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Corruption is getting worse in South Africa

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Corruption is getting worse in South Africa

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As the world remembers the passing of global icon Nelson Mandela, the fact that he was a man of principle is a clear element of his success as a leader and overall greatness. He understood the vital importance of the constitutional principles of accountability and the rule of law. He not only said as much, but also demonstrated the courage of his convictions by submitting himself before the courts when summoned to defend his decision to set up a commission to investigate alleged racism, corruption and nepotism in South African rugby.

It is therefore saddening to see how far some in the ruling elite have strayed from the example set by this great man. An important barometer of the extent of this problem is growing public sector corruption, whereby public funds are being diverted away from the public good towards private interests. Of course private sector corruption is also a problem, but until we get a handle on corruption in government, private sector corruption will continue to flourish.

South Africans certainly think that public sector corruption is getting worse. Transparency International's (TI) 2013 global Corruption Perception Index (CPI) shows that South Africa has dropped 34 places since 2001, with half the decline of 17 places occurring since 2009. South Africa is currently ranked at number 72 out of 175 countries and heading downwards.

The Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC) annual South African Social Attitudes Survey shows the proportion of people who think that tackling corruption should be a national priority almost doubling, from 14% to 26% in the five-year period between 2006 and 2011.

This trend is supported by the latest 2013 Afrobarometer report, Governments falter in fight to curb corruption, released on 13 November 2013. The report, based on surveys of 51 000 people in 34 African countries, shows that South Africa is one of the countries where there is a notable increase in public perceptions that corruption is getting worse, particularly since 2008. This is in contrast with countries such as Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal and Zambia, where people believe that their governments are making gains in curbing public sector corruption.

Interestingly, South Africa is better placed than many other African countries to tackle this problem. There are 13 public sector agencies that have a particular legal or policy role to play in combatting graft. Moreover, a number of national mechanisms - such as the National Anti-Corruption Task Team - have been established to coordinate the functions of these agencies. South Africa also has dedicated policies, standards and legislation specifically designed to enable the state to tackle corruption through both criminal and civil action.

The question then becomes, why, with all these resources available to tackle corruption, do South Africans perceive the government to be failing in this regard. For example, Afrobarometer has found that on average a little over half (56%) of people on the African continent thought that their governments were doing a poor job in "their efforts to fight corruption". However, South Africa performed notably worse than the average, with two out of three citizens (66%) believing the government to be performing poorly in combatting graft.

Importantly, these opinions are not held because South Africans are regularly confronted with public sector corruption. In fact, the 2013 Afrobarometer report shows that South Africa was ranked fifth lowest among African countries when it came to citizens having direct experiences of paying a bribe for public services.

Only 15% of South Africans said that they had paid a bribe in the previous year compared with an average of 30% of Africans who had paid a bribe. The worst performer was Sierra Leone, where 63% said that they had paid a bribe. So why do South Africans have such negative perceptions of corruption?

Arguably, it is because although most people are not expected to pay a bribe to access a public service, the public are aware that politicians and public officials divert public funds away from service delivery into their back pockets. In 2011 the former head of the Special Investigation Unit, Willie Hofmeyer, reported before parliament that between R25 billion and R30 billion was lost to the government procurement budget each year due to this type of fraud.

Moreover, there is evidence that incidents of corruption are increasing. A report by Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs, based on documented fraud and malfeasance cases presented to parliament and contained in Public Service Commission reports, found that the amount involved increased from R130-million in 2006/07 to over R1-billion in 2011/12.

So there is evidence that the heart of the problem lies in the lack of accountability for maladministration and corruption. Corruption Watch states that this problem starts with the president - while there are various efforts by the government to tackle corruption, "these actions were countered by the continuing impunity on the part of those who were politically and financially powerful". In particular, it was explained that the "Gupta wedding saga and on-going fiasco surrounding the president's private Nkandla residence are indicators in the past year of impunity in operation". Little symbolises the nature of our public sector corruption challenge better than the scandal of R215-million of public money being diverted away from the public good to upgrade President Jacob Zuma's private homestead.

It is therefore not surprising that research data supports the argument that corruption committed by politicians and government officials is driving negative public perceptions of corruption in South Africa.

According to the 2013 Afrobarometer Survey, perceptions of the office of the president being corrupt more than doubled, from a low of 13% in 2002 to 35% in 2011. This finding is backed up by the latest Future Fact Survey released last week that showed "a massive slide in trust and confidence in President Zuma to a current score of 37 from a high of 257 five years ago".

President Zuma is not solely responsible for all corruption in the public sector, but he certainly has stymied any progress that could have been made in this regard. In addition to his own shady dealings with people like convicted fraudster Shabir Shaik, he has repeatedly appointed people of low ethical standards to key positions in cabinet and the criminal justice system.

As a result, citizens are less trusting of their national leaders. This is reflected in the recently released 2013 South African Reconciliation Barometer survey undertaken by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. This survey revealed that since 2012 there has been a 10.8% decrease in citizens' confidence in national government. There has also been a 13% increase in the proportion of citizens who feel that government does not care about "people like them".

This can partly be explained by the sad reality that some in the ruling elite have jettisoned principle for political power (see The danger of sacrificing principle at the altar of greater power). In order to truly honour Mandela, it is now up to those men and women of principle in the ANC and the broader alliance to step forward and start taking to task those who besmirch his proud legacy.

There is no moral justification for the spending on Nkandla and the unethical behaviour of some of our cabinet ministers. Rather than trying to justify the indefensible or attacking important institutions such as the public protector, the ANC now needs to be at the forefront of holding its leaders to account for corruption and maladministration. Failing to do so will not only undermine Mandela's proud legacy, but will also further damage South Africa's prospects of solving its most pressing problems of poverty, unemployment and inequality.
This article first appeared in ISS Today, the weekly online newsletter of the Institute for Security Studies.

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Why is corruption getting worse in South Africa? - Corruption Watch

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Gareth Newham As the world remembers the passing of global icon Nelson Mandela, the fact that he was a man of principle is a clear element of his success as a leader and overall greatness. He understood the vital importance of the constitutional principles of accountability and the rule of law.

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__ Largest and most populous continent after Asia

__  Natural resources (gold, diamond, platinum)

__  Excellent infrastructure

__ Established corporate footprints

__ Easy access to finance for business

__  Stable micro and macro financial climate

__ Advanced banking system

__ Voice of the continent at various international forums

__ Gateway for investment from BRIC countries to the vast market of billion Africans

__  China's largest trading partner

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By Alisha Pinto

South Africa is set to participate in the 4th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, its 2nd since its membership last year. What does this mean for newest member of the group? Alisha Pinto, Researcher at Gateway House, interviewed Renu Modi, Senior Lecturer at the Department of African Studies, Mumbai University, on South Africa and its role in the BRICS.
In 2010, South Africa officially became a member of BRICS. Compared with the other BRICS countries, South Africa's size, population, and economy are quite small. Do you think that Nigeria would be more representative of sub-Saharan Africa? What value does South Africa add to BRICS?
BRICS is not decisively about a politico-economic grouping of comparable economic-demographic stature, though that is certainly one of the determining factors in deciding the membership. South Africa's entry into the BRICS on December 24, 2010, was a Christmas gift to itself. Even though it has a much smaller population and economy as compared to Nigeria, other factors worked in its favour - its vast natural resources such as gold, diamonds and platinum, its excellent infrastructure, its established corporate footprints, a culture of innovation, easy access to finance for business, a stable macro and micro financial climate, an advanced banking system, and functioning regulatory frameworks.

South Africa is already the voice of the continent at various international forums. It is poised to serve as a base as well as a gateway for investment from the BRICS countries to the vast market of a billion Africans.

