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Border conflicts and territorial disputes have been a prevalent issue across the former Soviet Union since the USSR's collapse, but the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated these tensions. Conflicts on the border of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and Armenia and Azerbaijan are two long-standing conflicts recently fueled by the Russo-Ukrainian war. Nations outside of the former Soviet Union have felt the ramifications of these tensions as well, seen in the recent disputes between Greece and Turkey.

Turkey & Greece

The "Aegean Dispute" has persisted between Turkey and Greece since a 1974 conflict between the two nations over issues in Cyprus. The nations have disputed over boundaries of Greek waters, ownership of certain islands, unresolved tension from the conflict in Cyprus, the militarization of certain islands, and more.

In recent months, these tensions have only escalated against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. Greece began constructing military bases on Aegean islands, something that Turkey claims to violate a previous agreement. Weeks ago, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan "When the time, the hour, comes, we will do what is necessary. Like we always say: we may come suddenly one night" in response to the Greek militarization. This ominous statement, coupled with accusations coming from both countries, has caused more concern for the region than past flare-ups of the dispute.

Some scholars have cited the war in Ukraine as a factor in the severity of this situation, as foreign powers that would typically play a diplomatic role in seeking a resolution between both sides are preoccupied with focusing their efforts on Ukraine, overshadowing the dispute between Turkey and Greece. The lack of a mediator or foreign diplomatic intervention could prevent a diffusal of tensions any time soon. President Erdogan has also Western nations of aggravating Russia, committing Turkey to remaining neutral in the Russo-Ukraine war. While Turkey has aided Ukraine, it has not joined in the Western sanctions placed against Russia. This nonalignment could cause tension amongst the NATO nations, among which Turkey and Greece are both members, who wish to show a united front against Russia.

Kyrgyzstan & Tajikistan

Border conflicts between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan began in , displacing tens of thousands of civilians. While a ceasefire was agreed upon in May 2021, there have since been sporadic clashes, the largest and more recent occurring just weeks ago .

In the most recent clash, over 100 people were killed and hundreds of thousands of civilians were evacuated from the threatened areas, making it the deadliest border clash in Central Asia since the fall of the Soviet Union. A potential reason for the recent incitement of the conflict is the desire of Tajik President, Emomali Rahmon, to demonstrate strong national power by winning a war.

Another cited reason is the backdrop of violence across the nations of the former Soviet Union is prompting conflicts where there may be unresolved tensions. The Collective Security Treaty Organization is an alliance currently consisting of six former Soviet states: five of which are currently engaged in conflict. The disregard for this treaty and violence across the region are potential sources of the renewed conflict on the Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan border. It is clear that, currently, the member nations of this treaty are not respecting the rules it has imposed, providing a window of opportunity for the remaining nations to engage in conflict without the typical repercussions.

Armenia & Azerbaijan

An additional conflict to note is the war between Armenia & Azerbaijan. Historically, Russia has played a peacekeeping role in the conflict between these nations, but with Putin's preoccupation in Ukraine, the role of peacekeeper has taken a back seat. In 2020, Russia helped to coordinate a ceasefire in the area, however their difficulty in the Ukraine invasion has hindered their ability to ensure peace in the area.

On the night of September 12, another border clash occurred, killing over 100 servicemen between the two nations. While conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is certainly not new, it is speculated that Azerbaijan is looking to capitalize on Russia's focus on Ukraine.

Border disputes in former Soviet nations have occurred since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, often attributed to the border drawings dividing ethnic and cultural groups . Russia has frequently acted as a mediator or stabilizing force for conflicts across the former Soviet states, but with its primary focus being drawn to Ukraine, there has been a rise in conflict across the region. While it is impossible to attribute all violence in the region to the Russo-Ukraine war, there has certainly been an uptick in regional clashes. These states see the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to act more aggressively than they would otherwise, allowing for old and previously stalemated conflicts to be reignited. As the former Soviet sphere becomes more war-torn, nationalists in these countries seek to exploit the global distraction other conflicts will provide. The war in Ukraine is consuming a significant amount of global attention and is Russia's current focus, allowing these states to behave in a way that can go more unnoticed than otherwise on a global scale and lack repercussions from Russia, who typically acts as a mediator in such conflicts.

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Conflict Reignited in the Former Soviet Union - International Relations Review

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Border conflicts and territorial disputes have been a prevalent issue across the former Soviet Union since the USSR's collapse, but the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated these tensions. Conflicts on the border of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and Armenia and Azerbaijan are two long-stan

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Publication: International Affairs

Source: International Affairs, No.1, Vol. 61, 2015, page(s):10-15

Author: Dmitry Tsybakov, Candidate of Science (Political Science), Associate Professor, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

Keywords: post-Soviet republics, possibilities for military and political conflict, international relations

THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU) remains a zone fraught with conflicts on the political map of the world. Political instability and festering disputes, including territorial disputes and disputes between political elites, prevail in many countries of the region.

The developments in Ukraine show the realness of bringing into play the military factor to achieve political objectives. Russia and Ukraine, whose peoples have a shared common history over many centuries and who boast close cultural and economic links without precedent anywhere in the rest of the world, have nearly ended in the state of an armed conflict.

Very relevant in this context appears to be the search for an answer to what causes the periodical recurrence of the factor of military-political conflicts in the immediate vicinity of Russia, a factor, as developments surrounding Ukraine show, can appreciably destabilize not just the regional but also world political process.

