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Ballotpedia is the digital encyclopedia of American politics and elections. Our goal is to inform people about politics by providing accurate and objective information about politics at all levels of government.

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The Slocum Massacre occurred on July 29, 1910 in Slocum, Texas, an unincorporated community in southeast Anderson County. The city used to be home to a thriving African American community with several businesses and farms owned by black residents. Leading up to the massacre, a … Read MoreThe Slocum…

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opening of he colored carneige library in houston 1912

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opening of he colored carneige library in houston 1912

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Houston had its own Carnegie Library (originally called Houston Lyceum and Carnegie Library) downtown at the corner of McKinney and Travis (currently McKinney Place Garage) - it was built in 1904 but by 1926 it was replaced by what is now the Julia Ideson building of Houston Public Library.

With the help of librarian Julia Ideson, Houston school administrator E.O. Smith, and Booker T. Washington's personal assistant Emmett Scott, Carnegie agreed to fund the building of the Colored Carnegie Library at 1112 Frederick St. which was built in 1912. This building was demolished around 1962 and was about where 3 Allen Center is now (more about the Colored Carnegie Library here).

Approximate location of 1112 Frederick St.:

1924 Sanborn map:

1907 Sanborn map:

Book plate:

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Houston had its own Carnegie Library (originally called Houston Lyceum and Carnegie Library) downtown at the corner of McKinney and Travis (currently McKinney Place Garage) - it was built in 1904 but by 1926 it was replaced by what is now the Julia Ideson building of Houston Public Library.

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founding of the harlem hellfighters 1913

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founding of the harlem hellfighters 1913

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‘The Harlem Hellfighters’: WW1’s African-American regiment

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From Harlem to the Rhine: the story of the Harlem Hellfighters, WW1’s African-American regiment

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In response to the Springfield riot, a group of black and white activists, Jews and gentiles, met in New York City to address the deteriorating status of African Americans. Among them were veterans of the Niagara Movement (a civil rights group), suffragists, social workers, labor reformers, philanthropists, socialists, anti-imperialists, educators, clergymen, and journalists-some with roots in abolitionism. In the abolitionist tradition, they proposed to fight the new color-caste system with a "new abolition movement"-the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The NAACP pledged "to promote equality of rights and eradicate caste or race prejudice among citizens of the United States; to advance the interest of colored citizens; to secure for them impartial suffrage; and to increase their opportunities for securing justice in the courts, education for their children, employment according to their ability, and complete equality before the law." The NAACP pursued this mission through a variety of tactics including legal action, lobbying, peaceful protest, and publicity.

Journalist Ray Stannard Baker

Ray Stannard Baker (1870-1946) was known as a leading muckraking journalist. From 1899 to1905, he was an associate editor of McClure's, and from 1906 to1915 he coedited American Magazine. As a muckraker, he reported on social and economic problems from a liberal perspective. After the Atlanta riot, he traveled throughout the South and North conducting interviews for Following the Color Line (1908), a groundbreaking book on race relations. Baker vacillated between the philosophies of Booker T. Washington and the NAACP. He joined the NAACP and attended meetings, but declined committee service. In his notebook he revealed that he "instinctively" agreed with Washington's "emphasis on duty and service" as a prerequisite for civil rights. Baker won the Pulitzer Prize for his biography of Woodrow Wilson in 1940. In this letter, NAACP founder William Wallings asks for Baker's support in convening a national conference on the Negro.

NAACP Leader Oswald Garrison Villard

Oswald Garrison Villard (1872-1949), publisher of the New York Evening Post and The Nation, was the son of railroad tycoon Henry Villard and grandson of abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison. He used his fortune to promote liberal causes, including women's suffrage, anti-imperialism, and Negro uplift. Villard originally supported Booker T. Washington, believing education was the solution to the "Negro problem," but the Brownsville affair and Atlanta riot convinced him of the need for a more militant strategy. The "Committee for the Advancement of the Negro Race" (1906) he envisioned became the blueprint for the NAACP. Villard funded the NAACP's budget and provided free office space in the Evening Post building. He resigned as NAACP chairman in 1914 due to irreconcilable differences with W. E. B. Du Bois, but remained a board member until his death in 1949.

First Issue of The Crisis

In November 1910 the NAACP launched The Crisis, an official organ under the editorship of W.E.B. Du Bois. The journal's title was inspired by James Lowell's poem "The Present Crisis." Through The Crisis Du Bois reported the NAACP's activities and rallied support, while articulating his views on race and politics. For the largely black readership he personified the NAACP. The Crisis also served as an open forum for discourse on race relations and black life and culture. The monthly issues included articles on current events, editorial commentary, short stories and poems, art work, and reports on the achievements of people of color worldwide.

Constitution and By-Laws of the NAACP

In 1911 Albert E. Pillsbury, former Massachusetts attorney general and nephew of abolitionist Parker Pillsbury, drafted the NAACP's constitution and by-laws. A second constitution and new by-laws were drafted in 1912 and approved in 1914. The by-laws established a board of directors to govern the organization, with each director serving three-year terms. The board elected officers: a chairman, president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer; and created all standing and special committees, departments, bureaus, branches, and other units. It held an annual meeting in January and met monthly to consider reports from committees. The NAACP constitution states that "the Annual Convention shall have the power to establish polices and programs. All actions on the question of policy and program shall be binding on the board, officers, branches, and other units of the Association."

NAACP Victory in Guinn v. United States

Many southern and border states devised legal barriers to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment and prohibit black voting. These barriers included poll taxes, literacy tests, "grandfather clauses," and the "white primary." In 1910 Oklahoma passed a constitutional amendment, which held that only residents whose grandfathers had voted in 1865 could vote, thus disqualifying the descendants of slaves. The NAACP persuaded the U.S. attorney general to challenge the constitutionality of the "grandfather clause," encouraged by a Maryland Circuit Court decision in 1913. Oklahoma appealed the case to the Supreme Court. Moorfield Storey was granted permission to argue the case on behalf of the NAACP. In June 1915, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in Guinn v. United States that the "grandfather clause" was in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.

The Amenia Conference Pamphlet

In 1916, one year after the death of Booker T. Washington, the NAACP issued a call for a conference of black leaders to unite Washington's supporters and NAACP activists behind a common program. W.E.B. Du Bois and Joel Spingarn held the conference August 24-26, at Troutbeck, Spingarn's estate near Amenia, New York. The roughly fifty conferees adopted a "Unity Platform" that affirmed all forms of education for blacks and political freedom. They also pledged to work together to improve race relations and forget old "hurts and enmities." The Anemia Conference marked the NAACP's ascent as the dominant force in the civil rights movement.