But Nigeria has a place too: If we take into account the fluid nature of international politics and constellations like BRICS or Nigeria's 'Vision 20: 2020', (a development goal designed in 2010 to take the country to the league of the top 20 economies of the world by 2020), we might have 'BRINCS,' and Nigeria might step in to be the western gateway to the continent!
To what extent does South Africa actually represent the better-developed parts of sub-Saharan Africa?
Africa, the second largest and the most populous continent after Asia, has 54 nations with diverse history and growth trajectories. South Africa is different from the other BRICS member states; it has a unique history and a different economic trajectory. It does not literally 'represent' the other African countries but it does share the concerns - democracy, countering violence, dealing with issues of law and order, economic inequality, social and cultural diverse populace, poverty and unemployment - of other African nations.
China pushed for South Africa to join BRICS in December 2010. In October 2011, South Africa denied the Dalai Lama a visa to attend the birthday celebrations of fellow Nobel Laureate, Desmond Tutu. Was that a trade-off?
Though unsaid, the China factor is clearly evident in South Africa's entry into the BRICS. China is definitely the most dominant constituent of the BRICS. It has massive financial stakes in South Africa, mainly in banking, infrastructure, mining, transport and renewable energy. For example, the Industrial Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) has a massive investment of $4.7bn, a 20% stake, in South Africa's Standard Bank.

China is South Africa's largest trading partner with a surplus in favour of China, and the infusion of the Chinese Yuan has kept South Africa afloat during the economic recession. You can see why China has a place of importance in South Africa's foreign policy.

The Dalai Lama last visited South Africa in 1996, a decade and a half ago, to meet Nelson Mandela. The denial of a visa to the Dalai Lama to attend Desmond Tutu's 80th birthday celebrations was not the first time he was denied a visa. In 2009, he was refused a visa on the pretext that his visit would distract from the 2010 World Cup preparations. The Dalai Lama is a vocal critic of China's denial of the right to self-determination and of human rights to the Tibetans. The recent visa denial was criticized locally; COSATU, the Coalition of South African Trade Unions, termed this decision an "exchange of morality for Yuan."

This definitely shows that South Africa prioritizes its economic relations with China and supports the 'one China' stance that rejects the political independence of Tibet. The Zuma administration is more explicit about preserving South Africa's enhanced engagement with China, while in the Mbeki period, the China factor was more understated.

South Africa is a part of the BASIC group comprising emerging countries opposed to Western pressure to undertake legal emission obligations. Given that South Africa is a polluter similar to mining countries like Australia and Canada, will it be able to maintain its position with the BRICS at the climate change negotiations?

There is an unstated link between the debates on climate change and energy security of a country. South Africa is Africa's foremost polluter and reportedly its mining sector, mainly coal, contributes about 40% of the total greenhouse gas emissions on the continent. South Africa's excessive use of coal for power generation, and production of petrol by leading public sector companies, questioned its position as a genuine broker at the December 2011 UNFCCC climate change meeting.

As a part of the BASIC countries, South Africa stood firm on the issue that developed countries should bear the burden of climate change, lead the emission cuts and provide funds to the proposed Green Climate Fund and technology to developing countries for better adaptation and mitigation of climate change. All countries, including South Africa, have been talking about the use of renewable sources of energy such as solar, wind and waterpower but this has not been put into practice. For a genuine commitment to the issue, there has to be an acceptance of the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) and a strong and legally binding compliance procedure in future climate change negotiations.

Where does South Africa stand in the Doha Rounds of the WTO negotiations? Has it been supporting the emerging economies at the past meetings?

At the recent Davos meeting in January 2012, South Africa stood alongside Brazil, India and China to issue a common declaration and reaffirmation that Doha Development Rounds must be based on the principle of "reciprocity" requiring proportional commitments between developing and developed countries. At the core of the agreements would be the interest of poor people that can be read as the 'national interests' in their respective home contexts. So certainly, South Africa supports the stance of the developing countries.

At the Doha negotiations, South Africa and other emerging markets of the global South are by and large on common grounds. However, they do differ in negotiations on issues of market access and the need to protect their domestic agricultural and industrial sectors. Here they use defensive strategies against each other, as exemplified by Brazil and South Africa, which guard against any 'injury' caused to the 'sensitive products'; these countries use import prices and quantity triggers to protect livelihoods at home. Brazil challenged the imposition of high tariffs on its poultry exports, amounting to 70% of South Africa's poultry imports. Brazil disagreed with the South African allegation that it was dumping.

From which BRIC countries does South Africa receive a majority of its foreign investments and what are the sectors that receive high levels of such investment?

Of the BRIC countries, China is the top investor in South Africa and the sectors that receive high levels of investments are the banking sector, mining sector (focusing on chrome), and electronic goods assembly. Overall, South Africa ranks second in China's mining investment in Africa, behind the Democratic Republic of Congo (six projects). China has expressed its desire to diversify its investments into sectors such as information technology, biotechnology, human resources and other industry services.

Renu Modi is a senior Lecturer and former Director of the Centre for African Studies, University of Mumbai.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer's editorial policy. *[This report was originally published by Gateway House.]

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Why is South Africa a BRIC(S)? - Fair Observer

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By Alisha Pinto South Africa is set to participate in the 4th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, its 2nd since its membership last year. What does this mean for newest member of the group? Alisha Pinto, Researcher at Gateway House, interviewed Renu Modi, Senior Lecturer at the Department of African Studies, Mumbai University, on South Africa and its role in the BRICS.

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- Better linkage with emerging powers => more value-added export.
- Knowledge and fund share from the forum.
- Same vision about reform in international realm

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South Africa in the BRICS | Harvard International Review

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South Africa will celebrate its 20 years of democratic rule next year, following the demise of apartheid in 1994. The ruling African National Congress (ANC), which is also the oldest liberation movement on the continent, celebrated its 100th anniversary last year. As its core statement of principles, the Freedom Charter was adopted in Kliptown on June 26, 1955.

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South Africa is not a true regional leader

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South Africa is not a true regional leader

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__ Leadership deficit at the continental level

__ Political instability

__ Insufficient economic growth

__ Deep societal-divisions

__ Xenophobic violence

__ Neither solidarity nor unity with other African nations

__ Question of identity

__ Corruption and poor governance

__ Inequality and poverty

__ Poor economic diplomacy

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In his book How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Walter Rodney contends that Western capitalist nations developed through a process that underdeveloped African nations. It is true that the relationship between the colonies and their colonisers was nothing but parasitic. Economic wealth was transferred from the colonies to the colonisers.
Thus, I can safely argue that Western imperial powers set the stage for Africa's underdevelopment.

OPINION: Whitlaw T Mugwiji

But being an African, to continue blaming Western powers for under developing Africa decades after most countries have gained independence, is simply failure to take responsibility. This is not to discount the continued negative effects of imperialism and neo-colonialism, but a sheer understanding that for us to turn things around we must take responsibility for our own actions.

We must ask ourselves tough questions, and provide brutally honest answers. We cannot keep blaming these imperial powers forever. For how long can we hide behind the finger of colonialism?

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), sub-Saharan Africa remains one of the poorest parts of the world. People south of the Sahara continue to wallow in poverty, suffering from material deprivation. This is despite the fact that the continent is blessed with vast natural and human resources.

So, why have most sub-Saharan countries failed to improve the lives of their citizens?

Corruption and poor governance - Africa's vices

Due to corruption and poor governance, many of our African leaders have totally driven themselves further away from achieving the aspirations and needs of their people. They have created the "personal rule paradigm" where they treat their offices as a form of personal property and a source of private gain. They openly appoint under-qualified and even incompetent personnel in key positions at State-owned institutions and government departments.
Building patronage and at the same time undermining development.

A 2002 African Union study estimated that corruption cost the continent roughly $150 billion a year. A massive sum of money, used for the benefit of a few private individuals and their families. If this amount were to be reinvested in the African economy, used to rebuild factories, schools and hospitals, I am sure it would result in economic growth. Thus, if we are serious about our development, we must fight corruption without failure.

Peace and security a prerequisite for development

Peter Lock in his essay titled: A critical analysis on the reasons of underdevelopment in Africa says security is a pre-condition for economic development. I agree, wars and general civil strife have destroyed our much-admired human resource base, have forced Africa's sons and daughters to drown in the seas trying to escape conflict. Our leaders have diverted funds meant for development in order to suppress dissent.

But I genuinely believe that we can reform our politics and eliminate conflict within our countries. It does not help that we inherited unstable countries with different ethnicities all bundled together into a single state. But if we want peace, then our politics must be very inclusive. We must abandon the winner takes all system that is so prevalent in many countries on the continent. Proportional representation and devolution can go a long way to achieve peace and stability, removing any cracks that may emerge along ethnic lines.

