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My professional perspective is that of a third year, third-grade teacher in a Title I campus located in Houston, Texas. I am currently a professional school counseling student and aim to counsel at the elementary school level.

This guide serves to support those in the counseling field to understand the laws and policies regarding student records and privacy. This topic was chosen because student privacy seems to be a constant issue as well as one of the most important aspects of counseling.

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Charlette Hart Vaughn is the counselor at G H Whitcomb Elementary in Clear Creek ISD. Charlette was interviewed to identify a legal topic in the field of school counseling. She discussed the importance of student privacy.

Charlette described that student privacy is very important in the field of counseling. Not only because it is the law based on FERPA (20 USC §1232g ), but because confidentiality is part of being a counselor and helps support the counselor-student relationships. Hart described that often times educators break these rules without realizing. She said "teachers love to talk" when describing her concern about student privacy. Many educators want to know everything they can about their students because they care about them. But the fact of the matter is that student privacy is protected by laws.

Hart emphasized on the importance of counselors advocating for student privacy to teachers and administration. When asked about her best practices regarding this legal issue she mentioned these three:

-Being well versed in FERPA and understanding what is and is not protected by the law as well as what can and cannot remain confidential.
- Advocating for student privacy and confidentiality to all staff members and keeping teachers aware of the law.
-Keeping updated and detailed records and notes of student information and data.

The G H Whitcomb Elementary website is https://whitcomb.ccisd.net/

References:

Family and Education Privacy Rights, 20 USC §1232g.

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This resources provides a guide on understanding FERPA as it pertains to school safety. Many times, counselors feel they are legally tied to student privacy due to laws and statutes. However, there are times when privacy and confidentiality can be disclosed. This resource describes an instance such as this.

Stone, C. (2008, May 1). FERPA and school safety. American School Counselor Association. https://www.schoolcounselor.org/Magazines/May-June-2008/FERPA-and-School-Safety

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Consider this hypothetical scenario: Clifton is a quiet, brooding young man who won't make eye contact with others, seems sullen and withdrawn, and when he does speak it is negative and sarcastic, usually with the theme of others "incompetence." Clifton appears to have no positive contact with his peers at school but reports that he is heavily involved in martial arts.

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Technology is becoming more and more prevalent in education. Especially in today's times, many students are participating in remote learning.

With teachers not being physically available to these students, many teachers are using remote classroom management tools that allow them to view students' screens from their own.

This article discusses how programs such as these may be an invasion in student privacy.

Sawchuk, S. (2021, April 2). Teachers are watching students' screens during remote learning. Is that invasion of privacy? EducationWeek. Retrieved from  https://www.edweek.org/technology/are-remote-classroom-management-tools-that-let-teachers-see-students-computer-screens-intrusive/2021/04

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At first, Ramsey Hootman thought something might be wrong with her son's school-issued laptop. All of a sudden, most of the browser tabs he'd opened had closed, seemingly of their own accord.

It took a little while to figure out that the culprit was actually a teacher, who'd used a tool called Securly Classroom to view her son's screen and close out all but two of his tabs-an action that, to both mother and son's frustration, gunked up an assignment he'd been trying to research.

Remote classroom-management tools like Securly Classroom and its competitors give teachers an expansive, real-time look into what their students are viewing or working on. As Hootman discovered, they also contain a panoply of features, like the ability to freeze a student's screen, or to call up, block, or limit tabs.

"My main objection is the personal level of the surveillance. It's not generalized; it's not a 'ping' from some student who used some trigger word. His teachers are looking, in real time, at what he's doing," said Hootman, whose children attend school in the West Contra Costa, Calif., district.

The companies that sell the products say the tools help replicate good brick-and-mortar classroom practices. Just like circulating about a classroom, a teacher using them can ensure students are on task, and quickly assess who might need some additional, personalized help.

But one thing is abundantly clear: Use of remote classroom-management tools has undoubtedly increased over the last year as millions of students learned full-time from home.

Districts have scrambled to get millions of devices into the hands of students and to respond to the needs of their teachers, most of whom have never taught remotely before and are desperately seeking ways to engage students. And, noted privacy experts, the nation's experiment with remote learning has blurred the line between home and school to an unprecedented degree.

"When you're at home, this monitoring starts to feel much more invasive and creepier. But it is going to continue long after students are no longer primarily at home," said Amelia Vance, the director of youth and education privacy at the nonprofit Forum on Privacy.

"So there's the need for clear information from schools that have installed these products, why they're installed, what the data protection is, and what the rights of students and parents are," she said. "It's something we rarely see in student privacy conversations."

How do remote classroom-management systems work?

The monitoring of students' web use is hardly new. Beginning with the federal Children's Internet Protection Act, in 2000, districts receiving federal school-connectivity funds had to install internet filters on their hardware and devices to protect children from obscene content.

Actual thumbnail-like monitoring of individual devices also dates back decades. One provider of classroom-monitoring software, LanSchool, began in 1986, when all school computers were hardwired in labs.

The movement toward cloud computing and increased fears about student safety-coupled with ambiguities in the CIPA law, which did not detail where surveillance should stop-means that as the tools have evolved, they've grown more powerful.

Two of the top companies in the space, GoGuardian and Securly, both got their start by providing cloud filtering services to districts, but have since expanded to other products. Their remote classroom management offerings are respectively known as GoGuardian Teacher and Securly Classroom.

The remote classroom-management systems work like this: They are extensions to the Chrome browser that are deployed on students' district accounts.

Teachers activate a session at the beginning of a synchronous remote class. Then, they can see thumbnails of each student's screen, review the tabs they have open, and scan the web address of the websites they've visited. They can also freeze students' screens, restrict the number of tabs students have open, close tabs if students are on YouTube, Spotify, or other sites not related to the day's lessons, and push out links and messages to students. Students, for their part, can "raise their hands" virtually to request help.

The systems do alert students when a session is beginning. And an extension icon or indicator in the browser signals when their screens can be viewed.

Teachers say the tools enable efficient feedback to students

Among teachers who regularly use them, the tools appear to be broadly popular.

Kathy Richardson, a high school biology and marine ecology teacher, teaches in the Louisa County, Va., district and for a regional online learning collaborative. She's used GoGuardian Teacher for several years, and she believes the pandemic has actually helped refine her use of it.

Before, she said, she used it mostly to make sure students were on task. But now she uses it to pinpoint which students need coaching on tricky tasks like calculating a standard error for their lab reports.

"For me, the biggest aid in using it has been identifying where they're getting stuck, where these misconceptions and misunderstandings are," she said. "Before, I would go back and explain the whole section. Now I can get very specific about what's wrong; maybe it's a graphing issue, not a content issue."

She likes being able to pop into students' screens so she can suggest they change their y-axis or put their data into a bar graph. Sometimes, students ask her to view their screens so she can double check their work. Most of all, she said, it has made instruction stronger during the pandemic.

"Even though the curriculum is a little slimmed-down, I think they're getting deeper in it than they would have otherwise," she said.

Enoch Kwok, the director of technology for the Oak Park district in California, believes most of the school district's teachers use it for similar purposes.

"I don't think a lot of our teachers are playing police and trying to catch kids out. If you make the lesson relevant and engaging enough, students will focus on that instead of goofing off," he said.

It is hard to say precisely how common the services are: They're often bundled with the companies' other security products. And like other privately held ed-tech firms, the companies don't share proprietary financial data. But both Securly and GoGuardian officials said that their tools have been popular.

The pandemic has accelerated interest in Securly Classroom, which the company launched in 2019 after acquiring its progenitor in a merger. Even before COVID-19 hit, though, the company was seeing tremendous growth in its sales, said Jarrett Volzer, the general manager of mobile device management and classroom technologies for Securly.

GoGuardian, which launched the Teacher service in 2015, offered it to districts for free in the spring of the 2019-20 school year, after the pandemic caused nearly every school in the country to shut down. About 20 million students and 14,000 schools now use a GoGuardian service of some kind, a spokesman for the organization said.

And according to a February survey of about 1,200 educators conducted by the EdWeek Research Center, more than two-thirds of respondents believe their districts will continue to offer remote learning options even after the pandemic ends.

Communicating with parents about monitoring tools is key

District technology officials have significant latitude to customize how the tools work and to constrain the hours when teachers can launch the live sessions, typically during regular school hours. They also tend to give teachers significant latitude on whether to use the remote classroom-management tools.

That's why the companies say they encourage districts to be purposeful in explaining to parents how they work.

"I would underscore and double click on the idea that while we provide the technology, schools use it to enact their policies," said Teddy Hartman, the head of privacy for GoGuardian. "A fair amount of the questions we get are parents who feel that the school system did not communicate well with them."

Communicating all those nuances is difficult, though, and probably also explains why some parents shrug at the use of the tools while others like Hootman, the California mom, feel caught out.

Hootman said that before the incident with Securly Classroom, she'd made her peace with some degree of school surveillance. She knew certain websites were blocked and that her sons' documents could be read by administrators. (One of her sons, in fact, once got flagged by the district's safety auditing service when he jokingly used the Klingon phrase "Today is a good day to die.")

But she was annoyed by how she found out about Securly Classroom.

"What really got me was that as soon as [the school] got [this tool], they escalated to the most restrictive possible environment. And they just really expected us to be glad about this," she said.

Tracey Logan, the district's technology director, said it added Classroom at the start of this semester, as teachers asked for more help with online learning. West Contra Costa doesn't mandate that teachers deploy the service; some educators like all its bells and whistles, and others use it minimally, she said.

In that district, Securly Classroom has been popular for teachers of very young students, English-language learners, and students with disabilities. In those classes, age, language barriers, or other issues mean getting everyone logged into and set up in a remote session is harder so the tool helps save valuable instructional time. Math teachers also like it.

But communicating about the tool in the 28,000-student district has fallen primarily to individual principals and classroom teachers. And Logan said she understands why parents might feel uncomfortable depending on how they learned about it.

"I can see how psychologically, they might think: Can they see through that webcam? Are they capturing keystrokes? I get how it can feel weird," she said. (The service does not do those things.)

In other districts, the problem has been exacerbated when the programs deploy on families' personal devices.

Chris Carman, a high school science teacher in the Kent City, Ohio, district, only learned about the tool's reach only after he got an email from his son's science teacher, admonishing the 7th grader for working on a social studies assignment during class. (Carman's son had been using the family's own device, not the school system's.)

Being off-task is a legitimate concern for teachers to bring up, Carman agreed. But the message got diluted by how intrusive the notification felt. (The district, he said, sent an email about GoGuardian Teacher to parents shortly after Carman inquired whether his son could opt out of the sessions. The district's tech director did not immediately return an email seeking comment.)

"Frankly, I was just offended by the disregard of our privacy. I know the district, and others, see this as technically students are in school. But my son's not using their device, and he's not using their WiFi or Internet connection. That was what really bothered me," Carman said.

"It was the consent aspect of it; if they'd asked me beforehand, I would have had time to think about it," he continued. "Most importantly, I would have had time to talk to my son."

Some students worry about monitoring, while others not so much

Just what do students whose daily school activities are being monitored by these programs make of it?

Some are predictably cross that they can't sneak off to play Fortnite or watch YouTube when they're supposed to be analyzing "Song of Solomon" or working on trigonometry ratios. But others have expressed bewilderment or anger, finding the surveillance intrusive or dystopian.

At a minimum, students are paying attention to the debate.

"I think it's a little scary to know that my teachers can see what I'm doing. It would be more beneficial for teachers to find a less invasive way to limit cheating," the newspaper quoted one senior as saying.

J.P. Kerrane, a 15-year-old freshman in the Boulder Valley district in Colorado, says some students there definitely feel that someone's constantly "watching over their shoulder" when teachers use the classroom-management program. Many teachers in the district have chosen not to deploy GoGuardian Teacher for that reason even though they have access to it, he said.

Other students don't sweat it, he said-their reasoning roughly paralleling school district officials nationally who assert there's nothing to fear about monitoring if students are following the rules. Some of Kerrane's peers, in fact, have even made funny memes about GoGuardian-like one which depicts the horrified expression of a teacher perusing student-written fan fiction.

But personally, he's not so sure.

"I think I'm more privacy-conscious than most. I know everything I type into Google Docs is being sent to an algorithm to see if I have suicidal tendencies, so I have to rethink what I'm doing. I keep a very strict separation between my school and private data footprint," said Kerrane, who is already taking an AP Computer Science class and aspires to work in coding or computer systems someday.

And, he said, it feels unfair that students who can afford to have personal devices of their own can more easily circumnavigate monitoring than students who have to rely on district-issued devices.

As both students and parents have discovered, the easiest workaround is to use a nonschool-issued device and log into a second account not tied to the school network. That typically isn't possible on a school-issued Chromebook.

The difference raises concerns about whether some groups of students are being observed more than others. The mistrust comes because by nearly all measures, disadvantaged students and, particularly, Black students are already monitored more than other students in other aspects of schooling, such as policing, disciplinary practices, and dress codes.

(Some districts like Oak Park that have "lease to own" programs for their school devices actually make more privacy an incentive. They offer parents who purchase the devices the opportunity to turn off filtering during nonschool hours.)

Are we conditioning students to surveillance?

For Vance, the privacy expert, it all comes down to context. In general, she worries less about remote classroom-management tools than the companies' other services, since there's at least a good case to be made that the management tools be useful in helping schools to fulfill their core job of teaching.

Still, communicating that to families can be done well or poorly, she said.

"Having someone come to you and say, 'I know what you were doing on the internet,' does not create a trusted relationship. So there's really a necessity to make sure that the monitoring that is occurring is really necessary and really fulfilling its purpose," she said. "Classroom-management software, when it's narrow and during class when students know about it, is going to be narrowly tailored. A lot of the other monitoring isn't."

Parents should also be informed what districts do with whatever metadata they collect via any of their online tools, where it's stored, and how often it's purged, she said.

Richardson, the Virginia teacher, concurs that it's partly her job to make sure students understand precisely what the program does. She thinks that's one reason her students are at ease with it.

"I made sure I told them about it at the beginning of the year, so it's very transparent that I'm using it," she said. "And I tell them I only use it while I'm in their class, so I don't do it from 8 in the morning to 5 in the afternoon."

At a broader level, it's still potentially worrisome that schools are layering so many student-surveillance tools on top of a social media ecosystem that already prioritizes oversharing, some privacy experts warned. Especially, they said, in the context of a tech-saturated world where everything from Alexa to home appliances is already potentially watching or listening.

"I just think we are all creating these environments where students think in this weird panopticon way that they're always being watched, and they can't expect any privacy under any circumstances," said Barbara Fedders, an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina School of Law, who wrote a 2019 law review article about the legal implications of surveillance for school districts.

(The panopticon refers to a prison design that, in theory, improves behavior among inmates because they don't know precisely when guards are monitoring. )

It's unclear yet whether surveillance could change students' behavior long-term, as the panopticon theory suggests, said Vance. It might alter their creativity and expressiveness in ways we don't understand, she said.

Or-and some research already suggests this is the case-perhaps students may simply assume that surveillance is everywhere, put it out of mind, and go back to behaving as usual.

At least for now, some parents say what they've learned about the classroom-management systems makes them wary. And they're still wrestling with the larger implications.

Carman's son is now logging into his remote schooling on a different browser. That means he can't access all the teacher-interaction functions that would be available to him in GoGuardian Teacher sessions, but his screen won't be watched.

Carman is troubled by the conversation he had with his son when he explained how the monitoring service worked: His son was not all that surprised.

"I'm realizing that with this generation-two if you count the millennials-not only do they not have this expectation of privacy, they don't even know what privacy means," he said.

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Teachers Are Watching Students' Screens During Remote Learning. Is That Invasion of Privacy?

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The tools help teachers keep remote students on track and pinpoint who needs help. Some parents and students worry about over-surveillance.

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Teachers can get upset when counselors withhold information regarding one of their students.

Counselors must balance student privacy and confidentiality while also sharing valuable information that would support the student's success.

Counselors can share useful information without sharing everything. Even when teachers get upset, it is the law that counselors only share what is considered a "need to know".

Fagell, P. (2019, August 27). Teacher is upset at counselor for withholding information. Phi Delta Kappan. Retrieved from https://kappanonline.org/fagell-teacher-counselor-withholding-information-troubled-student/

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Q: I just got a new student in my 7 th-grade English class. He seems really troubled. He steals supplies, knocks papers off my desk when he's mad and makes crass sexual comments to the girls. He's in 7th grade but can barely read. To say he's disrespectful would be an understatement. When I went to meet with his counselor, she told me nothing. The secretary said he showed up at our school with several boxes of files, and I'm so irritated that his counselor placed him in classes without giving teachers any background information. OK, so now I'm magically supposed to know what to do with this boy? For all I know, he's got a criminal record. This isn't the first time she's told me she can't breach student confidentiality. Don't teachers have any rights to background information?

A: The short answer is yes, but it's complicated. School counselors have the challenge of balancing their students' rights to confidentiality with the legitimate rights and concerns of teachers. Weighing those competing interests isn't always straightforward. Counselors are consultants to educators and want to provide helpful information about students' safety and well-being, but they also want to protect their students' confidentiality. Trust is a critical part of the counselor-student relationship. No child is going to disclose personal information to someone who's cavalier about their privacy.

That said, there's no question that teachers need to know about students' special needs to teach effectively and make a positive impact. At the same time, there's no need to gratuitously divulge sensitive information. For instance, a counselor might share that a child is prone to rage when he feels incompetent, or that he's excruciatingly sensitive to loud noises. A teacher wouldn't need to know the details of every setback that contributed to his fragility. Similarly, the counselor could let a teacher know a student had a very rough night without revealing that his parents fought loudly for hours.

There are instances when counselors must break confidentiality, including when they believe the student's behavior presents clear and imminent danger to themselves or others. That should give you some comfort. If the counselor did make that type of report, an administrator would be privy to that information even if you're left in the dark. Speaking of administrators, I assume you've been involving one to help you address the inappropriate sexual comments, stealing and disrespect. Counselors don't get involved in managing discipline because it's at odds with their role as the student's advocate. You clearly need all hands on deck to help this boy.

So where does that leave you as far as the counselor is concerned? Laws and ethical guidelines will vary from state to state, and individual counselors will take different approaches. You can try asking her more general questions, such as "What effective strategies have teachers used in the past with this student?" or "what might prevent him from leaving the room every time I ask him to sit and do work?" You can suggest that she ask the child for permission to share details with you. And don't be afraid to connect with the student on your own. Invite him to lunch and take the time to get to know him. If he opens up and starts to trust you, he may feel less edgy and display more respect in the classroom.

School counselors are charged with protecting students from harm, and that includes respecting their privacy. They only should reveal sensitive information when educators can use it to help a child. That's a tricky line to walk, and counselors have to rely on their best judgment. I doubt this particular one is trying to torment you by withholding data. As in any situation when you're frustrated with a colleague, talk to her directly in a nonconfrontational way. She might meet you somewhere in the middle. After all, you both want to help this student adjust and succeed.
Have a question that you'd like Career Confidential to answer? Email to careerconfidential@pdkintl.org. All names and schools will remain confidential. No identifying information will be included in the published questions and answers.