The Amenia Conference, 1916

This photograph shows some of the men and women who attended the Amenia Conference in 1916. Included are NAACP activists Addie Hunton, Mary Church Terrell, Mary Talbert (Second row, left to right: 1st, 3rd, and 4th), Arthur Spingarn, William Pickens, and Charles W. Chesnutt (First row, left to right: 1st, 2nd, and 4th). Among the other conferees were Booker T. Washington allies Henry Hunt, Emmet J. Scott, Fred Moore, J. Rosamond Johnson, and James Weldon Johnson; Niagarites Charles E. Bentley, L.M. Hershaw, and Mason Hawkins; and educators Kelly Miller and Lucy Laney (Second row, left to right: 5th and 7th).

Buchanan v. Warley

The NAACP sought out cases that infringed on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in order to set legal precedents and ultimately secure the constitutional rights of African Americans. An early victory was Buchanan v. Warley, a case involving residential segregation in Louisville, Kentucky. Louisville and other cities passed ordinances to prevent people of color from residing in white neighborhoods. Moorfield Storey, the NAACP's first president and a constitutional attorney, argued the case before the Supreme Court in April 1917. The Court reversed the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, ruling that the Louisville ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result of the ruling, whites resorted to private restrictive covenants, in which property owners agreed to sell or rent to whites only.

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NAACP: A Century in the Fight for Freedom Founding and Early Years

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In response to the Springfield riot, a group of black and white activists, Jews and gentiles, met in New York City to address the deteriorating status of African Americans. Among them were veterans of the Niagara Movement (a civil rights group), suffragists, social workers, labor reformers, philanthropists, socialists, anti-imperialists, educators, clergymen, and journalists-some with roots in abolitionism.

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Society in the South evolved ensuing the emancipation of slaves after the Civil War. The Reconstruction of the South ended in 1877 and only added to the bad racial tensions in the region. Whites instituted laws that held blacks back from education, jobs, and participating in many forms of government. Lynching of blacks became rather prevalent and reached fever pitch in the 1890s all across the United States, but mostly in the South. Lynching escalated during the 1920s and Texas ranked third among states between the years 1885 and 1942 with approximately 468, including 339 blacks. The only states that had more lynching incidents were Mississippi and Georgia.

In May 1916, Jesse Washington, a seventeen year old black man, was arrested for the killing of Lucy Fryer, a fifty-three year old white woman. Washington would later confess to raping and killing Fryer. Wanting to avoid an attack on Washington while in custody in Waco, authorities in McLennan County sent Washington to a Dallas jail to await his trial. When his trial took place on May 15, 1916, Washington arrived back in Waco to a packed court room. Twelve white men formed his jury, and they found him guilty of murder after only four minutes of deliberation.

A mob had gathered around the courthouse prior to the trial and waited for their chance to capture Washington. After his conviction, the jailers took Washington down the back stairs of the courthouse, where the mob had been waiting. The mob of white citizens wrapped a chain around Washington's neck and dragged him to city hall grounds, brutally stabbing and beating him as they went along.

A separate mob prepared a pile of dry-good boxes, which they ignited after they poured coal oil over Washington's body. A crowd estimated to be between 15,000 to 20,000 people watched as the belligerents hung Washington from a tree and slowly lowered him up and down over the burning boxes.

After two hours of monstrously lynching Washington, the mob took his body and placed it in a bag and dragged it to Robinson, Texas, which was the hometown of Fryer and a large African-American population. The charred and mangled body of Washington hung from a utility pole in front of a blacksmith's shop until a McLennan County Constable took his remains down and buried them. Washington's unclaimed remains were later buried in a local potters field. The news of Jesse Washington's lynching received national and international coverage. Horrific pictures capturing the violence and mob were taken by local photographer Fred Gildersleeve. He profited from selling these images as postcards and prints of the lynching were distributed globally.

Waco had seen another lynching previous to that of Washington. A mob had lynched an African American man by the name of Sank Majors in 1905. After a jury deliberated only three minutes in his trial, Majors was found guilty and two hundred men seized and dragged him to the town square, where they hung him from the Washington Street Bridge.

The lynchings took place during the time of the Jim Crow Laws in the South. These laws legally separated blacks and whites in numerous institutions such as schools, restrooms, and various types of transportation. "Separate but equal" had been affirmed by a 7-1 margin in the Plessy v. Ferguson case in 1896 by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The aftermath of the "Waco Horror" included a push to end lynching around the country. People began to see lynching as a barbaric act and started condemning those who participated in them. The NAACP led the charge in getting anti-lynching laws passed in light of the Washington lynching, which led to the decline of lynching after the 1920s and into the early 1960s. Lynching also had an effect on the arts. Billie Holiday released her song "Strange Fruit," and in 1935, two art exhibitions were displayed in New York City, one of which the NAACP sponsored.

In 2001, the lynching of Jesse Washington became national and local news again when ABC News Nightline aired an eighty-fifth anniversary special. Four years later, Patricia Bernstein released her book, "The First Waco Horror: The Lynching of Jesse Washington and the Rise of the NAACP," and it inspired the Waco community to call for local governments to apologize for the lynching. The Community Race Relations Coalition framed a resolution of apology, read it on the McLennan County Courthouse steps, and encouraged both the McLennan County Commissioners and Waco City Council to pass the resolution. After much debate over the word "apology," and the word's eventual removal, the McLennan County Commissioners passed a resolution condemning the lynching culture and mob violence of the past on May 23, 2006. The Waco City Council passed a similar resolution a little over a month later. Neither resolution included Jesse Washington by name.

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Jesse Washington Lynching | Waco History

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Society in the South evolved ensuing the emancipation of slaves after the Civil War. The Reconstruction of the South ended in 1877 and only added to the bad racial tensions in the region. Whites instituted laws that held blacks back from education, jobs, and participating in many forms of government.

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houston riot of 19178 dorris miller  awarded medal of honor 1942

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houston riot of 19178 dorris miller  awarded medal of honor 1942

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Among the names of the many individuals who served valiantly during World War II, Waco's own Doris Miller was a hero of national and international acclaim. Although many noted the valor he displayed during the war, some argue he still has not received the honors due him.

Born as the third of four sons to Connery and Henrietta Miller on October 19, 1919, Doris, named for the midwife present at his birth, grew up on a small sharecrop farm just outside of Waco in Speegleville, Texas. Years later, Henrietta Miller admitted that she had hoped for a baby girl, and her wishful thinking led to the feminine name, despite her husband's protests.