Class identity, a threat to development

Some scholars on development have attributed the lack of a national identity as the biggest threat to development. During the colonial era, nationalist leaders identified with the ordinary peasants and workers. However, this harmonious social identity has now been replaced with a "us" versus "them" mentality. "Us" being the privileged ruling political class and "them" being the ordinary citizens. Leaders begin to speak of grandiose ideas that have no bearing on the lived realities of their citizens.

Thomas Sankara, one of Africa's greatest sons, showed us what can be achieved when a cohesive national identity is created. United as a country, Burkina Faso was able to fight corruption, disease and poverty. In the four years he ruled (1983-87) literacy levels improved from 13% to 73%. Land was redistributed from the feudal landlords directly to the peasants, making the country self-sufficient within three years. He reduced the salaries of all public servants, including his own, sold the government fleet of Mercedes Benz and made the Renault 5 the official government car. He forbade the use of first class airline tickets and appointed women to higher government positions. They were able to build railway lines and improve the general infrastructure in the country without the financial support from multilateral financial institutions.

That he was able to achieve all of this is not a miracle, but was due to good governance and a genuine desire to create a cohesive national identity. The African political elites must always realise that their only purpose is to improve the lives of ordinary citizens and nothing else.

The connection between poor leadership and underdevelopment

Peace, security, good governance and social cohesion are prerequisites for (economic) development, but good leadership lies at the heart of this conversation. I am sure we all can agree that there is a strong connection between good leadership and development, or to put it more candidly, between underdevelopment and poor leadership. Munroe says 'leadership is like beauty, it's hard to define but you know it when you see it'.

Unfortunately, there are few African countries where good leadership is present. The fact that President Robert Mugabe is seen as an African champion is quite indicative to this lack of leadership on the continent. He has destroyed the Zimbabwean economy, reducing the once admired bread basket of southern Africa into a basket case, scattering millions across the globe and in the process breaking families apart.

Fanon, in his wisdom, already saw the crisis of lack of leadership in post-colonial Africa. He saw a leadership that was so eager to fill the shoes of its former colonial masters. This leadership's failure to identify with the society they purport to rule has also provoked citizens to disengage in constructive debate, forcing them to pursue individual or ethno-identity interests that have become the breeding grounds for conflicts, corruption and underdevelopment in Africa. It is, therefore, no surprise, why they have been unable to advance the course of development.

Without failure we must critically assess those who vie for leadership positions in our societies, least we select entertainers, sweet faced teddy bears, cool cats and orators, as opposed to strong visionaries.

Africa's future lies in our hands

Instead of grandstanding at international platforms preaching anti-colonialism rhetoric, we must start addressing issues that affect Africa's development. We must reduce poverty and increase access to health, nutrition, accommodation, education and income-earning opportunities for everyone, without fail.

We must develop an authentic ideology that we can use to further the development agenda and consolidate our independence. As Africa's young generation it is our responsibility to shape and develop this ideology. An ideology that must address Africa's challenges: income inequality, impoverishment and insecurity. We must always seek to improve the lives of ordinary citizens and not engage in an orgy of intellectual idealism.

To end the trend of underdevelopment in Africa, we must rise to the occasion and foster a common social identity, creating a social enclave, where we all belong with our diversity.
Africa, we are one.

Whitlaw Tanyanyiwa Mugwiji is a resident political analyst for Khuluma Afrika - a center for analysis and commentary

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Poor leadership at the centre of Africa's under-development - NewsDay Zimbabwe

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In his book How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Walter Rodney contends that Western capitalist nations developed through a process that underdeveloped African nations. It is true that the relationship between the colonies and their colonisers was nothing but parasitic. Economic wealth was transferred from the colonies to the colonisers.

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Lack of regional acceptance of South African leadership 

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Lack of regional acceptance of South African leadership 

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-The cost of co-operative hegemony is high
- Regional acceptance of leadership is lacking due to historical constraints
- Mbeki was more interested in promoting the image of South Africa in global rather than regional

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Possibility of threats along the Suez Canal

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Possibility of threats along the Suez Canal

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- South Africa's coastal waters between Asia, Atlantic, and Europe is a strategic trade route from geo - political perspective

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Since the 2013 5th BRICS summit in Durban, South African coverage of the 6th summit from Brazil has seen slim interest back home. It was as if BRICS itself did not exist, or simply, after South Africa's hosting of the 2013 meeting, the Brazil meeting had an insubstantial dent on public opinion

The BRICS bloc, however, is arguably the most defining geo-political formation after Bretton Woods. The group, which includes Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa, could emerge as a strong power counteracting western hegemony. BRICS member countries have growing economies and have been playing an ever increasing role in global politics. BRICS countries are poised to represent almost half of the world's GDP, more than three times the current 15-20% share they collectively hold now. Only time will tell the path the BRICS bloc will carve and the type of influence it will eventually exert.

For now the formation is the subject of a narrow debate by political, business and expert elites. Social activists, also aware of the bloc's important role, seek to widen the BRICS engagement process and will certainly continue to advocate for social and environmental issues at every BRICS forum. For most people living in BRICS countries though, for whom having enough food is the daily priority, the existence of BRICS is neither here nor there. The bloc still has a long ways to go before it becomes part of the public imagination.
South Africa and BRICS
Given the size of BRICS country economies, South Africa is small fry. Its GDP is high only when compared to African standards, but is miniscule in relation to other BRICS. South African GDP figures are also accompanied by an embarrassingly high Gini coefficient, especially as compared to other BRICS. South Africa's size and limited global political clout make people wonder how such a small country could be admitted to the BRIC club. Why not Indonesia with its 253 million people, or Mexico with its nearly $2 trillion GDP?

One way of explaining why South Africa sits at the BRICS table is through the lens of history. China, India and Russia share historical ties with both the South African liberation movement and the African National Congress (ANC), the party with majority political power today.

A second way to explain South African presence also has to do with something else, very strategic and of importance to trade and military.

If the Middle Eastern situation worsens and there is a possible threat to access to the Suez Canal, commodities like oil and gas will need to flow through an alternative route. This is where South Africa's coastal waters and diversion of trade between Asia, the Atlantic and Europe will become pivotal, even if the route is long and costly. Its strategic geographic location serves as one of South Africa's most important characteristics for the BRICS powers.

Newspaper reports acknowledge the US recognition of this strategic position, and a large US diplomatic complex is being built in Swaziland - an unusual step given the size of Swaziland's economy and that it is a landlocked country highly dependent on South Africa.

Some experts speculate that this complex is being built to establish a military command or an intelligence gathering base. Moreover, the US hosted its first US-Africa summit in August, partly to compete with China's own Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), already established a few years ago between China and the fifty odd states in Africa. Obama has pledged $100 billion dollars towards African programmes.

A third reason for BRIC interest in South Africa might be the need to have a partner in Africa with trade links, a good financial infrastructure and access to political players. The present chair of the African Union happens to be a South African. And while South Africa per se is not a tax-haven, its financial infrastructure and various competencies make it an attractive base and partner to support a wider gambit of trade and other deals. This African presence would be key for any future role the new BRICS bank will play in infrastructure development. Following South Africa's 1994 ushering in of a new democracy, it hosts the largest Chinese diaspora in Africa, estimate to be around 500,000.

South Africa's benefit being part of BRICS
Interest in Natural Resources
As a vast continent, Africa has generous mineral and other natural resources, including some of the most lucrative fertile agricultural land in the central regions of the continent. Over recent years Africa has become a major exporter of oil, gas and other important commodities to China and the US, and become very attractive to other new powers. Today, BRICS countries and other non-BRICS states such as Japan, Malaysia, South Korea and Turkey are seeking trade and investment in Africa in an attempt to oust older colonial powers like Britain and France for Africa's rich natural resource endowment. Experts are calling it "a new scramble": a new quest for resources, markets and fertile land.

This natural resource wealth has attracted China's eye, and its presence has led to an exponential growth in terms of people, capital and exports. China is in Africa for the long-haul and has the capacity to sustain its presence compared to other rival powers, and over the next decade China is expected to become Africa's leading trading partner.

