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Climate Change and Lack of Access to Nutritious Food Pose Risks for the Nigerian Population

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Climate Change and Lack of Access to Nutritious Food Pose Risks for the Nigerian Population

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This peer-reviewed article examined the multiple risk factors affecting the diets and health of Nigeria's population. Nigeria's population struggles with undernutrition, people not having enough to eat and obesity from lack of access to nutritious diets. The article focused on developing actionable plans to repair food insufficiencies while also improving climate change and agricultural systems. Obesity trends were higher in the southern regions of Nigeria, and food insecurity was more common in the northern regions of Nigeria, although these regions produce more food. Food systems, though, are at risk due to climate change, which is exacerbated due to Nigeria's geographical location. To formulate a plan to improve the diets of the Nigerian population, a three-part plan targeting undernutrition, obesity and climate change must work cohesively together without imposing further obstacles on one or more of these aspects.

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Nutrition Transition and Climate Risks in Nigeria: Moving Towards Food Systems Policy Coherence - Current Environmental Health Reports

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Purpose of Review The purpose of this review is to describe the combined impacts of the nutrition transition and climate change in Nigeria and analyze the country’s national food-related policy options that could support human and planetary health outcomes. Recent Findings This paper uses a food sys…

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WFP Chief Economist Explores Northeastern Nigeria Villages in 2018; Progress Made From 2016 Food Insecurity Rates

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WFP Chief Economist Explores Northeastern Nigeria Villages in 2018; Progress Made From 2016 Food Insecurity Rates

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This video from WFP documents the chief economist Arif Husain visiting villages across Nigeria's northeastern region and documenting the conditions of food access to the population. He had previously visited in 2016 and spoke about how the conditions in 2018 had positively increased. Violent conflict greatly affected this region, leading to deaths and fear instilled in people, which negatively affected their ability to obtain food. Husain reports that the population in 2018 looked much healthier than in 2016. WFP provided these populations with food and cash and ensured that they were healthy.

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WFP chief economist Arif Husain reports from villages isolated by insurgency in northeastern Nigeria on how WFP and other humanitarians are fighting famine,the sacrifices made while trying break the conflict/hunger cycle and what still needs to be done.

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Fighting Hunger in Nigeria with Arif Husain | World Food Programme

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WFP chief economist Arif Husain reports from villages isolated by insurgency in northeastern Nigeria on how WFP and other humanitarians are fighting famine,the sacrifices made while trying break the conflict/hunger cycle and what still needs to be done.

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Nigeria Is Not Alone In The African Food Crisis

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Nigeria Is Not Alone In The African Food Crisis

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This article looks into other African countries that are suffering from food insecurity that is mainly caused by violence. Compacted with the lingering effects of COVID-19 on the economy, 48 million people in West African countries are experiencing food insecurity. In addition to northern Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Mauritania are suffering from inadequate access to nutritious foods. There has been a 31% increase in children being admitted to hospitals, and this is exacerbated by the fact that violent groups have blockaded many villages in these countries. This makes it harder for people to leave their villages to find food and for agencies to deliver food assistance.

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Channels Television Discusses Real-World Impact of Food Insecurity in Nigeria, How It Affects Population

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Channels Television Discusses Real-World Impact of Food Insecurity in Nigeria, How It Affects Population

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This video from Channels Television, a Nigerian news and media television channel, discusses the real-world impact on Nigerian populations suffering a food insecurity crisis. The video documents real people not having enough food because they are unable to find work and how farmers have struggled to produce crops and food due to an inadequate food supply. The rising food costs and lasting economic effects of COVID-19 have negatively impacted Nigerians as well in the sector of food access. The video also spoke about how Nigeria is ranked 103 out of 121 countries in the 2022 Global Hunger Index.

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Food Insecurity In Nigeria: A Call To Action

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Various Causes of Food Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Various Causes of Food Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa

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This peer-reviewed article examined the various causes and links in explaining the reasons for Sub-Saharan Africa's past and current state of food insecurity. The article discussed that Sub-Saharan Africa's progress toward achieving the second Sustainable Development Goal, ending hunger, has been slow, and they are not on track to reach the intended 2030 goal for various reasons. These reasons include weak economic growth, gender inequality, food price inflation, low crop productivity, drought, weak infrastructural development, low investment in irrigation agriculture and research, poor policy frameworks, climate change, high population growth, violent conflicts and corruption. The article discussed how Nigeria's conflict between herders and farmers had forced farmers to leave their communities, and attacks conducted by Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa have led to 2.5 million Nigerians having to flee. This poses a risk to Nigerians' food security by being displaced and having less access to food. The article explained how Sub-Saharan Africa's population growth has been on an increasing rise of 3.2%, the highest globally, which makes it more difficult to eradicate food insecurity.

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1. Introduction

The effort to eradicate hunger, food insecurity, and other forms of malnutrition has been the topic of many studies [ 1]. Nevertheless, despite recent advances in these areas, many nations, particularly in developing countries like Sub-Saharan Africa, still face significant food insecurity challenges [ 1, 2]. In the mid-1970s, food insecurity prompted world leaders to acknowledge for the first time their shared duty to end hunger and malnutrition [ 3]. Nonetheless, in the 48 least developed countries, per capita food consumption fell between 1980 and 1998, while it rose in most of the developing world [ 4]. According to the 1996 World Food Summit (WFS), the number of hungry people worldwide was predicted to fall by at least 20 million every year between 2000 and 2015. Even though some areas made great strides in the 20 years before the year 2000, the latest data on the number of undernourished people around the world shows that the average annual decrease since the 1996 WFS has been only 2.5 million, which is far below the level needed to reach the WFS goal of significantly reducing the level of undernourishment by 2015 [ 5].

During the past three decades, global food production has increased faster than the population growth rate. However, in 2018-2019, more than 830 million people worldwide, mainly in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, experienced physical food insecurity; this figure does not account for obesity or micronutrient deficiency, which affect more than a billion people.

Stable distribution networks are critical to food security. Since the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 epidemic has been putting this stability through one of the most severe tests it has ever experienced. As evidenced by lockdowns, economic downturns, trade restrictions, and soaring food prices, the pandemic has become more than just a health issue. It is becoming a significant economic threat to world food security [ 6]. Food costs have hit all-time highs due to the war in the Ukraine, food supply issues, and the ongoing economic impacts of the COVID-19 epidemic [ 7]. People in poor and middle-income countries spend a large portion of their income on food, leaving them particularly vulnerable to price increases.

Despite years of persistent efforts to increase the production and quality of the world's food resources, food insecurity still exists, particularly in African countries. The information on Sub-Saharan African Food Security (SSAFB) estimates that one in three persons in the region is malnourished [ 8]. It will be difficult for Africa to have sustainable economic development if its people are malnourished and unwell. Many African nations continue to struggle with undernourishment despite receiving food aid from international organizations. Due to changes in consumer habits, population growth, and global economic upheavals, the food security situation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is deteriorating [ 9]. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has seen a large number of economic changes. No matter how hard people work, the economy is still shrinking and endangering everyone's way of life, especially those in rural areas. Since 2015, there has been an increase in food insecurity in the SSA. The SDG2 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is to end world hunger and malnutrition. Africa, however, is not on course to achieve this objective.

A plethora of studies has pointed to several factors that contribute significantly to food insecurity in Africa. For instance, low economic growth [ 10], gender inequality [ 11], food price inflation, low agricultural productivity, drought [ 12], inadequate investment in irrigation [ 9], climate change [ 13, 14], and rapid population growth [ 15, 16]. Floods, severe rainfall, drought, cyclones, and storms are all climate-induced phenomena that negatively influence rural income and food security in low-income developing countries [ 16, 17, 18].

Similarly, ref. [ 19] outlined the impact of poor social inclusion, ref. [ 20] emphasized the improper use of natural resources, and [ 21] explored the impact of politics and political instability The present study, however, views food insecurity in Africa from a multidimensional perspective; not only focusing on the determinants of food insecurity in the SSA, but also exploring remedies for SSA's ongoing food security dilemma. The following questions are therefore addressed in this review:

Why do SSA countries respond slowly to the SDG2 goal of "End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture"?

What strategy should Sub-Saharan African countries adopt to improve food security sustainably?

While addressing these questions, this study makes significant contributions. First, the study contributes to the food security literature by assessing the food security situation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, the study contributes to the sustainable development goal by identifying and analyzing the challenges for attaining the SDG2 of ending hunger, food insecurity, and sustainable agriculture in Africa. Third, the paper serves as a valuable resource for academics interested in food and nutrition security, illuminating the most recent findings and encouraging them to build upon previous investigations and anticipate future developments.

The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The following section focuses on an overview of the food security concept, followed by the global food insecurity trend. Subsequently, the article presents an overview of the global hunger index in Sub-Saharan Africa. The fourth section delves into the drivers of food insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the conclusions and recommendations are presented.

1.1. An Overview of the Concept of Food Security

Webb and Sheeran [ 27] claimed that individuals go hungry not because food is not readily available in the market, but because they cannot afford to buy it. Therefore, it is essential to differentiate between food supply and food demand. Availability is a term commonly used to describe the state of food supplies, and thanks to developments in agricultural output, availability has increased over the previous few decades. The unequal distribution of food occurs not only within households, but the term "access" is also usually employed to highlight the issue of demand [ 28]. The global food price issue could reverse the decades of progress in alleviating hunger and malnutrition and putting an end to extreme poverty.

1.1.1. The Trend of the Global Food Insecurity Situation since 2000

In 2017, about 1.9 billion individuals lacked consistent access to appropriate nutrition [ 29]. While most of those affected by food insecurity reside in the low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, this issue impacts individuals worldwide [ 30]. All nations must be able to acquire and maintain nutrient-dense diets that are diverse. Achieving food security and eliminating hunger are two 2030 Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations. Despite the world's nations concentrated efforts to alleviate global hunger, the number of undernourished people grew in 2015, following a decline from the 2003 to 2014 ( Figure 1). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), up to the year 2020, over 825 million people will have gone hungry, and roughly 2 billion will have been moderately or severely food insecure [ 31]. Due to the additional 60 million victims of hunger since 2014, the number of undernourished people is projected to reach 840 million by 2030 [ 30], which is a significant rise over the present estimated figure of 380 million [ 30] ( Figure 1). Every day, a colossal 830 million people worldwide suffer from hunger ( Figure 1). As a direct result of COVID-19 and the ongoing conflict in the Ukraine, the number of people experiencing acute food insecurity rose dramatically from 135 million in 2019 to 345 million in 2022 [ 32]. Even with the recovery of the global economy, [ 33] anticipated that eight percent of the world's population, or 670 million people, would still be hungry in 2030. This is comparable to 2015 when the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development established a goal date for this decade to abolish world hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition. According to the World Food Program, 50 million people in 45 countries are at risk of extreme hunger [ 32]. Historically, droughts and other natural disasters have been the leading causes of food scarcity [ 34].

1.1.2. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Global Hunger Index

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) developed a scale to assess food insecurity called the Global Hunger Index (GHI), which takes into account three indicators: stunting, malnutrition, and infant mortality [ 29]. On a scale from 0 (no hunger) to 100 (the worst case), this is measured with the following criteria. Child wasting: the number of children under five who are too thin for their height; this is a sign of severe malnutrition. Child stunting: the number of children under five who are stunted, which means they are short for their age because they do not get enough food. Anemia: the percentage of the population with anemia, which shows how many people are not getting enough calories (partially reflecting the serious interaction of inadequate nutrition and unhealthy environments).

South Asia and Africa, south of the Sahara, have the highest levels of hunger in the world according to the GHI values, 27.4 and 27.1, respectively, in the year 2022 ( Figure 2), and both regions are experiencing a stagnation in the fight against hunger. In South Asia and SSA, where the scores were 28.0 and 28.1 in 2014, progress in eliminating hunger has virtually stagnated in comparison to the progress recorded from the year 2000 to 2014 ( Figure 2). In terms of the development required to meet the second Sustainable Development Goal of "Zero Hunger" by 2030, Africa, south of the Sahara, is gravely behind the agenda [ 35].

2. The Sub-Saharan African Food Security Situation

Africa is home to at least one-third of the world's undernourished population and is the only continent where agricultural productivity per capita has been falling for the past 30 years [ 36]. Africa's population is expected to expand from its estimated 1.2 billion in 2020 to over 1.8 billion by 2050; more than half of the continent's inhabitants are under 20 [ 37]. The agricultural sector employs around 60% of the labor force, produces approximately 22% of the GDP, and accounts for more than 10% of export revenues. The SSA countries coverage in the international food security assessment in this study is presented in Figure 3.

According to research conducted by Harvard University Professor Calestous Juma, Africa could achieve food self-sufficiency if it stopped depending on food imports [ 9]. Farsund, Daugbjerg, and Langhelle [ 38] concluded that Africa's land resource could quickly produce an additional 100 million tons of grain-equivalent a year if it were intensively farmed. Africa has significant untapped potential, as seen by the region's relatively low yields compared to other regions with similar agro-ecological zones like South Asia. Utuk and Daniel [ 39] reported that about 800 million hectares of land in SSA is ideal for rain-fed agriculture. This suggests that Africa possesses a considerable amount of arable land that, if improved, may ensure the region's long-term food security. However, despite Africa's vast agricultural potential, it has struggled to embrace modern agricultural techniques fully. If Africa does not adopt modern farming techniques, it will waste the rich resources already in the continent and be forced to rely on expensive imports [ 40] (Juma, 2015). It is projected that by 2025, the annual cost of importing food will increase from its current level of USD 35 billion to USD 110 billion.