Along with his siblings, Doris worked to support the family farm from an early age. In his youth, he became an excellent marksman as he hunted for small game with his brothers. Doris also had a successful school career at A. J. Moore High School. His tall stature gained the attention of the football coach at the school who recruited Doris as a fullback on the team.

However, as Doris became older, and as war loomed on the horizon, he longed to join the armed forces much to the chagrin of his parents. After several attempts to join different sectors of the military, Doris Miller enlisted in the US Navy in Dallas, Texas, on September 16, 1939. Unfortunately, at the time of his enlistment, discrimination limited the areas of service for African Americans in the military. After training, his assignment was as a mess attendant, third class. It was from this station that Miller answered the call in extraordinary circumstances.

Assigned to the USS West Virginia anchored at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, Doris was collecting laundry in the hull of the ship when the attack began, according to some reports. As the air raid sirens started, Doris Miller burst into action. When he ran to the deck of the ship, he saw his captain sprawled, fatally wounded, on the ground. Miller pulled the wounded captain to safety before racing back to an unmanned antiaircraft gun in the midst of low-flying planes and a rain of bullets. Despite discriminatory policies that forbade Miller or other sailors of color to man heavy artillery, Miller seized control of a .50 caliber machine gun to fire at attacking Japanese planes. He committed his efforts to the defense of the West Virginia until superiors ordered all to abandon ship. Conflicting accounts exist of Miller's actions that day, but the most widely circulated reports won him quick and international attention.

After the attack, the military awarded Miller with an unprecedented honor. He became the first African American recipient of the Navy Cross, the highest decoration the navy can offer besides the Congressional Medal of Honor. The navy leveraged Miller's new status by returning him to the home front for a short time to act as a recruiter. In 1943, Miller received a promotion to petty officer, ship's cook third class, and was assigned to the escort carrier USS Liscome Bay. That November, in the Battle of Makin Island, a Japanese torpedo struck the Liscome Bay and the ship sunk within minutes. Miller did not survive the attack.

While awarded the Purple Heart posthumously, Doris Miller never received the Congressional Medal of Honor, which many believe he deserved. Those who fight for his legacy still lobby for its award.

Though his life was cut short due to the call of active duty, Doris Miller lives on in public memory. Throughout the nation, streets, schools, and parks bear his name. In Waco, his hometown, stands the Doris D. Miller Park and the Doris Miller Family YMCA, active reminders of one African American man's willingness to serve his country despite its discriminatory practices. Cultural Arts of Waco is currently raising money for a Doris Miller Memorial to be located on the east bank of the Brazos River.

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Among the names of the many individuals who served valiantly during World War II, Waco's own Doris Miller was a hero of national and international acclaim. Although many noted the valor he displayed during the war, some argue he still has not received the honors due him.

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U.S. Supreme Court
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)Smith v. Allwright No. 51 Argued November 10, 12, 1943 Reargued January 12, 1944 Decided April 3, 1944 321 U.S. 649 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
1. The right of a citizen of the United States to vote for the nomination of candidates for the United States Senate and House of Representatives in a primary which is an integral part of the elective process is a right secured by the Federal Constitution, and this right of the citizen may not be abridged by the State on account of his race or color. P. .

2. Whether the exclusion of citizens from voting on account of their race or color has been effected by action of the State -- rather than of individuals or of a political party -- is a question upon which the decision of the courts of the State is not binding on the federal courts, but which the latter must determine for themselves. P. .

3. Upon examination of the statutes of Texas regulating primaries, held: that the exclusion of Negroes from voting in a Democratic primary to select nominees for a general election -- although, by resolution of a state convention of the party, its membership was limited to white citizens -- was State action in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Grove v. Townsend, , overruled. Pp. , .

When, as here, primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing officials, state and federal, the same tests to determine

Page 321 U. S. 650

the character of discrimination or abridgment should be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election. P. .

4. While not unmindful of the desirability of its adhering to former decisions of constitutional questions, this Court is not constrained to follow a previous decision which, upon reexamination, is believed erroneous, particularly one which involves the application of a constitutional principle, rather than an interpretation of the Constitution to evolve the principle itself. P. .

131 F.2d 593, reversed.

Certiorari, 319 U.S. 738, to review the affirmance of a judgment for the defendants in a suit for damages under 8 U.S.C. § 43.

MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

This writ of certiorari brings here for review a claim for damages in the sum of $5,000 on the part of petitioner, a Negro citizen of the 48th precinct of Harris County, Texas,

Page 321 U. S. 651

for the refusal of respondents, election and associate election judges, respectively, of that precinct, to give petitioner a ballot or to permit him to cast a ballot in the primary election of July 27, 1940, for the nomination of Democratic candidates for the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and Governor and other state officers. The refusal is alleged to have been solely because of the race and color of the proposed voter.

The actions of respondents are said to violate §§ 31 and 43 of Title 8 [ Footnote 1] of the United States Code, 8 U.S.C. §§ 31 and 43, in that petitioner was deprived of rights secured by §§ 2 and 4 of Article I [ Footnote 2] and the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amendments

Page 321 U. S. 652

to the United States Constitution. [ Footnote 3] The suit was filed in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Texas, which had jurisdiction under Judicial Code § 24, subsection 14. [ Footnote 4]

The District Court denied the relief sought, and the Circuit Court of Appeals quite properly affirmed its action on the authority of Grovey v. Townsend, . [ Footnote 5] We granted the petition for certiorari to resolve a claimed inconsistency between the decision in the Grovey case and that of United States v. Classic, . 319 U.S. 738.

The State of Texas by its Constitution and statutes provides that every person, if certain other requirements are met which are not here in issue, qualified by residence

Page 321 U. S. 653

in the district or county "shall be deemed a qualified elector." Constitution of Texas, Article VI, § 2; Vernon's Civil Statutes (1939 ed.), Article 2955. Primary elections for United States Senators, Congressmen and state officers are provided for by Chapters Twelve and Thirteen of the statutes. Under these chapters, the Democratic Party was required to hold the primary which was the occasion of the alleged wrong to petitioner. A summary of the state statutes regulating primaries appears in the footnote. [ Footnote 6] These nominations are to be made by the qualified voters of the party. Art. 3101.

Page 321 U. S. 654

The Democratic Party of Texas is held by the Supreme Court of that state to be a "voluntary association," Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 534, protected by § 27 of the Bill of Rights, Art. 1, Constitution of Texas, from interference by the state except that:

"In the interest of fair methods and a fair expression by their members of their preferences in the selection of their

Page 321 U. S. 655

nominees, the State may regulate such elections by proper laws."

