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NATICK, Mass. - A World War II museum in Massachusetts is displaying artifacts commemorating the Pearl Harbor attack ahead of the Dec. 7 anniversary.

The International Museum of World War II says it recently acquired a life ring from the USS Arizona.

The battleship was among those destroyed in the surprise attack by Japan on the U.S naval base in Hawaii that prompted the U.S. to enter the war in 1941.

The ship's sunken remains are now a national memorial.

The museum, located in the Boston suburb of Natick, also displays many other artifacts related to the attack.

Among them is Japan's formal declaration of war against the U.S., pieces of Japanese planes shot down at Pearl Harbor and women's panties that read: "Remember Pearl Harbor, Don't Get Caught with Your Pants Down."

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USS Arizona life ring among museum's Pearl Harbor artifacts

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NATICK, Mass. - A World War II museum in Massachusetts is displaying artifacts commemorating the Pearl Harbor attack ahead of the Dec. 7 anniversary. The International Museum of World War II says it recently acquired a life ring from the USS Arizona.

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1.  Japan Invades Manchuria (before attack-Sept. 19, 1931-Feb. 27, 1932-after attack)

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1.  Japan Invades Manchuria (before attack-Sept. 19, 1931-Feb. 27, 1932-after attack)

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Eager to obtain more land and resources Japan's army invaded Manchuria. The Japanese government ordered them to stop but they ignored the order. After this the League of Nations condemned their actions. Japan didn't care and walked out on the League of Nations while continuing the invasion.

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World War II was fought by millions of people in all corners of the world. There were battles and military posts in surprising places. The Caribbean and Central America, Greenland, Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, Iraq, Syria, Burma and the Arctic are a few of the little known places that were involved. Every major country of the time was involved in the war.

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10.  U.S. Troops Invade Italy (Sept. 1943-after attack)

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10.  U.S. Troops Invade Italy (Sept. 1943-after attack)

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The Allied powers planned to attack Italy because it was known as "The soft underbelly of Europe". Their plan was to remove Italy from the War, secure the Mediterranean Sea and force Germany to spread their army out which would weaken them. This article has information on how the Allied Powers planned and wanted things to go and then how they really went.

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Italian Campaign - World War II - HISTORY.com

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Find out more about the history of Italian Campaign, including videos, interesting articles, pictures, historical features and more. Get all the facts on HISTORY.com

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9. Japanese Prejudice (Feb. 19, 1942-after attack)

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9. Japanese Prejudice (Feb. 19, 1942-after attack)

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After the attack at Pearl Harbor the U.S. Navy finally defeated Japan. America then started internment camps for Japanese Americans, scared that another surprise attack could happen. These camps and actions of the President started extreme hate towards the Japanese. This article shows and tells why and how Japanese internment camps were formed.

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Executive Order 9066

On February 19, 1942, shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 with the stated intention of preventing espionage on American shores.

Military zones were created in California, Washington and Oregon-states with a large population of Japanese Americans. Then Roosevelt's executive order forcibly removed Americans of Japanese ancestry from their homes. Executive Order 9066 affected the lives about 120,000 people-the majority of whom were American citizens.

Canada soon followed suit, forcibly removing 21,000 of its residents of Japanese descent from its west coast. Mexico enacted its own version, and eventually 2,264 more people of Japanese descent were forcibly removed from Peru, Brazil, Chile and Argentina to the United States.

Anti-Japanese American Activity

Weeks before the order, the Navy removed citizens of Japanese descent from Terminal Island near the Port of Los Angeles.

On December 7, 1941, just hours after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the FBI rounded-up 1,291 Japanese American community and religious leaders, arresting them without evidence and freezing their assets.

In January, the arrestees were transferred to prison camps in Montana, New Mexico and North Dakota, many unable to inform their families and most remaining for the duration of the war.

Concurrently, the FBI searched the private homes of thousands of Japanese American residents on the West Coast, seizing items considered contraband.

One-third of Hawaii's population was of Japanese descent. In a panic, some politicians called for their mass incarceration. Japanese-owned fishing boats were impounded.

Some Japanese American residents were arrested and 1,500 people-one percent of the Japanese population in Hawaii-were sent to prison camps on the U.S. mainland.

Photos of Japanese American Relocation and Incarceration

John DeWitt

Lt. General John L. DeWitt, leader of the Western Defense Command, believed that the civilian population needed to be taken control of to prevent a repeat of Pearl Harbor.