South Africa in turn is looking to expand its own footprint and intra-regional trade. The country is aiming to position itself as a hub for the export of cheap Chinese goods and technologies, with many South African companies looking to create joint-ventures with Chinese firms. Many of its major corporations are spending a great deal in banking, retail and other business to capture a sizeable share of the African consumer market, and South Africa has increased its dependence on continental oil and gas given recent troubles in the Middle East.
Political Power
South Africa's membership in BRICS is a strategy to hedge its political bets within the international architecture. While the friction between China and the US continues on one hand, and between Ukraine and Russia on the other, the emerging and imperfect BRICS bloc is seen as new sphere of influence that could become a counter-weight to dominant western hegemony. In this sense, South Africa is following Chinese and Russian footsteps, playing a more visible role in global politics and seeking to create new regional and global institutions while exerting influence through soft-power measures. By getting close with the new powers, South Africa perhaps even wants to influence them too, though whether it can punch above its weight remains to be seen.

However, South Africa's foreign policy has not turned against Europe or the US. Last year for instance, South Africa hosted joint military exercises with the US, but because this happened at the height of the Egyptian crises, the public and global media failed to take notice. Commercial and diplomatic relationships are still strong, but are undergoing a period of reconfiguration after the BRICS formation.
Trade and Investment
Growth in South Africa's economy is partly due to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and partly due to the commodity booms from Chinese demands for strengthened exports and reduced dependence on traditional trading partners in Europe and North America.

Facing the facts, being part of BRICS could give South Africa exclusive and lucrative trade agreements with the emerging economies of the future. South Africa's trade with BRICS countries in 2013 was $38 billion - a 27.5% increase compared to 2012. South African trade with China, its largest trading partner, increased from $20 billion to $27 billion between 2012 and 2013. China could also become an exporter of affordable green technologies for South Africa as China positions itself as a leading global manufacturer and exporter of clean technology in the future. This could have benefits for South Africa as it seeks to build its own low-carbon economy.

Finally, the newly formed New Development Bank (NDB), unofficially known as the BRICS Bank, will offer new sources of finance. Following the official July announcement in Fortaleza, Brazil, and to be headquartered in Shanghai, China, South Africa has been tasked with establishing a regional banking center. To the extent that the NDB will offer cheaper credit, it could help initiate large-scale South African infrastructure if it helps bring down the long-term cost of capital. The concern that the bank will make dirty infrastructure cheaper is also looming large. While western development institutions are turning away from financing dirty energy sources as a result of civil society pressure, the NDB may or may not choose to embrace higher environmental and social standards.

There is therefore a need for more thinking - especially from experts in the BRICS countries - on how to ensure that ideas and criteria shifting investments toward low-carbon technologies and clean infrastructure projects can be embedded in NDB funding allocation. The good news is that there is no need to start from scratch, given the progress of the past years in the field of green infrastructure and safeguards.
Challenges and Opportunities
The BRICS bloc proclaimed to have put "inclusive growth" at the center of its 2014 summit, insisting on the concept of "sustainable solutions". These concepts need to be assessed in practice. One key challenge in South Africa is the perception and concern that large infrastructure only benefits politicians and insiders with lucrative deals. Some projects involve not only significant environmental damage, but also displacement of people, as was the case recently with large-scale hydro-projects. In essence, corruption is growing in size, complexity and sophistication.

For that reason, South Africans must involve themselves in the BRICS idea and insist on good governance and strong safe-guards against corruption, human rights abuse and environmental damage. These ideals must also be demanded from the inception of the NDB as central tenets of its operational model and financing schemes.

South Africans must involve themselves in the BRICS idea and insist on good governance and strong safe-guards against corruption, human rights abuse and environmental damage.

In truly sustainable development, focus cannot only be on giving cheap credit for any type of infrastructure. The NDB should use its cheaper credit to incentivize investment in local low-carbon solutions while making credit availability or loans more difficult and costly for less cleaner technologies or infrastructure projects.

The BRICS puzzle is not solved, and South Africans need to continue engaging with it. The bloc brings together odd friends - a rare mix of democratic governments and centralized 'beneficent' authoritarianism. The BRICS bloc could, however, open a new chasm of opportunity for the reconfiguration of international relations, and South Africa should seize the opportunity to make it work for the people and for development in the long term.

Despite the emerging geopolitical competition over Africa, South Africa will continue to sit at the BRICS table. The critical question is: What influence can South Africa exert over the direction of the BRICS countries?

Even for keen observers of foreign policy, South Africa's own sense of priorities within the BRICS bloc seems to be unclear. It could be influential by taking on an enlightened leadership role, or it could also take the narrow road of geo-political self-interest and use participation in BRICS as a status symbol, doing little for the rest of Africa. Or it may just want to ensure the lucky receipt of BRICS trade-relations.

Indeed, the country has reached a cross-roads now that it sits at the BRICS table: South Africa can either truly be a part of Africa, or it can fall in danger of being part of the scramble for Africa.

This article was first published here:
http://www.nivela.org/articles/how-south-africa-fits-in-the-brics-puzzle-1/en

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How South Africa Fits in the BRICS Puzzle

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Since the 2013 5th BRICS summit in Durban, South African coverage of the 6th summit from Brazil has seen slim interest back home. It was as if BRICS itself did not exist, or simply, after South Africa's hosting of the 2013 meeting, the Brazil meeting had an insubstantial dent on public opinion The BRICS bloc, however, is arguably the most defining geo-political formation after Bretton Woods.

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- South Africa - BRICS leader in 2018.
- Other African nations - better economy but larger domestic issue with incoherent foreign policy.

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Big plans, little in the way of results. That is more or less the assessment many observers are making of BRICS, the exclusive club consisting of the emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Founded with the aim of breaking the West's supremacy in the global economy, at the start of this decade the BRICS states had a plethora of ambitious plans.

They wanted to create a joint rating agency to counteract supposedly unfair treatment by agencies in the United States. The BRICS countries also wanted to lay their own underwater cable system to protect themselves against possible spying activity by the US and Europe. And a joint development bank was supposed to make the emerging economies more independent of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

However, owing to difficulties in reaching agreements, as well as economic stagnation in South Africa, not to mention recessions in Russia and Brazil, interest in BRICS has noticeably died down. Out of all the projects mentioned above, only the New Development Bank (NDB) seems to making some progress: Last year, the Shanghai-based bank approved projects worth $1.5 billion (1.2 billion euros). However, the NDB is still nowhere near becoming a true alternative to the IMF and the World Bank.
41 percent of the world's population
So has the concept of BRICS become outdated? Not at all, says Jakkie Cilliers, the head of the African Futures and Innovation Program at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa. He believes that, as an association of emerging economies, BRICS will play an active role in the future as well. "BRICS remains important on the global stage as kind of a balance within the G20 to balance the influence of the G7 grouping," he told DW.

Current economic figures show that there's really no getting around the BRICS countries. In 2017, their joint contribution to the world economy was 23.6 percent, and according to IMF predictions this is set to rise to 26.8 percent by 2022. The BRICS countries' share of the world's population is even higher: 41 percent in 2015.

What these figures conceal, however, is that there is a great imbalance between the BRICS countries themselves. China, the heavyweight, currently contributes almost two thirds of the group's economic performance - and that figure is growing. Every six months the Chinese economy grows by an amount equivalent to the whole of South Africa's economic output.

However, ISS expert Cilliers says that this is one of the reasons why the countries still have a clear desire to continue working together. "Certainly for South Africa BRICS remains important and if one looks at the other members of BRICS, Brazil, China, Russia, almost all of them have of course depended on the big heavyweight China which is the number one trading partner almost for all of these countries. And everybody tries to benefit from that special relationship that they have with China. For South Africa, BRICS is very important, we are something like 3 percent of the total BRICS economy, but we are considered by the partners to be the leader, a leader in Africa."
South Africa takes over BRICS chairmanship
In 2018 South Africa takes over the rotating presidency of the club - reason enough for some observers to question the legitimacy of South Africa's claim to leadership. Because if it were merely a question of economic performance, Nigeria and Egypt, as Africa's biggest national economies, should have joined BRICS long ago.