P. 545. That court stated further:

"Since the right to organize and maintain a political party is one guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of this state, it necessarily follows that every privilege essential or reasonably appropriate to the exercise of that right is likewise

Page 321 U. S. 656

guaranteed, including, of course, the privilege of determining the policies of the party and its membership. Without the privilege of determining the policy of a political association and its membership, the right to organize such an association would be a mere mockery. We think these rights, that is, the right to determine the membership of a political party and to determine its policies, of necessity are to be exercised by the State Convention of such party, and cannot, under any circumstances, be conferred upon a state or governmental agency."

P. 546. Cf. Waples v. Marrast, 108 Tex. 5, 184 S.W. 180.

The Democratic party, on May 24, 1932, in a state convention adopted the following resolution, which has not since been "amended, abrogated, annulled or avoided":

"Be it resolved that all white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote under the Constitution and laws of the State shall be eligible to membership in the

Page 321 U. S. 657

Democratic party and, as such, entitled to participate in its deliberations."

It was by virtue of this resolution that the respondents refused to permit the petitioner to vote.

Texas is free to conduct her elections and limit her electorate as she may deem wise, save only as her action may be affected by the prohibitions of the United States Constitution or in conflict with powers delegated to and exercised by the National Government. [ Footnote 7] The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state from making or enforcing any law which abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States and the Fifteenth Amendment specifically interdicts any denial or abridgement by a state of the right of citizens to vote on account of color. Respondents appeared in the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals and defended on the ground that the Democratic party of Texas is a voluntary organization, with members banded together for the purpose of selecting individuals of the group representing the common political beliefs as candidates in the general election. As such a voluntary organization, it was claimed, the Democratic party is free to select its own membership and limit to whites participation in the party primary. Such action, the answer asserted, does not violate the Fourteenth, Fifteenth or Seventeenth Amendment, as officers of government cannot be chosen at primaries, and the Amendments are applicable only to general elections, where governmental officers are actually elected. Primaries, it is said, are political party affairs, handled by party, not governmental, officers. No appearance for respondents is made in this Court. Arguments presented here by the Attorney General of Texas and the Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee of Texas, as amici

Page 321 U. S. 658

curiae, urged substantially the same grounds as those advanced by the respondents.

Page 321 U. S. 659

In Grovey v. Townsend, , this Court had before it another suit for damages for the refusal in a primary of a county clerk, a Texas officer with only public functions to perform, to furnish petitioner, a Negro, an absentee ballot. The refusal was solely on the ground of race. This case differed from Nixon v. Condon, supra, in that a state convention of the Democratic party had passed the resolution of May 24, 1932, hereinbefore quoted. It was decided that the determination by the state convention of the membership of the Democratic party made a significant change from a determination by the Executive Committee. The former was party action, voluntary in character. The latter, as had been held in the Condon case, was action by authority of the State. The managers of the primary election were therefore declared not to be state officials in such sense that their action was state action. A state convention of a party was said not to be an organ of the state. This Court went on to announce that to deny a vote in a primary was a mere refusal of party membership, with which "the state need have no concern," loc.cit. , while for a state to deny a vote in a general election on the ground of race or color violated the Constitution. Consequently, there was found no ground for holding that the county clerk's refusal of a ballot because of racial ineligibility for party membership denied the petitioner any right under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.

Since Grovey v. Townsend and prior to the present suit, no case from Texas involving primary elections has been before this Court. We did decide, however, United States v. Classic, . We there held that § 4 of Article I of the Constitution authorized Congress to regulate primary, as well as general, elections, 313 U.S. at , ,

Page 321 U. S. 660

"where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery." 313 U.S. at =. Consequently, in the Classic case, we upheld the applicability to frauds in a Louisiana primary of §§ 19 and 20 of the Criminal Code. Thereby, corrupt acts of election officers were subjected to Congressional sanctions because that body had power to protect rights of Federal suffrage secured by the Constitution in primary as in general elections. 313 U.S. at . This decision depended, too, on the determination that, under the Louisiana statutes, the primary was a part of the procedure for choice of Federal officials. By this decision, the doubt as to whether or not such primaries were a part of "elections" subject to Federal control, which had remained unanswered since Newberry v. United States, , was erased. The Nixon cases were decided under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment without a determination of the status of the primary as a part of the electoral process. The exclusion of Negroes from the primaries by action of the State was held invalid under that Amendment. The fusing by the Classic case of the primary and general elections into a single instrumentality for choice of officers has a definite bearing on the permissibility under the Constitution of excluding Negroes from primaries. This is not to say that the Classic case cuts directly into the rationale of Grovey v. Townsend. This latter case was not mentioned in the opinion. Classic bears upon Grovey v. Townsend not because exclusion of Negroes from primaries is any more or less state action by reason of the unitary character of the electoral process, but because the recognition of the place of the primary in the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make the party's action the action of the state. When Grovey v. Townsend was written, the Court looked upon the denial of a vote in a primary as a

Page 321 U. S. 661

mere refusal by a party of party membership. 295 U.S. at . As the Louisiana statutes for holding primaries are similar to those of Texas, our ruling in Classic as to the unitary character of the electoral process calls for a reexamination as to whether or not the exclusion of Negroes from a Texas party primary was state action.

The statutes of Texas relating to primaries and the resolution of the Democratic party of Texas extending the privileges of membership to white citizens only are the same in substance and effect today as they were when Grovey v. Townsend was decided by a unanimous Court. The question as to whether the exclusionary action of the party was the action of the State persists as the determinative factor. In again entering upon consideration of the inference to be drawn as to state action from a substantially similar factual situation, it should be noted that Grovey v. Townsend upheld exclusion of Negroes from primaries through the denial of party membership by a party convention. A few years before, this Court refused approval of exclusion by the State Executive Committee of the party. A different result was reached on the theory that the Committee action was state authorized, and the Convention action was unfettered by statutory control. Such a variation in the result from so slight a change in form influences us to consider anew the legal validity of the distinction which has resulted in barring Negroes from participating in the nominations of candidates of the Democratic party in Texas. Other precedents of this Court forbid the abridgement of the right to vote. United States v. Reese, , ; Neal v. Delaware, , ; Guinn v. United States, , ; Myers v. Anderson, , ; Lane v. Wilson, .

It may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in such a primary for the nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like the right to vote

Page 321 U. S. 662

in a general election, is a right secured by the Constitution. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. at ; Myers v. Anderson, ; Ex parte Yarbrough, , et seq. By the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment, that right may not be abridged by any state on account of race. Under our Constitution, the great privilege of the ballot may not be denied a man by the State because of his color.