Currently, 346 million people in Africa are undernourished ( Figure 4). With the percentage of people experiencing food insecurity expected to drop from 40.5 percent in 2020 to 24.4 percent in 2030, SSA is predicted to experience the slowest improvement in food security [ 42]. The World Bank reported in 2021 that 7.2 million people in East Africa are at risk of hunger, while 26.5 million experience severe food insecurity. Acute malnutrition affects at least 12.8 million children in this area.

More than 50 million people in Africa require emergency food aid annually, making it the continent that now gets the most food aid. Sixty percent of WFP's efforts are focused on Africa [ 43]. Twenty-seven million people in West Africa are experiencing severe hunger, the highest number in ten years [ 44]. Allegedly, food crises have increased across most of West Africa, including Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mali, and Nigeria [ 44]. Approximately 27 million more individuals have required emergency food aid from 2015-2022 [ 45].

Due to an unprecedented drought and the continuous conflict in East Africa, particularly in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia, an estimated 81.6 million IDPs, refugees are residing in rural and urban areas within and outside these countries [ 46]. Southern Ethiopia, eastern and northern Kenya, and southern and central Somalia are all experiencing worsening drought conditions, which have led to a lack of water and pasture, the death of livestock, below-average harvests (65% in Somalia and 70% in Kenya's marginal agricultural areas), a surge in the price of cereal and other staple foods, and a decrease in the purchasing power of the residents [ 47].

According to [ 49], since 2015, there has been an increase in food insecurity across Africa. In 2015, there were 52.3 million people who experienced severe to moderate food insecurity; by 2017 that number rose to 56.7 ( Figure 5). In 2020, around 66.2% of people ( Figure 5) had moderate to severe food insecurity; of this number, 30% had severe food insecurity and almost 37% had moderate food insecurity [ 50]. Wang, Andrée, Chamorro, and Spencer [ 51], estimated that 704 million people living south of the Sahara experienced food insecurity in 2021.

In industrialized nations, undernourishment is less than 2.5%, but in most of Africa, the situation is dire [ 52]. In 2019, Figure 6 depicts the percentage of people in several Sub-Saharan nations experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity. As shown by the figure, more than half of the population in most SSA nations suffers from moderate or severe food insecurity.

3. Why Is Sub-Saharan Africa the Worst in Terms of Food Insecurity?

The high food insecurity rate in Africa is due to many factors, including low agricultural productivity, harsh climatic conditions, slow economic growth, poor governance, a dearth of research and innovation, and many other factors.

3.1. Weak Economic Growth

The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa face formidable obstacles on their path to higher growth and greater global economic participation. However, the current economic growth rates are still insufficient to significantly reduce extreme poverty and allow these countries to catch up to other developing nations. In alleviating poverty and raising living standards, these nations need to see actual per capita GDP growth rates rise steadily and significantly [ 57].

Current projections indicate that many countries' GDP per capita will not recover to pre-crisis levels until 2025 [ 10]. Expectations are that the growth gap between Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world will worsen during the next five years. Sub-Saharan Africa is forecast to see a slower economic recovery than the rest of the world, with cumulative per capita GDP growth for the 2020-2025 period predicted at 3.6%. This is significantly lower than the projected growth rate for the rest of the world (14%) [ 58].

3.2. Gender Inequality

Gender inequality has a negative effect on achieving food security [ 59]. This inequality is true not only in society, communities, nations, or continents, but also in the SDGs which reflect some form of inequality in their coverage. For example, some SDGs (13, 14, and 15) that indirectly deal with food security do not incorporate gender equity or recognize how vulnerable women are, these could hinder not only the goal of food security, but also the goal of conserving resources [ 60].

3.3. Food Price Inflation

Recently, food prices have increased by double digits on average throughout SSA countries, with certain countries (Sudan and Zimbabwe) seeing increases of more than 180 percent ( Figure 8). It is concerning because, since August 2022, the inflation rate in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Nigeria has been over 20% ( Figure 8).

From June through to August of 2022, rising food prices and prolonged conflict are considered to be the cause of food insecurity for more than 38 million people in West and Central Africa [ 70]. Due to below-average outputs in 2021/22 and disrupted trade flows in West Africa, rising food prices are at or near record highs, especially for staple products [ 71]. Sixty-four percent, or 6.4 billion people, of the world's impoverished, live in rural areas, where life is more complex [ 72]. For example, the FAO lists more than 30 nations with food costs: Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, and Liberia.

3.4. Low Crop Productivity

Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) agricultural sector has been underperforming for some time [ 73]. From the early 1960s to the 1970s and up to the present, SSA's agricultural production per capita increased by a modest amount ( Figure 9). Contrasting with other developing regions, however, the overall trend is a stagnating growth [ 74].

SSA countries spent about USD 43 billion in 2019 for food imports [ 75]. Experts have been puzzled about Africa's growing inability to feed itself despite possessing most of the world's uncultivated farmland for a significant period of time [ 76]. The majority of SSA's net agricultural import bill comes from four countries: Nigeria, Angola, the DRC, and Somalia [ 77]. Most of the food that is imported may be grown domestically, according to a report by [ 78]. This would provide much-needed employment and income for the country's large population of unemployed young people and smallholder farmers. The African Development Bank [ 79] estimated that by 2030, Africa's food import cost would be $90 billion.

3.5. Drought

Consequently, civil society groups advocating for food justice and the right to food have staged protests in response to food poverty [ 12]. As stated by [ 83], drought was the primary factor in the rapid rise in food prices and the heavy reliance on imports. The most vulnerable and impoverished populations felt the effects of this most acutely.

After four consecutive failed rainy seasons in some regions of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, food insecurity has become a severe problem in the Horn of Africa, a situation not seen for at least 40 years. The drought has impacted at least 19.4 million people in the Horn of Africa since it began in October 2020. High rates of acute food insecurity and growing malnutrition affect at least 18.6 million people every day in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, and this number could reach 20 million by the end of 2022 [ 84]. There are now 7.1 million people in Somalia who are severely hungry, and 213 thousand people who live in the catastrophic region of the country. Over 1.5 million animals in Kenya, 2.1-2.5 million in south and south-eastern Ethiopia, and 3 million animals in Somalia have died due to the drought. These make the Pastoralist families who rely on these animals for food and income more vulnerable to food insecurity [ 84].

3.6. Low Investment in Irrigation Agriculture and Research

The potential for irrigation agriculture to improve agricultural output, income, and food security in Sub-Saharan African countries is substantial [ 85, 86, 87]. However, the SSA countries cannot reach their full potential because of decades of underinvestment, underuse, and neglect of their public infrastructure. Only 5% of irrigable land in SSA is fitted compared to 37% in southern and eastern Asia. Comparatively, the average equipped area in SSA countries is around 450 times lower than the global average (18%) ( Figure 10).

The World Bank estimated in 2000 that 85-90% of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa relied on rainwater for survival and that agriculture accounted for 35% of the region's GDP, 40% of exports, and 70% of its employment [ 9]. Agricultural output may not be sustainable with an annual rainfall of less than 700 mm. While global scientific investments and the number of scientists have expanded in the last five years, no African country now devotes 1% of its GDP to R&D. By the end of 2022, global research investment is expected to average 2.06 percent of the GDP ( Figure 11). A report by [ 88] indicated that 80% of the countries that invested less than 1% of their GDP in scientific research are in Africa, suggesting that poor spending on scientific research was widespread across the continent. Africa's share of global R&D spending remained at 1.01% from 2014 to 2018 and from 2019 to 2021. In Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, R&D spending accounted for only 0.45% of the GDP ( Figure 11).

3.7. Climate Change

The African continent is the most at risk from the effects of global warming due to its poorer financial, scientific, and technological capabilities to adapt to the dangers posed by climate change and its reliance on climate-sensitive and fragile economic sectors, (e.g., rain-fed agriculture). Many of Africa's poorest countries rely heavily on agriculture for their economies, and climate change is widely recognized as one of the greatest threats to agricultural output and food security in the 21st century [ 14]. Some parts of Africa (the Sahel, for example), have been drier over the last century, and it is predicted that the continent will face a steeper rise in temperature than the rest of the world [ 90] Considering that around 96% of food production in Sub-Saharan Africa relies on rain for irrigation, this region is very susceptible to the effects of climate change [ 89]. Temperature increases of 1 °C have been linked to a 2.66% decrease in agricultural output in SSA nations [ 91], which in turn has been shown to reduce economic growth by an average of 1.3 percentage points for each degree of warming.

3.8. High Population Growth

Current estimates put the global population growth rate at 1.1% per year, with a medium-variant projection predicting that number to rise to 9.7 billion by 2050 [ 94]. Even though population forecasts are inherently unreliable, with recent years overestimating population growth; by 2050, the world's population is expected to have increased to between 9.4 and 10.1 billion [ 93]. Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to add 1.05 billion people between 2019 and 2050, which accounts for more than half of the global increase [ 95].

There is a snowball effect when it comes to the costs associated with rapid population growth, as follows. (1) The current rate of births necessitates massive increases in food supply and agricultural production to keep up with the demands of a fast-expanding population, putting pressure on the government and private institutions to divert funds away from other areas of the economy and social life. (2) A higher dependency ratio is expected due to the rapid rise in the world's population. (3) The availability of productive jobs is threatened by population growth. An increase in the available workforce typically follows a period of strong population growth, however, given that an ever-increasing number of Africans cannot find employment in the developed economies' manufacturing and service sectors, they are either relegated to low-paying service jobs or forced back into the traditional economy's subsistence level of production. A vast pool of potential low-wage workers can hinder technical progress, whereas widespread poverty can slow industrialization by dampening consumer demand. The ultimate effect is low saving rates and low levels of skills labor, which prevent some African countries from using the full extent of their natural riches [ 66].

Due to the increased need for government services in health, education, welfare, and other areas, large groups of young people, especially those unemployed or who see little hope for a satisfying future, might become a destructive and ultimately combustible political force. Since Africa's population has boomed in the previous two decades, but its GDP per capita has been stagnant, the continent's economic change cannot last. As a result, poverty traps become ever more entrenched [ 99].

3.9. Conflicts

According to a study by [ 100], conflict and insurgency are significant causes of food insecurity in Africa. The authors of [ 36] reported that conflict is a key contributor to food insecurity for many of the region's countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda.

Grebmer et al. [ 101] estimated that about USD 52 billion, or 75% of total public aid received, was lost to battles in the agricultural sector between 1970 and 1997 in the SSA. Approximately 79% of the world's 155 million stunted children and 60% of the world's 815 million undernourished people are located in nations experiencing some form of armed conflict in the SSA [ 102]. The United Nations reported in February 2021 that more than 34 million people in SSA countries undergoing or recovering from violence needed food and other emergency humanitarian assistance [ 103]. Moreover, there are roughly 18 African countries that have been severely impacted by war and other forms of violence, such as community clashes, civil war, terrorism, banditry, political instability, and arm robbery, all of which have contributed to widespread poverty and food insecurity in the region [ 9].

According to a study by [ 104], conflict has had a significant and long-lasting effect on the economy of Sub-Saharan Africa. They also asserted that the cumulative negative effect of conflicts on per capita GDP increases over time, leading to an increase in the already ubiquitous rate of food insecurity. Their findings showed that the GDP of the countries in conflict could shrink by 2.5 percent. Bircan et al. [ 105] reported that the number of people who have been compelled to leave their homes as a result of a crisis in SSA countries has increased considerably from approximately 2 million in the early 2000s to 10 million in 2017. The major countries on the list are: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (4.4 million), South Sudan (1.9 million), and Nigeria with around 1.7 million people.

3.10. Corruption

In every culture, corruption signifies a more profound and widespread sickness. Although it is not exclusive to any country or region, it is the most widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa [ 72]. Evidence from Transparency International showed that only seven Sub-Saharan African (SSA) nations achieved a higher than average Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score in 2019 [ 72]. Bribery, like other forms of economic instability, has the effect of widening the income gap between the rich and the poor and fueling widespread poverty and food insecurity in SSA [ 109]. Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the highest rates of corruption in the world, according to [ 110]. Corruption and the misuse of public finances have exacerbated social division and armed conflict in several SSA nations [ 111]. While many SSA governments claim to be concerned about ending malnutrition, few have taken the time to quantify the extent of the problem. Mbate [ 112] in his study on the link between corruption and food insecurity, claimed that poor rural people in the SSA are especially susceptible to corrupt practices. He further claimed that impoverished people in Kenya were shown to pay bribes more frequently and with a greater proportion of their income than the middle class and upper class, thus, pushing them into a more devastating state of food insecurity. Anser et al. [ 113] discovered that in the West African sub-region, poor governance and the high incidence of corruptions could reduce food security by 20%. In Malawi, urban residents overwhelmingly identified the Cashgate scandal as the root cause of household poverty and food insecurity [ 114].