However, economic strength isn't everything, says Jakkie Cilliers. It's also about foreign policy orientation and the domestic situation in the respective countries. "I think that countries like Nigeria, which now has a larger economy than South Africa, have such an incoherent foreign policy and so many domestic challenges that I think the other members of BRICS may feel that Nigeria in particular probably brings little addition to BRICS."

Whether Jacob Zuma (left) or Cyril Ramaphosa (right) will head the 2018 BRICS summit is open

At the moment, it seems more unclear than ever who exactly will preside over the upcoming BRICS summit in Johannesburg. President Zuma's time in office doesn't officially end until 2019, but it's looking increasingly likely that he will have to go prematurely and against his will. In mid-December Cyril Ramaphosa replaced Zuma as party chairman of the African National Congress (ANC). And last week the South African constitutional court ruled that parliament must initiate impeachment proceedings. The court deemed it proven that Zuma made illegal use of public funds while renovating his private house.

Jakkie Cilliers hopes Ramaphosa will be able to take over the presidency before the summit because with a new cabinet, fresh engagement on the subject of BRICS would also be possible. "That certainly would be quite important for South Africa."

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BRICS 2018: South Africa sets the pace | DW | 02.01.2018

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Big plans, little in the way of results. That is more or less the assessment many observers are making of BRICS, the exclusive club consisting of the emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Founded with the aim of breaking the West's supremacy in the global economy, at the start of this decade the BRICS states had a plethora of ambitious plans.

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No other African nation is included so South Africa is gaining the political advantage

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No other African nation is included so South Africa is gaining the political advantage

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It is considered as a political union to enable the bloc to expand its global influence

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BRAZIL, Russia, India, China and South Africa recently concluded the fifth annual meeting of the countries known collectively as the BRICs. Or should that be the BRICS? The confusion arises from the fact that South Africa has sneaked into the group, which claims to represent the world's emerging markets and act as a counterweight to the G8 and G20, which are dominated by rich-world economies.

The BRIC countries were the constituent members of an acronym coined by Jim O'Neill, then of Goldman Sachs, in 2001. Mr O'Neill was looking for a way to convey the fact that much of the world's economic growth would soon come from Brazil, Russia, India and China. There was much debate about whether this grouping made sense: at the time Brazil's growth seemed too sluggish to warrant inclusion; now Russia looks like it doesn't deserve to be placed with the others. China has a much higher economic growth rate than the rest. Even so, the label proved so catchy that the foreign ministers of the BRIC countries decided to hold a summit in New York in 2006. What began as a hook for an investment bank's research note became a real political institution.
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There was just one problem with the BRICs: no African countries were included. This was a little embarrassing. Overlooking Africa suggested that the continent was an economic irrelevance, good only for providing raw materials to the rest. It also cast doubt on the group's claim to speak for the emerging world. Two African countries might have been candidates, Nigeria and South Africa. But only one would keep the acronym intact. And so, in 2010, the club of BRICs became the BRICS.

The strange etymology of the BRICS has real-world consequences. Though the inter-governmental meetings have not amounted to much yet, these countries do have ambitions to set up a joint investment bank. It is easier to reach agreements in small groups than in big ones. China and Brazil struck a currency-swap deal to facilitate trade at this year's meeting. South Africa has thus gained some real political advantage-at least until someone invents a better acronym.

(Photo: AFP)

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Why is South Africa included in the BRICS?

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BRAZIL, Russia, India, China and South Africa recently concluded the fifth annual meeting of the countries known collectively as the BRICs. Or should that be the BRICS? The confusion arises from the fact that South Africa has sneaked into the group, which claims to represent the world's emerging markets and act as a counterweight to the G8 and G20, which are dominated by rich-world economies.

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- Expertise and Skill e.g. Russia's nuclear supply plan through Rosatom
- Infrastructure financing through New Development Bank

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COMMENT

The 7th Brics Summit taking place this week in Ufa, Russia, presents another opportunity for South Africa and Africa to help shape its new narrative as it awaits a new driver of growth following the commodity supercycle that fueled Africa's growth over the past two decades.

The recent World Economic Forum on Africa and the African Union Summit pointed to a number of key steps that Africa could take to drive growth internally. Membership of Brics can help Africa, with most, if not all, the initiatives.

The first thing that Africa has to do is to aggressively drive investment in infrastructure. Earlier this year, the commodity trading company Trafigura published a report, which found that developing countries had to double spending on infrastructure to $2-trillion a year by 2020, with the bulk of this money to be directed to sub-Saharan Africa.

Brics, through the New Development Bank (NBD), or Brics bank, can help drive financing of that infrastructure. But the initial funding pool for the NBD is $100-billion and that is roughly the amount of Africa's funding gap in a single year, so the Brics Bank can clearly not do it alone. It would need to be a lead funder and attract the World Bank, Sovereign Wealth Funds and global pension funds to help close the funding gap.

Apart from funding, Brics can help infrastructure programmes with skills and expertise, as Russia plans to supply SA with nuclear through Rosatom, as well as China South Rail's and China North Rail's supply to Transnet's locomotives and China's award of a $5-billion rail project in Tanzania shows.

The next big benefit that Brics can deliver for South Africa is to help the country export an increasing proportion of higher value and intermediate goods to the Brics countries and their regions of Asia, South America and Eastern Europe, depending on which neighbours Russia is on good terms with.

An April 2014 study by the South African Institute of International Affairs illustrates this point. The study, by Chukwuka Onyekwena, Olumide Taiwo and Eberechukwu Uneze of the Centre for the Study of Economies of Africa in Abuja, Nigeria, showed that between 1995 and 2011, trade between South Africa and Brics countries grew substantially.

Exports from South Africa to Brics countries grew from less than $5-billion in 1995, to almost $25-billion by 2011. But the underlying composition of that needs to change. China is the dominant partner in South African trade as it overtook India in 2003 as the leading destination of South African exports, followed by India, Brazil and a negligible portion to Russia, where trade consists of trucks and cars.

In 2011, crude materials, except fuels, accounted for 34.5%, while commodities and their related transaction accounted for 25.5%. Manufactured goods, an added value category that SA can look to grow, accounted for 14.3%, while capital and transport equipment accounted for 2.2% and other manufactured goods made up only 0.2%. Chemicals and related products, another value added category, accounted for 4.5%, beverages and tobacco, another processed goods category, took up only 0.1% while food and live animals, which are primary goods since they are not processed, accounted for 1%.

Minerals, lubricants and related materials accounted for 17.6%, a decent figure but what one that has room to be grown further.

The process of re-orientating South African exports to value added goods starts at this week's drafting of negotiation position before devolving to trade negotiation level. Countries rarely open up their market for high value processed goods, as many want to protect domestic industries, but in countries like China an undertaking to open up markets is not enough because bureaucracy at its ports, language barriers and regulations make exporting into China difficult. Other countries use measures like import restrictions, again to protect domestic industries. Breaking down such barriers requires tough negotiations that casts diplomacy aside.

Beneficiation is another area that South Africa needs to improve on given its mineral endowment. But beneficiation is skills and capital intensive and it's a fight for global market share which means that a smelter opening in one part of the globe, somewhere in Africa, means a closure of another smelter, usually somewhere in the developing world but possibly in a Brics country, with its attendant problem of job losses and social consequences that such closures can cause. There is no country that will let African countries take away their lunch while they sit idly.

Beneficiation has to be fought for and sometimes pursued at an initial high cost for Africa to win its right to add value to most of its minerals. A study by Deloitte found that South Africa produces 90% of the world's platinum, but only 24% of catalytic converters, one of key uses of platinum. It is such patterns of production that need to change.

Finally, the summit will officially inaugurate the Brics Bank, a remarkable feat when one considers that the idea was formally mooted at the 4th Summit in India in 2012 and formalised in Durban the next year. But the Bank's architect's will find that their decision to give each country an equal vote irrespective of contribution, while egalitarian and noble, has its limitations. The decision is meant to be anathema to the Breton Woods institutions like the World Bank that the Brics bank is designed to counter.