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Teacher is upset with counselor for withholding information - kappanonline.org

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Q: I just got a new student in my 7 th-grade English class. He seems really troubled. He steals supplies, knocks papers off my desk when he's mad and makes crass sexual comments to the girls. He's in 7th grade but can barely read. To say he's disrespectful would be an understatement.

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Family Education Rights and Privacy Act Statute (Statutory Law)

Federal law that outlines the rights
and privacy that parents or eligible students (over 18) have over students’ education records.

Prohibits educators from sharing student information with others unless it serves a legitimate educational interest in the student.

Family and Education Privacy Rights, 20 USC §1232g.

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§1232g. Family educational and privacy rights

(a) Conditions for availability of funds to educational agencies or institutions; inspection and review of education records; specific information to be made available; procedure for access to education records; reasonableness of time for such access; hearings; written explanations by parents; definitions

(1)(A) No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the parents of students who are or have been in attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution, as the case may be, the right to inspect and review the education records of their children. If any material or document in the education record of a student includes information on more than one student, the parents of one of such students shall have the right to inspect and review only such part of such material or document as relates to such student or to be informed of the specific information contained in such part of such material. Each educational agency or institution shall establish appropriate procedures for the granting of a request by parents for access to the education records of their children within a reasonable period of time, but in no case more than forty-five days after the request has been made.

(B) No funds under any applicable program shall be made available to any State educational agency (whether or not that agency is an educational agency or institution under this section) that has a policy of denying, or effectively prevents, the parents of students the right to inspect and review the education records maintained by the State educational agency on their children who are or have been in attendance at any school of an educational agency or institution that is subject to the provisions of this section.

(C) The first sentence of subparagraph (A) shall not operate to make available to students in institutions of postsecondary education the following materials:

(i) financial records of the parents of the student or any information contained therein;

(ii) confidential letters and statements of recommendation, which were placed in the education records prior to January 1, 1975, if such letters or statements are not used for purposes other than those for which they were specifically intended;

(iii) if the student has signed a waiver of the student's right of access under this subsection in accordance with subparagraph (D), confidential recommendations-

(I) respecting admission to any educational agency or institution,

(II) respecting an application for employment, and

(III) respecting the receipt of an honor or honorary recognition.

(D) A student or a person applying for admission may waive his right of access to confidential statements described in clause (iii) of subparagraph (C), except that such waiver shall apply to recommendations only if (i) the student is, upon request, notified of the names of all persons making confidential recommendations and (ii) such recommendations are used solely for the purpose for which they were specifically intended. Such waivers may not be required as a condition for admission to, receipt of financial aid from, or receipt of any other services or benefits from such agency or institution.

(2) No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution unless the parents of students who are or have been in attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution are provided an opportunity for a hearing by such agency or institution, in accordance with regulations of the Secretary, to challenge the content of such student's education records, in order to insure that the records are not inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in violation of the privacy rights of students, and to provide an opportunity for the correction or deletion of any such inaccurate, misleading or otherwise inappropriate data contained therein and to insert into such records a written explanation of the parents respecting the content of such records.

(3) For the purposes of this section the term "educational agency or institution" means any public or private agency or institution which is the recipient of funds under any applicable program.

(4)(A) For the purposes of this section, the term "education records" means, except as may be provided otherwise in subparagraph (B), those records, files, documents, and other materials which-

(i) contain information directly related to a student; and

(ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution.

(B) The term "education records" does not include-

(i) records of instructional, supervisory, and administrative personnel and educational personnel ancillary thereto which are in the sole possession of the maker thereof and which are not accessible or revealed to any other person except a substitute;

(ii) records maintained by a law enforcement unit of the educational agency or institution that were created by that law enforcement unit for the purpose of law enforcement;

(iii) in the case of persons who are employed by an educational agency or institution but who are not in attendance at such agency or institution, records made and maintained in the normal course of business which relate exclusively to such person in that person's capacity as an employee and are not available for use for any other purpose; or

(iv) records on a student who is eighteen years of age or older, or is attending an institution of postsecondary education, which are made or maintained by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or other recognized professional or paraprofessional acting in his professional or paraprofessional capacity, or assisting in that capacity, and which are made, maintained, or used only in connection with the provision of treatment to the student, and are not available to anyone other than persons providing such treatment, except that such records can be personally reviewed by a physician or other appropriate professional of the student's choice.

(5)(A) For the purposes of this section the term "directory information" relating to a student includes the following: the student's name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, major field of study, participation in officially recognized activities and sports, weight and height of members of athletic teams, dates of attendance, degrees and awards received, and the most recent previous educational agency or institution attended by the student.

(B) Any educational agency or institution making public directory information shall give public notice of the categories of information which it has designated as such information with respect to each student attending the institution or agency and shall allow a reasonable period of time after such notice has been given for a parent to inform the institution or agency that any or all of the information designated should not be released without the parent's prior consent.

(6) For the purposes of this section, the term "student" includes any person with respect to whom an educational agency or institution maintains education records or personally identifiable information, but does not include a person who has not been in attendance at such agency or institution.

(b) Release of education records; parental consent requirement; exceptions; compliance with judicial orders and subpoenas; audit and evaluation of federally-supported education programs; recordkeeping

(1) No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein other than directory information, as defined in paragraph (5) of subsection (a)) of students without the written consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or organization, other than to the following-

(A) other school officials, including teachers within the educational institution or local educational agency, who have been determined by such agency or institution to have legitimate educational interests, including the educational interests of the child for whom consent would otherwise be required;

(B) officials of other schools or school systems in which the student seeks or intends to enroll, upon condition that the student's parents be notified of the transfer, receive a copy of the record if desired, and have an opportunity for a hearing to challenge the content of the record;

(C)(i) authorized representatives of (I) the Comptroller General of the United States, (II) the Secretary, or (III) State educational authorities, under the conditions set forth in paragraph (3), or (ii) authorized representatives of the Attorney General for law enforcement purposes under the same conditions as apply to the Secretary under paragraph (3);

(D) in connection with a student's application for, or receipt of, financial aid;

(E) State and local officials or authorities to whom such information is specifically allowed to be reported or disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted-

(i) before November 19, 1974, if the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and such system's ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released, or

(ii) after November 19, 1974, if-

(I) the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and such system's ability to effectively serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released; and

(II) the officials and authorities to whom such information is disclosed certify in writing to the educational agency or institution that the information will not be disclosed to any other party except as provided under State law without the prior written consent of the parent of the student.

(F) organizations conducting studies for, or on behalf of, educational agencies or institutions for the purpose of developing, validating, or administering predictive tests, administering student aid programs, and improving instruction, if such studies are conducted in such a manner as will not permit the personal identification of students and their parents by persons other than representatives of such organizations and such information will be destroyed when no longer needed for the purpose for which it is conducted;

(G) accrediting organizations in order to carry out their accrediting functions;

(H) parents of a dependent student of such parents, as defined in section 152 of title 26;

(I) subject to regulations of the Secretary, in connection with an emergency, appropriate persons if the knowledge of such information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other persons;

(J)(i) the entity or persons designated in a Federal grand jury subpoena, in which case the court shall order, for good cause shown, the educational agency or institution (and any officer, director, employee, agent, or attorney for such agency or institution) on which the subpoena is served, to not disclose to any person the existence or contents of the subpoena or any information furnished to the grand jury in response to the subpoena; and

(ii) the entity or persons designated in any other subpoena issued for a law enforcement purpose, in which case the court or other issuing agency may order, for good cause shown, the educational agency or institution (and any officer, director, employee, agent, or attorney for such agency or institution) on which the subpoena is served, to not disclose to any person the existence or contents of the subpoena or any information furnished in response to the subpoena;

(K) the Secretary of Agriculture, or authorized representative from the Food and Nutrition Service or contractors acting on behalf of the Food and Nutrition Service, for the purposes of conducting program monitoring, evaluations, and performance measurements of State and local educational and other agencies and institutions receiving funding or providing benefits of 1 or more programs authorized under the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1751 et seq.) or the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1771 et seq.) for which the results will be reported in an aggregate form that does not identify any individual, on the conditions that-

(i) any data collected under this subparagraph shall be protected in a manner that will not permit the personal identification of students and their parents by other than the authorized representatives of the Secretary; and

(ii) any personally identifiable data shall be destroyed when the data are no longer needed for program monitoring, evaluations, and performance measurements; and

(L) an agency caseworker or other representative of a State or local child welfare agency, or tribal organization (as defined in section 5304 of title 25), who has the right to access a student's case plan, as defined and determined by the State or tribal organization, when such agency or organization is legally responsible, in accordance with State or tribal law, for the care and protection of the student, provided that the education records, or the personally identifiable information contained in such records, of the student will not be disclosed by such agency or organization, except to an individual or entity engaged in addressing the student's education needs and authorized by such agency or organization to receive such disclosure and such disclosure is consistent with the State or tribal laws applicable to protecting the confidentiality of a student's education records.

Nothing in subparagraph (E) of this paragraph shall prevent a State from further limiting the number or type of State or local officials who will continue to have access thereunder.

(2) No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of releasing, or providing access to, any personally identifiable information in education records other than directory information, or as is permitted under paragraph (1) of this subsection, unless-

(A) there is written consent from the student's parents specifying records to be released, the reasons for such release, and to whom, and with a copy of the records to be released to the student's parents and the student if desired by the parents, or

(B) except as provided in paragraph (1)(J), such information is furnished in compliance with judicial order, or pursuant to any lawfully issued subpoena, upon condition that parents and the students are notified of all such orders or subpoenas in advance of the compliance therewith by the educational institution or agency, except when a parent is a party to a court proceeding involving child abuse and neglect (as defined in section 3 of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (42 U.S.C. 5101 note)) or dependency matters, and the order is issued in the context of that proceeding, additional notice to the parent by the educational agency or institution is not required.

(3) Nothing contained in this section shall preclude authorized representatives of (A) the Comptroller General of the United States, (B) the Secretary, or (C) State educational authorities from having access to student or other records which may be necessary in connection with the audit and evaluation of Federally-supported education programs, or in connection with the enforcement of the Federal legal requirements which relate to such programs: Provided, That except when collection of personally identifiable information is specifically authorized by Federal law, any data collected by such officials shall be protected in a manner which will not permit the personal identification of students and their parents by other than those officials, and such personally identifiable data shall be destroyed when no longer needed for such audit, evaluation, and enforcement of Federal legal requirements.

(4)(A) Each educational agency or institution shall maintain a record, kept with the education records of each student, which will indicate all individuals (other than those specified in paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection), agencies, or organizations which have requested or obtained access to a student's education records maintained by such educational agency or institution, and which will indicate specifically the legitimate interest that each such person, agency, or organization has in obtaining this information. Such record of access shall be available only to parents, to the school official and his assistants who are responsible for the custody of such records, and to persons or organizations authorized in, and under the conditions of, clauses (A) and (C) of paragraph (1) as a means of auditing the operation of the system.

(B) With respect to this subsection, personal information shall only be transferred to a third party on the condition that such party will not permit any other party to have access to such information without the written consent of the parents of the student. If a third party outside the educational agency or institution permits access to information in violation of paragraph (2)(A), or fails to destroy information in violation of paragraph (1)(F), the educational agency or institution shall be prohibited from permitting access to information from education records to that third party for a period of not less than five years.

(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit State and local educational officials from having access to student or other records which may be necessary in connection with the audit and evaluation of any federally or State supported education program or in connection with the enforcement of the Federal legal requirements which relate to any such program, subject to the conditions specified in the proviso in paragraph (3).

(6)(A) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an institution of postsecondary education from disclosing, to an alleged victim of any crime of violence (as that term is defined in section 16 of title 18), or a nonforcible sex offense, the final results of any disciplinary proceeding conducted by such institution against the alleged perpetrator of such crime or offense with respect to such crime or offense.

(B) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an institution of postsecondary education from disclosing the final results of any disciplinary proceeding conducted by such institution against a student who is an alleged perpetrator of any crime of violence (as that term is defined in section 16 of title 18), or a nonforcible sex offense, if the institution determines as a result of that disciplinary proceeding that the student committed a violation of the institution's rules or policies with respect to such crime or offense.

(C) For the purpose of this paragraph, the final results of any disciplinary proceeding-

(i) shall include only the name of the student, the violation committed, and any sanction imposed by the institution on that student; and

(ii) may include the name of any other student, such as a victim or witness, only with the written consent of that other student.

(7)(A) Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit an educational institution from disclosing information provided to the institution under section 14071 of title 42 concerning registered sex offenders who are required to register under such section.

(B) The Secretary shall take appropriate steps to notify educational institutions that disclosure of information described in subparagraph (A) is permitted.

(c) Surveys or data-gathering activities; regulations

Not later than 240 days after October 20, 1994, the Secretary shall adopt appropriate regulations or procedures, or identify existing regulations or procedures, which protect the rights of privacy of students and their families in connection with any surveys or data-gathering activities conducted, assisted, or authorized by the Secretary or an administrative head of an education agency. Regulations established under this subsection shall include provisions controlling the use, dissemination, and protection of such data. No survey or data-gathering activities shall be conducted by the Secretary, or an administrative head of an education agency under an applicable program, unless such activities are authorized by law.

(d) Students' rather than parents' permission or consent

For the purposes of this section, whenever a student has attained eighteen years of age, or is attending an institution of postsecondary education, the permission or consent required of and the rights accorded to the parents of the student shall thereafter only be required of and accorded to the student.

(e) Informing parents or students of rights under this section

No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution unless such agency or institution effectively informs the parents of students, or the students, if they are eighteen years of age or older, or are attending an institution of postsecondary education, of the rights accorded them by this section.

(f) Enforcement; termination of assistance

The Secretary shall take appropriate actions to enforce this section and to deal with violations of this section, in accordance with this chapter, except that action to terminate assistance may be taken only if the Secretary finds there has been a failure to comply with this section, and he has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.

(g) Office and review board; creation; functions

The Secretary shall establish or designate an office and review board within the Department for the purpose of investigating, processing, reviewing, and adjudicating violations of this section and complaints which may be filed concerning alleged violations of this section. Except for the conduct of hearings, none of the functions of the Secretary under this section shall be carried out in any of the regional offices of such Department.

(h) Disciplinary records; disclosure

Nothing in this section shall prohibit an educational agency or institution from-

(1) including appropriate information in the education record of any student concerning disciplinary action taken against such student for conduct that posed a significant risk to the safety or well-being of that student, other students, or other members of the school community; or

(2) disclosing such information to teachers and school officials, including teachers and school officials in other schools, who have legitimate educational interests in the behavior of the student.

(i) Drug and alcohol violation disclosures

(1) In general

Nothing in this Act or the Higher Education Act of 1965 [20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.] shall be construed to prohibit an institution of higher education from disclosing, to a parent or legal guardian of a student, information regarding any violation of any Federal, State, or local law, or of any rule or policy of the institution, governing the use or possession of alcohol or a controlled substance, regardless of whether that information is contained in the student's education records, if-

(A) the student is under the age of 21; and

(B) the institution determines that the student has committed a disciplinary violation with respect to such use or possession.

(2) State law regarding disclosure

Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to supersede any provision of State law that prohibits an institution of higher education from making the disclosure described in subsection (a).

(j) Investigation and prosecution of terrorism

(1) In general

Notwithstanding subsections (a) through (i) or any provision of State law, the Attorney General (or any Federal officer or employee, in a position not lower than an Assistant Attorney General, designated by the Attorney General) may submit a written application to a court of competent jurisdiction for an ex parte order requiring an educational agency or institution to permit the Attorney General (or his designee) to-

(A) collect education records in the possession of the educational agency or institution that are relevant to an authorized investigation or prosecution of an offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, or an act of domestic or international terrorism as defined in section 2331 of that title; and

(B) for official purposes related to the investigation or prosecution of an offense described in paragraph (1)(A), retain, disseminate, and use (including as evidence at trial or in other administrative or judicial proceedings) such records, consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary, shall issue to protect confidentiality.

(2) Application and approval

(A) In general.-An application under paragraph (1) shall certify that there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the education records are likely to contain information described in paragraph (1)(A).

(B) The court shall issue an order described in paragraph (1) if the court finds that the application for the order includes the certification described in subparagraph (A).

(3) Protection of educational agency or institution

An educational agency or institution that, in good faith, produces education records in accordance with an order issued under this subsection shall not be liable to any person for that production.

(4) Record-keeping

Subsection (b)(4) does not apply to education records subject to a court order under this subsection.

( Pub. L. 90-247, title IV, §444, formerly §438, as added Pub. L. 93-380, title V, §513(a), Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 571; amended Pub. L. 93-568, §2(a), Dec. 31, 1974, 88 Stat. 1858; Pub. L. 96-46, §4(c), Aug. 6, 1979, 93 Stat. 342; Pub. L. 101-542, title II, §203, Nov. 8, 1990, 104 Stat. 2385; Pub. L. 102-325, title XV, §1555(a), July 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 840; renumbered §444 and amended Pub. L. 103-382, title II, §§212(b)(1), 249, 261(h), Oct. 20, 1994, 108 Stat. 3913, 3924, 3928; Pub. L. 105-244, title IX, §§951, 952, Oct. 7, 1998, 112 Stat. 1835, 1836; Pub. L. 106-386, div. B, title VI, §1601(d), Oct. 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 1538; Pub. L. 107-56, title V, §507, Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 367; Pub. L. 107-110, title X, §1062(3), Jan. 8, 2002, 115 Stat. 2088; Pub. L. 111-296, title I, §103(d), Dec. 13, 2010, 124 Stat. 3192; Pub. L. 112-278, §2, Jan. 14, 2013, 126 Stat. 2480.)

References in Text

The Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(1)(K), is act June 4, 1946, ch. 281, 60 Stat. 230, which is classified generally to chapter 13 (§1751 et seq.) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1751 of Title 42 and Tables.

The Child Nutrition Act of 1966, referred to in subsec. (b)(1)(K), is Pub. L. 89-642, Oct. 11, 1966, 80 Stat. 885, which is classified generally to chapter 13A (§1771 et seq.) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1771 of Title 42 and Tables.

Section 3 of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(2)(B), is section 3 of Pub. L. 93-247, which is set out as a note under section 5101 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

Section 14071 of title 42, referred to in subsec. (b)(7)(A), was repealed by Pub. L. 109-248, title I, §129(a), July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 600.

This Act, referred to in subsec. (i)(1), is Pub. L. 90-247, Jan. 2, 1968, 80 Stat. 783, known as the Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1967. Title IV of the Act, known as the General Education Provisions Act, is classified generally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 1968 Amendment note set out under section 6301 of this title and Tables.

The Higher Education Act of 1965, referred to in subsec. (i)(1), is Pub. L. 89-329, Nov. 8, 1965, 79 Stat. 1219, which is classified generally to chapter 28 (§1001 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1001 of this title and Tables.

Prior Provisions

A prior section 444 of Pub. L. 90-247 was classified to section 1233c of this title prior to repeal by Pub. L. 103-382.

Amendments

2013-Subsec. (b)(1)(L). Pub. L. 112-278, §2(1), added subpar. (L).

Subsec. (b)(2)(B). Pub. L. 112-278, §2(2), inserted ", except when a parent is a party to a court proceeding involving child abuse and neglect (as defined in section 3 of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (42 U.S.C. 5101 note)) or dependency matters, and the order is issued in the context of that proceeding, additional notice to the parent by the educational agency or institution is not required" after "educational institution or agency".

