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Argumentation: A Pragmatic Perspective

Ralph H. Johnson

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Is There a Role for Adversariality in Teaching Critical Thinking?

Bailin, Battersby

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Developing Norms of Argumentation: Metacognitive, Epistemological, and Social Dimensions of Developing Argumentive Competence

Deanna Kuhn, Nicole Zillmer, Amanda Crowell, Julia Zavala

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Developing Norms of Argumentation: Metacognitive, Epistemological, and Social Dimensions of Developing Argumentive Competence

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We examine how extended engagement in argumentation with peers leads to enhanced metalevel understanding of argumentive discourse. Following such engagement, young adolescents demonstrated enhanced…

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Argumentative Skills

A Systematic Framework for Teaching and Learning

Anne Burkard

Henning Franzen

David Löwenstein

Germany

Donata Romizi

Annett Wienmeister

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Argumentative Skills: A Systematic Framework for Teaching and Learning | Journal of Didactics of Philosophy

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In this paper, we propose a framework for fostering argumentative skills in a systematic way in Philosophy and Ethics classes. We start with a review of curricula and teaching materials from the German-speaking world to show that there is an urgent need for standards for the teaching and learning of argumentation. Against this backdrop, we present a framework for such standards that is intended to tackle these difficulties. The spiral-curricular model of argumentative competences we sketch helps teachers introduce the relevant concepts and skills to students early on in their school career. The focus is on secondary schools, but the proposal can also be of use for learning and teaching in universities, especially in introductory classes.

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Argumentieren im Philosophie-

und Ethikunterricht

Grundlagen, Anwendungen, Grenzen

David Löwenstein / Donata Romizi / Jonas Pfister (Hg.)

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How Scientists Think in the Real World

Kevin Dunbar

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Research on scientific thinking and science education is often based on introspections about what science is, interviews with scientists, prescriptive accounts of science, and historical data. Although each of these approaches is valuable, each lacks

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Metaphilosophical Criteria for Worldview Comparison

Clément Vidal

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JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary sources.

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Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair Or The Laboratory

Matthew C. Haug (Ed.)

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0138 Philosophical Methodology The Armchair Or The Laboratory : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

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Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Edited By Matthew C. Haug Copyright Year 2014 ISBN 9780415531320 Published July 18,…

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Textbooks of Philosophy in the Renaissance

Anja-Silvia Goeing

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Textbooks of Philosophy in the Renaissance

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The textbook is defined by its use in educational environments: in schools of different levels, in tutorials at home, or in universities. Any change in these environments also had an effect on the educational material employed: the fate of religion, the curriculum of…

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Teaching Philosophy in Early Modern Europe: Text and Image

Susanna Berger, Daniel Garber

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Teaching Philosophy in Early Modern Europe

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This book examines how philosophy was taught in the early modern period in Europe. It breaks new ground in a number of ways. Firstly, it seeks to bring text-based scholars in the history of philosophy together with social and cultural historians to examine the interaction between tradition and innovation in the early modern classroom, the site where traditional views of the world were transmitted to the generation that was to give birth to modern philosophy and science. Secondly, it draws together scholars who are centered on ideas and words with other scholars who focus on the role of images in the classroom and the intellectual world in this central period of history. The volume advances our understanding of how philosophy was understood and transmitted in this rich and crucial era. The principal audience for Teaching Philosophy are historians of science, philosophy, art, visual culture, and print culture. The chapters are written in a tone accessible to upper-level undergraduates and graduate students. It also reaches non-specialist readers interested in subjects including the “scientific revolution,” the organization of information, and Renaissance and Baroque visual art.

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Empathy as a means to understand people

Thomas Schramme

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Beyond Abilities: A Dispositional Theory of Thinking

D. N. Perkins, Eileen Jay and Shari Tishman

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JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary sources.

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Conceptualizing critical thinking

Sharon Bailin,Roland Case,Jerrold R. Coombs & Leroi B. Daniels

(Segurament, podria ser el marc al qual em referís quan parlés de "pensament crític") Hi escriu Bailin, de qui admiro molt el treball.

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Teaching children to think ethically

Susan T. Gardner

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Susan T. Gardner, Teaching children to think ethically - PhilPapers

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Classification of Strategies for Dealing with Student Relativism and the Epistemic Conceptual Change Strategy in advance

Jonas Pfister

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A Framework for Facilitating Classroom Dialogue

Maughn Rollins Gregory

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Philosophical Disagreement: An Essay Towards Orientational Pluralism in Metaphilosophy

Nicholas Rescher

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JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary sources.

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The Argumentation Rating Tool: Assessing and supporting teacher facilitation and student argumentation during text-based discussions

Alina Reznitskaya, Ian A. G. Wilkinson

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Pedagogy of Argumentation: Teaching the Skills of Argumentation to Older Teens

Luydmyla Moskalyova, Oleksandr Maksymov, Serhiy Gurov, Tetyana Gurova, Viktoria Yakovleva

article que ofereix una panòramica de diferents enfocaments de l'ensenyament de l'argumentació

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ARGUMENTATIVE SKILLS: A SYSTEMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING

Journal of Didactics of Philosophy 5 (2021)

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REVISTA

Diotime

Revue internationalede la didactique et des pratiques de la philosophie

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Diotime n°97

Numéro thématique : pratiques philosophiques, pédagogies critiques et émancipatrices ?

DOSSIER SPÉCIAL : "Pratiques Philosophiques et pédagogies critiques et émancipatrices"

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Numéro thématique : pratiques philosophiques, pédagogies critiques et émancipatrices ? DOSSIER SPÉCIAL : "Pratiques Philosophiques et pédagogies critiques et émancipatrices"

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REVISTA

Childhood & philosophy

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childhood & philosophy published works in concerning the relationship between philosophy, childhood and education.

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REVISTA

Teaching Philosophy

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Three Approaches to Doing Philosophy: a Proposal for Grouping Philosophical Exercises in Classroom Teaching

Natascha Kienstra, Machiel Karskens, Jeroen Imants

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Philosophical Dialogue and The Search For Truth

Karel L. van der Leeuw

Interessant article sobre el vincle històric entre diàleg i filosofia, en diferents tradicions.

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Argumentation, dialogue theory, and probability modeling: Alternative frameworks for argumentation research in education.