But what they will find is that the country that contributes the most, likely to be China given the size of its reserves, will demand a bigger say in how money is spent. So while the greatest area of need for infrastructure funding among Brics countries is in Africa, the continent may not get as much as it needs unless its needs are aligned to China and the continent furiously lobbies Shanghai, where the Bank will be headquartered.

South Africa must use this opportunity to raise Africa's voice. - ANA

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What Brics can do for South Africa and Africa

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COMMENT The 7th Brics Summit taking place this week in Ufa, Russia, presents another opportunity for South Africa and Africa to help shape its new narrative as it awaits a new driver of growth following the commodity supercycle that fueled Africa's growth over the past two decades.

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- Nigeria has better long-term investment and is preferred by the European and South African investment.
- Ineffective leadership under President Zuma: foreign policy lack of consistent.
- Turn towards China but maintain trade imbalance while Europe remain SA's biggest trading partner.

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South Africa's difficult economic circumstances will further undermine its position as a regional leader because they reduce its economic heft and soft power.

Inconsistent and contradictory decisions at the highest levels of the Zuma Government, also often tinged with outdated ideological perspectives, have undermined South Africa's moral authority.

Having already overtaken South Africa as the continent's largest economy, Nigeria could also replace it as the leading African state.

A sustained period of decisive and focussed political leadership will be needed to arrest the decline and return South Africa to the position of pre-eminence that it enjoyed in the early post-apartheid era.

Summary
Although South Africa remains the most powerful state in the Southern African region, even a cursory analysis of its current economic and political situation reveals a country beset by numerous, often deeply ingrained, problems. Those problems, compounded by a lack of effective leadership, are likely to hamper South Africa's regional and international engagement over the next decade. This paper suggests that if the current approach continues South Africa's waning status and position as the pre-eminent African state and will continue to recede. Pretoria's inability to articulate and enact a clear foreign policy vision continues to undermine its leadership potential and exemplar status - since 1994, a key source of its authority as the leading African state. In reducing its economic weight and soft power, South Africa's economic struggles will further undermine its position as a leader. That decline may cease if political circumstances produce a period of sustained and decisive leadership, but that would appear to be unlikely for at least the time being due to the entrenched nature of the political and economic issues that confront South Africa.
Analysis Current Issues and the Domestic Future: A Snapshot
Africa's most industrialised economy is steadily grinding to a halt. Gross Domestic Product growth that has at best been stagnant over recent years (in the first quarter of 2016, the miniscule growth of the previous quarter was replaced by a 1.2 per cent contraction), stubbornly high unemployment (the official unemployment rate in the second quarter of 2016 stood at 26.6 per cent, with youth unemployment officially at 37.5 per cent), educational underperformance, together with skills mismatches and public sector failures are all visible markers of underlying economic rot in the South African economy. More positively, the rolling blackouts implemented by Eskom, the State-owned power utility, which had become common occurrences, have now eased. Like many African economies, over-reliance on resources has stalled growth in the wake of persistent low commodity prices. Without the buffer provided by a strong mining sector, the systemic weaknesses in the economy have become apparent, with the latest forecast from the International Monetary Fund predicting the South African economy to grow by a barely-perceptible 0.1% this year. Ratings agencies have South Africa's credit rating hovering near junk status despite persistent claims that all is well by senior government officials, including Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan.

Ineffective leadership arguably bears a significant proportion of blame for South Africa's current economic troubles. Corruption, cronyism and mismanagement have flourished during the term of President Jacob Zuma. The President's dismissal of respected finance minister Nhlanhla Nene is a prime example of the questionable decision-making occurring at the highest levels of government. His replacement, African National Congress backbencher and Zuma loyalist, David van Rooyen, did not last even a week before the president retreated and installed Mr Gordhan. The tale of the Finance Ministry is but one example of progress being undermined by the national leadership.

With the backdrop of President Zuma's personal battle against corruption charges and an economy in a tailspin, it is unsurprising that the ANC's vice-like grip on political power in South Africa is showing previously unseen signs of weakness. Official Opposition, the Democratic Alliance and populist upstarts, the Economic Freedom Fighters, continue to make ground as social unrest and dissatisfaction with the ANC grow. Despite its losses in the 3 August local government elections, the ANC is no ordinary political party and for it to be toppled in the near future would be difficult to fathom.

Much of South Africa's political future will ride on the results of the December 2017 ANC National Conference. The conference will determine the selection of the next ANC Party President, who will, barring an enormous decline in the popularity of the ANC, also become the country's president. Although opposing parties continue to experience significant growth and polled well at the local government elections, they will still struggle to compete with the ANC at the national level. The ANC has the weight of history, unparalleled political infrastructure and a near-unshakeable hold over the hearts and minds of large numbers of South Africans. The internal leadership choices and factional machinations of the party of Mandela will be a key factor in the path that South Africa will take over the next decade.

The landmark paper produced by the Institute for Security Studies, 'South African Scenarios 2024: Politics, Violence and Growth in the Rainbow Nation ', paints three very different scenarios for the country's future. These scenarios are largely based on the success or failure of the so-called "reformers" over the "traditionalists" of the ANC. A victory by the reformists would see the adoption of prudent fiscal policy and the realisation of South Africa's dormant economic potential. A loss or stalemate would result in the less palatable continuation of the current trajectory or an even worse state of affairs. Critically, this considered and broad-scoped document makes a strong argument that an immediate future of progress and reform is highly unlikely.
A Leadership Plan?
It now remains to outline and assess South Africa's future international engagement over the next decade. By amalgamating South Africa's official foreign policy pronouncements, its actions in the international sphere and ANC party rhetoric, it is ought to be possible to decipher something of a "Leadership Plan" of what South Africa wishes to achieve regionally and internationally over the coming years. It is, however, not that simple.

The last South African Foreign Policy White Paper was released in 2011 and offers a vision of greater African co-operation and engagement underpinned by the "Diplomacy of Ubuntu", or the diplomacy of humanity. Closely linked to the notion of Ubuntu is the assessment of the Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) that South Africa plays a leading role in 'championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty ... in the region, on the continent and globally.' The White Paper finishes with the assertion that South Africa's greatest asset lies in the 'power of its example'.

With African states and institutions at the centre of DIRCO's engagement strategy, the White Paper also emphasises the importance of trade with the United States and "South-South" co-operation between the developing economies of Africa, Asia and South America. In a similar vein, it confirms South Africa's commitment to the BRICS grouping, of which it shares membership with Brazil, Russia, India and China, as a platform for multilateral relations and economic development.

The international relations discussion document presented to the ANC's 2015 National General Council, on the other hand, takes a far more divisive worldview and vision of South Africa's place within it. The document presents a Cold War era distillation of world affairs, with an "imperialist" United States presiding over unbridled capitalism and free market domination that condemns the rest of the world to a cycle of poverty and underdevelopment. Along with its damning critique of Western powers, the document declares South Africa's steadfast support for China and Russia as fellow international revolutionaries. The document paints a picture of a dated and binary world in which South Africa must be hostile to the West so as to draw closer to its revolutionary comrades. It is a far cry from the positivity of the "Diplomacy of Ubuntu" espoused by the diplomatic corps.

The incongruent foreign policy voices of DIRCO and the ANC demonstrate the inability of South Africa to present a clear, actionable and universally adopted foreign policy plan. The actions and decisions of senior political leaders further demonstrate the lack of consistency that pervades South Africa's international relations.

Under President Zuma, significant foreign policy decisions do seem to be made with a confusing lack of consistency. Arguably, decisions are made on the whims of the President rather than adherence to any foreign policy plan or doctrine. For example, Zuma, together with a very small group of key ministers, was happy to facilitate the expedient safe passage of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir from South Africa upon the conclusion of the June 2015 African Union heads of state meeting in Johannesburg. Al-Bashir's late-night departure occurred despite an indictment by the International Criminal Court against him for genocide and an order from the Pretoria High Court requiring him to remain in the country. Such actions make a mockery of South Africa's long-held claim to be a champion of human rights in the foreign policy sphere.

