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Not all men, but virtually all women CHECK SOURCE RELIABLITY 

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Until more men understand just how deeply ingrained the fear of violence and harassment is in every woman’s consciousness and behaviours…

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What Most Companies Get Wrong About Men and Women

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Why have women failed to achieve parity with men in the workplace? Contrary to popular belief, it’s not because women prioritize their families over their careers, negotiate poorly, lack confidence, or are too risk-averse. Meta-analyses of published studies show that those ideas are myths—men and women actually have similar inclinations, attitudes, and skills. What does differ is the way they are treated on the job: Women have less access to vital information, get less feedback from supervisors, and face other obstacles to advancement. To ensure gender equity, the authors recommend that managers: (1) question the stereotypes behind their practices; (2) consider other factors that might explain the achievement gap; (3) change workplace conditions accordingly; and (4) keep challenging assumptions and sharing learning so as to create a culture in which all employees can reach their full potential.

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Men like power more than they admit CHECK SOURCE RELIABLITY 

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Ask managers and CEO's whether they are interested in power, and they will deny it. They like "responsibility," or they like to share their " leadership qualities" with the organization, but power, no that's not what they are going for. They know other men, of course, whom they call power-hungry, but they themselves have nobler motives. They are, as Lloyd Blankfein, chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs, recently put it merely "doing God's work".

The above statements were documented in the 1970s by Mauk Mulder, a Dutch psychologist, who tried to understand what drove men to seek top positions. He noted a denial of the power motive. His findings contrast with what I observed in Chimpanzee Politics, in which adult males of another species very openly strove to become the top-dog, or as we call it, the alpha male. But then chimps don't need to fill out questionnaires, which is perhaps a good thing, because they might lie about their motives as much as humans do.

The human situation is cause for despair. The power dimension is totally underestimated and neglected by the social sciences. We all know that it exists, but there is remarkably little serious research on it. I challenge you to find much on power, dominance, or social hierarchy in any social psychology textbook. If it is mentioned at all, it's usually in negative terms, such as "power abuse." Even political candidates prefer to tout their interest in education, health care, fiscal responsibility, but have you ever heard one of them say "I love power" as the reason why they are entering the mudslinging arena? It is a total taboo.

The vertical dimension of social life is blindingly obvious in every primate society, however. Chimpanzee form coalitions specifically for this purpose: to overthrow the leader. Two or three males will band together, spending much time grooming each other, occasionally hooting together in the presence of the reigning alpha, which makes him nervous. They take enormous risks in doing so, and work on power relationships every day. The leader meanwhile is active in trying to prevent hostile coalitions. He monitors all of his rivals and breaks up any and all contacts they have with other males in a divide-and-rule strategy. To hang on to power requires that he shares females and meat with his allies and every day lets his potential challengers feel who's in charge. It's a full-time job.
The male chimpanzee on the left is the same size as the one on the right, but he's the dominant, has his hair up, walks bipedally, carries a stick, and thus looks bigger and stronger, which is typical for dominance rituals. Photo by FdW.
I hear that the same sort of isolation tactics are common in human organizations. The boss will ask those working under him or her why they talk with X or go out for lunch with Y, as if there's anything wrong with it. This is because coalitions are an important part of human power games, too, something to keep a watchful eye on.

If all of this is so obvious, why the power taboo? Why did Abraham Maslow, for example, move from describing dominant monkeys as "self-confident" (Maslow started out as a student of primatologist Harry Harlow) to his later terminology of " self-esteem," which is an internalized form of self-confidence? Was it because he felt social dominance happens inside the individual? This is hard to believe. I think that, like so many social scientists with their egalitarian ethos, he was disturbed by displays of raw power and preferred to couch them in the euphemism of an internal state.

And so, psychologists have always danced around the hot potato of power, seeking a terminology to hide the underlying motives, and to downplay the social inequities we see naturally among people as we see them among other primates. I am not asking here for moral approval of social hierarchies, but for a simple acknowledgement that they exist and permeate everything we do.

One of the most striking illustrations of how important power is to men is how they react when they lose it. Consider the following description of Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, in The Final Days, of President Nixon's reaction to his loss of power:

"Between sobs, Nixon was plaintive. ... How had a simple burglary ... done all this? ... Nixon got down on his knees. ... [He] leaned over and struck his fist on the carpet, crying, 'What have I done? What has happened?'"

Chimpanzees have the same sort of tantrums (minus the words) under similarly stressful conditions. When Yeroen, the oldest male in a group that I studied, was in danger of losing his top rank to another male, he would in the middle of a confrontation suddenly drop out of a tree like a rotten apple and writhe and squirm on the ground, screaming pitifully, waiting to be comforted by the rest of the group.

The expression "being weaned from power" is particularly apt, because Yeroen's (and Nixon's) relapse into childlike behavior was the same as that of a juvenile being weaned from milk. Despite its noisy protests, the juvenile keeps an eye on its mother for any signs that she might give in. Similarly, Yeroen always noted who approached him during his tantrums. If the group around him was big and powerful enough, and especially if it included the alpha female, he would gain instant courage. With his supporters in tow, he would rekindle the confrontation that he had been losing.
Wherever men get together ...
If males get so upset over the loss of status, isn't it about time we acknowledge the power motive? The human male is a hierarchical animal, whether we like it or not. Wherever men get together -- in the military, the church, secret societies -- they quickly arrange themselves vertically. I would even go further: without such an arrangement, men are miserable.

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Men and male chimpanzees are very much into power

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Pew Research Center's Social & Demographic Trends Project

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The public has very different views about what society values most in men and what it values in women. While many say that society values honesty, morality and professional success in men, the top qualities for women are physical attractiveness and being nurturing and empathetic.

When asked in an open-ended format to name the traits or characteristics that society values most in men, honesty and morality tops the list, with 33% saying this. About a quarter (23%) say society values professional and financial success most in men, including 14% who specifically mention money or being rich, 6% who reference jobs or careers and 6% who cite being a breadwinner. And roughly one-in-five adults point to ambition, leadership or assertiveness (19%), strength or toughness (19%) and a good work ethic (18%) as qualities society values most in men.

Some of the top traits listed for men are also mentioned as characteristics that society values most in women, but by significantly smaller shares. About one-in-ten say society values ambition, leadership or assertiveness (9%) and a good work ethic (9%) most in women; just 5% mention strength or toughness. In fact, 28% volunteer traits related to ambition, leadership and assertiveness when asked what qualities people in our society believe women should not have, far more than cite any other trait or characteristic.

When it comes to what society values most in women, traits associated with one's physical appearance are among the most often mentioned: 35% volunteered something having to do with physical attractiveness or beauty. Three-in-ten say that society values being nurturing and empathetic most in women, including 11% who specifically mention being a parent or caregiver and 6% who mention traits like kindness or being helpful. By contrast, significantly smaller shares of Americans say that society values physical attractiveness or being nurturing or empathetic most for men (11% each).

When it comes to traits or characteristics people in our society believe men should not have, no response stands out: Somewhat similar shares say most people in our society believe men should not be emotional or sensitive (15%), intolerant (11%), ambitious, assertive or a leader (11%), weak or vulnerable (11%), or dishonest or immoral (10%).

Public sees more pressure for men on job and career front

When asked about the extent to which men and women feel pressure in different realms of their lives - from jobs, to family responsibilities, to personal appearance - the public sees clear gender differences. In particular, far higher shares say men face a lot of pressure to support their family and to be successful at work. And while solid majorities say women face a lot of pressure to be an involved parent and to be physically attractive, about half or fewer see these as pressure points for men.

About three-quarters of Americans (76%) say men face a lot of pressure to support their family financially, compared with 40% who say the same about women. And while about two-thirds (68%) say men face a lot of pressure to be successful in their job or career, fewer than half (44%) say women face the same type of pressure.

By contrast, far larger shares of the public say that women are pressured to be an involved parent and to be physically attractive. Most Americans (77%) say women face a lot of pressure to be an involved parent; 49% say the same for men. Roughly seven-in-ten (71%) say women face a lot of pressure to be physically attractive, but just 27% say the same of men.

There are some gender gaps in views about the pressures faced by men and women. By double-digit margins, women are more likely than men to say women face a lot of pressure to support their family financially (a 12-percentage-point gap), to be successful in their job or career (16 points) and to be physically attractive (15 points). Large majorities of men and women agree that women face a lot of pressure to be an involved parent (74% and 80%, respectively).

At the same time, men are more likely than women to say that men face a lot of pressure to be an involved parent (a 13-point gap) and to support their family financially (10 points). Similar shares of men and women say that men face a lot of pressure to be successful in their job or career and to be physically attractive.