3.11. Other Factors

The Gateway to Sustainable Food Security in the SSA

Increasing food security calls for a varied and involved set of actions. Table 1 provides a concise summary of the most significant ones.

4. Conclusions

While the agricultural sector plays a critical role in enhancing food availability, guaranteeing food security has become an issue of key concern for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with varying degrees of economic development. The aim of this paper was to investigate: (1) why SSA countries respond slowly to the SDG2 goal of "End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture" and also (2) to showcase strategies that Sub-Saharan African countries should adopt to improve food security in a sustainable manner. This study focuses not only on identifying the reasons for high food insecurity in SSA, but also adds to the understanding of the most effective strategies to alleviate the hunger problem under the particular characteristics of SSA. It presents a holistic lookout for the policy options in various regions across the globe, that may interest to scholars and policy makers. The results from the literature reviewed show that the greatest problems related to sustaining food security in Sub-Saharan Africa include: weak economic growth, gender inequality, high inflation, low crop productivity, low investment in irrigated agriculture and research, climate change, high population growth, poor policy frameworks, weak infrastructural development, and corruption, among other things. Promoting investments in agricultural infrastructure and extension services together with implementing policies targeted at enhancing the households' purchasing power, especially those in rural regions, appear to be the essential drivers for improving both food availability and food access.

This study is not without limitations. First, the study was limited to Sub-Saharan Africa, which shares similar characteristics to South East Asia; therefore, there could be other factors responsible for food insecurity which are not captured in this review. Secondly, it should be stressed that the findings of this study do not constitute an all-inclusive evaluation of food security. Future research should incorporate other factors to have a comprehensive assessment of food security in Africa.

Author Contributions

A.H.W. and M.U. conceived the idea for the study. J.R.-S. and L.P. were involved in data collection procedure. M.B. and A.H.W. generated the graphs and interpret it. J.R.-S. and L.P. wrote the initial draft of the manuscript. M.U. and M.B. revised the work. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Informed Consent Statement

Informed consent was obtained from all the participants in the study.

Data Availability Statement

Data may be requested from A.A.H.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Wudil AH, Usman M, Rosak-Szyrocka J, Pilař L, Boye M. Reversing Years for Global Food Security: A Review of the Food Security Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2022; 19(22):14836. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192214836

Chicago/Turabian Style

Wudil, Abdulazeez Hudu, Muhammad Usman, Joanna Rosak-Szyrocka, Ladislav Pilař, and Mortala Boye. 2022. "Reversing Years for Global Food Security: A Review of the Food Security Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 22: 14836. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192214836

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Reversing Years for Global Food Security: A Review of the Food Security Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

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All around the world, inequalities persist in the complex web of social, economic, and ecological factors that mediate food security outcomes at different human and institutional scales. There have been rapid and continuous improvements in agricultural productivity and better food security in many regions of the world during the past 50 years due to an expansion in crop area, irrigation, and supportive policy and institutional initiatives.

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Flooding in Nigeria Negatively Impacts Food Security and Leads to Setbacks With Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals

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Flooding in Nigeria Negatively Impacts Food Security and Leads to Setbacks With Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals

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This peer-reviewed article looks into the effects flooding has on food security and the Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria. Nigeria's top three food sources, agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture, are negatively impacted by flooding as it destroys or contaminates the food. Nigeria is already one of the nations with the highest rates of food insecurity, which is exacerbated by its annual floods. The floods affect not only food production but also have the potential to displace people, bring them further into poverty, and negatively affect their health through less access to nutritious foods. The article called for governments to implement policies on flooding into their food security policies due to the significant impact that flooding has on food insecurity.

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by

School of Social Sciences, Western Sydney University, Penrith 2751, Australia

1. Introduction

Food is a primal need of humans and food security is central to sustainability. Food security is thus recognized as a crucial component of sustainability plans and a key concern of national security. It is key to building and sustaining a healthy economy and achieving social and environmental wellness, which are the three bottom lines of sustainable development ( Fanzo 2019; Pérez-Escamilla 2017). Many countries are currently dealing with the hydra-headed problem of flooding and food insecurity amid the COVID-19 pandemic ( Workie et al. 2020). In Kenya, for example, flooding, exacerbated by the effects of the pandemic, severely impacted food security and livelihoods ( Aura et al. 2020). The number of people facing food insecurity globally was projected to double by the end of 2020 ( Rondeau et al. 2020) in a world that was already off-track to achieve the SDGs by 2030 ( United Nations 2020). The growing problem of food insecurity thus portends a significant setback. Food insecurity is linked to a mix of factors, one of which is recurrent flooding disasters ( Banik 2019; Naylor 2018).

The achievement of the SDGs is directly dependent on food because, if there is no food, working towards achieving the goals is impossible. Of the 17 SDGs, 10 are directly impacted: No poverty; 2: Zero hunger; 3: Good Health and Wellbeing; 4: Quality education; 6: Clean water and Sanitation; 8: Decent work and economic growth; 10: Reducing inequalities; 11: Sustainable cities and communities; 14: Life on water; and 15: Life on land ( Echendu 2020a). Just as the SDGs are all interconnected, connections on the impact of flooding can be found in all the goals.

The SDGs recognize the centrality of food security to its success and map out targets for its achievement. While the SDGs are neither authoritarian nor binding, it proffers important guidelines that can be adjustable to local contexts. The SDG indicators are important as monitoring, operational, and evaluative tools. They are applicable across countries for measuring progress and determining where to channel resources to facilitate progress ( Gil et al. 2019). The SDGs follow country-led execution even though they are global goals. Working towards achieving them on a country-specific basis is necessary as different countries have different needs and challenges. Paths to attain them will therefore differ among countries because of different physical, social, and economic environments.

In the face of rising flood disasters and the effect on food security, a realignment of response strategies and rapid and concerted mitigation efforts have been called for ( The Lancet Public Health 2020; Mukarram 2020).

Climate change impacts are manifesting in Nigeria as increased incidences of dry spells and off-season rains which have caused variations in planting seasons in a country that depends mainly on rain-fed agriculture ( Ologeh et al. 2018). Climate projections indicate varying conditions in Nigeria, with the dryer regions experiencing more aridity with longer dry spells ( Animashaun et al. 2020; Oguntunde et al. 2017; Orimoloye et al. 2021) while the humid regions will experience much more intense precipitation during the rainy season leading to more flooding events ( Olaniyi et al. 2013). The coastal regions will also be exposed to more flooding due to the rising sea-level ( Merem et al. 2019).

Nigeria experienced its worst flooding in recent history in 2012 ( Nkeki et al. 2013; OCHA 2012; Toure 2014), wherein around 363 people died, more than 2.3 million people were displaced, and 16 million people were impacted ( Echendu 2020a; OCHA 2012). This flooding received national and international attention due to its magnitude, as 32 out of Nigeria's 36 states were affected ( OCHA 2012).

Many communities in Nigeria increasingly suffer localized perennial flooding during the rainy season between March and November ( Echendu 2022). The local nature of this flooding makes them receive little to no attention. However, the immediate and cumulative effects of such smaller, locally occurring incidents are no less important than major events and necessitate more attention ( Echendu 2019). Figure 1 below is a map of Nigeria that showcases areas prone to flooding.

Today, we face a situation whereby disasters are occurring back-to-back. The unpreparedness of the world to adequately respond to concurrent environmental and public health catastrophes highlights an urgent need to improve human resilience to shocks ( Béné 2020; Ishiwatari et al. 2020). This necessitates ascertaining the connections among different global problems and seeking synergistic ways to solve them. More capacity building is especially paramount in vulnerable developing countries if global sustainability is to be attained ( Adhikari et al. 2020; Bangar et al. 2020; Ouko et al. 2020).

In Nigeria, the impact of flooding on food security and the connection to sustainable development is an area that has not received adequate attention in research ( Akukwe et al. 2020). This study, therefore, specifically investigates the impact of flooding on food security in Nigeria. It showcases the link with the sustainable development goals and proffers ways to mitigate and improve resilience to flooding. Despite the threat of disasters such as flooding to food security, it has not been acknowledged in Nigeria's national food security policy/policies. This work thus serves another purpose of highlighting the need to consider disaster impact in future agriculture and food policies and to seek mitigation strategies. This paper is organized into eight sections. Following this introduction section, which presents a general overview of the research and its significance, is the section on the theoretical approach adopted. This is followed by the research method. The next section discusses food security and the SDGs. This is followed by an analysis of flooding and food security in Nigeria and the causes of flooding in the country. The impact of flooding on all components of food security is analyzed using the assemblage and systems thinking approach. Recommendations on how to address flooding to improve food security are made. The paper concludes by summarizing the key points and calling for the impact of disasters such as flooding to be considered in future food security policies.

2. Assemblage and Systems Thinking Approach

Assemblage thinking (AT) in its various descriptive, ontological, and methodological forms has gained the interest of social scientists in contemporary times, especially within the transdisciplinary critical policy field, where it has been used to gain new insights into the manner in which the governance and the political-economic domain evolve according to context, project, actors, and materials ( Baker and McGuirk 2017; Clarke et al. 2015). AT encourages scholars to undertake a deeper analysis of socio-ecological issues, actively seek relationships among seemingly standalone concepts, problems, or terms, and advocates an overall openness to looking at issues with a new lens, remixing interventions and planning in an adaptive style approach. Assemblages are not serendipitous but are intentionally and unintentionally joined together ( Briassoulis 2017). Bueger ( 2014) laments the philosophical and metaphorical overuse of AT, calling for its clearer application in practice in the form of an AT-inspired conscious posture that avoids binaries and looks at those overlooked details. McFarlane ( 2011) also invites scholars to 'thickly' 'describe the relationalities of compositions' that support the relationship between various actants and their material and contextual expressions. Assemblage-based approaches are capable of contributing to critical urban theory when they are linked to concepts and research agendas generated from a revitalized geopolitical economy ( Brenner et al. 2011). It is the author's view that its potential extends further into other fields, including disaster management and sustainable development, by its capability to draw together and seek connections between seemingly distinct subjects. For this reason, it was adopted as the analysis tool of choice in this work that brings together three distinct concepts-flooding, food security, and sustainable development. For Valzania ( 2021), AT needs to focus more on explaining the co-functioning of elements that make up an assemblage and not what assemblages are or mean. Explaining the co-functioning of an assemblage's element falls within the domain of the system's approach. The system approach of analysis takes into consideration every part that makes up the whole. It is a general approach that can be applied in various scenarios and fields even though it derives from system science and engineering ( Fiksel 2006; Jackson et al. 2010; Virapongse et al. 2016). Adopting an assemblage and systems approach to assess and understand the effects of flooding on the different components of food security enables a holistic and comprehensive overview and understanding of all four different dimensions of food security and their interrelationships. This would then inform the development of integrated solutions that can promote achieving the SDGs.

3. Research Method

This work is an integrative qualitative review that critically assembles, studies, and consolidates the existing literature on the distinct areas of flooding, food security, and the SDGs. The goal is to ascertain and dissect the linkages between flooding, food security, and the SDGs. Drawing from previous studies to generate a new and concrete interpretation of problems fosters scholarship and advances theory ( Post et al. 2020). Integrative reviews are broad and do not exclude studies based on design or the type of research to enable a holistic understanding of the phenomena under study ( Iida et al. 2020)

This study followed the steps outlined by Paré and Kitsiou ( 2017) for conducting reviews that aim to stand as an original body of work in contrast to literature reviews conducted to identify gaps in the literature to justify or act as a base to a researcher's work. Academic databases, specifically Google Scholar and ProQuest, were searched by using keywords including 'flooding', 'food security', and 'SDGs' in Nigeria. The search focused on studies conducted within the past ten years. The abstracts of selected papers were screened to ascertain relevance to the research questions. A supplementary hand search was conducted, during which a few studies outside of the 10-year timeframe were included due to their relevance to the current study. Articles making the final selection were then reviewed, from which the findings of this work were made.

3.1. Food Security and the Sustainable Development Goals

Food security is access to reliable and adequate quantities of nutritious and affordable food. It comprises four elements: availability, access, utilization, and stability ( Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007). Food security is an issue of global importance that nations strive towards achieving ( Osabohien et al. 2018). There are and have been several global partnerships and initiatives, most notably by the UN, to achieve food security, which sadly remains elusive today. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are particularly lagging in achieving food security. Eighteen of the twenty most food-insecure countries are in SSA, with 52% of the population being vulnerable to food insecurity and 20% being undernourished ( Gellert 2020; Prosekov and Ivanova 2018).

Food is an important component of the SDGs as a result of its interconnectedness to many of the goals ( Pérez-Escamilla 2017). The SDGs are a set of 17 goals and 169 targets that outline a shared pathway for all countries of the world geared towards achieving global prosperity and peace for the current and future generations. It succeeds the Millennium Development Goals which ended in 2015 and in which the need for food security as a development agenda was also a top priority ( Matemilola 2017).

Goal 2 specifically aims to achieve food security and end hunger. The targets linked to Goal 2 are presented in Figure 2 below.