We are thus brought to an examination of the qualifications for Democratic primary electors in Texas, to determine whether state action or private action has excluded Negroes from participation. Despite Texas' decision that the exclusion is produced by private or party action, Bell v. Hill, supra, Federal courts must for themselves appraise the facts leading to that conclusion. It is only by the performance of this obligation that a final and uniform interpretation can be given to the Constitution, the "supreme Law of the Land." Nixon v. Condon, , ; Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, , ; Bridges v. California, ; Lisenba v. California, , ; Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, , ; Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, , ; Chambers v. Florida, , . Texas requires electors in a primary to pay a poll tax. Every person who does so pay and who has the qualifications of age and residence is an acceptable voter for the primary. Art. 2955. As appears above in the summary of the statutory provisions set out in note 6 Texas requires by the law the election of the county officers of a party. These compose the county executive committee. The county chairmen so selected are members of the district executive committee and choose the chairman for the district. Precinct primary election officers are named by the county executive committee. Statutes provide for the election by the voters of precinct

Page 321 U. S. 663

delegates to the county convention of a party and the selection of delegates to the district and state conventions by the county convention. The state convention selects the state executive committee. No convention may place in platform or resolution any demand for specific legislation without endorsement of such legislation by the voters in a primary. Texas thus directs the selection of all party officers.

Primary elections are conducted by the party under state statutory authority. The county executive committee selects precinct election officials and the county, district or state executive committees, respectively, canvass the returns. These party committees or the state convention certify the party's candidates to the appropriate officers for inclusion on the official ballot for the general election. No name which has not been so certified may appear upon the ballot for the general election as a candidate of a political party. No other name may be printed on the ballot which has not been placed in nomination by qualified voters who must take oath that they did not participate in a primary for the selection of a candidate for the office for which the nomination is made.

The state courts are given exclusive original jurisdiction of contested elections and of mandamus proceedings to compel party officers to perform their statutory duties.

We think that this statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on the general election ballot makes the party which is required to follow these legislative directions an agency of the state in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election. The party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are performed by a political party. The plan of the Texas primary follows substantially that of Louisiana, with the exception that, in

Page 321 U. S. 664

Page 321 U. S. 665

of the party the action of the state. In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity of decision in constitutional questions. [ Footnote 8] However, when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment, and not upon legislative action, this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions. This has long been accepted practice, [ Footnote 9] and this practice has continued to this day. [ Footnote 10] This is particularly true when the decision believed erroneous is the application of a constitutional principle, rather

Page 321 U. S. 666

than an interpretation of the Constitution to extract the principle itself. [ Footnote 11] Here, we are applying, contrary to the recent decision in Grovey v. Townsend, the well established principle of the Fifteenth Amendment, forbidding the abridgement by a state of a citizen's right to vote. Grovey v. Townsend is overruled.
Judgment reversed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs in the result.

8 U.S.C. § 31:

"All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding."

"§ 43:"

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

Constitution, Art. I:

"Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."

"Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."

Constitution:

"Article XIV. Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

"Article XV. Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

"Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

"Article XVII. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures."

A declaratory judgment also was sought as to the constitutionality of the denial of the ballot. The judgment entered declared the denial was constitutional. This phase of the case is not considered further, as the decision on the merits determines the legality of the action of the respondents.

Smith v. Allwright, 131 F.2d 593.

The extent to which the state controls the primary election machinery appears from the Texas statutes, as follows: Art. 3118, Vernon's Texas Statutes, provides for the election of a county chairman for each party holding a primary by the "qualified voters of the whole county," and of one member of the party's county executive committee by the "qualified voters of their respective election precincts." These officers have direct charge of the primary. There is, in addition, statutory provision for a party convention: the voters in each precinct choose delegates to a county convention, and the latter chooses delegates to a state convention. Art. 3134. The state convention has authority to choose the state executive committee and its chairman. Art. 3139, 1939 Supp. Candidates for offices to be filled by election are required to be nominated at a primary election if the nominating party cast over 100,000 votes at the preceding general election. Art. 3101. The date of the primary is fixed at the fourth Saturday in July; a majority is required for nomination, and if no candidate receives a majority, a run-off primary between the two highest standing candidates is held on the fourth Saturday in August. Art. 3102. Polling places may not be within a hundred yards of those used by the opposite party. Art. 3103. Each precinct primary is to be conducted by a presiding judge and the assistants he names. These officials are selected by the county executive committee. Art. 3104. Absentee voting machinery provided by the state for general elections is also used in primaries. Art. 2956. The presiding judges are given legal authority similar to that of judges at general elections. Compare Art. 3105 with Art. 3002. The county executive committee may decide whether county officers are to be nominated by majority or plurality vote. Art. 3106. The state executive committee is given power to fix qualifications of party membership, Art. 3107; Art. 2955, 1942 Supp., requires payment of a poll tax by voters in primary elections, and Art. 3093(3) deals with political qualifications of candidates for nomination for United States Senator. But cf. Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 74 S.W.2d 113. Art. 3108 empowers the county committee to prepare a budget covering the cost of the primary and to require each candidate to pay a fair share. The form of the ballot is prescribed by Art. 3109. Art. 3101 provides that the nominations be made by the qualified voters of the party. Cf. Art. 3091. Art. 3110 prescribes a test for voters who take part in the primary. It reads as follows:

"No official ballot for primary election shall have on it any symbol or device or any printed matter, except a uniform primary test, reading as follows:"

" I am a . . . (inserting name of political party or organization of which the voter is a member) and pledge myself to support the nominee of this primary;"

"and any ballot which shall not contain such printed test above the names of the candidates thereon, shall be void and shall not be counted."

This appears, however, to be a morally, rather than a legally, enforceable pledge. See Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S.W.2d 515, 70 A.L.R. 1484.

Arts. 3092 and 3111 to 3114 deal with the mechanics of procuring a place on the primary ballot for federal, state, district, or county office. The request for a place on the ballot may be made to the state, district, or county party chairman, either by the person desiring nomination or by twenty-five qualified voters. The ballot is prepared by a subcommittee of the county executive committee. Art. 3115. A candidate must pay his share of the expenses of the election before his name is placed on the ballot. Art. 3116. Art. 3116, however, limits the sum that may be charged candidates for certain posts, such as the offices of district judge, judge of the Court of Civil Appeals, and senator and representative in the state and federal legislatures, and for some counties fees are fixed by Arts. 3116a-3116d, 1939 Supp., and 3116e, 3116f, 1942 Supp. Supplies for the election are distributed by the county committee, Art. 3119, and Art. 3120 authorizes the use of voting booths, ballot boxes and guard rails, prepared for the general election,

"for the organized political party nominating by primary election that cast over one hundred thousand votes at the preceding general election."