According to expert evaluations, armed conflicts, throughout the 1990s, involved one third of the FSU territory with a combined population of 30 million. There were 400 armed units totaling 30,000 men in more than 80 seats of potential conflict. ¹

In time, the temperature of conflicts in Russia's neighboring states began to gradually drop, largely due to diplomatic and military-political measures taken by Russia. ² There were also organized international formats of cooperation to fend off threats to military security of the CIS countries.

Despite this, there military-political conflicts there still remain a possibility. Neither Russia nor other heavyweights on the international political scene have proved able to neutralize these possibilities. What is more, Western leaders see the military-political factor as one of the main resources for consolidating their geopolitical domination.

In the past years, the West focused on provoking ethno-political conflicts mostly in third world countries. One telling example is the Greater Middle East project which touched off a wave of military coups and civil wars in Arab countries. In the post-Soviet republics, the United States mainly gambled on the so-called nonviolent action techniques even at the time of Republican administration.

One possible exception was the militarization of Micheil Saakashvili's regime in Georgia. The ensuing "reset" of the Russia-U.S. relations, one hoped, brought stability in the FSU. The attempt at a fresh start was actually over when Atlantists followed with resolute steps to undermine Russia's positions in the zone of its vital interests. The unrest in Ukraine steered and funded by the West is an attempt by the United States and the European Union to finally harness the near abroad of the FSU economically, militarily and politically.

The unrest in Ukraine, steered and funded by the West, is an attempt by the United States and the European Union to finally harness the near abroad of the FSU economically, militarily and politically.

There are solid foundations for possible conflicts in the post-Soviet republics. There is a combination of several factors, each of which is capable to destabilize the FSU region. Hard to resolve contradictions between separate clans, ethnic groups and cultures exist at the same locations and at the same time.

The model of a relatively smooth transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, which came to be termed a "conventional" paradigm, did not work back during the formative period of sovereignty in the ex-Soviet republics. ³ Unlike the majority of postcommunist countries of Europe, the political forces of the CIS disregarded the reaching of consensus before embarking on democratic reforms. The conflicts were resolved through violence which sparked serious foreign policy complications.

For this reason, the reliance on various paramilitary structures, including illegal and semi-legal structures, becomes a key resource in political struggle. There are many instances where the "military wing" of a political movement demands power over the country's internal affairs as well as its foreign policy.

One typical example is the activities of paramilitary forces during the government crisis in Ukraine in 2013-2014. They forced on the protesters their own view of Ukraine's state system, issued declarations containing territorial claims to neighboring nations and thereby significantly destabilized international relations in Eastern Europe.

The emergence of paramilitary forces is a graphic indication of the deep-seated cultural, inter-civilizational, ethno-religious and clan-related differences mentioned above.

The intercultural differences can be put down to the invisible borders dividing the post-Soviet republics into several segments which do not coincide with the official borders. The fault lines between civilizations run through all of Eurasia, dividing people with respect to their mentality even if they have the same citizenship or, sometimes, the same ethnic origin. A graphic example is the Transniestria conflict where the idea of independence from Moldova and, by the same token, from "united Europe" is backed by all ethnic groups of the left bank of the Dniester river and Gagauzia.

It is evidenced also by the divergences within some formally united communities of the west of Eurasia - in the Baltic States, Ukraine and Moldova. Considerable proportions of their populations and political elites have opted for protection from Euro-Atlantic organizations. Also popular in these states is the idea of belonging to the Russian world. This idea was especially popular during the developments in Crimea and in Ukraine's southeast in spring of 2014.

Intercultural differences are being aggravated by ethnic and religious differences. The strongest factor that can generate conflicts in the post-Soviet republics is ethnic hostility which traces its roots back to distant centuries. In many instances, ethnic hostility, even if it does not lead to direct armed violence, creates political tensions which also spread to international relations.

The CIS and Baltic countries took on their administrative and territorial contours only in the Soviet era while they continued to be distinct as regards their landscape, economy and culture. The borders within which the nations live are, however, stable enough while they, far from always, coincide with the borders of their states; this poses, and will pose, a threat of ethnic and territorial redrawing.

Many of the CIS countries have proved unable to preserve their territorial integrity and formalize the legitimacy of borders. Acute confrontation inside the "political class" is characteristic of the majority of them.

One suggested way out is to redirect the fellow citizens' protests to somewhere outside and thus achieve consolidation of society by creating the "common enemy" image.

The relatively low level of combat readiness of armies in the post-Soviet republics is no obstacle to flaunting them as attributes of state sovereignty. The armies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Uzbekistan have the capabilities of taking part in low-intensity conflicts and operations as components of international coalitions. The armed forces of the other CIS countries and the Baltic States mainly perform showcase functions. The ruling circles, however, make up for the low efficiency of their armed forces by militarist rhetoric and jingoistic propaganda. Radical nationalists are urging their governments to join NATO and take part in its future military interventions.

As they did at the dawn of perestroika, the political elites are capitalizing on their public's patriotic sentiment. They are pushing programs of revanche for foreign policy fiascos of previous years when territories like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Transniestria were forfeited. The latest similar instance is Crimea and Ukraine's southeast. The factor of armed violence, if not for practical purposes, then at least for ideological or propaganda purposes, is likely to be in great demand for a long time to come.

In the republics with vestiges of patriarchal lifestyles, above all in Central Asia and Transcaucasus, potentials for conflict vary mostly with the intensity of tensions between tribes and clansy All these republics are in fact a patchwork of culturally and geographically diverse regions which presupposes tough infighting for dominance.

Clans and parties provide themselves with their own armed and paramilitary structures, the so-called private armies. Their national armed forces are in fact combinations of paramilitary movements which destabilize the political process.

