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The literal rule is when the judges apply the plain, ordinary meaning of the words to the case. They can use the dictionary meaning and apply that strictly without any interpretation. This can produce some unfair outcomes but at least all of the cases are consistent and the same outcome. This is the original method of interpreting statutes and is the most commonly used process. The use of the literal translation of the words is key.
DPP v Cheeseman (1990)
A man was masturbating in a public toilet. The police who found him convicted him under a section that said being found by a 'passenger' was part of the crime. It was decided that the police were stationed outside the public toilet because he had been doing it before. He was acquitted because the police were not deemed as 'passengers'.
Whiteley v Chappell (1868)
​The man in the case voted for dead people in elections. The law said that it was unlawful to vote for somebody entitled to vote. The dead people he voted for were not entitled to vote, therefore he had not broken the law in this respect. Clearly he had been deceitful but under a literal interpretation of the words he had done nothing wrong.
LNER v Berriman (1946)
A man working for LNER was hit by a train. His wife sued for negligence against the fact that there was no look out when he was working on the tracks. The law involved said that there was to be a look out when workers were repairing or relating track. The fact he was oiling the tracks meant that he was 'maintaining' and that they had done nothing wrong. This meant the company did not have to pay out and that the wife received no compensation for the civil wrong done to his family.

​Advantages of the Literal Rule

The Literal Rule creates certainty. If judges interpret the laws using the Oxford English Dictionary, then everybody can use that same resource and be able to predict the outcome of cases in the future. It also means that people understand the laws that are applied to them.

The use of the rule upholds Parliamentary Supremacy. This is the idea that Parliament is the most important and powerful part of our legal system and government. Parliament, in theory, could create any law and repeal all previous laws; it has the power to change anything because it is the elected body that represents the people in our society. By following the legislation and not straying away from what our representative democracy has decreed, we are upholding our political system. Examples of this can be Cheeseman, where the judges followed the letter of the law, regardless of the outcome. Lord Esher also said that it is the role of Parliament to make changes and not for the judiciary.

Disadvantages of the Literal Rule

The literal rule can create loopholes in the law. Fisher v Bell for example; if you show things in your window you are inviting them to that but it is one way in which a person can still advertise things in their shop windows. It means therefore that people can get away with things when they have been commit wrongful acts in society.

It can lead to unfair or absurd outcomes. LNER v Berriman's judgement follow strict rules and wording in the law and it meant that a woman was left without any compensation when her husband was hit by a train. His employer should have made sure he would be safe when carrying out his work but because of the wording of the relevant law, it meant they did not have pay out for his death. This is an example of an absurd outcome that is socially distasteful, but lawfully sound.

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​​When there are issues and disputes, it can be because two different people think that the law is ambiguous and not clear what it says. But what happens when a statute is unclear? Judges will...

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New students are streaming into law schools across the country. But to become the next generation of lawyers, judges and activists, they'll first need to read through a mountain of case law. In case law, judges define what acts of parliament actually mean, explain the common law and resolve disputes between citizens, organisations and sometimes state institutions.

Newspapers occasionally publish a list of the most important cases for students to be aware of. But it's not just students who could benefit from learning about the law - after all, cases decided hundreds of years ago can set the precedent for decisions that the courts in England and Wales make today.

Here's my pick of some of the most important cases throughout history: ones that can teach us all something about how the law mirrors social and political attitudes, while revealing the principles and patterns that make up the country's version of justice.

1. The Case of Proclamations, 1610

Over 400 years ago, the chief justice, Sir Edward Coke, ruled that King James I could not prohibit new building in London without the support of parliament. King James believed that he had a divine right to make any laws that he wished. But the court opposed his view, and decided that the monarchy could not wield its power in this arbitrary way.

By the end of that century, the Glorious Revolution laid the foundation for today's constitutional monarchy, whereby whoever is king or queen respects the law-making authority of the elected parliament.

2. Entick v Carrington, 1765

Author and schoolmaster John Entick was suspected of writing a libellous pamphlet against the government. In response, the secretary of state sent Nathan Carrington, along with a group of other king's men, to search Entick's house for evidence. Entick then sued the men for trespass.

The court decided that the secretary of state did not have the legal authority to issue a search warrant, and therefore Carrington had trespassed. This case reflects the principle that "no man is above the law" - not even the secretary of state. To this day, law enforcement agencies may only do what the law allows.

3. R v Dudley and Stephens, 1884

In this case, the survivors of a shipwreck who killed and ate the youngest and weakest crew member were prosecuted for murder. Their defence was based on "necessity" - that they needed to eat the boy, as they were unlikely to survive and the boy probably would have died anyway.

It may have been a "custom of the sea" that cannibalism was allowed under such circumstances, but the defendants were found guilty on the basis that all life is equal - the law expected them to die, rather than kill another.

But the public was sympathetic to the defendants, and their sentences were later commuted from death to six months imprisonment. The boy was named Richard Parker, as is the tiger in the Man Booker prize-winning novel Life of Pi.

4. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co, 1893

Mrs Carlill sued the manufacturer of the carbolic smoke ball - a device for preventing colds and flu - which had promised a reward of £100 for any one catching flu following the use of its product but then refused to pay out.

The court decided that this promise, together with Mrs Carlill's use of the product as directed, amounted to a legally binding contract and she was entitled to the reward. The case explores many of the principles that must be present in modern day contracts, such as offer and acceptance, before we can make legally enforceable agreements between each other. Yet this most famous of cases may never have been brought at all, had Mrs Carlill not been married to a solicitor.

5. Donoghue and Stevenson, 1932

In a case originating in Scotland, Mrs Donoghue was given a bottle of ginger beer which allegedly contained the decomposed remains of a snail. She claimed to have suffered shock and gastroenteritis as a result. But as she had not bought the drink herself, she had no contract on which to sue.

Nevertheless, the court extended the law of negligence to require reasonable care towards those likely to be affected by a person's or company's actions. Was there really a snail? We don't know for sure, as Mr Stevenson died before the evidence could be heard.

6. Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 1969

To be guilty of a criminal offence, there often needs to be unlawful act accompanied by a guilty state of mind, such as a criminal intent. So, having accidentally driven his car onto a policeman's foot, did Mr Fagan commit an assault when he decided not to remove it?

Mr Fagan suggested not because he had no criminal intent at the time the car first went on to the foot, but the court held that deciding to leave the car there was a combination of act and intention, which meant he was guilty of the offence.

7. R v R, 1991

The law is constantly evolving to meet changing social attitudes. In this case, the House of Lords swept away the common law rule that a man could not be guilty of raping his wife. The previous rule was based on a 1736 pronouncement that:

By their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given herself up to her husband, consent which she cannot retract.

The House of Lords ruled that for modern times, marriage is a partnership of equals and any other suggestion was "quite unacceptable".

8. The Belmarsh case, 2004

The Human Rights Act empowered judges to review acts of parliament, to check if they are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Using this power, the House of Lords ruled that a statute which allowed terrorist suspects to be detained indefinitely without trial breached the suspects' human rights.

The case shows how modern courts ask not just whether government action is authorised by law, but also whether it is compatible with our rights. Parliament amended the law as a result.

In 2016, Gina Miller brought a case against the UK government, claiming that it couldn't trigger Article 50 - and therefore Brexit - without an act of parliament. Ruling in Miller's favour in 2017, the Supreme Court drew on the 1610 case of proclamations. So there's no doubt that even the oldest cases still have the power to shape society today.

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Eight cases from across history which still shape the law today

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From cannibalism to carbolic smoke balls, these are some of the fascinating cases that have made the law of England and Wales what it is today.

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English Bill of Rights: The document that helped shaped history

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The term 'constitution' refers to the principles, rules and laws that establish and underpin a political system. The constitution creates and defines the powers of different political institutions and determines how they should relate to each other. It sets out the limits of these powers and regulates the relationship between the state and its citizens.

Constitutions place both limitations and obligations on governmental organisations in their relationship with the people, and provide opportunities for the public to influence the political process.
Click on any of the questions below to be taken to the answer. Is the constitution of the United Kingdom written down?
Why is the UK's constitution different to most other modern liberal democracies?
Is Magna Carta (1215) our constitution?
What are the sources of the UK constitution?

What key reforms have been made to the UK constitution over time?
What are the advantages of having an 'uncodified' constitution? What are the disadvantages of having an 'uncodified' constitution? PowerPoint Further reading
Is the constitution of the United Kingdom written down?

It is often noted that the UK does not have a 'written' or 'codified' constitution. It is true that most countries have a document with special legal status that contains some of the key features of their constitution. This text is usually upheld by the courts and cannot be changed except through an especially demanding process. The UK, however, does not possess a single constitutional document of this nature. Nevertheless, it does have a constitution. The UK's constitution is spread across a number of places. This dispersal can make it more difficult to identify and understand. It is found in places including some specific Acts of Parliament; particular understandings of how the system should operate (known as constitutional conventions); and various decisions made by judges that help determine how the system works.
Why is the UK's constitution different to most other modern liberal democracies?
As described above, the UK's constitution is different from many other countries in that its core aspects are not contained in a single legal source. This can be explained in part by UK history. Unlike France, Italy and many other places, the UK did not experience a revolution or moment of political rupture in the late eighteenth century or nineteenth century, when written constitutions were at their most popular after the American Revolutionary War.

Unlike in the United States, where the constitution is the 'supreme law' the UK system has no clear concept of a 'higher law': there is no clear distinction between what is a constitutional law and what is a regular law. This also means there are no special procedures for changing the constitution itself in the UK. If it is determined to do so, a 'constitutional statute' can be repealed or amended by simple majority votes in Parliament, like any other legislation. This differs from the situation in countries such as the United States, where the constitution is 'entrenched' - in other words, needing to satisfy additional requirements in order for it to be amended. The UK constitution can be altered relatively easily by the government of the day, meaning it changes more frequently than many other constitutions. It is often said that the UK Parliament is 'sovereign'. This parliamentary 'sovereignty' means that Parliament can make or unmake any law, without being limited by a constitutional text.
Is Magna Carta (1215) our constitution?
Magna Carta (translated as Great Charter) was an agreement reached at Runnymede in 1215 between King John and a group of English barons who had been part of a rebellion against the King. In chapter 39 and 40 it stated that:
39. No free man shall be seized or imprisoned or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land. 40. To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.
Magna Carta became significant in placing formal limits on the King's power over his subjects, and in articulating the notion that the monarch should not be above the constraints of the law. In this, we can see the origins of a foundational constitutional principle: the rule of law (that everyone within a state should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of the law).

Many look to Magna Carta in the way people in other countries might look to a 'written' constitution. Although the extent of what it actually secured in thirteenth-century England has often been overstated, it no doubt represents a significant point in the development of our constitutional system. Much of its impact came through inspiring and supporting future developments, such as 'habeas corpus': that a person may not be detained without legal reason. Furthermore, it predated the existence of the UK by five centuries, and was an English document (though written in Latin).
What are the sources of the UK constitution?
The sources of the UK constitution are various, including both law and other less formal documents, without legal force.

Acts of the UK Parliament: certain pieces of primary legislation enacted by the UK Parliament form a major source for aspects of the UK constitution. These laws provide for: the devolution settlements; the right to vote and the holding of elections; the upholding of human rights; the prohibition of discrimination; the existence of the Supreme Court; and much else. As mentioned previously, despite the constitutional significance of these statutes, there is no clear formal means of distinguishing them from more regular laws which deal with policy areas such as education and transport.

Conventions: are understandings about how the constitution functions. They can be hard to define precisely and in a way that commands wide agreement; and they lack hard legal force. But conventions are the source of some of the most important features of the UK system of government. For instance, that the Prime Minister should be a member of the House of Commons able to command the confidence of that institution is only a convention. Traditionally, conventions tended not to be written down in official documents. But, increasingly in recent decades, accounts of them have come to be included in texts published by bodies such as the UK government. These include the Cabinet Manual and the Ministerial Code.

Common law: the UK has what's known as a 'common law' system, meaning that judges declare the law as derived from custom and precedent. Although it is the role of the courts to interpret the rules, not to make them; in practice, through identifying what the law is, judges can create it. In doing so, they have established important features of the UK constitution, such as individual rights and the idea that public authorities are subject to limitations and do not possess arbitrary power.

Authoritative works: in the UK system, as we have seen, the constitution is spread over a number of documents and sources, which can make it particularly hard to decipher. Given this, the interpretations of experts seeking to make sense of the system can become particularly important and influential. In fact, they can become so influential to perceptions of the system that they seem to become part of it. The views of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century legal scholar, Albert Venn Dicey, for instance, came to underpin the widely accepted doctrine known as 'parliamentary sovereignty'. The political journalist, Walter Bagehot, writing in the nineteenth century, helped shape the conception and operation of a constitutional monarchy. Although knowledge of these works has declined since the twentieth century, they continue to be important today, having shaped the ideas even of those who do not know what their source is.
What key reforms have been made to the UK constitution over time?
Although they do not provide a comprehensive picture, we can get a sense of the changing UK constitution through a number of key Acts of Parliament.

1536/1543: two laws now known as the 'Acts of Union' between Wales and England legally incorporated Wales into England. Among other measures, the 1536 law prevented the use of the Welsh language in court proceedings; while the 1543 Act provided more detail to the general settlement set out in the earlier law.

The Bill of Rights 1689: the Catholic King James II was defeated in the revolution of 1688-89 and replaced by Mary II and William III (the Prince of Orange), ruling jointly. The Bill of Rights in essence established the terms of his ascension to the throne, and was the outcome of negotiation between William and contemporary political leaders. It was a statute of particular constitutional importance in firmly establishing the authority and independence of Parliament in relation to the monarch. Laws could no longer be suspended or got rid of without the consent of Parliament. It also contained provisions to further protect the liberty and security of the individual.

The Act of Settlement 1701: prevented Catholics from taking the English throne and provided for the ascension of the House of Hanover. In doing so, it established Parliament's right to decide on the line of succession, further enhancing its power. It also contained important constitutional provisions relating to the independence of the judiciary. The Act protected the salaries and positions of judges, aiming to give them the security to enforce the law without fear of retribution.

The Treaty and Acts of Union of 1706-1707: provided for the union of Scotland and England. Two Acts were passed, one by the English Parliament and one by the Scottish Parliament, implementing the Treaty of Union. Whilst England and Scotland had the same monarch since 1603, they retained separate legislatures. After the Acts of Union, they united to form a single legislature: the Parliament of Great Britain, and a single state. Nonetheless, Scotland retained its own legal system, arrangements for education, local government, and religion.

Act of Union 1800: brought about a Union of Ireland and Great Britain. This arrangement began on a controversial footing because it was not accompanied by measures to remove political discrimination against Catholics.

The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949: established in law the primacy of the House of Commons and reduced the power of the House of Lords. The Acts meant that the Lords could in most cases no longer veto legislation if the Commons was determined to pass it. Bills could be presented for Royal Assent without the approval of the second chamber, as long a certain amount of time had elapsed and certain other conditions were met. The Lords no longer had any power at all to reject bills certified as relating to financial matters, giving the Commons clear control over money.

The European Communities Act 1972: provided for the UK's ascension to the three European Communities (the European Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Coal and Steel Community). Constitutionally, the most significant aspect of the Act was that European Community Law (later EU law) became incorporated and binding within UK domestic law. Furthermore, it stipulated that Community Law was 'supreme' within a member state, with potential conflicts between domestic law and EU legislation overseen by the European Court of Justice. It eventually became established that an Act of Parliament could be 'disapplied' in as far as it contradicted European law - a new departure for the UK constitution.

The Human Rights Act 1998: gave direct effect in domestic law to the rights contained within the European Convention on Human Rights, which was adopted in 1950 after the Second World War. The 1998 Act meant that human rights cases could be heard in UK courts, rather than individuals having to take their case to the European Court of Human Rights. Additionally, it stipulates that as far as possible judges must interpret Acts of Parliament so they are compatible with the rights in the Convention. If this is not possible, they may issue a declaration stating that the legislation is incompatible. However, this does not affect the validity of the primary legislation and the law remains the same unless it is altered by Parliament.

The House of Lords Act 1999: reduced the size of the House of Lords and largely removed hereditary peerages (where an individual could inherit a seat in the Lords through their family). It reduced the number of peers from 1330 to 669.

The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018: repealed the European Communities Act 1972 (see above), thus removing the provision that EU legislation automatically takes effect as domestic law in the UK. It was introduced by the Theresa May government in 2018 as part of the process of the UK's exit from the European Union. It transferred all EU law onto the UK statute book and gave ministers powers to make changes to this 'retained EU law' in the future.
What are the advantages of having an 'uncodified' constitution?
Some praise the UK's uncodified constitution for its flexibility. As the timeline above indicates, the constitution has been modified frequently over many years in response to changing circumstances. Its proponents argue this allows for a pragmatic approach, where different things can be tried, tested and developed, with an optimal arrangement being honed over time. They point to other countries with hard to change codified constitutions that have been unable to update their political systems in line with changing attitudes and political realities. The issue of gun ownership in the United States provides one often cited example of this, where controls have been hard to implement because of the 2 nd Amendment.

Many also believe that having an uncodified constitution is more democratic. Rather than being bound by the decisions of past generations, it allows for each successive generation to influence the constitution through the representatives they elect. If a party with a constitutional reform agenda is elected, they are able to carry out what the people have voted for. The new Labour government of 1997 had a wide-ranging constitutional programme, including devolution and human rights, that might have been difficult to implement otherwise. In an uncodified constitution, its supporters argue, it is elected politicians, rather than unelected judges, who have the final say.
What are the disadvantages of having an 'uncodified' constitution?
Critics of the uncodified constitution argue that it leaves the political system open to abuse. In the UK system, there are few checks on the power of a government with a majority in the House of Commons, which could alter the rules for its own advantage. In theory, a powerful government could abolish the devolved legislatures and repeal the Human Rights Act. There are also few barriers against a government rushing through poorly thought-out changes to the constitution.

For some the UK's constitution is pragmatic, for others it is piecemeal. In other words, changes often happen in stops and starts and through gradual, sporadic tweaks. When the constitution isn't considered as a whole, they say, it can lead to unintended negative consequences.

Finally, many argue that the UK's uncodified constitution is confusing and ambiguous. This makes it more difficult for citizens to fully understand, and therefore to know when a government is abusing its position. This lack of clarity can also be exploited by those in power to get away with things that would be more difficult if the rules were clearer. It also can make the business of governing harder, as there will be doubts surrounding the roles and responsibilities of different political institutions. Proponents of a codified constitution argue that stating clearly all in one place how the political system operates would enable the government to better serve the public and the public to better engage with government.
PowerPoint
Click here for a PowerPoint on the basics of the UK constitution, that condenses the information above. The PowerPoint is primarily designed for teachers covering the topic.
Further reading:
Vernon Bogdanor, Brexit and our unprotected constitution

Andrew Blick, Populism and the UK Constitution

Nat le Roux, 'Unconstitutional Democracy?'

Nat le Roux, Is there a tension between Parliamentary Democracy and referendums?

From the UK Parliament website:

Human Rights Act Review: Do not risk UK's constitutional settlement and enforcement of rights by amending Act, urge MPs and Peers

The Parliament Acts explained by the UK Parliament website

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The UK constitution - The Constitution Society

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A detailed explanation of the development of the UK's constitution: written by experts but easy to understand.

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Justice secretary to get power to veto sentencing guidance

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Shabana Mahmood has introduced a requirement for any new rules to be approved by her.

