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- Xinjiang is a significant producer of cotton for the world market, but rights organizations have long claimed that Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities in China are compelled to harvest and prepare cotton as part of a pervasive, state-approved system of forced labor.

- China did signed UDHR, and even took part in writing it.

- The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), which takes effect on June 21, 2022, grants US authorities expanded authority to halt the import of products connected to forced labor in China.

- The subject of Uyghurs being compelled to work in the cotton industry in Xinjiang is covered under the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Forced Labour Convention of the International Labour Organization (ILO).

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Do you think people who advocate for no forced labor should never by any products that is possibly produced by forced labor? As the products from industry that force their labor is almost omnipresent in our world.

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The impact of forced labors not limited to fashion industry

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The impact of forced labors not limited to fashion industry

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https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/21/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-uyghur-automotive-industry-human-rights/

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The grave human rights conditions in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where Uyghur Muslims and other religious and ethnic minorities are subjected to internment and forced labor, among other abuses, demand international response. So far, the centerpiece of the U.S. response has been the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), signed into law by President Joe Biden in December 2021. The law is intended to prevent U.S. consumers from being complicit in these abuses through the purchase of Chinese goods made with forced labor. In doing so, it encourages global firms to take Xinjiang out of their supply chains in order to maintain access to U.S. markets.

At the time, it was believed that the forced labor problems were concentrated in a few key industries: cotton, polysilicon that underpins solar arrays, and tomatoes. Issued by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the agency's Operational Guidance for Importers -the quick start guide, if you will, for complying with the UFLPA-mentions only those three products by name.

But a recent report by U.K.-based researchers finds that the problems extend deep into the supply chains of virtually every major automobile manufacturer. To the extent the findings are credible, they massively complicate both practical and political challenges to proper enforcement. More fundamentally, they provide a test of just how willing the United States and other entities-including the European Union-are willing to go to respond to what the United States has called a genocide.

The report, published by researchers affiliated with the Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice at Sheffield Hallam University, traces the contributions of Chinese companies implicated in forced labor-or firms sourcing from companies that have been so implicated-to automotive supply chains via basic inputs such as steel and aluminum but also electric vehicle (EV) batteries, vehicle electronic systems, tires, and spare/replacement parts. As the world's leading lithium processor, China dominates production of the upstream materials used by the world's main EV battery-makers.

The alleged connections are deep and pervasive. The report identifies 96 different companies operating in Xinjiang that feed into automotive supply chains at various stages from mining to auto glass and electronic systems, with 38 participating in state-sponsored labor transfer programs, by which workers from Xinjiang are relocated outside the region (more on that later). The list of implicated auto manufacturers is a who's who, including all the major players (Toyota, Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, and U.S. auto giants General Motors and Ford) and more boutique (Aston Martin, Ferrari) and EV-centric (Tesla, Rivian) producers. Although the UFLPA mostly applies to goods made in Xinjiang, it also covers goods produced outside the region by certain business entities that the United States has found to be complicit in abuses.

In highlighting these linkages, the report raises the economic stakes of the UFLPA dramatically. Xinjiang is pivotal in global cotton, polysilicon, and tomato production. But in terms of global trade, those markets are small potatoes-er, tomatoes-compared with the auto industry. Total global trade in cotton, all photovoltaics, and tomatoes was on the order of $80 billion in 2020; trade in motor vehicles alone amounted to $645 billion, with billions more in auto parts.

And this increased scrutiny on the automotive sector is coming at a time when there is still considerable pent-up demand for new vehicles due to pandemic-related supply chain disruptions and resulting sky-high prices.

The UFLPA was the most overwhelmingly bipartisan piece of U.S. legislation in recent memory, having passed the Senate unanimously and the House with only one dissenting vote (Republican Rep. Thomas Massie of Kentucky). And it's easy to understand why. It achieved a rare trifecta: being on the right side of moral issues (forced labor and religious persecution) while simultaneously protecting U.S. economic interests in import-competing sectors (agriculture and solar, especially as U.S. solar production ramps up in response to the renewable energy incentives included in the Inflation Reduction Act, or IRA) and matching pitch with increasingly intense anti-China sentiment in U.S. foreign policy. But implementing it-especially in light of alleged problems in the auto industry-faces significant challenges.