To argue his case, DeWitt prepared a report filled with known falsehoods, such as examples of sabotage that were later revealed to be the result of cattle damaging power lines.

DeWitt suggested the creation of the military zones and Japanese detainment to Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Attorney General Francis Biddle. His original plan included Italians and Germans, though the idea of rounding-up Americans of European descent was not as popular.

At Congressional hearings in February 1942, a majority of the testimonies, including those from California Governor Culbert L. Olson and State Attorney General Earl Warren, declared that all Japanese should be removed.

Biddle pleaded with the president that mass incarceration of citizens was not required, preferring smaller, more targeted security measures. Regardless, Roosevelt signed the order.

War Relocation Authority

After much organizational chaos, about 15,000 Japanese Americans willingly moved out of prohibited areas. Inland state citizens were not keen for new Japanese American residents, and they were met with racist resistance.

Ten state governors voiced opposition, fearing the Japanese Americans might never leave, and demanded they be locked up if the states were forced to accept them.

A civilian organization called the War Relocation Authority was set up in March 1942 to administer the plan, with Milton S. Eisenhower from the Department of Agriculture to lead it. Eisenhower only lasted until June 1942, resigning in protest over what he characterized as incarcerating innocent citizens.

Relocation to 'Assembly Centers'

Army-directed removals began on March 24. People had six days notice to dispose of their belongings other than what they could carry.

Anyone who was at least 1/16th Japanese was evacuated, including 17,000 children under age 10, as well as several thousand elderly and disabled residents.

Japanese Americans reported to "Assembly Centers" near their homes. From there they were transported to a "Relocation Center" where they might live for months before transfer to a permanent "Wartime Residence."

Assembly Centers were located in remote areas, often reconfigured fairgrounds and racetracks featuring buildings not meant for human habitation, like horse stalls or cow sheds, that had been converted for that purpose. In Portland, Oregon, 3,000 people stayed in the livestock pavilion of the Pacific International Livestock Exposition Facilities.

The Santa Anita Assembly Center, just several miles northeast of Los Angeles, was a de-facto city with 18,000 incarcerated, 8,500 of whom lived in stables. Food shortages and substandard sanitation were prevalent in these facilities.

Life in 'Assembly Centers'

Assembly Centers offered work to prisoners with the policy that they should not be paid more than an Army private. Jobs ranged from doctors to teachers to laborers and mechanics. A couple were the sites of camouflage net factories, which provided work.

Over 1,000 incarcerated Japanese Americans were sent to other states to do seasonal farm work. Over 4,000 of the incarcerated population were allowed to leave to attend college.

Conditions in 'Relocation Centers'

There were a total of 10 prison camps, called "Relocation Centers." Typically the camps included some form of barracks with communal eating areas. Several families were housed together. Residents who were labeled as dissidents were forced to a special prison camp in Tule Lake, California.

Two prison camps in Arizona were located on Native American reservations, despite the protests of tribal councils, who were overruled by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Each Relocation Center was its own "town," and included schools, post offices and work facilities, as well as farmland for growing food and keeping livestock. Each prison camp "town" was completely surrounded by barbed wire and guard towers.

Net factories offered work at several Relocation Centers. One housed a naval ship model factory. There were also factories in different Relocation Centers that manufactured items for use in other prison camps, including garments, mattresses and cabinets. Several housed agricultural processing plants.

Violence in Prison Camps

Violence occasionally occurred in the prison camps. In Lordsburg, New Mexico, prisoners were delivered by trains and forced to march two miles at night to the camp. On July 27, 1942, during a night march, two Japanese Americans, Toshio Kobata and Hirota Isomura, were shot and killed by a sentry who claimed they were attempting to escape. Japanese Americans testified later that the two elderly men were disabled and had been struggling during the march to Lordsburg. The sentry was found not guilty by the army court martial board.

On August 4, 1942, a riot broke out in the Santa Anita Assembly Center, the result of anger about insufficient rations and overcrowding. At California's Manzanar War Relocation Center, tensions resulted in the beating of Fred Tayama, a Japanese American Citizen's League (JACL) leader, by six men. JACL members were believed to be supporters of the prison camp's administration.