Michael Nussbaum

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Argumentation, dialogue theory, and probability modeling: Alternative frameworks for argumentation research in education.

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Argumentation, dialogue theory, and probability modeling: Alternative frameworks for argumentation research in education.

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Sharon Bailin

Investigadora clau: ARGUMENTATION AS INQUIRY

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Are Philosophers Arrogant and Irrational?

Michael Hannon

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Are Philosophers Arrogant and Irrational?

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Le « sens du problème » peut-il s’enseigner ?

Réflexion sur la pratique de la problématisation en classe de terminale

Julien Lamy

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Problématologie et argumentation ou la philosophie à la rencontre du langage

Michel Meyer

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Problématologie et argumentation ou la philosophie à la rencontre du langage

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La problématologie est une nouvelle manière de philosopher, de penser la raison et le langage. Elle le fait en s’attachant à l’interrogativité qui traverse l’ensemble des activités intellectuelles. Parler, comme penser, c’est traiter de certains problèmes qui nous animent. Ce sont eux qui mettent la pensée en branle et déclenchent tout le reste des opérations associées à l’usage du raisonnement et du langage. Les questions que les hommes doivent résoudre sont multiples, mais il

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Why Can't Philosophers Answer The Big Questions

Michael Hannon

Molt bon article. Possible text a treballar en formació docent.

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Why Can’t Philosophers Answer the Big Questions?

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Philosophy has been around for over two thousand years, yet its central questions remain remarkably unsettled.

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REVISTA

INFORMAL LOGIC

Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice

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Informal Logic is a scholarly journal devoted to theoretical and practical issues in the theories of reasoning and argumentation.

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Organising a culture of argumentation in elementary science

William A. Sandoval,Noel Enyedy,Elizabeth H. Redman & Sihan Xiao

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Organising a culture of argumentation in elementary science

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Most of the research on argumentation in science education has documented the myriad flaws in students’ argumentation, and the difficulties teachers have organising productive arguments in the clas…

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The Quality of Students' Use of Evidence in Written Scientific Explanations

William A. Sandoval & Kelli A. Millwood

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The Quality of Students’ Use of Evidence in Written Scientific Explanations

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Drawing on sociological and philosophical studies of science, science educators have begun to view argumentation as a central scientific practice that students should learn. In this article, we ex…

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Improvements to elementary children's epistemic understanding from sustained argumentation

Suna Ryu, William A. Sandoval

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Invented Science: A Framework for Discussing a Persistent Problem of Practice

Rosemary S. Russ &Leema K. Berland

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Invented Science: A Framework for Discussing a Persistent Problem of Practice

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A central goal of science education reform is for students to participate in scientific sense making rather than to merely acquire science facts. However, even in classrooms utilizing reform-based…

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Investigador de referència: Jonathan F. Osborne

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The development and validation of a learning progression for argumentation in science

Jonathan F. Osborne, J. Bryan Henderson, Anna MacPherson, Evan Szu, Andrew Wild, Shi-Ying Yao

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Investigador clau en el camp científic, mirar sí o sí: Richard A. Duschl

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TAKING SCIENCE TO SCHOOL

Richard A. Duschl, Heidi A. Schweingruber,

and Andrew W. Shouse

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“Doing the lesson” or “doing science”: Argument in high school genetics

M. Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre, Anxela Bugallo Rodríguez, Richard A. Duschl

This article focuses on the capacity of students to develop and assess arguments during a high school genetics instructional sequence. The research focused on the locating distinction in argumentation discourse between “doing science” vs. “doing school” or “doing the lesson”

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Investigador: Michael J. Ford

Molt interessant, sobre la naturalesa de les disciplines i la seva traducció a l'aula.

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National Science Foundation - Cited by 2,910 - science education - computer science education

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Redefining Disciplinary Learning in Classroom Contexts

Michael J. Ford and Ellice A. Forman

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Chapter 1: Redefining Disciplinary Learning in Classroom Contexts - Michael J. Ford, Ellice A. Forman, 2006

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Investigador de referència: Charles Bazerman

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The Rhetorical Situation

Lloyd F. Bitzer

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Classroom communities' adaptations of the practice of scientific argumentation

Leema K. Berland, Brian J. Reiser

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Framing for scientific argumentation

Leema K. Berland, David Hammer

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Motivating and Shaping Scientific Argumentation in Lab Reports

Julia Gouvea, Lara Appleby, Liren Fu, and Aditi Wagh

Article molt interessant: PSEUDOARGUMENTACIÓ, importància del CONTEXT

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Moving Beyond PSEUDOARGUMENTATION: Teachers’ Enactments of an Educative Science Curriculum Focused on Argumentation

KATHERINE L. McNEILL, MARÍA GONZÁLEZ-HOWARD, REBECCA KATSH-SINGER, SUZANNA LOPER

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Pedagogical Content Knowledge of Argumentation: Using Classroom Contexts

to Assess High-Quality PCK Rather Than Pseudoargumentation

Katherine L. McNeill, María Gonzalez-Howard, Rebecca Katsh-Singer,

and Suzanna Lopez

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Investigadora, àmbit científic i també sobre el "pedagogical content knowlegde" dels professors sobre argumentació: Katherine L. McNeill

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Epistemologies in practice: Making scientific practices meaningful for students

Leema K Berland, Christina V Schwarz, Christina Krist, Lisa Kenyon, Abraham S Lo, Brian J Reiser

Un marc de fons molt interessant. També parla de "pseudoargumentació"

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Investigador destacat, àmbit científic: Brian J. Reiser

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Developing a learning progression for scientific modeling: Making scientific modeling accessible and meaningful for learners

Christina V. Schwarz, Brian J. Reiser, Elizabeth A. Davis, Lisa Kenyon, Andres Achér, David Fortus, Yael Shwartz, Barbara Hug, Joe Krajcik

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Enhancing the quality of argumentation in school science

Jonathan Osborne, Sibel Erduran, Shirley Simon

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The Potential of Argument in Knowledge Building

Selma Leitão

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Establishing the norms of scientific argumentation in classrooms

Rosalind Driver, Paul Newton, Jonathan Osborne

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Investigador en argumentació científica: Clark Chinn

Molts articles interessants

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Epistemologically Authentic Inquiry in Schools: A Theoretical Framework for Evaluating Inquiry Tasks

Clark Chinn, Betina Malhotra

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Por amor al debate

Daniel Cohen

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Why do we argue? To out-reason our opponents, prove them wrong, and, most of all, to win! Right? Philosopher Daniel H. Cohen shows how our most common form of argument -- a war in which one person must win and the other must lose -- misses out on the real benefits of engaging in active disagreement.