The first relates to the nature of proving a negative. The law establishes a "rebuttable presumption" that goods produced wholly or in part in Xinjiang are prohibited entry into the United States. That is, evidence must be provided to demonstrate forced labor was not used. As any veteran of a college philosophy course can tell you, proving a negative is extraordinarily difficult.

Also, the forced labor problem is not confined to Xinjiang. Via labor transfers, workers from Xinjiang have been relocated en masse to other regions of the country, with suppliers to U.S.-based multinationals such as Apple having been implicated. The most common approaches to addressing supply chain-related concerns are third-party monitoring and audits like that used by Apple in sourcing minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But these measures cannot be credibly conducted in Xinjiang's police-state environment, which renders virtually impossible the task for media and civil society actors attempting to verify conditions on the ground.

Given these challenges, proving conclusively that forced labor has not tainted a supply chain is an arduous task when applied to basic products such as cotton and tomatoes. Automobile supply chains are much more complex: A single vehicle can be composed of parts and materials sourced from dozens if not hundreds of suppliers and subsidiaries, a point the report makes clear.

The second relates to U.S. enforcement capacity. From June through early December, CBP held up roughly 2,200 goods shipments valued at $728 million on suspicion of links to forced labor; of those, 300 were ultimately allowed to enter. But U.S. imports from China in 2022 are expected to near half a trillion dollars. Even if enforcing the UFLPA were CBP's only task-and it is not-true supply chain monitoring for the hundreds if not thousands of products imported from Xinjiang would be incredibly difficult, to say nothing of the wider problem implied by cross-regional labor transfers.

Fundamentally, the biggest challenge is one of political will. In spite of high enforcement costs, as they say, where there's a will, there's a way. And when the problem was thought to be confined to cotton, polysilicon, and tomatoes, will was in ample supply. U.S. cotton producers were full-throated in their opposition to Chinese forced labor and emphasis on supply chain monitoring in the run-up to the UFLPA's passage. In addition to being the right thing to do, the UFLPA has encouraged textile companies and clothing manufacturers to look elsewhere-including to the United States-to source cotton.

For an industry buffeted by high temperatures in Texas, the buckle of the cotton belt, relief from competing Chinese imports is welcome. And additional costs to consumers due to Chinese supply disruptions have been relatively negligible: The U.S. consumer price index for apparel has barely budged since the UFLPA went into effect over the summer. Even prior to the ban, the United States was not importing Chinese tomatoes in large volumes, so there was no real domestic constituency standing against import restrictions.

The effects for U.S. solar have been more negative, as the industry is heavily dependent on China at virtually every step in the supply chain from mined silica to solar arrays. But the blow has been softened somewhat by the subsidies, tax credits, and loans created by the IRA, which seeks to ramp up U.S. solar capacity throughout the supply chain. The UFLPA has harmed U.S. solar in the short term, but medium- and longer-term outlooks are bullish. What the UFLPA taketh, the IRA giveth.

In stark contrast, the effects for the auto industry would be massive, hitting both consumers and producers. If enforcement begins targeting auto imports, the cost of one of the most expensive purchases most U.S. consumers ever make will likely rise further at a time when prices-even if softening of late-are still extremely high for both new and used vehicles.

For U.S. automakers, the report's implications are superficially positive-seemingly encouraging consumers to "Buy American"-but actually harrowing. As recently as 2020, the U.S. auto industry was the most reliant on Chinese parts and accessories of major producing countries, with Chinese content in U.S.-built vehicles growing steadily in the last 15 years. Unfortunately, that dependence is most acute in areas that are vital to achieving the emissions cuts necessary to mitigate climate change, such as EV battery production. Assuaging concerns about forced labor would require U.S. and foreign automakers to establish the legality and legitimacy of their supply chains in perhaps the most challenging environment on Earth.