Fearing a riot, police tear-gassed crowds that had gathered at the police station to demand the release of Harry Ueno. Ueno had been arrested for allegedly assaulting Tayama. James Ito was killed instantly and several others were wounded. Among those injured was Jim Kanegawa, 21, who died of complications five days later.

At the Topaz Relocation Center, 63-year-old prisoner James Hatsuki Wakasa was shot and killed by military police after walking near the perimeter fence. Two months later, a couple was shot at for strolling near the fence.

In October 1943, the Army deployed tanks and soldiers to Tule Lake Segregation Center in northern California to crack down on protests. Japanese American prisoners at Tule Lake had been striking over food shortages and unsafe conditions that had led to an accidental death in October 1943. At the same camp, on May 24, 1943, James Okamoto, a 30-year-old prisoner who drove a construction truck, was shot and killed by a guard.

Fred Korematsu

In 1942, 23-year-old Japanese-American Fred Korematsu was arrested for refusing to relocate to a Japanese prison camp. His case made it all the way to the Supreme Court, where his attorneys argued in Korematsu v. United States that Executive Order 9066 violated the Fifth Amendment.

Korematsu lost the case, but he went on to become a civil rights activist and was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1998. With the creation of California's Fred Korematsu Day, the United States saw its first U.S. holiday named for an Asian American. But it took another Supreme Court decision to halt the incarceration of Japanese Americans.

Mitsuye Endo

The prison camps ended in 1945 following the Supreme Court decision, Ex parte Mitsuye Endo. In this case, justices ruled unanimously that the War Relocation Authority "has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure."

The case was brought on behalf of Mitsuye Endo, the daughter of Japanese immigrants from Sacramento, California. After filing a habeas corpus petition, the government offered to free her, but Endo refused, wanting her case to address the entire issue of Japanese incarceration.

One year later, the Supreme Court made the decision, but gave President Truman the chance to begin camp closures before the announcement. One day after Truman made his announcement, the Supreme Court revealed its decision.

Reparations

The last Japanese internment camp closed in March 1946. President Gerald Ford officially repealed Executive Order 9066 in 1976, and in 1988, Congress issued a formal apology and passed the Civil Liberties Act awarding $20,000 each to over 80,000 Japanese Americans as reparations for their treatment.

Sources

Japanese Relocation During World War II. National Archives.
Confinement and Ethnicity: An Overview of World War II Japanese American Relocation Sites. J. Burton, M. Farrell, F. Lord and R. Lord.
Lordsburg Internment POW Camp. Historical Society of New Mexico.
Smithsonian Institute.

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Japanese Internment Camps: WWII, Life & Conditions | HISTORY

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Japanese internment camps were established during World War II by President Franklin D. Roosevelt through his Executive Order 9066. From 1942 to 1945, it was the policy of the U.S. government that people of Japanese descent, including U.S. citizens, be incarcerated.

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6. Second Wave of Japanese Air Crafts 8:54am (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack)

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6. Second Wave of Japanese Air Crafts 8:54am (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack)

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The second wave hit and they focused on striking battleships. They hit the USS West Virginia and USS Oklahoma which both sunk quickly. They later hit the USS Arizona which was the biggest explosion causing damage to other ships around. This article shows a photo of the second wave of Japanese air crafts arriving to the attack.

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In September of 1941, 33-year-old Lt. Cmdr. Shigekazu Shimazaki was assigned to be the equipping officer of the aircraft carrier Zuikaku, which had been commissioned into the Imperial Japanese Navy just days prior. It was in this capacity that he and his ship, together with the rest of Japan's First Air Fleet, set sail towards the American naval base at Pearl Harbor. Shimazaki wouldn't just be a participant in the planned attack, he would lead a portion of it.

While Mitsuo Fuchida led the first wave of fighters and bombers that launched on the morning of December 7, 1941, Shimazaki waited patiently for his turn. At the helm of a Nakajima B5N2 "Kate" bomber, the minutes ticked by as the moment neared when he'd be cleared to take off and launch the second attack wave against Pearl Harbor. And when he did launch, he did so with more than 50 high-level bombers and 78 dive bombers behind him.

Prior to the Second World War, Shimazaki had also fought in the Second Sino-Japanese War. In 1938, he transferred to the aircraft carrier Soryu. He later saw action aboard Akagi. Within a year, he was promoted to lieutenant commander, leading to his role in the Pearl Harbor attack at the end of 1941.