There are also gaps along educational lines in assessments of the pressures men and women face. About half of adults with a high school diploma or less (49%) say women face a lot of pressure to support their family financially, compared with 36% of those with some college experience and 31% with a bachelor's degree or higher. Similarly, 48% of those with a high school diploma or less say women face a lot of pressure to be successful in their job or career, compared with 40% of those with a bachelor's degree or higher (43% with some college experience say the same).

By contrast, those with at least a bachelor's degree are more likely than those with less education to say women face a lot of pressure to be an involved parent or be physically attractive. For example, 84% of adults with at least a bachelor's degree say women face a lot of pressure to be physically attractive, compared with 73% of those with some college experience and 60% with a high school diploma or less.

When it comes to pressures men face, adults with a bachelor's degree are more likely than their less-educated counterparts to say men face a lot of pressure to be successful in their job or career, but they are less likely to say men feel pressured to be an involved parent or be physically attractive. Three-quarters of adults with at least a bachelor's degree say that men face a lot of pressure to be successful in their job or career, compared with 68% with some college experience and 62% with a high school diploma or less. By contrast, 61% with a high school diploma or less say that men face a lot of pressure to be an involved parent, compared with 46% with some college experience and 38% with at least a bachelor's degree. About a third of adults with a high school diploma or less (32%) say men face a lot of pressure to be physically attractive; 28% of adults with some college experience and 20% with a bachelor's degree or higher agree. Most adults across all educational groups say that men face a lot of pressure when it comes to supporting their family financially.

While Republicans and Democrats generally agree on how much pressure men face in these different areas, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say women face a lot of pressure in each of these. For example, 49% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say women face a lot of pressure to be successful in their job or career, compared with 38% of Republicans and those who lean to the GOP. And while majorities of Democrats and Republicans say women face a lot of pressure to be physically attractive, Democrats are more likely to say this is the case (77% vs. 65%).

Among men, sharp generational differences in views of pressures men face

In recent years, research looking at the messages boys and men get from society about what it means to "be a man" has received increased attention. The survey asked men how much pressure they think men in general face to do each of the following: be emotionally strong, be interested in sports, be willing to throw a punch if provoked, join in when other men are talking about women in a sexual way, and have many sexual partners.

Most men say men face at least some pressure to be emotionally strong (86%) and to be interested in sports (71%). About six-in-ten (57%) say men face pressure to be willing to throw a punch if provoked. Smaller but substantial shares say men face at least some pressure to join in when other men are talking about women in a sexual way (45%) and to have many sexual partners (40%).

Millennial men are far more likely than older men to say men face pressure to be willing to throw a punch, to join in when other men are talking about women in a sexual way and to have many sexual partners. About seven-in-ten Millennial men (69%) say men face at least some pressure to throw a punch if provoked, compared with 55% of Gen Xers, 53% of Boomers and 34% of men from the Silent Generation. When it comes to having many sexual partners, 61% of Millennial men say there is at least some pressure to do so, compared with 34% of Gen Xers, 29% of Boomers and 16% from the Silent Generation. And while 57% of Millennial men say men face pressure to join in when other men are talking about women in a sexual way, about four-in-ten or fewer men in other generations say the same. There are no significant differences in the shares of men across generations who say men face at least some pressure to be emotionally strong or be interested in sports.

Unmarried men are more likely than those who are married to say men generally face pressure to have many sexual partners (47% vs. 32%) and to join in when other men talk about women in a sexual way (52% vs. 38%). Still, among those who are married and those who are not, Millennial men are more likely than their older counterparts to say men face at least some pressure in these areas.

For the most part, white, black and Hispanic men share similar views about the pressures men face, but black and Hispanic men are more likely than their white counterparts to say men face at least some pressure to join in when other men are talking about women in a sexual way (54% of black men and 56% of Hispanic men vs. 42% of white men). And while majorities of white, black and Hispanic men say men face pressure to be interested in sports, blacks and Hispanics are more likely to say this is the case (81% and 80%, respectively, vs. 68% of whites).

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Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz and Renee Stepler

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2. Americans see different expectations for men and women

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The public has very different views about what society values most in men and what it values in women. While many say that society values honesty,

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By Joseph Pleck, PhD

Printed with permission

MEN'S POWER WITH OTHER MEN

In recent years, we have come to understand that relations between men and women are governed by a sexual politics that exists outside individual men's and women's needs and choices. It has taken us much longer to recognize that there is a systematic sexual politics of male-male relationships as well. Under patriarchy, men's relationships with other men cannot help but be shaped and patterned by patriarchal norms, though they are less obvious than the norms governing male-female relationships. A society could not have the kinds of power dynamics that exist between women and men in our society without certain kinds of systematic power dynamics operating among men as well.

Men do not just happily bond together to oppress women. In addition to hierarchy over women, men create hierarchies and rankings among themselves according to criteria of "masculinity." Men at each rank of masculinity compete with each other, with whatever resources they have, for the differential payoffs that patriarchy allows men.

Men in different societies choose different grounds on which to rank each other. Many societies use the simple facts of age and physical strength to stratify men. Our society stratifies men according to physical strength and athletic ability in the early years, but later in life focuses on success with women and ability to make money.

In our society, one of the most critical rankings among men deriving from patriarchal sexual politics is the division between gay and straight men. This division has powerful negative consequences for gay men and gives straight men privileges. But in addition, this division has a larger symbolic meaning. Our society uses the male heterosexual-homosexual dichotomy as a central symbol for all the rankings of masculinity, for the division on any grounds between males who are "real men" and have power, and males who are not. Any kind of powerlessness or refusal to compete becomes imbued with imagery of homosexuality. In the men's movement documentary film Men's Lives, a high school male who studies modern dance says that others often think he is gay because he is a dancer. When asked why, he gives three reasons: because dancers are "free and loose," because they are "not big like football players," and because "you're not trying to kill anybody." The patriarchal connection: if you are not trying to kill other men, you must be gay.

Another dramatic example of men's use of homosexual insults as weapons in their power struggle with each other comes from a document which provides one of the richest case studies of the politics of male-male relationships to yet appear: Woodward and Bernstein's The Final Days. Ehrlichman jokes that Kissinger is queer, Kissinger calls an unnamed colleague a psychopathic homosexual, and Haig jokes that Nixon and Rebozo are having a homosexual relationship. From the highest ranks of male power to the lowest, the gay-straight division is a central symbol of all the forms of ranking and power relationships which men put on each other.

MEN S POWER WITH WOMEN

The relationships between the patriarchal stratification and competition which men experience with each other, and men's patriarchal domination of women, are complex. Let us briefly consider several points of interconnection between them. First, women are used as SYMBOLS OF SUCCESS in men's competition with each other. It is sometimes thought that competition for women is the ultimate source of men's competition with each other. There is considerable reason, however, to see women not as the ultimate source of male-male competition, but rather as only symbols in a male contest where real roots lie much deeper.

Second, women often play a MEDIATING role in the patriarchal struggle among men. Women get together with each other, and provide the social lubrication necessary to smooth over men's inability to relate to each other non-competitively.

A modern myth, James Dickey's novel Deliverance, portrays what happens when men's relationships with each other are not mediated by women. According to Heilburn, the central message of Deliverance is that when men get beyond the bounds of civilization, which really means beyond the bounds of the civilizing effects of women, men rape and murder each other.

A third function women play in male-male sexual politics is that relationships with women provide men a REFUGE from the dangers and stresses of relating to other males. Traditional relationships with women have provided men a safe place in which they can recuperate from the stresses they have absorbed in their daily struggle with other men, and in which they can express their needs without fearing that these needs will be used against them. If women begin to compete with men and have power in their own right, men are threatened by the loss of this refuge.

Finally, a fourth function of women in males' patriarchal competition with each other is to reduce the stress of competition by serving as anUNDERCLASS. As Elizabeth Janeway has written in Between Myth and Morning, under patriarchy women represent the lowest status, a status to which men can fall only under the most exceptional circumstances, if at all. Competition among men is serious, but its intensity is mitigated by the fact that there is a lowest possible level to which men cannot fall. One reason men fear women's liberation, writes Janeway, is that the liberation of women will take away this unique underclass status of women. Men will now risk falling lower than ever before, into a new underclass composed of the weak of both sexes. Thus, women's liberation means that the stakes of patriarchal failure for men are higher than they have been before, and that it is even more important for men not to lose.