The situation in Xinjiang is appalling, and the U.S. government is right to do what it can to keep U.S. consumers from aiding and abetting abuses there and throughout China. Up until now, doing the right thing was costly but also consistent with broader U.S. economic and security goals: kick-starting U.S. solar production and protecting a beleaguered cotton industry.

The inconvenient truth, however, appears to be that Xinjiang is more deeply enmeshed in global supply chains than was realized when the current enforcement regime was established. And that will affect the UFLPA's enforceability, both practically and politically. If the United States is serious about enforcing the ULFPA, it will need to ramp up CBP resources dedicated to the task. If it is not, it will clarify the costs the United States is willing to bear to end-or at least not be complicit in-human rights abuses in Xinjiang.

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Forced Uyghur Labor Probably Helped Build Your Car

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The grave human rights conditions in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where Uyghur Muslims and other religious and ethnic minorities are subjected to internment and forced labor, among other abuses, demand international response. So far, the centerpiece of the U.S. response has been the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), signed into law by President Joe Biden in December 2021.

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Law that mandates all products from Xinjiang or companies that engage in forced labor must be identified by US customs officials. According to the regulation, importers are required to show "clear and persuasive evidence" that indicates the products were not made with forced labor. The supply chain mapping that identifies the factories where the goods were produced, data about workers at each facility, and payments should be transparent.

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https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/20/china-us-law-against-uyghur-forced-labor-takes-effect

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China: US Law Against Uyghur Forced Labor Takes Effect

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(Washington, DC) - The United States government should vigorously enforce a new law that aims to prevent imports linked to forced labor by Uyghurs and other persecuted groups in China, Human Rights Watch said today.

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Bricks, Carpets, Coal, Cotton, Sugarcane, Wheat

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Cattle, Charcoal, Coffee, Garments, Sugarcane, Timber

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Bricks, Cement, Coal, Gold, Iron, Textiles, Timber

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Bricks, Carpets, Cottonseed (hybrid), Embellished Textiles, Garments, Rice, Sandstone, Stones

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Bamboo, Beans (green, soy, yellow), Bricks, Jade, Palm Thatch, Rice, Rubber, Rubies, Sesame, Shrimp, Sugarcane, Sunflowers, Teak

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Artificial Flowers, Bricks, Christmas Decorations, Coal, Cotton, Electronics, Fireworks, Fish, Footwear, Garments, Gloves, Hair Products, Nails, Polysilicon,Textiles, Thread/Yarn, Tomato Products, Toys

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However, the true likely reason for the custody and care for children and elders is to avoid excuses from the cotton farmers not to work.

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Does the care and custody for elders and children combined with the "objective" of generating wealth make the deprivation of human rights eligible? Or acceptable?

Suppose if people volunteer to come due to the custody provided for their children and parents, but they are still not paid, does that count as a violation of human rights?

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The Excuse from Local Government on the Violation of Human Rights

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The Excuse from Local Government on the Violation of Human Rights

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Local government in Xinjiang states that the cotton industry helps the local people to "avoid indolence" and get to know "diligence is the only way to reach wealth", which is moral blackmail.

"The country is currently providing centralized care and custody for children, the elderly, and even livestock, in order to "solve the worries of villagers who go out to work"

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“When it cut its ties with Chinese suppliers in 2020, Patagonia had to phase out some products that had been available for more than a decade because the fabric couldn’t be easily replicated.“

Later Patagonia switched to importing cotton from Peru farmers.

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https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/27/business/cotton-xinjiang-forced-labor-retailers.html

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‘Escalation of Secrecy’: Global Brands Seek Clarity on Xinjiang (Published 2022)

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Companies that sourced cotton from the region in China are weighing evidence of forced labor, a lack of visibility into operations and new regulation.

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https://www.sohu.com/a/458617148_188189

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造谣新疆棉花没有证据，为什么还有那么多人信？我找到答案了_家长

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本来想不通，但是在公务员培训机构工作了那么久，形形色色的家长给了我启示，其实这些相信谣言的人和我们有相似之处。 最可怕的是，这些家长影响了自己的孩子，可能自己的孩子有机会成为一名公务员，但是被家长这…

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Chinese Media Response to the International Exposure of Forced Labor in Xinjiang

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Chinese Media Response to the International Exposure of Forced Labor in Xinjiang

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The author states that there is no evidence of the world's accusation on the forced labor in Xinjiang cotton industry.