2010-Subsec. (b)(1)(K). Pub. L. 111-296, which directed that par. (1) be amended by adding subpar. (K) "at the end", was executed by adding subpar. (K) after subpar. (J), to reflect the probable intent of Congress.

2002-Subsec. (a)(1)(B). Pub. L. 107-110, §1062(3)(A), realigned margins.

Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 107-110, §1062(3)(C), substituted "subparagraph (E)" for "clause (E)" in concluding provisions.

Subsec. (b)(1)(J). Pub. L. 107-110, §1062(3)(B), realigned margins.

Subsec. (b)(7). Pub. L. 107-110, §1062(3)(D), realigned margins.

2001-Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 107-56 added subsec. (j).

2000-Subsec. (b)(7). Pub. L. 106-386 added par. (7).

1998-Subsec. (b)(1)(C). Pub. L. 105-244, §951(1), amended subpar. (C) generally. Prior to amendment, subpar. (C) read as follows: "authorized representatives of (i) the Comptroller General of the United States, (ii) the Secretary, or (iii) State educational authorities, under the conditions set forth in paragraph (3) of this subsection;".

Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 105-244, §951(2), designated existing provisions as subpar. (A), substituted "or a nonforcible sex offense, the final results" for "the results", substituted "such crime or offense" for "such crime" in two places, and added subpars. (B) and (C).

Subsec. (i). Pub. L. 105-244, §952, added subsec. (i).

1994-Subsec. (a)(1)(B). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(1)(A)(ii), added subpar. (B). Former subpar. (B) redesignated (C).

Subsec. (a)(1)(C). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(1)(A)(i), (iii), redesignated subpar. (B) as (C) and substituted "subparagraph (D)" for "subparagraph (C)" in cl. (iii). Former subpar. (C) redesignated (D).

Subsec. (a)(1)(D). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(1)(A)(i), (iv), redesignated subpar. (C) as (D) and substituted "subparagraph (C)" for "subparagraph (B)".

Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(1)(B), substituted "privacy rights" for "privacy or other rights".

Subsec. (a)(4)(B)(ii). Pub. L. 103-382, §261(h)(1), substituted semicolon for period at end.

Subsec. (b)(1)(A). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(2)(A)(i), inserted before semicolon ", including the educational interests of the child for whom consent would otherwise be required".

Subsec. (b)(1)(C). Pub. L. 103-382, §261(h)(2)(A), substituted "or (iii)" for "(iii) an administrative head of an education agency (as defined in section 1221e-3(c) of this title), or (iv)".

Subsec. (b)(1)(E). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(2)(A)(ii), amended subpar. (E) generally. Prior to amendment, subpar. (E) read as follows: "State and local officials or authorities to whom such information is specifically required to be reported or disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted prior to November 19, 1974;".

Subsec. (b)(1)(H). Pub. L. 103-382, §261(h)(2)(B), substituted "the Internal Revenue Code of 1986" for "the Internal Revenue Code of 1954", which for purposes of codification was translated as "title 26" thus requiring no change in text.

Subsec. (b)(1)(J). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(2)(A)(iii)-(v), added subpar. (J).

Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(2)(B)(i), which directed amendment of matter preceding subpar. (A) by substituting ", unless-" for the period, was executed by substituting a comma for the period before "unless-" to reflect the probable intent of Congress.

Subsec. (b)(2)(B). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(2)(B)(ii), inserted "except as provided in paragraph (1)(J)," before "such information".

Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 103-382, §261(h)(2)(C), substituted "or (C)" for "(C) an administrative head of an education agency or (D)" and "education programs" for "education program".

Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(2)(C), inserted at end "If a third party outside the educational agency or institution permits access to information in violation of paragraph (2)(A), or fails to destroy information in violation of paragraph (1)(F), the educational agency or institution shall be prohibited from permitting access to information from education records to that third party for a period of not less than five years."

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(3), substituted "Not later than 240 days after October 20, 1994, the Secretary shall adopt appropriate regulations or procedures, or identify existing regulations or procedures, which" for "The Secretary shall adopt appropriate regulations to".

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 103-382, §261(h)(3), inserted a comma after "education".

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(4), inserted "effectively" before "informs".

Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 103-382, §261(h)(4), struck out ", or an administrative head of an education agency," after "The Secretary" and substituted "enforce this section" for "enforce provisions of this section", "in accordance with" for "according to the provisions of", and "comply with this section" for "comply with the provisions of this section".

Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 103-382, §261(h)(5), struck out "of Health, Education, and Welfare" after "the Department" and "the provisions of" after "adjudicating violations of".

Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 103-382, §249(5), added subsec. (h).

1992-Subsec. (a)(4)(B)(ii). Pub. L. 102-325 amended cl. (ii) generally. Prior to amendment, cl. (ii) read as follows: "if the personnel of a law enforcement unit do not have access to education records under subsection (b)(1) of this section, the records and documents of such law enforcement unit which (I) are kept apart from records described in subparagraph (A), (II) are maintained solely for law enforcement purposes, and (III) are not made available to persons other than law enforcement officials of the same jurisdiction;".

1990-Subsec. (b)(6). Pub. L. 101-542 added par. (6).

1979-Subsec. (b)(5). Pub. L. 96-46 added par. (5).

1974-Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 93-568, §2(a)(1)(A)-(C), (2)(A)-(C), (3), designated existing par. (1) as subpar. (A), substituted reference to educational agencies and institutions for reference to state or local educational agencies, institutions of higher education, community colleges, schools, agencies offering preschool programs, and other educational institutions, substituted the generic term education records for the enumeration of such records, and extended the right to inspect and review such records to parents of children who have been in attendance, and added subpars. (B) and (C).

Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 93-568, §2(a)(4), substituted provisions making the availability of funds to educational agencies and institutions conditional on the granting of an opportunity for a hearing to parents of students who are or have been in attendance at such institution or agency to challenge the contents of the student's education records for provisions granting the parents an opportunity for such hearing, and inserted provisions authorizing insertion into the records a written explanation of the parents respecting the content of such records.

Subsec. (a)(3) to (6). Pub. L. 93-568, §2(a)(1)(G), (2)(F), (5), added pars. (3) to (6).

Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 93-568, §2(a)(1)(D), (2)(D), (6), (8)(A)-(C), (10)(A), in provisions preceding subpar. (A), substituted "educational agency or institution which has a policy of permitting the release of education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein other than directory information, as defined in paragraph (5) of subsection (a))" for "state or local educational agency, any institution of higher education, any community college, any school, agency offering a preschool program, or any other educational institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of personally identifiable records or files (or personal information contained therein)", in subpar. (A), substituted "educational agency, who have been determined by such agency or institution to have" for "educational agency who have", in subpar. (B), substituted "the student seeks or intends to" for "the student intends to", in subpar. (C), substituted reference to "section 408(c)" for reference to "section 409 of this Act" which for purposes of codification has been translated as "section 1221e-3(c) of this title", and added subpars. (E) to (I).

Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 93-568, §2(a)(1)(E), (2)(E), substituted "educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of releasing, or providing access to, any personally identifiable information in education records other than directory information, or as is permitted under paragraph (1) of this subsection" for "state or local educational agency, any institution of higher education, any community college, any school, agency offering a preschool program, or any other educational institution which has a policy or practice of furnishing, in any form, any personally identifiable information contained in personal school records, to any persons other than those listed in subsection (b)(1) of this section".

Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 93-568, §2(a)(8)(D), substituted "information is specifically authorized by Federal law, any data collected by such officials shall be protected in a manner which will not permit the personal identification of students and their parents by other than those officials, and such personally identifiable data shall be destroyed when no longer needed for such audit, evaluation, and enforcement of Federal legal requirements" for "data is specifically authorized by Federal law, any data collected by such officials with respect to individual students shall not include information (including social security numbers) which would permit the personal identification of such students or their parents after the data so obtained has been collected".

Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 93-568, §2(a)(9), substituted provisions that each educational agency or institution maintain a record, kept with the education records of each student, indicating individuals, agencies, or organizations who obtained access to the student's record and the legitimate interest in obtaining such information, that such record of access shall be available only to parents, school officials, and their assistants having responsibility for the custody of such records, and as a means of auditing the operation of the system, for provisions that with respect to subsecs. (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) of this section, all persons, agencies, or organizations desiring access to the records of a student shall be required to sign forms to be kept with the records of the student, but only for inspection by the parents or the student, indicating specifically the legitimate educational or other interest of the person seeking such information, and that the form shall be available to parents and school officials having responsibility for record maintenance as a means of auditing the operation of the system.

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 93-568, §2(a)(1)(F), substituted "to any educational agency or institution unless such agency or institution" for "unless the recipient of such funds".

Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 93-568, §2(a)(7), (10)(B), struck out reference to sections 1232c and 1232f of this title and inserted provisions that except for the conduct of hearings, none of the functions of the Secretary under this section shall be carried out in any of the regional offices of such Department.

Effective Date of 2010 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 111-296 effective Oct. 1, 2010, except as otherwise specifically provided, see section 445 of Pub. L. 111-296, set out as a note under section 1751 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare.

Effective Date of 2002 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 107-110 effective Jan. 8, 2002, except with respect to certain noncompetitive programs and competitive programs, see section 5 of Pub. L. 107-110, set out as an Effective Date note under section 6301 of this title.

Effective Date of 1998 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 105-244 effective Oct. 1, 1998, except as otherwise provided in Pub. L. 105-244, see section 3 of Pub. L. 105-244, set out as a note under section 1001 of this title.

Effective Date of 1992 Amendment

Pub. L. 102-325, title XV, §1555(b), July 23, 1992, 106 Stat. 840, provided that: "The amendment made by this section [amending this section] shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act [July 23, 1992]."

Effective Date of 1979 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 96-46 effective Oct. 1, 1978, see section 8 of Pub. L. 96-46, set out as a note under section 930 of this title.

Effective Date of 1974 Amendment

Pub. L. 93-568, §2(b), Dec. 31, 1974, 88 Stat. 1862, provided that: "The amendments made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall be effective, and retroactive to, November 19, 1974."

Effective Date

Pub. L. 93-380, title V, §513(b)(1), Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 574, provided that: "The provisions of this section [enacting this section and provisions set out as a note under section 1221 of this title] shall become effective ninety days after the date of enactment [Aug. 21, 1974] of section 438 [now 444] of the General Education Provisions Act [this section]."

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20 USC 1232g: Family educational and privacy rights

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(a) Conditions for availability of funds to educational agencies or institutions; inspection and review of education records; specific information to be made available; procedure for access to education records; reasonableness of time for such access; hearings; written explanations by parents; definitions (1)(A) No funds shall be made available under any

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Family Education Rights and Privacy Act Regulations (Administrative Law)

Provides regulations and codes for following the Statutory Law, FERPA.

Sets requirements for agencies that protests students' and families privacy rights in education.

Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 34 CFR §99

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Title 34, part 99 of the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations.

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By critically evaluating laws and ethical standards I can see how they may have impacted my educational journey. Privacy and confidentiality laws make it where only information that is "need to know" be shared about a student. FERPA was passed in long before I was in school so I know that my education was impacted by the law. I can feel more comfortable knowing only information was shared with intent of supporting my success in school.

The ASCA ethical standards (2016) show that privacy is very important in the role of school counselors. Part of that role includes advocating appropriate use of student records to both teachers and administrators. This shows that counselors play a leadership role on campus as well as a consult to privacy and confidentiality for staff. My goal is to be a counselor so I can support more than just the academic success of students. This includes only sharing information that will benefit the success of the student and nothing that could taint my relationship with students.

Reference
American School Counselor Association, (2016). ASCA ethical standards for school counselors. Alexandria,

VA: Author.

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New Jersey v. T.L.O (Judicial Law)

Searches and seizures can be done by school administration if there is a reasonable cause.

Searching a student's belongings and sharing information about what was found does not violate student privacy laws or rights as long as there is reasonable cause for the search and seizure.

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)

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U.S. Supreme Court
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)New Jersey v. T.L.O. No. 83-712 Argued March 28, 1984 Reargued October 2, 1984 Decided January 15, 1985 469 U.S. 325 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A teacher at a New Jersey high school, upon discovering respondent, then a 14-year-old freshman, and her companion smoking cigarettes in a school lavatory in violation of a school rule, took them to the Principal's office, where they met with the Assistant Vice Principal. When respondent, in response to the Assistant Vice Principal's questioning, denied that she had been smoking and claimed that she did not smoke at all, the Assistant Vice Principal demanded to see her purse. Upon opening the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes and also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers that are commonly associated with the use of marihuana. He then proceeded to search the purse thoroughly and found some marihuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a fairly substantial amount of money, an index card containing a list of students who owed respondent money, and two letters that implicated her in marihuana dealing. Thereafter, the State brought delinquency charges against respondent in the Juvenile Court, which, after denying respondent's motion to suppress the evidence found in her purse, held that the Fourth Amendment applied to searches by school officials, but that the search in question was a reasonable one, and adjudged respondent to be a delinquent. The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial court's finding that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded on other grounds. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and ordered the suppression of the evidence found in respondent's purse, holding that the search of the purse was unreasonable.

1. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials, and is not limited to searches carried out by law enforcement officers. Nor are school officials exempt from the Amendment's dictates by virtue of the special nature of their authority over schoolchildren. In carrying out searches and other functions pursuant to disciplinary policies mandated by state statutes, school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents of students, and they cannot claim the parents immunity from the Fourth Amendment's strictures. Pp. -337.

Page 469 U. S. 326

2. Schoolchildren have legitimate expectations of privacy. They may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items by bringing them onto school grounds. But striking the balance between schoolchildren's legitimate expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. Thus, school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority. Moreover, school officials need not be held subject to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a determination of whether the search was justified at its inception and whether, as conducted, it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Under ordinary circumstances, the search of a student by a school official will be justified at its inception where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. And such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search, and not excessively intrusive in light of the student's age and sex and the nature of the infraction. Pp. -343.

3. Under the above standard, the search in this case was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. First, the initial search for cigarettes was reasonable. The report to the Assistant Vice Principal that respondent had been smoking warranted a reasonable suspicion that she had cigarettes in her purse, and thus the search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would constitute "mere evidence" of a violation of the no-smoking rule. Second, the discovery of the rolling papers then gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that respondent was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse, and this suspicion justified the further exploration that turned up more evidence of drug-related activities. Pp. -347.

94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934, reversed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Part MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. .

Page 469 U. S. 327

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to examine the appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by public school authorities. Our consideration of the proper application of the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, however, has led us to conclude that the search that gave rise to

Page 469 U. S. 328

the case now before us did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we here address only the questions of the proper standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by public school officials and the application of that standard to the facts of this case.
I
On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, N.J. discovered two girls smoking in a lavatory. One of the two girls was the respondent T.L.O, who at that time was a 14-year-old high school freshman. Because smoking in the lavatory was a violation of a school rule, the teacher took the two girls to the Principal's office, where they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr. Choplick, T.L.O's companion admitted that she had violated the rule. T.L.O, however, denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all.

Mr. Choplick asked T.L.O to come into his private office and demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse and held before T.L.O as he accused her of having lied to him. As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, Mr. Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers. In his experience, possession of rolling papers by high school students was closely associated with the use of marihuana. Suspecting that a closer examination of the purse might yield further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O money, and two letters that implicated T.L.O in marihuana dealing.

Mr. Choplick notified T.L.O's mother and the police, and turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police. At

Page 469 U. S. 329

the request of the police, T.L.O's mother took her daughter to police headquarters, where T.L.O confessed that she had been selling marihuana at the high school. On the basis of the confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick, the State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County. [ Footnote 1] Contending that Mr. Choplick's search of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T.L.O moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse as well as her confession, which, she argued, was tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress. State ex rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J.Super. 329, 428 A.2d 1327 (1980). Although the court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches carried out by school officials, it held that

"a school official may properly conduct a search of a student's person if the official has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school policies."

Id. at 341, 428 A.2d at 1333 (emphasis in original).

Applying this standard, the court concluded that the search conducted by Mr. Choplick was a reasonable one. The initial decision to open the purse was justified by Mr. Choplick's well-founded suspicion that T.L.O had violated the rule forbidding smoking in the lavatory. Once the purse

Page 469 U. S. 330

was open, evidence of marihuana violations was in plain view, and Mr. Choplick was entitled to conduct a thorough search to determine the nature and extent of T.L.O's drug-related activities. Id. at 343, 428 A.2d at 1334. Having denied the motion to suppress, the court on March 23, 1981, found T.L.O. to be a delinquent and on January 8, 1982, sentenced her to a year's probation.

On appeal from the final judgment of the Juvenile Court, a divided Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's finding that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a determination whether T.L.O. had knowingly and voluntarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing. State ex rel. T.L.O., 185 N.J.Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (1982). T.L.O. appealed the Fourth Amendment ruling, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and ordered the suppression of the evidence found in T.L.O.'s purse. State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983).

The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials. The court also rejected the State of New Jersey's argument that the exclusionary rule should not be employed to prevent the use in juvenile proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by school officials. Declining to consider whether applying the rule to the fruits of searches by school officials would have any deterrent value, the court held simply that the precedents of this Court establish that "if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." Id. at 341, 463 A.2d at 939 (footnote omitted).

With respect to the question of the legality of the search before it, the court agreed with the Juvenile Court that a warrantless search by a school official does not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the official

"has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal

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activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline and order."

Id. at 346, 463 A.2d at 941-942. However, the court, with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed with the Juvenile Court's conclusion that the search of the purse was reasonable. According to the majority, the contents of T.L.O.'s purse had no bearing on the accusation against T.L.O., for possession of cigarettes (as opposed to smoking them in the lavatory) did not violate school rules, and a mere desire for evidence that would impeach T.L.O.'s claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not justify the search. Moreover, even if a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse would justify a search, Mr. Choplick had no such suspicion, as no one had furnished him with any specific information that there were cigarettes in the purse. Finally, leaving aside the question whether Mr. Choplick was justified in opening the purse, the court held that the evidence of drug use that he saw inside did not justify the extensive "rummaging" through T.L.O.'s papers and effects that followed. Id. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942-943.

We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari. 464 U.S. 991 (1983). Although the State had argued in the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the search of T.L.O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the petition for certiorari raised only the question whether the exclusionary rule should operate to bar consideration in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a school official without the involvement of law enforcement officers. When this case was first argued last Term, the State conceded for the purpose of argument that the standard devised by the New Jersey Supreme Court for determining the legality of school searches was appropriate and that the court had correctly applied that standard; the State contended only that the remedial purposes of the exclusionary rule were not well served by applying it to searches conducted by public authorities not primarily engaged in law enforcement.

Page 469 U. S. 332

Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding the wisdom of deciding that question in isolation from the broader question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of school authorities prompted us to order reargument on that question. [ Footnote 2] Having heard argument on

Page 469 U. S. 333

the legality of the search of T.L.O.'s purse, we are satisfied that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. [ Footnote 3]
II
In determining whether the search at issue in this case violated the Fourth Amendment, we are faced initially with the question whether that Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials. We hold that it does.

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It is now beyond dispute that

"the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers."

Elkins v. United States, , (1960); accord, Mapp v. Ohio, (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, (1949). Equally indisputable is the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students against encroachment by public school officials:

"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes."