Thus, men's patriarchal competition with each other makes use of women as symbols of success, as mediators, as refuges, and as an underclass. In each of these roles, women are dominated by men in ways that derive directly from men's struggle with each other. Men need to deal with the sexual politics of their relationships with each other if they are to deal fully with the sexual politics of their relationships with women.

MEN'S POWER IN SOCIETY

At one level, men's social identity is defined by the power they have over women and the power they can compete for against other men. But at another level, most men have very little power over their own lives. How can we understand this paradox?

The major demand to which men must accede in contemporary society is that they play their required role in the economy. But this role is not intrinsically satisfying. The social researcher Daniel Yankelovich has suggested that about 80% of U.S. male workers experience their jobs as intrinsically meaningless and onerous. They experience their jobs and themselves as worthwhile only through priding themselves on the hard work and personal sacrifice they are making to be breadwinners for their families. Accepting these hardships reaffirms their role as family providers and therefore as true men.

Linking the breadwinner role to masculinity in this way has several consequences for men. Men can get psychological payoffs from their jobs which these jobs never provide in themselves. By training men to accept payment for their work in feelings of masculinity, rather than in feelings of satisfaction, men will not demand that their jobs be made more meaningful. As a result, jobs can be designed for the more important goal of generating profits. Further, the connection between work and masculinity makes men accept unemployment as their personal failing as males, rather than analyze and change the profit-based economy whose inevitable dislocations make them unemployed or unemployable.

Men's jobs are increasingly structured as if men had no direct roles or responsibilities in the family-indeed, as if they did not have families at all. But paradoxically, at the same time that men's responsibilities in the family are reduced to facilitate more efficient performance of their work role, the increasing dehumanization of work means that jobs give men only the satisfaction of fulfilling the family breadwinner role.

The relative privilege that men get from sexism, and more importantly the false consciousness of privilege men get from sexism, play a critical role in reconciling men to their subordination in the larger political economy. This analysis does not imply that men's sexism will go away if they gain control over their own lives, or that men do not have to deal with their sexism until they gain this control. Rather, the point is that we cannot fully understand men's sexism or men's subordination in the larger society unless we understand how deeply they are related.

Ultimately, we have to understand that patriarchy has two halves which are intimately related to each other. Patriarchy is a dual system, a system in which men oppress women, and in which men oppress themselves and each other. At one level, challenging one part of patriarchy inherently leads to challenging the other. This is one way to interpret why the idea of women's liberation led so soon to the idea of men's liberation, which ultimately means freeing men from the patriarchal sexual dynamics they now experience with each other. But because the patriarchal sexual dynamics of male-male relationships are less obvious than those of male-female relationships, men now face a real danger: while the patriarchal oppression of women may be lessened as a result of the women's movement, the patriarchal oppression of men may be untouched. The real danger for men posed by the attack that the women's movement is making on patriarchy is not that this attack will go too far, but that it will not go far enough. Ultimately, men cannot go any further in relating to women as equals

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Understanding Patriarchy and Men's Power

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By Joseph Pleck, PhD Printed with permission MEN'S POWER WITH OTHER MEN In recent years, we have come to understand that relations between men and women are governed by a sexual politics that exists outside individual men's and women's needs and choices.

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Throughout history, the central role of women in society has ensured the stability, progress and long-term development of nations. Globally, women comprise 43 percent of the world's agricultural labor force - rising to 70 percent in some countries. For instance, across Africa, 80 percent of the agricultural production comes from small farmers, most of whom are rural women. It's widely accepted that agriculture can be the engine of growth and poverty reduction in developing nations. Women, notably mothers, play the largest role in decision-making about family meal planning and diet. And, women self-report more often their initiative in preserving child health and nutrition.
The Role of Women as Caregivers

Women are the primary caregivers of children and elders in every country of the world. International studies demonstrate that when the economy and political organization of a society change, women take the lead in helping the family adjust to new realities and challenges. They are likely to be the prime initiator of outside assistance, and play an important role in facilitating (or hindering) changes in family life.

"Rural women play a key role in supporting their households and communities in achieving food and nutrition security, generating income, and improving rural livelihoods and overall well-being."
- UN Womenwatch Organization

The Role of Women as Educators

The contribution of women to a society's transition from pre-literate to literate likewise is undeniable. Basic education is key to a nation's ability to develop and achieve sustainability targets. Research has shown that education can improve agricultural productivity, enhance the status of girls and women, reduce population growth rates, enhance environmental protection, and widely raise the standard of living.

It is the mother in the family who most often urges children of both genders to attend - and stay - in school. The role of women is at the front end of the chain of improvements leading to the family's, the community's long-term capacity.

The Role of Women in the Workforce

Today, the median female share of the global workforce is 45.4 percent. Women's formal and informal labor can transform a community from a relatively autonomous society to a participant in the national economy. Despite significant obstacles, women's small businesses in rural developing communities not only can be an extended family's lifeline, but can form a networked economic foundation for future generations. The role of women in the urban and rural workforce has expanded exponentially in recent decades.

The theme for International Women's Day 2019 "Think equal, build smart, innovate for change," was chosen to identify innovative ways to advance gender equality and the empowerment of women, accelerating the , building momentum for the effective implementation of the new U.N. Sustainable Development Goals. Of course, women's opportunities still lag behind those of men worldwide. But, the historic and current role of women is indisputable.

"When women are empowered and can claim their rights and access to land, leadership, opportunities and choices, economies grow, food security is enhanced and prospects are improved for current and future generations."
- Michelle Bachelet, Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of UN Women

The Role of Women as Global Volunteers

Global Volunteers' community development work in host countries worldwide strengthens women's and children's capacity and supports their sustained health and development. Under the direction of local leaders, our volunteers help ensure academic accessibility, foster parental involvement, offer psycho-social support, provide nutrition and health education, fund girls' scholarships, construct schools with girls' bathrooms, tutor literacy, and numeracy, and so much more. Contact us using the form below to learn how you can contribute to this critical agenda.

To learn more about the vital role of women in the world, read Women and the Sustainable Development Goals.

Request more information below to learn how you can support women around the world as a Global Volunteer.

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The Global Role of Women - Caregivers, Conscience, Farmers, Educators and Entrepreneurs

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Throughout history, the central role of women in society has ensured the stability, progress and long-term development of nations. Globally, women comprise 43 percent of the world's agricultural labor force - rising to 70 percent in some countries. For instance, across Africa, 80 percent of the agricultural production comes from small farmers, most of whom are rural women.

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Women now account for record shares of Fortune 500 chief executives and board members in the United States - 10.6% and 30.4%, respectively. Still, the share of women in top business leadership positions remains well below their share of the population.

Pew Research Center conducted this study to explore Americans' views about the current state of gender and business leadership.

This analysis is based on a survey of 5,057 U.S. adults conducted July 17-23, 2023. Everyone who took part is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. Address-based sampling ensures that nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP's methodology.

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and the survey methodology.

A majority of Americans (55%) say there are too few women in top executive business positions, according to a new Pew Research Center survey. This is down somewhat from 59% who said this in 2018.

Among those who say there are too few women in top business positions, most (79%) say it would be ideal to have the same number of women and men in these roles. One-in-ten say having more women than men would be ideal. The same share (10%) say it would be ideal to have more women in these positions than there are now, but still not as many women as men.
Women and Political Leadership Ahead of the 2024 Election
Why aren't there more women in top executive business positions?

Americans see many factors as major reasons why there aren't more women in top executive business positions, such as:

Women having to do more to prove themselves than men (58% say this is a major reason)

Gender discrimination (50%)

Family responsibilities (48%)

Many businesses not being ready to hire women for these positions (43%)

Sexual harassment creating an environment that makes it harder for women to succeed (40%)

Will there ever be as many women as men in top executive business positions?

Americans are divided on this question. Half say that, even as more women move into management roles, men will continue to hold more of these top positions. A similar share (48%) say that as more women move into management roles, it's only a matter of time before there are as many women as men in top executive positions in business.

How views vary by gender

On nearly every question we asked, women and men express different views about the current state of gender and business leadership:

65% of women say there are too few women in top executive business positions, compared with 45% of men. Men are more likely than women to say the number of women in these positions is about right (46% vs. 29%).

55% of women say men will continue to hold more top executive business positions in the future. In turn, more than half of men (54%) say it's only a matter of time before there are as many women as men in these roles.

By large margins, women are more likely than men to see nearly all of the potential obstacles we asked about as major reasons why there aren't more women in top business leadership positions.

How views vary by party

There are also differences in the views of Democrats and Democratic leaners when compared with Republicans and those who lean to the GOP. Among these differences:

76% of Democrats say there are too few women in top business leadership positions, compared with 33% of Republicans. A majority of Republicans (56%) say the number of women in these positions is about right.