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Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice - GOV.UK

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English Common Law is a fascinating legal system that has evolved over centuries through key cases and rulings that have shaped the foundation of modern law. Let's delve into some examples that highlight the essence of this rich tradition:

1. Habeas Corpus
One of the most fundamental principles in English Common Law is habeas corpus, which protects individuals from unlawful detention. The landmark case of Rex v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms established that even in cases involving national security, the government must disclose the reasons for a person's detention. This case reaffirmed the importance of habeas corpus as a safeguard against arbitrary imprisonment.

2. Donoghue v. Stevenson
In the famous case of Donoghue v. Stevenson, the concept of negligence in tort law was revolutionized. This ruling established the duty of care owed by manufacturers to consumers, leading to the development of modern product liability law. The case involved a woman who found a decomposed snail in her bottle of ginger beer and successfully sued the manufacturer for negligence, setting a precedent for consumer protection.

3. R v. Dudley and Stephens
The case of R v. Dudley and Stephens presents a moral dilemma that tested the boundaries of necessity in criminal law. In this case, survivors of a shipwreck killed and ate a crew member to stay alive. The court held that necessity could not justify murder, establishing the principle that the sanctity of human life prevails even in extreme circumstances.

These examples illustrate the significance of key cases and rulings in shaping English Common Law and its enduring impact on legal systems around the world. Through these cases, we witness the intricate interplay between justice, morality, and the evolution of legal principles that continue to guide our understanding of law today.

Exploring an Example of English Common Law: Key Insights and Analysis

Understanding English Common Law:
English Common Law is a legal system that originated in England and has been influential in many countries, including the United States. It is a system of law based on judicial decisions and customs rather than on written statutes. One key feature of English Common Law is the principle of precedent, where judges are bound to follow the decisions of higher courts in similar cases.

Key Insights and Analysis:
1.

Precedent: Precedent is a fundamental concept in English Common Law. When a court makes a ruling on a particular issue, that decision becomes a precedent that other courts are generally obligated to follow when faced with similar issues.

2.

Stare Decisis: Stare Decisis is the principle that courts should adhere to precedent and make decisions based on previous rulings. This principle helps ensure consistency and predictability in the legal system.

3.

Rulings: English Common Law is known for its landmark cases that have shaped legal principles and doctrines. For example, the case of Donoghue v Stevenson established the modern law of negligence, which has had a significant impact on tort law.

4.

Evolving Nature: While English Common Law is based on precedent, it is not static and can evolve over time. Courts may reinterpret existing laws or develop new legal principles to adapt to changing societal needs.

Implications for Clients:
Understanding English Common Law and its key insights can be crucial for clients involved in legal disputes or seeking legal advice. Knowing how precedent and rulings shape the law can help clients navigate the legal system more effectively and anticipate potential outcomes in their cases.

By grasping the principles of English Common Law and its application in key cases, clients can better comprehend the legal landscape and make informed decisions when engaging with the legal process.

Exploring Common Law Decisions: Examples and Insights
Understanding Common Law Decisions
Common law is a legal system where judicial decisions are based on precedent rather than statutes. This means that courts make decisions based on previous rulings in similar cases rather than relying solely on legislative statutes. This system allows for flexibility and the evolution of the law over time.

Key Elements of Common Law Decisions

Precedent: Precedent is a fundamental principle in common law. Courts are bound by decisions made in higher courts within the same jurisdiction. Lower courts must follow the decisions of higher courts when the cases are similar.

Stare Decisis: Stare decisis, which means "to stand by things decided," is a doctrine that obligates courts to follow historical cases when making decisions.

Judicial Interpretation: Common law decisions often involve judges interpreting statutes, regulations, and prior case law to apply to the current case.

Case-by-Case Development: Common law evolves case by case as judges render decisions that become part of the body of common law.

Examples of Common Law Decisions
1. Roe v. Wade (1973): This landmark case in the United States established a woman's legal right to have an abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The decision was based on the concept of a right to privacy.

2. Brown v. Board of Education (1954): In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that state laws establishing separate public schools for black and white students were unconstitutional. This decision was based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. Miranda v. Arizona (1966): This case established the Miranda rights, which are rights that must be read to individuals taken into custody before any interrogation occurs. This decision was based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

These examples illustrate how common law decisions can have a significant impact on society and shape legal principles for future cases.

Uncovering the Crucial Element Behind the Evolution of English Common Law
Understanding the Evolution of English Common Law
English Common Law, the legal system developed in England over centuries, has had a profound influence on legal systems worldwide. To comprehend the evolution of English Common Law, it is crucial to explore its key elements and pivotal cases. One fundamental aspect that underpins the development of English Common Law is the concept of precedent.

Precedent:

Precedent refers to the practice of deciding current cases based on previous rulings.

It ensures consistency and predictability in the legal system.

There are two types of precedents: binding precedents and persuasive precedents.

Key Cases and Rulings:
English Common Law has been shaped by landmark cases and rulings that have established legal principles and doctrines. Some examples include:

Donoghue v Stevenson (1932): This case established the principle of duty of care in negligence.

R v Dudley and Stephens (1884): This case dealt with the defense of necessity in criminal law.

Miranda v Arizona (1966): While not an English case, it influenced English Common Law by introducing the concept of Miranda rights.

The Role of Judges:
In the evolution of English Common Law, judges play a critical role in interpreting laws and setting precedents. Their decisions contribute to the development and refinement of legal principles over time.

Conclusion:
The evolution of English Common Law is a fascinating journey that has been shaped by precedent, key cases, and the interpretation of judges. Understanding these elements is essential for grasping the foundation of the legal system in England and its enduring impact on legal systems globally.

The Significance of Understanding Examples of English Common Law

Exploring examples of English common law, including key cases and rulings, is essential for anyone interested in the legal system. Common law forms the basis of the legal systems in many English-speaking countries and plays a significant role in shaping judicial decisions.

Studying key cases and rulings can provide valuable insights into legal principles, precedents, and the evolution of the law over time. Understanding how common law works can help individuals comprehend legal reasoning, interpret statutes, and predict potential outcomes in legal disputes.

However, it is crucial to verify and cross-check the information presented in any article discussing examples of English common law. Legal concepts can be complex and nuanced, and interpretations may vary based on jurisdiction and context.

Importance of Seeking Professional Assistance

Legal matters require careful analysis and expertise. While articles like this one can provide useful background information, they are not a substitute for professional advice. If you are facing a legal issue or need specific guidance, it is advisable to consult with a qualified expert in the field.

Remember, the information provided here is solely for informational purposes. Each case is unique, and legal outcomes can differ based on various factors. Relying solely on general information without seeking personalized advice may not be in your best interest.

Encouragement to Seek Qualified Assistance

If you have questions about examples of English common law or any legal matter, do not hesitate to reach out to a knowledgeable professional. Seeking assistance from a qualified expert can help you navigate the complexities of the legal system and make informed decisions.

Legal issues can have far-reaching consequences, and having the right guidance is crucial. By consulting with a legal expert, you can ensure that your rights are protected and your interests are represented effectively.

In conclusion, understanding examples of English common law is a valuable pursuit that can enhance your legal knowledge. However, always remember to approach legal matters with caution, verify information carefully, and seek assistance from a qualified professional when needed.

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Examples of English Common Law: Key Cases and Rulings - Abogados Gold

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English common law is a legal system based on precedents set by past court decisions. Examples include contract law, property law, and tort law.

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“How King John’s Reign Led to the Magna Carta: A Turning Point in History”

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Free General Legal English Course Lesson 1 - Recording from 7th April 2020.

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Dan O’Donoghue, Judith Moritz, Lauren Hirst & Rachael Lazaro

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Nurse Lucy Letby guilty of murdering seven babies on neonatal unit

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The 33-year-old is convicted of killing babies at the hospital neonatal unit where she worked.

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Simon de Montfort and the emergence of Parliament

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Brexit: What is the new Northern Ireland deal?

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R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister & Cherry and others v Adv.General for Scotland

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If you have been charged with an either-way offence, you may be asking yourself what 'triable either-way' actually means. Oftentimes, legal jargon can add to the stress of being involved in a criminal trial.

It is natural to want to understand as much as possible about what you are up against so that you can prepare your case accordingly and give appropriate instructions to your criminal defence solicitor. You might wonder how an either-way offence differs from a summary offence or an indictable offence. Perhaps you are asking yourself if you get to choose where the case is held, or if this is a matter for the Magistrate to decide at your first appearance. You might also be wondering whether you should elect for your case to be heard in the Magistrate's Court or the Crown Court. These are important questions that we set out to explore in this article. If you have further questions, know that there is no substitute for tailored legal advice from a criminal defence solicitor.

What are the three types of offences?

Criminal offences in England and Wales are split into three categories: summary only offences, either-way offences, and indictable only offences. These offence categories determine which court in which a case will be heard.
Summary offences
Summary offences are less serious offences that are usually heard in the Magistrate's Court. However, a summary offence can be tried in the Crown Court, if:

it is linked to an indictable offence; and

it could be punishable by a prison sentence or a disqualification from driving.

As a general principle, young offenders under the age of 18 should be tried summarily wherever possible. This means that their case will usually be heard in the Magistrate's Court. However, young offenders accused of serious offences such as murder or other violent or sexual offences will have to go to the Crown Court. They may also have to go to the Crown Court where they commit an offence with another defendant aged over the age of 17, and it is determined that it is in the interests of justice for their cases to be heard together.
Summary offence examples
Summary offences are usually petty offences. They include:
Either-way offences
An either-way offence, also known as an indictable offence, may be heard either in the Magistrate's Court or in the Crown Court. The defendant will initially appear in the Magistrate's Court. Both the defendant, and the Magistrate have the option to request that the case is transferred to the Crown Court.

The Magistrate will consider whether their sentencing powers are adequate to give the defendant a just sentence, if they are convicted. The Magistrate will also assess whether the case has any particular complexities that would render it unsuitable to be heard in the Magistrate's Court (for example, whether expert witness evidence is required).

If the Magistrate considers they have sufficient powers to hear the case, the decision then lies with the defendant as to whether they want their case to be heard by the Magistrate or in the Crown Court before a jury.

Appearing in the Crown Court can be daunting, and the court's sentencing powers mean that if you are convicted you may face a heftier sentence. On the other hand, evidence suggests that you are less likely to be convicted if you appear in the Crown Court. A jury of ordinary men and women is more likely to give a defendant the benefit of the doubt, compared with a Magistrate who may be jaded by many years of hearing similar cases.
Either-way offence examples
Either-way offences are crimes that can be more or less serious depending on the circumstances of the offence. For example:

Theft, under the Theft Act 1968; the value of the items stolen will be an important determining factor in whether the offence is summary only or indictable.

Possession of drugs, under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971; the quantity of drugs is likely to determine in which court the offence is heard.

Indictable only offences
Indictable only offences must be heard in the Crown Court. The Crown Court has greater sentencing powers than the Magistrate's Court. An indictment is a formal notice issued by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) notifying the defendant of the criminal offence for which they have been accused. Indictable offences are the most serious category of offence. Often the punishment for an indictable only offence is a sentence of imprisonment. However, it could also be a substantial fine.

If you are charged with an indictable offence, you will first appear in the Magistrate's Court. Once you have given your plea, your case will then be transferred to the Crown Court. If you plead guilty, you will be transferred for sentencing. If you plead not guilty, your case will be transferred for trial.
Indictable only examples
The following are examples of indictable offences:

Who decides in which court an either-way offence case is heard?

Both the Magistrate's Court and the defendant have a role to play in deciding where the case will be heard. The court will consider whether:

it has adequate sentencing powers

if the case has issues of complexity that make it more suitable to be heard in the Crown Court

If the Magistrate's Court concludes that it is capable of hearing the case, the defendant will be asked to elect whether they would prefer the case to be heard by the Magistrate or before a jury in the Crown Court.

What time limits are applicable to either-way offences?

Unlike summary only offences where there is general rule that there is a time limit of twelve months from the criminal act for the prosecution to commence, there is no specific time limit for either-way offences. In some cases, such as historical sexual offences, a prosecution can be brought many years after the events in question. These types of cases tend to bring with them evidential difficulties, which means they are more likely to be heard in the Crown Court.

What are the maximum sentences used in either-way offences?

The maximum sentence that the Magistrate's Court can give for a single offence is twelve months imprisonment. The Magistrate's Court can sentence a person to up to 12 months' imprisonment in total as a cumulation of more than one sentence for different charges. The Magistrate's Court can also issue other punitive measures such as bans, fines, and community service orders. In order for the defendant to receive a sentence that is heftier that these maximum sentences, the case must be transferred to the Crown Court.

In statutes containing either-way offences, two different maximum sentences are usually stated. One for if the offence is tried summarily, and another for if the offence is tried on indictment. For example, fraud is an either-way offence. Section 1(3) of the Fraud Act 2006 states that:

A person who is guilty of fraud is liable:

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or to both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to a fine (or to both).

This means that if the fraud offence is tried in the Magistrate's Court, the maximum sentence is a term not exceeding 12 months. The maximum fine that can be given in the Magistrate's Court is £5000, therefore this would be the maximum fine if the offence was tried summarily. By contrast, in the Crown Court, there is no limit on the size of the fine that can be issued, and the defendant could be imprisoned for up to 10 years.

Where to get further help

Either-way offences, particularly if they are heard on indictment in the Crown Court, can result in substantial sentences of imprisonment. Therefore, if you have been charged with an either-way offence, seek the advice of a criminal defence solicitor as soon as possible. At Stuart Miller Solicitors, we are here to help. We can advise you of the pros and cons of your case being heard in the Magistrate's Court or in the Crown Court. This advice depends on the circumstances of your case, so there is no substitute for a consultation with an experienced solicitor. Contact us for a no obligation consultation today.

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What are triable either way offences? - Stuart Miller Solicitors

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Triable either way offences are serious crimes can carry hefty penalties, including imprisonment, fines, and a criminal record.

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DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITY | The Lawyers & Jurists

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An outline of the operation of the doctrine of precedent explaining the concepts of stare decisis, ratio decidendi, obiter dicta, binding and persuasive precedents, the hierarchy of the courts, overruling and distinguishing.

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Abstract. Courts may reason using precedents in various ways, but not all of them satisfy the rule of law. This article provides two ways that are compatible wi

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New students are streaming into law schools across the country. But to become the next generation of lawyers, judges and activists, they'll first need to read through a mountain of case law. In case law, judges define what acts of parliament actually mean, explain the common law and resolve disputes between citizens, organisations and sometimes state institutions.

Newspapers occasionally publish a list of the most important cases for students to be aware of. But it's not just students who could benefit from learning about the law - after all, cases decided hundreds of years ago can set the precedent for decisions that the courts in England and Wales make today.

Here's my pick of some of the most important cases throughout history: ones that can teach us all something about how the law mirrors social and political attitudes, while revealing the principles and patterns that make up the country's version of justice.

1. The Case of Proclamations, 1610

Over 400 years ago, the chief justice, Sir Edward Coke, ruled that King James I could not prohibit new building in London without the support of parliament. King James believed that he had a divine right to make any laws that he wished. But the court opposed his view, and decided that the monarchy could not wield its power in this arbitrary way.

By the end of that century, the Glorious Revolution laid the foundation for today's constitutional monarchy, whereby whoever is king or queen respects the law-making authority of the elected parliament.

2. Entick v Carrington, 1765

Author and schoolmaster John Entick was suspected of writing a libellous pamphlet against the government. In response, the secretary of state sent Nathan Carrington, along with a group of other king's men, to search Entick's house for evidence. Entick then sued the men for trespass.

The court decided that the secretary of state did not have the legal authority to issue a search warrant, and therefore Carrington had trespassed. This case reflects the principle that "no man is above the law" - not even the secretary of state. To this day, law enforcement agencies may only do what the law allows.

3. R v Dudley and Stephens, 1884

In this case, the survivors of a shipwreck who killed and ate the youngest and weakest crew member were prosecuted for murder. Their defence was based on "necessity" - that they needed to eat the boy, as they were unlikely to survive and the boy probably would have died anyway.

It may have been a "custom of the sea" that cannibalism was allowed under such circumstances, but the defendants were found guilty on the basis that all life is equal - the law expected them to die, rather than kill another.

But the public was sympathetic to the defendants, and their sentences were later commuted from death to six months imprisonment. The boy was named Richard Parker, as is the tiger in the Man Booker prize-winning novel Life of Pi.

4. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co, 1893

Mrs Carlill sued the manufacturer of the carbolic smoke ball - a device for preventing colds and flu - which had promised a reward of £100 for any one catching flu following the use of its product but then refused to pay out.

The court decided that this promise, together with Mrs Carlill's use of the product as directed, amounted to a legally binding contract and she was entitled to the reward. The case explores many of the principles that must be present in modern day contracts, such as offer and acceptance, before we can make legally enforceable agreements between each other. Yet this most famous of cases may never have been brought at all, had Mrs Carlill not been married to a solicitor.

5. Donoghue and Stevenson, 1932

In a case originating in Scotland, Mrs Donoghue was given a bottle of ginger beer which allegedly contained the decomposed remains of a snail. She claimed to have suffered shock and gastroenteritis as a result. But as she had not bought the drink herself, she had no contract on which to sue.

Nevertheless, the court extended the law of negligence to require reasonable care towards those likely to be affected by a person's or company's actions. Was there really a snail? We don't know for sure, as Mr Stevenson died before the evidence could be heard.

6. Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 1969

To be guilty of a criminal offence, there often needs to be unlawful act accompanied by a guilty state of mind, such as a criminal intent. So, having accidentally driven his car onto a policeman's foot, did Mr Fagan commit an assault when he decided not to remove it?

Mr Fagan suggested not because he had no criminal intent at the time the car first went on to the foot, but the court held that deciding to leave the car there was a combination of act and intention, which meant he was guilty of the offence.

7. R v R, 1991

The law is constantly evolving to meet changing social attitudes. In this case, the House of Lords swept away the common law rule that a man could not be guilty of raping his wife. The previous rule was based on a 1736 pronouncement that:

By their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given herself up to her husband, consent which she cannot retract.

The House of Lords ruled that for modern times, marriage is a partnership of equals and any other suggestion was "quite unacceptable".

8. The Belmarsh case, 2004

The Human Rights Act empowered judges to review acts of parliament, to check if they are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Using this power, the House of Lords ruled that a statute which allowed terrorist suspects to be detained indefinitely without trial breached the suspects' human rights.

The case shows how modern courts ask not just whether government action is authorised by law, but also whether it is compatible with our rights. Parliament amended the law as a result.

In 2016, Gina Miller brought a case against the UK government, claiming that it couldn't trigger Article 50 - and therefore Brexit - without an act of parliament. Ruling in Miller's favour in 2017, the Supreme Court drew on the 1610 case of proclamations. So there's no doubt that even the oldest cases still have the power to shape society today.

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Eight cases from across history which still shape the law today

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From cannibalism to carbolic smoke balls, these are some of the fascinating cases that have made the law of England and Wales what it is today.

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Classification of Law - Criminal vs Civil Law and Public vs Private Law

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What is the Privy Council of the United Kingdom?

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Cases capture human stories, shape public debate and establish new expectations of the state. Their wider effect can reflect society's consciousness but often lead to new laws. Cases and judges' decisions are a law student's bread and butter. Here are a few you will come across:

Care for thy neighbour:

In 1932 Mrs Donoghue launched the modern law of negligence, after finding her ginger beer less than appealing. Known to generations of law students as the "snail in the bottle" case, it is best known for Lord Atkin's famous neighbour principle. In declaring we should take reasonable care to avoid harm to those we foresee can be affected, he established when we owe duties to each other. Accidents and injuries were forever to be reshaped into claims and compensation.