In a similarly widely criticised incident, the Zuma Government refused to grant a visa to the Dalai Lama in 2014, who was scheduled to attend a meeting of Nobel peace laureates. This incident highlighted the Zuma Administration's growing deference to China. In fact, economic and political enthusiasm for China (and the other BRICS members) is one of the only consistent threads in a highly contradictory foreign policy. A simultaneous pushback against the United States, a prime example being the needless dispute over US poultry imports during the renegotiation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, is a trend that now seems to have evolved from mere rhetoric, if not into actual policy, at least into a factor that has significant influence on government actions.

The Zuma Administration's pivot to China and away from the West seems to have little rational economic basis. South Africa maintains a heavily skewed trade imbalance with China and Europe continues to be South Africa's biggest trading partner. The United States comes in third on the list. A more pragmatic plan for the future would see engagement with China continued while a broad range of trading relationships is pursued. By politicising these economic issues, Zuma and the ANC are risking an over-reliance on China and failing to properly protect and advance South Africa's pressing economic interests.

Thus, South Africa's "Leadership Plan", as much as it can be discerned, lacks focus and direction. Although DIRCO has taken a relatively measured foreign policy position, the ANC and the Executive demonstrate that South Africa's actual behaviour will continue to be erratic, lacking in consistency and overly influenced by ideology.
The Rise of Nigeria
If, as predicted, South Africa's international credibility and economic power continue to decline, the outlook for the rest of Africa will change significantly. Other states may rise or compete to fill the growing void left by a stagnating South Africa.

In the box seat to take up a greater leadership role in Africa is Nigeria. Already boasting a larger economy and far larger population, many European investment analysts and even South African companies now view Nigeria as having better long-term investment return prospects than South Africa.

In the past, widespread corruption and deep ethnic and religious divisions have hampered Nigeria's regional and international engagement. Despite now falling into recession, Nigeria for the most part looks to be turning a corner just as South Africa's star is beginning to fade. Since Muhammadu Buhari took the reins from Goodluck Jonathan, the Boko Haram insurgency has lost considerable ground and the internal security situation in much - but not all - of the country has improved. Buhari's tough stance on corruption has also been a necessary and beneficial improvement. Nigeria's plentiful natural resources are matched by its strong cultural capital. Nigerian music, art and "Nollywood" films are consumed across Africa and increase Nigeria's ability to project soft power. As the dominant power in the 16-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria could well-positioned to try and expand its influence further south. If the Buhari Government can effect significant improvements in law and order and reduce corruption, Nigeria may begin to realise its enormous economic potential. As it does, it will naturally progress towards a more dominant leadership position in Africa, presumably at the expense of South Africa.

Although its leadership role within the continent as a whole may diminish, South Africa will remain the major power within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Although these blocs provide a good basis for the promotion of greater security and tackling cross-border issues such as water sustainability, their economic importance is less obvious. Part of this issue is that member states can often belong to multiple groupings and even though those groups may share very similar overall objectives, the benefits of overlapping membership are unclear. Tanzania, for instance, has membership of both the SADC and the East African Community. Zambia, Madagascar and Zimbabwe are all members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the SADC. The groupings reflect the complexity and fluidity of economic relations among African countries.
Conclusion
If unaddressed, South Africa's internal challenges over the next decade will disrupt its ability to provide the regional leadership that it has sought and delivered in the past; an extended leadership crisis will leave the country with no clear domestic or foreign policy roadmap. As other countries, such as Nigeria, and possibly also Kenya and Ghana, provide more viable investment options, South Africa's standing as the leading African state will also be reduced. Its status as the de-facto "moral leader" of Africa has been weakened by its inability, or unwillingness, to practice what it preaches. Without a significant economic overhaul accompanied by decisive leadership, South Africa risks entering a long-term cycle of low growth and political, social and economic uncertainty that will significantly inhibit its leadership credentials. South Africa must demonstrate self-mastery if it is to once again provide the regional leadership and moral example that it did in the early post-apartheid era.

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Economic and Political Challenges Could End South Africa's Role as Regional Leader - Future Directions International

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South Africa's difficult economic circumstances, coupled with inconsistent and contradictory government decisions, are undermining its position as a regional leader by reducing its economic weight and soft power projection. A sustained period of decisive political leadership will be needed to arrest the decline and return South Africa to the position of pre-eminence that it enjoyed in the early post-apartheid era.

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South Africa's self appointed status as a representative of the African continent. It has used domestic political strategies to join the group to fulfil its aspirations

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South Africa benefited both politically and economically from the BRICS

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Big plans, little in the way of results. That is more or less the assessment many observers are making of BRICS, the exclusive club consisting of the emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Founded with the aim of breaking the West's supremacy in the global economy, at the start of this decade the BRICS states had a plethora of ambitious plans.

They wanted to create a joint rating agency to counteract supposedly unfair treatment by agencies in the United States. The BRICS countries also wanted to lay their own underwater cable system to protect themselves against possible spying activity by the US and Europe. And a joint development bank was supposed to make the emerging economies more independent of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

However, owing to difficulties in reaching agreements, as well as economic stagnation in South Africa, not to mention recessions in Russia and Brazil, interest in BRICS has noticeably died down. Out of all the projects mentioned above, only the New Development Bank (NDB) seems to making some progress: Last year, the Shanghai-based bank approved projects worth $1.5 billion (1.2 billion euros). However, the NDB is still nowhere near becoming a true alternative to the IMF and the World Bank.
41 percent of the world's population
So has the concept of BRICS become outdated? Not at all, says Jakkie Cilliers, the head of the African Futures and Innovation Program at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa. He believes that, as an association of emerging economies, BRICS will play an active role in the future as well. "BRICS remains important on the global stage as kind of a balance within the G20 to balance the influence of the G7 grouping," he told DW.

Current economic figures show that there's really no getting around the BRICS countries. In 2017, their joint contribution to the world economy was 23.6 percent, and according to IMF predictions this is set to rise to 26.8 percent by 2022. The BRICS countries' share of the world's population is even higher: 41 percent in 2015.

What these figures conceal, however, is that there is a great imbalance between the BRICS countries themselves. China, the heavyweight, currently contributes almost two thirds of the group's economic performance - and that figure is growing. Every six months the Chinese economy grows by an amount equivalent to the whole of South Africa's economic output.

However, ISS expert Cilliers says that this is one of the reasons why the countries still have a clear desire to continue working together. "Certainly for South Africa BRICS remains important and if one looks at the other members of BRICS, Brazil, China, Russia, almost all of them have of course depended on the big heavyweight China which is the number one trading partner almost for all of these countries. And everybody tries to benefit from that special relationship that they have with China. For South Africa, BRICS is very important, we are something like 3 percent of the total BRICS economy, but we are considered by the partners to be the leader, a leader in Africa."
South Africa takes over BRICS chairmanship
In 2018 South Africa takes over the rotating presidency of the club - reason enough for some observers to question the legitimacy of South Africa's claim to leadership. Because if it were merely a question of economic performance, Nigeria and Egypt, as Africa's biggest national economies, should have joined BRICS long ago.

However, economic strength isn't everything, says Jakkie Cilliers. It's also about foreign policy orientation and the domestic situation in the respective countries. "I think that countries like Nigeria, which now has a larger economy than South Africa, have such an incoherent foreign policy and so many domestic challenges that I think the other members of BRICS may feel that Nigeria in particular probably brings little addition to BRICS."

Whether Jacob Zuma (left) or Cyril Ramaphosa (right) will head the 2018 BRICS summit is open

At the moment, it seems more unclear than ever who exactly will preside over the upcoming BRICS summit in Johannesburg. President Zuma's time in office doesn't officially end until 2019, but it's looking increasingly likely that he will have to go prematurely and against his will. In mid-December Cyril Ramaphosa replaced Zuma as party chairman of the African National Congress (ANC). And last week the South African constitutional court ruled that parliament must initiate impeachment proceedings. The court deemed it proven that Zuma made illegal use of public funds while renovating his private house.

Jakkie Cilliers hopes Ramaphosa will be able to take over the presidency before the summit because with a new cabinet, fresh engagement on the subject of BRICS would also be possible. "That certainly would be quite important for South Africa."

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BRICS 2018: South Africa sets the pace | DW | 02.01.2018

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Big plans, little in the way of results. That is more or less the assessment many observers are making of BRICS, the exclusive club consisting of the emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Founded with the aim of breaking the West's supremacy in the global economy, at the start of this decade the BRICS states had a plethora of ambitious plans.