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Investigador especialista en argumentació filosòfica: Daniel Cohen

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Approaches to Meaning: A Basis for a Literature Curriculum

George Hillocks,Jr.

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Observing and Writing.

Hillocks, George, Jr.

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ERIC - ED102574 - Observing and Writing., 1975-Mar

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Experience in teaching composition at every level, from seventh grade to advanced writing courses intended for college sophomores, reveals one common problem--lack of specificity. Hillocks discusses this problem and suggests that it can be surmounted by involving students in the process of observing, encouraging them to draw inferences from their observations, and helping them to develop the sense of audience and critical awareness that comes with having students read, listen to, and comment on each other’s writing. Fifteen activities designed to increase the students’ power as observers and recorders of sensory experience are described. (JM)

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Research on Written Composition: New Directions for Teaching

Per George Hillocks (Jr.)

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Inquiry and the Composing Process: Theory and Research

George Hillocks Jr.

Per aprendre a escriure assaig és imprescindible investigar.

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Inquiry and the Composing Process: Theory and Research

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Welcome to the new NCTE Publications site, your gateway to NCTE journals, ebooks, and the Council Chronicle.

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Enseñar Historia mediante “situaciones-problema”

Alain Dalongeville

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Étudier les voies de la conceptualisation en Histoire à partir des écrits des élèves

Didier Cariou

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Étudier les voies de la conceptualisation en Histoire à partir des écrits des élèves

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La didactique de l’histoire connaît encore mal les processus d’apprentissage mis en œuvre par les élèves réels dans des situations pédagogiques concrètes. Certes, l’approche de ces processus est mal aisée, mais on peut s’appuyer sur l’exemple de la didactique du français (Bucheton & Chabanne, 2002) quand elle recherche les traces d’activités cognitives dans les productions langagières des élèves. La didactique s’inscrit alors dans le cadre théorique de Vygotski (1934) selon

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Delving into depth: an empirical investigation of the ordinary concepts of depth and profundity

Florian Cova, Céline Schöpfer

A què anomenem "profund"? Què volem dir quan diem que alguna cosa és "produnda"?

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Cartes conversacionals

Cesire

Per aprofundir:

Laura Farró, Silvia Lope

Cartas conversacionales para aprender a debatir REVISTA ALAMBIQUE - 91 (ENERO 18)

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En el marc d'un treball interdisciplinari per portar el debat sociocientífic a les aules, el CESIRE va elaborar la proposta Conversar per participar, que aporta un conjunt de recursos per fomentar en l'alumnat les habilitats comunicatives lligades a la conversa exploratòria, així com també les actituds de respecte i d'intercanvi constructiu necessàries en tot debat, de les quals no sol haver-hi bons models en els medis de comunicació.

Un d'aquests recursos són les cartes conversacionals, que proporcionen exponents i iniciadors de frase per saber discrepar, proposar una ampliació d'informació, demanar aclariments... El docent pot ampliar el conjunt amb exponents nous, si ho veu necessari.

Podem veure un exemple d'aplicació d'aquestes cartes en l'activitat d'E. Freixa-Bódalo Simulem un ple municipal: joc de rol per debatre una problemàtica ambiental.

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Cartes conversacionals per aplicar a les discussions de grup

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En el marc d'un treball interdisciplinari per portar el debat sociocientífic a les aules, el CESIRE va elaborar la proposta Conversar per participar, que aporta un conjunt de recursos per fomentar en l'alumnat les habilitats comunicatives lligades a la conversa exploratòria, així com també les actituds de respecte i d'intercanvi constructiu necessàries en tot debat, de les quals no sol haver-hi bons models en els medis de comunicació.

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Seminar Track, una herramienta para Seminarios y Conversaciones en el aula de Ciencias

Jordi Domènech

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Estoy últimamente ordenando distintas actividades y materiales lingüísticos para enseñar Ciencia. Hoy ha tocado poner presentable y darle nombre a una herramienta para hacer un seguimiento de Seminarios Socráticos y Conversaciones Exploratorias que he estado probando los últimos años en el aula de Ciencias. Es un material que no sé porqué no tenía todavía compartido, así que lo he incorporado a los materiales del ProjecteC3. En consideración a mi amigo Isaac Muro, con quien tenemos interesantes conversaciones sobre el " naming", le he dado a la herramienta (en realidad es sólo una ficha) el nombre molón de " Seminar Track ".

Una cosa interesante de la herramienta es que mantiene al docente atareado durante el debate y así deja de entorpecer. No, en serio: la utilidad es compartir el análisis de la conversación con el alumnado para que a lo largo de distintas conversaciones vayamos comunicándole no sólo qué intervenciones son de calidad en una conversación, sino también qué intervenciones se corresponden con el modo de crear conocimiento que tiene la ciencia.

La base de la herramienta es un mapa de la disposición de los participantes en la conversación y una serie de letras que permiten identificar sobre cada persona los distintos tipos de participaciones. Requiere acostumbrarse , y lo cierto es que el listado de ítems ha ido evolucionando (inicialmente la usé sobretodo en Seminarios de Laboratorio, así que sólo había cosas relativas a diseño de experimentos y demás). Es difícil (o imposible) anotarlo todo, pero permite registrar la mayoría de interacciones. El eje de tiempo es interesante como forma simple para desmontar la idea de un método científico lineal. Creo que puede continuar evolucionando ajustando los ítems, o incorporando también más ítems gestuales. Seguramente puedan usarla también los mismos alumnos, o pueda proponerse como herramienta para otras cosas (conversaciones en conflictos, detectar diferencias de género en la participación, analizar escenas de cine...), o como una herramienta de calificación, pero de momento no la he usado así.