Foreign detainees

Known as the Belmarsh decision, there is no modern case that better sets the boundary between national security and civil liberties. Decided by a panel of nine law lords, the 2004 decision became an important milestone in judges protecting both the rule of law and human rights. In a challenge to the Labour policy of indefinitely detaining foreign terrorist suspects without charge, the majority declared the British state acted illegally and in a discriminatory way. In his powerful rejection, Lord Hoffman stated "The real threat to the life of the nation... comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these."

Spanish fisherman

Providing the legal backdrop to a decade of EU-scepticism is the 1991 case of Factortame, this case on the rights of Spanish fisherman to fish in British waters is a mainstay on any public law course. It confirmed the priority of European laws over UK acts of parliament and thus struck a blow against parliament's legal supremacy. In so doing it provoked much constitutional debate about the extent of EU legal powers - and Britain's relationship with Europe as a whole.

McLibel

Officially the longest case in English legal history, this ten year David v Goliath libel battle exposed the price of justice when corporations take on individuals. The fast food giant sued green campaigners David Morris and Helen Steel for libel over a stinging pamphlet criticising the their ethical credentials. McDonalds walked away with both a win and a PR disaster. The European court of human rights later declared in 2005 that the pair, who were unfunded and were representing themselves, had been denied their right to a fair trial.

Jodie and Mary

In the year 2000 the plight of conjoined twins made front page news. The question was whether it was justified to separate and knowingly "kill" the weaker Mary in order to save her stronger sister Jodie, given both were destined for a premature death. In spite of parents favouring non-separation, doctors wanted a declaration that such an operation would be lawful. In a maze of ethical and legal conflicts, Lord Justice Ward rather hollowly declared that "this is a court of law, not a court of morals."

After admitting to sleepless nights, the judges allowed the doctors to separate. Lord Justice Brooke declared the situation as one of necessity, allowing the option of a lesser evil. The stronger twin survived and made a full recovery. The thankfully rare case, otherwise found in philosophy debates, demonstrates the relationship between law and morality, perhaps one of the first questions on a legal theory course.

Domestic abuse

A year after marital rape was declared rape in 1991, came the case of Kiranjit Ahluwalia, who had been abused for over a decade by a violent husband. She was convicted of murder after setting her husband alight as he slept. In recognising long-term domestic abuse and the possibility of a slow-burn anger that led to her snapping, the case was a cause célèbre for feminist and domestic abuse groups. Though finally the decision in the end was based on diminished responsibility, it was seen as a benchmark for tackling the gender bias in the criminal law and raising public awareness of domestic abuse. Ahluwalia's conviction was reduced to manslaughter, and she was freed.

Pinochet

International human rights law received a global TV audience in 1998 after former Chilean dictator General Pinochet was arrested in London. Under the rules of universal jurisdiction, he was detained following a Spanish extradition request facing charges of crimes against humanity. The law lords declared that there could be a limit to the immunity enjoyed by heads of states. Though Pinochet was never extradited, the case sent out a strong message about accountability for leaders who commit human rights abuses,before the international criminal court was established.

The case is also well known among lawyers when after the first hearing it was disclosed that that one of the ruling law lords, Lord Hoffmann, was a director of Amnesty International, a party to the cases. The entire hearing had to be repeated to show that "justice must not only be done but be seen to be done."

The internet age

Injunctions, twitter, privacy and the extra marital activities of footballers were all the rage in early 2011. Nothing struck up more attention than the application for an injunction by Ryan Giggs against the Sun. His name was widely tweeted and the situation became more farcical when MP John Hemming revealed his name in the House of Commons. The debate forced the law to react to an age of the internet and social media. The case followed a long line of celebrity court battles in the 2000's, and became another marker in the debate between balancing freedom of expression and the right to a private life.

From across the Atlantic arguably no case better demonstrates the political and social impact of judicial decisions. The landmark decision in 1973 upheld a woman's right to an abortion. Synonymous with abortion in the USA. Hundreds of thousands march on the US supreme court on the anniversary of the decision each year.

Any of Denning's cases

In our common law system, many judges leave their mark on a particular area of law. However clichéd, no judge will live longer in the memory of law students than the controversial Lord Denning. He demonstrates the power of personality in a subject that is often seen technical, dry and rule-based. In the words of Lord Irvine, "the word Denning became a byword for the law itself." Denning reminds us that all cases are eventually decided by individuals who are made up of values and personal perspectives that make them who they are. Students, you are encouraged to think, debate and learn the law in the same spirit. Good luck.

Are there any need-to-know cases missing from this list? Add them in the comments below.
Topics

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The essential cases every law student should know | Birju Kotecha

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Cases capture human stories, shape public debate and establish new expectations of the state. Their wider effect can reflect society's consciousness but often lead to new laws. Cases and judges' decisions are a law student's bread and butter.

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Brewminate: A Bold Blend of News and Ideas

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Prior to the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, there was no unitary, national legal system.

Before 1066 the English legal system involved a mass of oral customary rules, which varied according to region. The law of the Jutes in the south of England, for example, was different from that of the Mercians in the middle of the country (see map below). Each county had its own local court dispensing its own justice in accordance with local customs that varied from community to community and were enforced in often arbitrary fashion. For example, courts generally consisted of informal public assemblies that weighed conflicting claims in a case and, if unable to reach a decision, might require an accused to show their guilt or innocence by carrying a red-hot iron or snatching a stone from a cauldron of boiling water or some other 'test' of veracity. If the defendant's wound healed within a prescribed period, he was set free as innocent; if not, execution usually followed.

Figure 1: A map of pre-1066 Britain - a country with different regional laws

Unlike continental civil law, the English system does not originate from any particular set of texts but from what has been called 'tradition expressed in action'. It began as customary law used in the King's court to settle disputes and conflicts which affected the monarch directly. To begin with, these only included the graver crimes which became 'Pleas of the Crown'. After the Norman invasion there were still many different types of court apart from the royal court - the stannary (tin mining) courts of Devon and Cornwall, the courts of the royal hunting forests, for example - but principally, in potential rivalry with the royal court, were the feudal and manorial courts. It was during Henry II's reign that the clerics in his court began specialising in legal business and acting in a judicial capacity. Clerics were part of the King's royal entourage.

In 1154, Henry II institutionalised common law by creating a unified court system 'common' to the country through incorporating and elevating local custom to the national level, ending local control, eliminating arbitrary remedies, and reinstating a jury system of citizens sworn on oath to investigate criminal accusations and civil claims. Judges of the realm went on regular journeys throughout the country bringing the King's justice to every citizen. Their aim was that there should be a common system of law throughout the land, hence the laws became known as the common law. The travelling judges formed a nucleus of judges with national jurisdiction who had no local roots.

They were thus much less susceptible to the corruption which had spoilt a similar attempt earlier in the twelfth century in which the royal judges had actually been based in the local communities. It was under Henry II that judges were for the first time sent on 'circuits', hearing pleas in the major places they visited and taking over the work of the local courts. In time the decisions of the judges were written down. As the decisions of these courts came to be recorded and published, so the practice developed where past decisions (precedents) would be cited in argument before the courts and would be regarded as being of persuasive authority.

These practices developed into the common law of England, the law which was available throughout the realm. Perhaps the most convincing of the reasons why Henry II should be regarded as the 'father of the common law' is that he was largely responsible for the regional and itinerant royal justice through which the law truly became common - available to all. It is true that Henry II, who reigned from 1154 to 1189, did much of significance to enhance the development of the common law, for instance by popularising the King's court. However, we don't know how the King's court (called the Curia Regis) acted during the Norman period before Henry II, because the earliest documents date from his reign, so it might be presumptuous to credit too much to Henry II. In any event, many factors of a general historical nature contributed to the development of the common law and it might be more meaningful to speak of the various parties which helped nurture the common law from its first green shoots to its full bloom rather than to try to find a 'father'.

In the expansion of the King's legal powers, an important role was played by the clerics. They developed a range of claim forms, called writs, and established procedures which, perhaps significantly, gave them greater importance and provided them with a generous income! Another important development, for example, was the expansion of the 'King's Peace'. This was the monarch's, as opposed to a local lord's, right to deal with any local disorder or crime.

Another reason the royal courts obtained a lot of business and thus power was the interpretation given to the Statute of Gloucester (1278) by the royal judges. This statute provided that no cases involving an amount of less than 40 shillings should be brought in the royal courts, but that they should be tried before local tribunals. The judges interpreted this to mean that no personal actions to recover a sum greater than 40 shillings could be commenced in the local courts, thus reserving all important cases for themselves. It is relevant here that the judges were anxious to attract litigants because their fees varied with the amount of business done.

The distinctive feature of common law is that it represents the law of the courts as expressed in judicial decisions. The grounds for deciding cases are found in the principles provided by past court decisions, as contrasted to a system which is based solely on Acts of Parliament. Besides the system of judicial precedents, other characteristics of common law are trial by jury and the doctrine of the supremacy of the law. Originally, supremacy of the law meant that not even the King was above the law; today it means that acts of governmental agencies and ministers can be challenged in the courts.
Originally published by The Open University under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International license.

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A Brief History of the Development of the Common Law in Medieval England

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Prior to the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, there was no unitary, national legal system. Before 1066 the English legal system involved a mass of oral customary rules, which varied according to...

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An ancient system

The English and Welsh legal system has evolved over more than a 1,000 years and is still changing to meet the needs of modern society. It is widely regarded as one of the best and most independent in the world.

A real ordeal

Justice in Anglo-Saxon times (and even after the Norman invasion of 1066) was a combination of local and royal government. Local courts were presided over by a lord or one of his stewards, whereas the King's court - the Curia Regis - was (initially at least) presided over by the King himself.

Until the end of the 12th century, guilt or innocence in criminal cases was determined through the process of 'trial by ordeal'. Under this system, the accused would undergo a painful and dangerous 'ordeal'. They might be forced to pick up a red-hot bar of iron, pluck a stone out of a cauldron of boiling water, or something equally as painful. If their hand had begun to heal after 3 days, they were considered to have God on their side - thus proving their innocence.

Another extremely popular ordeal involved water. The accused would be tied up and thrown into lake or another body of water. If innocent, they were expected to sink.

The number of 'not guilty' verdicts recorded under the 'trial by ordeal' system is not known. William II (1087-1100) eventually banned trial by ordeal - reportedly because 50 men accused of killing his deer had passed the test - and it was condemned by the Church in 1216.

Fighting for freedom?

Criminal and civil disputes could also be decided by trial by combat, but this gradually fell into disuse for civil cases. It was banned outright in 1818, when a litigant insisted that it was allowed for his dispute, and it was realised that trial by combat was technically still an option!

The earliest judges and seeds of modern justice

During this period, judges gradually gained independence from the monarch and the government. The very first judges, back in the 12th century, were court officials who had particular experience in advising the King on the settlement of disputes. From that group evolved the 'justices in Eyre', who possessed mixed administrative and judicial powers. The justices in Eyre were not popular, and in fact came to be regarded as instruments as oppression.

Seeds of change

The seeds of the modern justice system were sown by Henry II (1154-1189), who established a jury of 12 local knights to settle disputes over the ownership of land. When Henry came to the throne, there were just 18 judges in the country - compared to more than 40,000 today.

In 1166, Henry issued a Declaration at the Assize of Clarendon (an assize was an early form of the King's Bench). The Assize of Clarendon ordered the remaining non-King's Bench judges to travel the country - which was divided into different areas known as circuits - deciding cases.

To decide cases, they would use the laws made by the judges in Westminster, a change that meant many local customs were replaced by new national laws. These national laws applied to everyone and so were common to all. Even today, we know them as the 'common law'.

The system of judges sitting in London while others travelled round the country became known as the 'assizes system'. Incredibly, it survived until 1971. The circuits remain in place today.

Origins of the King's Bench

In 1178, Henry II first chose 5 members of his personal household - 2 clergy and 3 lay - "to hear all the complaints of the realm and to do right". This, supervised by the King and "wise men" of the realm, was the origin of what was known as the Court of Common Pleas.

Eventually, a new permanent court, the Court of the King's Bench, evolved, and judicial proceedings before the King came to be seen as separate from proceedings before the King's Bench. Changes evolved slowly; even in the middle of the 14th century, under Edward III, there could be close collaboration between the Court of King's Bench and the King's Council. A 3rd common law court of justice, the Court of Exchequer, eventually emerged as the financial business of the Royal Household was split off to a specialist group of officials. The Chancellor of the Exchequer used to be a judge of that court.

The first professional judges and magistrates

Martin de Pateshull, Archdeacon of Norfolk and Dean of St Paul's, became a Justice of the bench in 1217. By the time he died in 1229 he was known as one of the finest lawyers in England - even 60 years after his death, his judgments were being referenced.

Like Martin, many judges of this era were members of the clergy - although this did not necessarily mean they were parish priests. In an era when the church was rich and the King poor, joining the clergy was often just seen as a sensible means of support.

By the middle of the 13th century, knights had begun to join members of the clergy on the bench. The first professional judges were appointed from the order of serjeants-at-law. These were advocates who practised in the Court of Common Pleas. Lawrence de Brok, a serjeant, became a judge in 1268, starting the tradition, which lasted until 1875, of serjeants being the group from which judges were chosen.

This was important, because it meant that the judiciary now had real professional experience of the law before moving on to the bench.

Over the years, serjeants were overtaken in popularity by barristers, solicitors and members of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives. Today these are the groups from which the judiciary is appointed.

Growth of independence

Even though bribes and payments were commonplace during this era, in the mid-13th century the judiciary was openly accused of corruption.

In 1346, judges were obliged to swear that "they would in no way accept gift or reward from any party in litigation before them or give advice to any man, great or small, in any action to which the King was a party himself".

Judicial salaries were also increased, possibly to make them less dependent on other forms of income.

This didn't always help; in 1350 the Chief Justice of the King's Bench, William de Thorpe, was sentenced to death for bribery (he was later pardoned, but demoted).

The first Magistrates' courts

Meanwhile, a new type of court began to evolve, which we now recognise as the Magistrates' court. Magistrates' courts hark back to the Anglo-Saxon moot court and the manorial court, but their official birth came in 1285, during the reign of Edward I - when 'good and lawful men' were commissioned to keep the King's peace.

From that point, and continuing today, magistrates (also known as Justices of the Peace) have undertaken the majority of the judicial work carried out in England and Wales (today, about 95% of criminal cases are dealt with by magistrates).

Until the introduction of our modern system of councils in the 19th century, Justices of the Peace also governed the country at a local level.

Problems with politics

During the 14th century, members of the judiciary were still involved in politics to some extent. For example, Edward III's Chancellors were common-law judges for a period of 10 years.

In 1387, 6 judges advised Richard II that a parliamentary commission set up to limit his own powers was 'invalid and traitorous'. They were all impeached, convicted and sentenced to death. Although only 1 was executed, the rest were banished to Ireland.

Unsurprisingly, for the 2 centuries which followed, the judiciary kept almost entirely away from politics.

Moving away from politics

During the turbulent 15th century - the Wars of the Roses - judges stood apart from both the warring Houses of Lancaster and York and were largely unaffected by the changes in government.

From 1540 onwards, Henry VIII had no judges in the Privy Council - his advisory body. While his son Edward VI and daughter Mary I did include judges on their own Privy Councils, Mary I removed 3 judges from office, while Elizabeth I then excluded them entirely for 40 years.

Slowly, the judiciary were becoming separate from the government. Although it was generally accepted at this time that even the King was subject to the laws of the land, the Reformation added to the sovereign's powers - the state had taken over the Church's privilege to define the laws of God and had removed the influence of the Pope as the ultimate arbiter on Earth.

So, the King remained principal lawmaker, with the judges as interpreters of that law, a potentially uneasy relationship.

Meanwhile, by the Elizabethan and early Stuart periods, assize judges on the 6 circuits in England were mainly dealing with the most serious crimes not normally handled by the local Quarter Sessions, run by Justices of the Peace. They also took a role in local administration, although this was much reduced following the English Civil War.

A risky business

On the face of it, the judiciary was becoming steadily more independent - in 1642, Charles I was forced to agree to the appointment of judges "during good behaviour", and in 1645, their salaries were raised from under £200 to £1,000 a year.

On the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, all judges - and there were just 12 at this point, 4 in each of the common law courts - remained in office.

But in 1668 the system of appointments "during pleasure" was reintroduced, and in the last 11 years of his reign Charles II sacked 11 of his judges. The next king, Charles's brother, James II, sacked 12 in just 3 years.

This was bound to affect the quality and independence of the judiciary; judges knew very well their jobs were at risk if the sovereign did not like their judgments.

A new independence...

The day after the House of Commons resolved that James II had abdicated, a parliamentary committee drew up Heads of Grievances to be presented to the new King and Queen, William III and Mary II.

This document contained, among other things: items on paying judges' salaries out of public funds, and preventing judges being removed or suspended from office, "unless by due cause of law". These grievances eventually appeared in much the same form in the Act of Settlement (1701) and have remained in place ever since.

When common law failed

As the judiciary and its associated independence developed, so did the avenues of redress open to aggrieved parties. The common law system was an improvement on what had gone before, but it was still slow, highly technical, and vulnerable to corruption, especially when civil juries were used.

Fortunately, those who felt they had been failed by the common law system could still petition the King with their grievances. Gradually, these cases were delegated to the King's Council, and eventually to one individual - the Lord Chancellor. Because of this, the Lord Chancellor came to be known as the 'Keeper of the King's conscience', and began to preside over his own court, the Court of Chancery. This dealt only with civil disputes (for example property and contract cases) and applied the law of equity - even-handedness or fairness.

By the time of Henry VIII, the Court of Chancery had become a rival to the common law courts.

But as the years went by, the Court of Chancery began to be known for the same problems it had been set up to combat: complexity, expense and delay. Also, the Lord Chancellor was free to give whatever ruling he liked in a Chancery court, unbound by the law - which made it almost impossible for lawyers to advise their clients correctly.

Changes to the system

It was not until 1830 that there was any change to the 300-year-old assize courts.

By the Law Terms Act of that year, the Court of Great Sessions was abolished, and the Welsh counties and Chester were brought into the general circuit system. Shortly afterwards, the new Central Criminal Court - the Old Bailey - was set up, unifying the administration of justice in London and surrounding areas.

In 1856, judges of the Central Criminal Court were also given the right to hear cases outside the court's ordinary jurisdiction, to ensure a fair trial where local prejudice existed or when it could offer an early trial and so avoid the delay involved in waiting for the next assizes.

County Courts, dealing with civil cases, were created under the County Courts Act 1846. In 2013 the individual County Courts were unified to form a single County Court for England and Wales.

The Judicature Act 1873 and after

In 1873, Parliament passed the Judicature Act which merged both the common law and equity and the common law courts and Court of Chancery. Although one of the Divisions of the High Court is still called the Chancery Division, all courts could now administer both equity and common law - with equity to reign supreme in any dispute.

The same Act established the High Court and the Court of Appeal and provided a right of appeal in civil cases to the Court of Appeal. Criminal appeal rights remained limited until the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act 1907.

The Court of Criminal Appeal sat for nearly 60 years, until its existence as a separate body was ended by the Criminal Appeal Act 1966. Its power passed to the Court of Appeal.

The Crown Court is created

Crown Courts as we know them today were not actually established until 1956, and then only in Liverpool and Manchester. These courts also took over the quarter sessions work in their cities.

The Royal Commission on Assizes and Quarter Sessions, 1966-1969, led to the abolition of courts of assize and quarter sessions and the establishment of a new unified Crown Court to deal with business from both, under the terms of the Courts Act 1971.