These two propositions -- that the Fourth Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the actions of public school officials are subject to the limits placed on state action by the Fourteenth Amendment -- might appear sufficient to answer the suggestion that the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe unreasonable searches by school officials. On reargument, however, the State of New Jersey has argued that the history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement officers; accordingly, although public school officials are concededly state agents for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no rights enforceable against them. [ Footnote 4]

Page 469 U. S. 335

"[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."

387 U.S. at . Because the individual's interest in privacy and personal security "suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards," Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, at -313, it would be "anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at .

Page 469 U. S. 336

Notwithstanding the general applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the activities of civil authorities, a few courts have concluded that school officials are exempt from the dictates of the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special nature of their authority over schoolchildren. See, e.g., R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.App.1983). Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is that of the parent, not the State, and is therefore not subject to the limits of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid.

Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court. We have held school officials subject to the commands of the First Amendment, see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, (1969), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Goss v. Lopez, (1975). If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of their students. More generally, the Court has recognized that "the concept of parental delegation" as a source of school authority is not entirely "consonant with compulsory education laws." Ingraham v. Wright, , (1977). Today's public school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies. See, e.g., the opinion in State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. at 343, 463 A.2d at 934, 940, describing the New Jersey statutes regulating school disciplinary policies and establishing the authority of school officials over their students. In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they

Page 469 U. S. 337

cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
III
We have recognized that even a limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy. Terry v. Ohio, , -25 (1967). We have also recognized that searches of closed items of personal luggage are intrusions on protected privacy interests, for "the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view." United States v. Ross, , -823 (1982). A search of a child's person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person, [ Footnote 5] no less

Page 469 U. S. 338

than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.

Page 469 U. S. 339

yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

Nor does the State's suggestion that children have no legitimate need to bring personal property into the schools seem well anchored in reality. Students at a minimum must bring to school not only the supplies needed for their studies, but also keys, money, and the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming. In addition, students may carry on their persons or in purses or wallets such nondisruptive yet highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries. Finally, students may have perfectly legitimate reasons to carry with them articles of property needed in connection with extracurricular or recreational activities. In short, schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.

Against the child's interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems. See generally 1 NIE, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Violent Schools -- Safe Schools: The Safe School Study Report to the Congress (1978). Even in schools that have been spared the most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. "Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at . Accordingly, we have recognized

Page 469 U. S. 340

The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. Ordinarily, a search -- even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant -- must be based upon "probable cause" to believe that a violation of the law has occurred. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, , (1973); Sibron v. New York, , -66 (1968). However, "probable cause" is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although

"both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required."

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J., concurring). Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, although "reasonable," do not rise to the level of probable cause. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, (1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, , (195); Delaware v. Prouse, , -655 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, (1976); cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at -539. Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.

We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue [ Footnote 6] in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether the . . . action was justified at its inception," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place," ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official [ Footnote 7] will be

Page 469 U. S. 342

"justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. [ Footnote 8] Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. [ Footnote 9]

This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools

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nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools.
IV
There remains the question of the legality of the search in this case. We recognize that the "reasonable grounds" standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its consideration of this question is not substantially different from the standard that we have adopted today. Nonetheless, we believe that the New Jersey court's application of that standard to strike down the search of T.L.O.'s purse reflects a somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness. Our review of the facts surrounding the search leads us to conclude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. [ Footnote 10]

The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved two separate searches, with the first -- the search for cigarettes -- providing the suspicion that gave rise to the second

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-- the search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of the second search that are at issue here, the validity of the search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of the initial search for cigarettes, as there would have been no reason to suspect that T.L.O. possessed marihuana had the first search not taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search for cigarettes that we first turn our attention.

The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds for its holding that the search for cigarettes was unreasonable. First, the court observed that possession of cigarettes was not in itself illegal or a violation of school rules. Because the contents of T.L.O.'s purse would therefore have "no direct bearing on the infraction" of which she was accused (smoking in a lavatory where smoking was prohibited), there was no reason to search her purse. [ Footnote 11] Second, even assuming that a search of T.L.O.'s purse might under some circumstances be reasonable in light of the accusation made against T.L.O., the New Jersey court concluded that Mr. Choplick in this particular case had no reasonable grounds to suspect that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse. At best, according

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to the court, Mr. Choplick had "a good hunch." 94 N.J. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942.

Both these conclusions are implausible. T.L.O. had been accused of smoking, and had denied the accusation in the strongest possible terms when she stated that she did not smoke at all. Surely it cannot be said that under these circumstances, T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes would be irrelevant to the charges against her or to her response to those charges. T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes, once it was discovered, would both corroborate the report that she had been smoking and undermine the credibility of her defense to the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of the cigarettes would not prove that T.L.O. had been smoking in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessarily be inconsistent with her claim that she did not smoke at all. But it is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have

"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."

Fed.Rule Evid. 401. The relevance of T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes to the question whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked supplied the necessary "nexus" between the item searched for and the infraction under investigation. See Warden v. Hayden, , -307 (1967). Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse, the search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would constitute "mere evidence" of a violation. Ibid.

Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that the purse would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A teacher had reported that T.L.O. was smoking in the lavatory. Certainly this report gave Mr. Choplick reason to suspect that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes with her; and

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if she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in which to find them. Mr. Choplick's suspicion that there were cigarettes in the purse was not an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at ; rather, it was the sort of "common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior" upon which "practical people" -- including government officials -- are entitled to rely. United States v. Cortez, , (1981). Of course, even if the teacher's report were true, T.L.O. might not have had a pack of cigarettes with her; she might have borrowed a cigarette from someone else or have been sharing a cigarette with another student. But the requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. . . ." Hill v. California, , (1971). Because the hypothesis that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes in her purse was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other hypotheses were also consistent with the teacher's accusation. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted unreasonably when he examined T.L.O.'s purse to see if it contained cigarettes. [Footnote 12]

Page 469 U. S. 347

Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick's decision to open T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable brings us to the question of the further search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes was located. The suspicion upon which the search for marihuana was founded was provided when Mr. Choplick observed a package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed the pack of cigarettes. Although T.L.O. does not dispute the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick's belief that the rolling papers indicated the presence of marihuana, she does contend that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted exceeded permissible bounds when he seized and read certain letters that implicated T.L.O. in drug dealing. This argument, too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse. This suspicion justified further exploration of T.L.O.'s purse, which turned up more evidence of drug-related activities: a pipe, a number of plastic bags of the type commonly used to store marihuana, a small quantity of marihuana, and a fairly substantial amount of money. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse; and when a search of that compartment revealed an index card containing a list of "people who owe me money" as well as two letters, the inference that T.L.O. was involved in marihuana trafficking was substantial enough to justify Mr. Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they contained any further evidence. In short, we cannot conclude that the search for marihuana was unreasonable in any respect.

Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing by T.L.O. was reasonable, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to exclude that evidence

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from T.L.O.'s juvenile delinquency proceedings on Fourth Amendment grounds was erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is

T.L.O. also received a 3-day suspension from school for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area and a 7-day suspension for possession of marihuana. On T.L.O.'s motion, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, set aside the 7-day suspension on the ground that it was based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (T.L.O.) v. Piscataway Bd. of Ed., No. C.2865-79 (Super.Ct. N.J. Ch.Div., Mar. 31, 1980). The Board of Education apparently did not appeal the decision of the Chancery Division.

State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools. Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a number of cases courts have held that school officials conducting in-school searches of students are private parties acting in loco parentis and are therefore not subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., D. R. C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska App.1982); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.App.1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.Civ.App.1970). At least one court has held, on the other hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to in-school searches by school officials and that a search conducted without probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La.1976); others have held or suggested that the probable cause standard is applicable at least where the police are involved in a search, see M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill.1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill.1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S.E.2d 586, 594 (1975); or where the search is highly intrusive, See M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (CA2 1979).

The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of the Fourth Amendment in the schools have, like the Supreme Court of New Jersey in this case, reached a middle position: the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities, but the special needs of the school environment require assessment of the legality of such searches against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause. These courts have, by and large, upheld warrantless searches by school authorities provided that they are supported by a reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover evidence of an infraction of school disciplinary rules or a violation of the law. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, No. 83-3174 (CA6, Aug. 31, 1984); Bilorey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (CA9 1984); Hortol v. Goose Creek Independent School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (CA5 1982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977); M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super.1971); State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla.App.1983); State v. Young, supra; In re J.A. 85 Ill.App.3d 567, 406 N.E.2d 958 (1980); People v. Ward, 62 Mich.App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (App.1975); People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977); In re L.L., 90 Wis.2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (App.1979).

Although few have considered the matter, courts have also split over whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for Fourth Amendment violations committed by school authorities. The Georgia courts have held that although the Fourth Amendment applies to the schools, the exclusionary rule does not. See, e.g., State v. Young, supra; State v. Lamb, 137 Ga.App. 437, 224 S.E.2d 51 (1976). Other jurisdictions have applied the rule to exclude the fruits of unlawful school searches from criminal trials and delinquency proceedings. See State v. Mora, supra; People v. D., supra.

In holding that the search of T.L.O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we do not implicitly determine that the exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authorities. The question whether evidence should be excluded from a criminal proceeding involves two discrete inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for the violation. Neither question is logically antecedent to the other, for a negative answer to either question is sufficient to dispose of the case. Thus, our determination that the search at issue in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment implies no particular resolution of the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule.

We do not address the question, not presented by this case, whether a schoolchild has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks, or other school property provided for the storage of school supplies. Nor do we express any opinion on the standards of any governing searches of such areas by school officials or by other public authorities acting at the request of school officials. Compare Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (CA10 1981) ("Inasmuch as the school had assumed joint control of the locker it cannot be successfully maintained that the school did not have a right to inspect it"), and People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366 (1969) (school administrators have power to consent to search of a student's locker), with State v. Engerud, 94 N.J. 331, 348, 463 A.2d 934, 943 (1983) ("We are satisfied that in the context of this case the student had an expectation of privacy in the contents of his locker. . . . For the four years of high school, the school locker is a home away from home. In it the student stores the kind of personal effects' protected by the Fourth Amendment").

We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority. This case does not present the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on that question. Cf. Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND.Ill. 1976) (holding probable cause standard applicable to searches involving the police).

We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities. In other contexts, however, we have held that although

"some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,] . . . the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion."

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, , -561 (1976). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, (1967). Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available "to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the official in the field.'" Delaware v. Prouse, , -655 (1979) (citation omitted). Because the search of T.L.O.'s purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she had violated school rules, see infra, at -347, we need not consider the circumstances that might justify school authorities in conducting searches unsupported by individualized suspicion.

"repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."

[ Footnote 10]

Of course, New Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard under its own Constitution or statutes. In that case, its courts would not purport to be applying the Fourth Amendment when they invalidate a search.

[ Footnote 11]

[ Footnote 12]

T.L.O. contends that even if it was reasonable for Mr. Choplick to open her purse to look for cigarettes, it was not reasonable for him to reach in and take the cigarettes out of her purse once he found them. Had he not removed the cigarettes from the purse, she asserts, he would not have observed the rolling papers that suggested the presence of marihuana, and the search for marihuana could not have taken place. T.L.O.'s argument is based on the fact that the cigarettes were not "contraband," as no school rule forbade her to have them. Thus, according to T.L.O., the cigarettes were not subject to seizure or confiscation by school authorities, and Mr. Choplick was not entitled to take them out of T.L.O.'s purse regardless of whether he was entitled to peer into the purse to see if they were there. Such hairsplitting argumentation has no place in an inquiry addressed to the issue of reasonableness. If Mr. Choplick could permissibly search T.L.O.'s purse for cigarettes, it hardly seems reasonable to suggest that his natural reaction to finding them -- picking them up -- could be a constitutional violation. We find that neither in opening the purse nor in reaching into it to remove the cigarettes did Mr. Choplick violate the Fourth Amendment.

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, concurring.

I agree with the Court's decision, and generally with its opinion. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.

In any realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally. They spend the school hours in close association with each other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods. The students in a particular class often know each other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child. It is simply unrealistic to think that students have the same subjective expectation of privacy as the population generally. But for purposes of deciding this case, I can assume that children in school -- no less than adults -- have privacy interests that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate.

Page 469 U. S. 349

to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id. at . See also Epperson v. Arkansas, , (1968). The Court has balanced the interests of the student against the school officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative differences between the constitutional remedies to which students and adults are entitled.

"[A]t the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment."

Id. at . The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness of the public school and its supervision by the community afford significant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional rights. Ibid.

The special relationship between teacher and student also distinguishes the setting within which schoolchildren operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial

Page 469 U. S. 350

relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. [ Footnote 2/1] Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for his education.

The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the Court states, is the education and training of young people. A State has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. And apart from education, the school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full panoply of constitutional rules applies with the same force and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal laws. [ Footnote 2/2]

In sum, although I join the Court's opinion and its holding, [ Footnote 2/3] my emphasis is somewhat different.

Page 469 U. S. 351

[ Footnote 2/1]

Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law enforcement responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case, school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the types of crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the distribution and use of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as well as fellow students.

[ Footnote 2/2]

[ Footnote 2/3]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.

I join the judgment of the Court and agree with much that is said in its opinion. I write separately, however, because I believe the Court omits a crucial step in its analysis of whether a school search must be based upon probable cause. The Court correctly states that we have recognized limited exceptions to the probable cause requirement "[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served" by a lesser standard. Ante at . I believe that we have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly applying the Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only when we were confronted with "a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility." Florida v. Royer, , (1983) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). I pointed out in United States v. Place, (1983):

"While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from unreasonable [searches], the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of most [searches] to the judgment of courts or government officers; the Framers of the Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided that a [search] is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause. See Texas v. Brown, , -745 (1983) (POWELL, J., concurring); United States v. Rabinowitz, , (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)."

Id. at (opinion concurring in judgment). See also Dunaway v. New York, , -214 (1979); United States v. United States District Court, , -316 (1972). Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.

Page 469 U. S. 352

Thus, for example, in determining that police can conduct a limited "stop and frisk" upon less than probable cause, this Court relied upon the fact that "as a practical matter" the stop and frisk could not be subjected to a warrant and probable cause requirement, because a law enforcement officer must be able to take immediate steps to assure himself that the person he has stopped to question is not armed with a weapon that could be used against him. Terry v. Ohio, , -21, -24 (1968). Similarly, this Court's holding that a roving Border Patrol may stop a car and briefly question its occupants upon less than probable cause was based in part upon "the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, , (1975). See also Michigan v. Long, , , n. 14 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, , (1976); Camara v. Municipal Court, , (1967).

The Court's implication that the balancing test is the rule rather than the exception is troubling for me because it is unnecessary in this case. The elementary and secondary school setting presents a special need for flexibility justifying a departure from the balance struck by the Framers. As JUSTICE POWELL notes, "[w]ithout first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students." Ante at . Maintaining order in the classroom can be a difficult task. A single teacher often must watch over a large number of students, and, as any parent knows, children at certain ages are inclined to test the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct and to imitate the misbehavior of a peer if that misbehavior is not dealt with quickly. Every adult remembers from his own schooldays the havoc a water pistol or peashooter can wreak until it is taken away. Thus, the Court has recognized that "[e]vents calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action." Goss v. Lopez, , (1975). Indeed, because drug use and possession of weapons have become increasingly common

Page 469 U. S. 353

among young people, an immediate response frequently is required not just to maintain an environment conducive to learning, but to protect the very safety of students and school personnel.

Such immediate action obviously would not be possible if a teacher were required to secure a warrant before searching a student. Nor would it be possible if a teacher could not conduct a necessary search until the teacher thought there was probable cause for the search. A teacher has neither the training nor the day-to-day experience in the complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement officer possesses, and is ill-equipped to make a quick judgment about the existence of probable cause. The time required for a teacher to ask the questions or make the observations that are necessary to turn reasonable grounds into probable cause is time during which the teacher, and other students, are diverted from the essential task of education. A teacher's focus is, and should be, on teaching and helping students, rather than on developing evidence against a particular troublemaker.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I fully agree with Part Teachers, like all other government officials, must conform their

Page 469 U. S. 354

I do not, however, otherwise join the Court's opinion. Today's decision sanctions school officials to conduct fullscale searches on a "reasonableness" standard whose only definite content is that it is not the same test as the "probable cause" standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment. In adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court carves out a broad exception to standards that this Court has developed over years of considering Fourth Amendment problems. Its decision is supported neither by precedent nor even by a fair application of the "balancing test" it proclaims in this very opinion.
I
Three basic principles underly this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically delineated and well-recognized exceptions. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, , (1967); accord, Welsh v. Wisconsin, , -749 (1984); United States v. Place, , (1983); Steagald v. United States, , -212 (1981); Mincey v. Arizona, (1978); Terry v. Ohio, , (1968); Johnson v. United States, , -14 (1948). Second, full-scale searches -- whether conducted in accordance with the warrant

Page 469 U. S. 355

Assistant Vice Principal Choplick's thorough excavation of T.L.O.'s purse was undoubtedly a serious intrusion on her privacy. Unlike the searches in Terry v. Ohio, supra, or Adams v. Williams, (1972), the search at issue here encompassed a detailed and minute examination of respondent's pocketbook, in which the contents of private papers and letters were thoroughly scrutinized. [ Footnote 3/1] Wisely, neither petitioner nor the Court today attempts to justify the search of T.L.O.'s pocketbook as a minimally intrusive search in the Terry line. To be faithful to the Court's settled doctrine, the inquiry therefore must focus on the warrant and probable cause requirements.

I agree that schoolteachers or principals, when not acting as agents of law enforcement authorities, generally may conduct a search of their students' belongings without first

Page 469 U. S. 356

obtaining a warrant. To agree with the Court on this point is to say that school searches may justifiably be held to that extent to constitute an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Such an exception, however, is not to be justified, as the Court apparently holds, by assessing net social value through application of an unguided "balancing test" in which "the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security" are weighed against "the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order." Ante at . The Warrant Clause is something more than an exhortation to this Court to maximize social welfare as we see fit. It requires that the authorities must obtain a warrant before conducting a full-scale search. The undifferentiated governmental interest in law enforcement is insufficient to justify an exception to the warrant requirement. Rather, some special governmental interest beyond the need merely to apprehend lawbreakers is necessary to justify a categorical exception to the warrant requirement. For the most part, special governmental needs sufficient to override the warrant requirement flow from "exigency" -- that is, from the press of time that makes obtaining a warrant either impossible or hopelessly infeasible. See United States v. Place, supra, at -702; Mincey v. Arizona, supra, at -394; Johnson v. United States, supra, at . Only after finding an extraordinary governmental interest of this kind do we -- or ought we -- engage in a balancing test to determine if a warrant should nonetheless be required. [ Footnote 3/2]

Page 469 U. S. 357

To require a showing of some extraordinary governmental interest before dispensing with the warrant requirement is not to undervalue society's need to apprehend violators of the criminal law. To be sure, forcing law enforcement personnel to obtain a warrant before engaging in a search will predictably deter the police from conducting some searches that they would otherwise like to conduct. But this is not an unintended result of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy; rather, it is the very purpose for which the Amendment was thought necessary. Only where the governmental interests at stake exceed those implicated in any ordinary law enforcement context -- that is, only where there is some extraordinary governmental interest involved -- is it legitimate to engage in a balancing test to determine whether a warrant is indeed necessary.