Se me ocurre que con algunas modificaciones quizás también sea útil para analizar cómo desarrollamos nuestras propias reuniones y aprender de ello. Aunque quizás no nos guste lo que encontremos... ;-)))

Se puede descargar en el apartado de Argumentación, Oralidad y Debate de la web ProjecteC3 en:

Las ideas clave para desarrollar la propuesta no son mías, sino de estas personas que saben más que yo:

* Essential Questions: Opening Doors to Student Understanding. (2013). Grant Wiggins, Jay McTighe. ASSN.
* Dar clase con la boca cerrada. (2008) Don Finkel. Universitat de València.
* Aprender a hablar ciencia (1997). Jay L. Lemke. Paidós.
* Cartas conversacionales para aprender a debatir. Alambique, Didáctica de las Ciencias Experimentales (2018), 91, 49-55 Laura Farró y Silvia Lope.
* The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto (1982). Mortimer J. Adler. New York: Simon & Schuster.

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Seminar Track, una herramienta para Seminarios y Conversaciones en el aula de Ciencias

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Estoy últimamente ordenando distintas actividades y materiales lingüísticos para enseñar Ciencia. Hoy ha tocado poner presentable y darle nombre a una herramienta para hacer un seguimiento de Seminarios Socráticos y Conversaciones Exploratorias que he estado probando los últimos años en el aula de Ciencias.

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Socratic Seminars: Guidelines

Grant Wiggins

Presentació útil + CARTES DE PARTICIPACIÓ

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Llistat de "teahing Resources" de la American Philosophical Association

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Rencontrer et susciter l’inattendu : une approche deweyenne de l’expérience

Joris Thievenaz

Conté especialment una taula de diferents possibles desencadenants de la recerca: la mancança, la contradicció, etc.

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Rencontrer et susciter l’inattendu : une approche deweyenne de l’ex...

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« La théorie est éminemment pratique » (J. Dewey, 1910) Introduction Certaines œuvres théoriques, bien que devenues des « classiques » en sciences humaines, ont le pouvoir de continuer à éclairer…

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The challenges of observing geologically: Third graders' descriptions of rock and mineral properties

Danielle J. Ford

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Criteria of excellence for geological inquiry: The necessity of ambiguity

Charles R. Ault Jr.

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Looking for ideas: observation, interpretation and hypothesis-making by 12-year-old pupils undertaking science investigations

Stephen P. Tomkins & Sue Dale Tunnicliffe

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Looking for ideas: observation, interpretation and hypothesis-making by 12-year-old pupils undertaking science investigations

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As part of a study of the effect of an extended period of observation on pupils’ interpretation and hypothesis-making, pupils from four English comprehensive secondary schools were studied while un…

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The philosophical basis of observation in science and science education

Stephen P. Norris

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On Scientific Observation

Lorraine Daston

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From Seeing to Observing: How Parents and

Children Learn to See Science in a Botanical

Garden

Catherine Eberbach & Kevin Crowley

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From Everyday to Scientific Observation: How Children Learn to Observe the Biologist’s World

Catherine Eberbach and Kevin Crowley

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From Everyday to Scientific Observation: How Children Learn to Observe the Biologist’s World - Catherine Eberbach, Kevin Crowley, 2009

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This article explores the development of observation in scientific and everyday contexts. Fundamental to all scientific activity, expert observat…

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Understanding, Evaluating, and Promoting the Development of Argumentative Competence: An Interview With Dr. Deanna Kuhn

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Understanding, Evaluating, and Promoting the Development of Argumentative Competence: An Interview With Dr. Deanna Kuhn From Teachers College, Columbia University - Yu Song (宋郁), Yuchen Shi (石雨晨), 2025

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Argument skills are fundamental intellectual skills implicated in a variety of higher-order intellectual practices characteristic of the 21st century such as critical thinking (Kuhn, 2018), scientific inquiry (Kuhn, 2010), knowledge construction (Iordanou et al., 2019), and belief revision (Kuhn et al., 2020). The latest educational policies and curriculum standards in multiple countries have recognized the importance of argumentative competence by identifying it as a major objective of elementary and secondary school education. For example, the Common Core Standards Initiative (2010) and the new Next Generation Science Standards of the United States (2013) identified argumentation as the key to cultivating the critical skills they feature. Studies on argumentation as a tool for reasoning can be traced back to Socrates and Plato. Scholars have advanced the development of dialogue theory as a foundation for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation (Billig, 1996; Walton, 2007). Since the 1980s, psychology researchers have begun to explore the manifestations and implications of argumentation in individuals’ everyday reasoning and decision-making processes (Kuhn, 1991, 1993; Weinstock & Cronin, 2003). The past two decades have witnessed the proliferation of educational and psychological research into the development of argumentative competencies of students, the goal of which is to prepare them for the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.

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Teaching and Learning Argumentative Reading and Writing: A Review of Research

George E. Newell

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La argumentación dialógica como puente para el pensamiento y la escritura argumentativa

Deanna Kuhn,Laura Hemberger &Valerie Khait

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Articles de Clark A. Chinn

Especialista en cognició epistèmica, avaluació d'informació, argumentació

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‪Professor of Education, Rutgers University‬ - ‪‪Cited by 19,053‬‬ - ‪education‬

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The Development of Argument Skills

Deanna Kuhn

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A Developmental Model of Critical Thinking. Deanna Kuhn

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The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument

Douglas Walton

Walton planteja diferents tipus de situacions argumentatives

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In Search of The Truth. A History of Disputation Techniques From Antiquity To Early Modern Times

Olga Weijers

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In Search of The Truth. A History of Disputation Techniques From Antiquity To Early Modern Times - Olga Weijers | PDF | Dialectic | Rhetoric

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This document provides an introduction to a volume on the history of disputation techniques from antiquity to early modern times. It discusses disputation in context, sources used, key vocabulary, and structure. Disputation has evolved over centuries while maintaining its fundamental character as debate between individuals or a person engaging in self-debate. It has taken various forms from Platonic dialogues to public religious debates to standardized oral defenses of dissertations. Argumentation through questioning is a key characteristic of Western culture and philosophy, with knowledge obtained through open questioning of problems.