For his part in the attack on Pearl Harbor, Shimazaki was hailed as a hero by the Japanese, a man praised for his aviation prowess and ability to lead the wave of bombers. Alongside Fuchida, he earned an audience with Emperor Hirohito on December 25, 1941. But Pearl Harbor was only his first wartime victory against the Allied forces. It was major, but Shimazaki pressed on to cause further damage to the US Pacific Fleet.

After Pearl Harbor

During the Battle of the Coral Sea, the commander delivered another crippling blow to the Americans and their allies. As the battle raged, Shimazaki and his bombers attacked the USS Lexington (CV-2). The American aircraft carrier was responsible for sinking the Imperial Japanese Navy carrier Shoho, and Shimazaki's explosive delivery was his revenge.

The sinking of Lexington was followed by that of the destroyer USS Sims (DD-409), which proved to be his last great effort as a pilot. In July of 1942, when he was transferred to Kure Naval District and reassigned as a ground-based air officer. In October, 1944, he was promoted to commander.

Shimazaki Meets His End

On January 9, 1945, while serving as a staff officer of the IJN's 3rd Air Fleet, Shimazaki was killed in action. For his dedicated service to the Imperial Japanese Navy and his country, the commander was posthumously promoted two ranks, to rear admiral.

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Shigekazu Shimazaki: Leading the Second Wave - Visit Pearl Harbor

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In September of 1941, 33-year-old Lt. Cmdr. Shigekazu Shimazaki was assigned to be the equipping officer of the aircraft carrier Zuikaku, which had been commissioned into the Imperial Japanese Navy just days prior. It was in this capacity that he and his ship, together with the rest of Japan's First Air Fleet, set sail towards the American naval base at Pearl Harbor.

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5. U.S. fires at Japanese submarine and misses 8:17am (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack)

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5. U.S. fires at Japanese submarine and misses 8:17am (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack)

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The Japanese had used five midget submarines in total during the Pearl Harbor attack. They had reached the American Naval base hours before the air crafts arrived. They were fired at but none were ever hit or taken down, they were later found on the reef. This is a photo of a washed up Japanese Midget Submarine.

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7.USS Arizona Battleship gets Hit (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack)

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7.USS Arizona Battleship gets Hit (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack)

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Japan's other main target besides war planes were the eight battleships anchored there. At the beginning of the second wave all the ships adjacent to Ford Island took bomb or torpedo hits. The USS Arizona was hit by a bomb which ignited the ships ammunition magazines. This resulted in 1,777 men killed in the explosion and fire. This link tells about why, where, and what ships were hit and the results of it. This is an additional photo of the USS Arizona when it had exploded.

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The Pearl Harbor naval base was recognized by both the Japanese and the United States Navies as a potential target for hostile carrier air power. The U.S. Navy had even explored the issue during some of its interwar "Fleet Problems". However, its distance from Japan and shallow harbor, the certainty that Japan's navy would have many other pressing needs for its aircraft carriers in the event of war, and a belief that intelligence would provide warning persuaded senior U.S. officers that the prospect of an attack on Pearl Harbor could be safely discounted.

When the time came for war in 1941, the Japanese devised a mission which included all six of the nation's first-line aircraft carriers, Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku. With over 420 embarked planes, these ships constituted by far the most powerful carrier task force ever assembled. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo would command the operation. His Pearl Harbor Striking Force also included fast battleships, cruisers and destroyers, with tankers to fuel the ships during their passage across the Pacific. An Advance Expeditionary Force of large submarines, five of them carrying midget submarines, was sent to scout around Hawaii, dispatch the midgets into Pearl Harbor to attack ships there, and torpedo American warships that might escape to sea.

Under the greatest secrecy, Nagumo took his ships to sea on 26 November 1941, with orders to abort the mission if he was discovered, or should diplomacy work an unanticipated miracle. Before dawn on the 7th of December, undiscovered and with diplomatic prospects firmly at an end, the Pearl Harbor Striking Force was less than 300 miles north of Pearl Harbor. At 6:00 a.m., six carriers launched a first wave of 181 planes composed of torpedo bombers, dive bombers, horizontal bombers and fighters. Even as they flew south, some elements of U.S. forces on Oahu realized there was something different about this Sunday morning. In the hours before dawn, U.S. Navy vessels spotted an unidentified submarine periscope near the entrance to Pearl Harbor. It was attacked and reported sunk by the destroyer USS Ward (DD-139) and a patrol plane.