The quote translated from the media: "The result of fabricating lies about Xinjiang cotton is also the same. When the people of the world come to know the real China and understand the truth behind the lies, those countries and media that spread rumors will surely lose their credibility."

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Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian strongly denied allegations of forced labor in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China.

"China has repeatedly stated its position on Xinjiang-related issues. The so-called 'forced labor' is a fabricated lie," Zhao Lijian said at a daily news conference on July 15.

However, Zhao Lijian's claim that the allegations of forced labor are "completely fabricated lies" is likely to be incorrect and misleading.

The opaque media environment and access restrictions in China make verification of Zhao's words difficult.

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https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-55344353

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沙磊（John Sudworth）

BBC驻中国记者 发自新疆

BBC获得的一项最新研究结果显示，中国正迫使数十万维吾尔族和其他少数民族人群在西部新疆地区广阔的棉田中从事艰苦的体力劳动。

根据近期在网上发掘的文件，该研究首次清晰地展示了采棉产业背后潜在的强迫劳动规模。新疆的棉花产量占全球棉花供应量的五分之一，在全球时尚产业用途甚广。

除了 大型的再教育营系统 （据信有超过100万人被拘留在那里），有关少数族裔被迫在纺织厂工作的指控也得到详细记录。

中国政府否认这些说法，坚称这些营地是"职业教育培训中心"，而这些工厂是一个大规模、自愿的扶贫计划的一部分。

但新的证据表明，每年有超过50万少数民族工人也被调往参与季节性采棉工作中。他们的工作环境可能存在很高的强制性。

"在我看来，其潜在影响确实是历史性的，"曝光 这些文件 的华盛顿共产主义受害者纪念基金会（Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation）高级研究员郑国恩博士（Adrian Zenz）告诉BBC。

视频加注文字，
调查揭中国棉花行业背后的维吾尔人强迫劳动

"我们第一次有证据证明维吾尔人在制造业、服装生产中的强迫劳动，而且直接涉及到采摘棉花，我认为这是一个改变游戏规则的事件。"

"任何关心道德采购的人都必须看看贡献了中国棉花产量85%、世界棉花产量20%的新疆，然后说'我们不能再这样做了'。"

这些文件包含了网上的政府政策文件和官方新闻报道。文件显示，2018年，阿克苏及和田地区"通过劳动力转移"派出21万名工人，跨地区为中国准军事组织新疆生产建设兵团采摘棉花。

另一些报道称拾花工被"动员并组织起来"，输送到数百公里外的田地里。

今年，阿克苏地区确定了其田地需要142,700名工人的需求，这很大程度上通过"应转尽转"的原则得到了满足。

文件中称要"引导"拾花工"自觉抵制非法宗教活动"，表明这些政策主要是为新疆的维吾尔人和其他传统穆斯林人群制定的。

政府官员首先与棉场签订"意向合同"，确定"雇工人数、地点、住宿和工资"。然后经过动员后，拾花工"踊跃报名"。

有很多迹象表明，这种踊跃并非完全自愿。例如，有报告描述一座村庄的人"不愿意从事农业工作"。

官员们不得不再次上门做"思想教育工作"。最终有20人被送走，并计划再"输出"60人。

营地和工厂

长期以来，中国一直将大规模迁移农村贫困人口作为全国扶贫运动的一部分，其公开目的是改善他们的就业前景。

对中国国家主席习近平来说，消除绝对贫困可以说已成为其在明年中共成立100周年之前，最重要的国内政治优先事项。

但在新疆，有证据表明当局有着更多的政治目的及实施了更严密的控制。官员们也面临着完成 大量目标和配额 的压力。

图像来源， Reuters

中国治疆态度的显著转变可以追溯到两起针对路人和乘客的残忍袭击事件--2013年天安门金水桥袭击和2014年昆明火车站袭击。中国指责维吾尔族伊斯兰分子和分裂势力策动恐袭。