Most Democrats say women having to do more to prove themselves than men (73%) and gender discrimination (67%) are major reasons why there aren't more women in top business leadership positions. This compares with 42% and 30% of Republicans, respectively.

Among Republicans, family responsibilities are cited more often than any other factor as a major reason why there aren't more women in top leadership positions in business. Similar shares of Republicans (48%) and Democrats (49%) see this as a major reason.

Gender differences among Republicans and Democrats

On many questions, there are differences by gender within each party. Republican and Democratic women are more likely than their male counterparts to say there are too few women in top business leadership positions and to point to certain factors as major obstacles for women.

Note: Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and the survey methodology.

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How Americans see the state of gender and leadership in business

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55% of Americans say there are too few women in top executive business positions. This is down somewhat from 59% who said this in 2018.

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In this topic page we present data and research on economic inequalities between men and women. Whenever the data allows it, we also discuss how these inequalities have been changing over time.

As we show, although economic gender inequalities remain common and large, they are today smaller than they used to be some decades ago.
Related topics:
Women's Employment - rising female labor force participation has been one of the most remarkable economic developments of the last century. In this topic page we present the key facts and drivers behind this important change.
See all interactive charts on economic inequality by gender ↓
The 'gender pay gap' comes up often in political debates, policy reports, and everyday news. But what is it? What does it tell us? Is it different from country to country? How does it change over time?

Here we try to answer these questions, providing an empirical overview of the gender pay gap across countries and over time.

The gender pay gap measures inequality but not necessarily discrimination

The gender pay gap (or the gender wage gap) is a metric that tells us the difference in pay (or wages, or income) between women and men. It's a measure of inequality and captures a concept that is broader than the concept of equal pay for equal work.

Differences in pay between men and women capture differences along many possible dimensions, including worker education, experience and occupation. When the gender pay gap is calculated by comparing all male workers to all female workers - irrespective of differences along these additional dimensions - the result is the 'raw' or 'unadjusted' pay gap. On the contrary, when the gap is calculated after accounting for underlying differences in education, experience, etc., then the result is the 'adjusted' pay gap.

Discrimination in hiring practices can exist in the absence of pay gaps - for example, if women know they will be treated unfairly and hence choose not to participate in the labor market. Similarly, it is possible to observe large pay gaps in the absences of discrimination in hiring practices - for example, if women get fair treatment but apply for lower-paid jobs.

The implication is that observing differences in pay between men and women is neither necessary nor sufficient to prove discrimination in the workplace. Both discrimination and inequality are important. But they are not one and the same. (You can read about discrimination and 'equal pay for equal work' in our post here).

In most countries there is a substantial gender pay gap

Cross-country data on the gender pay gap is patchy, but the most complete source in terms of coverage is the United Nation's International Labour Organization (ILO). The visualization here presents this data. You can add observations by clicking on the option 'add country' at the bottom of the chart.

The estimates shown here correspond to differences between average hourly earnings of men and women (expressed as a percentage of average hourly earnings of men), and cover all workers irrespective of whether they work full time or part time.

As we can see: (i) in most countries the gap is positive - women earn less than men; and (ii) there are large differences in the size of this gap across countries.

(NB. By this measure the gender wage gap can be positive or negative. If it is negative, it means that, on an hourly basis, men earn on average less than women. This happens in some countries, such as Malaysia.)

In most countries the gender pay gap has decreased in the last couple of decades

How is the gender pay gap changing over time? To answer this question, let's consider this chart showing available estimates from the OECD. These estimates include OECD member states, as well as some other non-member countries, and they are the longest available series of cross-country data on the gender pay gap that we are aware of.

Here we see that the gap is large in most OECD countries, but it has been going down in the last couple of decades. In some cases the reduction is remarkable. In the UK, for example, the gap went down from almost 50% in 1970 to about 17% in 2016.

These estimates are not directly comparable to those from the ILO, because the pay gap is measured slightly differently here: The OECD estimates refer to percent differences in median earnings (i.e. the gap here captures differences between men and women in the middle of the earnings distribution); and they cover only full-time employees and self-employed workers (i.e. the gap here excludes disparities that arise from differences in hourly wages for part-time and full-time workers).

However, the ILO data shows similar trends for the period 2000-2015.

The conclusion is that in most countries with available data, the gender pay gap has decreased in the last couple of decades.

The gender pay gap is larger for older workers

The United States Census Bureau defines the pay gap as the ratio between median wages - that is, they measure the gap by calculating the wages of men and women at the middle of the earnings distribution, and dividing them.

By this measure, the gender wage gap is expressed as a percent (median earnings of women as share of median earnings of men) and it is always positive. Here, values below 100% mean that women earn less than men, while values above 100% mean than women earn more. Values closer to 100% reflect a lower gap.

The next chart shows available estimates of this metric for full-time workers in the US, by age group.

First, we see that the series trends upwards, meaning the gap has been shrinking in the last couple of decades. Secondly, we see that there are important differences by age.

The second point is crucial to understand the gender pay gap: the gap is a statistic that changes during the life of a worker. In most rich countries, it's small when formal education ends and employment begins, and it increases with age. As we discuss in our analysis of the determinants, the gender pay gap tends to increase when women marry and when/if they have children.

The gender pay gap is smaller in middle-income countries - which tend to be countries with low labor force participation of women

The scatter plot here shows available ILO estimates on the gender pay gap (vertical axis) vs GDP per capita (on a logarithmic scale along the horizontal axis). As we can see there is a weak positive correlation between GDP per capita and the gender pay gap. However, the chart shows that the relationship is not really linear. Actually, middle-income countries tend to have the smallest pay gap.

The fact that middle-income countries have low gender wage gaps is, to a large extent, the result of selection of women into employment. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) explain it as follows: "if women who are employed tend to have relatively high‐wage characteristics, low female employment rates may become consistent with low gender wage gaps simply because low‐wage women would not feature in the observed wage distribution."

Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) show that this pattern holds in the data: unadjusted gender wage gaps across countries tend to be negatively correlated with gender employment gaps. That is, the gender pay gaps tend to be smaller where relatively fewer women participate in the labor force.

So, rather than reflect greater equality, the lower wage gaps observed in some countries could indicate that only women with certain characteristics - for instance, with no husband or children - are entering the workforce.

Women in management positions

The chart here plots the proportion of women in senior and middle management positions around the world. It shows that women all over the world are underrepresented in high-profile jobs, which tend to be better paid.

Firms with female managers

The next chart provides an alternative perspective on the same issue. Here we show the share of firms that have a woman as manager. We highlight world regions by default, but you can add specific countries by using the option 'add country'.

As we can see, all over the world firms tend to be managed by men. And, globally, only about 18% of firms have a female manager.

Firms with female managers tend to be different to firms with male managers. For example, firms with female managers tend to also be firms with more female workers.

Despite having fallen in recent decades, there remains a substantial pay gap between the average wages of men and women.

But what does gender inequality look like if we focus on the very top of the income distribution? Do we find any evidence of the so-called 'glass ceiling' preventing women from reaching the top? How did this change over time?

Answers to these questions are found in the work of Atkinson, Casarico and Voitchovsky (2018). Using tax records, they investigated the incomes of women and men separately across nine high-income countries. As such, they were restricted to those countries in which taxes are collected on individual basis, rather than as couples.

In addition to wages they also take into account income from investments and self-employment.

Whilst investment income tends to make up a larger share of the total income of rich individuals in general, the authors found this to be particularly marked in the case of women in top income groups.

The two charts present the key figures from the study.

One chart shows the proportion of women out of all individuals falling into the top 10%, 1% and 0.1% of the income distribution. The open circle represents the share of women in the top income brackets back in 2000; the closed circle shows the latest data, which is from 2013.

The other chart shows the data over time for individual countries. You can explore data for other countries using the 'Change country' button on the chart.
The two charts allow us to answer the initial questions:

Women are greatly under-represented in top income groups - they make up much less than 50% across each of the nine countries. Within the top 1% women account for around 20% and there is surprisingly little variation across countries.

The proportion of women is lower the higher you look up the income distribution. In the top 10% up to every third income-earner is a woman; in the top 0.1% only every fifth or tenth person is a woman.

The trend is the same in all countries of this study: Women are now better-represented in all top income groups than they were in 2000.

But improvements have generally been more limited at the very top. With the exception of Australia, we see a much smaller increase in the share of women amongst the top 0.1% than amongst the top 10%.