...But still not separate

Hundreds of years of evolution may have resulted in an independent judiciary - but that doesn't mean they were entirely separated from government. For example, Lord Mansfield was Lord Chief Justice and also occupied a position in the Cabinet between 1757 and 1765. More recently, Lord Cave was Home Secretary for a couple of months at the end of the First World War whilst also a serving Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.

Additionally, until 2006, the Lord Chancellor was part of the government, Parliament, and the judiciary. The Lord Chancellor's role changed drastically on 3 April 2006 as a result of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. This major change has been described as the most significant to affect the justice system since Magna Carta. The Act establishes the Lord Chief Justice as President of the Courts of England and Wales and Head of its Judiciary, a role that from 1873 had been performed by the Lord Chancellor. For the first time an express statutory duty was placed on the Lord Chancellor and other Ministers of the Crown to protect the independence of the judiciary. For the first time in its 1,000-year history, the judiciary is officially recognised as fully independent from the government and Parliament and a fully equal branch of the State.

Bibliography

Geoffrey Rivlin, Understanding the Law, Oxford, 2004
Theodore FT Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, Butterworth & Co, 1956
Judy Hodgson (ed), The English Legal Heritage, Oyez Publishing, 1979

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Overview of the judiciary - Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

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Read more about the history of the legal system in England and Wales

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During the First World War, in 1917, a decision was made by the Government to "suspend" (infringe) the Common Law rights of the subject with respect to Jury trial.

The traditional system was that persons qualified to be members of Juries (freeholders aged over 21) were called by County Sherriff's to Assizes (Now Crown Courts) and divided into "Grand" and "Petit" juries.

Grand Juries heard accusations of crimes and decided whether there was a case to answer. If there was, The Crown was required to place the matter before a Petit Jury.

Members of a Grand Jury could also make investigations on their own initiative as a posse.

The authority of a Grand Jury comes from the subject's right to be tried by his Peers per Chapter 39 of Magna Carta 1215:

No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, and by the law of the land.

The right of Grand Juries to present their verdicts to The Sovereign is acknowledged in Articles 5 and 11 of the Bill of Rights 1688:

5. Right to petition. That it is the Right of the Subjects to petition the King and all Commitments and Prosecutions for such Petitioning are Illegall...

11. Juries. That Jurors ought to be duely impannelled and returned ...

Both Magna Carta 1215 and the Bill of Rights are "statutes in force". As with many legal terms, "statute" has more than one definition. In these cases they were re-statements of the common law by The Sovereign as an exercise of the Royal Prerogative. No Parliaments were involved because in there had been lawful rebellions and "trial by battle" had settled the issue on both occasions (see footnote).

This also means that no Parliament has authority to infringe their provisions. This is also acknowledged in Article 13 of the Bill of Rights:

13. Frequent Parliaments. And that for Redresse of all Grievances and for the amending strengthening and preserveing of the Lawes Parlyaments ought to be held frequently...

"Amending" is a legal term which means "to improve". "Strengthen" and "preserve" have their natural meaning. There is no lawful authority for a Parliament to infringe the subjects Common Law rights.

Returning to the fate of Grand Juries post 1917, the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 was passed which was described as "An Act to abolish grand juries and amend the law as to the presentment of indictments;". That Act was later repealed and the practice of accepting the signature of a Court Official, instead of that of the foreman of a Grand Jury on indictments (formal charges requiring a jury trial) has continued on dubious legal grounds.

There are in force at least two statutes which still require trial by Grand Jury. The first is known as " Statute the Fifth of 1351 ":

IV. None shall be taken upon Suggestion without lawful Presentment; nor disfranchised, but by Course of Law.

Whereas it is contained in the Great Charter of the Franchises of England, that none shall be imprisoned nor put out of his Freehold, nor of his Franchises nor free Custom, unless it be by the Law of the Land; It is accorded assented, and stablished, That from henceforth none shall be taken by Petition or Suggestion made to our Lord the King, or to his Council, unless it be by Indictment or Presentment of good and lawful People of the same neighbourhood where such Deeds be done, in due Manner, or by Process made by Writ original at the Common Law; nor that none be out of his Franchises, nor of his Freeholds, unless he be duly brought into answer, and forejudged of the same by the Course of the Law; and if any thing be done against the same, it shall be redresseed and holden for none...

This is another example of a statute made by The Sovereign.

Now we turn to a statute in force made by a Parliament which requires that Grand Juries be embodied:

V. Indictment must be found by a Grand Jury within Three Years.

And to the intent that the Terror and Dread of such Criminal Accusations may in some reasonable time bee removed That . . . F1 noe Person or Persons whatsoever shall bee indicted tryed or prosecuted for any such Treason as aforesaid or for Misprision of such Treason that shall bee committed or done within the Kingdome of England Dominion of Wales or Towne of Berwick upon Tweed . . . F1 unlesse the same Indictment bee found by a Grand Jury within Three Years next after the Treason or Offence done and committed...

There we have it, Grand Juries never went away, they have been conveniently forgotten by the present establishment. That does not mean they can get away with it. In Bowles.v. Bank of England (1913) it was ruled that:

The Bill of Rights remains unrepealled and practice or custom, however prolonged ... cannot be relied on by the Crown as justifying any infringement of its provisions.

If the present legal establishment fails to do their duty, freeholders aged over 21 may, on their own authority, form Grand Juries to investigate and indict criminals.

Footnote:

Here is confirmation from Blackstone's Commentaries that "Right of War" sets lawful title to The Crown and the limitations which bind the King:

THIS conquest then by William of Normandy was, like that of Canute before, a forcible transfer of the crown of England into a new family: but, the crown being so transferred, all the inherent properties of the crown were with it transferred also. For, the victory obtained at Hastings not being a victory over the nation collectively, but only over the person of Harold, the only right that the conqueror could pretend to acquire thereby, was the right to possess the crown of England, not to alter the nature of the government. And therefore, as the English laws still remained in force, he must necessarily take the crown subject to those laws, and with all it's inherent properties; the first and principal of which was it's descendibility. Here then we must drop our race of Saxon kings, at least for a while, and derive our descents from William the conqueror as from a new stock, who acquired by right of war (such as it is, yet still the dernier resort of kings) a strong and undisputed title to the inheritable crown of England...

Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England

Book the First : Chapter the Third : Of the King and His Title P 193.

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During the First World War, in 1917, a decision was made by the Government to "suspend" (infringe) the Common Law rights of the subject with respect to Jury trial.

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: a record office for public archives or those of ecclesiastical, legal, or diplomatic proceedings

capitalized : a high court of equity in England and Wales with common-law functions and jurisdiction over causes in equity

in chancery

: in litigation in a court of chancery

also : under the superintendence of the lord chancellor

Examples of chancery in a Sentence

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'chancery.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

Middle English chancerie, alteration of chancelerie chancellery, from Anglo-French, from chanceler

14th century, in the meaning defined at sense 2a

The first known use of chancery was in the 14th century

Dictionary Entries Near chancery

Cite this Entry

"Chancery." Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chancery. Accessed 19 Sep. 2023.

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a record office for public archives or those of ecclesiastical, legal, or diplomatic proceedings; a high court of equity in England and Wales with common-law functions and jurisdiction over causes in equity; a court of equity in the American judicial system... See the full definition

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Now in the light of all of this, probably the most immediately accessible and practically useful way of categorising the law would be to divide the subject matter contextually. The law is after all, fundamentally concerned with the human world, it provides an essential framework that underpins the operation of our society, of our economic activities and our governance. This means that it is certainly practically useful to gather together relevant law, according to the different activities or institutions or problems for which the relevant law provides a framework or solution, such as family law, environmental law, tax law, perhaps employment law, banking law, company law, planning law, and perhaps intellectual property law that's concerned with copyright, for example.

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This step explains the importance of good categorisation and introduces two particularly useful approaches to categorising our law.

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Case law defined and explained with examples. Case law is law that comes from decisions made by judges in previous cases.

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The scope of judicial review of prerogative powers has been the subject of significant litigation in the context of the UK's withdrawal from the EU. On 24 January 2017, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment and declaration issued by the High Court to the effect that the government could not issue notice under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union to withdraw the UK from the EU by way of the royal prerogative, and would require authorisation of an Act of Parliament in order to do so ( R (Miller and Santos) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5). The Supreme Court in R (Miller) v The Prime Minister, Cherry and others v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41 unanimously held that the prorogation of Parliament for five weeks by the Prime Minister was unlawful and that, therefore, the prorogation was void and of no effect. The Supreme Court confirmed that the issue was justiciable and that the power to prorogue Parliament is a prerogative power, however it is not unlimited and therefore is capable of being subject to judicial scrutiny.

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Overview

3. The Constitutional Reform Act modifies the office of Lord Chancellor and makes changes to the way in which some of the functions vested in that office are to be exercised. The Act also creates the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and abolishes the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords. It creates the Judicial Appointments Commission to select people for judicial appointments in England and Wales, and provides for judicial discipline in England and Wales. The Act modifies the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and removes the right of the Lord President of the Council to sit judicially.

4. The explanatory notes are divided into parts reflecting the structure of the Act. In relation to each Part, there is a summary and background section. Commentary on particular sections is then set out in number order, with the commentary on the various schedules included with the section to which they relate.

5. Notes on the effects of the Act on: public expenditure; public sector manpower; cost to business and regulatory impact, follow the commentary on sections, as does a brief note on issues relating to the European Convention on Human Rights.

6. The Act is divided into 7 parts:

7. Parts 2 and 4 are intended to give substantial effect to the agreement between the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and the Lord Chancellor on the proposals relating to the transfer of the Lord Chancellor's judiciary-related functions. This was set out in a document called "Constitutional Reform. The Lord Chancellor's judiciary-related functions: Proposals" (usually referred to as the 'Concordat'). This was placed in the libraries of both Houses of Parliament at the time of the Oral Statement made to the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor, and repeated in the House of Commons, on 26th January 2004. The text was also printed as Appendix 6 to the House of Lords Select Committee's Report on the Bill.

8. Part 1 provides that the Act does not adversely affect the existing constitutional principle of the Rule of Law or the Lord Chancellor's existing constitutional role in relation to that principle.

9. Part 2 modifies the office of Lord Chancellor and provides for the future exercise of certain functions of that office and for continued judicial independence. It provides:

that in appointing a person to be Lord Chancellor the Prime Minister must be satisfied that the person is qualified for the post by relevant experience;

that the Lord Chancellor must take a specified oath, in addition to the other oaths required of Ministers;

a guarantee of continued judicial independence in England and Wales, and (separately) in Northern Ireland;

for general statutory responsibilities of the Lord Chief Justice, who will assume the new additional titles of President of the Courts of England and Wales and Head of the Judiciary of England and Wales;

that the most senior Judge within the three legal jurisdictions of the UK (England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) may make written representations to Parliament on justice-related matters;

for new offices of the Head and Deputy Head of Criminal Justice and Head and Deputy Head of Family Justice;

for the transfer of certain of the Lord Chancellor's statutory functions relating to the judiciary to the Lord Chief Justice (and/or other senior members of the judiciary as appropriate), and for consultation or concurrence between them in the exercise of such functions to reflect the agreement set out in the 'Concordat';

for the amendment of certain statutory provisions that refer to the Lord Chancellor in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Lords, so that they will in future refer to the Speaker of the House of Lords in general terms;

for the modification, transfer and abolition of existing functions of the Lord Chancellor created or modified in primary legislation since the introduction of the Act, and in secondary legislation, local or private acts, charters and other prerogative instruments; and

for the amendment of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975 to disapply section 1 of that Act to specified functions of the Lord Chancellor, so that they cannot be transferred to another Minister of the Crown by an order under that Act.

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3. The Constitutional Reform Act modifies the office of Lord Chancellor and makes changes to the way in which some of the functions vested in that office are to be exercised. The Act also creates the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and abolishes the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords.

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The literal rule is when the judges apply the plain, ordinary meaning of the words to the case. They can use the dictionary meaning and apply that strictly without any interpretation. This can produce some unfair outcomes but at least all of the cases are consistent and the same outcome. This is the original method of interpreting statutes and is the most commonly used process. The use of the literal translation of the words is key.
DPP v Cheeseman (1990)
A man was masturbating in a public toilet. The police who found him convicted him under a section that said being found by a 'passenger' was part of the crime. It was decided that the police were stationed outside the public toilet because he had been doing it before. He was acquitted because the police were not deemed as 'passengers'.
Whiteley v Chappell (1868)
​The man in the case voted for dead people in elections. The law said that it was unlawful to vote for somebody entitled to vote. The dead people he voted for were not entitled to vote, therefore he had not broken the law in this respect. Clearly he had been deceitful but under a literal interpretation of the words he had done nothing wrong.
LNER v Berriman (1946)
A man working for LNER was hit by a train. His wife sued for negligence against the fact that there was no look out when he was working on the tracks. The law involved said that there was to be a look out when workers were repairing or relating track. The fact he was oiling the tracks meant that he was 'maintaining' and that they had done nothing wrong. This meant the company did not have to pay out and that the wife received no compensation for the civil wrong done to his family.

​Advantages of the Literal Rule

The Literal Rule creates certainty. If judges interpret the laws using the Oxford English Dictionary, then everybody can use that same resource and be able to predict the outcome of cases in the future. It also means that people understand the laws that are applied to them.

The use of the rule upholds Parliamentary Supremacy. This is the idea that Parliament is the most important and powerful part of our legal system and government. Parliament, in theory, could create any law and repeal all previous laws; it has the power to change anything because it is the elected body that represents the people in our society. By following the legislation and not straying away from what our representative democracy has decreed, we are upholding our political system. Examples of this can be Cheeseman, where the judges followed the letter of the law, regardless of the outcome. Lord Esher also said that it is the role of Parliament to make changes and not for the judiciary.

Disadvantages of the Literal Rule

The literal rule can create loopholes in the law. Fisher v Bell for example; if you show things in your window you are inviting them to that but it is one way in which a person can still advertise things in their shop windows. It means therefore that people can get away with things when they have been commit wrongful acts in society.

It can lead to unfair or absurd outcomes. LNER v Berriman's judgement follow strict rules and wording in the law and it meant that a woman was left without any compensation when her husband was hit by a train. His employer should have made sure he would be safe when carrying out his work but because of the wording of the relevant law, it meant they did not have pay out for his death. This is an example of an absurd outcome that is socially distasteful, but lawfully sound.

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​​When there are issues and disputes, it can be because two different people think that the law is ambiguous and not clear what it says. But what happens when a statute is unclear? Judges will...

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Industrial interests

The demand for such reform came from Britain's leading industrial, commercial and financial interests who found that complex commercial cases often required the attention of different branches of law in different courts.

Under the 1873 Act the old higher courts were abolished and a new Supreme Court of Judicature was created consisting of the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal.

Specialist divisions

The High Court was divided into five specialist divisional courts based on the old central courts (King's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Chancery), with the addition of the new Probate, Divorce and Admiralty division.

Further trimming of the system took place in 1880 when the Common Pleas and Exchequer divisions were abolished. This radical restructuring did much to unify the system and allowed the ending of ancient and time-consuming practices.

Court of Appeal

The establishment of a single Court of Appeal above the High Court simplified the varied procedures of appeal in civil cases.

But it was not until 1907, with the Criminal Appeal Act, that Parliament created the right of appeal against criminal convictions and created the Court of Criminal Appeal. Previously, decisions in criminal cases could only be reversed by the Home Secretary.

Role of House of Lords

The role of the House of Lords as the highest court of appeal in the land was finally placed on a proper judicial footing by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876.

The Act made provision for appointing lords of appeal in ordinary, a small body of senior and experienced judges who would consider and pronounce on appeal cases.

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The demand for such reform came from Britain's leading industrial, commercial and financial interests who found that complex commercial cases often required the attention of different branches of law in different courts. Under the 1873 Act the old higher courts were abolished and a new Supreme Court of Judicature was created consisting of the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal.

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Birkbeck Explains: What is the Human Rights Act?

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Our right to a fair trial, which underpins criminal law in the United Kingdom, the USA and many other nations, can be traced back to Magna Carta in 1215.
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The three key values which are central to the role of judicial office holders (JOHs) in England and Wales are:

The core principles

JOHs are required to adhere to these core principles both inside and outside the courtroom. These form part of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, which were endorsed at the 59th session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission at Geneva in April 2003. The principles state:

1. Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

2. Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

3. Integrity is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office.

4. Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance of all of the activities of the judge.

5. Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial office.

6. Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

Independence
The judiciary should be fair and transparent, free of any influence outside the rule of law.
In a democracy, it is of vital importance that the public and those who appear before judges trust that their cases will be decided in accordance with the law. This can only be achieved if judges and the judiciary as a whole are independent of external pressures and of each other. For judges to discharge their constitutional responsibility of providing fair and impartial justice, it is solely relevant facts and law that should form the basis of their decisions.

When carrying out their judicial function judges must be free of any improper influence, such as pressure by individual litigants, commercial interests, the media, politicians, and their own self-interest. They must not allow potential public or media responses to skew their decision-making. This does not, however, mean displaying no awareness of the profound consequences that judicial decisions inflict on the lives of people before them, and often upon issues of great interest to society at large.

In the last century, the responsibilities of judges in disputes between the citizen and the state have increased together with the growth in governmental functions. The responsibility of the judiciary to protect citizens against unlawful acts of government has increased, and with it the need for the judiciary to be independent of government.

A practical example of the importance of judicial independence is where a high-profile matter, generating a great deal of media interest, comes before the court. This may be the criminal trial of a person accused of a shocking murder, the divorce of celebrities or challenges to the legality of government policy, such as the availability of a new and expensive drug to NHS patients. In the 24-hour media age in which we live, it stands to reason that the judge hearing the case will often be under intense scrutiny, with decisions open to intense debate. It is right that this is so, but it is equally important that decisions in court are made in accordance with the law and are not determined by external pressures.

Impartiality

The judiciary should treat all members of the public equally and fairly, no matter who they are.

Judges strive to ensure that their conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants, in their personal impartiality and that of the judiciary.

It follows that judges should, so far as is reasonable, avoid extra-judicial activities that could result in reasonable apprehension of bias or would result in a conflict of interest. This may involve refraining from sitting in a case where they have a close family relationship with a litigant or avoiding involvement with a political party, in such a way as to give the appearance of political bias. They should also avoid taking part in public demonstrations which might diminish their authority as a judge or create a perception of bias in subsequent cases.

It is, however, important for members of the court to deliver lectures and speeches, partake in conferences and seminars and contribute to debate on matters of public interest in the law, the administration of justice, and the judiciary. In making such contributions, judges will take special care to avoid associating themselves with a particular organisation, group or cause in such a way as to give rise to a perception of partiality towards that organisation, group or cause in the conduct of their judicial duties.

Integrity
Judges' conduct must be bound by principles of honesty and respect, and may require putting the obligations of judicial office above their own personal interests.
Judges are expected to display:

Intellectual honesty

Respect for the law and observance of the law

Prudent management of financial affairs

Diligence and care in the discharge of judicial duties

Discretion in personal relationships, social contacts and activities

Generally, judges are entitled to exercise the rights and freedoms available to all citizens. Appointment to judicial office brings with it limitations on the private and public conduct of a judge, but that is not to say judges must refrain entirely from community affairs, as there is great public interest in their engagement. It is also necessary to strike a balance between the requirements of judicial office and the legitimate demands of the judge's personal and family life.

However, they must accept that the nature of their office exposes them to considerable scrutiny and puts constraints on their behaviour which other people may not experience. They should avoid situations which might reasonably lower respect for their judicial office or might cast doubt upon their impartiality as judges. They must also avoid situations which might expose them to charges of hypocrisy by reason of things done in their private life.