At 7:00 a.m., an alert operator of an Army radar station at Opana spotted the approaching first wave of the attack force. The officers to whom those reports were relayed did not consider them significant enough to take action. The report of the submarine sinking was handled routinely, and the radar sighting was passed off as an approaching group of American planes due to arrive that morning.

The Japanese aircraft achieved complete surprise when they hit American ships and military installations on Oahu shortly before 8:00 a.m., attacking military airfields at the same time they hit the fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor. The Navy air bases at Ford Island and Kaneohe Bay, the Marine airfield at Ewa and the Army Air Corps fields at Bellows, Wheeler and Hickam were all bombed and strafed. The purpose of the simultaneous attacks was to destroy the American planes before they could rise to intercept the Japanese.

Of the 100 ships in Pearl Harbor, the primary targets were the eight battleships anchored there. Seven were moored on Battleship Row along the southeast shore of Ford Island while the USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) lay in drydock across the channel. Within the first minutes of the attack all the battleships adjacent to Ford Island had taken bomb and/or torpedo hits. The USS West Virginia (BB-48) sank quickly. The USS Oklahoma (BB-37) turned turtle and sank. At about 8:10 a.m., the USS Arizona (BB-39) was mortally wounded by an armorpiercing bomb which ignited the ship's forward ammunition magazine. The resulting explosion and fire killed 1,177 crewmen, the greatest loss of life on any ship that day and about half the total number of Americans killed. The USS California (BB-44), USS Maryland (BB-46), USS Tennessee (BB-43) and USS Nevada (BB-36) also suffered varying degrees of damage in the first half hour of the raid.

There was a short lull in attack at about 8:30 a.m. At that time the USS Nevada, despite her wounds, managed to get underway and move down the channel toward the open sea. Before she could clear the harbor, a second wave of 170 Japanese planes, launched 30 minutes after the first, appeared over the harbor. They concentrated their attacks on the moving battleship, hoping to sink her in the channel and block the narrow entrance to Pearl Harbor. On orders from the harbor control tower, the Nevada beached herself at Hospital Point and the channel remained clear.

When the attack ended shortly before 10:00 a.m., less than two hours after it began, the American forces has paid a fearful price. Twenty-one ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet were sunk or damaged. Aircraft losses were 188 destroyed and 159 damaged, the majority hit before they had a chance to take off. There were a total of 2,403 American casualties, including 68 civilians, most of them killed by improperly fused anti-aircraft shells landing in Honolulu. There were 1,178 military and civilian wounded.

Japanese losses were comparatively light. Twenty-nine planes, less than 10 percent of the attacking force, failed to return to their carriers. The Japanese success was overwhelming, but not complete; as fate would have it, U.S. aircraft carriers that were to be primary targets in the attack were absent from the harbor. The Japanese also failed to damage the Pearl Harbor Naval Base's shoreside facilities; these facilities played an important role in the Allied victory in World War II.

On December 8, U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt addressed the Congress to ask for a declaration of war against Japan. Referring to December Seventh, 1941, as a "day that shall live in infamy", he gave the Pearl Harbor attack its most famous and enduring title. Within a few days, Germany and Italy had declared war on the United States.

Eventually, all but three of the ships sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor were repaired: the USS Arizona (too badly damaged to be salvaged), the USS Oklahoma (raised but considered to be too old to be worth repairing), and the USS Utah (also considered obsolete). Most importantly, the shock and anger caused by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor united a divided nation, resulting in a whole-hearted American commitment to victory in World War II.

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The Pearl Harbor naval base was recognized by both the Japanese and the United States Navies as a potential target for hostile carrier air power. The U.S. Navy had even explored the issue during some of its interwar "Fleet Problems".

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8. Ship USS Vestal (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack) 

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8. Ship USS Vestal (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack) 

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This ship was a repair ship and was hit by two Japanese bombs during the Pearl Harbor attack. It was additionally damaged by the explosion and fire from the USS Arizona.  As it was following behind it. This is a photo of the USS Vestal.

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4. First Wave of air craft attacks 7:55am (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack)

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4. First Wave of air craft attacks 7:55am (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack)

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The first wave targeted all war planes on the ground.  They did this so that the U.S. wouldn't be able to strike back and the would hopefully flee afterwards. This link shows a photo of the island and the ground area that the first wave was focusing on to stop U.S. reinforcements.