The centrality of food to the SDGs makes food security a major determinant of achieving success. While SDG 2 focuses mainly on food security, the connection to the other goals cannot be overemphasized. For example, SDG 1 is focused on poverty eradication. The poorest people globally and in Nigeria are small-scale farmers who are most impacted by flooding ( Durodola 2019; Echendu 2020a; Fanzo et al. 2020; Mbah 2019). Ironically, farmers also comprise the majority of the food-insecure population ( Ecker and Kennedy 2019). Poverty is generally worsening in Nigeria, as seen in the incidence of disease and hunger, decreased life expectancy, and low per-capita income ( Ibikunle et al. 2019). The rising cost and unavailability of food exacerbated by perennial flooding disasters ensure that the poor cannot access this basic need ( Echendu 2020a; Tunde 2021; Udegbunam 2020).

Food insecurity impacts SDG 3-good health and well-being. Nutritious food is the most important indicator of good health ( Ohia et al. 2020). With a score of 29.2 in the 2020 Global Hunger Index (GHI), the hunger level in Nigeria is considered serious. The number of stunted children under 5 remains high in Nigeria, with over one-third of deaths among this group resulting from malnutrition ( Ezeh et al. 2021).

Making the food sector robust and resilient to flooding will contribute to reducing poverty and hunger. However, this goal is still elusive in Nigeria, which has the highest number of global poor, with about 87 million people living below the poverty line ( Abiodun et al. 2019; Amare et al. 2020; Dankumo et al. 2019; Okoi and Bwawa 2020). The goal of quality education is also impacted if children cannot go to school when the community is overwhelmed by floods. Access to clean water is affected when water sources become contaminated as a result of flooding. Moreover, food production from agriculture, aquaculture, and fishing contribute to SDG 10 (reducing inequalities) by helping mainly the poor to sustain their food supply and income ( Blanchard et al. 2017), but flooding derails this. Life on water and land is also impacted, as flooding is known to cause human deaths, destroy flora and fauna, and impact marine life. Food security is indeed a very important indicator of the success of the SDGs.

3.2. Flooding, Food Security, and the Nigeria Agriculture Promotion Policy

Food insecurity is a longstanding and growing problem in Nigeria, with the government struggling to address it as the country is unable to meet its local food needs ( Osabohien et al. 2018). The problem has worsened since 2020, when the country faced extreme food shortages and record-breaking flooding disasters ( Gellert 2020). In a study on food security by Week and Wizor ( 2020) in a Nigerian community, 75.6% of the respondents reported experiencing acute food insecurity. Following major floods, a significant surge in malnutrition levels is experienced due to the impacts of flooding ( Douglas 2017). The World Food Programme, in their 2020 global report on food crises, reported that, in 2019, flooding affected 32 of the 36 states in Nigeria. There was a major food crisis due to crop damage. In October of the same year, Adamawa, one of Nigeria's states was hit by its worst flooding event in 17 years, affecting more than 100,000 people ( World Food Programme 2020). These recent examples illustrate the severity of the flooding incidents in the country. Nigeria's food security is highly dependent on its agricultural sector, which underperforms. Therefore, it imports large amounts of food for local consumption despite its huge agricultural potential. Over the years, there have been national policies in place to address food security issues. The latest is the Nigeria Agriculture Promotion Policy (APP).

The APP aims at improving food security and reducing food importation. It acknowledges a food production problem and links it to an ineffective farming model ( Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2016). Improving productivity thus formed the key focus of the policy. Even though agricultural productivity is impacted by climate change, which has led to increased disasters over the years, the impact of disasters such as flooding was not acknowledged in the policy. Despite food production being the focus of the APP, flooding, a recurrent problem in the country that directly impacts food production, did not earn a mention. This is notwithstanding the devasting impact flooding has had on the Nigerian agricultural sector over the years. The negative impact of flooding on farmers has been widely reported ( Chukwu 2014; Madukwe et al. 2019). Climate change impacts such as rising flooding incidences cause decreased food production and are projected to worsen in Nigeria ( Blanchard et al. 2017; Durodola 2019; Echendu 2020a). This lack of mention of the role of disasters in food insecurity is a significant oversight that needs to be addressed in future policies, because, no matter the gains in the policy focus area of food production, a single flooding event can reverse them. This necessitates a more comprehensive approach to addressing food insecurity.

The importance of addressing food security issues in Nigeria is even more compelling given the rapid population growth in Nigeria, a country predicted to become the third most populous nation in the world by 2050 ( Gil et al. 2019). This necessitates looking into the factors that directly and indirectly impact food security and finding ways to eliminate or reduce these negative factors which comprise environmental, social, and economic factors. Socio-economic factors impacting food security encompass income, sex, gender, marital status, household size, etc. Environmental factors include climate impacts such as flooding and drought. Even though flooding is believed to portend benefits to agriculture and fish production in some aspects and locations due to the deposition of rich nutrients in the aftermath of flooding ( Otomofa et al. 2015; Talbot et al. 2018), this does not appear to be the case in Nigeria, as flooding has mainly been credited with serious and negative impacts. The impact of flooding on food security deserves adequate attention in national food security policies.

3.3. Flooding in Nigeria and Causes

Flooding is a complex issue because of its various types, causes, and impact. Nigeria mainly experiences pluvial and fluvial flooding. Pluvial flooding is when heavy rainfall causes flooding despite the absence of a nearby water body. It can occur even in areas situated above coastal or river floodplains. Fluvial or river flooding occurs when a river bursts its banks due to high rainfall over a period. Flooding in Nigeria is mainly caused by:

(i)

High Precipitation: Climate change is a global phenomenon, but the developing countries of the world are disproportionately suffering from the impact ( Akeh and Mshelia 2016; Azadi et al. 2019). The weather pattern in many parts of the globe has changed and, in Nigeria, climate-related events are manifesting in disasters such as flooding and droughts. Climate change will steadily and continuously increase flood risk in the coming years by inducing changes in sea levels, an increase in river flows, and heavier, prolonged rainfall durations ( Akeh and Mshelia 2016). Major flooding incidents in Nigeria have particularly been witnessed after high rainfall events. Climate change effects manifest according to the region; for instance, the dry northern arid areas are becoming drier while the wet southern areas are experiencing increasingly wetter conditions ( Olaniyi et al. 2019). The river basins of Niger-Benue, Anambra, and Sokoto-Rima are also exposed to flooding due to the bursting of river banks ( Nemine 2015). The impact of climate-induced flooding will be enormous, particularly in the coastal areas, where rising sea levels and precipitation are expected to be higher. Rainfall-induced flooding is considered serious because many parts of Nigeria lack the needed infrastructure to conduct and channel rainwater and surface run-off water, which exacerbates flooding risk;

(ii)

Poor physical planning and implementation of planning regulations: The state of urban planning in Nigeria leaves a lot to be desired. Poor urban planning practices and implementation are a leading cause of flooding in Nigeria. Lack of adherence to planning regulations has seen the construction of buildings on floodplains and drainage pathways that cause flooding. The urbanization rate is high at over 50% and is set to increase in the coming years ( Aliyu and Amadu 2017; Ojo et al. 2017). This is not accompanied by appropriate urban planning and infrastructural development to cater to the growing population ( Adekola and Lamond 2018; Echendu and Georgeou 2021). Good planning practices incorporate sustainable drainage management to cater to the needs of the population, which is lacking in the country ( Adedeji et al. 2012). On paper, urban planning laws and policies compare to global standards, but the implementation leaves a lot to be desired ( Echendu 2019). Development control and zoning are not being enforced. Along with this, infrastructural decay, the indiscriminate construction of buildings, and informal settlements that characterize the urban planning sphere, all contribute to flooding in Nigeria;

The importance of spatial planning in mitigating environmental disasters and achieving sustainable development cannot be overemphasized ( Adedeji et al. 2012; Meyer and Auriacombe 2019). However, the planning system in Nigeria leaves a lot to be desired and has been criticized for its ineffectiveness ( Olalekan 2014; Tasantab 2019). Urban planning presents opportunities for regulating the environment, mitigating global warming, and achieving sustainable development. Human activities tied to urbanization have increased flood risks. However, the detachment of urban planning and implementation from reality worsens the problem ( Echendu 2021b). Poor physical planning also manifests in the indiscriminate construction of buildings, including on drain paths and waterways in Nigeria, which contribute to flooding. The urban planning sphere in Nigeria is not lacking in knowledgeable professionals or laws and policies to manage the physical environment, but a gap lies in implementation and control, incurring these laws to be critiqued as only existing on paper ( Echendu 2019; Gyau 2018; Ikelegbe and Andrew 2012). The poor planning and regulation of development has majorly contributed to the country's flooding problem;

(iii)

Poor Drainage infrastructure and waste management: The lack of adequate stormwater management infrastructure and drainage is one of the leading causes of flooding in Nigeria ( Salami et al. 2017). Poorly constructed and managed drains are hallmarks of Nigerian cities, where storm drains in many places are open and small ( Echendu and Georgeou 2021). Their small size makes them unable to support large volumes of water during heavy rainfall. The absence of covers makes them easy dumping sites by undisciplined citizens. Most of the drains are also characterized by their poor or absent connectivity to adequate discharge points ( Frimpong 2013). It is not uncommon to see drains flood settlements due to poor connectivity and suboptimization whereby drains from a community can discharge into another community and cause flooding. The poor conditions of existing drains make them likely to cause, rather than prevent, flooding. The construction of infrastructure lags urban development. As a result, the existing drainage is not adequate enough to discharge run-off, thereby increasing the risk of flooding ( Cirella and Iyalomhe 2018). Poor infrastructure is a problem in this country that contributes enormously to flood risk ( Lamond et al. 2012).

3.4. Understanding the Impact of Flooding on the Different Components of Food Security

The concept of food security encompasses the availability, access, utilization, and stability of food. Flooding impacts all these different aspects. However, the majority of food security programs and policies have focused on food availability by seeking to increase production while neglecting other areas ( Firdaus et al. 2019). This approach is evident in Nigeria's current APP, where production alone formed the focus of the policy.

The food system comprises the chain of activities involved in producing, assembling, processing, storing, transporting, consuming, and disposing of food and food products ( Firdaus et al. 2019; Nguyen 2018). It includes broader governance and management and how food production affects the natural environment and social and economic life ( HLPE 2017). Flood impact studies have mainly focused on the agricultural sector even though Nigeria is also a top aquaculture producer in Africa ( Ahmed and Solomon 2016; Ipinjolu et al. 2013; Oluwatobi et al. 2017). Numerous fish farmers have had their productivity negatively impacted by perennial flooding due to their reduced catch, destruction of fishing tools, and environmental pollution ( Chukwu 2014; Oyebola et al. 2018). Despite the recognized threats of flooding to food security, there has been no integrated response or approach to mitigate flooding, which would have positive impacts that extend far beyond food security. For example, the millions of children who are denied education due to flooding would be able to attend school. Epidemics linked to flooding would also be averted if adequate flood mitigation strategies are in place.

The interwoven interactions and feedbacks in the food system mean that interventions need to be holistic to avoid intervention in one area creating or exacerbating problems in another. The focus on food production leads to the neglect of other components of food security, with the implication that the root causes of the food system's underperformance are missed. The various ways flooding impacts all aspects of food security is thus enumerated in this section for a more holistic understanding of the impacts. Here, the different assemblages that encompass food security are looked at individually. By taking the assemblage and systems approach, we are able to not only look at the holistic concept of food security but also take a deeper dive into how flooding affects the different subcomponents.