The most influential political actors there are the groups built along patron-client or territorial lines. For years, there was virtually no official governance in the gray zones: Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan), Svanetia, Mingrelia, and the Pankisi Gorge (Georgia), Kadar Zone (Russian Federation), Osh region in the Fergana Valley (Kyrgyzstan). The existence of gray zones attracts groups of extremists to set up bases for international terrorism. Therefore, sources of military and political conflicts in the post-Soviet republics should be looked for in the specifics of the acquisition of sovereignty by regional states which was accompanied by armed con

flicts. In the absence of national political governance traditions, the dominant factor in international relations in this space was and is armed violence.

The cause of existing and possible conflicts in Eurasia boils down to the array of contradictions formed over centuries. It is apparent that this array has inter-cultural, ethno-religious, and clan-related levels.

The first of them, manifested in civilization fault lines between the Russian world and the Euro-Atlantic Community, spans the territories of several countries and regions. This type of contradictions is most obvious, and the world's leaders assess their threat objectively on the whole. As a rule, international organizations readily join in to resolve conflicts sparked by civilizational factors. On the other hand, many such conflicts are caused precisely by the shortsighted policy of the West which seeks, as it did during the Cold War years, global expansion and triumph of its cultural values to the prejudice of other nations' interests.

The second level of contradictions is related to ethnic and religious tensions. Inter-ethnic conflicts are also evident. The world community has developed political-legal and military ways of settling them. However, the U.S. and its allies widely apply double standards in this field. This results in unconditional defeat for one of the sides in the conflict. That is why Russia relies on its own capabilities in addition to cooperation with international organizations to settle conflicts.

The clan-related source of conflict is in evidence in the regions with seriously deformed patriarchal society. Conflicts arising in this connection are protracted and uncontrollable. They involve many actors and amorphous coalitions with diverging interests and often without rational foundations.

They are also notoriously hard to resolve. International organizations, national governments, and commanders of peacekeeping forces are bureaucratized and not equipped to promptly react to conflicts. The onus of resolving conflicts lies entirely on diplomats, bureaucrats, and middleechelon military people. They, however, operate depending on the situation, their own experience and with practically no officially approved methods and legal tools available to resolve conflicts between clans and tribes. In the end, let me say that possibilities for conflicts in the FSU tend to hang on and replicate. The clash of interests of the world powers based on hidden geopolitical motives is supplemented with conflicts on national and sub-national levels. Each of the described types of sources of conflict is unique and this calls for a comprehensive approach to resolve them by the Russian Federation and the world community.

NOTES

¹ Maslyuk S.G. "Voyenno-grazhdanskiye otnosheniya: otechestvennyi i zarubezhnyi opyt," Armiya i obshchestvo. 1999. No. 2, p. 41.

² Vartanyan V.G. Yevropeisky soyuz i strany Kavkaza: novyye gorizonty sotrudnichestva v XXI veke. M.: Sotsial'no-politicheskaya mysl', 2007, p. 182.

³ Karozers N. "Konets paradigmy tranzita [Thomas Carothers. The End of the Transition Paradigm]," Politicheskaya nauka. 2003. No.2, pp. 44, 60.

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The Possibility of Military-Political Conflicts in the Former Soviet Union - East View Press

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Today's international political competition is largely about states and political groups trying to undermine one another's prestige, and they far from always use peaceful means in doing so. The arsenals that are used in such struggles include false flags - attacks, sometimes causing heavy casualties, that are falsely blamed on their adversaries by those who carry them out.

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This collection is composed of diverse materials that were gathered from the Soviet Union at the time of its collapse in 1991 and shortly thereafter. Items range from propaganda posters and new political party proclamations to exhibition pamphlets and profiles of contemporary artists. Most are political in nature, although some items deal with cultural and ethnic matters. These materials can be viewed as historical documents that were popularly available at this critical time of dissolution and transition.

The approximately 200 files in this collection have been divided into 17 preservation boxes that are listed below. There are over 1,500 items. The largest folder is a collection of over 300 leaflets and flyers. The other large collections include Armenia with 150 items, Ukraine with close to 200 items and Coup with close to 150 items. All the documents are sorted by subject matter and alphabetized according to their Russian file name, for which English translations have also been provided. In order to conserve space, some liberties have been taken in alphabetizing the files. In a few cases subjects were simply too large to fit into just one file. Some boxes have fewer items due to the physical size of the items (some are large format and take up more space in the box), or to the page length of the document. The item count for each folder is in brackets next to the subject folder. Most items are in the Russian language. The materials must be requested in the European Reading Room (LJ-249). Researchers must follow all directions of the reference staff regarding the handling of ephemeral material. For questions regarding this collection, please contact the European Reading Room Reference Desk at (202)-707-4515.

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Research Guides: Russian and Post-Soviet Ephemera Collection at the Library of Congress: Introduction

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This guide describes a unique collection of primary sources from the post-perestroika era-the time following the 1989 collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 1991 failed coup against Gorbachev culminating in the fall of the Soviet Union later that year.

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A precarious peace is back in place between Georgia and South Ossetia after the long-frozen conflict nearly became a hot war again and drew in Russia when dozens were killed in August 2004 fighting. President Saakashvili tried to break a twelve-year deadlock and take another step to restore Georgia's territorial integrity by undermining the regime in Tskhinvali, but seriously miscalculated. A more comprehensive approach is needed to resolve this conflict peacefully. The onus is on Georgia, with help from its international partners, to increase the security and confidence of people living in the zone of conflict, promote economic rehabilitation and development, ensure the right of Ossetians to return to South Ossetia and Georgia proper, and create arrangements guaranteeing South Ossetia effective autonomy. South Ossetia must enter a real dialogue with Georgia on its status and not use the winter to force Georgian villagers still in South Ossetia to leave their homes.