I emphatically disagree with the Court's decision to cast aside the constitutional probable cause standard when assessing the constitutional validity of a schoolhouse search. The Court's decision jettisons the probable cause standard -- the only standard that finds support in the text of the Fourth

Page 469 U. S. 358

Amendment -- on the basis of its Rohrschach-1ike "balancing test." Use of such a "balancing test" to determine the standard for evaluating the validity of a full-scale search represents a sizable innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis. This innovation finds support neither in precedent nor policy and portends a dangerous weakening of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy and security of our citizens. Moreover, even if this Court's historic understanding of the Fourth Amendment were mistaken and a balancing test of some kind were appropriate, any such test that gave adequate weight to the privacy and security interests protected by the Fourth Amendment would not reach the preordained result the Court's conclusory analysis reaches today. Therefore, because I believe that the balancing test used by the Court today is flawed both in its inception and in its execution, I respectfully dissent.

"the facts and circumstances within [the officials'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief"

that a criminal offense had occurred and the evidence would be found in the suspected place, id. at -- is the constitutional minimum for justifying a full-scale search, regardless of whether it is conducted pursuant to a warrant or, as in Carroll, within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Henry v. United States, , (1959) ( Caroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant on grounds of practicality," but "did not dispense

Page 469 U. S. 359

with the need for probable cause"); accord, Chambers v. Maroney, , (1970) ("In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution"). [ Footnote 3/3]

Our holdings that probable cause is a prerequisite to a fullscale search are based on the relationship between the two Clauses of the Fourth Amendment. The first Clause ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .") states the purpose of the Amendment and its coverage. The second Clause (". . . and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . .") gives content to the word "unreasonable" in the first Clause.

"For all but . . . narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by probable cause."

Page 469 U. S. 360

and seizures are to be measured. The Fourth Amendment neither requires nor authorizes the conceptual free-for-all that ensues when an unguided balancing test is used to assess specific categories of searches. If the search in question is more than a minimally intrusive Terry stop, the constitutional probable cause standard determines its validity.

To be sure, the Court recognizes that probable cause "ordinarily" is required to justify a full-scale search and that the existence of probable cause "bears on" the validity of the search. Ante at -341. Yet the Court fails to cite any case in which a full-scale intrusion upon privacy interests has been justified on less than probable cause. The line of cases begun by Terry v. Ohio, (1968), provides no support, for they applied a balancing test only in the context of minimally intrusive searches that served crucial law enforcement interests. The search in Terry itself, for instance, was a "limited search of the outer clothing." Id. at . The type of border stop at issue in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, , (1975), usually "consume[d] no more than a minute"; the Court explicitly noted that "any further detention . . . must be based on consent or probable cause." Id. at . See also United States v. Hensley, ante at (momentary stop); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at -707 (brief detention of luggage for canine "sniff"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, (1977) (per curiam) (brief frisk after stop for traffic violation); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, , (1976) (characterizing intrusion as "minimal"); Adams v. Williams, (1972) (stop and frisk). In short, all of these cases involved

"'seizures' so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment 'seizures' reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test."

Page 469 U. S. 361

the Camara Court recognized that probable cause standards themselves may have to be somewhat modified to take into account the special nature of administrative searches, the Court did so only after noting that "because [housing code] inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." Id. at . Subsequent administrative search cases have similarly recognized that such searches intrude upon areas whose owners harbor a significantly decreased expectation of privacy, see, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, , -599 (1981), thus circumscribing the injury to Fourth Amendment interests caused by the search.

Considerations of the deepest significance for the freedom of our citizens counsel strict adherence to the principle that no search may be conducted where the official is not in possession of probable cause that is, where the official does not know of "facts and circumstances [that] warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at ; see also id. at -101 (discussing history of probable cause standard). The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against official intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by some "balancing test" than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant the individual a zone of privacy whose protections could be breached only where the "reasonable" requirements of the probable cause standard were met. Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials -- perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens -- may be tempted to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to assuage the perceived evil. [ Footnote 3/4] But the Fourth Amendment

Page 469 U. S. 362

"a balancing process that overwhelms the individual's protection against unwarranted official intrusion by a governmental interest said to justify the search and seizure."

I thus do not accept the majority's premise that

"[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches."

Page 469 U. S. 363

The Court begins to articulate its "balancing test" by observing that "the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order" is to be weighed on one side of the balance. Ibid. Of course, this is not correct. It is not the government's need for effective enforcement methods that should weigh in the balance, for ordinary Fourth Amendment standards -- including probable cause.-- may well permit methods for maintaining the public order that are perfectly effective. If that were the case, the governmental interest in having effective standards would carry no weight at all as a justification for departing from the probable cause standard. Rather, it is the costs of applying probable cause as opposed to applying some lesser standard that should be weighed on the government's side. [ Footnote 3/5]

In order to tote up the costs of applying the probable-cause standard, it is thus necessary first to take into account the nature and content of that standard, and the likelihood that it would hamper achievement of the goal -- vital not just to "teachers and administrators," see ante at -- of maintaining an effective educational setting in the public schools. The seminal statement concerning the nature of the probable cause standard is found in Carroll v. United States, (1925). Carroll held that law enforcement authorities have probable cause to search where

"the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to

Page 469 U. S. 364

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief"

Two Terms ago, in Illinois v. Gates, (1983), this Court expounded at some length its view of the probable cause standard. Among the adjectives used to describe the standard were "practical," "fluid," "flexible," "easily applied," and "nontechnical." See id. at , , . The probable cause standard was to be seen as a "common-sense" test whose application depended on an evaluation of the "totality of the circumstances." Id. at .

Ignoring what Gates took such great pains to emphasize, the Court today holds that a new "reasonableness" standard is appropriate because it

"will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense."

Ante at . I had never thought that our pre- Gates understanding of probable cause defied either reason or common sense. But after Gates, I would have thought that there could be no doubt that this "nontechnical," "practical," and "easily applied" concept was eminently serviceable in a context like a school, where teachers require the flexibility to respond quickly and decisively to emergencies.

A consideration of the likely operation of the probable cause standard reinforces this conclusion. Discussing the issue of school searches, Professor LaFave has noted that the cases that have reached the appellate courts

"strongly suggest that in most instances the evidence of wrong-doing prompting teachers or principals to conduct searches is sufficiently detailed and specific to meet the traditional probable cause test."

3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.11,

Page 469 U. S. 365

pp. 459-460 (1978). [ Footnote 3/6] The problems that have caused this Court difficulty in interpreting the probable cause standard have largely involved informants, see, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, supra; Spinelli v. United States, (1969); Agilar v. Texas, (1964); Draper v. United States, (1959). However, three factors make it likely that problems involving informants will not make it difficult for teachers and school administrators to make probable cause decisions. This Court's decision in Gates applying a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether an informant's tip can constitute probable cause renders the test easy for teachers to apply. The fact that students and teachers interact daily in the school building makes it more likely that teachers will get to know students who supply information; the problem of informants who remain anonymous even to the teachers -- and who are therefore unavailable for verification or further questioning -- is unlikely to arise. Finally, teachers can observe the behavior of students under suspicion to corroborate any doubtful tips they do receive.

As compared with the relative ease with which teachers can apply the probable cause standard, the amorphous "reasonableness under all the circumstances" standard freshly coined by the Court today will likely spawn increased litigation and greater uncertainty among teachers and administrators. Of course, as this Court should know, an essential purpose of developing and articulating legal norms is to enable individuals to conform their conduct to those norms. A school system conscientiously attempting to obey the Fourth Amendment's dictates under a probable cause standard could, for example, consult decisions and other legal materials and prepare a booklet expounding the rough outlines of the concept. Such a booklet could be distributed to

Page 469 U. S. 366

teachers to provide them with guidance as to when a search may be lawfully conducted. I cannot but believe that the same school system faced with interpreting what is permitted under the Court's new "reasonableness" standard would be hopelessly adrift as to when a search may be permissible. The sad result of this uncertainty may well be that some teachers will be reluctant to conduct searches that are fully permissible and even necessary under the constitutional probable cause standard, while others may intrude arbitrarily and unjustifiably on the privacy of students. [ Footnote 3/7]

One further point should be taken into account when considering the desirability of replacing the constitutional probable cause standard. The question facing the Court is not whether the probable cause standard should be replaced by a test of "reasonableness under all the circumstances." Rather, it is whether traditional Fourth Amendment standards should recede before the Court's new standard. Thus, although the Court today paints with a broad brush and holds its undefined "reasonableness" standard applicable to all school searches, I would approach the question with considerably more reserve. I would not think it necessary to develop a single standard to govern all school searches, any more

Page 469 U. S. 367

than traditional Fourth Amendment law applies even the probable cause standard to all searches and seizures. For instance, just as police officers may conduct a brief stop and frisk on something less than probable cause, so too should teachers be permitted the same flexibility. A teacher or administrator who had reasonable suspicion that a student was carrying a gun would no doubt have authority under ordinary Fourth Amendment doctrine to conduct a limited search of the student to determine whether the threat was genuine. The "costs" of applying the traditional probable cause standard must therefore be discounted by the fact that, where additional flexibility is necessary and where the intrusion is minor, traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence itself displaces probable cause when it determines the validity of a search.

A legitimate balancing test whose function was something more substantial than reaching a predetermined conclusion acceptable to this Court's impressions of what authority teachers need would therefore reach rather a different result than that reached by the Court today. On one side of the balance would be the costs of applying traditional Fourth Amendment standards -- the "practical" and "flexible" probable cause standard where a full-scale intrusion is sought, a lesser standard in situations where the intrusion is much less severe and the need for greater authority compelling. Whatever costs were toted up on this side would have to be discounted by the costs of applying an unprecedented and ill-defined "reasonableness under all the circumstances" test that will leave teachers and administrators uncertain as to their authority and will encourage excessive fact-based litigation.

Page 469 U. S. 368

sides of the balance would necessarily reach the same conclusion that, as I have argued above, the Fourth Amendment's language compels -- that school searches like that conducted in this case are valid only if supported by probable cause.
II
Applying the constitutional probable cause standard to the facts of this case, I would find that Mr. Choplick's search violated T.L.O.'s Fourth Amendment rights. After escorting T.L.O. into his private office, Mr. Choplick demanded to see her purse. He then opened the purse to find evidence of whether she had been smoking in the bathroom. When he opened the purse, he discovered the pack of cigarettes. At this point, his search for evidence of the smoking violation was complete.

On my view of the case, we need not decide whether the initial search conducted by Mr. Choplick -- the search for evidence of the smoking violation that was completed when Mr. Choplick found the pack of cigarettes -- was valid. For Mr. Choplick at that point did not have probable cause to continue to rummage through T.L.O.'s purse. Mr. Choplick's suspicion of marihuana possession at this time was based solely on the presence of the package of cigarette papers. The mere presence without more of such a staple item of commerce is insufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in inferring both that T.L.O. had violated the law

Page 469 U. S. 369

by possessing marihuana and that evidence of that violation would be found in her purse. Just as a police officer could not obtain a warrant to search a home based solely on his claim that he had seen a package of cigarette papers in that home, Mr. Choplick was not entitled to search possibly the most private possessions of T.L.O. based on the mere presence of a package of cigarette papers. Therefore, the fruits of this illegal search must be excluded and the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.
III
In the past several Terms, this Court has produced a succession of Fourth Amendment opinions in which "balancing tests" have been applied to resolve various questions concerning the proper scope of official searches. The Court has begun to apply a "balancing test" to determine whether a particular category of searches intrudes upon expectations of privacy that merit Fourth Amendment protection. See Hudson v. Palmer, , (1984) ("Determining whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate' or `reasonable' necessarily entails a balancing of interests"). It applies a "balancing test" to determine whether a warrant is necessary to conduct a search. See ante at ; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at -566. In today's opinion, it employs a "balancing test" to determine what standard should govern the constitutionality of a given category of searches. See ante at -341. Should a search turn out to be unreasonable after application of all of these "balancing tests," the Court then applies an additional "balancing test" to decide whether the evidence resulting from the search must be excluded. See United States v. Leon, (1984).

All of these "balancing tests" amount to brief nods by the Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will. Perhaps this doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely

Page 469 U. S. 370

On my view, the presence of the word "unreasonable" in the text of the Fourth Amendment does not grant a shifting majority of this Court the authority to answer all Fourth Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the social good. Full-scale searches unaccompanied by probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment. I do not pretend that our traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine automatically answers all of the difficult legal questions that occasionally arise. I do contend, however, that this Court has an obligation to provide some coherent framework to resolve such questions on the basis of more than a conclusory recitation of the results of a "balancing test." The Fourth Amendment itself supplies that framework and, because the Court today fails to heed its message, I must respectfully dissent.

[ Footnote 3/1]

A purse typically contains items of highly personal nature. Especially for shy or sensitive adolescents, it could prove extremely embarrassing for a teacher or principal to rummage through its contents, which could include notes from friends, fragments of love poems, caricatures of school authorities, and items of personal hygiene.

[ Footnote 3/2]

Administrative search cases involving inspection schemes have recognized that

"if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection. . . ."

United States v. Biswell, , (1972); accord, Donovan v. Dewey, , (1981). Cf. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., (1978) (holding that a warrant is nonetheless necessary in some administrative search contexts).

[ Footnote 3/3]

In fact, despite the somewhat diminished expectation of privacy that this Court has recognized in the automobile context, see South Dakota v. Opperman, , -368 (1976), we have required probable cause even to justify a warrantless automobile search, see United States v. Ortiz, , (1975) ("A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum requirement for a lawful search") (footnote omitted); Chamers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at .

[ Footnote 3/4]

"In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion this basic law and the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts."

[ Footnote 3/5]

I speak of the "government's side" only because it is the terminology used by the Court. In my view, this terminology itself is seriously misleading. The government is charged with protecting the privacy and security of the citizen, just as it is charged with apprehending those who violate the criminal law. Consequently, the government has no legitimate interest in conducting a search that unduly intrudes on the privacy and security of the citizen. The balance is not between the rights of the government and the rights of the citizen, but between opposing conceptions of the constitutionally legitimate means of carrying out the government's varied responsibilities.

[ Footnote 3/6]

It should be noted that Professor LaFave reached this conclusion in 1978, before this Court's decision in Gates made clear the "flexibility" of the probable cause concept.

[ Footnote 3/7]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, and with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins as to Part I, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Assistant Vice Principal Choplick searched T.L.O.'s purse for evidence that she was smoking in the girls' restroom. Because T.L.O.'s suspected misconduct was not illegal and did not pose a serious threat to school discipline, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Choplick's search

Page 469 U. S. 371

of her purse was an unreasonable invasion of her privacy and that the evidence which he seized could not be used against her in criminal proceedings. The New Jersey court's holding was a careful response to the case it was required to decide.

The State of New Jersey sought review in this Court, first arguing that the exclusionary rule is wholly inapplicable to searches conducted by school officials, and then contending that the Fourth Amendment itself provides no protection at all to the student's privacy. The Court has accepted neither of these frontal assaults on the Fourth Amendment. It has, however, seized upon this "no smoking" case to announce "the proper standard" that should govern searches by school officials who are confronted with disciplinary problems far more severe than smoking in the restroom. Although I join Part I continue to believe that the Court has unnecessarily and inappropriately reached out to decide a constitutional question. See (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting from reargument order). More importantly, I fear that the concerns that motivated the Court's activism have produced a holding that will permit school administrators to search students suspected of violating only the most trivial school regulations and guidelines for behavior.
I
The question the Court decides today -- whether Mr. Choplick's search of T.L.O.'s purse violated the Fourth Amendment -- was not raised by the State's petition for writ of certiorari. That petition only raised one question: "Whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public school officials and teachers in school." [ Footnote 4/1] The State quite properly declined to submit the former question because "[it] did not wish to present what might appear to be solely a factual dispute to this Court." [ Footnote 4/2]

Page 469 U. S. 372

Since this Court has twice had the threshold question argued, I believe that it should expressly consider the merits of the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling that the exclusionary rule applies.

The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding on this question is plainly correct. As the state court noted, this case does not involve the use of evidence in a school disciplinary proceeding; the juvenile proceedings brought against T.L.O. involved a charge that would have been a criminal offense if committed by an adult. [ Footnote 4/3] Accordingly, the exclusionary rule issue decided by that court and later presented to this Court concerned only the use in a criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in a search conducted by a public school administrator.

Having confined the issue to the law enforcement context, the New Jersey court then reasoned that this Court's cases have made it quite clear that the exclusionary rule is equally applicable

"whether the public official who illegally obtained the evidence was a municipal inspector, See v. Seattle, [1967]; Camara [v. Municipal Court,] [1967]; a firefighter, Michigan v. Tyler, , [1978]; or a school administrator or law enforcement official. [ Footnote 4/4]"

It correctly concluded "that, if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." [ Footnote 4/5]

When a defendant in a criminal proceeding alleges that she was the victim of an illegal search by a school administrator, the application of the exclusionary rule is a simple corollary of the principle that

"all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court."

Mapp v. Ohio, , (1961). The practical basis for this principle is, in part, its deterrent effect, see id. at , and as a general

Page 469 U. S. 373

matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the Court, that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does deter the authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by sharply reducing their incentive to do so. [ Footnote 4/6] In the case of evidence obtained in school searches, the "overall educative effect" [ Footnote 4/7] of the exclusionary rule adds important symbolic force to this utilitarian judgment.

Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great teacher. It was he who wrote:

"Our Government is the potent, the onmipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."

Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry. [ Footnote 4/8] If the Nation's students can be convicted through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot help but feel that they have

Page 469 U. S. 374

been dealt with unfairly. [ Footnote 4/9] The application of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings arising from illegal school searches makes an important statement to young people that "our society attaches serious consequences to a violation of constitutional rights," [ Footnote 4/10] and that this is a principle of "liberty and justice for all." [ Footnote 4/11]

Thus, the simple and correct answer to the question presented by the State's petition for certiorari would have required affirmance of a state court's judgment suppressing evidence. That result would have been dramatically out of character for a Court that not only grants prosecutors relief from suppression orders with distressing regularity, [ Footnote 4/12] but

Page 469 U. S. 375

also is prone to rely on grounds not advanced by the parties in order to protect evidence from exclusion. [ Footnote 4/13] In characteristic disregard of the doctrine of judicial restraint, the Court avoided that result in this case by ordering reargument and directing the parties to address a constitutional question that the parties, with good reason, had not asked the Court to decide. Because judicial activism undermines the Court's power to perform its central mission in a legitimate way, I dissented from the reargument order. See (1984). I have not modified the views expressed in that dissent, but since the majority has brought the question before us, I shall explain why I believe the Court has misapplied the standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
II
Page 469 U. S. 376

papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . . " In order to evaluate the reasonableness of such searches,

"it is necessary 'first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,' for there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.'"

The "limited search for weapons" in Terry was justified by the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him." 392 U.S. at , . When viewed from the institutional perspective, "the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools," ante at (majority opinion), is no less acute. Violent, unlawful, or seriously disruptive conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the principal function of teaching institutions which is to educate young people and prepare them for citizenship. [ Footnote 4/15] When such conduct occurs amidst a sizable group of impressionable young people, it creates an explosive atmosphere that requires a prompt and effective response.