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Many Sides: A Protagorean Approach to the Theory, Practice and Pedagogy of Argument

Michael Mendelson

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La argumentación como diálogo. Una perspectiva para el estudio discursivo y la práctica social

Laura Mariela Rodríguez

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Quintilian and the Pedagogy of Argument

Michael Mendelson

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Quintilian and the Pedagogy of Argument - Argumentation

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Originating in the Sophistic pedagogy of Protagoras and reflecting the sceptical practice of the New Academy, Quintilian’s rhetorical pedagogy places a special emphasis on the juxtaposition of multiple, competing claims. This inherently dialogical approach to argumentation is referred to here as controversia and is on full display in Quintilian’s own argumentative practice. More important to this paper, however, is the role of controversia as an organizing principle for Quintilian’s rhetorical curriculum. In particular, Quintilian introduces the protocols of controversia through a series of progressively more complex exercises in imitation, role-playing, and declamation (now referred to as situational games). All of these exercises are open for adaptation by contemporary teachers who would promote a dialogical approach to argument, i.e. argument with its methods of inquiry, invention, and judgment based on direct interaction with opposing parties.

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La théorie de l’enquête de John Dewey

Número de revista

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92 | 2019 La théorie de l’enquête de John Dewey

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Le concept d’enquête (inquiry) forgé par John Dewey fait l’objet d’un intérêt renouvelé en sciences humaines et sociales (SHS), notamment en sciences de l’éducation et de la formation (SEF). Cet e…

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Philosophy Now

Revista divulgativa interessant i accessible

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Welcome to Philosophy Now

the bi-monthly magazine for everyone interested in ideas. Published since 1991, it was the winner of the 2016 Bertrand Russell Society Award. Please look around! You can read four articles free per month. To have complete access to the thousands of philosophy articles on this site

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A magazine for everyone interested in ideas.

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Philosophy Compass

Philosophy Compass és una revista acadèmica que ofereix articles de revisió clars i rigorosos sobre els debats filosòfics actuals. Està pensada per a estudiants, investigadors i docents que volen una introducció accessible però informada a diferents àmbits de la filosofia.

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Edge

Converses amb grans especialistes d'ètica

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Something radically new is in the air: new ways of understanding physical systems, new ways of thinking about thinking that call into question many of our basic assumptions. A realistic biology of the mind, advances in evolutionary biology, physics, information technology, genetics, neurobiology, psychology, engineering, the chemistry of materials: all are questions of critical importance with respect to what it means to be human. For the first time, we have the tools and the will to undertake the scientific study of human nature.

This began in the early seventies, when, as a graduate student at Harvard, evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers wrote five papers that set forth an agenda for a new field: the scientific study of human nature. In the past thirty-five years this work has spawned thousands of scientific experiments, new and important evidence, and exciting new ideas about who and what we are presented in books by scientists such as Richard Dawkins, Daniel C. Dennett, Steven Pinker, and Edward O. Wilson among many others.

In 1975, Wilson, a colleague of Trivers at Harvard, predicted that ethics would someday be taken out of the hands of philosophers and incorporated into the "new synthesis" of evolutionary and biological thinking. He was right.

Scientists engaged in the scientific study of human nature are gaining sway over the scientists and others in disciplines that rely on studying social actions and human cultures independent from their biological foundation.

No where is this more apparent than in the field of moral psychology. Using babies, psychopaths, chimpanzees, fMRI scanners, web surveys, agent-based modeling, and ultimatum games, moral psychology has become a major convergence zone for research in the behavioral sciences.

So what do we have to say? Are we moving toward consensus on some points? What are the most pressing questions for the next five years? And what do we have to offer a world in which so many global and national crises are caused or exacerbated by moral failures and moral conflicts? It seems like everyone is studying morality these days, reaching findings that complement each other more often than they clash.

NYU psychologist Elizabeth Phelps investigates the brain activity underlying memory and emotion. Much of Phelps' research has focused on the phenomenon of "learned fear," a tendency of animals to fear situations associated with frightening events. Her primary focus has been to understand how human learning and memory are changed by emotion and to investigate the neural systems mediating their interactions. A recent study published in Nature by Phelps and her colleagues, shows how fearful memories can be wiped out for at least a year using a drug-free technique that exploits the way that human brains store and recall memories. [

Disgust has been keeping Cornell psychologist David Pizarro particularly busy, as it has been implicated by many as an emotion that plays a large role in many moral judgments. His lab results have shown that an increased tendency to experience disgust (as measured using the Disgust Sensitivity Scale, developed by Jon Haidt and colleagues), is related to political orientation.

Each of the above participants led a 45-minute session on Day One that consisted of a 25-minute talk. Day Two consisted of two 90-minute open discussions on "The Science of Morality", intended as a starting point to begin work on a consensus document on the state of moral psychology to be published on Edge in the near future.

Among the members of the press in attendance were: Sharon Begley, Newsweek, Drake Bennett, Ideas, Boston Globe, David Brooks, OpEd Columnist, New York Times, Daniel Engber, Slate, Amanda Gefter, Opinion Editor, New Scientist, Jordan Mejias, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,, Scientific American, Pamela Weintraub, Discover Magazine.
The New Science of Morality, Part 1
[ JONATHAN HAIDT:] As the first speaker, I'd like to thank the Edge Foundation for bringing us all together, and bringing us all together in this beautiful place. I'm looking forward to having these conversations with all of you.

I was recently at a conference on moral development, and a prominent Kohlbergian moral psychologist stood up and said, "Moral psychology is dying." And I thought, well, maybe in your neighborhood property values are plummeting, but in the rest of the city, we are going through a renaissance. We are in a golden age.
The New Science of Morality, Part 2
[ JOSHUA D. GREENE:] Now, it's true that, as scientists, our basic job is to describe the world as it is. But I don't think that that's the only thing that matters. In fact, I think the reason why we're here, the reason why we think this is such an exciting topic, is not that we think that the new moral psychology is going to cure cancer. Rather, we think that understanding this aspect of human nature is going to perhaps change the way we think and change the way we respond to important problems and issues in the real world. If all we were going to do is just describe how people think and never do anything with it, never use our knowledge to change the way we relate to our problems, then I don't think there would be much of a payoff. I think that applying our scientific knowledge to real problems is the payoff.
The New Science of Morality, Part 3
[ SAM HARRIS:] ...I think we should differentiate three projects that seem to me to be easily conflated, but which are distinct and independently worthy endeavors. The first project is to understand what people do in the name of "morality." We can look at the world, witnessing all of the diverse behaviors, rules, cultural artifacts, and morally salient emotions like empathy and disgust, and we can study how these things play out in human communities, both in our time and throughout history. We can examine all these phenomena in as nonjudgmental a way as possible and seek to understand them. We can understand them in evolutionary terms, and we can understand them in psychological and neurobiological terms, as they arise in the present. And we can call the resulting data and the entire effort a "science of morality". This would be a purely descriptive science of the sort that I hear Jonathan Haidt advocating.
The New Science of Morality, Part 4
[ ROY BAUMEISTER:] And so that said, in terms of trying to understand human nature, well, and morality too, nature and culture certainly combine in some ways to do this, and I'd put these together in a slightly different way, it's not nature's over here and culture's over there and they're both pulling us in different directions. Rather, nature made us for culture. I'm convinced that the distinctively human aspects of psychology, the human aspects of evolution were adaptations to enable us to have this new and better kind of social life, namely culture.