After peacefully resolving its decade-old conflict with Ajara earlier this year, the Georgian decision-makers turned their attention to South Ossetia. In May 2004 they believed their Ajarian success could easily be repeated. They considered that South Ossetia's de facto president, Eduard Kokoity, had little democratic legitimacy or popular support and that, as in Ajara, the people would rapidly switch loyalty from Tskhinvali to Tbilisi.

The initial strategy aimed to address the political-economic causes of the conflict through an anti-smuggling operation, aimed primarily at closing the sprawling Ergneti market on the outskirts of Tskhinvali, in the Georgian-South Ossetia zone of conflict. The theory was that Kokoity and a small circle of officials around him were maintaining control over South Ossetia through their involvement in black market trade. In parallel, the Georgian side organised a humanitarian "offensive" to provide people in the region with the benefits of economic and cultural projects.

The strategy backfired. Rather then capitalising on real popular discontent, it caused many average citizens who depended on illegal trade for their economic survival to regroup around Kokoity. Ossetian de facto authorities successfully portrayed Georgian moves as aggressive first steps towards a remilitarisation of the conflict that had enjoyed a ceasefire since 1992. Kokoity's popular support rose as he described himself as the only leader capable of guaranteeing Ossetians' security, as well as their political, economic and cultural interests. Assistance sent by Tbilisi was portrayed as a cheap attempt to buy support.

The Georgian approach failed in large part because it was based on a limited analysis of the causes of the conflict. Since 1992 little progress has been made to bring Ossetians and Georgians closer together. Many of the grievances and ambitions developed during the war that broke out as the Soviet Union was dying remain tough obstacles to peace. Unless they are addressed, efforts to re-integrate South Ossetia into Georgia are almost certain to lead again to violence.

In the past few months Georgia has shifted gears and begun to emphasise the geopolitical nature of the conflict, terming it "a problem between Georgia and Russia". Russia does play a special role. But it is unlikely that Georgia can successfully persuade the U.S. or European Union to duel with Moscow over South Ossetia.

A new ceasefire holds since 19 August 2004. At a high level meeting between Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity on 5 November in Sochi, an agreement on demilitarisation of the zone of conflict was signed. Some exchange of fire continues in the zone of conflict, apparently primarily initiated by the Ossetian side, but there is still cause for optimism that the conflict will be resolved non-violently since all sides seem to be reconsidering their policies. Georgia's legitimate insistence on the preservation of its territorial integrity needs to be balanced with the Ossetians' concerns for the protection of their national minority rights.

For the negotiations that are needed with Russia, South and North Ossetia to succeed, Georgia must show it is putting in place political, economic, legal, and social conditions to guarantee Ossetians equal rights in a multi-national and democratic state. The greatest lesson from the May-August period is that attempts to resolve the conflict swiftly will lead to war. President Saakashvili seemed to recognise this when, at the UN General Assembly, he pledged to engage in a "stage-by-stage settlement plan". To avoid further casualties and displacement, Georgia, together with its international partners, must implement a comprehensive strategy to resolve the root causes of the conflict and make non-violent re-integration possible.

Tbilisi/Brussels, 26 November 2004

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Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia | Crisis Group

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A precarious peace is back in place between Georgia and South Ossetia after the long-frozen conflict nearly became a hot war again and drew in Russia when dozens were killed in August 2004 fighting. President Saakashvili tried to break a twelve-year deadlock and take another step to restore Georgia's territorial integrity by undermining the regime in Tskhinvali, but seriously miscalculated.

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Crimea's regional parliament has declared independence and applied to become part of the Russian Federation, a day after people in the Black Sea peninsula voted overwhelmingly to leave Ukraine in a referendum that most of the world has condemned as illegal.

The parliament "made a proposal to the Russian Federation to admit the Republic of Crimea as a new subject with the status of a republic", according to a statement on its website.

A Crimean parliamentary delegation was expected to arrive in Moscow on Monday to discuss the procedures required for the region to become part of the Russian Federation. Final results showed that 96.8% of voters were in favour of joining Russia, the head of the referendum commission said. Mikhail Malyshev told a televised news conference that the commission had not registered a single complaint about the vote.

Russia's lower house of parliament will pass legislation allowing Ukraine's southern Crimea region to join Russia "in the very near future", news agency Interfax cited its deputy speaker as saying on Monday morning.

"Results of the referendum in Crimea clearly showed that residents of Crimea see their future only as part of Russia," Sergei Neverov was quoted as saying.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's interim government has endorsed a presidential decree to carry out a partial mobilisation involving 40,000 reservists. Andriy Paruby, secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, told parliament that 20,000 reservists would be deployed in the armed forces and the rest in the newly created National Guard.

The speaker of the Crimean regional parliament said Ukrainian soldiers on the peninsula would be able to choose whether to side with the new separatist state or leave.

"The personnel of Ukraine's armed forces will be given an alternative: serve in Crimea and swear allegiance to the republic, or continue outside the borders of Crimea in the Ukrainian army," said Volodymyr Konstantynov.

The US and its allies in Europe are expected to announce sanctions against Russia, including visa bans and potential asset freezes.

The US president, Barack Obama, told his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on Sunday that Crimea's vote "would never be recognised" by the United States, as he and other US officials warned Moscow against making further military moves toward southern and eastern Ukraine.

The White House said Obama "emphasised that Russia's actions were in violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and that, in co-ordination with our European partners, we are prepared to impose additional costs on Russia for its actions".