The judge should seek to be courteous, patient, tolerant and punctual and should respect the dignity of all. They must ensure that no one in court is exposed to any display of bias or prejudice on grounds said in the Bangalore principle entitled "equality" to include but not to be limited to "race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes".

Guidance for JOHs

The Equal Treatment Bench Book is an extensive document which functions as a key work of reference for the judiciary on the matter of equal treatment for all, covering in detail topics such as ethnicity, religion, disability, sexuality, gender, and more. It is continuously updated to reflect changing social circumstances and to include areas of newer, growing research. More recent additions include sections on modern slavery and multicultural communication. JOHs refer to the text for assistance on how best they can tailor conduct and communication styles to create a professional and inclusive courtroom environment. In July 2022 an interim revision of the book was issued, which you can access by clicking here: Equal Treatment Bench Book - Courts and Tribunals Judiciary.

The Guide to Judicial Conduct explains these principles to judges, and provides practical guidance on a wide range of everyday situations.

Training is provided to new judges in independence, integrity and impartiality, and the principles are often addressed in programmes for continuing training.

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Three Is: Independence, Impartiality and Integrity - Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

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The three key values which are central to the role of judicial office holders (JOHs) in England and Wales are: The core principles JOHs are required to adhere to these core principles both inside and outside the courtroom. These form part of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, which were endorsed at the 59th session [...]

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03 Law - Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Processes

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Le 1er octobre 2009, les onze Justices de la Cour suprême britannique prêtaient serment concrétisant, plus de six ans après son annonce, la mise en place de cette juridiction qui a succédé à l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords. Cette formation juridictionnelle de la Chambre des Lords siégeait, pour des raisons historiques et malgré l'adoption de l' Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 qui en a professionnalisé la composition, au sein de la Chambre haute du Parlement de Westminster. Ce mélange des genres a conduit le Gouvernement du Premier ministre Blair à vouloir en clarifier le fonctionnement au nom de la séparation des pouvoirs.

La remise en cause de la Chambre des Lords et sa substitution par une Cour suprême n'est pas une idée nouvelle au Royaume-Uni. En 1790 déjà , Jeremy Bentham écrivait qu'il serait plus sage de " donner la parole à un cheval dans cette Chambre plutôt qu'à un juge " car " le fait de hennir dans la Chambre ne rend pas un cheval plus difficile à monter ; mais y siéger et y voter rend un juge moins apte à juger ". Selon lui, cette situation conduit les membres de l' Appellate Committee à " juger en un nom ce qu'ils ont fait en un autre nom ". De même, à la fin du XIXe siècle, Walter Bagehot considérait que la plus haute juridiction britannique devrait être une juridiction visible qui ne " devrait pas être cachée derrière la robe d'une assemblée législative ".

Dans le prolongement de ces critiques, une loi de 1873, le Supreme Court of Judicature Act, proposée par le Gouvernement libéral de Gladstone a envisagé de supprimer les compétences d'appel de la Chambre des Lords lui substituant une nouvelle Cour suprême pour l'Angleterre et le pays de Galles, composée de la Haute Cour et de la Cour d'appel. Cependant, le Gouvernement conservateur de Disraeli arrivé au pouvoir en 1874 revint sur ce projet en faisant voter l'Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 qui a rétabli la Chambre des Lords sous sa forme moderne avant que la loi de 1873 ne produise ses effets.

Des critiques plus récemment formulées par des organisations non gouvernementales ou par certains membres de l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords eux-mêmes font écho à la position de ces deux grands juristes. En 1999, l'organisation Justice a, à la demande de la Commission Royale sur la réforme de la Chambre des Lords, formulé plusieurs propositions au nombre desquelles on trouve l'institution d'une Cour suprême indépendante. Certains éléments contenus dans cette proposition ont été repris par le Gouvernement dans son propre projet. Par ailleurs, dès 2001, Lord Bingham, Président de la Chambre des Lords et Lord Steyn, sont intervenus à plusieurs reprises en faveur de l'instauration d'une Cour suprême, mais se sont heurtés au Lord Chancelier de l'époque, Lord Irvine of Lairg. Certaines Commissions parlementaires se sont également rangées aux vues avancées par Lord Bingham en proposant le départ des Law Lords de la formation parlementaire de la Chambre des Lords. Malgré l'opposition du Lord Chancelier et à la plus grande surprise de tous, ces réflexions et propositions se sont concrétisées quelques années plus tard à l'occasion de l'annonce d'un remaniement ministériel par le Premier ministre Tony Blair dans un simple communiqué de presse le 12 juin 2003. La décision du Gouvernement a fait grand bruit en raison notamment de la méthode employée.

Sur la forme, la mise en place d'une Cour suprême au Royaume-Uni a été présentée avec d'autres réformes constitutionnelles d'envergure au nombre desquelles on trouve l'abolition de la fonction de Lord Chancelier qui était à la fois membre du Gouvernement et Président de la Chambre des Lords dans ses formations parlementaire et juridictionnelle, la modification de la fonction de Speaker à la Chambre des Lords et de nouvelles modalités de désignation des juges. Compte tenu de leur ampleur, la présentation de ces réformes évoquées au détour de l'annonce d'un remaniement ministériel comportant le remplacement du Lord Chancelier, Lord Irvine, par le Premier ministre - qui n'avait même pas consulté son cabinet - a été particulièrement critiquée. S'est ajouté à ce remplacement une refonte de l'organisation du Ministère du Lord Chancelier ( Lord Chancellor's Department) et sa transformation en Ministère des affaires constitutionnelles chargé de piloter une réforme à laquelle l'ancien Lord Chancelier s'était opposé. Prenant le prétexte qu'il n'avait pas été informé par le Premier ministre, Lord Irvine a démissionné de ses fonctions. On peut regretter ce processus de prise de décision sans consultation préalable des membres du pouvoir judiciaire, que le Premier ministre lui-même a qualifié a posteriori de " chaotique " et " désordonnée ".

L'annonce de ces réformes a divisé le monde judiciaire. Alors que Lord Bingham of Cornhill défendait ardemment la mise en place d'une Cour suprême, cette idée a suscité les craintes du Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, du Vice-Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, et du Conseil des juges ( Judges Council) en raison de l'atteinte qu'elle serait susceptible de porter à l'indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire. Pour calmer ces critiques une consultation a été réalisée a posteriori. Elle a permis la conclusion d'un Concordatentre le Lord Chancelier et le Lord Chief Justice qui fût un facteur d'apaisement. Le projet de loi a finalement été déposé devant la Chambre des Lords le 24 février 2004, après avoir été présenté par une déclaration ministérielle du nouveau Lord Chancelier, Lord Falconer of Thorothon. Il a, chose rare, été examiné par une Commission spéciale : le Select Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill. Le Constitutional Reform Act 2005 ( CRA) a finalement été promulgué le 24 mars 2005, mais son entrée en vigueur s'est échelonnée dans le temps. Les dispositions concernant le Lord Chancelier, les modalités de nomination des juges sont entrées en vigueur le 3 avril 2006. En revanche, l'entrée en fonction de la Cour suprême, conditionnée au terme d'une clause suspensive par les locaux dans lesquels elle pourrait s'établir, a eu lieu le 1er octobre 2009.

Sur le fond, le projet du Gouvernement a été motivé par une volonté de " moderniser et de redéfinir les relations entre les pouvoirs exécutif, législatif et judiciaire ", de " protéger et ainsi de renforcer l'indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, de clarifier le rôle du Gouvernement et du pouvoir judiciaire et d'instaurer des relations sur une base explicite et transparente ". En dépit de ces arguments, la création d'une Cour suprême ne faisait à l'origine pas partie des priorités initiales du Gouvernement et a davantage résulté de l'effet d'entraînement de l'abolition du Lord Chancelier plutôt que d'une volonté politique forte de réformer cette institution. C'est au mois de janvier 2004 que Lord Falconer of Thoroton a annoncé " qu'il était temps que la plus haute juridiction britannique se dégage de l'ombre du pouvoir législatif ". Il s'agissait, en réalité, d'améliorer la perception que l'opinion publique pouvait avoir d'une formation juridictionnelle de la Chambre des Lords faisant partie intégrante de la Chambre législative. C'est surtout la perspective d'une condamnation de la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme (CourEDH) qui a accéléré la remise en cause de la Haute juridiction britannique. L'affaire McGonnel c. Royaume-Unipouvait laisser présager un risque de condamnation du fait de la position particulière des Law Lords ayant des fonctions à la fois législatives et judiciaires. D'ailleurs, la Commission des droits de l'Homme et des affaires juridiques de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe avait adopté un rapport au mois d'avril 2003 concernant la fonction de Lord Chancelier dans le système constitutionnel du Royaume-Uni. Il comportait des recommandations suggérant aux autorités britanniques la création d'une Cour suprême dont les membres ne seraient pas à la fois juges de la plus haute juridiction et membres de l'Assemblée parlementaire. La réforme aurait donc pu se limiter à une simple interdiction pour les Law Lords de participer aux débats parlementaires et à leur maintien au sein d'une Commission de la Chambre des Lords. L'importance des apparences exigeant d'aller au bout de la logique, le CRA a choisi l'option radicale en établissant une Cour suprême séparant les formations juridictionnelle et parlementaire de la Chambre des Lords.

A ces avancées concrètes s'ajoute un apport, plus théorique, mais tout aussi remarquable du CRA qui permet de situer l'instauration de la Cour suprême britannique au sein d'un contexte constitutionnel en pleine mutation. Il est fait référence, pour la première fois dans un texte de loi, au principe de Rule of Law, qui constitue avec la souveraineté du Parlement l'un des deux fondements de la Constitution britannique. Le principe de Rule of Law, traduit par l'expression " la suprématie ou le règne de la loi " ou " prééminence du droit " recouvre, tel qu'il a été défini par Albert V. Dicey, trois aspects distincts : un principe de légalité, un principe d'égalité de tous devant le droit et un principe de " protection judiciaire des droits ". Cette consécration textuelle de la Rule of Law, sur laquelle nous reviendrons, s'inscrit dans un mouvement de rééquilibrage des fondements constitutionnels britanniques en faveur de ce principe. Les deux piliers du cadre constitutionnel britannique font, depuis un certain temps déjà , l'objet d'importantes évolutions. La réalité du principe de souveraineté parlementaire ne correspond plus aujourd'hui au tableau dépeint par Albert A. V. Dicey qui en faisait le premier principe du droit public anglais. L'impossibilité pour le Parlement de lier ses successeurs, l'interdiction faite à toute personne ou à tout corps d'annuler ou d'écarter une loi et l'absence de distinction entre lois ordinaires et constitutionnelles qui sont les trois composantes de la souveraineté parlementaire sont aujourd'hui remises en cause, à des degrés différents, par l'adhésion du Royaume-Uni au cadre européen communautaire - aujourd'hui de l'Union européenne - avec le European Communities Act 1972 ( EC Act 1972) et conventionnel avec le Human Rights Act 1998 ( HRA 1998). L'institution de la nouvelle Cour suprême s'inscrit donc dans un mouvement général de transformation de la Constitution britannique qui résulte de la mutation de ses deux fondements et de son écriture progressive par un nombre croissant de lois matériellement constitutionnelles. Le CRA a révisé, à l'instar de ces lois, la Constitution souple du Royaume-Uni.

Quelle est, en conséquence, la portée de cette loi sur la plus Haute juridiction du Royaume-Uni désormais dénommée Cour suprême ? Dans quelle mesure cette juridiction peut-elle être qualifiée de Cour suprême alors même que cette appellation peut recouvrir des réalités différentes ? Cette réforme a été présentée comme " un changement sur le plan de la forme, et non du fond ". Fidèles au pragmatisme britannique, les dispositions de la troisième partie du CRA dédiée à la Cour suprême concernent essentiellement la désignation et le statut des membres de la Cour, la composition des formations de jugement, les modalités d'adoption des règles de procédure, le statut du personnel et les frais de justice. Les aspects concernant la compétence de la Cour et ses rapports avec les autres juridictions ne constituent qu'une part résiduelle du texte de loi. Les principales préoccupations au cours des débats ont ainsi davantage concerné des aspects pratiques tels que l'emplacement et le coût occasionné par l'établissement de la nouvelle Cour suprême plutôt que la question de ses compétences et de sa véritable nature. Les préoccupations qui ont sous-tendu l'élaboration du CRA laissent entendre qu'il n'était pas question pour le Gouvernement de créer une nouvelle institution.

Pourtant, la dénomination de la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni ne peut empêcher les observateurs, étrangers notamment, de penser à la Cour suprême américaine. Les débats parlementaires sont pourtant assez clairs à ce sujet. Lord Falconer, le Ministre des affaires constitutionnelles a nié avoir été influencé par le modèle de la Cour suprême américaine et a bien précisé dans le Consultation paper précédant le dépôt du projet de loi qu'il " n'y a pas de proposition de création d'une Cour suprême sur le modèle américain dotée du pouvoir de renverser une loi. Il n'y a pas non plus de proposition de création d'une Cour constitutionnelle spécialisée ou d'une Cour dont le premier rôle serait de se prononcer a priori sur une question de droit soulevant des difficultés ". L'idée d'une Cour suprême à l'américaine ou d'une Cour constitutionnelle spécialisée a été clairement rejetée par le Département des affaires constitutionnelles car cela constituerait une " rupture avec les traditions constitutionnelles britanniques ".

La Cour suprême ne se serait donc inspirée d'aucun modèle préexistant. Cette réforme aurait-elle alors fait " beaucoup de bruit pour rien " ? N'aurait-elle qu'une portée symbolique pour ne pas dire cosmétique qui ne serait, pour l' Appellate Committee de Chambre des Lords, qu'une opération de chirurgie esthétique, masquant sous de nouvelles apparences ce qui existait déjà ou réalise-t-elle un changement plus profond ? En définitive, quelle réalité se cache-t-il sous cette nouvelle dénomination ?

Aux États-Unis la Cour suprême est " la plus haute juridiction du pouvoir judiciaire fédéral ". Le Professeur Elisabeth Zoller rappelle qu'elle est " juge en dernier ressort du droit fédéral [qui] ... comprend la Constitution, les traités passés par les États-Unis et les lois du Congrès ". De façon plus générale, les Cours suprêmes ont été présentées par le Professeur Louis Favoreu, par opposition aux Cours constitutionnelles selon une conception, qualifiée par certains auteurs de " restrictive ". Elles sont présentées comme " des juridictions placées au sommet de l'édifice juridictionnel d'un État et dont relève par la voie de l'appel ou de la cassation l'ensemble des tribunaux et cours composant cet édifice " qui disposent d'une " vocation générale " lui permettant de connaître d'une diversité de contentieux (civil, administratif, pénal...) parmi lesquels on trouve notamment le contentieux constitutionnel. Une Cour suprême se distingue d'une Cour constitutionnelle en ce que cette dernière est une juridiction " créée pour connaître spécialement et exclusivement du contentieux constitutionnel, située hors de l'appareil juridictionnel ordinaire et indépendante de celui-ci comme des pouvoirs publics ". Le Cour suprême a encore été définie par le Professeur Roland Drago comme " une juridiction supérieure unique impliquant l'existence d'un seul ordre juridique et juridictionnel ; [...] une juridiction supérieure statuant en droit et en fait ; [...] une juridiction supérieure pouvant, même indirectement, se prononcer sur des questions constitutionnelles ". Une étude comparative conduite en 1978 met en évidence que " La mission essentielle unanimement reconnue à une cour suprême est de veiller à la bonne application des règles juridiques par les juridictions inférieures et, par là -même, d'assurer au droit unité, clarté, certitude ".

Les Cours suprêmes seraient ainsi caractérisées par leur compétence générale et non spécialisée dans le contentieux constitutionnel, par leur place au sommet d'une hiérarchie de juridictions et par leur mission consistant à assurer une certaine " cohérence dans l'application du droit " par les juridictions inférieures. Par contre, si l'on s'en tient aux compétences de ces juridictions, la frontière entre Cours suprêmes et Cours constitutionnelles, n'est pas si étanche puisqu'elles peuvent toutes deux disposer de compétences constitutionnelles. Les auteurs britanniques parlent d'ailleurs de " Cour suprême constitutionnelle ". Ainsi, les Cours disposant, comme aux États-Unis, au Canada ou encore en Inde pour ne se limiter qu'à quelques exemples, d'une plénitude de juridiction et compétentes à ce titre pour le contentieux constitutionnel, sont non seulement des Cours suprêmes mais aussi des cours ou du moins des juges constitutionnels. Lorsqu'elles se prononcent sur des questions constitutionnelles, les Cours suprêmes comme les tribunaux ordinaires dans certains systèmes, et les Cours constitutionnelles sont toutes des juridictions constitutionnelles " chargées de la justice constitutionnelle ", notion que nous appréhenderons dans un sens matériel. Suivant une définition suggérée, parmi d'autres, par le Professeur Luc Heuschling nous entendrons la justice constitutionnelle comme désignant " toutes les procédures juridictionnelles portant sur la matière constitutionnelle " et, plus largement, " une justice portant sur la Constitution " quelle que soit sa nature. Il serait d'ailleurs possible de comprendre la première définition d'Eisenmann selon laquelle " La justice constitutionnelle est cette sorte de justice ou mieux de juridiction qui porte sur les lois constitutionnelles " comme intégrant également des lois matériellement constitutionnelles qui font partie du cadre constitutionnel britannique. Une telle approche permet une analyse plus universelle et explicative qui n'exclue pas ab initio certains systèmes, comme ceux dotés de constitutions souples, du champ de la justice constitutionnelle.

L'analyse de la nature de la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni interroge donc les notions de Cour suprême, de Cour constitutionnelle et, plus largement, de juridiction et de justice constitutionnelle compte tenu notamment des évolutions du constitutionnalisme britannique. C'est pourquoi l'approche adoptée dépassera la modélisation des systèmes de justice constitutionnelle à laquelle l'opposition entre Cour constitutionnelle et Cour suprême renvoie. L'analyse de la Cour suprême britannique confirme, nous le verrons, le caractère pédagogique, mais scientifiquement insatisfaisant de la classification fondée sur les modèles américain et européen de justice constitutionnelle. Selon cette présentation, le modèle américain est un système de justice constitutionnelle au sein duquel le contrôle de constitutionnalité est diffus, concret, par voie d'exception, s'exerçant a posteriori et à l'origine de décisions ayant un effet inter partes. Le modèle européen se définit par des critères opposés en ce qu'il repose sur un contrôle de constitutionnalité concentré, abstrait, exercé par voie d'action et a priori conduisant à des décisions ayant un effet erga omnes. Sans s'inscrire dans une telle classification, l'étude de la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni ne se privera pas de l'utilisation d'un certain nombre de critères sur lesquels elle est basée. Ils permettront de situer cette juridiction par rapport à celles d'autres systèmes, sans pour autant en tirer de conclusion quant à l'appartenance de cette juridiction à un modèle.

L'objet de cette étude est, en effet, d'apprécier l'impact du CRA sur l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords devenu Cour suprême et de comparer ses caractéristiques institutionnelles et fonctionnelles avec celles des cours suprêmes et constitutionnelles afin d'en identifier la nature. Ces analyses seront l'occasion de déterminer, au regard des réformes introduites par le CRA, si la nature de cette juridiction a évolué " dans le temps " et de situer cette juridiction " dans l'espace " par rapport aux juridictions relevant d'autres systèmes constitutionnels. L'examen de l'expérience britannique contribue ainsi à renouveler modestement le débat sur la notion de juge et de justice constitutionnelle.