Culture is our biological strategy. It's a new and better way of relating to each other, based on shared information and division of labor, interlocking roles and things like that. And it's worked. It's how we solve the problems of survival and reproduction, and it's worked pretty well for us in that regard. And so the distinctively human traits are ones often there to make this new kind of social life work.

Now, where does this leave us with morality?
The New Science of Morality, Part 5
[ PAUL BLOOM:] What I want to do today is talk about some ideas I've been exploring concerning the origin of human kindness. And I'll begin with a story that Sarah Hrdy tells at the beginning of her excellent new book, "Mothers And Others." She describes herself flying on an airplane. It's a crowded airplane, and she's flying coach. She's waits in line to get to her seat; later in the flight, food is going around, but she's not the first person to be served; other people are getting their meals ahead of her. And there's a crying baby. The mother's soothing the baby, the person next to them is trying to hide his annoyance, other people are coo-cooing the baby, and so on.

As Hrdy points out, this is entirely unexceptional. Billions of people fly each year, and this is how most flights are. But she then imagines what would happen if every individual on the plane was transformed into a chimp. Chaos would reign. By the time the plane landed, there'd be body parts all over the aisles, and the baby would be lucky to make it out alive.

The point here is that people are nicer than chimps.
The New Science of Morality, Part 6
[ DAVID PIZARRO:] What I want to talk about is piggybacking off of the end of Paul's talk, where he started to speak a little bit about the debate that we've had in moral psychology and in philosophy, on the role of reason and emotion in moral judgment. I'm going to keep my claim simple, but I want to argue against a view that probably nobody here has, (because we're all very sophisticated), but it's often spoken of emotion and reason as being at odds with each other - in a sense that to the extent that emotion is active, reason is not active, and to the extent that reason is active, emotion is not active. (By emotion here, I mean, broadly speaking, affective influences).

I think that this view is mistaken (although it is certainly the case sometimes). The interaction between these two is much more interesting. So I'm going to talk a bit about some studies that we've done. Some of them have been published, and a couple of them haven't (because they're probably too inappropriate to publish anywhere, but not too inappropriate to speak to this audience). They are on the role of emotive forces in shaping our moral judgment. I use the term "emotive," because they are about motivation and how motivation affects the reasoning process when it comes to moral judgment.
The New Science of Morality, Part 7
[ ELIZABETH PHELPS:] In spite of these beliefs I do think about decisions as reasoned or instinctual when I'm thinking about them for myself. And this has obviously been a very powerful way of thinking about how we do things because it goes back to earliest written thoughts. We have reason, we have emotion, and these two things can compete. And some are unique to humans and others are shared with other species.

And economists, when thinking about decisions, have also adopted what we call a dual system approach. This is obviously a different dual system approach and here I'm focusing mostly on Kahneman's System 1 and System 2. As probably everybody in this room knows Kahneman and Tversky showed that there were a number of ways in which we make decisions that didn't seem to be completely consistent with classical economic theory and easy to explain. And they proposed Prospect Theory and suggested that we actually have two systems we use when making decisions, one of which we call reason, one of which we call intuition.

Kahneman didn't say emotion. He didn't equate emotion with intuition.
The New Science of Morality, Part 8
[ JOSHUA KNOBE:] ...what's really exciting about this new work is not so much just the very idea of philosophers doing experiments but rather the particular things that these people ended up showing. When these people went out and started doing these experimental studies, they didn't end up finding results that conformed to the traditional picture. They didn't find that there was a kind of initial stage in which people just figured out, on a factual level, what was going on in a situation, followed by a subsequent stage in which they used that information in order to make a moral judgment. Rather they really seemed to be finding exactly the opposite.

What they seemed to be finding is that people's moral judgments were influencing the process from the very beginning, so that people's whole way of making sense of their world seemed to be suffused through and through with moral considerations. In this sense, our ordinary way of making sense of the world really seems to look very, very deeply different from a kind of scientific perspective on the world. It seems to be value-laden in this really fundamental sense.
EDGE IN THE NEWS BOSTON GLOBE
August 15, 2010
IDEAS The surprising moral force of disgust
By Drake Bennett
...Psychologists like Haidt are leading a wave of research into the so-called moral emotions - not just disgust, but others like anger and compassion - and the role those feelings play in how we form moral codes and apply them in our daily lives. A few, like Haidt, go so far as to claim that all the world's moral systems can best be characterized not by what their adherents believe, but what emotions they rely on.

There is deep skepticism in parts of the psychology world about claims like these. And even within the movement there is a lively debate over how much power moral reasoning has - whether our behavior is driven by thinking and reasoning, or whether thinking and reasoning are nothing more than ornate rationalizations of what our emotions ineluctably drive us to do. Some argue that morality is simply how human beings and societies explain the peculiar tendencies and biases that evolved to help our ancestors survive in a world very different from ours.
THE ATLANTIC
A few of the leading researchers in the new field met late last month at a small conference in western Connecticut, hosted by the Edge Foundation, to present their work and discuss the implications. Among the points they debated was whether their work should be seen as merely descriptive, or whether it should also be a tool for evaluating religions and moral systems and deciding which were more and less legitimate - an idea that would be deeply offensive to religious believers around the world.
Alexis Madrigal
But even doing the research in the first place is a radical step. The agnosticism central to scientific inquiry is part of what feels so dangerous to philosophers and theologians. By telling a story in which morality grows out of the vagaries of human evolution, the new moral psychologists threaten the claim of universality on which most moral systems depend - the idea that certain things are simply right, others simply wrong. If the evolutionary story about the moral emotions is correct, then human beings, by being a less social species or even having a significantly different prehistoric diet, might have ended up today with an entirely different set of religions and ethical codes. Or we might never have evolved the concept of morals at all. ...
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
July 29, 2010