(i)

Flooding and Food availability: Food availability refers to the availability of sufficient amounts of food. Regular availability is dependent on sufficient production levels that only a healthy, disaster-free environment can ensure ( Gil et al. 2019). Food production levels in Nigeria are below demand despite agriculture being the second most important economic activity after crude oil. The perennial nature of flooding disasters further impacts production levels on both the aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, the two main food production interfaces. Flooding degrades the environment, destroys crops, farm settlements, livestock, and seedling stores ( Echendu 2020a). This reduces harvest and impacts the next planting season, culminating in a food shortage crisis. Human production capital is also impacted as, during floods, people are at risk of physical injuries and ill-health. Floods, therefore, have a chain reaction effect and represent a threat to food security by affecting the production of food ( Armah et al. 2010). Farming communities are disproportionately impacted not only because they lose income, but also because they lack the cash to purchase the other food and non-food items that they need. Inundated farmlands are unsuitable for cultivation. Livestock is not spared either during floods. Depending on the type of sediments deposited on farmlands during floods, some can be rendered uncultivatable for a period, creating a cycle of food scarcity and hunger ( Armah et al. 2010). Nigeria has no social security net and, for most of the affected, there is no other source of income except agriculture. This becomes a direct hit on SDGs 1 and 2, as the people become further impoverished and exposed to starvation and hunger. Moreover, floods impact the natural flora and fauna of an ecosystem. Floodwaters destroy land by striping soils and eroding shorelines taking out the natural vegetative cover in its path ( Smith 2017). The hazardous conditions it causes pose a threat to every form of life. The fact that water systems are also contaminated is a hazard to life. Flooding destroys both farms and harvest, contributing to hunger and jeopardizing the nation's path to sustainable development ( Kwari et al. 2015). Aquaculture and fish farming are not spared either, as floods wash away fish stock, leading not only to a loss of income for the farmers, but a loss of valuable protein sources for the general population. Floods negatively impact the aquatic ecosystem, and more frequent flood occurrences worsen the impact by leaving an insufficient recovery time in between flood occurrences which can last from months to years ( Talbot et al. 2018). This negatively impacts communities that rely on subsistence fishing and farming for food. Flooding thus negatively affects food availability;

(ii)

Flooding and Food access: Flooding impacts access to food, which is the ability to secure or obtain food as determined by purchasing power and affordability. It is the capacity to obtain sufficient nutritious food. Shocks on the food system due to flooding directly impacts accessibility. High prices of food due to limited supply in the aftermath of flooding deny access to the majority of the population who live in abject poverty ( Hallegatte et al. 2020). Food scarcity ensues and the forces of demand and supply come into play, increasing food prices beyond that which the poor can afford. Smallholder rural farmers who cultivate, process, and eat directly from their farms are the worst impacted by flooding disasters. Their primary source of income is impacted, and they are further plunged into poverty and lack the resources to purchase food in the market. This volatility in food prices caused by flooding puts an additional constraint on households, leading to inaccessibility. Thus, a cycle ensues where high costs also deter farmers from purchasing new seedlings, impacting their productive capacity. Flooding is known to collapse bridges in Nigeria, cutting off physical access between communities ( Ede et al. 2019). Access is further limited by the destruction of the already weak transportation infrastructure and road networks required to transport food. The result is that those communities not directly affected by flooding also suffer income loss due to a disruption in the transport services needed to transport food products to the buyers. Rural communities become further isolated and farmers cannot access the needed inputs and markets for their goods ( Osabohien et al. 2018). Supply chain disruptions, increased prices, the destruction of farm produce and stored reserves, and scarcity are some of the ways flooding affects food accessibility;

(iii)

Flooding and Food utilization: Food utilization is the most important but least researched aspect of food security due to its complexity ( Zewdie 2014). It is the ability of the body to absorb the needed nutrients from food. It is having the necessary nutritional intake and encompasses food safety and quality issues. According to FAO ( 2008), it is the nutritional worth of food, makeup and ways of food preparation, the social values attached to food that determine the type of food consumed at different times and events, and the safety and quality of food supply which can result in nutrient loss and food-borne diseases if the standards are poor. Food availability and access are the precursors to food utilization. A varied and healthy diet is necessary to furnish the necessary nutrients ( Hwalla et al. 2016). However, availability and access do not guarantee adequate utilization of the necessary nutrition from food ( Zewdie 2014). Nutrient and soil loss occurs as a result of flooding ( Sánchez-Rodríguez et al. 2017). This subsequently reduces the nutritional composition of food cultivated on nutrient-poor soil, since degraded soil produces low-quality food ( Lal 2009). The impact of flooding on the loss of nutritional quality of food is recognized. In a recent study in southern Nigeria, 71.4% of the respondents reportedly believed that flooding causes a loss of nutritional quality of food ( Week and Wizor 2020).

Flooding can affect the yield and quality of food crops. Plant tissue damage also occurs due to flooding, which promotes the development of bacterial and fungal diseases impacting crop quality ( Lauer 2008). Micronutrient consumption is affected if the nutrient composition of foods is altered. Farmers may decide to grow different types of crops of less nutritional value that are not affected by flooding. This, therefore, impacts the availability of nutrient-rich crops and the food utilization capacity of the general population. The impact of flooding on the general flora and fauna has also reduced the availability of wild food and game, which are rich nutrient sources. Financial access to food also has a significant correlation to food utilization than physical access ( Abbade 2017). The economic losses due to flooding also affect access to food.

(iv)

Flooding and Food stability: Food stability is ensuring that there is food availability, access, and utilization at all times ( Hwalla et al. 2016; Matemilola 2017). Vulnerabilities and shocks on the food system due to flooding impact food stability. This is because of the impact on other aspects of the food system, as enumerated in the previous sections. A decline in agricultural productivity because of flooding impacts the availability of food. Subsequent shortfalls in supply increase prices of food, making it inaccessible to a large section of Nigeria's population. This renders the already vulnerable population in the country more so among the poorer, small-scale farmers. The high prices and unavailability of certain types of food force consumers to limit their consumption and opt for less nutritious but more filling food, which impacts food utilization. Flooding thus presents a severe shock to the entire food system in Nigeria.

3.5. Addressing Flooding to Improve Food Security in Nigeria

Strategies to manage flooding are necessary to cushion its impact on food security and achieve more success with the SDGs. The complexity of the flooding problem necessitates a tailored response specific to locations and types of flooding. The negative impact of flooding on food security, which is the heart of the SDGs, necessitates seeking ways to tackle the flooding menace. As the causes of flooding in Nigeria have been identified as mainly anthropogenic, measures that can help address them and mitigate the impact on food security are highlighted here.

(i)

Improved physical planning: Urban planning has a role to play in reducing the impact of flooding on food security. The unregulated or poorly regulated nature of urban development in Nigeria has contributed majorly to flooding incidences due to developments on floodplains and natural drain paths ( Echendu 2020b; Idoko 2016). The urban growth pattern, therefore, deserves closer attention, with good regulations and effective implementation put in place. Zoning is important. As much as possible, agricultural lands should be sited further away from flood-prone areas. Riparian zones need to be restored. Restricting the building of impervious surfaces near water bodies will help manage flooding. Planning for, and construction of, flood control infrastructure is the purview of physical planning and needs to be factored in during the planning process. This is important to enable a flood-free environment in which farming can thrive and cater to the food needs of the population. Waste management is a core part of urban governance and citizen waste management sensitization is needed to discourage the indiscriminate dumping of refuse which blocks drainages and causes flooding. Adequate waste collection and treatment facilities need to form a core part of urban management and governance;

(ii)

Improved farming practices: More support, effort, and investment in research and development to develop flood-resistant, high yield, and a quick-maturing variety of crops will help in improving food security. This is necessary because, despite the best efforts to manage and control flooding, there may still be pockets of flood occurrences. Early maturing varieties, as was introduced in Bayelsa state in the aftermath of the 2012 flooding disaster in Nigeria ( Nemine 2015), should be made widely available because many farmers do not readily have access to such varieties ( Fakayode et al. 2016). Similar improved varieties offer the chance for the plants to mature before the onset of heavy rains associated flooding. Coping with flooding necessitates responding to changes in agricultural practices. Mixing crops and livestock with cash crops and trees to reduce the impact and losses due to crop failure is another strategy ( Reddy et al. 2019). Cultivating in the dry season with improved irrigation, especially in southern Nigeria, where it is not a common practice, is another way of mitigating the impact of flooding. This is because flooding occurs mostly during the rainy season, which doubles as the planting season. In the fisheries and aquaculture sector, technical innovations such as pond embankment modifications, fencing, caging and netting, and riverbank modifications are proven techniques that minimize flood threats to fish farming ( Oyebola et al. 2018). Farmers need support and training to apply these improvements. The integration of various extension education methods have proven effective in enhancing Nigerian farmers' adoption of new and improved practices, but farmers in some areas lack access to extension services ( Abubakar et al. 2019; Madukwe et al. 2019). Expanding the availability and reach of agricultural extension services will help in educating and encouraging farmers to adopt new and improved farming practices;

(iii)

Indigenous practices: Indigenous practices such as the use of mounds commonly practiced in Rivers, Akwa Ibom, and Ondo states as a flood mitigation strategy ( Nemine 2015) should be introduced in other parts of the country that do not employ similar practices. Undocumented local meteorological knowledge based on traditional beliefs, practices, and observation has been known to help locals predict flooding on a long-term and seasonal basis ( Nemine 2015). Curating and documenting such knowledge, which could be transferable, can help in calculating the best farming periods and strategies and help in managing flooding. This knowledge could be applied during research for the development of new crop varieties to factor in the flooding window. Infusion of scientific and indigenous knowledge and practices could further enrich practices;

(iv)

Grey and green infrastructure: Grey infrastructure consists of structures made of concrete and steel, for example, dams, dykes, and drains, hence the grey connotation. They have traditionally been used in managing flood risks with good performance ( Alves et al. 2018). Green infrastructure refers to multipurpose natural solutions that also provide ecosystem services such as recreation while also providing flood protection ( Dipeolu and Ibem 2020). A combination of grey and green infrastructure in managing flood risks is advocated as a better way to improve resiliency ( Alves et al. 2018; Pamungkas and Purwitaningsih 2019). The construction and improvement of the drainage system, the construction of buffer dams in needed areas, dredging, and the desilting of rivers and other water bodies are measures that can help control flooding. Dams can serve a dual purpose of providing electricity and a source of water for irrigation, boosting agriculture ( Durodola 2019). Farmlands in areas particularly prone to flooding where grey infrastructure is insufficient to control the flooding could be converted to wetlands and artificial lakes. Owners could then be adequately compensated and relocated with their active involvement. Pervious/permeable surfaces where possible should be encouraged to promote underground water absorption.

4. Conclusions

Food insecurity remains a serious and growing problem in Nigeria. Currently, the nation cannot provide a sustainable means of nutritious and sufficient food for its large and growing population. Food insecurity is widespread across the country, presenting in both direct and indirect forms. It exists at the individual, household, community, sub-national, and national levels. In the quest to achieve food security, the impact of flooding needs to come to the forefront of discussions and policies. Improving food security demands that those factors that increase vulnerabilities and pose threats or risks such as flooding be better understood, managed, or eliminated. The assemblage and systems thinking approach adopted in this study has helped shed light on the interconnections of flooding, the various components of food security, and sustainable development. It is important to tailor solutions considering the different geographical and topological zones of the country. For instance, indigenous knowledge and improved varieties could be deployed more in the southern lowland areas, while grey and green infrastructure and improved varieties could be employed in the areas surrounding the Niger-Benue and Sokoto-Rima basins. Flooding can be controlled by sustainable land-use management and planning and the provision of environmental infrastructure, the most important being drainage and solid waste management. The international community is encouraged to aid Nigeria by directly investing in flood mitigation and control projects which would positively impact Nigeria's food system and help achieve global food security, as is hoped for in the SDGs. Better knowledge on flooding and its impact on food security and the SDGs can help get to the heart of the issue, enabling actions to solve the problem. This paper is a call to action to the Nigerian government to consider disasters such as flooding which are set to rise in the coming years due to climate change in future food security policies while taking immediate actions to control flooding. The changing landscape and climate necessitate changing approaches to ensure food security and sustainability. Most importantly, rising global disasters have brought to the fore the need to build resilient and sustainable food systems. Those controllable factors that impact food security such as flooding deserve urgent attention.

Funding

This research received no external funding. The APC was funded by Western Sydney University, Australia.

Informed Consent Statement

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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AMA Style

Echendu AJ. Flooding, Food Security and the Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria: An Assemblage and Systems Thinking Approach. Social Sciences. 2022; 11(2):59. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11020059

Chicago/Turabian Style

Echendu, Adaku Jane. 2022. "Flooding, Food Security and the Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria: An Assemblage and Systems Thinking Approach" Social Sciences 11, no. 2: 59. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11020059

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Flooding, Food Security and the Sustainable Development Goals in Nigeria: An Assemblage and Systems Thinking Approach

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Food is connected to sustainable development goals in numerous ways, as food security is key to achieving sustainable development. The world is currently not on track to achieve the set sustainable development goals (SDGs). In Nigeria, flooding is a recurrent disaster and constitutes a setback to success with the SDGs and sustainable development.

# data[].attributes.headline
Food Insecurity Increases Among Nigerian Households During the COVID-19 Pandemic

# data[].attributes.subject
Food Insecurity Increases Among Nigerian Households During the COVID-19 Pandemic

# data[].attributes.body
This peer-reviewed article examined 1,674 Nigerian households to research the effects that the COVID-19 pandemic had on their food supply. The study's findings reported that roughly 32% of households surveyed were moderately food insecure before the COVID-19 pandemic, yet these percentages increased to 74% and 72% during the pandemic. 4% of households experienced severe food insecurity before the pandemic, and these percentages increased to 43% and 22% during the pandemic.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
BMJ Open. 2023; 13(1): e066810.

Original research

Abstract

Objective

This study set out to investigate the risk of household food insecurity in Nigeria during the novel COVID-19 pandemic using a harmonised dataset of Nigeria's prepandemic face-to-face survey and two waves of the COVID-19 National Longitudinal Phone Survey (NLPS).

Setting

Nigeria.

Participants

A representative sample of 1674 households is used in the analysis.

Design

A longitudinal study.

Results

Our longitudinal study reveals a significant increase in the prevalence of food insecurity in Nigeria during the COVID-19 crisis. For a sample of 1674 households used in the analysis, nearly 32% were moderately food insecure in the baseline survey (ie, the prepandemic period), compared with 74% and 72% that faced the same degree of food insecurity in the two waves of the COVID-19 phone survey. In like manner, not up to 4% of the households faced severe food insecurity in the prepandemic period, compared with 43% and 22% that experienced the same level of food insecurity during the period of the pandemic. Based on the available information in the dataset, we construct a composite non-monetary measure (or index) of household well-being and employ the binary logistic model to investigate the objects under study. The empirical results show that the well-being index has a strong negative association with household food insecurity. Further investigation reveals that the risk of being food insecure increases for households in relatively poor living conditions compared with those in the middle category and conversely declines for households in much better living conditions.