L'apport du CRA est ambigu. Novateur par certains aspects, il est, par d'autres caractéristiques, seulement révélateur de ce qui existait déjà à l'époque de l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords. Cette loi n'est donc pas, à elle seule, à l'origine des transformations que connaissait la Haute juridiction britannique depuis longtemps. Elle présente un double apport qui ne fait que s'inscrire dans un mouvement plus général de mutation du constitutionnalisme britannique résultant de réformes et évolutions antérieures.

Le premier apport de la loi sur la réforme constitutionnelle de 2005 est purement formel. La rénovation de l'organisation et du fonctionnement de l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords " normalise " l'apparence de la Haute juridiction britannique. Elle se rapproche à cet égard d'autres juridictions, aussi bien suprêmes que constitutionnelles, qui présentent, du point de vue formel, des caractéristiques communes. Ces convergences sont toutefois insuffisantes pour éclairer la nature précise de la Cour suprême (I). Une telle identification dépend davantage d'aspects fonctionnels, dont la modification constitue le second apport du CRA. Cette loi a transféré les attributions de la Chambre des Lords et du Privy Council en matière de dévolution au profit d'une seule et même institution. Par cette concentration de compétences, le CRA réduit la singularité de la Cour suprême en confortant des convergences déjà existantes avec les fonctions d'autres Cours suprêmes (II).

I. La rénovation de l'organisation et du fonctionnement de l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords : une " normalisation " formelle insuffisante

En cherchant à rénover l'organisation et le fonctionnement de l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords le CRA révèle un double discours. Tout en voulant moderniser l'institution, il témoigne d'une volonté de ne pas bousculer l'ordre établi. Le CRA fait en quelque sorte " du neuf avec du vieux " en " dépoussiérant " l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords sans pour autant transformer radicalement ses principes d'organisation et de fonctionnement. Les modifications formelles apportées à la Haute juridiction mettent, tout d'abord, en évidence l'ambiguïté de l'indépendance affichée de la Cour suprême (A). Elles modifient, par ailleurs, partiellement les garanties liées au statut des membres de la Cour suprême (B) et transforment, enfin, de façon limitée les modalités de prise de décision (C).
A) Un affichage ambigu de l'indépendance de la Cour suprême
S'expliquant par un objectif de transparence et de clarté institutionnelle, la création de la Cour suprême a notamment été justifiée par une volonté d'afficher l'indépendance structurelle de la Cour suprême. Le CRA consacre ainsi des règles assurant son indépendance administrative et réglementaire par rapport à la formation parlementaire de la Chambre des Lords (1), faisant ainsi écho aux garanties d'indépendance dont bénéficient les juridictions suprêmes et constitutionnelles. Cette convergence générale doit toutefois être relativisée en raison du caractère problématique de l'indépendance budgétaire de la Cour par rapport au Gouvernement (2).

1) La consécration de l'indépendance administrative et réglementaire

L'installation de la Cour suprême hors de l'enceinte du Parlement dans le bâtiment du Middlesex Guildhall sur Parliament Square, consacre au niveau géographique l'indépendance administrative de la Cour suprême. La clarification des rapports entre les formations juridictionnelles et parlementaires de la Chambre des Lords ne fait que consacrer au niveau institutionnel la réalité de la pratique existante. Il n'y a pas de changement fondamental quant à la participation des Law Lords aux travaux législatifs et des Lords non judiciaires aux travaux juridictionnels.

Les dernières interventions des membres non judiciaires de la Chambre des Lords dans la prise de décision juridictionnelle remontent, en pratique, à la moitié du XXe siècle. L' Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 impose une présence exclusive de juristes au sein de la formation juridictionnelle de la Chambre des Lords, outre la présence du Lord Chancelier. Ces membres sont désignés par la Reine à condition d'avoir détenu de " hautes fonctions judiciaires " ou d'être des membres de la formation parlementaire de la Chambre des Lords détenant ayant détenu de telles fonctions. Ce n'est qu'en 2001, que le Lord Chancelier, Lord Irvine of Lairg, a siégé pour la dernière fois au sein de l'Appellate Committee en 2001 alors même qu'il était membre du Gouvernement. Le CRA, qui met un terme à cette participation, formalise donc ce qui existait déjà dans les faits.

La participation des Law Lords aux travaux législatifs s'est également raréfiée en pratique. Jusqu'au début des années 1990, ils ont participé " librement et en grand nombre " aux débats parlementaires ou ont siégé sans voter au sein de commissions. Leurs interventions sont néanmoins devenues sporadiques. Après l'entrée en vigueur du Human Rights Act le 2 octobre 2000, ils se sont engagés sous la présidence de Lord Bingham of Cornhill, à ne pas participer aux débats, à ne pas voter lorsqu'une question soulève une controverse politique importante et à ne pas exprimer publiquement une opinion sur une affaire susceptible d'être portée plus tard devant eux. En supprimant le droit de siéger et de voter à la Chambre des Lords, la section 137 du CRA entérine donc une convention constitutionnelle puisque le divorce était déjà existant dans les faits. Il fallait cependant que le divorce soit non seulement réel mais aussi visible, à défaut une simple modification du règlement de procédure, le standing order, aurait suffi. La scission géographique des deux institutions a ainsi affiché cette indépendance aux yeux de tous.

Dotée d'un siège distinct du Parlement, la Cour suprême dispose également d'un personnel propre alors qu'elle était autrefois dépendante, au niveau administratif, du personnel de la Chambre des Lords. Celui-ci est désormais recruté au sein du Civil service et géré par le Président de la Cour, seul ou en collaboration avec le Lord Chancelier. Le Secrétaire général, auquel le Président peut déléguer des fonctions non-judiciaires ou de désignation du personnel, est nommé par le Lord Chancelier après consultation du Président de la Cour suprême. Les agents administratifs sont, en revanche, désignés par le seul Président de la Cour. Leur nombre et les conditions de leur recrutement sont décidés par le Secrétaire général avec l'accord du Lord Chancelier. L'implication du Lord Chancelier semble en quelque sorte déplacer le pôle de dépendance administrative de la Haute juridiction du Parlement vers le Gouvernement. Néanmoins, le fait que le personnel de la Cour doive accomplir sa tâche en accord avec les directives du Président de la Cour et soit responsable uniquement devant lui garantit l'autonomie administrative de la juridiction.

La section 45(1) du CRA consacre également une autonomie dans l'établissement des règles de procédure qui relèvent de la compétence du Président de la Cour suprême après consultation du Lord Chancelier, des barreaux et Sociétés du droit anglais et gallois, écossais et nord-irlandais. Le Supreme Court rule 2009, adopté par le Parlement le 1er juillet 2009 et complété par des Directives établies par le Président de la Cour suprême, s'est substitué aux règles internes de la Chambre des Lords,les Civil, Criminal and Taxation Practice Directions and Standing Orders, qui organisaient jusque-là les procédures devant l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords. La validation ministérielle des règles de procédure envisagée, à l'origine, par le projet de loi, qui n'aurait fait que déplacer au profit du Gouvernement la dépendance réglementaire de la haute juridiction a heureusement été abandonnée. L'apport du nouveau règlement est néanmoins limité sur le fond puisqu'il reprend, pour l'essentiel, les règles procédurales qui s'appliquaient devant la Chambre des Lords à l'exclusion de certaines conventions et pratiques qui s'appliquaient en raison de l'appartenance de l' Appellate Committee à la Chambre haute du Parlement. Sur la forme, les procédures ont perdu en solennité mais elles ont gagné en accessibilité et en transparence. La section 45(3) du CRA impose, en effet, que la Cour soit " accessible, juste et efficace " et que les règles de procédure soient " simples et exprimées simplement ". Ces éléments révèlent une volonté d'assurer une proximité entre la Cour et les justiciables et de démocratiser cette nouvelle institution afin d'en asseoir la légitimité.
2) Les limites de l'indépendance budgétaire
Le financement de la Haute juridiction a fait l'objet d'une modification assez importante en passant d'un système de financement assuré par le Parlement à un système contrôlé par le Gouvernement. L' Appellate Committee était jusque là financé par le budget de l'Assemblée parlementaire de la Chambre des Lords qui pouvait garantir un montant de budget illimité à condition que les Lords parviennent à convaincre les Communes. L'indépendance financière de l' Appellate Committee, placée sous la responsabilité de la Chambre des Lords, est désormais confiée au Lord Chancelier par la Section 50(1)(b) du CRA. Ce dernier est tenu de s'assurer que la Cour suprême dispose de ressources qu'il estime " appropriées " pour accomplir ses fonctions. La mouture finale du texte de loi illustre un recul des garanties d'indépendance financière de la Cour suprême. Contrairement à ce que préconisait le Select Committe, la Cour suprême n'est pas libre de traiter directement avec le Trésor puisque son budget est sous la responsabilité du Ministère de la justice. Compte tenu de cette situation, le Président de la Cour suprême a estimé que ce dispositif ne garantissait pas de façon satisfaisante son indépendance puisqu'elle dépend de sa faculté de persuasion du Lord Chancelier qui lui a demandé, en des termes apparemment " péremptoires ", de faire un certain nombre d'économies. Le CRA révèle, sur cet aspect, un paradoxe. Sa section 3(1) impose au Lord Chancelier, aux autres ministres de la Couronne et à tous ceux qui ont des responsabilités en matière de justice ou d'administration de la justice de défendre l'indépendance durable du pouvoir judiciaire, mais est dans le même temps susceptible d'affecter les garanties financières jusque là accordées à la Haute juridiction pour des raisons de politique budgétaire. La dissociation entre l' Appellate Committee et la Chambre législative a rendu son indépendance plus visible, par rapport au Parlement, mais sans doute moins réelle par rapport au Gouvernement. Quoiqu'il en soit, le lien budgétaire entre certaines juridictions constitutionnelles et le Gouvernement existe dans d'autres systèmes. Il faut donc relativiser la portée de cette caractéristique, qui variera selon la nature des systèmes constitutionnels et des procédures budgétaires. Si aux États-Unis, le budget de la branche judiciaire dont la Cour suprême est la plus haute émanation dépend essentiellement du Congrès qui détient " le pouvoir financier, souvent appelé pouvoir de la bourse ( power of the purse) ", la Cour constitutionnelle autrichienne dépend par exemple, dans son administration de la Chancellerie. Comme l'indique le Professeur Wanda Mastor " le personnel est nommé par le chancelier et le budget est établi dans le cadre du budget annuel de la Fédération par le Conseil national ". A l'inverse la Cour constitutionnelle allemande " bénéficie d'une autonomie complète sur le plan administratif et financier ". L'effectivité de l'autonomie budgétaire de la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni sera, en définitive, conditionnée par la pratique.

B) Une modification partielle du statut des membres

Le CRA a partiellement modifié le statut des membres de l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords. Comparables sous plusieurs aspect à celles reconnues aux membres d'autres Cours suprêmes et constitutionnelles, les garanties d'indépendance entourant le mandat des membres de la juridiction sont maintenues (1). Le CRA a, en revanche, modifié les modalités de désignation des membres sans en bouleverser les principes (2).
1) Le maintien des garanties d'indépendance
Il est, tout d'abord, intéressant de noter, du point de vue des seules apparences, que les douze membres de la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni sont désormais appelés collectivement Justicesà l'instar des membres de la Cour suprême américaine. Ils persistent cependant à s'appeler Lords dans leurs jugements, témoignant ainsi de l'ambivalence de l'apport du CRA. Ce point de convergence formel s'ajoute à un mandat dont les caractéristiques sont proches de celles des Justices américains. La section 33 du CRA reprend les règles régissant le mandat des Law Lords posées par la section 6 de l' Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 et la section 3 de l'Acte d'établissement de 1701 consacrant des principes similaires à ceux de l'article III, section 1 de la Constitution américaine ou de la section 125(2) de la Constitution indienne. A l'instar de leurs homologues américains et indiens les Justices de la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni disposent d'un traitement - identique à celui des Lords of Appeal in Ordinary - dont le montant ne peut être réduit. Ils ont, par ailleurs, l'assurance de rester en fonction tant qu'ils auront une bonne conduite. Ils bénéficient ainsi d'une inamovibilité de fait et ne peuvent être démis de leur fonction que par une adresse des deux Chambres. Cette procédure, qui existe également pour les membres de la Cour suprême indienne et canadienne, n'a, en pratique, jamais été mise en oeuvre.
2) La réforme des modalités de désignation
Le processus de désignation des juges prévu par le CRA formalise et complète les principes existants. Il vise à mettre un terme à la suspicion entourant la nomination des Law Lords et à rendre ce processus plus transparent afin d'asseoir la légitimité des membres de la Cour.

Jusqu'au CRA, les Lords of Appeal in Ordinary étaient désignés par la Reine sur recommandation du Premier ministre qui agissait sur les conseils du Lord Chancelier. Ce dernier réalisait la sélection des candidats en coopération avec les membres de la profession judiciaire. Ce processus de consultation, assez opaque malgré certaines évolutions, pérennisait une corporation judiciaire basée sur le même moule. La désignation des juges de la Cour suprême est dorénavant précédée d'un processus de sélection conduit par une Commission composée de cinq membres. Contrairement au silence de la Constitution américaine ou française, le CRA exige que les candidats aient certaines qualifications juridiques, à l'instar des règles régissant la composition de certaines Cours constitutionnelles européennes ou des Cours suprêmes canadienne et indienne. La Commission de sélection réalise un rapport à l'intention du Lord Chancelier, après diverses consultations. Le Lord Chancelier est ensuite chargé de recommander ce candidat au Premier ministre en vue de sa désignation par la Reine et dispose d'un droit de veto limité. Une fois le candidat choisi par la Commission de sélection, le Lord Chancelier pourra accepter la proposition de la Commission, la rejeter ou demander à la Commission de considérer de nouveau son choix s'il ne l'estime pas approprié. A l'instar des membres de la Cour suprême indienne la procédure associe les juges à une désignation par l'organe exécutif, mais en exclut le Parlement. En effet, si l'idée d'auditions de confirmation devant les commissions parlementaires, telles qu'elles existent aux États-Unis a été émise, elle a rapidement été écartée. Le Gouvernement, les commissions parlementaires, le Président de la Cour suprême et le Master of the Rolls s'y sont opposés de crainte que la désignation des juges ne soit trop politisée.

Composée, lors de son installation des anciens Law Lords et excluant la présence du Lord Chancelier, la Cour doit, à l'instar de certaines Cours suprêmes et constitutionnelles, avoir une composition marquée par une certaine diversité, qui est cependant limitée dans les textes à une dimension géographique. La commission de sélection intervenant dans le processus de désignation doit veiller à ce que les candidats aient des connaissances et une expérience pratique du droit de l'ensemble des territoires britanniques. Est ainsi consacrée une convention qui imposait la présence de juges écossais et nord-irlandais au sein de la juridiction suprême. Une représentativité géographique des juges existe donc, comme au Canada, en Belgique ou aux États-Unis jusqu'en 1891. La représentativité sociale, notamment en terme de présence féminine, reste encore lacunaire, par rapport à celle du Canada ou des États-Unis. A l'exception de la première et seule femme, la Baroness Hale of Richmond, à avoir été désignée à cette fonction les membres de la Cour suprême sont des hommes blancs, issus de classes sociales élevées, ce que semble regretter le Président de la Cour suprême lui-même et qui en fragilise la légitimité.
C) Une transformation limitée de la prise de décision
La pratique qui a accompagné l'instauration de la Cour suprême révèle une transformation relative de la prise de décision. Sur la forme, on constate une nouvelle rédaction des arrêts inspirée de ceux de la Cour suprême américaine (1). Le CRA a, par ailleurs, réduit, sans l'effacer, l'incertitude entourant les critères de composition des formations de jugement maintenant ainsi une pratique originale par rapport à celles d'autres juridictions(2).
1) Une nouvelle rédaction des arrêts
L' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords rendait des jugements seriatim qui ne contenaient pas de motivation unique et collégiale. Marqués par la pratique parlementaire dont il était l'une des commissions, les arrêts de l' Appellate Committe étaient composés des différentes " opinions " de ses membres. Il ne s'agissait pas de jugements, car les Lords of Appeal étaient historiquement considérés comme membres d'une commission conseillant la Chambre au nom de laquelle le jugement était rendu. La motivation des jugements se trouvait donc dans les différentes opinions des Law Lords rendues les unes après les autres par ordre d'ancienneté.

La forme des décisions de la Cour suprême est désormais similaire à celles de la Cour suprême américaine. Les Lords ont rejeté l'idée d'un jugement unique, mais ont opté pour la technique américaine du " jugement de la Cour ". Les décisions peuvent désormais être rendues au nom de la Cour unanime par un ou plusieurs Justices. La longueur des décisions est ainsi réduite ce qui en favorise l'accessibilité. Il est ainsi plus aisé de trouver le ratio decidendi d'un jugement rendu " au nom de la Cour " que de plusieurs opinions rendues les unes à la suite des autres. Lorsque la Cour n'est pas unanime, s'ajoutent à l'opinion majoritaire des opinions qualifiées d'" individuelles " ou " concordantes ", approuvant la décision majoritaire pour d'autres motifs et des opinions dissidentes, qui s'écartent aussi bien des motifs que du dispositif de la décision. En pratique, parmi les cinquante sept premières décisions rendues au cours de la première année d'exercice de la Cour, vingt étaient des jugements de la Cour et onze contenaient des opinions solidaires dans lesquelles les juges ne font qu'" apposer leur signature à une opinion rédigée par un ou plusieurs autres juges ". L'importance de ce type de décision témoigne du développement de la collégialité au sein de cette nouvelle juridiction. Ce nouveau formalisme dans la présentation des décisions n'a pas eu d'impact sur le fond des décisions ni sur la pratique des opinions dissidentes formulées par les juges puisqu'elles sont proportionnellement aussi nombreuses que devant la Chambre des Lords, mais semble-t-il moins nombreuses que celles que l'on trouve dans d'autres Cours suprêmes, telle qu'aux États-Unis, au Canada et en Australie.
2) L'incertitude entourant les critères de composition des formations de jugement
Contrairement à ce qui prévaut devant les Cours suprêmes américaine et canadienne ou devant les Cours constitutionnelles autrichienne, italienne ainsi qu'espagnole et portugaise (pour certaines affaires seulement), la Cour suprême britannique ne siège ni en formation plénière ni en chambre, comme c'est le cas en Allemagne, en Belgique, en Espagne et au Portugal pour certaines affaires. Les affaires sont, comme devant la Cour suprême indienne, entendues par des formations de jugement dont la composition est variable. Les sections 42 et 43 du CRA ont repris les conventions préexistantes devant la Chambre des Lords et permettent, en multipliant les formations, l'examen d'un plus grand nombre d'appels. Les formations peuvent être composées d'un nombre variable de juges : trois au minimum, cinq, sept ou neuf Justices lorsque l'affaire soulève des questions importantes. Ni le CRA, ni les Rules of the Supreme Court 2009, ni les Practice Directions adoptées par le Président de la Cour suprême n'ont établi de critères précis de sélection des formations de jugement. Ces derniers, qui ne sont mentionnés qu'à titre indicatif sur le site internet de la Cour suprême, précisent que les cas dans lesquels une formation de plus de cinq juges devra siéger sont : un revirement de jurisprudence, des affaires soulevant des questions de haute importance constitutionnelle ou ayant une importance publique, les affaires concernant un conflit entre des décisions de la Chambre des Lords, de la Cour suprême et du Privy Council et les affaires soulevant une question importante relative à la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Le choix de la composition des formations de jugement reprend certains aspects de la pratique de l' Appellate Committee. Elles étaientchoisies par les Clerks du Judicial Office de la Chambre des Lords et du Privy Council sous le contrôle de deux Senior Law Lords, le Lord Chancelier pouvait également intervenir afin de sélectionner les formations. Désormais placée sous le contrôle du Président et du Vice-président, la composition persiste à tenir compte des domaines de compétences de chaque Law Lord et de leur origine géographique.

