existentialism-for-what-ails-you-73633

Опубликовано: 3 марта 2017 г., 13:51

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A bit of existentialism for what ails you

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In these narcissistic and anxious times, existentialism has a lot to offer.

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1. Подталкивает на развитие
2. Белая зависть
3. Помогает понять что вы хотите
4. Зависть это эгоизм, эгоизм любовь к себе
5. Указать человеку, насколько хорошо и в нужной пропорции удовлетворяются его потребности
6. Зависть двигатель прогресса
7. Зависть формирует социальные рамки
8. Зависть не позволяет успокоится
9. Зависть может быть инструментом манипуляции
10. Вы можете чувствовать себя лучше, когда вам завидуют

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Идолы Бэкона

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Идолы Бэкона

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Свобода воли и детерминизм 

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Свобода воли и детерминизм 

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Beige Self Care Mental Health Graph (1) (1)

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Статья Aeon "Книги опасны"

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Статья Aeon "Книги опасны"

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https://aeon.co/essays/contagion-poison-trigger-books-have-always-been-dangerous
Автор: Франк Фуреди
Статья Aeon "Книги опасны"

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может это  (1)

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ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛИЗМ В ЖИВОПИСИ XX ВЕКА.Мальцева А.

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ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛИЗМ В ЖИВОПИСИ XX ВЕКА.Мальцева А.

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https://conf.sfu-kras.ru/sites/mn2014/pdf/d01/s15/s15_004.pdf

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3. Основные 

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3. Основные темы
3.1 Смысл жизни
3.2 Абсурд и иррациональность бытия
3.3 Смерть и смертность
3.4 Отчуждение и одиночество

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Введение в экзистенциализм

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4. Радикальн

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4. Радикальный индивидуализм и свобода
4.1 Детерминизм и свобода воли
4.2 Ответственность за собственный выбор

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Экзистенциализм в современном мире

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Предшественники экзистенциализма

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ХМ 7 Қайырбек А

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Одиночество 