Conclusion

This study informs an understanding of the prevalence and risk of household food insecurity in Nigeria during the novel COVID-19 pandemic and provides insights that can guide policy actions in responding to the current wave of food crises in Nigeria.

Keywords: COVID-19, nutrition & dietetics, health economics

We use a longitudinal dataset of Nigerian households collected during the COVID-19 pandemic to study the association between household living conditions and food security in Nigeria.

We employ measures of household food insecurity provided in the dataset, which were computed base on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale methodology.

Our investigation informs an understanding of the risk of food insecurity in Nigeria in the period before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Our approach to the measurement of household well-being/living conditions in the study is driven by data availability and is less rigorous for a multidimensional measure of well-being.

The analysis does not account for selection bias; therefore, we do not disavow the possibility of endogeneity in the analytical results, nor do the findings infer causality.

Introduction

Undoubtedly, food insecurity has turned out to be the most discussed global issue in recent times, following the recent global crises caused by the persistent COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing war in Ukraine. The economic downturn caused by the pandemic resulted in job losses and reduced incomes for many people, making it more difficult for them to earn a living. The hard-earned reduction in global poverty was lost because of the pandemic, as more people moved into extreme poverty and were unable to meet basic needs. 1 The confounding effect of the pandemic was more severe in developing countries such as Nigeria, where as many as 4 in 10 persons were already living below US$1.90 a day prior to the pandemic. 2 The situation was worsened by the effects of the pandemic, as many Nigerians, estimated at around 86 million of the population, lost their livelihoods during the COVID-19 crisis. 3 The World Bank's poverty assessment report asserts that 3.8 million Nigerians moved into extreme poverty in 2020 as a result of the pandemic and projects an additional 5.1 million to transit into poverty by the end of 2022. 2

In addition, the lockdowns and other measures implemented to control the spread of the virus disrupted the global food supply chains and agriculture, leading to food shortages and price increases in some regions. The already-existing food insecurity in many parts of the world, particularly in developing countries, where people were already struggling to access sufficient food, was worsened by the pandemic. Many people in these countries rely on informal work, such as farming and street vending, to survive, and the lockdowns and economic downturn caused by the pandemic have made it difficult for them to earn a living, which has led to an increase in hunger and malnutrition in many parts of the world. Preliminary evidence revealed that the number of food-insecure populations was escalating in many parts of the world during the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated mobility lockdowns. 4-6 In Nigeria, for instance, household food insecurity was predicted to increase by 6-15 percentage points with additional cases of COVID-19 or mobility lockdowns. 4 Similar empirical evidence exists for other developing countries such as Ghana, where a SD increase in an instrumented COVID-19 measure leads to a 0.232 SD increase in poverty and a 0.289 SD increase in food insecurity. 5

In the same vein, global reports on food crises confirmed the rising profile of food-insecure populations around the world. 7-10 According to the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises, the number of acutely food insecure populations at the end of 2020 was around 151 million against 135 million in 2019. 10 In 2021, close to 193 million people in 53 countries were in crisis or worse conditions (IPC/CH phase 3 or above), based on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and Cadre Harmonisé (CH) or comparable sources. 10 In the case of Nigeria, the number of food-insecure populations has been on the increase since 2020. Figure 1 shows the situation of food insecurity in Nigeria between 2016 and 2022 using data from the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises. 10 The data is comparable for 16 states in Nigeria (out of the 36 states) and the Federal Capital Territory.

Before the peak of the pandemic, that is, between October and December 2019, the number of people in Nigeria that were in CH phase 2 (crisis) or above stood at 4.1 million. The value increased throughout 2020 and peak the highest in October-December, with 9.2 million people in crisis or worse phases.

Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the fragility of global food systems and the need for more robust and resilient systems that can withstand disruptions and ensure that all people have access to sufficient, nutritious food. Further, there is no doubt that the ongoing crisis in Ukraine is making it more challenging for countries to recover from the socioeconomic shocks of the pandemic. 11 12 The surging inflation in many parts of the world has worsened the situation of global food insecurity compared with the pandemic era. This calls for urgent action from governments of food crises countries such as Nigeria, where as many as 19.45 million of the population were projected to face crisis or worse conditions (IPC/CH phase 3 or above) as of June-August 2022, according to the Global Alliance for Food Security. 13

It is against this background that this study is set to analyse the risk of household food insecurity in Nigeria during the pandemic. Earlier studies obtained evidence of the socioeconomic and demographic factors that accounted for household food insecurity during the COVID-19 crisis. 14-21 To contribute to this growing knowledge, this study set out to answer the following research questions: (1) What is the prevalence rate of household food insecurity in Nigeria before and during the COVID-19 crisis? (2) What is the distribution of food insecurity by household living conditions in Nigeria? (3) What is the association between household living conditions and food insecurity in Nigeria? We explore the above research questions that form the study objectives using a longitudinal phone survey collected during the COVID-19 crisis. Our investigations inform an understanding of the prevalence and risk of household food insecurity in Nigeria during the novel COVID-19 pandemic and provide insights that can guide policy actions in responding to the current wave of food crises in Nigeria

Methods

Study design and data source

We use a harmonised dataset of Nigeria's COVID-19 National Longitudinal Phone Survey (NLPS), compiled by the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Study team. 22 The COVID-19 high-frequency phone survey is part of the World Bank's effort to promote data collection on COVID-19 impacts in developing countries and to foster evidence-based policies that can help countries mitigate the devastating effects of the pandemic. 23 The first phase of Nigeria's COVID-19 NLPS lasted from April 2020 to April 2021, during which a representative sample of 1950 households, drawn from the preceding face-to-face survey before the pandemic, was surveyed in 12 consecutive rounds. 24

In addition to being the most recent dataset with the potential to reveal the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria, the dataset has additional qualities that make it most suited for this study. First and most importantly for this study, the harmonised data file contains food insecurity variables that provide useful information on household food security status in Nigeria in the period before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, it contains rich socioeconomic and demographic variables that are useful in deciphering household food insecurity. In addition, the dataset contains a list of indicators that describe the state of household living conditions or well-being. These include indicators of household access to essential facilities such as electricity, clean water, modern housing and improved sanitation; and also the ownership of basic assets such as television, radio, a mobile phone, a motorcycle, etc. Having the above information enables us to examine the objects under study.

Participants

The study participants are restricted to households with complete food insecurity information in all three rounds of our longitudinal survey-the baseline, second and fourth survey rounds. In other words, participants with missing food security data in any of the survey rounds are excluded from the study. Consequently, we used only 1674 panel households out of the 1950 sampled households in the COVID-19 NLPS, excluding 276 with some form of missing data.

Measurement of variables

Household living conditions

Different indicators are recognised in the literature as measures of household welfare or well-being, from the most common income or consumption measures to non-monetary asset-based wealth indices (see Moratti and Natali 25 for a review). The use of wealth indices as alternative metrics for measuring well-being is increasingly popular among users of large-scale surveys (eg, Demographic and Health Surveys) that usually lack information on measures of income and/or consumption. 26 Such indices have the advantage of being more suitable for analysing multidimensional well-being and are less volatile compared with monetary indices such as consumption, income and/or expenditure. 27 28 Also, they are less data intensive and easier to calculate 29-31; thus, are considered superior alternative metrics for measuring well-being compared with income and consumption. 32

Following common practices in the literature, we identify several items (indicators) in the dataset that can assess household living conditions and aggregate them into a composite index. Our choice of items is guided by what is commonly used in the construction of multidimensional well-being or poverty indexes 33 34. Based on the information the dataset provides, we aggregate 14 binary indicators in the dataset into a composite well-being index. Table 1 describes the indicators used to construct the composite well-being index. The indicators are coded in such a way that desirable outcomes (eg, having access to a clean water supply) take the positive value (ie, equals one) while undesirable outcomes take the null value (ie, equals zero). We construct the index by taking the average of the 14 items. The resulting index is bound between 0 (worst) and 1 (best), such that larger values will imply more improved well-being or living conditions.

Table 1

Indicators

Number of households
(N=1674)%

Item-test correlation

From table 1 above, we could deduce that the majority of households in the sample have access to modern building materials such as roofs, floors and walls, as well as improved sanitation. However, quite a few of them (only 17%) have access to improved water sources. For the asset variables, a good number of households own a mobile phone, television or radio, irrespective of who owns it in the household. On the other hand, just 6% own a computer, and 12% own a car or other vehicle, irrespective of who owns it in the household. The item-test correlation result indicates the individual items have a positive correlation with the composite index, with coefficient values between 0.2913 and 0.7604. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient, α=0.7967, further indicates that the index has good internal reliability.

Lastly, we assign households to five well-being quantiles or groups-from the first to the fifth quantile. The classification is done in such a way that households with the small index scores, in other words, own or have access to a few of the items belong to the least quantiles, while those with much better scores (ie, own or have access to more of the items) belong to the higher quantiles.

Food security

The harmonised dataset provides measures of household food insecurity, defined as the 'probability of being moderately or severely food insecure' or 'probability of being severely food insecure'. 22 The indicators are binary, coded as 1 if a household's probability of experiencing food insecurity, based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale methodology, equals or exceeds 50% and 0 if otherwise. 23 For easy identification, we refer to two measures as 'moderate food insecurity' and 'severe food insecurity', respectively. Having these indicators across three rounds of the survey-the baseline survey and two waves of the COVID-19 NLPS-makes our longitudinal study possible.

Other covariates

Welfare literature maintains that household size and composition are important in explaining different aspects of well-being. 35 36 Empirical findings support the premise that household food insecurity or poverty increases with large households 14 and those living in rural or remote areas. 16 It is also empirically recognised that socioeconomic factors such as the receipt of remittances, 37 assistance, 38-40 access to finances, 19 21 41-43 income 14 16 and consumption level 23 play a significant role in explaining household food insecurity. Additional evidence in the literature suggests that demographic information about the family head, such as age, gender, marital status, employment and health status, are important elements that explain household food security. In this regard, there are enough findings to suggest that the risk of being food insecure or experiencing food poverty increases for female-headed households, 14 39 44 household heads not having enough education, 14 16 those living with disabilities 21 and those that are unemployed. 14

In addition to the well-being indices, we include a vector of demographic and socioeconomic variables in the regression equation. Our choice of the control variable is motivated by previous empirical evidence on the determinants of household food insecurity. The first set of covariates relates to information about the family head, such as age, gender, literacy, marital status, employment and health status. Next, we account for household characteristics using variables such as household size, consumption level, receipt of assistance, remittances and rental income, place of residence, cultivation of crops and the ratio of household adults working in wage employment, farm employment, or non-farm family establishment. In addition, we include regional dummies for the six geopolitical zones: North Central, North East, North West, South West, South East and South-South.

Statistical methods

To answer the first research question, we calculate the prevalence rate of household food insecurity in the baseline survey (ie, pre-pandemic period) and two waves of the COVID-19 NLPS and test the differences using McNemar's test. Next, we use the Chi-square test to test if the prevalence of food insecurity in each of the survey periods varies across household living statuses. Lastly, we employ the binary logistic regression model to investigate the relationship between household living conditions and food insecurity in different periods of the survey. The association model between household living and food insecurity is expressed as follows:

F o o d _ i n s t =δ H H _ L i v C o n d+γ′X′+μ i

where the outcome variable, F o o d _ i n s t , denotes our measures of household food insecurity (ie, moderate food insecurity and severe food insecurity) and the associated subscript t denotes the survey periods-the baseline survey (t=0), the second wave (t=2) and the fourth wave (t=4). H H _ L i v C o n d stands for household living conditions, X′ represents a vector of covariates that enter the model function and µ i denotes the error term. A logistic expression of the model is as follows:

P r(F o o d _ i n s t =1 X′ )=e α+δ H H _ L i v C o n d+γ′X′1+e α+δ H H _ L i v C o n d+γ′X′

where P r(F o o d _ i n s t ) is the conditional probability of experiencing food insecurity. The logistic transformation of the model is expressed as:

l o g i t(F o o d _ i n s t )=l n p 1−p=l n e α+δ H H _ L i v C o n d+γ′X′

The above transformation results in a linear function (X∗ ) that is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. The values of the estimated coefficients reflect the direction of association between the outcome variable and the regressors. Positive or negative coefficient values indicate that the associated variable increases or decreases the likelihood of a household being food insecure. We examined the model fit using the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test and attached the results as online supplemental material.

Patient and public involvement

Patients or the public were not involved in the design, conduct, reporting or dissemination plans of our research.

Results

Sample characteristics

The analytic sample comprised 1674 households with complete food insecurity data in the three survey periods of our longitudinal study (see table 2 ). The mean value of the composite index (H W _ i n d e x ) is estimated at 0.5064. By well-being groups, 15% of the households belong to the first well-being quantile; 16% belong to the second well-being quantile; approximately 20% are in the third (middle) well-being quantile; 24% belong to the fourth well-being quantile; and 24% are in the fifth well-being quantile. Only 17% of the households in the sample are headed by females, while the average age of household heads in the sample is 48 years. About 78% of the family heads are married; approximately 3% are living with a disability; 82% are literate; and 84% are working or currently employed.