Overall, despite recent inroads, we continue to see remarkably few women making it to the top of the income distribution today.

Above we show that women all over the world are underrepresented in high-profile jobs, which tend to be better paid. As it turns out, in many countries women are at the same time overrepresented in low-paying jobs.

This is shown in the chart here, where 'low-pay' refers to workers earning less than two-thirds of the median (i.e. the middle) of the earnings distribution.

A share above 50% implies that women are 'overrepresented', in the sense that among those with low wages, there are more women than men.

The fact that women in rich countries are overrepresented in the bottom of the income distribution goes together with the fact that working women in these countries are overrepresented in low-paying occupations. The chart shows this for the US.

Women often have no control over their personal earned income

The chart plots cross-country estimates of the share of women who are not involved in decisions about their own income. The line shows national averages, while the dots show averages for rich and poor households (i.e. averages for women in households within the top and bottom quintiles of the corresponding national income distribution).

As we can see, in many countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, a large fraction of women are not involved in household decisions about spending their personal earned income. And this pattern is stronger among low-income households within low-income countries.

Percentage of women not involved in decisions about their own income - World Development Report (2012)

In many countries women have limited influence over important household decisions

Above we focus on whether women get to choose how their own personal income is spent. Now we look at women's influence over total household income.

In the next chart we plot the share of currently married women who report having a say in major household purchase decisions, against national GDP per capita.

We see that in many countries, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, an important number of women have limited influence over major spending decisions.

The chart above shows that women's control over household spending tends to be greater in richer countries. In the chart we show that this correlation also holds within countries: Women's control is greater in wealthier households. Household's wealth is shown by the quintile in the wealth distribution on the x-axis - the poorest households are in the lowest quintiles (Q1) on the left.

There are many factors at play here, and it's important to bear in mind that this correlation partly captures the fact that richer households enjoy greater discretionary income beyond levels required to cover basic expenditure, while at the same time, in richer households women often have greater agency via access to broader networks as well as higher personal assets and incomes.

Land ownership is more often in the hands of men

Economic inequalities between men and women manifest themselves, not only in terms of wages earned, but also in terms of assets owned. For example, as the chart shows, in nearly all low and middle-income countries with data, men are more likely to own land than women.

Women's lack of control over important household assets, such as land, can be a critical problem in case of divorce or the husband's death.

Closely related to the issue of land ownership is the fact that in several countries women do not have the same rights to property as men. These countries are highlighted in the map.

( This map from the World Development Report (2012) provides a more fine-grained overview of different property regimes operating in different countries.)

Gender equal inheritance systems have been adopted in most, but not all countries

Inheritance is one of the main mechanisms for the accumulation of assets. In the map we provide an overview of the countries that do, and do not have gender-equal inheritance systems.

If you move the slider to 1920, you will see that while gender equal inheritance systems were very rare in the early 20th century, today they are much more common. And still, despite the progress achieved, in many countries, notably in North Africa and the Middle East, women and girls still have fewer inheritance rights than men and boys.

Gender differences in access to productive inputs are often large

Above we show that there are large gender gaps in land ownership across low-income countries. Here we show that there are also large gaps in terms of access to borrowed capital.

The chart shows the percentage of men and women who report borrowing any money in the past 12 months to start, operate, or expand a farm or business.

As we can see, almost everywhere, including in many rich countries, women are less likely to get borrowed capital for productive purposes.

This can have large knock-on effects: In agriculture and entrepreneurship, gender differences in access to productive inputs, including land and credit, can lead to gaps in earnings via lower productivity.

Indeed, studies have found that, when statistical gender differences in agricultural productivity exist, they often disappear when access to and use of productive inputs are taken into account.

Women's Economic Opportunity Index

The previous discussion focused on particularly aspects one by one. What is the the picture on economic inequality in the aggregate?

Tracking progress across multiple dimensions of gender inequalities can be difficult, since changes across dimensions often go in different directions and have different magnitudes. Because of this, researchers and policymakers often construct synthetic indicators that aggregate various dimensions.

The Women's Economic Opportunity Index (WEO) published by The Economist Intelligence Unit, is one such effort to aggregate various aspects of female economic empowerment into a single metric.

The WEO index defines women's economic opportunity as "a set of laws, regulations, practices, customs and attitudes that allow women to participate in the workforce under conditions roughly equal to those of men, whether as wage-earning employees or as owners of a business." It is calculated from 29 indicators drawing on data from many sources, including the UN and the OECD.

Here is a map showing scores on this index (higher scores denote more economic opportunities for women).

The Gender Inequality Index from the Human Development Report

The Human Development Report produced by the UN includes a composite index that captures gender inequalities across several dimensions, including economic status.

This index, called the Gender Inequality Index, measures inequalities in three dimensions: reproductive health (based on maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates); empowerment (based on proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and proportion of adult females aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education); and economic status (based on labour market participation rates of female and male populations aged 15 years and older).

The map shows scores, country by country.

Historical Gender Equality Index

The Gender Inequality Index from the Human Development Report only has data from 1995. Considering this, Sarah Carmichael, Selin Dilli and Auke Rijpma, from Utrecht University, produced a similar composite index of gender inequality, using available data for the period 1950-2000, in order to make aggregate comparisons over the long run.

This index covers four dimensions:

(i) Health, measured by sex rations in life expectancy;

(ii) Socio-economic resources, measured by sex ratios in average years of education and labour force participation;

(iii) Gender disparities in the household, captured by sex ratios in marriage ages; and

(iv) Gender disparities in politics, measured by sex rations in parliamentary seats.

The results from this study are shown in the chart.

As we can see, the second half of the 20th century saw global improvements, and the regions with the steepest increase in gender equality were Latin America and Western Europe.

Interestingly, this chart also shows that in Eastern Europe there was important progress in the period 1950-1980, but there was a reversal after the fall of the Soviet Union.

In almost all countries, if you compare the wages of men and women you find that women tend to earn less than men. These inequalities have been narrowing across the world. In particular, over the last couple of decades most high-income countries have seen sizeable reductions in the gender pay gap.

How did these reductions come about and why do substantial gaps remain?

Before we get into the details, here is a preview of the main points.

An important part of the reduction in the gender pay gap in rich countries over the last decades is due to a historical narrowing, and often even reversal of the education gap between men and women.

Today, education is relatively unimportant to explain the remaining gender pay gap in rich countries. In contrast, the characteristics of the jobs that women tend to do, remain important contributing factors.

The gender pay gap is not a direct metric of discrimination. However, evidence from different contexts suggests discrimination is indeed important to understand the gender pay gap. Similarly, social norms affecting the gender distribution of labor are important determinants of wage inequality.

On the other hand, the available evidence suggests differences in psychological attributes and non-cognitive skills are at best modest factors contributing to the gender pay gap.

Differences in human capital

The adjusted pay gap

Differences in earnings between men and women capture differences across many possible dimensions, including education, experience and occupation.

For example, if we consider that more educated people tend to have higher earnings, it is natural to expect that the narrowing of the pay gap across the world can be partly explained by the fact that women have been catching up with men in terms of educational attainment, in particular years of schooling.

Indeed, since differences in education partly contribute to explain differences in wages, it is common to distinguish between 'unadjusted' and 'adjusted' pay differences.

When the gender pay gap is calculated by comparing all male and female workers, irrespective of differences in worker characteristics, the result is the raw or unadjusted pay gap. In contrast to this, when the gap is calculated after accounting for underlying differences in education, experience, and other factors that matter for the pay gap, then the result is the adjusted pay gap.

The idea of the adjusted pay gap is to make comparisons within groups of workers with roughly similar jobs, tenure and education. This allows us to tease out the extent to which different factors contribute to observed inequalities.

The chart here, from Blau and Kahn (2017) shows the evolution of the adjusted and unadjusted gender pay gap in the US.

More precisely, the chart shows the evolution of female to male wage ratios in three different scenarios: (i) Unadjusted; (ii) Adjusted, controlling for gender differences in human capital, i.e. education and experience; and (iii) Adjusted, controlling for a full range of covariates, including education, experience, job industry and occupation, among others. The difference between 100% and the full specification (the green bars) is the "unexplained" residual.

Several points stand out here.

First, the unadjusted gender pay gap in the US shrunk over this period. This is evident from the fact that the blue bars are closer to 100% in 2010 than in 1980.

Second, if we focus on groups of workers with roughly similar jobs, tenure and education, we also see a narrowing. The adjusted gender pay gap has shrunk.