Thus, warrantless searches of students by school administrators are reasonable when undertaken for those purposes.

Page 469 U. S. 377

But the majority's statement of the standard for evaluating the reasonableness of such searches is not suitably adapted to that end. The majority holds that

"a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school."

Ante at -342. This standard will permit teachers and school administrators to search students when they suspect that the search will reveal evidence of even the most trivial school regulation or precatory guideline for student behavior. The Court's standard for deciding whether a search is justified "at its inception" treats all violations of the rules of the school as though they were fungible. For the Court, a search for curlers and sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress code [ Footnote 4/16] is apparently just as important as a search for evidence of heroin addiction or violent gang activity.

The majority, however, does not contend that school administrators have a compelling need to search students in

Page 469 U. S. 378

order to achieve optimum enforcement of minor school regulations. [ Footnote 4/17] To the contrary, when minor violations are involved, there is every indication that the informal school disciplinary process, with only minimum requirements of due process, [ Footnote 4/18] can function effectively without the power to search for enough evidence to prove a criminal case. In arguing that teachers and school administrators need the power to search students based on a lessened standard, the United States as amicus curiae relies heavily on empirical evidence of a contemporary crisis of violence and unlawful behavior that is seriously undermining the process of education in American schools. [ Footnote 4/19] A standard better attuned to this concern would permit teachers and school administrators to search a student when they have reason to believe that the search will uncover evidence that the student is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational process.

This standard is properly directed at "[t]he sole justification for the [warrantless] search." [ Footnote 4/20] In addition, a standard

Page 469 U. S. 379

that varies the extent of the permissible intrusion with the gravity of the suspected offense is also more consistent with common law experience and this Court's precedent. Criminal law has traditionally recognized a distinction between essentially regulatory offenses and serious violations of the peace, and graduated the response of the criminal justice system depending on the character of the violation. [ Footnote 4/21] The application of a similar distinction in evaluating the reasonableness of warrantless searches and seizures "is not a novel idea." Welsh v. Wisconsin, , (1984). [ Footnote 4/22]

In Welsh, police officers arrived at the scene of a traffic accident and obtained information indicating that the driver of the automobile involved was guilty of a first offense of

Page 469 U. S. 380

driving while intoxicated -- a civil violation with a maximum fine of $200. The driver had left the scene of the accident, and the officers followed the suspect to his home where they arrested him without a warrant. Absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless invasion of the home was a clear violation of Payton v. New York, (1980). In holding that the warrantless arrest for the "noncriminal, traffic offense" in Welsh was unconstitutional, the Court noted that

"application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed."

466 U.S. at . The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the reasonableness of school searches is almost too clear for argument. In order to justify the serious intrusion on the persons and privacy of young people that New Jersey asks this Court to approve, the State must identify "some real immediate and serious consequences." McDonald v. United States, , (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring, joined by Frankfurter, J.). [ Footnote 4/23] While school administrators have entirely legitimate reasons for adopting school regulations and guidelines for student behavior, the authorization of searches to enforce them "displays a shocking lack of all sense of proportion." Id. . [ Footnote 4/24]

Page 469 U. S. 381

The majority offers weak deference to these principles of balance and decency by announcing that school searches will only be reasonable in scope "when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Ante at (emphasis added). The majority offers no explanation why a two-part standard is necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the ordinary school search. Significantly, in the balance of its opinion the Court pretermits any discussion of the nature of T.L.O.'s infraction of the "no smoking" rule.

The "rider" to the Court's standard for evaluating the reasonableness of the initial intrusion apparently is the Court's perception that its standard is overly generous and does not, by itself, achieve a fair balance between the administrator's right to search and the student's reasonable expectations of privacy. The Court's standard for evaluating the "scope" of reasonable school searches is obviously designed to prohibit physically intrusive searches of students by persons of the opposite sex for relatively minor offenses. The Court's effort to establish a standard that is, at once, clear enough to allow searches to be upheld in nearly every case, and flexible enough to prohibit obviously unreasonable intrusions of young adults' privacy only creates uncertainty in the extent of its resolve to prohibit the latter. Moreover, the majority's application of its standard in this case -- to permit a male administrator to rummage through the purse of a female high school student in order to obtain evidence that she was smoking

Page 469 U. S. 382

in a bathroom -- raises grave doubts in my mind whether its effort will be effective. [ Footnote 4/25] Unlike the Court, I believe the nature of the suspected infraction is a matter of first importance in deciding whether any invasion of privacy is permissible.
III
"We are satisfied that, when a school official has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline and order, the school official has the right to conduct a reasonable search for such evidence."

"In determining whether the school official has reasonable grounds, courts should consider the child's age, history, and school record, the prevalence and seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search was

Page 469 U. S. 383

directed, the exigency to make the search without delay, and the probative value and reliability of the information used as a justification for the search. [ Footnote 4/26]"

The emphasized language in the state court's opinion focuses on the character of the rule infraction that is to be the object of the search.

In the view of the state court, there is a quite obvious and material difference between a search for evidence relating to violent or disruptive activity, and a search for evidence of a smoking rule violation. This distinction does not imply that a no-smoking rule is a matter of minor importance. Rather, like a rule that prohibits a student from being tardy, its occasional violation in a context that poses no threat of disrupting school order and discipline offers no reason to believe that an immediate search is necessary to avoid unlawful conduct, violence, or a serious impairment of the educational process.

A correct understanding of the New Jersey court's standard explains why that court concluded in T.L.O.'s case that

"the assistant principal did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the student was concealing in her purse evidence of criminal activity or evidence of activity that would seriously interfere with school discipline or order. [ Footnote 4/27]"

The importance of the nature of the rule infraction to the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding is evident from its brief explanation of the principal basis for its decision:

"A student has an expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse. Mere possession of cigarettes did not violate school rule or policy, since the school allowed smoking in designated areas. The contents of the handbag had no direct bearing on the infraction."

"The assistant principal's desire, legal in itself, to gather evidence to impeach the student's credibility at a

Page 469 U. S. 384

hearing on the disciplinary infraction does not validate the search. [ Footnote 4/28]"

Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, I would view this case differently if the Assistant Vice Principal had reason to believe T.L.O.'s purse contained evidence of criminal activity, or of an activity that would seriously disrupt school discipline. There was, however, absolutely no basis for any such assumption -- not even a "hunch."

In this case, Mr. Choplick overreacted to what appeared to be nothing more than a minor infraction -- a rule prohibiting smoking in the bathroom of the freshmen's and sophomores' building. [ Footnote 4/29] It is, of course, true that he actually found evidence of serious wrongdoing by T.L.O., but no one claims that the prior search may be justified by his unexpected discovery. As far as the smoking infraction is concerned, the search for cigarettes merely tended to corroborate a teacher's eyewitness account of T.L.O.'s violation of a minor regulation designed to channel student smoking behavior into designated locations. Because this conduct was neither unlawful nor significantly disruptive of school order or the educational process, the invasion of privacy associated with the forcible opening of T.L.O.'s purse was entirely unjustified at its inception.

A review of the sampling of school search cases relied on by the Court demonstrates how different this case is from those

Page 469 U. S. 385

in which there was indeed a valid justification for intruding on a student's privacy. In most of them the student was suspected of a criminal violation; [ Footnote 4/30] in the remainder either violence or substantial disruption of school order or the integrity of the academic process was at stake. [ Footnote 4/31] Few involved matters as trivial as the no-smoking rule violated by T.L.0., [ Footnote 4/32] The rule the Court adopts today is so open-ended that it may make the Fourth Amendment virtually meaningless in the school context. Although I agree that school administrators must have broad latitude to maintain order and discipline in our classrooms, that authority is not unlimited.
IV
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the power of government. Through it passes every citizen and public official, from schoolteachers to

Page 469 U. S. 386

I respectfully dissent.

[ Footnote 4/1]

Pet. for Cert. i.

[ Footnote 4/2]

Supplemental Brief for Petitioner 6.

[ Footnote 4/3]

State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 337, nn. 1 and 2, 342, n. 5, 463 A.2d 934, 937, nn. 1 and 2, 939, n. 5 (1983).

[ Footnote 4/4]

Id. at 341, 463 A.2d at 939.

[ Footnote 4/5]

Id. at 341-342, 463 A.2d at 939.

[ Footnote 4/6]

[ Footnote 4/7]

[ Footnote 4/8]

[ Footnote 4/9]

"We do not know what class petitioner was attending when the police and dogs burst in, but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than the one her teacher had hoped to convey. I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another lesson: that the Fourth Amendment protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures'. . . . Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional freedoms."

[ Footnote 4/10]

[ Footnote 4/11]

36 U.S.C. § 172 (pledge of allegiance to the flag).

[ Footnote 4/12]

A brief review of the Fourth Amendment cases involving criminal prosecutions since the October Term, 1982, supports the proposition. Compare Florida v. Rodriguez, ante p. (per curiam); United States v. Leon, (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, (1984); Segura v. United States, (1984); United States v. Karo, (1984); Oliver v. United States, (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, (1984); Massachusetts v. Upton, (1984) (per curiam); Florida v. Meyers, (1984) (per curiam); Michigan v. Long, (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, (1983); Illinois v. Gates, (1983); Texas v. Brown, (1983); United States v. Knotts, (1983); Illinois v. Batchelder, (1983) (per curiam); Cardwell v. Taylor, (1983) (per curiam), with Thompson v. Louisiana, ante p. (per curiam); Welsh v. Wisconsin, (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, (1984); United States v. Place, (1983); Florida v. Royer, (1983).

[ Footnote 4/13]

[ Footnote 4/14]

See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, , -882 (1975); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, , (1976).

[ Footnote 4/15]

[ Footnote 4/16]

Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N.J.] H. S. (1979), Record Doc. S-1, p. 7. A brief survey of school rule books reveals that, under the majority's approach, teachers and school administrators may also search students to enforce school rules regulating:

"(i) secret societies;"

"(ii) students driving to school;"

"(iii) parking and use of parking lots during school hours;"

"(iv) smoking on campus;"

"(v) the direction of traffic in the hallways;"

"(vi) student presence in the hallways during class hours without a pass;"

"(vii) profanity;"

"(viii) school attendance of interscholastic athletes on the day of a game, meet or match;"

"(ix) cafeteria use and cleanup;"

"(x) eating lunch off-campus; and"

"(xi) unauthorized absence."

See id. at 7-18; Student Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H. S. (1984); Fairfax County [Va.] Public Schools, Student Responsibilities and Rights (1980); Student Handbook of Chantilly [Va.] H. S. (1984).

[ Footnote 4/17]

[ Footnote 4/18]

[ Footnote 4/19]

"The sad truth is that many classrooms across the country are not temples of learning teaching the lessons of good will, civility, and wisdom that are central to the fabric of American life. To the contrary, many schools are in such a state of disorder that not only is the educational atmosphere polluted, but the very safety of students and teachers is imperiled."

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23. See also Brief for National Education Association as Amicus Curiae 21 ("If a suspected violation of a rule threatens to disrupt the school or threatens to harm students, school officials should be free to search for evidence of it").

[ Footnote 4/20]

[ Footnote 4/21]

Throughout the criminal law this dichotomy has been expressed by classifying crimes as misdemeanors or felonies, malum prohibitum or malum in se, crimes that do not involve moral turpitude or those that do, and major or petty offenses. See generally W. LaFave, Handbook on Criminal Law § 6 (1972).

Some codes of student behavior also provide a system of graduated response by distinguishing between violent, unlawful, or seriously disruptive conduct, and conduct that will only warrant serious sanctions when the student engages in repetitive offenses. See, e.g., Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N.J.] H.S. (1979), Record Doc. S-1, pp. 15-16; Student Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H.S. E (1984); Rules of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, Ch. IV, §§ 431.1-.10 (1982). Indeed, at Piscataway High School a violation of smoking regulations that is "[a] student's first offense will result in assignment of up to three (3) days of after school classes concerning hazards of smoking." Record Doc. S-1, supra, at 15.

[ Footnote 4/22]

"[A]s a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from school. We agree . . ., however, that there are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such cases the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable. . . ."

[ Footnote 4/23]

In McDonald police officers made a warrantless search of the office of an illegal "numbers" operation. Justice Jackson rejected the view that the search could be supported by exigent circumstances:

"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced entry without a warrant, no such emergency was present in this case. . . . Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it. . . . [The defendant's] criminal operation, while a shabby swindle that the police are quite right in suppressing, was not one which endangered life or limb or the peace and good order of the community. . . ."

[ Footnote 4/24]

While a policeman who sees a person smoking in an elevator in violation of a city ordinance may conduct a full-blown search for evidence of the smoking violation in the unlikely event of a custodial arrest, United States v. Robinson, , (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, , -266 (1973), it is more doubtful whether a search of this kind would be reasonable if the officer only planned to issue a citation to the offender and depart, see Robinson, 414 U.S. at , n. 6. In any case, the majority offers no rationale supporting its conclusion that a student detained by school officials for questioning, on reasonable suspicion that she has violated a school rule, is entitled to no more protection under the Fourth Amendment than a criminal suspect under custodial arrest.

[ Footnote 4/25]

One thing is clear under any standard -- the shocking strip searches that are described in some cases have no place in the schoolhouse. See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (CA7 1980) ("It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude"), cert. denied (1981); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977), People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466 (1974); M.J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla.App.1981). To the extent that deeply intrusive searches are ever reasonable outside the custodial context, it surely must only be to prevent imminent, and serious harm.

[ Footnote 4/26]

94 N.J. at 346, 463 A.2d at 941-942 ( quoting State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977)) (emphasis added).

[ Footnote 4/27]

94 N.J. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942 (emphasis added).

[ Footnote 4/28]

Ibid. The court added:

"Moreover, there were not reasonable grounds to believe that the purse contained cigarettes, if they were the object of the search. No one had furnished information to that effect to the school official. He had, at best, a good hunch. No doubt good hunches would unearth much more evidence of crime on the persons of students and citizens as a whole. But more is required to sustain a search."

Id. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942-943. It is this portion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning -- a portion that was not necessary to its holding -- to which this Court makes its principal response. See ante, at -346.

[ Footnote 4/29]

See Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N.J.] H.S. 15, 18 (1979), Record Doc. S-1. See also Tr. of Mar. 31, 1980, Hearing 13-14.

[ Footnote 4/30]

See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (CA6 1984) (search for marihuana); M. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288 (SD Ill.1977) (drugs and large amount of money); D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (AlaskaApp.1982) (stolen money); In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) (marihuana); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) (amphetamine pills); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) (methedrine pills); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super.1971) (drugs); State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla.App.1983) (drugs); In re J.A., 85 Ill.App.3d 567, 406 N.E.2d 958 (1980) (marihuana); People v. Ward, 62 Mich.App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975) (drug pills); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.Civ.App.1970) (marihuana); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) ("speed").

[ Footnote 4/31]

See, e.g., In re L.L., 90 Wis.2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (App.1979) (search for knife or razor blade), R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.App.1983) (student with bloodshot eyes wandering halls in violation of school rule requiring students to remain in examination room or at home during midterm examinations).

[ Footnote 4/32]

See, e.g., State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (three students searched when they made furtive gestures and displayed obvious consciousness of guilt), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (1975) (student searched for pipe when a teacher saw him using it to violate smoking regulations).

# data[].attributes.body
Texas Constitution (Constitutional Law)

Gives all students a right to an efficient public education system.

An efficient education system includes adhering to privacy and confidentiality regulations regarding student information and data.

Tex. Const. art. 7, §1

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION



ARTICLE 7. EDUCATION



Sec. 1. SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF SYSTEM OF PUBLIC FREE SCHOOLS. A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 2. PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND. All funds, lands and other property heretofore set apart and appropriated for the support of public schools; all the alternate sections of land reserved by the State out of grants heretofore made or that may hereafter be made to railroads or other corporations of any nature whatsoever; one half of the public domain of the State; and all sums of money that may come to the State from the sale of any portion of the same, shall constitute a permanent school fund.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Nov. 8, 2011)


Sec. 2A. RELEASE OF STATE CLAIM TO CERTAIN LANDS AND MINERALS WITHIN SHELBY, FRAZIER, AND MCCORMICK LEAGUE AND IN BASTROP COUNTY. (a) The State of Texas hereby relinquishes and releases any claim of sovereign ownership or title to an undivided one-third interest in and to the lands and minerals within the Shelby, Frazier, and McCormick League (now located in Fort Bend and Austin counties) arising out of the interest in that league originally granted under the Mexican Colonization Law of 1823 to John McCormick on or about July 24, 1824, and subsequently voided by the governing body of Austin's Original Colony on or about December 15, 1830.


(b) The State of Texas relinquishes and releases any claim of sovereign ownership or title to an interest in and to the lands, excluding the minerals, in Tracts 2-5, 13, 15-17, 19-20, 23-26, 29-32, and 34-37, in the A. P. Nance Survey, Bastrop County, as said tracts are:


(1) shown on Bastrop County Rolled Sketch No. 4, recorded in the General Land Office on December 15, 1999; and


(2) further described by the field notes prepared by a licensed state land surveyor of Travis County in September through November 1999 and May 2000.


(c) Title to such interest in the lands and minerals described by Subsection (a) is confirmed to the owners of the remaining interests in such lands and minerals. Title to the lands, excluding the minerals, described by Subsection (b) is confirmed to the holder of record title to each tract. Any outstanding land award or land payment obligation owed to the state for lands described by Subsection (b) is canceled, and any funds previously paid related to an outstanding land award or land payment obligation may not be refunded.


(d) The General Land Office shall issue a patent to the holder of record title to each tract described by Subsection (b). The patent shall be issued in the same manner as other patents except that no filing fee or patent fee may be required.


(e) A patent issued under Subsection (d) shall include a provision reserving all mineral interest in the land to the state.


(f) This section is self-executing.


(Added Nov. 2, 1993; amended Nov. 6, 2001.)


Sec. 2B. AUTHORITY TO RELEASE STATE'S INTEREST IN CERTAIN PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND LAND HELD BY PERSON UNDER COLOR OF TITLE. (a) The legislature by law may provide for the release of all or part of the state's interest in land, excluding mineral rights, if:


(1) the land is surveyed, unsold, permanent school fund land according to the records of the General Land Office;


(2) the land is not patentable under the law in effect before January 1, 2002; and


(3) the person claiming title to the land:


(A) holds the land under color of title;


(B) holds the land under a chain of title that originated on or before January 1, 1952;


(C) acquired the land without actual knowledge that title to the land was vested in the State of Texas;


(D) has a deed to the land recorded in the appropriate county; and


(E) has paid all taxes assessed on the land and any interest and penalties associated with any period of tax delinquency.


(b) This section does not apply to:


(1) beach land, submerged or filled land, or islands; or


(2) land that has been determined to be state-owned by judicial decree.


(c) This section may not be used to:


(1) resolve boundary disputes; or


(2) change the mineral reservation in an existing patent.


(Added Nov. 6, 2001; Subsec. (d) expired Jan. 2, 2002.)