Compte tenu du manque de clarté des critères conditionnant la constitution des formations de jugement, des auteurs et des juges ont plaidé en faveur de formations plénières, plus larges afin de garantir davantage de transparence et de " légitimité démocratique " dans le traitement des décisions. D'autres observateurs ont proposé que les formations de jugement soient composées sur la base du hasard ou d'un roulement. Bien que certains Lords ont admis qu'un changement de composition de la formation de jugement aurait pu modifier le contenu de la décision, le choix des panels persiste à être dominé par l'exercice d'un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire, ce qui peut affecter l'autorité et la légitimité des décisions.

En définitive, les rénovations formelles de la Cour suprême témoignent de l'ambivalence de l'apport du CRA. Vecteur de changement sous couvert d'une certaine continuité, cette loi a formalisé, en les précisant et en les clarifiant, des règles déjà latentes à l'époque de l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords. Cette officialisation change la perception de la Cour suprême, sans pour autant en asseoir incontestablement la légitimité. Marquée par la persistance de spécificités, la Cour suprême révèle un rapprochement, d'une intensité variable, avec les caractéristiques institutionnelles de certaines Cours, aussi bien suprêmes que constitutionnelles. Les nouvelles règles d'organisation et de fonctionnement ne sont donc pas décisives pour identifier la nature de la Cour suprême car elles existent sous des formes comparables devant ces deux types de juridiction. C'est donc vers les compétences de la Cour suprême qu'il convient de se tourner.

II. La concentration de compétences au profit de la Cour suprême : une singularité fonctionnelle déclinante

Selon Lord Hope, la Cour suprême " n'a pas été configurée sur le modèle de la Cour suprême des États-Unis - [..] il s'est simplement agi d'un changement de nom, et non pas d'un changement de fonctions ou de compétences ". A l'en croire, l'apport du CRA sur les fonctions de la Haute juridiction serait minime. Lord Phillips indique dans le même sens que " Les Law Lords qui deviendront les premiers juges de la Cour suprême seront dotés strictement de la même compétence que celle qui est la leur aujourd'hui ". Pourtant, le CRA ne s'est pas limité au transfert de compétences, déjà originales, de l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lordsvers la Cour suprême. Il a opéré un changement important en lui attribuant les compétences auparavant exercées par le Privy Council en matière de dévolution. Dans quelle mesure de telles fonctions correspondent-t-elles à celles exercées par une Cour suprême - qui est un juge suprême et constitutionnel - lorsqu'elle est entendue comme une juridiction placée au sommet d'une hiérarchie de juridictions qui peut trancher en dernier ressort une diversité de contentieux, dont le contentieux constitutionnel et qui assure " la cohérence dans l'application du droit " ? La concentration de compétences au profit de la Cour suprême perpétue les anciennes attributions de la Chambre des Lords et développe, à travers le contentieux de la dévolution, ses fonctions de juridiction suprême et constitutionnelle. Dès lors, le CRA réduit, sans les effacer, les spécificités fonctionnelles de la Haute juridiction. Il fait de la Cour suprême tant une juridiction suprême atypique (A) qu'une juridiction constitutionnelle singulière (B), qui reflète les transformations préexistantes du constitutionnalisme britannique. Le parachèvement de la nature de la Cour suprême et sa complète métamorphose dépendront de l'approfondissement de ces mutations constitutionnelles (C).
A) Une juridiction suprême atypique
Le CRA n'a pas véritablement " créé " de Cour suprême au Royaume-Uni puisqu'il a perpétué les compétences de l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lordsen les attribuant à une juridiction nouvellement dénommée ayant une même place dans l'ordre juridictionnel. Lord Wilberforce, Président de l' Appellate Committee, affirmait en 1978 qu'" Au Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, un État dénué de constitution écrite, les fonctions de cour suprême sont remplies par la Chambre des Lords ", tempérant immédiatement son propos en indiquant " Cette simple constatation, à laquelle des nuances seront apportées par la suite, révèle immédiatement le caractère unique de l'institution ". La Cour suprême est donc, à l'instar de la Chambre des Lords, une juridiction suprême atypique puisqu'elle maintient la compétence de dernier ressort à " géométrie variable " de sa devancière (1). L'attribution du contentieux de la dévolution tend cependant à réduire cette spécificité en développant indirectement les compétences de dernier ressort de la Cour suprême (2).
1) Le maintien d'une compétence de dernier ressort à " géométrie variable "
Avant l'entrée en vigueur du CRA, certaines Cours étaient qualifiées de suprêmes sans en avoir les fonctions. Plusieurs textes de lois ont donné le titre de Cour suprême à la Haute Cour et à la Cour d'appel en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles. En Irlande du Nord, existait la Supreme Court of Judicature, composée de la Cour d'appel, de la Haute Cour et de la Crown Court Nord-Irlandaises. En Ecosse, la Court of Session et la High Court of Justiciary, juridictions statuant respectivement sur les appels civils et pénaux, étaient également appelées Cours suprêmes. Ces cours n'avaient, en réalité de suprême que le nom puisque parmi toutes ces juridictions, seule la High Court of Justiciary statuait (et statue toujours) en dernier ressort en Ecosse. Les décisions de toutes les autres juridictions étaient susceptibles de faire l'objet d'un appel devant l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords qui statuait en dernier ressort et était à cet égard une Cour suprême qui n'en avait pas la dénomination.

Qualifiée par la Section 40 du CRA de "  superior court of record ", la Cour suprême est, à l'instar de la Chambre des Lords, une juridiction d'appel de dernier ressort. Elle peut, comme d'autres Cours suprêmes et bien qu'elle ne le fasse plus toujours en pratique, examiner " en appel l'ensemble des points de droit et des points de fait que soulève une affaire ". Elle ne se limite donc pas à être un juge de cassation et dispose d'un " pouvoir de juridiction total ". Elle statue, à l'instar de la Cour suprême américaine, sur la base de la common law, mais aussi de l' equity depuis la fin du XVIIe siècle.

Si cette compétence est étendue en pratique, elle n'est ni exclusive, ni exhaustive. Sa plénitude de compétence de dernier ressort pose certaines difficultés en l'absence d'un droit comparable à un droit fédéral ou à un droit de common law unifié résultant de l'existence de systèmes juridictionnels différents en Angleterre, en Ecosse et en Irlande du Nord. La section 41(1) du CRA indique bien que les dispositions relatives aux compétences de la Cour n'affectent " pas la distinction entre les systèmes juridiques séparés des différentes parties du Royaume-Uni ".

Reprenant les compétences de la Chambre des Lords en vertu des Appellate Jurisdiction Acts de 1876 et de 1888, la Cour suprême est chargée d'examiner les appels en matière civile de la Cour d'Appel et de la Haute Cour anglaise et galloise, nord-irlandaise et de la Court of Session écossaise ainsi que des appels en matière pénale des mêmes juridictions à l'exception de l'Ecosse. En effet, les appels en matière pénale continuent de relever, en dernier ressort, de la compétence de la High Court of Justiciary écossaise et ne sont susceptibles d'aucun recours. Par ailleurs, ses décisions ont une autorité de chose jugée géographiquement circonscrite à l'ordre juridictionnel du territoire concerné et une autorité seulement persuasive pour les juridictions des autres territoires. La Cour est, en quelque sorte, une Cour, suprême régionalisée de chacun des territoires qui composent le Royaume-Uni, à l'exception partielle de l'Ecosse. Cour suprême d'Angleterre, du Pays de Galles et d'Irlande du Nord aussi bien en matière civile que pénale, elle n'est qu'une Cour suprême civile pour l'Ecosse. Elle n'est donc pas juridiquement une Cour suprême de l'ensemble du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord. Sa mission " de veiller à la bonne application des règles juridiques par les juridictions inférieures " est ainsi morcelée entre chacun des ordres juridictionnels qui composent le Royaume-Uni, ce qui en fait une Cour suprême protéiforme.

Par ailleurs, en dépit du transfert du contentieux de la dévolution à la Cour suprême, la Commission judiciaire du Conseil privé de la Reine, Judicial Committee du Privy Council, reste compétente pour les appels des États membres du Commonwealth qui l'acceptent, des territoires d'outre-mer britanniques, des îles dépendantes de la Couronne et des zones dans lesquelles existe une bases militaires britanniques souveraines comme en Chypre. Certes, les membres de la Cour suprême sont également membres du Privy Council, mais la Cour est bien, en pratique, concurrencée par une autre juridiction suprême pour ces divers contentieux. Sa compétence de dernier ressort à géométrie variable et territorialement limitée fait donc obstacle à une qualification indiscutable de Cour suprême.

Outre le contentieux civil ou pénal, la Cour suprême s'est vue transférer d'autres compétences exercées par la Chambre des Lords parmi lesquelles on trouve notamment les contentieux militaires ou maritimes. Elle peut entendre les appels des décisions de la Cour d'appel martiale et également connaître en dernier ressort des décisions des Cours maritimes qui font partie de la Queen's Bench Division de la Haute Cour puisque leurs décisions sont susceptibles d'appel devant la Cour d'appel, puis devant la Cour suprême. Là encore, certains litiges maritimes spécifiques échappent à la Cour suprême et relèvent de la compétence du Privy Council. Il s'agit des appels des décisions des Prize Courts qui sont des juridictions statuant sur des questions de saisie et de capture de navires en temps de guerre et des décisions de la Court of Admiralty de Cinque Port, qui est une province militaire et administrative particulière.

La Cour suprême ne dispose, par ailleurs, d'aucune compétence en matière ecclésiastique ni sur des décisions rendues par certains corps professionnels. Le Privy Council est, en effet, encore compétent pour examiner les appels des décisions de Cours ecclésiastiques, de la Commission disciplinaire du Collège Royal des chirurgiens ainsi que les appels contre certaines réglementations des Church Commissionners chargés de gérer le patrimoine de l'Eglise d'Angleterre et contre les litiges relatifs aux incompatibilités parlementaires prévues par le House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975.

Ces éléments révèlent l'absence de compétence uniforme de la Cour pour statuer en dernier ressort. Comme la Chambre des Lords, la Cour suprême " est presque la seule cour d'appel suprême de la nation ", mais elle n'est pas la seule puisqu'à ses côtés officie également le Privy Council. Cependant, la rareté et la spécificité du contentieux ecclésiastique et médical, nuance cette absence de monopole de la Cour suprême. On peut considérer, qu'elle est, en pratique, si ce n'est en théorie, majoritairement compétente en dernier ressort pour le territoire du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord. Par ailleurs, le fait que les membres du Conseil privé sont aussi membres de la Cour suprême montre que, dans les faits, ce sont les mêmes juges examinent les appels des affaires en provenance des États du Commonwealth qui l'acceptent ainsi que des territoires ou protectorat. C'est à condition de réunir ces attributions au sein d'une seule et même juridiction et de lui accorder une compétence pour le contentieux pénal écossais que la juridiction de dernier appel de la Cour suprême répondrait à celles d'une juridiction pleinement suprême pour le Royaume-Uni et le Commonwealth.
2) Le contentieux de la dévolution, facteur indirect de développement des compétences de dernier ressort
Le transfert des attributions du Privy Council à la Cour suprême en matière de dévolution a indirectement remis en cause son incompétence pour se prononcer en appel sur le contentieux pénal écossais. La juridiction de la Cour suprême s'étend désormais de facto à ce contentieux par le biais de ses fonctions en matière de dévolution. Ces fonctions lui permettent de se prononcer, d'une part, sur la méconnaissance par un projet d'acte ou par un acte promulgué d'une entité dévolue des règles de répartition des compétences prévues par les lois de dévolution. Elle est, d'autre part, chargée de se prononcer sur la conformité de ces mêmes actes promulgués aux droits de l'Union européenne et de la Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme, qui constituent des " questions de dévolution ".

Ainsi, des litiges relatifs à la répartition des compétences entre Westminster et les entités dévolues peuvent, tout d'abord, concerner des affaires pénales écossaises. Dans la décision Martin et Millerla Cour suprême a examiné si l'augmentation des pouvoirs de sanction pénale des Scheriffs résultant d'une modification de la section 45 du Criminal Proceedings etc (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007 relevait bien de la compétence du Parlement écossais. Elle a répondu par l'affirmative, jugeant que cette dispositionqui impose une peine d'emprisonnement pour conduite sans permis n'outrepassait pas la compétence législative du Parlement écossais en matière pénale.

Ce sont, par ailleurs, surtout les litiges portant sur le respect des droits conventionnels par les autorités dévolues qui ont donné à la Cour suprême l'occasion d'investir le contentieux pénal écossais en tant que Cour de dernier ressort. La Cour suprême britannique dans l'affaire Cadder v. HM Advocate du 26 octobre 2010 a jugé que l'utilisation par le Lord advocate d'aveux obtenus en garde à vue sans l'assistance d'un avocat méconnaissait l'article 6(3)(c) et 6(1) de la CEDH. Elle également jugé qu'une condamnation pour meurtre prononcée par la High Court of Justiciary en l'absence de divulgation par la Couronne de l'ensemble des informations et preuves à l'encontre du prévenu soulevait une contrariété avec l'article 6(1) CEDH. La Cour suprême a considéré que cette condamnation devait être de nouveau examinée par la juridiction écossaise qui n'avait pas mis en œuvre le bon standard de contrôle. En pratique, le contentieux pénal écossais n'est donc plus hors de portée de la Cour suprême. Ses compétences constitutionnelles en matière de dévolution ont influencé sa compétence de dernier ressort puisqu'elle devient une juridiction de dernier ressort en matière pénale lorsque la dévolution est en cause. Dans ce domaine, la Cour rend des décisions ayant une autorité sur tout le territoire britannique. Elle est ainsi, à proprement parler, une juridiction suprême pour l'ensemble du Royaume-Uni dans le cadre limité du contentieux de la dévolution. Facteur indirect de développement des compétences de cette juridiction suprême atypique, le contentieux de la dévolution présente des répercussions plus directes sur les compétences de cette juridiction constitutionnelle singulière.
B) Une juridiction constitutionnelle singulière
Compte tenu de ses attributions de juridiction suprême, la Cour au Royaume-Uni ne correspond tout d'abord pas à une Cour constitutionnelle définie, au sens strict, comme une juridiction exclusivement spécialisée dans le contentieux constitutionnel et située hors de l'appareil juridictionnel ordinaire. Elle n'en dispose pas moins de compétences constitutionnelles originales autrefois exercées par la Chambre des Lords (1). Par ailleurs, en attribuant les compétences du Privy Council en matière de dévolution à la Cour suprême, la section 41(4)(b) CRA lui confère une fonction de contrôle de la répartition des compétences territoriales s'accompagnant d'un contrôle de constitutionnalité des actes des entités dévolues, que l'on retrouve devant des juridictions constitutionnelles, quelles qu'elles soient. En développant directement ses compétences constitutionnelles, cette nouvelle attribution rapproche la Cour suprême au Royaume-Uni d'autres juridictions constitutionnelles et réduit, par là même, ses spécificités (2).
1) Le maintien de compétences constitutionnelles originales
L'existence de compétences constitutionnelles de la Cour suprême est, pour ceux qui limitent à tort de telles compétences à la seule possibilité d'écarter une loi inconstitutionnelle, sujette à caution. Ainsi, A. Stevens indique que " La nouvelle appellation de cette juridiction est certes logique, puisqu'elle est la juridiction suprême (c'est-à -dire la plus élevée) dont les décisions sont insusceptibles d'appel, mais elle peut également être trompeuse car elle invite à la comparaison avec d'autres Cours suprêmes qui, elles, sont dotées de fonctions constitutionnelles. Or la nouvelle Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni n'est investie d'aucune fonction autre que celles déjà dévolues aux Lords of Appeal in Ordinary et ne pourra pas contrôler la validité ou la " constitutionnalité " d'une loi ". Plusieurs Law lords se sont d'ailleurs basés sur cette idée pour souligner la principale différence entre la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni et la Cour suprême américaine. Lord Mance insiste sur le fait que, la Cour suprême, ni aucune autre juridiction britannique n'a le pouvoir de refuser l'application d'une loi considérée comme inconstitutionnelle. Lord Bingham a évoqué, à propos de la comparaison dressée avec la Cour suprême américaine, le fait que " trop de personnes, en citant la Cour suprême, évoquent des images de la Cour suprême la plus connue dans le monde, c'est-à -dire celle des États-Unis, écartant l'application d'une loi du Congrès et affirmant la primauté de la Constitution. Il faut préciser que la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni ne pourra jamais prétendre exercer un tel pouvoir ".

Bien qu'il en constitue un élément essentiel, le contentieux constitutionnel ne se limite pas au pouvoir d'annuler ou d'écarter une loi dans le cadre du contrôle de constitutionnalité. Il recouvre également le contrôle de la répartition des compétences entre les entités territoriales de l'État et entre organes politiques de l'État, le contrôle des élections ou des consultations populaires, la justice politique et la garantie des droits fondamentaux. Dans cette perspective, il apparaît que la Cour suprême britannique dispose bien de fonctions constitutionnelles - certes originales - qui s'étendent, comme devant certaines juridictions constitutionnelles, à certaines de ces compétences seulement. Reflétant les spécificités du cadre constitutionnel souple du Royaume-Uni, fondé sur les conventions de la Constitution, les règles de "  strict law " que sont la jurisprudence et les lois ayant une portée constitutionnelle, ces attributions résident en un contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois spécifique principalement axé sur de la garantie des droits fondamentaux et en des compétences extérieures à un tel contrôle.

La Cour suprême dispose, en premier lieu, de compétences originales dans le domaine du contrôle des normes et de la garantie des droits fondamentaux, souvent présentés comme les fonctions essentielles des juridictions constitutionnelles. Si le contrôle des actes infra-législatifs ne pose pas de difficulté particulière, celle du contrôle des lois se heurte au principe de souveraineté du Parlement qui empêche, en principe, toute juridiction d'écarter, d'abroger ou d'annuler une loi. Ce principe connaît cependant une érosion progressive résultant de l'insertion du Royaume-Uni dans le cadre européen. Les juges britanniques peuvent, en effet, depuis l'arrêt Factortameet en vertu du European Communities Act 1972 écarter des lois contraires au droit de l'Union européenne. Avec l'adoption du Human Rights Act 1998, ils sont également compétents pour contrôler des lois par rapport à la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'Homme et des libertés fondamentales (CEDH) et les déclarer incompatibles avec les droits qu'elle reconnaît. Est ainsi apparu au Royaume-Uni un contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois original, limité et européanisé.

Ce contrôle de constitutionnalité est, tout d'abord, original en ce que le HRA 1998 et le EC Act 1972 sont matériellement des éléments de la Constitution souple du Royaume-Uni, mais elles se distinguent également, formellement des lois ordinaires si l'on suit la décision de la High Court, Thoburn v. Sunderland City Court. Le juge Laws a reconnu, dans cette affaire, l'existence de lois " constitutionnelles ", au nombre desquelles on trouve le EC Act 1972 et le HRA 1998 aux côtés de lois historiques telles que la Magna Carta 1215, le Bill of Rights 1688, le Petition of Rights 1628, l' Act of Settlement 1701 et les Parliaments Act 1911. Le régime de ces lois " constitutionnelles " diffère de celui des lois ordinaires puisqu'elles font exception à la doctrine de l'abrogation implicite. Elles ne peuvent être abrogées que de façon expresse par le législateur. La modification de telles lois est donc réalisée selon une procédure " exceptionnelle " qui peut laisser percevoir une distinction formelle entre lois ordinaires et constitutionnelles au Royaume-Uni. Il apparaît ainsi une formalisation, une " rigidification " des lois composant la Constitution britannique.