Third, we can see that education and experience used to help explain a very large part of the pay gap in 1980, but this changed substantially in the decades that followed. This third point follows from the fact that the difference between the blue and red bars was much larger in 1980 than in 2010.

And fourth, the green bars grew substantially in the 1980s, but stayed fairly constant thereafter. In other words: Most of the convergence in earnings occurred during the 1980s, a decade in which the "unexplained" gap shrunk substantially.

Education and experience have become much less important in explaining gender differences in wages in the US

The chart here shows a breakdown of the adjusted gender pay gaps in the US, factor by factor, in 1980 and 2010.

When comparing the contributing factors in 1980 and 2010, we see that education and work experience have become much less important in explaining gender differences in wages over time, while occupation and industry have become more important.

In this chart we can also see that the 'unexplained' residual has gone down. This means the observable characteristics of workers and their jobs explain wage differences better today than a couple of decades ago. At first sight, this seems like good news - it suggests that today there is less discrimination, in the sense that differences in earnings are today much more readily explained by differences in 'productivity' factors. But is this really the case?

The unexplained residual may include aspects of unmeasured productivity (i.e. unobservable worker characteristics that cannot be controlled for in a regression), while the "explained" factors may themselves be vehicles of discrimination.

For example, suppose that women are indeed discriminated against, and they find it hard to get hired for certain jobs simply because of their sex. This would mean that in the adjusted specification, we would see that occupation and industry are important contributing factors - but that is precisely because discrimination is embedded in occupational differences!

Hence, while the unexplained residual gives us a first-order approximation of what is going on, we need much more detailed data and analysis in order to say something definitive about the role of discrimination in observed pay differences.

Gender pay differences around the world are better explained by occupation than by education

The set of three maps here, taken from the World Development Report (2012), shows that today gender pay differences are much better explained by occupation than by education. This is consistent with the point already made above using data for the US: as education expanded radically over the last few decades, human capital has become much less important in explaining gender differences in wages.

This blog post from Justin Sandefur at the Center for Global Development shows that education also fails to explain wage gaps if we include workers with zero income (i.e. if we decompose the wage gap after including people who are not employed).

Looking beyond worker characteristics

Job flexibility

All over the world women tend to do more unpaid care work at home than men - and women tend to be overrepresented in low paying jobs where they have the flexibility required to attend to these additional responsibilities.

The most important evidence regarding this link between the gender pay gap and job flexibility is presented and discussed by Claudia Goldin in the article ' A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter', where she digs deep in the data from the US. There are some key lessons that apply both to rich and non-rich countries.

Goldin shows that when one looks at the data on occupational choice in some detail, it becomes clear that women disproportionately seek jobs, including full-time jobs, that tend to be compatible with childrearing and other family responsibilities. In other words, women, more than men, are expected to have temporal flexibility in their jobs. Things like shifting hours of work and rearranging shifts to accommodate emergencies at home. And these are jobs with lower earnings per hour, even when the total number of hours worked is the same.

The importance of job flexibility in this context is very clearly illustrated by the fact that, over the last couple of decades, women in the US increased their participation and remuneration in only some fields. In a recent paper, Goldin and Katz (2016) show that pharmacy became a highly remunerated female-majority profession with a small gender earnings gap in the US, at the same time as pharmacies went through substantial technological changes that made flexible jobs in the field more productive (e.g. computer systems that increased the substitutability among pharmacists).

The chart here shows how quickly female wages increased in pharmacy, relative to other professions, over the last few decades in the US.

The motherhood penalty

Closely related to job flexibility and occupational choice, is the issue of work interruptions due to motherhood. On this front there is again a great deal of evidence in support of the so-called 'motherhood penalty'.

Lundborg, Plug and Rasmussen (2017) provide evidence from Denmark - more specifically, Danish women who sought medical help in achieving pregnancy.

By tracking women's fertility and employment status through detailed periodic surveys, these researchers were able to establish that women who had a successful in vitro fertilization treatment, ended up having lower earnings down the line than similar women who, by chance, were unsuccessfully treated.

Lundborg, Plug and Rasmussen summarise their findings as follows: "Our main finding is that women who are successfully treated by [in vitro fertilization] earn persistently less because of having children. We explain the decline in annual earnings by women working less when children are young and getting paid less when children are older. We explain the decline in hourly earnings, which is often referred to as the motherhood penalty, by women moving to lower-paid jobs that are closer to home."

The fact that the motherhood penalty is indeed about 'motherhood' and not 'parenthood', is supported by further evidence.

A recent study, also from Denmark, tracked men and women over the period 1980-2013, and found that after the first child, women's earnings sharply dropped and never fully recovered. But this was not the case for men with children, nor the case for women without children.

These patterns are shown in the chart here. The first panel shows the trend in earnings for Danish women with and without children. The second panel shows the same comparison for Danish men.

Note that these two examples are from Denmark - a country that ranks high on gender equality measures and where there are legal guarantees requiring that a woman can return to the same job after taking time to give birth.

This shows that, although family-friendly policies contribute to improve female labor force participation and reduce the gender pay gap, they are only part of the solution. Even when there is generous paid leave and subsidized childcare, as long as mothers disproportionately take additional work at home after having children, inequities in pay are likely to remain.

Ability, personality and social norms

The discussion so far has emphasised the importance of job characteristics and occupational choice in explaining the gender pay gap. This leads to obvious questions: What determines the systematic gender differences in occupational choice? What makes women seek job flexibility and take a disproportionate amount of unpaid care work?

One argument usually put forward is that, to the extent that biological differences in preferences and abilities underpin gender roles, they are the main factors explaining the gender pay gap. In their review of the evidence, Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn (2017) show that there is limited empirical support for this argument.

To be clear, yes, there is evidence supporting the fact that men and women differ in some key attributes that may affect labor market outcomes. For example standardised tests show that there are statistical gender gaps in maths scores in some countries; and experiments show that women avoid more salary negotiations, and they often show particular predisposition to accept and receive requests for tasks with low promotion potential. However, these observed differences are far from being biologically fixed - 'gendering' begins early in life and the evidence shows that preferences and skills are highly malleable. You can influence tastes, and you can certainly teach people to tolerate risk, to do maths, or to negotiate salaries.

What's more, independently of where they come from, Blau and Kahn show that these empirically observed differences can typically only account for a modest portion of the gender pay gap.

In contrast, the evidence does suggest that social norms and culture, which in turn affect preferences, behaviour and incentives to foster specific skills, are key factors in understanding gender differences in labor force participation and wages. You can read more about this in our blog post dedicated to answer the question 'How well do innate gender differences explain the gender pay gap?'.

Discrimination and bias

Independently of the exact origin of the unequal distribution of gender roles, it is clear that our recent and even current practices show that these roles persist with the help of institutional enforcement. Goldin (1988), for instance, examines past prohibitions against the training and employment of married women in the US. She touches on some well-known restrictions, such as those against the training and employment of women as doctors and lawyers, before focusing on the lesser known but even more impactful 'marriage bars' which arose in the late 1800s and early 1900s. These work prohibitions are important because they applied to teaching and clerical jobs - occupations that would become the most commonly held among married women after 1950. Around the time the US entered World War II, it is estimated that 87% of all school boards would not hire a married woman and 70% would not retain an unmarried woman who married.

The map here highlights that to this day, explicit barriers across the world limit the extent to which women are allowed to do the same jobs as men.

However, even after explicit barriers are lifted and legal protections put in their place, discrimination and bias can persist in less overt ways. Goldin and Rouse (2000), for example, look at the adoption of "blind" auditions by orchestras, and show that by using a screen to conceal the identity of a candidate, impartial hiring practices increased the number of women in orchestras by 25% between 1970 and 1996.

Many other studies have found similar evidence of bias in different labor market contexts. Biases also operate in other spheres of life with strong knock-on effects on labor market outcomes. For example, at the end of World War II only 18% of people in the US thought that a wife should work if her husband was able to support her. This obviously circles back to our earlier point about social norms.

Strategies for reducing the gender pay gap

In many countries wage inequality between men and women can be reduced by improving the education of women. However, in many countries gender gaps in education have been closed and we still have large gender inequalities in the workforce. What else can be done?

An obvious alternative is fighting discrimination. But the evidence presented above shows that this is not enough. Public policy and management changes on the firm level matter too: Family-friendly labor-market policies may help. For example, maternity leave coverage can contribute by raising women's retention over the period of childbirth, which in turn raises women's wages through the maintenance of work experience and job tenure.

Similarly, early education and childcare can increase the labor force participation of women - and reduce gender pay gaps - by alleviating the unpaid care work undertaken by mothers.