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3. Japanese Air Crafts Spotted 7:15am (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack)

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3. Japanese Air Crafts Spotted 7:15am (Dec. 7, 1941-during attack)

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A Japanese submarine was spotted, reported, and told to wait for verification of report to strike. After  Japanese air crafts were seen flying towards Pearl Harbor. This is a photo of the first wave of air crafts that followed the submarines and began the attack.

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2. Japan warns the United States not to interfere (Jan. 1941-before attack)

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2. Japan warns the United States not to interfere (Jan. 1941-before attack)

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Japan wanted to the United States out of the way. The U.S. interfered and was against the invasion of China.  Because the U.S. had a Naval Station in Hawaii Japan needed a way to get them out of the way and thought one attack would make them leave the area. This link is an article about Yamamoto planning the attack on Pearl Harbor after the U.S. interfered with their invasion of China and the Pacific.

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By Mark Stille

Japan's approach in 1941, which consisted of negotiations in parallel with preparations for war, never gave the negotiations any realistic chance of success unless the United States agreed to Japan's conditions. Thus, increasingly, war became the only remaining option. An Imperial Conference on July 2, 1941, confirmed the decision to attack the Western powers. In early September, the Emperor declined to overrule the decision to go to war and the final authorization for war was given on December 1. By this time, Yamamoto's Pearl Harbor attack force was already at sea.

Yamamoto alone came up with the idea of including the Pearl Harbor attack into Japan's war plans and, because the attack was so risky, it took great perseverance on his part to get it approved. It says much for his influence and powers of persuasion that the event even occurred. The attack was successful beyond all expectations, making it central to Yamamoto's reputation as a great admiral, and as it had strategic and political ramifications far beyond what he imagined, it made Yamamoto one of World War II's most important commanders.

Yamamoto was not the first person to think of attacking the American naval base at Pearl Harbor. As early as 1927, war games at the Japanese Navy War College included an examination of a carrier raid against Pearl Harbor. The following year, a certain Captain Yamamoto lectured on the same topic. By the time the United States moved the Pacific Fleet from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor in May 1940, Yamamoto was already exploring how to execute such a bold operation. According to the chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, Vice Admiral Fukudome Shigeru, Yamamoto first discussed an attack on Pearl Harbor in March or April 1940. This clearly indicates that Yamamoto did not copy the idea of attacking a fleet in its base after observing the British carrier raid on the Italian base at Taranto in November 1940. After the completion of the Combined Fleet's annual maneuvers in the fall of 1940, Yamamoto told Fukudome to direct Rear Admiral Onishi Takijiro to study a Pearl Harbor attack under the utmost secrecy. After the Taranto attack, Yamamoto wrote to a fellow admiral and friend stating that he had decided to launch the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1940.

If it is to be believed that Yamamoto decided on his daring attack as early as December 1940, several issues are brought into focus. First and foremost, it can be established that Yamamoto had decided on this risky course of action even before the advantages and disadvantages of such an action could be fully weighed. Also, in late 1940, Yamamoto did not even possess the technical means to mount such an operation. Another question that needs to be asked is why Yamamoto thought it was his job to formulate grand naval strategy, which was the responsibility of the Naval General Staff.

The planning for the attack was a confused and often haphazard process. In the beginning, there was only Yamamoto's vision. Gradually, and against almost universal opposition, Yamamoto made his vision become reality. In a letter dated January 7, 1941, Yamamoto ordered Onishi to study his proposal. This was followed by a meeting between Yamamoto and Onishi on January 26 or 27 during which Yamamoto explained his ideas. Onishi was selected by Yamamoto to develop the idea since he was the chief of staff of the land-based 11th Air Fleet and was a fellow air advocate and a noted tactical expert and planner.

Onishi pulled Commander Genda Minoru into the planning in February. After Genda was shown Yamamoto's letter, his initial reaction was that the operation would be difficult, but not impossible. With Yamamoto providing the driving vision and political top-cover, Genda became the driving force in actually turning the vision into a viable plan. Genda believed that secrecy was an essential ingredient of planning and that to have any chance of success, all the IJN's carriers would have to be allocated to the operation. Genda was charged with completing a study of the proposed operation in seven to ten days. The subsequent report was a landmark event in the planning process since most of his ideas were reflected in the final plan. Onishi presented an expanded draft of Genda's plan to Yamamoto on about March 10.