The county tax collector must supply lists of qualified voters by precincts; and these lists must be used at the primary. Art. 3121. The same precautions as to secrecy and the care of the ballots must be observed in primary as in general elections. Art. 3122. Arts. 3123-3125 cover the making of returns to the county and state chairmen and canvass of the result by the county committee. By Art. 3127, a statewide canvass is required of the state executive committee for state and district officers and a similar canvass by the state convention, with respect to state officers, is provided by Art. 3138. The nominations for district offices are certified to the county clerks, and for state officers to the Secretary of State. Arts. 3127, 3137, 3138. Ballot boxes and ballots are to be returned to the county clerk, Art. 3128, 1942 Supp., and, upon certification by the county committee, the county clerk must publish the result. Art. 3129, 1942 Supp. If no objection is made within five days, the name of the nominee is then to be placed on the official ballot by the county clerk. Art. 3131, 1942 Supp. Cf. Arts. 2978, 2984, 2992, 2996. Arts. 3146-3153, 1942 Supp., provide for election contests. The state district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction, and the Court of Civil Appeals has appellate jurisdiction. The state courts are also authorized to issue writs of mandamus to require executive committees, committeemen, and primary officers to discharge the duties imposed by the statute. Art. 3142; cf. Art. 3124.

The official ballot is required to contain parallel columns for the nominees of the respective parties, a column for independent candidates, and a blank column for such names as the voters care to write in. Arts. 2978, 2980. The names of nominees of a party casting more than 100,000 votes at the last preceding general election may not be printed on the ballot unless they were chosen at a primary election. Art. 2978. Candidates who are not party nominees may have their names printed on the ballot by complying with Arts. 3159-62. These sections require applications to be filed with the Secretary of State, county judge, or mayor, for state and district, county, and city offices, respectively. The applications must be signed by qualified voters to the number of from one to five percent of the ballots cast at the preceding election, depending on the office. Each signer must take an oath to the effect that he did not participate in a primary at which a candidate for the office in question was nominated. While this requirement has been held to preclude one who has voted in the party primary from appearing on the ballot as an independent, Westerman v. Mims, 111 Tex. 29, 227 S.W. 178; see Cunningham v. McDermett, (Civ.App.), one who lost at the primary may still be elected at the general election by a write-in vote. Cunningham v. McDermett, supra.

The operations of the party are restricted by the state in one other important respect. By Act. 3139, 1939 Supp., the state convention can announce a platform of principles, but its submission at the primary is a prerequisite to party advocacy of specific legislation. Art. 3133.

See cases collected in the dissenting opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., , .

[ Footnote 10]

See e.g., United States v. Darby, , overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, ; California v. Thompson, , overruling Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, , overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, ; Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., , overruling Gillespie v. Oklahoma, , and Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., ; Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, , 16 Pet. 1; Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, , overruling Day and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, ; O'Malley v. Woodrough, , overruling Miles v. Graham, ; Madden v. Kentucky, , overruling Colgate v. Harvey, ; Helvering v. Hallock, , overruling Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., , and Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., ; Nye v. United States, , overruling Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, ; Alabama v. King & Boozer, , overruling Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, , and Graves v. Texas Co., ; Williams v. North Carolina, , overruling Haddock v. Haddock, ; State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, , overruling First National Bank v. Maine, ; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, , overruling Minersville School District v. Gobitis, .

[ Footnote 11]

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS.

In 1923, Texas adopted a statute which declared that no negro should be eligible to participate in a Democratic Primary election in that State. A negro, a citizen of the United States and of Texas, qualified to vote, except for the provisions of the statute, was denied the opportunity to vote in a primary election at which candidates were to be chosen for the offices of senator and representative in the Congress of the United States. He brought action against the judges of election in a United States court for

Page 321 U. S. 667

In 1927, the legislature of Texas repealed the provision condemned by this court and enacted that every political party in the State might, through its Executive Committee, prescribe the qualifications of its own members and determine in its own way who should be qualified to vote or participate in the party, except that no denial of participation could be decreed by reason of former political or other affiliation. Thereupon, the State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party in Texas adopted a resolution that white Democrats, and no other, should be allowed to participate in the party's primaries.

The opinion was written with care. The court refused to decide whether a political party in Texas had inherent power to determine its membership. The court said, however: "Whatever inherent power a state political party has to determine the content of its membership resides in the state convention," and referred to the statutes of Texas to demonstrate that the State had left the Convention free to formulate the party faith. Attention was directed to the fact that the statute under attack did not leave to the party convention the definition of party membership, but placed it in the party's State Executive Committee, which could not, by any stretch of reasoning, be

Page 321 U. S. 668

held to constitute the party. The court held, therefore, that the State Executive Committee acted solely by virtue of the statutory mandate and as delegate of State power, and again struck down the discrimination against negro voters as deriving force and virtue from State action -- that is, from statute.

In 1932, the Democratic Convention of Texas adopted a resolution that

"all white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote under the Constitution and laws of the state shall be eligible to membership in the Democratic party, and, as such, entitled to participate in its deliberations."

A negro voter qualified to vote in a primary election, except for the exclusion worked by the resolution, demanded an absentee ballot which he was entitled to mail to the judges at a primary election except for the resolution. The county clerk refused to furnish him a ballot. He brought an action for damages against the clerk in a state court. That court, which was the tribunal having final jurisdiction under the laws of Texas, dismissed his complaint, and he brought the case to this court for review. After the fullest consideration by the whole court, an opinion was written representing its unanimous views and affirming the judgment. Grovey v. Townsend, (1935).

I believe it will not be gainsaid the case received the attention and consideration which the questions involved demanded, and the opinion represented the views of all the justices. It appears that those views do not now commend themselves to the court. I shall not restate them. They are exposed in the opinion, and must stand or fall on their merits. Their soundness, however, is not a matter which presently concerns me.

Page 321 U. S. 669

The reason for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only. I have no assurance, in view of current decisions, that the opinion announced today may not shortly be repudiated and overruled by justices who deem they have new light on the subject. In the present term, the court has overruled three cases.

In the present case, as in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., the court below relied, as it was bound to, upon our previous decision. As that court points out, the statutes of Texas have not been altered since Grovey v. Townsend was decided. The same resolution is involved as was drawn in question in Grovey v. Townsend. Not a fact differentiates that case from this except the names of the parties.