University of Virginia moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt delivered an absolutely dynamite talk on new advances in his field last week. The video and a transcript have been posted by Edge.org, a loose consortium of very smart people run by John Brockman. Haidt whips us through centuries of moral thought, recent evolutionary psychology, and discloses which two papers every single psychology student should have to read. Through it all, he's funny, erudite, and understandable. Here, we excerpt a few paragraphs from his conclusion, in which Haidt tells us how to think about our moral minds: ...
Moral reasoning
SOLEMN HIGH MASS IN THE TEMPLE OF REASON
July 28, 2010

FEUILLETON
Better be nice
How do you train a moral muscle? American researchers take their first steps on the path to a science of morality without God hypothesis. The last word should have the reason.
By Jordan Mejias

[Google translation:]

28th July 2010 One was missing and had he turned up, the illustrious company would have had nothing more to discuss and think. Even John Brockman, literary agent, and guru of the third culture, it could not move, stop by in his salon, which he every summer from the virtuality of the Internet, click on edge.org moved, in a New England idyl. There, in the green countryside of Washington, Connecticut, it was time to morality as a new science. When new it was announced, because their devoted not philosophers and theologians, but psychologists, biologists, neurologists, and at most such philosophers, based on experiments and the insights of brain research. They all had to admit, even to be on the search, but they missed not one who lacked the authority in matters of morality: God.
ANDREW SULLIVAN - THE DAILY DISH
The secular science dominated the conference. As it should come to an end, however, a consensus first, were the conclusions apart properly. Even on the question of whether religion should be regarded as part of evolution, remained out of the clear answer. Agreement, the participants were at least that is to renounce God. Him, the unanimous result of her certainly has not been completed or not may be locked investigations, did not owe the man morality. That it is innate in him, but did so categorically not allege any. Only on the findings that morality is a natural phenomenon, there was agreement, even if only to a certain degree. For, should be understood not only the surely. Besides nature makes itself in morality and the culture just noticeable, and where the effect of one ends and the other begins, is anything but settled.
FACTS INFUSED WITH MORALITY
In a baby science, as Elizabeth Phelps, a neuroscientist at New York University, called the moral psychology may by way of surprise not much groping. How about some with free will, will still remain for the foreseeable future a mystery. Moral instincts was, after all, with some certainty Roy Baumeister, a social psychologist at Florida State University, are not built into us. We are only given the ability to acquire systems of morality. Gives us to be altruistic, we are selfish by nature, benefits. It is moral to be compared with a muscle, the fatigue, but can also be strengthened through regular training. What sounds easier than is done, if not clear what is to train as well. A moral center that we can selectively edit points, our brain does not occur.

But amazingly, with all that we are nice to each other are forced reproduction, and Paul Bloom, a psychologist at Yale, is noticed. Obviously, we have realized that our lives more comfortable when others do not fight us. Factors of Nettigkeitswachstums Bloom also recognizes in capitalism that will work better with nice people, and world religions, which act in large groups and their dynamics as it used to strangers to meet each other favorably. The fact that we have developed over the millennia morally beneficial, holds not only he has been proved. Even the neurologist Sam Harris, author of "The Moral Landscape. How Science Can Determine Human Values "(Free Press), wants to make this progress not immoral monsters like Hitler and Stalin spoil. ...

[...Continue: German language original | Google translation]

25 JUL 2010

Edge held a seminar on morality. Here's Joshua Knobe:
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Over the past few years, a series of recent experimental studies have reexamined the ways in which people answer seemingly ordinary questions about human behavior. Did this person act intentionally? What did her actions cause? Did she make people happy or unhappy? It had long been assumed that people's answers to these questions somehow preceded all moral thinking, but the latest research has been moving in a radically different direction. It is beginning to appear that people's whole way of making sense of the world might be suffused with moral judgment, so that people's moral beliefs can actually transform their most basic understanding of what is happening in a situation.
Scientific research is showing that we are born with an innate moral sense.
By DAVID BROOKS
David Brooks' illuminating column on this topic covered the same ground:

...

...Advantage Locke over Hobbes.

July 23, 2010
OP-ED COLUMNIST
QUESTIONS FOR "THE MORAL NINE" FROM THE EDGE COMMUNITY
Washington, Conn.

Where does our sense of right and wrong come from? Most people think it is a gift from God, who revealed His laws and elevates us with His love. A smaller number think that we figure the rules out for ourselves, using our capacity to reason and choosing a philosophical system to live by.

Moral naturalists, on the other hand, believe that we have moral sentiments that have merged from a long history of relationships. To learn about morality, you don't rely upon revelation or metaphysics; you observe people as they live.

This week a group of moral naturalists gathered in Connecticut at a conference organized by the Edge Foundation. ...

By the time humans came around, evolution had forged a pretty firm foundation for a moral sense. Jonathan Haidt of the University of Virginia argues that this moral sense is like our sense of taste. We have natural receptors that help us pick up sweetness and saltiness. In the same way, we have natural receptors that help us recognize fairness and cruelty. Just as a few universal tastes can grow into many different cuisines, a few moral senses can grow into many different moral cultures.

Paul Bloom of Yale noted that this moral sense can be observed early in life. Bloom and his colleagues conducted an experiment in which they showed babies a scene featuring one figure struggling to climb a hill, another figure trying to help it, and a third trying to hinder it. ...

Howard Gardner, Geoffrey Miller, Brian Eno, James Fowler, Rebecca Mackinnon, Jaron Lanier, Eva Wisten, Brian Knutson, Andrian Kreye, Anonymous, Alison Gopnik, Robert Trivers, Randoph Nesse, M.D.

Enlightenment ideas were the product of white male Christians living in the 18th century. They form the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other Western-inflected documents. But in our global world, Confucian societies and Islamic societies have their own guidelines about progress, individuality, democratic processes, human obligations. In numbers they represent more of humanity and are likely to become even more numerous in this century. What do the human sciences have to contribute to an understanding of these 'multiple voices' ? Can they combined harmoniously or are there unbridgeable gaps?