On November 15, 1940, Yamamoto had been promoted to full admiral and, as the planning for war increased in intensity, he began to wonder about his future. It was customary for the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet to serve for two years. In early 1941, Yamamoto was thinking of his impending change of duty and was pondering retirement. He would have liked to have been appointed commander of the First Air Fleet (the IJN's carrier force), to lead his bold attack, but realized that such an event was impossible. During this time, he told one of his friends:

If there's a war, it won't be the kind where battleships sally forth in a leisurely fashion as in the past, and the proper thing for the C. in C. of the Combined Fleet would be, I think, to sit tight in the Inland Sea, keeping an eye on the situation as a whole. But I can't see myself doing anything so boring, and I'd like to get Yonai to take over, so that if the need arose I could play a more active role.

In spite of his desires, Yamamoto did not leave his post in mid-1941 after his two years were up.
Yamamoto Takes On the Naval General Staff
Perhaps harder than resolving any technical and operational difficulties to make the attack on Pearl Harbor possible was Yamamoto's task of convincing the Naval General Staff that the Pearl Harbor operation was viable. Since the Naval General Staff had responsibility for the overall formulation of naval strategy, any questions about whether, and how, to attack the United States in the initial phase of the war clearly fell under its jurisdiction. However, in another indication of the muddled Japanese planning process, Yamamoto wanted to seize this prerogative for himself. In late April, Yamamoto entrusted one of his principal Combined Fleet staff officers to begin the process of convincing the skeptical Naval General Staff. The initial meeting did not go well for Yamamoto since the Naval General Staff did not believe his contention that the attack would be so devastating that it would undermine American morale. The focus of the Naval General Staff was on guaranteeing the success of the southern operation and this required the use of the Combined Fleet's carriers. Their biggest concern was that the Pearl Harbor attack was simply too risky. In order to gain the Naval General Staff's approval, Yamamoto began to stress the fact that his Pearl Harbor attack would also serve to guard the flank of the southern advance by crippling the Pacific Fleet at its principal base.

In August, the same staff officer returned to Tokyo to plead Yamamoto's case. Though the Naval General Staff remained opposed to the idea, it did agree that the annual war games would include an examination of the Pearl Harbor plan. These began on September 11 with the first phase focusing on the conduct of the southern operation. On September 16, a group of officers selected by Yamamoto, including representatives of the Naval General Staff, began a review of the Hawaii operation. The results of this controlled tabletop maneuver seemed to confirm that the operation was feasible, but also served to confirm that it was risky and that success depended heavily on surprise. At the end of the two-day exercise, the Naval General Staff remained unconvinced. Basic concerns, such as whether refueling was possible to get the entire force to Hawaii and how many carriers were to be allocated to the operation, also remained unresolved.

On September 24, the Operations Staff of the Naval General Staff held a conference on the proposed Hawaii attack. Yamamoto became enraged when he learned that once again the Naval General Staff had rejected his plan. On October 13, the Combined Fleet's staff held another round of table maneuvers on Yamamoto's flagship, the battleship Nagato, to refine aspects of the Pearl Harbor operation and toreview the southern operation. Only three of the IJN's fleet carriers were used, Kaga, Zuikaku, and Shokaku, because they had the range to sail to Pearl Harbor; the other three fleet carriers, Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu were allocated to the southern operation. For the first time, fleet and midget submarines were included in the planning for the Pearl Harbor attack. The next day, there was a conference to review the plan, and where all admirals present were invited to speak. All but one was opposed to the Pearl Harbor attack. When they were done, Yamamoto addressed the assembled group and stated that as long as he was in charge, Pearl Harbor would be attacked. The time for dissension and doubt among the Combined Fleet's admirals was finished.

With the support of his own commanders assured, Yamamoto was determined to bring the issue to a head with the still skeptical Naval General Staff. In a series of meetings on October 17-18, Yamamoto played his ace card. His staff representatives revealed that unless the plan was approved in its entirety Yamamoto and the entire staff of the Combined Fleet would resign. Since to Nagano the notion of going to war without Yamamoto at the helm of the Combined Fleet was simply unthinkable, this threat served to bring the Pearl Harbor debate to a close. In the end, it was not logic that carried the day for Yamamoto, but the threat of resignation and it was not to be the last time that he would use this tactic.