Additionally, the experience of women's historical advance in specific professions (e.g. pharmacists in the US), suggests that the gender pay gap could also be considerably reduced if firms did not have the incentive to disproportionately reward workers who work long hours, and fixed, non-flexible schedules.

Changing these incentives is of course difficult because it requires reorganizing the workplace. But it is likely to have a large impact on gender inequality, particularly in countries where other measures are already in place.

Implementing these strategies can have a positive self-reinforcing effect. For example, family-friendly labor-market policies that lead to higher labor-force attachment and salaries for women, will raise the returns to women's investment in education - so women in future generations will be more likely to invest in education, which will also help narrow gender gaps in labor market outcomes down the line.

Nevertheless, powerful as these strategies may be, they are only part of the solution. Social norms and culture remain at the heart of family choices and the gender distribution of labor. Achieving equality in opportunities requires ensuring that we change the norms and stereotypes that limit the set of choices available both to men and women. It is difficult, but the evidence shows that social norms, too, can be changed.

Gender pay gap

The gender pay gap (or the gender wage gap) is a metric that tells us the difference in pay (or wages, or income) between women and men. It's a measure of inequality and captures a concept that is broader than the concept of equal pay for equal work.

Differences in pay between men and women capture differences along many possible dimensions, including worker education, experience and occupation. When the gender pay gap is calculated by comparing all male workers to all female workers - irrespective of differences along these additional dimensions - the result is the 'raw' or unadjusted pay gap. On the contrary, when the gap is calculated after accounting for underlying differences in education, experience, etc., then the result is the adjusted pay gap.

Discrimination in hiring practices can exist in the absence of pay gaps - for example, if women know they will be treated unfairly and hence choose not to participate in the labor market. Similarly, it is possible to observe large pay gaps in the absences of discrimination in hiring practices - for example, if women get fair treatment but apply for lower-paid jobs.

The implication is that observing differences in pay between men and women is neither necessary nor sufficient to prove discrimination in the workplace. Both discrimination and inequality are important. But they are not one and the same.

How is the unadjusted gender pay gap measured?

Percent differences in average or median earnings

The gender wage gap is often measured as the difference between average earnings of men and average earnings of women expressed as a percentage of average earnings of men. By this measure the gender wage gap can be negative. This is the definition used by the ILO. (We explore the ILO data above.)

Comparisons of averages can often be misleading because averages are very sensitive to extreme data points. Hence, it is also common to measure gender gaps by comparing earnings for the individuals at the median - or middle - of the earnings distribution. This is the definition used by the OECD. (We explore the OECD data above.)

Ratios of average or median earnings

In addition to percent differences, it is also common to express the gender pay gap as a simple ratio between wages. This is the measure adopted by the United States Census Bureau.

By this measure, the gender wage gap is expressed as a percent (median earnings of women as share of median earnings of men) and it is always positive. Here, values below 100% mean that women earn less than men, while values above 100% mean than women earn more. Values closer to 100% reflect a lower gap.

Data hubs dedicated to gender statistics

World Bank - Gender Statistics

United Nations - Gender Statistics

OECD - Development Centre's Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI)

OECD - Gender data portal

Data Source: Multiple sources

Description of available measures: The OECD Gender Data Portal includes selected indicators shedding light on gender inequalities in education, employment, entrepreneurship, health and development, showing how far we are from achieving gender equality and where actions is most needed. The data cover OECD member countries, as well as partner economies including Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa.

Link: http://www.oecd.org/gender/data/

Wikigender statistics

World Economic Forum - Global Gender Gap Report

Other sources referenced in this article

International Labor Organization (ILO)

Data Source: ILO

Description of available measures: Unadjusted gender gap in average hourly wages, Female share of low pay earners

Time span: 1990-2016

Geographical coverage: Global by country

Link: http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/

World Bank - World Development Indicators

UN Human Development Report

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What is determining the inequality in incomes, jobs, and wealth between men and women?

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Pew Research Center's Social & Demographic Trends Project

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The gender pay gap - the difference between the earnings of men and women - has barely closed in the United States in the past two decades. In 2022, American women typically earned 82 cents for every dollar earned by men. That was about the same as in 2002, when they earned 80 cents to the dollar. The slow pace at which the gender pay gap has narrowed this century contrasts sharply with the progress in the preceding two decades: In 1982, women earned just 65 cents to each dollar earned by men.

There is no single explanation for why progress toward narrowing the pay gap has all but stalled in the 21st century. Women generally begin their careers closer to wage parity with men, but they lose ground as they age and progress through their work lives, a pattern that has remained consistent over time. The pay gap persists even though women today are more likely than men to have graduated from college. In fact, the pay gap between college-educated women and men is not any narrower than the one between women and men who do not have a college degree. This points to the dominant role of other factors that still set women back or give men an advantage.

One of these factors is parenthood. Mothers ages 25 to 44 are less likely to be in the labor force than women of the same age who do not have children at home, and they tend to work fewer hours each week when employed. This can reduce the earnings of some mothers, although evidence suggests the effect is either modest overall or short-lived for many. On the other hand, fathers are more likely to be in the labor force - and to work more hours each week - than men without children at home. This is linked to an increase in the pay of fathers - a phenomenon referred to as the " fatherhood wage premium " - and tends to widen the gender pay gap.
Related: Gender pay gap in U.S. hasn't changed much in two decades
Family needs can also influence the types of jobs women and men pursue, contributing to gender segregation across occupations. Differential treatment of women, including gender stereotypes and discrimination, may also play a role. And the gender wage gap varies widely by race and ethnicity.

How the gender pay gap increases with age

Younger women - those ages 25 to 34 and early in their work lives - have edged closer to wage parity with men in recent years. Starting in 2007, their earnings have consistently stood at about 90 cents to the dollar or more compared with men of the same age. But even as pay parity might appear in reach for women at the start of their careers, the wage gap tends to increase as they age.

Consider, for example, women who were ages 25 to 34 in 2010. In that year, they earned 92% as much as men their age, compared with 83% for women overall. But by 2022, this group of women, now ages 37 to 46, earned only 84% as much as men of the same age. This pattern repeats itself for groups of women who were ages 25 to 34 in earlier years - say, 2005 or 2000 - and it may well be the future for women entering the workforce now.

A good share of the increase in the gender pay gap takes place when women are between the ages of 35 and 44. In 2022, women ages 25 to 34 earned about 92% as much as men of the same ages, but women ages 35 to 44 and 45 to 54 earned 83% as much. The ratio dropped to 79% among those ages 55 to 64. This general pattern has not changed in at least four decades.

The increase in the pay gap coincides with the age at which women are more likely to have children under 18 at home. In 2022, 40% of employed women ages 25 to 34 had at least one child at home. The same was true for 66% of women ages 35 to 44 but for fewer - 39% - among women ages 45 to 54. Only 6% of employed women ages 55 to 64 had children at home in 2022.

Similarly, the share of employed men with children at home peaks between the ages of 35 to 44, standing at 58% in 2022. This is also when fathers tend to receive higher pay, even as the pay of employed mothers in same age group is unaffected.

Mothers with children at home tend to be less engaged with the workplace, while fathers are more active

Parenthood leads some women to put their careers on hold, whether by choice or necessity, but it has the opposite effect among men. In 2022, 70% of mothers ages 25 to 34 had a job or were looking for one, compared with 84% of women of the same age without children at home. This amounted to the withdrawal of 1.4 million younger mothers from the workforce. Moreover, when they are employed, younger mothers tend to put in a shorter workweek - by two hours per week, on average - than other women their age. Reduced engagement with the workplace among younger mothers is also a long-running phenomenon.

Fathers, however, are more likely to hold a job or be looking for one than men who don't have children at home, and this is true throughout the prime of their working years, from ages 25 to 54. Among those who do have a job, fathers also work a bit more each week, on average, than men who do not have children at home.

As a result, the gender gap in workplace activity is greater among those who have children at home than among those who do not. For example, among those ages 35 to 44, 94% of fathers are active in the workforce, compared with 75% of mothers - a gap of 19 percentage points. But among those with no children at home in this age group, 84% of men and 78% of women are active in the workforce - a gap of 6 points.

These patterns contribute to the gap in workplace activity between men and women overall. As of 2022, 68% of men ages 16 and older - with or without children at home - are either employed or seeking employment. That compares with 57% of women, a difference of 11 percentage points. This gap was as wide as 24 points in 1982, but it narrowed to 14 points by 2002. Men overall also worked about three hours more per week at a job than women in 2022, on average, down from a gap of about six hours per week in 1982.