1) Many people become vegans, protect animal rights, and care about the long-term future of the environment. It seems hard to explain these 'green virtues' in terms of the usual evolutionary-psychology selection pressures: reciprocity, kin selection, group selection -- so how can we explain their popularity (or unpopularity?)

2) What are the main sex differences in human morality, and why?

3) What role did costly signaling play in the evolution of human morality (i.e. 'showing off' certain moral virtues' to attract mates, friends, or allies, or to intimidate rival individuals or competing groups)?

4) Given the utility of 'adaptive self-deception' in human evolution -- one part of the mind not knowing what adaptive strategies another part is pursuing -- what could it mean to have the moral virtue of 'integrity' for an evolved being?

5) Why do all 'mental illnesses' (depression, mania, schizophrenia, borderline, psychopathy, narcissism, mental retardation, etc.) reduce altruism, compassion, and loving-kindness? Is this partly why they are recognized as mental illnesses?

Is morality a human invention - a way of trying to stabilise human societies and make them coherent - or is there evidence of a more fundamental sense of morality in creatures other than humans?

Another way of asking this question is: are there moral concepts that are not specifically human?

Yet another way of asking this is: are moral concepts specifically the province of human brains? And, if they are, is there any basis for suggesting that there are any 'absolute' moral precepts?

Or: do any other creatures exhibit signs of 'honour' or 'shame'??

Given recent evidence about the power of social networks, what is our personal responsibility to our friends' friends?

Does the human race require a major moral evolution in order to survive? Isn't part of the problem that our intelligence has vastly out-evolved our morality, which is still stuck back in the paleolithic age? Is there anything we can do? Or is this the tragic flaw that dooms us? Might technology help to facilitate or speed up our moral evolution, as some say technology is already doing for human intelligence? We have artificial intelligence and augmented reality. What about artificial or augmented morality?

A crucial topic is how group interactions change moral perception. To what degree are there clan-oriented processes inherent in the human brain? In particular, how can well-informed software designs for network-mediated social experience play a role in changing behavior and values? Is there anything specific that can be done to reduce mob-like phenomena, as is spawned in online forums like 4chan's /b/, without resorting to degrees of imposed control? This is where a science of moral psychology could inform engineering.
ANONYMOUS
What's would be a good definition - a few examples - of common moral sense? How does an averagely moral human think and behave (it's easy to paint a picture of the actions of an immoral person...) Now, how can this be expanded?

Could an understanding/acceptance of the idea that we are all having unconscious instincts for what's right and wrong replace the idea of religion as necessary for moral behavior?

What tends to be the hierarchy of "blinders" - the arguments we, consciously or unconsciously, use to relabel exploitative acts as good? (I did it for God, I did it for the German People, I did it for Jodie Foster...) What evolutionary purpose have they filled?

BRIAN KNUTSON
Psychologist & Neuroscientist, Stanford

What is the difference between morality and emotion? How can scientists distinguish between the two (or should they)? Why has Western culture been so historically reluctant to recognize emotion as a major influence on moral judgments?

Is there a fine line or a wide gap between morality and ideology?

1. Some of the new literature on moral psychology feels like traditional discussions of ethics with a few numbers attached from surveys; almost like old ideas in a new can. As an outsider I'd be curious to know what's really new here. Specifically, if William James were resurrected what might be the new findings we could explain to him that would astound him or fundamentally change his way of thinking?

2. Is there a reason to believe there is such a thing as moral psychology that transcends upbringing and culture? Are we really studying a fundamental feature of the mind or simply the outcome of a social process?

Many people have proposed an evolutionary psychology/ nativist view of moral capacities. But surely one of the most dramatic and obvious features of our moral capacities is their capacity for change and even radical transformation with new experiences. At the same time this transformation isn't just random but seems to have a progressive quality. Its analogous to science which presents similar challenges to a nativist view. And even young children are empirically, capable of this kind of change in both domains. How do we get to new and better conceptions of the world, cognitive or moral, if the nativists are right?

Shame.

What is it? When does it occur? What function does it serve? How is it related, if at all, to guilt? Is it related to "morality" and if so how?

Key point, John, is that shame is a complex mixture of self and other: Tiger Woods SHAMES his wife in public - he may likewise be ashamed.

If i fuck a goat i may feel ashamed if someone saw it, but absent harm to the goat, not clear how i should respond if i alone witness it.

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Something radically new is in the air: new ways of understanding physical systems, new ways of thinking about thinking that call into question many of our basic assumptions. A realistic biology of the mind, advances in evolutionary biology, physics, information technology, genetics, neurobiology, psychology, engineering, the chemistry of materials: all are questions of critical importance with respect to what it means to be human.

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Philosophy of Religion

Amb articles molt interessants de diferents acadèmics

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Philosophy of Religion | big question philosophy for scholars and students

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Elizabeth Burns is Reader in Philosophy of Religion at the University of London, and Programme Director for the University of London Distance Learning Programmes in Divinity (email: elizabeth.burns@london.ac.uk). Her publications include What is this thing called philosophy of religion? (Routledge, 2018). We invited her to discuss comparative philosophy of religion as part of our “Philosophers of Religion on Philosophy of Religion” series.

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Introduction to Ethics

Open TextBook

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“Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource” is now available!

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Free Philosophy textbooks and free science fiction (sci-fi) books along with other works and a blog. By Noah Levin and NGE Far Press.

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Blog de Nathan Nobis

Especialista en ètica i argumentació

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Nathan Nobis, Ph.D. - Philosophy Professor and More

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Nathan Nobis. Nobis, Nathan. Teaching Philosophy. 1000-Word Philosophy. Animals and Ethics 101.

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Everyday Ethical Arguments: Beginning Discussions on Moral Issues

Un recurs molt valuós per plantejar discussions ètiques inicials

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Everyday Ethical Arguments: Beginning Discussions on Moral Issues

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Students’
opinions on debated ethical issues are often supported by reasons which
professional philosophers find not just simple, but simplistic. For
abortion, some students will feel that the issue is completely settled by the
claim that people have a right to control their bodies. For animal ethics, some
will assert confidently that it’s OK to eat animals because doing so is
“natural.” For gun policy, students will try to resolve the debate by
saying that we all have a right to defend ourselves against harm.

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Institut of Art and Ideas