For the remaining covariates, on average, 26% of working adults in the sampled households are working in agriculture, 31% in non-farm family enterprises and approximately 16% in wage employment. The average size of household in each of the survey rounds is 6. On average, 63% of the households own a financial account (regardless of who owns it in the household); 32% received remittances; nearly 10% received assistance from the government or other institutions; 6% received rental income; 66% are agricultural households and 39% live in the rural area.

Prevalence rate of household food insecurity across well-being groups

Table 3 displays the percentage of households that were food insecure during the periods of the survey and across the well-being groups. The results from McNemar's test show a significant difference (p<0.001) in the prevalence of food insecurity in the prepandemic and pandemic periods, that is, between the baseline survey and each wave of the COVID-19 NLPS (The results from McNemar's test are attached as online supplemental materials). For a sample of 1674 households used in the analysis, nearly 32% of them faced some moderate level of food insecurity in the period before the pandemic, compared with 74% that faced the same degree of food insecurity in the second wave of the COVID-19 NLPS and 72% in the fourth wave of the same survey. Likewise, only 4% of the sampled households were severely food insecure in the prepandemic period, compared with 43% and 22% that experienced a similar magnitude of food insecurity in the period of the pandemic (ie, the second and fourth waves of COVID-19 NLPS).

Table 3

Variable name

Definition

Mod_FIns0

Probability of being moderately/severely food insecure≥50% (round 0)

Sev_FIns0

Probability of being severely food insecure≥50% (round 0)

Mod_Fins2

Probability of being moderately/severely food insecure≥50% (round 2)

Sev_Fins2

Probability of being severely food insecure≥50% (round 2)

Mod_Fins4

Probability of being moderately/severely food insecure≥50% (round 4)

Sev_Fins4

Probability of being severely food insecure≥50% (round 4)

Total
(N=1674)

HW_1st Quant (N=256)

HW_2nd Quant (N=272)

HW_3rd Quant (N=331)

HW_4th Quant (N=405)

HW_5th Quant (N=410)

Pearson χ ² (p value)

The χ ² tests show significant differences in the prevalence of food insecurity across the well-being groups. In the baseline survey, for instance, among households in the fifth well-being quantile, 31.5% were moderately food insecure, compared with 20.7% among households in the first well-being quantile; however, there is no significant difference for the prevalence of severe food insecurity in the same period. The subsequent analysis (rounds 2 and 4) shows a significant difference in the prevalence of food insecurity across household living statuses and that it is increasingly higher for households in the least well-being groups.

Association between household living conditions and food insecurity

We investigate the risk of being food insecure in three periods of the survey and present the results in tables 4-6 . The first two columns in each table present the probability estimates for the risk of being moderately food insecure, while the remaining two columns show the probability estimates for the risk of experiencing severe food insecurity. We begin by estimating the models using the composite well-being index as our measure of household living conditions while controlling for the other covariates (panel A). In subsequent specifications, we estimate the models using the dummy variables for each of the well-being quantiles (omitting the third quantile-the reference category) and control for the same covariates used in the formal analysis, although they are not reported due to space constraints (panel B). The coefficients are reported as average marginal effects after adjusting the standard errors for model misspecification using Stata's 'robust' option. To conserve space, we interpret only covariates that show significant association with the dependent variable at the conventional 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels.

Risk of household food insecurity in prepandemic period (baseline survey)

The baseline survey regression (panel A, table 4 ) shows that the well-being index has a negative association with the probability of experiencing food insecurity in the prepandemic period. However, the finding is statistically significant only in the first specification of the moderate food insecurity model. That is, without accounting for household consumption level, the average marginal probability of experiencing moderate food insecurity in the baseline survey (or prepandemic period) is predicted to decline by 15.5 percentage points for an additional increase in the value of the composite index. Further estimations using the well-being quantile (panel B) reveal that households in the first well-being quantile have a greater probability of experiencing severe food insecurity relative to those in the reference category. The finding is consistently significant in both estimations-with or without accounting for household consumption level-with an average probability that increases by 3.44-3.52 percentage points. Conversely, the probability of experiencing moderate food insecurity is significantly lower for households in the fifth well-being quantile, relative to those in the base category.

For the rest of the covariates, the results show that household risk of being moderately food insecure is positively correlated with the household head being female and the size of the household, though the finding loses significance after controlling for household consumption level. There is consistent evidence that rural households are more likely to be food insecure in the baseline survey regressions (ie, the prepandemic period). On the contrary, households that cultivate crops, own financial accounts and receive rental income are less likely to experience moderate food insecurity in the pre-pandemic period. Additionally, there is a negative and significant association between the share of adults working in agriculture and household risk of experiencing severe food insecurity in the baseline survey. The evidence is weakly significant at the 10 per cent level of significance.

Risk of household food insecurity during COVID-19 pandemic (round 2)

In table 5 , we present the logistic estimates for household risk of being food insecure in the second round of the COVID-19 NLPS survey. The results (in panel A) show a strong negative association between the composite well-being index and household risk of being food insecure in the entire model specification-across all indicators of food insecurity and with or without accounting for household consumption level. The average marginal probability of being moderately food insecure in the second round survey is predicted to decline by 28.8 percentage points for an additional increase in the value of the well-being index. The probability value decreases to 25.6 percentage points after controlling for household consumption level. Similarly, without accounting for household consumption, the average probability of experiencing severe food insecurity in the same period is estimated to decline by 40.5 percentage points for an extra increase in the value of the well-being index and by 39.7 percentage points after controlling for household consumption levels.

The lower panel of table 5 (panel B) shows that the probability of being food insecure is much higher for households in the first well-being quantile relative to those in the third well-being quantile (the reference group). However, the finding is statistically significant only in the severe food insecurity model, with an estimated probability that grows by 7.64-7.72 percentage points. On the other hand, there is enough evidence that households in upper (fourth and fifth) well-being quantiles have less likelihood of being food insecure compared with the reference category. The average marginal probability of experiencing moderate food insecurity, after accounting for household consumption level, is estimated to decline by 60.5 percentage points for households in the fourth well-being quantile, and 13.7 percentage points for households in the fifth well-being quantile. In the same vein, the average probability of being severely food insecure in the same period after accounting for the level of consumption declines by 14.6 percentage points for households in the fifth well-being quantile relative to the base category.

Additional findings from the results in table 5 show that household risk of experiencing moderate food insecurity in the second round of the COVID-19 NLPS has a negative association with the household head being married, the share of wage earners, and ownership of the financial account. At the same time, the results infer that households headed by females and literate are less likely to be severely food insecure in the same survey period. Also, there is significant evidence across the model specifications that households with a record of receiving rental income have less probability to be food insecure in the same survey period. On the contrary, the risk of experiencing severe food insecurity is positively correlated with the percentage of working adults working in the non-farm family enterprise.

Risk of household food insecurity during COVID-19 pandemic (round 4)

Table 6 contains the regression estimates for the probability of experiencing food insecurity in the fourth round of the COVID-19 NLPS survey. In line with the preceding findings, there is a strong negative relationship between the composite well-being index and household food insecurity in the entire analysis. Without accounting for household consumption, the estimated probability value of the well-being index equals −0.377 in the moderate food insecurity regression and −0.368 in the severe food insecurity regression. The values decrease in absolute terms to −0.307 and −0.343 when we add the consumption level controls to the specifications. Further investigation using the household well-being quantiles (panel B) supports the earlier established evidence that households in the least state of well-being have a higher probability of experiencing severe food insecurity relative to those in the reference group, while on the contrary, the probability is much lesser for households in a better state of well-being. The average marginal probability of being severely food insecure, after accounting for household consumption level, is estimated at 0.0561 for households in the first well-being quantile. Meanwhile, the same probability is estimated at −0.0644 for households in the fourth quartile and −0.181 for households in the fifth quantile.

Among the rest of the variables included in the analysis, the results in table 6 indicate that the risk of being severely food insecure in the fourth round of the COVID-19 NLPS is negatively associated with household head characteristics like age and marital status, while positively correlated with household size and the number of wage workers. However, the latter finding loses significance after accounting for household consumption levels in the analysis. Additional evidence from the analysis suggests that household risk of being severely food insecure is positively correlated with the receipt of assistance and the share of adults working in wage employment. However, the finding on the receipt of assistance loses significance after we added household consumption level in the analysis.

Diagnostic test

The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test results indicate that the models have a good fit (The results are attached as online supplemental materials).

Discussions

This study contributes to the growing knowledge of household food insecurity during the novel COVID-19 pandemic. Using a harmonised dataset of Nigeria's prepandemic face-to-face survey and two waves of the COVID-19 NLPS, we analyse the prevalence of food insecurity in Nigeria before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our analysis recorded a significant increase in the number of food-insecure households during the COVID-19 crisis relative to the prepandemic period. Thus, for a sample of 1674 households used in the analysis, only 32% were at moderate risk of food insecurity in the baseline survey (or prepandemic period), compared with 74% and 72% at such risk in the second and fourth waves of the COVID-19 survey. In like manner, not up to 4% of the households faced severe food insecurity in the baseline survey, compared with 43% and 22% that experienced the same magnitude of food insecurity in the period of the COVID-19 pandemic (or waves of the COVID-19 survey). This shows that the levels of food insecurity substantially increased in Nigeria at the point when COVID-19 was rife and beyond 4 and has continued in contemporary times. 10 13 The outcome of this study does agree with some recent studies across regions. 4-6 Succinctly, a study in Uttar Pradesh, India, reported that household food insecurity in the region increased from 21% in the prepandemic period to 80% during the pandemic, with 62% of the food-secure households in the initial period turning out to be food insecure during the pandemic. 6

In the later part of the study, we investigate the association between household living conditions and food insecurity in each of the survey periods-the baseline and two waves of the COVID-19 NLPS. We begin by constructing a composite non-monetary measure (or index) of household well-being using the available information in the dataset. Relative to conventional measures of well-being, particularly income and consumption, the constructed measure of household well-being in this study has the advantage of being more suitable for analysing multidimensional or non-monetary well-being and is less volatile to external shocks. 26 27 However, our approach to constructing the well-being index is driven by data availability and lacks rigorousness for a multidimensional measure of well-being.

Our investigations inform our understanding of how the risk of food insecurity varies across categories of household well-being in Nigeria during the COVID-19 pandemic. First, we observe an increasing food insecurity status among households in relatively poor living conditions (ie, those in the first and second well-being quantiles) compared with their upper quantile counterparts. For the risk of experiencing food insecurity, we establish a strong negative relationship between the well-being index and household probability of experiencing food insecurity, most significant in the pandemic specifications. Further investigation reveals that the risk of being food insecure increases for households with poor well-being or living conditions relative to those in the middle category and conversely declines for households in much better living conditions.

Addressing food insecurity, at least in the short and medium terms, requires that food (or other social assistance) be provided for the vulnerable population-individuals suffering from food insecurity. Although not within the scope of this study, existing evidence suggests that social security or assistance plays a meaningful role in mitigating the effects of negative life events. In India, for instance, it was observed that social safety programmes in the form of cash transfers helped protect households from food insecurity during the COVID-19 crisis. 37 A similar study for 11 different countries during the pandemic argued that cash safety nets were more effective in addressing food insecurity than food assistance 38; while in Malawi it was observed that assistance-recipient households have a lower probability of engaging in coping strategies during the pandemic, particularly, reducing food consumption or depending on savings. 39

However, an issue of concern that calls for urgent attention is the low coverage of social protection programmes in Nigeria. It is quite surprising to know that only 4% of households in Nigeria received social assistance in the form of direct cash transfers during the pandemic, 23 with less than 10% of the households in our analytical sample having a record of receiving assistance either from the government or an institutional body ( table 2 ). Reactive attempts to contain the burden of food insecurity during the pandemic pre-empted households from finding solace in cost-effective coping strategies, such as reducing food and dietary consumption, which has a long-lasting effect on welfare. 23

To this end, we call for a 'robust' social protection system that, beyond responding to food (or any) crises in the country, will ensure no one is left behind, most especially among individuals or households in the least well-being group, which, according to our findings, are vulnerable to food insecurity during unexpected emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Beyond this, more efforts must be geared toward improving household living conditions through improved access to essential infrastructures such as electricity, clean water supply, improved sanitation and an internet connection, which are very essential for meeting basic needs and pursuing economic activities.

Footnotes

Contributors: Conceptualisation, data analysis: ECO. Literature review: ECO, AA and WN. Methodology: ECO. Writing-original draft: ECO and JOU. Writing-review & editing: ECO, AA, JOU and WN. Guarantor: ECO. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Funding: The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Competing interests: None declared.

Patient and public involvement: Patients and/or the public were not involved in the design, or conduct, or reporting, or dissemination plans of this research.

Provenance and peer review: Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.