Obama told Putin the crisis could still be resolved diplomatically, but said the Russian military would need to first stop its "incursions" into Ukraine, the White House said. Putin told Obama the vote was "fully consistent with the norms of international law and the UN charter", according to a statement on the Kremlin website.

The European Union also condemned the referendum as illegal and said it was taking steps to increase sanctions against Russia. EU foreign ministers will meet on Monday to decide whether to impose asset freeze and visa sanctions and, if so, whom to target.

"The referendum is illegal and illegitimate and its outcome will not be recognised," Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European council, and José Manuel Barroso, European commission president, said in a joint statement on Sunday.

France and Germany echoed the statement by the British foreign secretary, William Hague, that Moscow must face "economic and political consequences".

Valery Ryazantsev, head of Russia's observer mission in Crimea and a lawmaker from the upper house of the Russian parliament, said on Monday that the results were beyond dispute. He told Interfax there were "absolutely no reasons to consider the vote results illegitimate".

Earlier on Sunday Russia and Ukraine agreed a truce in the region until Friday, Ukraine's acting defence minister announced, in a move that may ease tension between Moscow and the western-backed government in Kiev. Speaking on the sidelines of a cabinet meeting, Ihor Tenyukh said the deal had been struck with Russia's Black Sea fleet and the Russian defence ministry. "No measures will be taken against our military facilities in Crimea during that time," he said. "Our military sites are therefore proceeding with a replenishment of reserves."

The agreement has provided some respite for Ukraine's beleaguered troops, who have been trapped on their military bases and naval ships since Russian forces began occupying the peninsula on 27 February. They have been encircled ever since, in some cases without electricity. Residents have smuggled in food to them amid a standoff with the Russian military.

But there seems little doubt that Ukrainian forces will be evicted from Kremlin-controlled Crimea once the truce expires. Crimea's deputy prime minister, Rustam Temirgaliyev, said on Sunday that troops would be given safe passage and predicted that eastern Ukraine would be next to join Russia. "Donetsk, Lugansk, Kharkiv have the same situation as in Crimea - 75% of people want to join Russia in eastern Ukraine," he told journalists near the parliament building in Simferopol. There was further turmoil in Donetsk when pro-Russian protesters stormed the prosecutor's office and removed the Ukrainian flag from the roof, raising a Russian flag in its place. Riot police deployed to protect the building made little effort to stop the crowd, which later dispersed.

The government in Kiev has accused Moscow of deliberately stirring up tensions in the east by bringing in professional activists and provocateurs from across the border. In a series of ominous statements, Russia's foreign ministry has said it may be forced to act to "protect" ethnic Russians - an expression that appears to provide a rationale for future military incursions.

Self-defence volunteers line up outside the parliament in Kiev, Ukraine, after the referendum. Photograph: David Azia/AP

Putin spent Sunday evening at the closing ceremony of the Paralympic Games in Sochi but was keeping an eye on the Crimea results, his spokesman said. Earlier he had expressed concern about the escalation of tensions in the south and south-eastern regions of Ukraine, Reuters reported.

He blamed the febrile mood on "radical forces" acting with the "connivance of the current Kiev authorities". The Kremlin refuses to recognise Kiev's temporary government, that it says came to power on the back of a "fascist" coup.

Putin telephoned the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, on Sunday and told her that the referendum in Crimea complied with international law. The Russian leader had reportedly agreed that more observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) should be deployed in east Ukraine. Existing observers were refused entry to Crimea by pro-Russian checkpoint guards. On Saturday Russia vetoed a US-drafted motion in the UN security council in New York, which had declared the Crimea referendum invalid. China - a consistent ally of Moscow - abstained.

Ukraine's acting prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, has promised to take action against separatist "ringleaders" who, he said, had compromised his country's independence "under the cover of Russian troops". He said: "We will find all of them - if it takes one year, two years - and bring them to justice. The ground will burn beneath their feet."

The conflict spread from the ground to the internet, with several Nato websites targeted by hackers calling themselves CyberBerkut, after the Ukrainian riot police who were disbanded by the Kiev government. Crimean officials said their referendum website was also hacked.

Pro-unity rallies took place at the Maidan in Kiev on Sunday, the scene of Ukraine's revolution that led to President Viktor Yanukovych abandoning his office and fleeing to Russia last month. Some of those who attended were Crimeans who opposed secession and said they had left the peninsula in recent days amid threats and pressure.

Antonina Danchuk, 30, who lived in Simferopol until two years ago and studied Greek and English at its university, described the referendum as fake. "It's illegal," she said. "My Crimean friends who are there are afraid to go out and build their own Maidan. They're not voting. People with Russian passports are being allowed to vote."

Danchuk said she was not opposed to Russia, but to Putin and his expansionist policies. "I'm ethnic Russian. But I feel my nationality is Ukrainian. We've stayed in Ukraine for 22 years. We want Putin to leave us alone. We don't want Crimea to be a part of Russia."

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Crimea applies to be part of Russian Federation after vote to leave Ukraine

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Delegation expected in Moscow to discuss procedures for joining Russia as Ukraine mobilises 40,000 reservists

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The SAIS Review of International Affairs -

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This is a shortened, significantly revised article based on the authors' chapter "Shifting balances - the war and Russia's neighbours," published in the report "Russia's War Against Ukraine and the West: The First Year", edited by Maria Engqvist and Emil Wannheden, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2023, FOI-R-5479-SE.
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, represents a watershed moment, an event producing a new geopolitical landscape. The full magnitudes of the changes unleashed by the war remain to be seen, but there are already signs of Russia losing ground in countries beyond Ukraine that it sees as part of its sphere of interest. The war and its consequences have confirmed that the notion of a unified "post-Soviet" region, based on a shared identity and Russia as center of gravity, no longer holds relevance for describing states with widely different identities and interests. This article analyzes how Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan view their security policy and Russia's role in it after the first year of full-scale war in Ukraine. How have they adjusted their foreign and security policy?