It is suggested that Grovey v. Townsend was overruled sub silentio in United States v. Classic, . If so, the situation is even worse than that exhibited by the outright repudiation of an earlier decision, for it is the fact that, in the Classic case, Grovey v. Townsend was distinguished in brief and argument by the Government without suggestion that it was wrongly decided, and was relied on by the appellees not as a controlling decision, but by way of analogy. The case is not mentioned in either of the opinions in the Classic case. Again and again, it is said in the opinion of the court in that case that the voter who was denied the right to vote was a fully qualified voter. In other words, there was no question of his being a person entitled under state law to vote in the primary. The offense charged was the fraudulent denial of his conceded right by an election officer because of his race. Here, the question is altogether different. It is whether, in a Democratic primary, he who tendered his vote was a member of the Democratic Party.

Page 321 U. S. 670

I do not stop to call attention to the material differences between the primary election laws of Louisiana under consideration in the Classic case and those of Texas which are here drawn in question. These differences were spelled out in detail in the Government's brief in the Classic case and emphasized in its oral argument. It is enough to say that the Louisiana statutes required the primary to be conducted by State officials and made it a State election, whereas, under the Texas statute, the primary is a party election conducted at the expense of members of the party and by officials chosen by the party. If this court's opinion in the Classic case discloses its method of overruling earlier decisions, I can only protest that, in fairness, it should rather have adopted the open and frank way of saying what it was doing than, after the event, characterize its past action as overruling Grovey v. Townsend though those less sapient never realized the fact.

It is regrettable that, in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era whose greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this court, which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication and a steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and flows of opinion, should now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our institutions.

* The court was composed of Hughes, C.J., Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Stone, Roberts and Cardozo, JJ.

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Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) Smith v. Allwright No. 51 Argued November 10, 12, 1943 Reargued January 12, 1944 Decided April 3, 1944 321 U.S. 649 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 1.

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African American News and Issues - News for the Community

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By: Nevaeh Richardson Did you know that the State Fair of Texas once had a policy of admitting Blacks only on "Negro Achievement Day?" Well, they did, and this woman helped put an end to that. Learn about renowned politician and civil rights activist Juanita Craft in this week's "Know Your History" feature.

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Prints & Photographs Collection, Heman Sweatt file,
The Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin

In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt applied for admission to the University of Texas School of Law, which was at the time an all-white institution. Sweatt met all eligibility requirements for admission except for his race. At that time, Article VII, Section 7 of the Texas Constitution read: "Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, and impartial provision shall be made for both." Based on the Texas constitution, the university registrar rejected his application because Sweatt was black and the University of Texas was a segregated institution. With assistance from NAACP counsel, Sweatt sued in state court, requesting that the court require state and university officials to enroll him. The trial judge continued the case to give the state an opportunity to establish a "separate but equal" law school, and a temporary law school was opened in February 1947, known as the School of Law of the Texas State University for Negroes.

At the School of Law of the Texas State University for Negroes, students had access to the Texas Supreme Court library, and several members of the law faculty of the University of Texas School of Law taught classes. After the establishment of the black law school, the state court dismissed Sweatt's case. Sweatt appealed the dismissal of the case to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the Texas admissions scheme continued to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court ruled that in states where public graduate and professional schools existed for white students but not for black students, black students must be admitted to the all-white institutions, and that the equal protection clause required Sweatt's admission to the University of Texas School of Law. In the summer of 1950, Horace Heath enrolled in the Graduate School of Government and John Chase enrolled in the architecture program at the University of Texas. Heman Marion Sweatt entered law school at the University of Texas in the fall of 1950, as did several other blacks.

The case had a direct impact on the University of Texas because it permitted black applicants to apply to graduate and professional programs. However, black students could only pursue those degrees that were not available from segregated black universities such as Prairie View A&M University and Texas State University for Negroes, now known as Texas Southern University. Since the University of Texas adopted a narrow interpretation of Sweatt, black undergraduate students were not admitted. Graduate students, however, were allowed to enroll in undergraduate courses when necessary for their program.

At the same time the Supreme Court considered the Sweatt case, it reviewed the policies of the University of Oklahoma in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education. On January 28, 1948, a retired black professor, George McLaurin, applied to the University of Oklahoma to pursue a Doctorate in Education. University authorities were required to deny him admission because of his race under Oklahoma statutes making it a misdemeanor to maintain, operate, teach, or attend a school at which both whites and blacks were enrolled or taught. McLaurin filed a complaint to gain admission. On October 6, the Court for the Western District of Oklahoma found those parts of the Oklahoma statute that denied McLaurin admission unconstitutional, and held that the state had a constitutional duty to provide McLaurin with the education he sought as soon as it provided that education for applicants of any other group. With this ruling the University's Board of Regents voted to admit McLaurin, but on a segregated basis.

On October 13, 1948, McLaurin entered the University. He sat at a designated desk on the mezzanine level of Bizzell Library rather than in the regular reading room, at a desk in an anteroom adjoining Classroom 104 in Carnegie Hall, and ate at a separate time from the white students in the cafeteria. McLaurin once again filed suit, claiming that this segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that as a result of McLaurin's segregation he was "handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession."

With Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, the Supreme Court began to overturn the separate but equal doctrine in public education by requiring graduate and professional schools to admit black students.

View Case: Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)

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Tarlton Law Library: The Papers of Justice Tom C. Clark: Sweatt v. Painter (1950)

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In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt applied for admission to the University of Texas School of Law, which was at the time an all-white institution. Sweatt met all eligibility requirements for admission except for his race.

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D. Joe Williams integrate collegiate sports 1953

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D. Joe Williams integrate collegiate sports 1953

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Inducted in 1996 A pioneer not only as an outstanding ballplayer but also as a Coach and Administrator One of the first African Americans to play in the Junior League in McAllen Texas in the late...

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1955 Dallas Youth Council Protest of Negro Achievement Day

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1955 Dallas Youth Council Protest of Negro Achievement Day

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In 1955, the Texas State Fair in Dallas was segregated, a tradition that dated back to 1889 when planners first set aside a day for African Americans to attend the fair. Then called Colored People's Day, it was discontinued in 1910 and renamed Negro Achievement Day in 1936.

A collaboration between the Negro Chamber of Commerce and the State Fair Board, Negro Achievement Day featured a parade decked out with floats and fair Queens, the presentation of the Most Distinguished Negro Citizen Award, and high school and college football games. The day drew African American visitors from all over the state.

In 1953, the fair announced that African Americans could attend the fair on any day, but could only fully participate in the fair's enjoyments on Negro Achievement Day. Juanita Craft, NAACP Youth Council advisor for the Dallas branch, spearheaded a movement to end discrimination at the fair so that any person of any race could participate on any day they chose. Craft and members of the Youth Council decided to stage a boycott of the fair to draw attention to discriminatory practices. Teenagers, equipped with signs proclaiming "TODAY IS NEGRO APPEASEMENT DAY AT THE FAIR," picketed the parade that began at the local black high school. In an interview given in 1974, Craft remembered, "Those kids went to the starting point at Lincoln High School and boarded the floats right along with the queens and everybody else and rode down the streets saying, 'Stay out. Don't sell your pride for a segregated ride.' The kids were on top of people's houses along the route of the parade with megaphones telling about the segregated policy out there and to stay out."