Sec. 2C. RELEASE OF STATE CLAIM TO CERTAIN LANDS IN UPSHUR AND SMITH COUNTIES. (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b) of this section, the State of Texas relinquishes and releases any claim of sovereign ownership or title to an interest in and to the tracts of land, including mineral rights, described as follows:


Tract 1:


The first tract of land is situated in Upshur County, Texas, about 14 miles South 30 degrees east from Gilmer, the county seat, and is bounded as follows: Bound on the North by the J. Manning Survey, A-314 the S.W. Beasley Survey A-66 and the David Meredith Survey A-315 and bound on the East by the M. Mann Survey, A-302 and by the M. Chandler Survey, A-84 and bound on the South by the G. W. Hooper Survey, A-657 and by the D. Ferguson Survey, A-158 and bound on the West by the J. R. Wadkins Survey, A-562 and the H. Alsup Survey, A-20, and by the W. Bratton Survey, A-57 and the G. H. Burroughs Survey, A-30 and the M. Tidwell Survey, A-498 of Upshur County, Texas.


Tract 2:


The second tract of land is situated in Smith County, Texas, north of Tyler and is bounded as follows: on the north and west by the S. Leeper A-559, the Frost Thorn Four League Grant A-3, A-9, A-7, A-19, and the H. Jacobs A-504 and on the south and east by the following surveys: John Carver A-247, A. Loverly A-609, J. Gimble A-408, R. Conner A-239, N.J. Blythe A-88, N.J. Blythe A-89, J. Choate A-195, Daniel Minor A-644, William Keys A-527, James H. Thomas A-971, Seaborn Smith A-899, and Samuel Leeper A-559.


(b) This section does not apply to:


(1) any public right-of-way, including a public road right-of-way, or related interest owned by a governmental entity;


(2) any navigable waterway or related interest owned by a governmental entity; or


(3) any land owned by a governmental entity and reserved for public use, including a park, recreation area, wildlife area, scientific area, or historic site.


(c) This section is self-executing.


(Added Nov. 8, 2005.)


Sec. 3. TAXES FOR BENEFIT OF SCHOOLS; PROVISION OF FREE TEXT BOOKS; SCHOOL DISTRICTS. (a) One-fourth of the revenue derived from the State occupation taxes shall be set apart annually for the benefit of the public free schools.


(b) It shall be the duty of the State Board of Education to set aside a sufficient amount of available funds to provide free text books for the use of children attending the public free schools of this State.


(c) Should the taxation herein named be insufficient the deficit may be met by appropriation from the general funds of the State.


(d) The Legislature may provide for the formation of school districts by general laws, and all such school districts may embrace parts of two or more counties.


(e) The Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and collection of taxes in all school districts and for the management and control of the public school or schools of such districts, whether such districts are composed of territory wholly within a county or in parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature may authorize an additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all school districts for the further maintenance of public free schools, and for the erection and equipment of school buildings therein; provided that a majority of the qualified voters of the district voting at an election to be held for that purpose, shall approve the tax.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Aug. 14, 1883, Nov. 3, 1908, Aug. 3, 1909, Nov. 5, 1918, Nov. 2, 1920, Nov. 2, 1926, and Nov. 2, 1999.) (TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISIONS for Sec. 3: See Appendix, Note 1.)


Sec. 3a. (Repealed Aug. 5, 1969.)


Sec. 3-b. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT AND JUNIOR COLLEGE DISTRICT TAXES AND BONDS NOT AFFECTED BY CHANGES IN BOUNDARIES. No tax for the maintenance of public free schools voted in any independent school district and no tax for the maintenance of a junior college voted by a junior college district, nor any bonds voted in any such district, but unissued, shall be abrogated, cancelled or invalidated by change of any kind in the boundaries thereof. After any change in boundaries, the governing body of any such district, without the necessity of an additional election, shall have the power to assess, levy and collect ad valorem taxes on all taxable property within the boundaries of the district as changed, for the purposes of the maintenance of public free schools or the maintenance of a junior college, as the case may be, and the payment of principal of and interest on all bonded indebtedness outstanding against, or attributable, adjusted or allocated to, such district or any territory therein, in the amount, at the rate, or not to exceed the rate, and in the manner authorized in the district prior to the change in its boundaries, and further in accordance with the laws under which all such bonds, respectively, were voted; and such governing body also shall have the power, without the necessity of an additional election, to sell and deliver any unissued bonds voted in the district prior to any such change in boundaries, and to assess, levy and collect ad valorem taxes on all taxable property in the district as changed, for the payment of principal of and interest on such bonds in the manner permitted by the laws under which such bonds were voted. In those instances where the boundaries of any such independent school district are changed by the annexation of, or consolidation with, one or more whole school districts, the taxes to be levied for the purposes hereinabove authorized may be in the amount or at not to exceed the rate theretofore voted in the district having at the time of such change the greatest scholastic population according to the latest scholastic census and only the unissued bonds of such district voted prior to such change, may be subsequently sold and delivered and any voted, but unissued, bonds of other school districts involved in such annexation or consolidation shall not thereafter be issued.


(Added Nov. 6, 1962; amended Nov. 8, 1966.)


Sec. 4. SALE OF PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND LANDS; INVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS. The lands herein set apart to the Permanent School fund, shall be sold under such regulations, at such times, and on such terms as may be prescribed by law; and the Legislature shall not have power to grant any relief to purchasers thereof. The proceeds of such sales must be used to acquire other land for the Permanent School fund as provided by law or the proceeds shall be invested by the comptroller of public accounts, as may be directed by the Board of Education herein provided for, in the bonds of the United States, the State of Texas, or counties in said State, or in such other securities, and under such restrictions as may be prescribed by law; and the State shall be responsible for all investments.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Aug. 14, 1883, Nov. 5, 1985, Nov. 7, 1995, and Nov. 8, 2011.)


Sec. 4A. (Repealed Nov. 6, 2001.)


(TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISION for Sec. 4A: See Appendix, Note 3.)


Sec. 4B. DONATION OF REAL PROPERTY BY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR HISTORICAL PRESERVATION. (a) The legislature by general law may authorize the board of trustees of an independent school district to donate district real property and improvements formerly used as a school campus for the purpose of preserving the improvements.


(b) A law enacted under this section must provide that before the board of trustees may make the donation, the board must determine that:


(1) the improvements have historical significance;


(2) the transfer will further the preservation of the improvements; and


(3) at the time of the transfer, the district does not need the real property or improvements for educational purposes.


(Added Nov. 6, 2001.)


Sec. 5. PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND AND AVAILABLE SCHOOL FUND: COMPOSITION, MANAGEMENT, USE, AND DISTRIBUTION. (a) The permanent school fund consists of all land appropriated for public schools by this constitution or the other laws of this state, other properties belonging to the permanent school fund, and all revenue derived from the land or other properties. The available school fund consists of the distributions made to it from the total return on all investment assets of the permanent school fund, the taxes authorized by this constitution or general law to be part of the available school fund, and appropriations made to the available school fund by the legislature. The total amount distributed from the permanent school fund to the available school fund:


(1) in each year of a state fiscal biennium must be an amount that is not more than six percent of the average of the market value of the permanent school fund, excluding real property belonging to the fund that is managed, sold, or acquired under Section 4 of this article, but including discretionary real assets investments and cash in the state treasury derived from property belonging to the fund, on the last day of each of the 16 state fiscal quarters preceding the regular session of the legislature that begins before that state fiscal biennium, in accordance with the rate adopted by:


(A) a vote of two-thirds of the total membership of the State Board of Education, taken before the regular session of the legislature convenes; or


(B) the legislature by general law or appropriation, if the State Board of Education does not adopt a rate as provided by Paragraph (A) of this subdivision; and


(2) over the 10-year period consisting of the current state fiscal year and the nine preceding state fiscal years may not exceed the total return on all investment assets of the permanent school fund over the same 10-year period.


(b) The expenses of managing permanent school fund land and investments shall be paid by appropriation from the permanent school fund.


(c) The available school fund shall be applied annually to the support of the public free schools. Except as provided by this section, the legislature may not enact a law appropriating any part of the permanent school fund or available school fund to any other purpose. The permanent school fund and the available school fund may not be appropriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school. The available school fund shall be distributed to the several counties according to their scholastic population and applied in the manner provided by law.


(d) The legislature by law may provide for using the permanent school fund to guarantee bonds issued by school districts or by the state for the purpose of making loans to or purchasing the bonds of school districts for the purpose of acquisition, construction, or improvement of instructional facilities including all furnishings thereto. If any payment is required to be made by the permanent school fund as a result of its guarantee of bonds issued by the state, an amount equal to this payment shall be immediately paid by the state from the treasury to the permanent school fund. An amount owed by the state to the permanent school fund under this section shall be a general obligation of the state until paid. The amount of bonds authorized hereunder shall not exceed $750 million or a higher amount authorized by a two-thirds record vote of both houses of the legislature. If the proceeds of bonds issued by the state are used to provide a loan to a school district and the district becomes delinquent on the loan payments, the amount of the delinquent payments shall be offset against state aid to which the district is otherwise entitled.


(e) The legislature may appropriate part of the available school fund for administration of a bond guarantee program established under this section.


(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, in managing the assets of the permanent school fund, the State Board of Education may acquire, exchange, sell, supervise, manage, or retain, through procedures and subject to restrictions it establishes and in amounts it considers appropriate, any kind of investment, including investments in the Texas growth fund created by Article XVI, Section 70, of this constitution, that persons of ordinary prudence, discretion, and intelligence, exercising the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing, acquire or retain for their own account in the management of their affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income as well as the probable safety of their capital.


(g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution or of a statute, the State Board of Education, the General Land Office, or another entity that has responsibility for the management of revenues derived from permanent school fund land or other properties may, in its sole discretion and in addition to other distributions authorized under this constitution or a statute, distribute to the available school fund each year revenue derived during that year from the land or properties, not to exceed $600 million by each entity each year.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Aug. 11, 1891, and Nov. 3, 1964; Subsec. (a) amended and (b) and (c) added Nov. 8, 1983; Subsec. (d) added Nov. 8, 1988; Subsec. (b) amended Nov. 7, 1989; Subsec. (a) amended, a new (b) added, a portion of (a) redesignated as (c), former (b) and (c) amended, former (b)-(d) redesignated as (d)-(f), and (g) and (h) added Sept. 13, 2003; former Subsec. (g) and Subsec. (h) expired Dec. 1, 2006; Subsec. (a) amended and current Subsec. (g) added Nov. 8, 2011; Subsec. (g) amended Nov. 5, 2019.)


Sec. 6. COUNTY SCHOOL LANDS AND PROCEEDS OF SALES HELD AS SCHOOL TRUST. All lands heretofore, or hereafter granted to the several counties of this State for educational purposes, are of right the property of said counties respectively, to which they were granted, and title thereto is vested in said counties, and no adverse possession or limitation shall ever be available against the title of any county. Each county may sell or dispose of its lands in whole or in part, in manner to be provided by the Commissioners Court of the county. Said lands, and the proceeds thereof, when sold, shall be held by said counties alone as a trust for the benefit of public schools therein; said proceeds to be invested in bonds of the United States, the State of Texas, or counties in said State, or in such other securities, and under such restrictions as may be prescribed by law; and the counties shall be responsible for all investments; the interest thereon, and other revenue, except the principal shall be available fund.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Aug. 14, 1883, and Nov. 6, 2001.) (TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISION for Sec. 6: See Appendix, Note 3.)


Sec. 6a. COUNTY AGRICULTURAL OR GRAZING SCHOOL LAND SUBJECT TO TAX. All agriculture or grazing school land mentioned in Section 6 of this article owned by any county shall be subject to taxation except for State purposes to the same extent as lands privately owned.


(Added Nov. 2, 1926.)


Sec. 6b. COUNTY PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND: REDUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6, Article VII, Constitution of the State of Texas, any county, acting through the commissioners court, may reduce the county permanent school fund of that county and may distribute the amount of the reduction to the independent and common school districts of the county on a per scholastic basis to be used solely for the purpose of reducing bonded indebtedness of those districts or for making permanent improvements. The commissioners court shall, however, retain a sufficient amount of the corpus of the county permanent school fund to pay ad valorem taxes on school lands or royalty interests owned at the time of the distribution. Nothing in this Section affects financial aid to any school district by the state.


(Added Nov. 7, 1972.)


Sec. 7. (Repealed Aug. 5, 1969.)


Sec. 8. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. The Legislature shall provide by law for a State Board of Education, whose members shall be appointed or elected in such manner and by such authority and shall serve for such terms as the Legislature shall prescribe not to exceed six years. The said board shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Nov. 6, 1928.)


Sec. 9. (Repealed Nov. 6, 2001.)


(TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISION for Sec. 9: See Appendix, Note 3.)


Sec. 9-a. (Added Nov. 6, 2001; expired Jan. 1, 2005.)


Sec. 10. ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS; AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL DEPARTMENT. The Legislature shall as soon as practicable establish, organize and provide for the maintenance, support and direction of a University of the first class, to be located by a vote of the people of this State, and styled, "The University of Texas", for the promotion of literature, and the arts and sciences, including an Agricultural, and Mechanical department.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 11. ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT UNIVERSITY FUND; INVESTMENT IN GOVERNMENT BONDS. In order to enable the Legislature to perform the duties set forth in the foregoing Section, it is hereby declared all lands and other property heretofore set apart and appropriated for the establishment and maintenance of the University of Texas, together with all the proceeds of sales of the same, heretofore made or hereafter to be made, and all grants, donations and appropriations that may hereafter be made by the State of Texas, or from any other source, except donations limited to specific purposes, shall constitute and become a Permanent University Fund. And the same as realized and received into the Treasury of the State (together with such sums belonging to the Fund, as may now be in the Treasury), shall be invested in bonds of the United States, the State of Texas, or counties of said State, or in School Bonds of† municipalities, or in bonds of any city of this State, or in bonds issued under and by virtue of the Federal Farm Loan Act approved by the President of the United States, July 17, 1916, and amendments thereto; and the interest accruing thereon shall be subject to appropriation by the Legislature to accomplish the purpose declared in the foregoing Section; provided, that the one-tenth of the alternate Sections† of the lands granted to railroads, reserved by the State, which were set apart and appropriated to the establishment of the University of Texas, by an Act of the Legislature of February 11, 1858, entitled, "An Act to establish the University of Texas", shall not be included in, or constitute a part of, the Permanent University Fund.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Nov. 4, 1930, and Nov. 8, 1932.)


† The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here.


Sec. 11a. INVESTMENT OF PERMANENT UNIVERSITY FUND. In addition to the bonds enumerated in Section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution of the State of Texas, the Board of Regents of The University of Texas may invest the Permanent University Fund in securities, bonds or other obligations issued, insured, or guaranteed in any manner by the United States Government, or any of its agencies, and in such bonds, debentures, or obligations, and preferred and common stocks issued by corporations, associations, or other institutions as the Board of Regents of The University of Texas System may deem to be proper investments for said funds; provided, however, that not more than one per cent (1%) of said fund shall be invested in the securities of any one (1) corporation, nor shall more than five per cent (5%) of the voting stock of any one (1) corporation be owned;† provided, further, that stocks eligible for purchase shall be restricted to stocks of companies incorporated within the United States which have paid dividends for five (5) consecutive years or longer immediately prior to the date of purchase and which, except for bank stocks and insurance stocks, are listed upon an exchange registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or its successors.


In making each and all of such investments said Board of Regents shall exercise the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing which men of ordinary prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income therefrom as well as the probable safety of their capital.


The interest, dividends and other income accruing from the investments of the Permanent University Fund, except the portion thereof which is appropriated by the operation of Section 18 of Article VII for the payment of principal and interest on bonds or notes issued thereunder, shall be subject to appropriation by the Legislature to accomplish the purposes declared in Section 10 of Article VII of this Constitution.


This amendment shall be self-enacting, and shall become effective upon its adoption, provided, however, that the Legislature shall provide by law for full disclosure of all details concerning the investments in corporate stocks and bonds and other investments authorized herein.


(Added Nov. 6, 1956; amended Nov. 5, 1968.)


† The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here.


Sec. 11b. EXPANDED INVESTMENT AUTHORITY FOR PERMANENT UNIVERSITY FUND. Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, in managing the assets of the permanent university fund, the Board of Regents of The University of Texas System may acquire, exchange, sell, supervise, manage, or retain, through procedures and subject to restrictions it establishes and in amounts it considers appropriate, any kind of investment, including investments in the Texas growth fund created by Article XVI, Section 70, of this constitution, that prudent investors, exercising reasonable care, skill, and caution, would acquire or retain in light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the fund then prevailing, taking into consideration the investment of all the assets of the fund rather than a single investment.


(Added Nov. 8, 1988; amended Nov. 7, 1995, and Nov. 2, 1999.)


Sec. 12. SALE OF PERMANENT UNIVERSITY FUND LANDS. The land herein set apart to the University fund shall be sold under such regulations, at such times, and on such terms as may be provided by law; and the Legislature shall provide for the prompt collection, at maturity, of all debts due on account of University lands, heretofore sold, or that may hereafter be sold, and shall in neither event have the power to grant relief to the purchasers.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 13. AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE. The Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, established by an act of the Legislature passed April 17th, 1871, located in the county of Brazos, is hereby made, and constituted a Branch of the University of Texas, for instruction in Agriculture, the Mechanic Arts, and the Natural Sciences connected therewith,† And the Legislature shall at its next session, make an appropriation, not to exceed forty thousand dollars, for the construction and completion of the buildings and improvements, and for providing the furniture necessary to put said College in immediate and successful operation.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


† The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here.


Sec. 14. PRAIRIE VIEW A&M UNIVERSITY. Prairie View A&M University in Waller County is an institution of the first class under the direction of the same governing board as Texas A&M University referred to in Article VII, Section 13, of this constitution as the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas.


(Feb. 15, 1876. Amended Nov. 6, 1984.)


Sec. 15. GRANT OF ADDITIONAL LANDS TO UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS. In addition to the lands heretofore granted to the University of Texas, there is hereby set apart, and appropriated, for the endowment maintenance, and support of said University and its branches, one million acres of the unappropriated public domain of the State, to be designated, and surveyed as may be provided by law; and said lands shall be sold under the same regulations, and the proceeds invested in the same manner, as is provided for the sale and investment of the permanent University Fund; and the Legislature shall not have power to grant any relief to the purchasers of said lands.


(Feb. 15, 1876.)


Sec. 16. COUNTY TAXATION OF CERTAIN UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS LANDS. All land mentioned in Sections 11, 12 and 15 of Article VII, of the Constitution of the State of Texas, now belonging to the University of Texas shall be subject to† taxation for county purposes to the same extent as lands privately owned; provided they shall be rendered for taxation upon values fixed by the State Tax Board; and providing that the State shall remit annually to each of the counties in which said lands are located an amount equal to the tax imposed upon said land for county purposes.


(Added Nov. 4, 1930.)


† The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here.


Sec. 16-a. TERMS OF OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL OFFICERS. The Legislature shall fix by law the terms of all offices of the public school system and of the State institutions of higher education, inclusive, and the terms of members of the respective boards, not to exceed six years.


(Added Nov. 6, 1928; amended Nov. 4, 1997.)