Moscow's influence among the countries that used to be part of the Soviet empire has relied on its role as dominant security actor, where military presence and security cooperation have been important tools. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has served as a vessel for Russian influence as well as provided participant countries with preferential conditions for arms sales and training, and defense commitments. But Russia has also resorted to coercion and aggression to promote its interests, not least when countries have opted for a Western course. Russia's military and political support to irredentist provinces in the region has provided Moscow with a security footprint, which these countries have had to consider when pursuing their foreign policy choices. As softer tools, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have been key to promote economic and political integration - but predominantly on Russian terms. Russia's goal has been to create a buffer zone of friendly or dependent states, to ensure its own security and identity as a great power.

Mapping the different reactions of the countries, it is evident that the "near abroad," as the region is often called in Russian strategic documents, is far from as integrated and tied to Russia as Moscow would prefer. Each country has its distinct security and foreign policy interests, and relations with Russia. It is also clear that Russia's influence in the neighborhood is waning, albeit with important differences and some exceptions.

Belarus in Russia's corner, Moldova turning West

The war has demonstrated that Belarus is at Russia's military disposal. Russia has been able to use Belarusian territory at will to launch missile strikes, and for ground and air operations, including the Kyiv offensive along with the targeted drone strike campaign against critical Ukrainian infrastructure launched in October 2022. Belarus has likewise provided the war effort with vital logistical support, such as repair, medical services, transport, and extensive training. Thousands of Russian mobilized personnel have undergone training in Belarus. The announced deployment of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus, formally at Minsk's request but under Russian control, will tie Belarus even closer to Moscow and its confrontation with the West. Following the aborted armed mutiny in Russia in June 2023, thousands of Wagner mercenaries relocated to Belarus as Minsk established a partnership with the Russian mercenary group. But Wagner's presence in Belarus appears uncertain following the death of its senior leadership.

Lukashenko has, however, expressed assurances that Belarus will not join the war with its own troops in Ukraine unless attacked first. While Belarusians remain divided on Russia's actions in Ukraine, an overwhelming majority of the population would oppose direct involvement. There has been significant partisan activity directed at existing war contributions. The risks to regime stability in Belarus are likely a restraining factor in Moscow's calculus on whether to pressure the Belarusian regime to commit troops. Overall, Belarus's approximation to Russia's position stands in sharp contrast to Moldova but also departs from the general trend in the region.

Moldova's application for EU membership, in March 2022, and subsequent candidate status, in June, were part of a long-standing objective of the current government. But embarking on EU integration was also a strategic response to the war to ensure national security. Simultaneously moving further from Russia, Moldova has suspended its participation in the CIS. To strengthen resilience, Moldova has begun to rid the country of its hitherto almost exclusive dependency on Russian energy and has imposed a temporary ban of several Russian propaganda news outlets. The government has also taken a tougher stance on Russia-backed separatist Transnistria, underscoring that Moldova's EU integration will apply to its entire sovereign territory, with no special status envisaged for the breakaway region of Transnistria. Moscow has issued threatening statements to the Moldovan authorities, emphasizing its commitment to protect the interests of Moldova's Russian-speaking population.

The war has underlined the need for Moldova to cooperate with Western partners to address its substandard defense capabilities, not least air defense since Moldovan airspace has been repeatedly violated by Russian missiles launched against Ukraine. By May 2023, the EU's support to the Moldovan Armed Forces under the European Peace Facility stood at more than double the amount of Moldova's 2022 military expenditure. Ties with NATO have deepened. While a discussion on Moldova's constitutional neutrality is brewing, the government has ruled out NATO membership for now. Cooperation with Western partners is at unprecedented levels, but the Western path is strongly tied to the current government's policy. Other political factions retain close ties with Russia and have reportedly been involved in organizing anti-government protests in the capital Chisinau, exploiting divisions in Moldovan society. A change of government in the next elections could therefore hold far-reaching consequences for Moldova's Western orientation.

Realignment and vulnerability in the South Caucasus

The war has changed the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus, a region at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Regional rivals Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to be preoccupied with one another and their conflict over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The second Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan ended on November 9, 2020 with a Russian-brokered trilateral ceasefire statement, which established a Russian peacekeeping mission of some 2,000 soldiers along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Lachin corridor, connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. The peacekeepers however failed to deter Azerbaijan from making further territorial advances in September 2022, and from enacting a partial blockage of the Lachin corridor in December 2022.

Increasingly disenchanted, the Armenian government rejected a CSTO mission to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in late 2022, opting for an EU mission instead. The EU Mission Armenia (EUMA) was established in January 2023. The small and unarmed EUMA does not enjoy the cooperation of Azerbaijan, limiting its ability to play an increased role in the conflict. All said and done, the question remains whether any viable alternatives to Russia really exist for Armenia: Which other regional actor would find it worthwhile taking on both Russia's ire at being pushed out, and the Azerbaijani and Turkish challenge?