When the parade reached the picket line at the entrance of the fair, participants turned and refused to enter. The picket line lasted throughout the day and into the night. While the Youth Council did not succeed in ending Negro Achievement Day, they were able to draw attention to the discrimination African Americans faced. The Youth Council was given an award by the NAACP for their well organized and peaceful demonstration. In later years, adults took over picketing the fair. Achievement Day (fair planners dropped the "Negro" in 1957) officially ended in 1961, followed by the full desegregation of the fair later in the '60s.

The boycott, and the majority of other civil rights activity in Dallas, was captured on film by photographer R. C. Hickman. Born in the East Texas town of Mineloa in 1922, Hickman moved to Dallas with his family in the 1930s. After attending Tillotson College in Austin, he served as an Army photographer in World War II, then returned to Dallas to work as a photographer for the Dallas Star Post. As the unofficial photographer of the African American community in Dallas in the 1950s, he captured pivotal moments in the city's civil rights history, including visits by Martin Luther King Jr. and Thurgood Marshall.

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NAACP Picket the Texas State Fair in 1955

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In 1955, members of the NAACP Youth Council formed a picket line to protest segregation at the Texas State Fair in Dallas.

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The Mansfield school desegregation incident is a 1956 event in the Civil Rights Movement in Mansfield, Texas, a suburb of the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex.

In 1955, the Mansfield Independent School District was segregated and still sent its black children to separate, run down facilities, despite the Brown v. Board of Education court decision in 1954. Three students brought a suit with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In Jackson v. Rawdon, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the students. In 1956, Mansfield ISD became the first school district in the state ordered by a federal court to desegregate. The school board approved the measure and allowed Mansfield High School to desegregate. Although other districts in Texas desegregated quietly that fall, the mayor and police chief of Mansfield did not approve of this measure. When school started on August 30, 1956, they joined over 300 whites in front of Mansfield High School. Their goal was to prevent the enrollment of the three black students. The town turned into complete turmoil as three black effigies were hanged as part of the demonstration.

Texas Governor Allan Shivers was a noted segregationist and used the power of his office to resist implementation of Brown v. Board of Education. Shivers dispatched Texas Rangers to prevent integration, led by Captain Jay Banks, who, in addition to threatening to arrest Black students, refused to take down an effigy of a Black man hanging by a noose at the entrance of Mansfield High School. Shivers then authorized the Mansfield Independent School District to send its Black students to Fort Worth, Texas. By doing this the school district had effectively ignored a federal court order for integration.

After the transfer of the Black students to Fort Worth, the demonstrations soon ended and order was restored. It was this success that in 1957 inspired Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus to attempt a similar ordeal in Little Rock, Arkansas. Later that year, Texas passed more segregation laws that delayed integration even further.

Facing the lack of federal funds, the Mansfield Independent School District quietly desegregated in 1965. The decade long defiance of a federal school integration order was one of the longest in the nation during that period.

In June 2020, a statue modeled after Texas Ranger Captain Jay Banks, called One Riot, One Ranger, was removed from Dallas Love Field. It was first dedicated in 1961, 5 years after the Mansfield School Desegregation Incident.

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Mansfield school desegregation incident - Wikipedia

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The Mansfield school desegregation incident is a 1956 event in the Civil Rights Movement in Mansfield, Texas, a suburb of the Dallas–Fort Worth metroplex.

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University of Texas at El Paso Flowsheet student yearbook

The 1966 championship game for the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball tournament came down to a test between a small southwestern institution, El Paso's Texas Western College Miners, and an accomplished four-time NCAA tournament winner, the University of Kentucky Wildcats. This game, however, proved to be more than just a challenge by the Miners, a multi-racial team that had joined the NCAA just three years earlier, and an all-white opponent, the Wildcats, widely considered the strongest basketball team in the nation. This game, according to many sports observers, forever changed major college basketball. The Miners' unexpected victory demonstrated that African American players had the skill to control the game as well as a white team, and ultimately better than the best white team.

The 1966 Miners consisted of seven African Americans: Bobby Joe Hill, Orsten Artis, Willie Worsley, Willie Cager, Nevil Shed, Harry Flournoy, and David Lattin; four Anglo Americans: Jerry Armstrong, Louis Baudoin, Dick Meyers, and Togo Railey; and one Mexican American, Dave Palacio. The opposing team contained all Anglo Americans, which was not surprising since many African Americans gained access to Southern colleges only in the 1960s. While some southern white campuses desegregated and blacks could attend classes, they were still usually excluded from team sports. No major white institution in the South or Southwest recruited black basketball players.

In contrast to other Texas colleges and universities, as well as most universities throughout the South, Texas Western experienced integration more than a decade earlier. The Miners' coach, Don Haskins, recruited the best players, regardless of their hue. Adolph Rupp, on the other hand, the legendary coach and strategist of the Kentucky Wildcats, admitted he did not seek black players for his team.

The Miners arrived in Kentucky for the championship game on March 19, 1966. The sports announcers and writers expected an overwhelming win for the Wildcats. However, Haskins understood the pressure his team faced and sent in his best players, all African Americans. At first, Kentucky gained the advantage, but soon the Miners captured the lead during the first half and ended the final quarter with a Miner 72-65 win. This victory, according to sports writer and historian Charles Martin, "was a watershed event" because it encouraged other schools to recruit African American players.

In 2006, the movie Glory Road, depicting the significance of this game, was released. The following year, the team was inducted into the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame. On February 6, 2016, the now University of Texas El Paso Miners held a reunion for the 1966 players at the Don Haskins Center. The opening ceremony heard an address from President Barack Obama, which included these words: "...by becoming the first team to win an NCAA title with five black starters, the Miners weren't just champs on the court: They helped change the rules of the game. They didn't know it at the time, but their contribution to civil rights was as important as any other..." "...Go Miners!"

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The 1966 championship game for the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball tournament came down to a test between a small southwestern institution, El Paso's Texas Western College Miners, and an accomplished four-time NCAA tournament winner, the University of Kentucky Wildcats. This game, however, proved ...

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Election of Barbara Jordan to the Texas State Sanate 1967 and House of Representatives

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Election of Barbara Jordan to the Texas State Sanate 1967 and House of Representatives