作为回应，中国从2016年开始建立"再教育营"。对任何表现出被视为不可信迹象的人--比如在手机上安装加密的聊天应用程式、观看宗教内容或有亲戚旅居海外--进行教育。

尽管中国称它们为"去极端化学校"，但其 自己的文件 表明，这实际是一个严厉的拘留系统，目的是用强制忠诚于党取代旧的信仰和文化认同。

自2018年以来，一场大规模工业扩张开始进行，数百家工厂被迅速建造。

许多工厂出现在再教育营的围墙之内或相隔不远处，这表明了大规模就业和拘留是两个平行进行的目标。

政府似乎相信，工作将有助于改变新疆少数民族的 "过时观念" ，将他们重塑为现代、世俗并有工资收入的中国公民。

BBC曾试图访问库车市的一处设施，那里被 独立研究人员 确定为再教育营。

该设施建于2017年，开源卫星图像显示，设施内包括隔离网和一座看上去像是瞭望台的装置。

2018年，它的隔壁出现了一座全新的工厂。施工完成后不久，卫星就捕捉到了一些重要的东西。

独立分析人士证实，可以看到大批显然穿着统一颜色制服的人，在这两个地点之间紧密地排队走动。

BBC试图探访，在我们拍摄建筑群外围时，一些没有标示的车辆尾随了我们。

工厂和营地如今似乎已合并成一个大型工厂综合体，墙上贴满了宣传口号，宣扬扶贫运动的好处。

据当地官方媒体报道，在"政府的动员和组织"下，这家服装厂雇佣了近3000人。

但我们无法核实卫星图像中的人是谁，也无法了解设施里的工人如今状况如何。

在新疆期间，我们多次被警察、当地宣传官员等阻止拍摄，并不断被大批不明身份的人驾驶的车辆尾随，跟踪数百公里。

"等靠要懒散思想根深蒂固"

尽管再教育营和工厂之间存在联系，但新疆扶贫运动的 对象主要是 那些未被拘留的人，这个群体被视为安全威胁较小，但仍需要教育。

两百多万人被动员起来参加工作，他们往往来自贫困的农牧民家庭。在许多情况下，他们首先接受了短期的"军事化"职业培训和思想教育。

目前已有的证据表明，与再教育营里的被拘留者一样，他们也被工厂--特别是新疆蓬勃发展的纺织厂--用作劳动力来源。

今年7月，总部位于美国的战略与国际研究中心（CSIS） 得出结论 称，少数民族也被派去采摘棉花是"有可能的"，但"需要进一步信息"。

郑国恩博士发现的新文件不仅提供了这一信息，还揭示了这种大规模将少数民族转移到田地背后明显的政治目的。

2016年8月，新疆自治区政府发布了一份关于对拾花工进行管理的通知，要求官员们"加强思想教育和民族团结教育"。

郑国恩博士发现的一份当局的宣传报道说，棉田提供了一个改变贫困村庄村民"等靠要懒散思想"的机会，让他们知道"勤劳致富光荣"。这一观点在文件中被多次重复。

在另一份关于采摘棉花好处的宣传报道中，"只满足于在家里带带孩子"的想法被描述为"造成家庭贫困的重要原因"。国家正为儿童、老人甚至牲畜提供"集中"抚养托管，"解决好村民外出务工的后顾之忧"。

文件还多次提到被动员起来的拾花工如何受到控制和监视，这似乎与任何正常的就业实践相比都很不寻常。

阿克苏今年10月发布的一份政策文件规定，采摘人员必须分批运输，并有官员陪同，他们必须"同吃同住同学习同劳动，积极开展拾花期间思想教育"。

马赫穆特（化名）是一位现居欧洲的维吾尔族青年。他无法回到新疆，有海外旅行史是被关押进再教育营的主要原因之一。

但2018年他们最后一次通话时，他听说母亲和妹妹都被调去工作了。

"他们把我妹妹带到阿克苏的一家纺织厂，"他对我说。"她在那家工厂呆了三个月，没有拿到一分钱。"