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan is becoming a more important partner for Russia, despite the two states' lingering disagreements, particularly on Nagorno-Karabakh. On February 22, 2022, just before Russia commenced its invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a wide-ranging agreement with his Russian counterpart that brought, in Aliyev's words, Russian-Azerbaijani relations "to the level of an alliance." Nonetheless, Azerbaijan has not offered any support for Russia's war in Ukraine, maintaining a balanced approach in foreign relations with close relations to both Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, there is sympathy between Azerbaijan and Ukraine: both see parallels between the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory and Armenian action in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the middle of the changing South Caucasian security landscape is Georgia, which for long has had the most acrimonious relationship with Moscow. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has evoked painful memories of the five-day Russian-Georgian war, in 2008, when Russia seized parts of Georgia's internationally recognized territory and acknowledged the independence of the breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia holds a military presence in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has reportedly redeployed troops from its military base in South Ossetia to Ukraine. The invasion raised domestic fears that Georgia could be next, should Russia succeed in achieving its goals in Ukraine. Georgia applied for EU membership after Russia had launched its invasion. However, unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia failed to receive immediate candidate status. The European Commission did give Georgia a European perspective, but listed 12 recommendations that Georgia must fulfil to qualify for candidate status.

Central Asia at a crossroads

While the Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - have tried to distance themselves from Russia's war in Ukraine, they are at the same time exposed to Russian pressure and therefore cautious about openly criticizing Moscow's actions. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, all members of the CSTO, have tried to steer the alliance away from potential involvement in Ukraine, arguing instead for the need of securing the unstable southern border with Afghanistan. In reality, however, Russia has reportedly redirected resources from its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Ukraine, further eroding its military posture in the region. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has thus confirmed that Moscow's primary security interests lie elsewhere than in Central Asia.

The effectiveness of the CSTO as a military alliance guaranteeing the collective security of its members is increasingly questioned in the region. The violent clashes between the militaries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, both CSTO members with Russian military bases on their territories, along the contested border in September 2022, which left at least 134 people dead, did not provoke a response from Russia. For both states, Russia's image as the main guarantor of security in the region rings hollower now than ever before. Now viewing the Russian-led CSTO as a collective insecurity alliance, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are looking beyond Russia to protect themselves against one another. Kyrgyzstan is buying military drones from Turkey, while Tajikistan's closer security cooperation with Iran includes a newly inaugurated Iranian drone factory in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe.

The other countries have also declared that they need to strengthen their military capabilities in response to the deteriorating security environment. Uzbekistan's President Mirziyoyev, in a speech on August 31, 2022, Independence Day, pledged that strengthening the country's armed forces would now receive the highest priority. In Turkmenistan, new President Serdar Berdimuhamedov has called for increasing investments in defense, and China has pledged to help equip and train the Turkmen armed forces. Most significantly, Kazakhstan decided to increase its defense spending and has updated its military doctrine to handle "new threats and risks" with a particular emphasis on the need to protect the nation's borders with modern military equipment. Kazakhstan's territorial integrity is especially precarious with 3.5 million ethnic Russians, approximately 20 per cent of its population, living mainly near the vast border with Russia. Even after the CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022, which helped President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev secure his hold on power amidst large-scale unrest, the Kazakh government has shown greater resistance to Moscow than expected. As a result, Kazakhstan has been the target of aggressive Russian media campaigns with senior Russian officials, journalists and other public figures, dissatisfied with Astana's refusal to support Russia in Ukraine, attacking Kazakhstan's sovereignty and national identity.

Besides turning to China, political incumbents in the four Turkic-speaking countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, seek closer ties with Turkey, whose geopolitical significance is growing in Central Asia. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have elevated their relationships with Turkey to the level of "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership," with agreements to develop military cooperation, including education, exercises and intelligence-sharing. Turkey's defense industry is rapidly gaining a foothold in the Central Asian arms market. Turkey and Kazakhstan have agreed to produce the Anka drone in Kazakhstan, while Turkmenistan, as well as Kyrgyzstan, have purchased Bayraktar TB2 combat drones.

Amidst the turbulence, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are pushing to further strengthen regional collaboration. The two countries have signed a treaty on allied relations - the first of its kind in Central Asia. The rapprochement between Kazakhstan, the largest economy in the region, and Uzbekistan, the most populous country, could have far-reaching implications if it lays a foundation for building security from within the region instead of depending on the whims of external powers.

Conclusion

Claiming the "near abroad" as its own is becoming ever more important for Russia's political leadership in its confrontation with the West. But barring Belarus, after a year and a half of war, Russia's influence in the neighborhood is increasingly challenged. Many of Russia's neighbors are bolstering national defense and seeking security cooperation with other actors, such as China, Turkey, Iran, and the EU. In parallel, the foundation of Russia's regional power, its military might, is being undermined in Ukraine. The neighbors' reduced appetite for Russia stands in stark contrast to the Kremlin's enduring hegemonical claims. It will be a source of tension going forward.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia's role as a security provider in Eurasia has diminished. The CSTO's defense commitments have come under question, and CSTO members are far from united in their views on the war in Ukraine. Indeed, apart from Belarus, Russia is unable to shore up the support of its CSTO allies, despite claiming to be fighting a defensive war. A reduced Russian military presence, both at its regional bases and in the Nagorno-Karabakh peacekeeping mission, has shown allies that Moscow's main security focus lies elsewhere. In the South Caucasus, this appears to be devastating for Armenia, a CSTO member, while beneficial for Azerbaijan, a non-CSTO member. Both parties' dissatisfaction with the Russian peacekeeping mission, albeit for different reasons, raises doubts as to whether the peacekeeping mandate will be prolonged beyond its expiration, in 2025.