Supplemental material: This content has been supplied by the author(s). It has not been vetted by BMJ Publishing Group Limited (BMJ) and may not have been peer-reviewed. Any opinions or recommendations discussed are solely those of the author(s) and are not endorsed by BMJ. BMJ disclaims all liability and responsibility arising from any reliance placed on the content. Where the content includes any translated material, BMJ does not warrant the accuracy and reliability of the translations (including but not limited to local regulations, clinical guidelines, terminology, drug names and drug dosages), and is not responsible for any error and/or omissions arising from translation and adaptation or otherwise.

Data availability statement

Data are available in a public, open access repository. Data used in this study is derived from a source in the public domain - COVID-19 National Longitudinal Phone Survey (COVID-19 NLPS) 2020 - World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study Harmonized Dataset and available at https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3856.

Ethics statements

Patient consent for publication

Not applicable.

Ethics approval

Not applicable.

References

13. Global alliance for food security country profile: Nigeria. Available: https://gafs.info [Accessed 10 Nov 2022].

21. Orjiakor EC. Does access to financial services help improve household food security during COVID-19 pandemic? Evidence from Nigeria. International Journal of Social Sciences 2022. under review. [ Google Scholar]

28. Filmer D, Pritchett LH. Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data--or tears: an application to educational enrollments in states of India. Demography 2001;38:115-32. 10.1353/dem.2001.0003 [[ PubMed] [ CrossRef] Google Scholar]

34. Orjiakor EC, Nto SE, Nnamani GO. Assessing the determinants of non-monetary household asset poverty in Nigeria. Journal of Economics and Development 2022. Under review. [ Google Scholar]

37. Sulemana I, Anarfo EB, Quartey P. International remittances and household food security in sub-Saharan Africa. Migr Dev 2018. [ Google Scholar]

41. Gyasi RM, Phillips DR, Adam AM. How far is inclusivity of financial services associated with food insecurity in later life? implications for health policy and sustainable development goals. J Appl Gerontol 2021;40:189-200. 10.1177/0733464820907441 [[ PubMed] [ CrossRef] Google Scholar]

Articles from BMJ Open are provided here courtesy of BMJ Publishing Group

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Original research: Household living conditions and food insecurity in Nigeria: a longitudinal study during COVID-19 pandemic

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
BMJ Open. 2023; 13(1): e066810. Original research This study set out to investigate the risk of household food insecurity in Nigeria during the novel COVID-19 pandemic using a harmonised dataset of Nigeria's prepandemic face-to-face survey and two waves of the COVID-19 National Longitudinal Phone Survey (NLPS). Nigeria.

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World Food Programme's Mission To Assist Nigeria's Food Insecurity Crisis

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World Food Programme's Mission To Assist Nigeria's Food Insecurity Crisis

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This article from the World Food Programme discusses the rising effects of food insecurity facing Nigerians. Being the most populated African country with 200 million people, 8.4 million people in northeast Nigeria are suffering from food insecurity. Violence in the region has exacerbated the food crisis, leading to 4.1 million people in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states being food insecure. Climate change deeply affects the country's land, making the population and agriculture more vulnerable to climate effects. WFP, along with UNICEF, have developed a joint Rapid Response Mechanism to provide food, health and nutrition aid to vulnerable populations in the Borno and Yobe states. Monthly, WFP sends food and money to 1.2 million people in the Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states.

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UNICEF's Call to Action to Fight Nigeria's Food Insecurity Crisis

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UNICEF's Call to Action to Fight Nigeria's Food Insecurity Crisis

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This article from UNICEF details the increasing numbers of Nigerians at risk of food insecurity during the summer of 2023. Climate change, conflict, inflation and rising food prices are the main reasons for the food insecurity crisis ensuing. The northeast states are highly affected due to violence persistently occurring there, threatening people's ability to obtain food. This article details how children are the population most at risk of food insecurity; a bit less than half of the millions of Nigerians suffering from food insecurity are children under the age of five, which makes them more vulnerable to mortality due to acute malnutrition. In the Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states alone, it is expected that 2 million children are suffering from acute malnutrition, a number rising from 1.74 million in 2022. The regions of Katsina, Zamfara and Sokoto are expected to have 4.3 million people suffering from food insecurity this summer. UNICEF aims to assist Nigeria through partnerships with the government and organizations such as MSF and ALIMA to increase preventative nutrition interventions to expand children's access to nutrition services. Last year, UNICEF and its partners reached roughly 650,000 in the BAY states and in Sokoto, Katsina and Zamfara. The article also discussed how the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, along with partners, has played a role in supporting the restoration of Nigeria's northeast and northwestern regions' livelihoods through livestock production, crop production, value chain development, homestead micro gardening and aquaculture. However, the UN has called upon Nigeria's government and other donors and stakeholders to create an action plan to prevent a possibly disastrous food insecurity crisis.

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ABUJA, 16 January 2023 - Nearly 25 million Nigerians are at risk of facing hunger between June and August 2023 (lean season) if urgent action is not taken, according to the October 2022 Cadre Harmonisé, a Government led and UN-supported food and nutrition analysis carried out twice a year.

This is a projected increase from the estimated 17 million people currently at risk of food insecurity. Continued conflict, climate change, inflation and rising food prices are key drivers of this alarming trend. Food access has been affected by persistent violence in the north-east states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) and armed banditry and kidnapping in states such as Katsina, Sokoto, Kaduna, Benue and Niger. According to the National Emergency Management Agency, widespread flooding in the 2022 rainy season damaged more than 676,000 hectares of farmlands, which diminished harvests and increased the risk of food insecurity for families across the country. The flooding is one of the effects of climate change and variability impacting Nigeria. More extreme weather patterns affecting food security are anticipated in the future.

Of the 17 million people who are currently food insecure, 3 million are in the northeast BAY states. Without immediate action, this figure is expected to increase to 4.4 million in the lean season. This includes highly vulnerable displaced populations and returnees who are already struggling to survive a large-scale humanitarian crisis in which 8.3 million people need assistance.

"The food security and nutrition situation across Nigeria is deeply concerning," said Mr. Matthias Schmale, the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Nigeria. "I have visited nutrition stabilization centres filled with children who are fighting to stay alive. We must act now to ensure they and others get the lifesaving support they need."

Children are the most vulnerable to food insecurity. Approximately 6 of the 17 million food-insecure Nigerians today are children under 5 living in Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Sokoto, Katsina and Zamfara states. There is a serious risk of mortality among children attributed to acute malnutrition. In the BAY states alone, the number of children suffering from acute malnutrition is expected to increase from 1.74 million in 2022 to 2 million in 2023.

UNICEF, working with the government and partners such as MSF and ALIMA, is investing in scaling up preventive nutrition interventions, while ensuring that vulnerable children have access to life-saving nutrition services. In 2022, UNICEF with partners was able to reach approximately 650,000 children with life-saving nutrition services across the six states mentioned above.

The northwest region, around Katsina, Zamfara and Sokoto states, is an increasing food insecurity and malnutrition hotspot. An estimated 2.9 million people are currently critically food insecure (Cadre Harmonisé Phase 3 or worse.) This figure is projected to increase to 4.3 million in the lean season if urgent action is not taken.

With partners, FAO has been supporting the government to restore livelihoods in the northeast and northwest regions. This includes livestock production, crop production, homestead micro gardening, value chain development and aquaculture.

The United Nations is calling on the Government of Nigeria, the donor community, and public and private stakeholders to urgently commit resources and implement mitigation measures to save lives and prevent a potentially catastrophic food security and nutrition situation. Support for vulnerable families across the country is needed today, not tomorrow.

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25 million Nigerians at high risk of food insecurity in 2023

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ABUJA, 16 January 2023 - Nearly 25 million Nigerians are at risk of facing hunger between June and August 2023 (lean season) if urgent action is not taken, according to the October 2022 Cadre Harmonisé, a Government led and UN-supported food and nutrition analysis carried out twice a year.

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The Two Main Factors Exacerbating Nigeria's Food Insecurity Crisis: Climate Change and Violent Conflict

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The Two Main Factors Exacerbating Nigeria's Food Insecurity Crisis: Climate Change and Violent Conflict

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This article discusses how climate change and violent conflict are exacerbating Nigeria's food insecurity crisis. Approximately 25.3 million Nigerians are at risk of suffering from acute food insecurity in the next few months, numbers that have risen from the current 17 million at risk now. Nigeria is a country very vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters such as floods. A flood that occurred in 2022 destroyed large amounts of their farmland, exacerbating the food insecurity crisis. Northern parts of Nigeria are suffering from drought, resulting in less availability of water to use for crops. The Boko Haram extremist group in Nigeria has affected the primary food production spot by forcing farmers to abandon their land and has initiated violent conflicts, armed banditry and kidnappings. Boko Haram have revolted in parts of Nigeria, leading to farmers and herders having to leave their land, and this has led to clashes between the farmers and herders.

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An alarming number of Nigerians - approximately 25.3 million - are in danger of acute food insecurity during the next few months, according to a recent report from the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization.

This represents a rise from the 17 million that are currently estimated to be at risk of food insecurity. The report identifies violent conflict, climate change, inflation and rising food prices as the key drivers exacerbating the country's food security situation.

The 2022 Global Food Security Index - which ranks countries based on food affordability, availability, quality and safety - ranked Nigeria 107 out of 113 countries. This is a notable drop from its previous rank of 97 in 2021.

Two formidable forces have converged to push Nigeria's food security to the brink: climate change, with its unpredictable weather patterns, and violent conflict.

Nigerian politicians have attested to this dangerous combination. Muhammad Abubakar, Nigeria's minister of agriculture and rural development, lamented in 2022 that terrorism and floods were hampering the nation's food security.

Climate change and food insecurity

Nigeria relies heavily on agriculture, with approximately two-thirds of its labour force dependent on farming or herding to make a living. Since both activities rely heavily on weather patterns like rainfall, Nigeria's agriculture industry is very susceptible to the effects of climate change.

In addition, Nigeria is one of the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and natural hazards. It has experienced a variety of climate disasters, including rising temperatures, gully erosion, drought and increased flooding.

In 2022, Nigeria was hit by devastating floods that killed more than 500 people, displaced more than 1.4 million and destroyed about 90,000 homes. Analysis from the World Weather Attribution group found that climate change was likely responsible for the heavy rains that caused the flooding.

The floods destroyed thousands of hectares of farmland, worsening the already severe food insecurity in the country. Crops were destroyed and the floods cost the agricultural sector about C$2 billion in damages.

In addition, the arid regions of the northwest and northeastern parts of Nigeria are currently facing substantial challenges from drought and land degradation. Both issues have a significant impact on food security, as they result in less water being available for crops.

Violence fuelling food crisis

Compounding the climate change crisis is the rise in violence orchestrated by armed groups like the Boko Haram extremist group.

Violence, armed banditry and kidnappings have affected food access across Nigeria. This violence has affected northern Nigeria in particular, where the bulk of food production occurs and 8.4 million are currently food insecure.

Boko Haram terrorists, bandits and armed herders have forced at least 78,000 farmers to abandon their farmland in Borno, Katsina, Taraba, Plateau and other northern states.

More than 2,000 Benue farmers have been displaced, according to the chairman of the All Farmers Association of Nigeria, disrupting farming activities in the affected regions.

Farmer-herder conflict

The Boko Haram insurgency is also a contributing factor in the farmer-herder conflict in the Middle Belt region, a key crop-producing area of Nigeria.

The insurgency, along with land and water scarcity, has forced nomadic herders from the north to migrate south in search of grazing lands and water for their livestock. As a result, the herders have clashed violently with local farmers over resources.

Although ethnicity and religion play a role in the conflict - many of the herders are Fulani Muslims while the farmers are Christian and from other ethnic groups - climate change is exacerbating it. Increasing temperatures and unpredictable rainfall patterns have intensified the resource competition between the two groups, leading to more disputes.

Herders have allegedly destroyed the crops of farmers and chased some of them off their land.

Over the past eight years, an estimated 6,000 Benue people have been killed and two million farmers have been displaced. The violence has largely disrupted the food supply chains between northern and southern Nigeria, as many roads are too unsafe for farmers to transport their crops.

Addressing the crisis

Nigeria is currently at a crossroads. Without taking immediate action, the number of Nigerians who are food insecure will continue to increase.

More than 5.9 million children in northwest and northeast Nigeria experienced acute malnutrition between May 2022 and April 2023. More than 1.6 million of these children suffered from severe acute malnutrition.

The government has recently made announcements regarding these issues. In May, Bola Tinubu, Nigeria's president, pledged to implement "best modern practices" to address the conflicts between farmers and herdsmen in the country.

These modern practices include building agricultural hubs to enhance productivity, guaranteeing minimal prices for certain crops and animal products, and creating storage facilities to reduce food waste.

The government should adopt a multi-faceted approach to address the food insecurity crisis. This kind of approach would integrate climate action, modern livestock and farming techniques, and security measures to mitigate the impacts climate change and violent conflict are having on Nigeria's food insecurity.

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A deadly duo: Climate change and conflict are fuelling Nigeria's food insecurity crisis

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An alarming number of Nigerians - approximately 25.3 million - are in danger of acute food insecurity during the next few months, according to a recent report from the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization. This represents a rise from the 17 million that are currently estimated to be at risk of food insecurity.