"冬天时，我妈妈在给政府官员摘棉花。他们说需要村里5%到10%人去摘棉花。他们挨家挨户地到每家去。"

"人们之所以去，是因为怕被抓去坐牢或被抓去其他地方。"

在过去五年里，这种挨家挨户的走访已成为新疆管控机制的重要一环。35万名官员被派往新疆，收集每个少数民族家庭的详细和隐私信息。

那些被"驻村工作队"叫去工作的人都非常清楚，他们也是决定谁应该被送到再教育营的关键角色。

"凭空捏造"

新疆的棉花种植业过去一直依赖来自中国其他省份的季节性农民工。

但采棉过程出了名的艰辛，当其他地方工资上涨和有更好的工作机会时，意味着外地民工的快速减少。

现在，地方媒体大肆宣传对当地劳动力的挖掘如何既解决了劳动力危机，又帮助种植者增加了利润。

但报道中并未解释的是，为什么成千上万此前显然对采摘棉花没有兴趣的人，如今突然涌入田地。

尽管文件中声称工资水平可以达到每月5000元人民币（764美元），但一份报道似乎表明，一个村庄组织的132名拾花工平均月薪只有1670元人民币（255美元）。

中国外交部在一份回应BBC提问的传真中称，"新疆各族劳动者根据自己的意愿选择职业，本着平等自愿原则与企业依法签订《劳动合同》。"

该声明还表示，新疆的贫困率已从2014年的近20%降至目前略高于1%。

声明说，有关强迫劳动的说法完全是西方的"凭空捏造"，并指责对中国的批评者企图在新疆造成"强迫失业和强迫贫困"。

"新疆各族人民的笑脸是对美国的谎言和谣言最有力的回应，"中国外交部说。

但是，致力于宣传伦理和可持续标准的独立行业组织"良好棉花发展协会"（Better Cotton Initiative）对BBC说，对中国扶贫计划的担忧是他们最近决定停止审核和认证新疆农场的主要原因之一。

该协会标准与质量保证部总监达米安·桑菲利波（Damien Sanfilippo）说："我们已经发现，贫困的农村社区有可能被胁迫从事与这项扶贫计划有关的工作。"

"即使这些工人有可能获得体面的工资，他们也可能不是自愿选择这份工作的。"

桑菲利波还表示，他的国际观察人员进入新疆越来越受到限制是另一个因素。他表示，该协会离开新疆的决定只会进一步提醒全球时尚产业面临的风险。

"据我所知，当地没有任何其他活跃的组织能够为这种棉花提供认证。"

BBC询问了30个主要国际品牌，他们是否打算根据本次调查继续或暂停从中国采购产品。

在作出回应的品牌中，只有玛莎（Marks and Spencer）、Next、巴宝莉（Burberry）和特易购（Tesco）四家表示，它们对此有严格的政策，要求从中国任何地方采购的商品不使用新疆的原棉。

当我们准备离开新疆时，就在库尔勒郊外，我们经过了一处地点。直到2015年，这里还是一片开阔的沙漠。

现在，这里有一座巨大的营地聚合体。独立分析人士说，里面可以看到多座厂房建筑。

这只是现在点缀在这片土地上众多此类建筑中的一个。它在我们旅程尾声令人不寒而栗地提醒着，在这里，大规模拘留和大规模劳动的界限模糊不明。

BBC更多有关新疆"再教育营"的报道

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"被玷污"的棉花：新证据揭露新疆棉田里的强迫劳动 - BBC News 中文

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沙磊（John Sudworth） BBC驻中国记者 发自新疆 BBC获得的一项最新研究结果显示，中国正迫使数十万维吾尔族和其他少数民族人群在西部新疆地区广阔的棉田中从事艰苦的体力劳动。 根据近期在网上发掘的文件，该研究首次清晰地展示了采棉产业背后潜在的强迫劳动规模。新疆的棉花产量占全球棉花供应量的五分之一，在全球时尚产业用途甚广。 除了 大型的再教育营系统 ...