The observed changes in foreign and security policy are often not new developments, but rather continuations of existing trends that have come to a head, or been accelerated, through the war. For those already viewing Russia as a threat, their concerns have been reinforced. For those invested in a multi-vector foreign policy, balancing their relations has become more important. For the Moldovan government, and for large parts of Georgian society, the Western course has become even more urgent. In Central Asia, ties with China continue to strengthen. And Belarus has fallen further under Russia's sway. The war has also exposed tensions in societies: between people and their government, as in Georgia and to some extent in Belarus, and between diverting views on Russia, as in Moldova. It reminds us that these countries remain vulnerable to Russian influence as Russia continues to contest any Westward movement.The standoff between Russia and the West will likely present the countries with security dilemmas. Will Armenia be able to host a fully active EU mission on the border with Azerbaijan while Russian peacekeepers operate in Nagorno-Karabakh? Can Kazakhstan remain a committed security partner to Russia while refusing to support Moscow's actions in Ukraine? Can Georgia continue its rapprochement with Russia while simultaneously pursuing a policy of Euro-Atlantic integration? At the same time, countries will likely resist a binary choice between Russia and the West and further diversify relations, leveraging the role of China, Turkey, Iran, and others.The different reactions of Russia's neighbors to the war have unequivocally revealed the diversity of what is too-often reduced to a "post-Soviet" space. Instead of deferring to Moscow's priorities, the neighboring countries navigate a shifting security landscape in pursuit of greater agency for themselves. To grasp events unfolding in these countries, we must leave the idea of a coherent post-Soviet region behind and recognize the multifaceted geopolitical landscape now emerging. There are opportunities for diversifying relations, but also risks of new dependencies, insecurities and conflicts. Importantly, much remains contingent on the further development and outcome of the war.

Johan Engvall, Ph.D., works at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) and is a former deputy research director at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). His specialisation is domestic, foreign and security policy in Central Asia. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Uppsala University.
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Ismail Khan is an Analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Ismail analyses developments within the Russian military & security establishment as well as politico-security related developments in Ukraine. He holds an M.Sc. in Oriental Studies with focus on security studies.

Kristina Melin is an Analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Kristina focuses on security policy in Russia and in Russia's neighbouring countries, in particular Belarus, as well as Russian nuclear policy. She holds an M.A. from the Department of War Studies, King's College London.

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Johan Engvall, Ismail Khan, and Kristina Melin

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Post-Soviet no more - the transformative impact of war on Russia's neighbors - The SAIS Review of International Affairs

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This is a shortened, significantly revised article based on the authors' chapter "Shifting balances - the war and Russia's neighbours," published in the report "Russia's War Against Ukraine and the West: The First Year", edited by Maria Engqvist and Emil Wannheden, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2023, FOI-R-5479-SE.

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The Religious Dimension of Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union on JSTOR

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James W. Warhola, The Religious Dimension of Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter, 1991), pp. 249-270

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Elza Had to Flee Her Home During the Holocaust, and Then Was Forced to Flee Again From the Conflict in Ukraine

Elza Gorbanov fled from the Nazis as a young girl living in Donetsk, Ukraine. After the war she and her family returned home, and that is where Elza was recently receiving aid from the Claims Conference, through Hesed Tsdaka. But last year Elza had to flee her home a second time when the conflict in Ukraine became too dangerous for her to stay. Elza now lives in Edmonton, Canada, and again the Claims Conference is helping her.

During the Holocaust

In October 1941, 6-year-old Elza and her family fled from Donetsk towards Almaty, Kazakhstan. After two months on the journey, the little girl was so ill that the family got off the train in a tiny village, where there were no medical services. Elza's mother found work in the community association for the local Soviet agricultural community, which was growing rice. Little Elza and her mother knit socks for the Soviet Army, which they exchanged for bread. Her father, wounded fighting in the Soviet army, was sent home to recuperate. Elza spent her days gathering sticks to make a fire to cook the rice.

The family lived in this village, starving, for two years. When Donetsk was liberated in September 1943, Elza's family returned home. When they arrived, they found their home ransacked, and they were left with nothing. The family struggled to create a new life for themselves in Donetsk, and there Elza stayed, getting married and having children. In 1998, Elza and her husband started to receive food packages funded by the Claims Conference. Her son immigrated to Canada more than a decade ago.

The Conflict in Ukraine forces Elza to Flee Again

Elza said she never thought she would leave Donetsk, where her husband and her parents are buried. But in 2014, fighting between the Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian forces moved too close to her neighborhood, and Elza felt unsafe. "Someone from Hesed helped me to put paper on my windows" so they wouldn't shatter, she recalled. In July 2014, Elza fled for her safety, taking only a purse with her identification documents. She ended up in Kharkov, where Hesed Shaare Tikva gave her a blanket and a monthly stipend for refugees.

Claims Conference Support Helped Elza in Ukraine, and Now Helps Her in Her New Home in Canada

Her son in Canada begged her to leave Ukraine and in March 2015, she did. She now lives with him in an apartment in Edmonton, furnished by friends in the local Jewish community. Luckily, a friend directed her to Jewish Family Service of Edmonton (JFSE).

In Ukraine, Elza was receiving meals-on-wheels and food vouchers from Hesed Tsdaka, funded by the Claims Conference. She also had applied for the Hardship Fund. Now, in Edmonton, where she has no possible current means of supporting herself, Elza receives homecare and housekeeping, case management and grocery-store gift cards from JFSE. Because Elza does not speak English, her homecare aide accompanies her to the grocery store to buy food. At this time Elza receives no social services from Canada, but JFSE and her son are in the process of applying for a special humanitarian visa for her.

But until then, her only source of help is Jewish Family Service and the Claims Conference. "I am so happy and thankful for the services I receive," Elza says.

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Survivor Story: Elza Gorbanov - Claims Conference

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The conflict in Ukraine between Ukrainian government and pro-Russian forces moved too close to her neighborhood, and Elza felt unsafe.