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- South Africa fails to attract prominent investors due to insufficient savings
- Decreasing growth rate in mining sector

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SA in the company  of giants - compulsory reading.pdf

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South Africa can benefit from the BRICS through trade and improved economy with massive influx of FDI

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South Africa can benefit from the BRICS through trade and improved economy with massive influx of FDI

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Africa gains representative on group of emerging countries as counterparts Brazil, Russia, India and China look to secure closer ties with continent's leading economy

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- Self-positioned leader
- But facing skill shortage - xenophobia due to immigration.
- Collapse of South Africa's superiority perception.
- But harder immigration law.

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According to a recent report on xenophobia in South Africa by Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley titled Imagined Liberation: Xenophobia, Citizenship & identity in South Africa, Germany and Canada, there has been a steady decline in the number of the African immigrants moving to Europe. This has caused South Africa to increasingly become an economic and political sanctuary for many facing dire situations within their home countries.

However, South Africa's recent introduction of stricter immigration laws will effectively serve to close the country's borders to African immigrants, many of whom add valuable skills to the local economy. The idea behind the Immigration Amendment Act is that South Africa should, as part of its policy to stem the inflow of immigrants, seek to help build ailing countries so that those who ordinarily would have considered moving to South Africa are more likely to stay and build a life within their own countries. That sounds fair enough, but shutting the borders is not the answer.

State-sanctioned xenophobia
This push to limit unskilled labour can be linked to the upcoming general elections and the role the strong labour lobby - in the form of trade unions (such as COSATU or National Union of Metalworkers (NUM) - play in these elections and the political realm in general. It is also, undoubtedly, a response to an ever-present xenophobic sentiment in South African society.

With the country facing a skills shortage (there are 470, 000 vacancies in the private sector according to Adcorp the Labour market specialist), this amendment may further serve to exacerbate the situation whilst also ignoring or failing to recognise human rights issues and obligations.

South Africa has positioned itself as a leader of the African continent, both within and outside of the continent, having taken up the mandate to head the African Union as well as seeking more prestigious positions within the United Nations. However, South Africa's pending immigration policy does not speak to the country's vision of being "a champion of (and within) Africa".

With countries such as Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo and Ivory Coast seeing a surge of immigrants escaping uncomfortable political and economic situations, the move by policymakers to tighten regulations around immigration seems counterproductive.

The adverse effect this amendment is likely to have on the on previous ease with which skilled foreigners can be employed has also not gone unmentioned by critics.

Under the new law, it is the Director-General of Home Affairs who will have the responsibility of assigning critical skills visas by "determin[ing] a 'critical skill' in line with 'national interest'"; previously, the Department of Labour had identified which skills were critical to the SA economy.

No one who follows the news can be unaware of the xenophobic attacks that made headlines in 2008, but the evidence of state-sanctioned xenophobia against foreigners can be traced back as far as the mid-1980s when Mozambican refugees fled south to escape hostilities in their own country. And, following a study on the rise of xenophobia in 2006, Queens University and the South African Migration Project (SAMP) described some of the unfounded stereotypes South Africans held of other Africans: Zimbabweans steal jobs; Nigerians deal drugs; Somali merchants force local shops out of business with cut-rate prices.

According to another SAMP study two years before, 20% of South Africans wanted a complete ban on new immigrants. Bear in mind that then, as now, the overall foreign population in South Africa constituted, at most, 4% of the total population of South Africa (current estimate of 1.6 to 2-million foreign nationals is 3 - 4% of the total population of >50 million; for a comparison, immigrants make up 11% of the US population). The 2006 report also noted that the "us vs. them" mentality seemed unlikely to abate much as long as the unemployment rate remained high. And that's what the current immigration amendment taps into: the strongly held convictions relating to competition for jobs. "Why did the government let them in?", the previous study quotes one Veronica Douman, a shopkeeper in Delft township, near Cape Town, referring to her newly arrived Somali competitors. "Most of our people have no work."

In Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley's new report, which was researched and written between 2011 and 2013, they quote Grade 11 and 12 learners in Khayelitsha who, when asked "What do foreigners contribute?" responded that they "have skills", "can fix things", "work together to secure goods cheaply", but others considered them a burden - they "steal our women", "peddle drugs", "don't pay taxes", "kill babies" and "sell body parts". The researchers note that this is "reminiscent of how anti-Semitism and other forms of racism work."

The origins of our superiority complex
Prior to the end of apartheid in 1994, most black South Africans had little contact with Africans from outside the country because of tight border controls established by the white-minority government. Loren Landau, director of the Forced Migration Studies Program at the University of the Witwatersrand, said back in 2006: "During apartheid, [black South Africans] were continually shown images of the rest of the continent as violent, corrupt and dangerous. They were fed an odd mix of superiority and inferiority: 'Black South Africans are not African.'" Jacob Zuma's recent advice to South Africans to not "think like Africans" did not come out of nowhere. It's been an unpleasant shock for the black South Africans who bought into the idea of their own superiority to discover they are not as well educated as many of the Kenyans, Zimbabwean and other African migrants they have encountered since the end of apartheid (black South Africans were deprived of good schooling under the apartheid government). The SAMP report that these encounters sometimes led to notions of superiority among migrants themselves, some of whom deride South Africans as lazy or incompetent.

But some immigrants are also angry at black South Africa's short memory. During the apartheid era, many South African exiles found safe haven in other African countries, yet since the end of apartheid people from these same countries have been made to feel unwelcome in South Africa, now that South Africans no longer need them.

Oddly enough, the ANC government's campaign of social cohesion inadvertently exacerbated the "us" and "them" feelings. The redefinition of the boundaries of citizenship and belonging was based on the creation of a 'new other': the "non-citizen", the "foreigner", the "alien", said Landau.

Skills shortage
Thus, the re-conceptualisation of immigration laws seeks to address the tension caused by real or imagined competition between locals and foreigners, but the amendment disregards our skill shortage. The government will now face the problem of keeping out foreigners whilst the country grows economically and demands more skilled workers. The Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) has pointed out that "the skills shortage in South Africa is 'among the most significant constraints on the capacity of the South African economy to grow and to create jobs.'" The fear by some is that the amendments will cause migration policies within the country to become too restrictive.

The most unattractive aspect of the new regulations is the need for companies to show they have performed a 'diligent search' and have been unable to find the requisite skills amongst South Africans. The problem with this provision is it needs a certification from the Department of Labour, which is infamous for its low capacity and slow processes.

These provisions ostensibly make it difficult for foreign nationals to live and work in South African, skilled or unskilled, no matter the reason for entry.

"Beat the system"?
The new restrictions also raise concerns as to how asylum seekers will be handled.

The Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) have expressed concern that harsher penalties and regulations will in fact swell the numbers of undocumented migrants as people attempt to 'beat the system'.

Defenders of the amendments claim it will help to address abuses of the asylum seeker system, but it's hard to see how this will not adversely affect immigrants from all categories, whether they are abusing the system or not.

With power comes responsibility
Despite being a national policy, the Immigration Amendments Act must be seen within the wider international context. South Africa has positioned itself both as a political and economic powerhouse - it is the only African nation within the rising BRICS alliance, even if we now know its economy is considerably smaller than Nigeria's - while also having taken up a number of international leadership mandates.

With this great power comes great responsibility. South Africa's rise within the region has opened it up to a host of opportunities within the continent, having been allowed access to the markets of a host of countries (especially within the SADC region) - access it has utilised, a fact that should not easily escape policy makers.

National policies and attitudes must seek to reflect the international role played by South Africa more effectively, both economically and socio-politically. Granted, it is not the sole mandate of South Africa to aid the continent; other regional leaders must also take up the mantle. However, South Africa has positioned itself as a champion of human rights and as an economic and political powerhouse, and thus local policies need to speak to these lofty international obligations.

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South Africa: Regional leader or xenophobe? - This Is Africa

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According to a recent report on xenophobia in South Africa by Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley titled Imagined Liberation: Xenophobia, Citizenship & identity in South Africa, Germany and Canada , there has been a steady decline in the number of the African immigrants moving to Europe.