The staff of the First Air Fleet conducted the actual planning for the operation. On April 10, 1941, Yamamoto had given the go-ahead to form the First Air Fleet by combining Divisions 1 and 2 into a single formation. This was a revolutionary step which had been considered for some time, and in April Yamamoto judged that the time was right to take that step. As an air power advocate, he felt it was necessary to maximize the striking power of the carrier force. By concentrating the carriers into a single force, Yamamoto had created the most powerful naval force in the Pacific and gained the means by which to conduct his Pearl Harbor operation. By late April, the staff of the new First Air Fleet, led by Genda, who had been assigned as staff air officer, was engaged in fleshing out the details of the operation. Gradually, the problems associated with refueling, executing torpedo attacks in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor, and making level bombing against heavily armored battleships a viable tactic, were solved.
The Pearl Harbor Plan
For Yamamoto, the purpose of the Pearl Harbor attack was to sink battleships rather than carriers. Battleships were so deeply entrenched in the minds of the American public as a symbol of naval power that by shattering their battle fleet Yamamoto believed American morale would be crushed. He even considered giving up the entire operation when it appeared that the problem of using torpedoes in the shallow harbor could not be solved - torpedoes were required to sink the heavily armored battleships, whereas dive-bombing would have sufficed to sink the lightly armored carriers. This emphasis on the targeting of battleships rather than carriers calls into question Yamamoto's credentials as a strategic planner as well as his status as a true air power advocate.

The final plan was completed by Genda and reflected the difference in opinion between Genda and Yamamoto. Genda, the air power zealot, devoted more weight to sinking carriers, and less to sinking battleships. The first wave of the attack included 40 torpedo planes which were broken down into 16 against the two carriers that might be present, and the other 24 against as many as six battleships, which were vulnerable to torpedo attack. Fifty level bombers carrying specially modified armor-piercing bombs were also allocated to attack the so-called "Battleship Row" where most of the battleships were berthed. Level attack was the only way to strike inboard areas of the battleships when two ships were moored together. Fifty-four dive-bombers and the escorting fighters were ordered to attack the many airfields on Oahu. In all, the six carriers in the attack force planned to use 189 aircraft in the first wave.

The second wave was planned to comprise 171 aircraft. The 81 dive-bombers were the centerpiece of this group and were given orders to concentrate on completing the destruction of any carriers present, followed by attacks on cruisers. The relatively small bombs carried by the dive-bombers were insufficient to penetrate battleship armor, so the first wave had the job of inflicting maximum damage on the heavy ships. The remainder of the second wave aircraft, which included 54 level bombers, was to complete the destruction of American air power on Oahu in order to prevent any return strikes on the Japanese carriers.

Despite the fact that the strikeforce (the Kido Butai) embarked at least 411 aircraft for the operation, making it the most powerful naval force in the Pacific, the attack remained a risky undertaking. If the Americans detected the raiders in time to prepare their air defenses, the attack could be catastrophic for the Japanese, a fact they had ascertained in their pre-attack gaming. If exposed to counterattack, the Japanese carriers were vulnerable. Nagumo Chuichi had under his control a large portion of the IJN's striking power, and to lose the force on the first day of the war would be a disaster.
The Pearl Harbor Raid
The Kido Butai departed its anchorage in the Kurile Islands on November 26. The transit was undetected and by the morning of December 7, from a position some 200 miles north of Oahu, six Japanese carriers had begun to launch the first attack wave. At 0753hrs the strike leader sent the signal "Tora, Tora, Tora," indicating that the element of surprise had been gained.

Excerpted from Yamamoto Isoroku by Mark Stille.

Copyright 2012 by Osprey Publishing.

Reprinted with permission from Osprey Publishing.

MARK STILLE (Commander, United States Navy, retired) is the author of Yamamoto Isoroku, The Coral Sea 1942 and numerous other books focusing on naval history in the Pacific. He received his BA in History from the University of Maryland and also holds an MA from the Naval War College. He has worked in the intelligence community for 30 years including tours on the faculty of the Naval War College, on the Joint Staff and on US Navy ships. He is currently a senior analyst working in the Washington, D.C. area

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Yamamoto and the Planning for Pearl Harbor - The History Reader : The History Reader

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The attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor by Yamamoto was one of the most infamously well planned and executed strikes in naval history