Sec. 17. FUNDING TO SUPPORT AGENCIES AND INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION NOT SUPPORTED BY AVAILABLE UNIVERSITY FUND. (a) In the fiscal year beginning September 1, 1985, and each fiscal year thereafter, there is hereby appropriated out of the first money coming into the state treasury not otherwise appropriated by the constitution $100 million to be used by eligible agencies and institutions of higher education for the purpose of acquiring land either with or without permanent improvements, constructing and equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, major repair or rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements, acquisition of capital equipment, library books and library materials, and paying for acquiring, constructing, or equipping or for major repair or rehabilitation of buildings, facilities, other permanent improvements, or capital equipment used jointly for educational and general activities and for auxiliary enterprises to the extent of their use for educational and general activities. For the five-year period that begins on September 1, 2000, and for each five-year period that begins after that period, the legislature, during a regular session that is nearest, but preceding, a five-year period, may by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house increase the amount of the constitutional appropriation for the five-year period but may not adjust the appropriation in such a way as to impair any obligation created by the issuance of bonds or notes in accordance with this section.


(b) The funds appropriated under Subsection (a) of this section shall be for the use of the following eligible agencies and institutions of higher education (even though their names may be changed):


(1) East Texas State University including East Texas State University at Texarkana;


(2) Lamar University including Lamar University at Orange and Lamar University at Port Arthur;


(3) Midwestern State University;


(4) University of North Texas;


(5) The University of Texas-Pan American including The University of Texas at Brownsville;


(6) Stephen F. Austin State University;


(7) Texas College of Osteopathic Medicine;


(8) Texas State University System Administration and the following component institutions:


(9) Sam Houston State University;


(10) Southwest Texas State University;


(11) Sul Ross State University including Uvalde Study Center;


(12) Texas Southern University;


(13) Texas Tech University;


(14) Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center;


(15) Angelo State University;


(16) Texas Woman's University;


(17) University of Houston System Administration and the following component institutions:


(18) University of Houston;


(19) University of Houston-Victoria;


(20) University of Houston-Clear Lake;


(21) University of Houston-Downtown;


(22) Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi;


(23) Texas A&M International University;


(24) Texas A&M University-Kingsville;


(25) West Texas A&M University; and


(26) Texas State Technical College System and its campuses, but not its extension centers or programs.


(c) Pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature, institutions of higher education may be created at a later date by general law, and, when created, such an institution shall be entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section if it is not created as a part of The University of Texas System or The Texas A&M University System. An institution that is entitled to participate in dedicated funding provided by Article VII, Section 18, of this constitution may not be entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section.


(d) In the year 1985 and every 10 years thereafter, the legislature or an agency designated by the legislature no later than August 31 of such year shall allocate by equitable formula the annual appropriations made under Subsection (a) of this section to the governing boards of eligible agencies and institutions of higher education. The legislature shall review, or provide for a review, of the allocation formula at the end of the fifth year of each 10-year allocation period. At that time adjustments may be made in the allocation formula, but no adjustment that will prevent the payment of outstanding bonds and notes, both principal and interest, may be made.


(d-1) Notwithstanding Subsection (d) of this section, the allocation of the annual appropriation to Texas State Technical College System and its campuses may not exceed 2.2 percent of the total appropriation each fiscal year.


(e) Each governing board authorized to participate in the distribution of money under this section is authorized to expend all money distributed to it for any of the purposes enumerated in Subsection (a). In addition, such governing board may issue bonds and notes for the purposes of refunding bonds or notes issued under this section or prior law, acquiring land either with or without permanent improvements, constructing and equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, acquiring capital equipment, library books, and library materials, paying for acquiring, constructing, or equipping or for major repair or rehabilitation of buildings, facilities, other permanent improvements, or capital equipment used jointly for educational and general activities and for auxiliary enterprises to the extent of their use for educational and general activities, and for major repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements, and may pledge up to 50 percent of the money allocated to such governing board pursuant to this section to secure the payment of the principal and interest of such bonds or notes. Proceeds from the issuance of bonds or notes under this subsection shall be maintained in a local depository selected by the governing board issuing the bonds or notes. The bonds and notes issued under this subsection shall be payable solely out of the money appropriated by this section and shall mature serially or otherwise in not more than 10 years from their respective dates. All bonds issued under this section shall be sold only through competitive bidding and are subject to approval by the attorney general. Bonds approved by the attorney general shall be incontestable. The permanent university fund may be invested in the bonds and notes issued under this section.


(f) The funds appropriated by this section may not be used for the purpose of constructing, equipping, repairing, or rehabilitating buildings or other permanent improvements that are to be used only for student housing, intercollegiate athletics, or auxiliary enterprises.


(g) The comptroller of public accounts shall make annual transfers of the funds allocated pursuant to Subsection (d) directly to the governing boards of the eligible institutions.


(h) To assure efficient use of construction funds and the orderly development of physical plants to accommodate the state's real need, the legislature may provide for the approval or disapproval of all new construction projects at the eligible agencies and institutions entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section.


(i) (Repealed.)


(j) The state systems and institutions of higher education designated in this section may not receive any additional funds from the general revenue of the state for acquiring land with or without permanent improvements, for constructing or equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, or for major repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements except that:


(1) in the case of fire or natural disaster the legislature may appropriate from the general revenue an amount sufficient to replace the uninsured loss of any building or other permanent improvement; and


(2) the legislature, by two-thirds vote of each house, may, in cases of demonstrated need, which need must be clearly expressed in the body of the act, appropriate additional general revenue funds for acquiring land with or without permanent improvements, for constructing or equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, or for major repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements.


This subsection does not apply to legislative appropriations made prior to the adoption of this amendment.


(k) Without the prior approval of the legislature, appropriations under this section may not be expended for acquiring land with or without permanent improvements, or for constructing and equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, for a branch campus or educational center that is not a separate degree-granting institution created by general law.


(l) This section is self-enacting upon the issuance of the governor's proclamation declaring the adoption of the amendment, and the state comptroller of public accounts shall do all things necessary to effectuate this section. This section does not impair any obligation created by the issuance of any bonds and notes in accordance with prior law, and all outstanding bonds and notes shall be paid in full, both principal and interest, in accordance with their terms. If the provisions of this section conflict with any other provisions of this constitution, then the provisions of this section shall prevail, notwithstanding all such conflicting provisions.


(Former Sec. 17 repealed Nov. 2, 1982; current Sec. 17 added Nov. 6, 1984; Subsecs. (a), (b), (e), (f), and (g) amended and (d-1) added Nov. 2, 1993; Subsec. (l) amended Nov. 7, 1995; Subsec. (b) amended Nov. 6, 2007; Subsec. (i) repealed Nov. 3, 2009.)


Sec. 18. FUNDING TO SUPPORT TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY SYSTEM AND UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SYSTEM; AVAILABLE UNIVERSITY FUND. (a) The Board of Regents of The Texas A&M University System may issue bonds and notes not to exceed a total amount of 10 percent of the cost value of the investments and other assets of the permanent university fund (exclusive of real estate) at the time of the issuance thereof, and may pledge all or any part of its one-third interest in the available university fund to secure the payment of the principal and interest of those bonds and notes, for the purpose of acquiring land either with or without permanent improvements, constructing and equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, major repair and rehabilitation of buildings and other permanent improvements, acquiring capital equipment and library books and library materials, and refunding bonds or notes issued under this Section or prior law, at or for The Texas A&M University System administration and the following component institutions of the system:


(1) Texas A&M University, including its medical college which the legislature may authorize as a separate medical institution;


(2) Prairie View A&M University, including its nursing school in Houston;


(3) Tarleton State University;


(4) Texas A&M University at Galveston;


(5) Texas Forest Service;


(6) Texas Agricultural Experiment Stations;


(7) Texas Agricultural Extension Service;


(8) Texas Engineering Experiment Stations;


(9) Texas Transportation Institute; and


(10) Texas Engineering Extension Service.


(b) The Board of Regents of The University of Texas System may issue bonds and notes not to exceed a total amount of 20 percent of the cost value of investments and other assets of the permanent university fund (exclusive of real estate) at the time of issuance thereof, and may pledge all or any part of its two-thirds interest in the available university fund to secure the payment of the principal and interest of those bonds and notes, for the purpose of acquiring land either with or without permanent improvements, constructing and equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, major repair and rehabilitation of buildings and other permanent improvements, acquiring capital equipment and library books and library materials, and refunding bonds or notes issued under this section or prior law, at or for The University of Texas System administration and the following component institutions of the system:


(1) The University of Texas at Arlington;


(2) The University of Texas at Austin;


(3) The University of Texas at Dallas;


(4) The University of Texas at El Paso;


(5) The University of Texas of the Permian Basin;


(6) The University of Texas at San Antonio;


(7) The University of Texas at Tyler;


(8) The University of Texas Health Science Center at Dallas;


(9) The University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston;


(10) The University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston;


(11) The University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio;


(12) The University of Texas System Cancer Center;


(13) The University of Texas Health Center at Tyler; and


(14) The University of Texas Institute of Texan Cultures at San Antonio.


(c) Pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature, institutions of higher education may be created at a later date as a part of The University of Texas System or The Texas A&M University System by general law, and, when created, such an institution shall be entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section for the system in which it is created. An institution that is entitled to participate in dedicated funding provided by Article VII, Section 17, of this constitution may not be entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section.


(d) The proceeds of the bonds or notes issued under Subsection (a) or (b) of this section may not be used for the purpose of constructing, equipping, repairing, or rehabilitating buildings or other permanent improvements that are to be used for student housing, intercollegiate athletics, or auxiliary enterprises.


(e) The available university fund consists of the distributions made to it from the total return on all investment assets of the permanent university fund, including the net income attributable to the surface of permanent university fund land. The amount of any distributions to the available university fund shall be determined by the board of regents of The University of Texas System in a manner intended to provide the available university fund with a stable and predictable stream of annual distributions and to maintain over time the purchasing power of permanent university fund investments and annual distributions to the available university fund. The amount distributed to the available university fund in a fiscal year must be not less than the amount needed to pay the principal and interest due and owing in that fiscal year on bonds and notes issued under this section. If the purchasing power of permanent university fund investments for any rolling 10-year period is not preserved, the board may not increase annual distributions to the available university fund until the purchasing power of the permanent university fund investments is restored, except as necessary to pay the principal and interest due and owing on bonds and notes issued under this section. An annual distribution made by the board to the available university fund during any fiscal year may not exceed an amount equal to seven percent of the average net fair market value of permanent university fund investment assets as determined by the board, except as necessary to pay any principal and interest due and owing on bonds issued under this section. The expenses of managing permanent university fund land and investments shall be paid by the permanent university fund.


(f) Out of one-third of the annual distribution from the permanent university fund to the available university fund, there shall be appropriated an annual sum sufficient to pay the principal and interest due on the bonds and notes issued by the Board of Regents of The Texas A&M University System under this section and prior law, and the remainder of that one-third of the annual distribution to the available university fund shall be appropriated to the Board of Regents of The Texas A&M University System,† which shall have the authority and duty in turn to appropriate an equitable portion of the same for the support and maintenance of The Texas A&M University System administration, Texas A&M University, and Prairie View A&M University. The Board of Regents of The Texas A&M University System, in making just and equitable appropriations to Texas A&M University and Prairie View A&M University, shall exercise its discretion with due regard to such criteria as the board may deem appropriate from year to year. Out of the other two-thirds of the annual distribution from the permanent university fund to the available university fund there shall be appropriated an annual sum sufficient to pay the principal and interest due on the bonds and notes issued by the Board of Regents of The University of Texas System under this section and prior law, and the remainder of such two-thirds of the annual distribution to the available university fund, shall be appropriated for the support and maintenance of The University of Texas at Austin and The University of Texas System administration.


(g) The bonds and notes issued under this section shall be payable solely out of the available university fund, mature serially or otherwise in not more than 30 years from their respective dates, and, except for refunding bonds, be sold only through competitive bidding. All of these bonds and notes are subject to approval by the attorney general and when so approved are incontestable. The permanent university fund may be invested in these bonds and notes.


(h) To assure efficient use of construction funds and the orderly development of physical plants to accommodate the state's real need, the legislature may provide for the approval or disapproval of all new construction projects at the eligible agencies and institutions entitled to participate in the funding provided by this section except The University of Texas at Austin, Texas A&M University in College Station, and Prairie View A&M University.


(i) The state systems and institutions of higher education designated in this section may not receive any funds from the general revenue of the state for acquiring land with or without permanent improvements, for constructing or equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, or for major repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements except that:


(1) in the case of fire or natural disaster the legislature may appropriate from the general revenue an amount sufficient to replace the uninsured loss of any building or other permanent improvement; and


(2) the legislature, by two-thirds vote of each house, may, in cases of demonstrated need, which need must be clearly expressed in the body of the act, appropriate general revenue funds for acquiring land with or without permanent improvements, for constructing or equipping buildings or other permanent improvements, or for major repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other permanent improvements.


This subsection does not apply to legislative appropriations made prior to the adoption of this amendment.


(j) This section is self-enacting on the issuance of the governor's proclamation declaring the adoption of this amendment, and the state comptroller of public accounts shall do all things necessary to effectuate this section. This section does not impair any obligation created by the issuance of bonds or notes in accordance with prior law, and all outstanding bonds and notes shall be paid in full, both principal and interest, in accordance with their terms, and the changes herein made in the allocation of the available university fund shall not affect the pledges thereof made in connection with such bonds or notes heretofore issued. If the provisions of this section conflict with any other provision of this constitution, then the provisions of this section shall prevail, notwithstanding any such conflicting provisions.


(Added Aug. 23, 1947; amended Nov. 6, 1956, Nov. 8, 1966, and Nov. 6, 1984; former Subsec. (f) expired Nov. 6, 1994; Subsec. (j) amended Nov. 7, 1995; Subsec. (e) amended and current Subsec. (f) added Nov. 2, 1999.) (TEMPORARY PROVISION for Sec. 18: See Appendix, Note 2.)


† The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here.


Sec. 19. TEXAS TOMORROW FUND. (a) The Texas tomorrow fund is created as a trust fund dedicated to the prepayment of tuition and fees for higher education as provided by the general laws of this state for the prepaid higher education tuition program. The assets of the fund are held in trust for the benefit of participants and beneficiaries and may not be diverted. The state shall hold the assets of the fund for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the program.


(b) Financing of benefits must be based on sound actuarial principles. The amount contributed by a person participating in the prepaid higher education program shall be as provided by the general laws of this state, but may not be less than the amount anticipated for tuition and required fees based on sound actuarial principles. If in any fiscal year there is not enough money in the Texas tomorrow fund to pay the tuition and required fees of an institution of higher education in which a beneficiary enrolls or the appropriate portion of the tuition and required fees of a private or independent institution of higher education in which a beneficiary enrolls as provided by a prepaid tuition contract, there is appropriated out of the first money coming into the state treasury in each fiscal year not otherwise appropriated by the constitution the amount that is sufficient to pay the applicable amount of tuition and required fees of the institution.


(c) Assets of the fund may be invested by an entity designated by general law in securities considered prudent investments. Investments shall be made in the exercise of judgment and care under the circumstances that a person of ordinary prudence, discretion, and intelligence exercises in the management of the person's affairs, not for speculation, but for the permanent disposition of funds, considering the probable income from the disposition as well as the probable safety of capital.


(d) The state comptroller of public accounts shall take the actions necessary to implement this section.


(e) To the extent this section conflicts with any other provision of this constitution, this section controls.


(Added Nov. 4, 1997.)


Sec. 20. NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY FUND. (a) There is established the national research university fund for the purpose of providing a dedicated, independent, and equitable source of funding to enable emerging research universities in this state to achieve national prominence as major research universities.


(b) The fund consists of money transferred or deposited to the credit of the fund and any interest or other return on the investment assets of the fund. The legislature may dedicate state revenue to the credit of the fund.


(c) The legislature shall provide for administration of the fund, which shall be invested in the manner and according to the standards provided for investment of the permanent university fund. The expenses of managing the investments of the fund shall be paid from the fund.


(d) In each state fiscal biennium, the legislature may appropriate as provided by Subsection (f) of this section all or a portion of the total return on all investment assets of the fund to carry out the purposes for which the fund is established.


(e) The legislature biennially shall allocate the amounts appropriated under this section, or shall provide for a biennial allocation of those amounts, to eligible state universities to carry out the purposes of the fund. The money shall be allocated based on an equitable formula established by the legislature or an agency designated by the legislature. The legislature shall review and as appropriate adjust, or provide for a review and adjustment, of the allocation formula at the end of each state fiscal biennium.


(f) The portion of the total return on investment assets of the fund that is available for appropriation in a state fiscal biennium under this section is the portion determined by the legislature, or an agency designated by the legislature, as necessary to provide as nearly as practicable a stable and predictable stream of annual distributions to eligible state universities and to maintain over time the purchasing power of fund investment assets. If the purchasing power of fund investment assets for any rolling 10-year period is not preserved, the distributions may not be increased until the purchasing power of the fund investment assets is restored. The amount appropriated from the fund in any fiscal year may not exceed an amount equal to seven percent of the average net fair market value of the investment assets of the fund, as determined by law. Until the fund has been invested for a period of time sufficient to determine the purchasing power over a 10-year period, the legislature may provide by law for means of preserving the purchasing power of the fund.


(g) The legislature shall establish criteria by which a state university may become eligible to receive a portion of the distributions from the fund. A state university that becomes eligible to receive a portion of the distributions from the fund in a state fiscal biennium remains eligible to receive additional distributions from the fund in any subsequent state fiscal biennium. The University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M University are not eligible to receive money from the fund.


(h) An eligible state university may use distributions from the fund only for the support and maintenance of educational and general activities that promote increased research capacity at the university.


(Added Nov. 3, 2009.)

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THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 7. EDUCATION

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THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 7. EDUCATION Sec. 1. SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF SYSTEM OF PUBLIC FREE SCHOOLS. A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.

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ASCA standard A.12(b) requires counselors to advocate for appropriate use of student data and records to administration and educators. Teachers often share too much information with each other regarding students. It is part of a counselor's role to advocate what is and is not appropriate to be shared and how it relates to the law.

American School Counselor Association, (2016). ASCA ethical standards for school counselors. Alexandria,

VA: Author.

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Attached is Clear Creek's student record policy. This is the policy they have created to ensure the district and its employees follow laws regarding student privacy.

Clear Creek ISD. (2019). Clear Creek ISD Student Records Policy. Retrieved from https://pol.tasb.org/Policy/Download/505?filename=FL(LOCAL).pdf

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Slide #13- Recommendations/ Best practices 

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Slide #13- Recommendations/ Best practices 

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1. Research and become knowledgable of FERPA and what is and is not protected by the law.

2. Attend trainings and professional development sessions regarding student privacy and confidentiality. Alway stay up to date with policies and laws.

3. Each year, educate staff members on what can and cannot be shared regarding student records and privacy according to law. Always advocate for student privacy and confidentiality and minimize potential risks for breaching those policies.

4. Keep detailed and organized records of students involved in counseling program.

5. Communicate with students as well as families the privacy policies multiple times throughout the year to ensure an understanding and minimize any risks.

6. Finally, when in doubt, research or reach out the district legal team. It is better to be precautions then risk breaching student privacy and confidentiality.