Employed mothers earn about the same as similarly educated women without children at home; both groups earn less than fathers

Parenthood affects the hourly earnings of employed women and men in unexpected ways. While employed mothers overall appear to earn less than employed women without children at home, the gap is driven mainly by differences in educational attainment between the two groups. Among women with similar levels of education, there is little gap in the earnings of mothers and non-mothers. However, fathers earn more than other workers, including other men without children at home, regardless of education level. This phenomenon - known as the fatherhood wage premium - is one of the main ways that parenthood affects the gender pay gap among employed workers.

Motherhood does have important effects on the potential earnings of women. Women who experience breaks in their careers after becoming mothers sacrifice at least some of their earnings. Some mothers may never work for pay after having children, passing on earnings altogether. But it is difficult to know what the earnings of mothers might have been and, as a result, it is hard to know for certain what the full effect of motherhood is on women's earnings. Estimates suggest that motherhood may account for much of the current shortfall in the earnings potential of women overall.

Among employed men and women, the impact of parenting is felt most among those ages 25 to 54, when they are most likely to have children under 18 at home. In 2022, mothers ages 25 to 34 earned 85% as much as fathers that age, but women without children at home earned 97% as much as fathers. In contrast, employed women ages 35 to 44 - with or without children - both earned about 80% as much as fathers. The table turns for women ages 45 to 54, with mothers earning more than women with no children at home. Among those ages 35 to 44 or 45 to 54, men without children earned only 84% as much as fathers.

But these patterns in the earnings of employed mothers and women with no children at home are influenced greatly by differences in education levels between the two. Among employed women ages 25 to 34, some 61% of women without children at home had a bachelor's degree or higher level of education in 2022, compared with 37% of mothers. It follows that among women ages 25 to 34, those without children at home (a more highly educated group, on average) earned more than women with at least one child at home. Conversely, employed mothers ages 45 to 54 were more likely than other women to have at least a bachelor's degree - 58% vs. 42%. For that reason, mothers ages 45 to 54 earned more than women without children.

When the earnings of mothers are compared with those of women without children at home who have the same level of education, the differences either narrow or go away. Among employed women ages 25 to 34 with at least a bachelor's degree, both mothers and women without children at home earned 80% as much as fathers in 2022. Among women ages 25 to 34 with a high school diploma and no further education, mothers earned 79% as much as fathers and women with no children at home earned 84% as much. The narrowing of the gap in earnings of mothers and women without children at home after controlling for education level also extends to other age groups.

Thus, among the employed, the effect of parenthood on the gender pay gap does not seem to be driven by a decrease in mothers' earnings relative to women without children at home. Instead, the widening of the pay gap with parenthood appears to be driven more by an increase in the earnings of fathers. Fathers ages 25 to 54 not only earn more than mothers the same age, they also earn more than men with no children at home. Nonetheless, men without children at home still earn more than women with or without children at home.

Although there is little gap in the earnings of employed mothers and women with no children at home who have the same level of education, there is a lingering gap in workplace engagement between the two groups. Whether they had at least a bachelor's degree or were high school graduates, mothers ages 25 to 34 are less likely to hold a job or be looking for one. Similarly, younger mothers on average work fewer hours than women without children at home each week, regardless of their education level. The opposite is true for fathers compared with men without children at home.

Progress in closing the gender pay gap has slowed despite gains in women's education

The share of women with at least a bachelor's degree has increased steadily since 1982 - and faster than among men. In 1982, 20% of employed women ages 25 and older had a bachelor's degree or higher level of education, compared with 26% of employed men. By 2022, 48% of employed women had at least a bachelor's degree, compared with 41% of men. Still, women did not see the pay gap close to the same extent from 2002 to 2022 as they did from 1982 to 2002.

In part, this may be linked to how the gains from going to college have changed in recent decades, for women and men alike. The college wage premium - the boost in earnings workers get from a college degree - increased rapidly during the 1980s. But the rise in the premium slowed down over time and came to a halt around 2010. This likely reduced the relative growth in the earnings of women.

Although gains in education have raised the average earnings of women and have narrowed the gender pay gap overall, college-educated women are no closer to wage parity with their male counterparts than other women. In 2022, women with at least a bachelor's degree earned 79% as much as men who were college graduates, and women who were high school graduates earned 81% as much as men with the same level of education. This underscores the challenges faced by women of all education levels in closing the pay gap.

Notably, the gender wage gap has closed more among workers without a four-year college degree than among those who do have a bachelor's degree or more education. For example, the wage gap for women without a high school diploma narrowed from 62% in 1982 to 83% in 2022 relative to men at the same education level. But it closed only from 69% to 79% among bachelor's degree holders over the same period. This is because only men with at least a bachelor's degree experienced positive wage growth from 1982 to 2022; all other men saw their real wages decrease. Meanwhile, the real earnings of women increased regardless of their level of education.

As women have improved their level of education in recent decades, they've also increased their share of employment in higher-paying occupations, such as managerial, business and finance, legal, and computer, science and engineering (STEM) occupations. In 1982, women accounted for only 26% of employment in managerial occupations. By 2022, their share had risen to 40%. Women also substantially increased their presence in social, arts and media occupations. Over the same period, the shares of women in several lower-paying fields, such as administrative support jobs and food preparation and serving occupations, fell significantly.

Even so, women are still underrepresented in managerial and STEM occupations - along with construction, repair and production, and transportation occupations - when compared with their share of employment overall. And there has been virtually no change in the degree to which women are overrepresented in education, health care, and personal care and services occupations - the last of which are lower paying than the average across all occupations. The distribution of women and men across occupations remains one of the drivers of the gender pay gap. But the degree to which this distribution is the result of personal choices or gender stereotypes is not entirely clear.

Gender pay gap differs widely by race and ethnicity

Looking across racial and ethnic groups, a wide gulf separates the earnings of Black and Hispanic women from the earnings of White men. In 2022, Black women earned 70% as much as White men and Hispanic women earned only 65% as much. The ratio for White women stood at 83%, about the same as the earnings gap overall, while Asian women were closer to parity with White men, making 93% as much.

The pay gap narrowed for all groups of women from 1982 to 2022, but more so for White women than for Black and Hispanic women. The earnings gap for Asian women narrowed by about 17 percentage points from 2002 to 2022, but data for this group is not available for 1982.

To some extent, the gender wage gap varies by race and ethnicity because of differences in education, experience, occupation and other factors that drive the gender wage gap for women overall. But researchers have uncovered new evidence of hiring discrimination against various racial and ethnic groups, along with discrimination against other groups, such as LGBTQ and disabled workers. Discrimination in hiring may feed into differences in earnings by shutting out workers from opportunities.

Broader economic forces may impact men's and women's earnings in different ways

Changes in the gender pay gap are also shaped by economic factors that sometimes drive men's and women's earnings in distinctive ways. Because men and women tend to work in different types of jobs and industries, their earnings may respond differently to external pressures.

More specifically, men's earnings essentially didn't change from 1982 to 2002. Potential reasons for that include a more rapid decline in union membership among men, a shift away from jobs calling for more physical skills, and global competition that sharply reduced employment in manufacturing in the 1980s. At the same time, women's earnings increased substantially as they raised their level of education and shifted toward higher-paying occupations.

But in some ways, the economic climate has proved less favorable for women this century. For reasons that are not entirely clear, women's employment was slower to recover from the Great Recession of 2007-2009. More recently, the COVID-19 recession took on the moniker " she-cession" because of the pressure on jobs disproportionately held by women. Amid a broader slowdown in earnings growth from 2000 to 2015, the increase in women's earnings from 2002 to 2022 was not much greater than the increase in men's earnings, limiting the closure in the gender pay gap over the period.

What's next for the gender pay gap?

Higher education, a shift to higher-paying occupations and more labor market experience have helped women narrow the gender pay gap since 1982. But even as women have continued to outpace men in educational attainment, the pay gap has been stuck in a holding pattern since 2002, ranging from 80 to 85 cents to the dollar.

More sustained progress in closing the pay gap may depend on deeper changes in societal and cultural norms and in workplace flexibility that affect how men and women balance their careers and family lives. Even in countries that have taken the lead in implementing family-friendly policies, such as Denmark, parenthood continues to drive a significant wedge in the earnings of men and women. New research suggests that family-friendly policies in the U.S. may be keeping the pay gap from closing. Gender stereotypes and discrimination, though difficult to quantify, also appear to be among the "last-mile" hurdles impeding further progress.

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The pay gap between men and women has barely closed in the past two decades, even as women today are more likely than men to have graduated from college, suggesting other factors are at play.