Ce contrôle est, ensuite, limité dans son champ d'application au droit européen. Depuis la décision Factortame, dans laquelle la Chambre des Lords a reconnu la possibilité de suspendre une loi, les juridictions britanniques n'hésitent plus à ne pas appliquer des lois contraires au droit de l'Union européenne. Elle effectue, dans ce domaine, un véritable contrôle de la loi dont les effets sont comparables au contrôle effectué dans le système américain puisque la loi est privée d'effet en l'espèce et non pas abrogée ou annulée comme devant certaines Cours constitutionnelles. Pour l'heure, la Cour suprême n'a pas eu l'occasion d'effectuer un tel contrôle, mais a notamment été amenée à contrôler la validité d'un mandat d'arrêt européen, à interpréter une directive européenne sur l'habitat et à juger non-discriminatoires les conditions d'attribution préférentielles au bénéfice des citoyens irlandais d'une allocation, le State pension Credit.

Le contrôle juridictionnel des lois est également limité au champ d'application du droit de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme avec le HRA. Dans ce cadre particulier, le contrôle exercé est d'une portée limitée. Le HRA 1998, entré en vigueur le 2 octobre 2000, a incorporé la plupart des dispositions de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme dans l'ordre juridique britannique et introduit une forme originale de contrôle de la loi. Depuis maintenant plus de dix ans, certaines Cours britanniques, dont la Cour suprême, ne parvenant pas à interpréter une législation primaire ou subordonnée conformément aux droits conventionnels, sont compétentes pour prononcer une déclaration d'incompatibilité. Si toutes les juridictions peuvent effectuer une interprétation des lois conforme à la CEDH, seules les plus Hautes juridictions sont compétentes pour prononcer une déclaration d'incompatibilité qui n'affecte pas " la validité, le maintien en vigueur ou la mise en œuvre de la disposition législative ". Une telle déclaration ne donne en aucun cas la possibilité au juge d'écarter les lois en contrariété avec le HRA en raison du principe de souveraineté parlementaire. Elle constitue une invitation à l'attention des autorités politiques de modifier la disposition législative dont la contrariété a été dénoncée. Il s'agit d'une décision juridictionnelle qui n'a pas d'effet juridique sur la loi dont la contrariété a été constatée, mais qui est susceptible d'avoir des effets politiques si le Gouvernement propose de corriger l'incompatibilité par la voie législative ordinaire ou par une procédure de remedial order. Tout en cherchant à sauvegarder le principe de souveraineté parlementaire, cette procédure autorise les cours à contrôler les lois. Apparaît ainsi un contrôle juridictionnel des lois original, que plusieurs auteurs et certains juges ont comparé au contrôle de constitutionnalité. Les plus hautes juridictions britanniques, au premier rang desquelles se trouve la Cour suprême, s'engagent ainsi dans un raisonnement comparable à celui des Cours suprêmes ou des Cours constitutionnelles. La principale différence est l'issue de ce contrôle puisque, dans le cas britannique, la loi reste en vigueur. Malgré cela, le mécanisme de contrôle des lois instauré par la procédure de déclaration d'incompatibilité peut être envisagé comme une forme européanisée et inaboutie de contrôle des lois. Elle constitue une variante du contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois par rapport aux droits et libertés constitutionnellement garantis que l'on rencontre dans la majorité des systèmes constitutionnels. Le Président de la Cour suprême a ainsi affirmé que " Le HRA, qui exige des Cours non seulement d'examiner les agissements de l'exécutif, mais aussi les lois afin de s'assurer qu'ils respectent les droits de l'homme, a donné à la Cour suprême certaines des fonctions d'une Cour constitutionnelle ". La Cour suprême est donc bien un juge constitutionnel qui connaît un contentieux des droits de l'homme croissant. Ses premières décisions, qui s'inscrivent dans la continuité de celles de la Chambre des Lords, n'ont rien à envier aux décisions rendues par d'autres juridictions constitutionnelles en ce domaine. La Cour suprême a, par exemple, déclaré la section 82 (1) du Sexual Offences Act 2003, qui impose aux personnes condamnées à une peine de prison d'au moins trente mois une obligation de notification permanente de leur résidence et de leurs déplacements à l'étranger aux autorités de police, incompatible avec l'article 8 CEDH. Elle a également déclaré illégale la détention indéfinie des empreintes ADN de personnes acquittées, en préférant procéder à une interprétation conforme de la section 64(1A) du Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. De même, l'article 8 de la CEDH a permis d'interpréter le Children (Scotland) Act 1995 afin qu'un père non-marié et séparé de sa compagne puisse assister à l'audience établissant la future situation de son enfant. Le contentieux des droits de l'homme ne se limite pas au contrôle des lois, puisque la Cour suprême s'est également assurée, dans une décision qui rappelle la décision 14/22 QPC sur la garde à vue du Conseil constitutionnel français, de la garantie effective du droit à un avocat pendant la garde à vue en Ecosse dans la décision Cadder v. HM Advocate du 26 octobre 2010. L'importance du contentieux des droits de l'homme devant la Cour suprême, montre que le Royaume-Uni s'inscrit dans un mouvement global que connaissent toutes les juridictions constitutionnelles.

Le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois est, enfin, européanisé, car lorsqu'elle exerce un contrôle sur la base du EC Act 1972 ou du HRA 1998, la Cour suprême assure aussi bien la primauté de lois " constitutionnelles ", dans le sens de l'arrêt Thoburn, que celle des traités européens. Elle est ainsi compétente pour réaliser un contrôle mixte qui emprunte à la fois au contrôle de constitutionnalité et de conventionnalité. L'exercice de ce contrôle combiné, dominé par les droits fondamentaux et européanisé, donne naissance à un contentieux dont la nature se rapproche de celui des juridictions constitutionnelles européennes.

La Cour suprême dispose, en second lieu, de compétences constitutionnelles extérieures au contrôle des lois. Certes, des questions susceptibles d'être rattachées au contentieux constitutionnel échappent à la Cour suprême. On constate ainsi une absence de juridictionnalisation des conflits entre organes politiques de l'État et une incompétence de la Cour suprême pour examiner le contentieux électoral, national ou local qui relève de juridictions créées ad hoc ou de juridictions de droit commun. Ce contentieux ne remonte pas jusqu'à la Cour suprême, les décisions de la Cour d'appel étant définitives en vertu de la section 157 du Representation of the People Act 1983. Le contentieux électoral de la Chambre des communes s'articule, d'ailleurs, avec les pratiques et les règles des commissions parlementaires compétentes de cette Chambre. Le House of Lors Disqualification Act 1975, qui réglemente également la déchéance des fonctions de membres de la Chambre des Communes en cas de faillite, de condamnation pénale ou d'incapacité au terme de la loi sur la santé mentale permettra, par exemple, au Président de la Chambre des Communes de déclarer un siège vacant.

Il n'existe, par ailleurs, pas de justice politique relevant de la compétence d'une Cour spécialisée existant en Allemagne, en Italie ou en Autriche et la procédure de destitution, telle qu'on la rencontre aux États-Unis est devenue obsolète à la faveur d'un contrôle politique. Cependant, la Cour suprême peut être amenée, à l'instar de toute juridiction, à juger le personnel politique au civil ou au pénal. En effet, la Rule of Law implique un principe d'égalité devant la loi qui suppose que " tout homme, quels que soient son rang, sa condition, est soumis à la loi ordinaire du royaume et justiciable des tribunaux ordinaires. [...] tous les fonctionnaires, depuis le premier ministre jusqu'aux constables ou aux collecteurs de taxes, sont soumis à la même responsabilité que n'importe quel autre citoyen pour tout acte fait sans justification légale ". Il n'existe donc pas de juge d'exception en ce domaine. La Cour suprême a d'ailleurs été amenée à rendre une décision dans l'affaire des notes de frais qui a secoué la classe politique en 2009. Elle a jugé que l'immunité parlementaire ne s'appliquait pas à trois membres de la Chambre des communes et un membre de la Chambre des Lords accusés de fausses déclarations relatives à leurs dépenses. Selon la Cour suprême, l'article 9 du Bill of Rights qui renvoie aux débats au sein du Parlement ne s'applique pas à de telles déclarations. Ces affaires ont donc été renvoyées devant la Crown court qui a prononcé des peines de prison. Cet exemple montre que la Cour suprême, comme la Chambre des Lords, est amenée à examiner des questions constitutionnelles dans le cadre de recours ordinaires fondés sur les lois, la common law ou l' equity.

En outre, la Cour suprême peut développer des principes de common law touchant des questions constitutionnelles comme la Chambre des Lords a pu le faire, il y a bien longtemps, dans les affaires dites des interdictions ou des proclamations concernant le statut de la prérogative ordinaire du Roi ou plus récemment en interprétant des lois à la lumière de principes constitutionnels de common law. Plusieurs décisions de la Chambre des Lords ont ainsi reconnu l'existence de droits ou libertés constitutionnels sur le fondement desquels des lois ont été interprétées. Si l'entrée en vigueur du HRA réduit l'utilité d'une telle technique, on ne peut exclure le recours à des principes constitutionnels qui ne seraient pas prévu par cette loi. En se substituant à la garantie des droits et libertés fondée sur la common law le HRA a, comme le EC Act 1972, complété ce contentieux constitutionnel original par un contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois lui aussi spécifique. Le particularisme de ces fonctions constitutionnelles tend néanmoins à décliner en raison du transfert des compétences en matière de dévolution au profit de la Cour suprême.

2) Le contentieux de la dévolution, vecteur direct d'extension des compétences constitutionnelles

Le contentieux de la dévolution développe les fonctions constitutionnelles de cette juridiction constitutionnelle singulière qu'est la Cour suprême. Les lois de dévolution ont créé une structure territoriale complexe, " quasi-fédérale ", pour certains. Elles prévoient un contrôle des actes des entités dévolues qui relève désormais de la compétence de la Cour suprême. Cette dernière est chargée, à l'instar de la Chambre des Lords, d'examiner les " affaires de dévolutions " ( devolution matters). Les caractéristiques des actes susceptibles d'être contrôlés illustre un transfert de compétences normatives original sur lequel le Parlement de Westminster est libre de revenir. Au pays de Galles, les actes susceptibles d'être concernés par ce contrôle sont des " mesures d'assemblée ", qui sont des législations déléguées adoptées par l'Assemblée galloise dans un domaine de compétences défini sur le fondement d'une habilitation des sections 93 et 94 du Government of Wales Act 2006 et des lois de l'Assemblée nationale galloise ( Acts of the National Assembly for Wales), depuis le référendum du 3 mars 2011 qui a étendu les pouvoirs législatifs de l'Assemblée galloise. Le contrôle exercé sur les actes écossais et nord-irlandais porte également sur des " lois " dont la nature est " incertaine ". Comme des législations primaires, elles peuvent être sources de législations déléguées et doivent être " prises en compte par les juridictions ". Comme des législations secondaires, elles sont adoptées sur la base d'une habilitation donnée par le Governement of Wales Act 2006, le Scotland Act 1998 et le Northern Ireland Act 1998, au regard de laquelle elles peuvent être contrôlées, et il est toujours possible pour le Parlement de Westminster de continuer à légiférer dans les domaines dévolus.

Dans le contentieux de la dévolution, la Cour suprême peut, d'une part, répondre à une " question  " posée par les officiers judiciaires lui demandant si un projet d'acte des entités dévolues respecte bien la répartition des compétences prévue par les lois de dévolution. Il s'agit d'une forme de contrôle a priori facultatif et abstrait. La Cour peut être saisie par les Law officers dans les quatre semaines suivant la première lecture d'un projet de loi gallois, écossais et nord-irlandais ou d'une mesure d'Assemblée, au Pays de Galles, ou bien à tout moment dans les quatre semaines suivant une étape d'approbation d'un projet de loi ou d'une mesure d'Assemblée afin de vérifier que ces textes n'outrepassent pas la compétence législative des entités dévolues. En cas de méconnaissance des principes de répartition des compétences, la décision de la Cour suprême fait obstacle à la promulgation du texte.

La Cour suprême peut, d'autre part, examiner a posteriori et en dernier ressort des "  devolution issues " en vertu de la section 41(4)(b) du CRA. Ces questions consistent à vérifier que les actes des Assemblées et des Exécutifs dévolus relèvent bien des compétences prévues par les lois de dévolution et respectent tant le droit de l'Union européenne que le droit de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales. Ces actes seront écartés s'ils violent les lois de dévolution, le droit communautaire ou les droits conventionnels. Le contentieux de la dévolution présente donc certaines spécificités par rapport au contentieux territorial d'autres systèmes car il ne se limite pas au seul contrôle de la répartition des compétences normatives entre territoires, mais présente aussi une dimension européenne. La Cour suprême peut-être saisie de ces devolution issues de façon différente. Les Law officers, partis à l'instance, peuvent demander à n'importe quelle juridiction de renvoyer une question de dévolution à la Cour suprême. Sinon, certaines juridictions sont tenues de renvoyer les questions de dévolution dont elles sont saisies à une Cour supérieure en Ecosse, au Pays de Galles ou en Irlande du Nord, qui pourra ensuite saisir la Cour suprême par la voie de l'appel. Cette dernière, compétente en dernier ressort, pourra déclarer l'acte ultra vires s'il ne respecte pas les règles de répartition des compétences prévues par les lois de dévolution. Les décisions peuvent avoir, selon la nature de l'acte contesté (un acte d'une assemblée dévolue ou l'exercice d'une fonction par un exécutif dévolu), les griefs invoqués contre cet acte (contrariété à la répartition des compétences organisée par les lois de dévolution, contrariété au droit communautaire ou contrariété aux droits conventionnels) une autorité variable. Cette autorité est, en principe, relative. Néanmoins, la décision aura, en pratique, une autorité absolue si la contrariété d'un acte législatif d'une entité dévolue avec l'organisation de la répartition des compétences par les lois de dévolution est constatée par la Cour suprême, ce qui n'a pour l'instant jamais eu lieu. Le contentieux de la dévolution a, en effet, été dominé par le contrôle du respect des droits de la CEDH et la seule décision à s'être prononcée exclusivement sur une question la méconnaissance des règles de répartition des compétences n'a pas déclaré illégale la loi pénale écossaise en cause dans cette affaire.

Les contrôles normatifs et de répartition des compétences exercés par la Cour suprême dans le cadre de ce contentieux " quasi-fédéral " s'apparentent ainsi au contentieux des compétences territoriales que l'on retrouve devant certaines Cours suprêmes ou constitutionnelles. Ces compétences présentent une originalité par rapport aux compétences de Cours suprêmes intervenant dans des systèmes fédéraux en raison de leur caractère " asymétrique ". Elles ne contraignent que la périphérie et non le centre. Le Parlement de Westminster peut toujours revenir sur les compétences dévolues et ne peut voir ses lois annulées ou écartées pour violation des règles de répartition des compétences. Toujours est-il qu'en examinant les actes des entités dévolues, la Cour suprême, à l'instar du Privy Council, dispose de " fonctions d'une Cour constitutionnelle pour les questions de dévolution ". D'ailleurs, lors de l'adoption des lois de dévolution, le Gouvernement s'était orienté vers l'attribution de cette compétence au Privy Council car il estimait que cette juridiction dotée de " l'expérience d'une Cour suprême constitutionnelle pour les différentes dépendances et colonies du Commonwealth  ". La Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni, exerce ainsi un " contrôle constitutionnel de la dévolution " ou un " contrôle localisé de constitutionnalité ", qui a considérablement développé le champ de ses compétences constitutionnelles et de dernier ressort.
C) Les conditions de la métamorphose définitive de la Cour suprême
Les attributions de la Cour suprême influencent les fondements de la Constitution du Royaume-Uni. Par ses compétences et sa jurisprudence, la Cour suprême perpétue la consolidation du principe de Rule of Law, précédemment amorcée par la Chambre des Lords (1), par rapport à un principe de souveraineté parlementaire dont le déclin se poursuit. Le véritable changement de nature de la Cour dépend de l'interprétation qu'elle fera de ces deux fondements de la Constitution du Royaume-Uni. Sa métamorphose définitive est conditionnée par la remise en cause du principe de souveraineté parlementaire (2).

1) La consolidation du principe de Rule of Law

Analyser le rôle de la Cour suprême par rapport au principe de Rule of Law nécessite d'abord de comprendre la Constitution britannique telle que l'a présenté A. V. Dicey, à savoir, une " Constitution faite par les juges ( a judge-made Constitution) ". Comme il l'explique, en présentant le principe de Rule of Law, " le règne de la loi pénètre dans la Constitution pour cette raison que les principes généraux de la Constitution (tel que, par exemple, le droit à la liberté individuelle et le droit de réunion publique) sont chez nous le résultat des décisions judiciaires déterminant les droits de simples citoyens dans les cas particuliers soumis à l'appréciation des tribunaux ; au contraire, sous l'empire de beaucoup de Constitutions étrangères, la garantie (telle qu'elle existe) accordée aux droits des individus résulte ou semble résulter des principes généraux de la Constitution. ". Il conclut sur ce point en indiquant que " le terme, le " règne de la loi ", peut être employé comme exprimant le fait que le droit constitutionnel anglais, c'est-à -dire les règles qui, à l'étranger font naturellement partie d'un Code constitutionnel, ne sont pas la source, mais la conséquence des droits des particuliers, définis et sanctionnés par les tribunaux ; bref, que les principes du droit privé ont été étendus en Angleterre par l'action des tribunaux et de la Couronne et de ses fonctionnaires ; ainsi, la Constitution est le résultat de la loi ordinaire du pays  ". Si l'on suit ce raisonnement, chaque décision de la Cour suprême à l'instar de celles de la Chambre des Lords, contribue au développement de cette " Constitution faite par les juges " sous-tendue par le principe ubi jus, ibi remedium, élément indissociable de la Rule of Law. L'affirmation du principe de Rule of Law à la suite du CRA résulte, en outre, de plusieurs autres facteurs.

La consécration textuelle de ce principe dans la première section de la loi sur la réforme constitutionnelle et l'omission de toute référence au principe de souveraineté parlementaire conforte, tout d'abord, l'importance croissante de la Rule of Law. Le soin avec lequel le législateur précise que le CRA n'affecte pas défavorablement le principe constitutionnel de Rule of Lawillustre sa volonté d'ancrer ce principe dans le droit positif écrit et de prévenir toute déstabilisation de ce fondement de la Constitution britannique au cœur duquel se trouve le rôle du juge. Elle s'inscrit en ce sens dans un mouvement de consolidation de la Rule of Law qui a précédé la mise en place de la Cour suprême puisque certains Law Lords ont reconnu un affaiblissement de l'autorité du principe de souveraineté du Parlement corrélatif à l'affirmation du principe de Rule of Law dans la décision Jackson du 13 octobre 2005. Lord Hope affirme ainsi que " le principe de souveraineté parlementaire n'est plus, s'il l'a jamais été, absolu " et reconnaît que " la rule of law, mise en œuvre par les cours, est le facteur ultime de contrôle sur lequel [la] Constitution est fondée ".

Le CRA s'inscrit, ensuite, dans une dynamique générale d'affirmation du principe de Rule of Law par l'attribution de compétences en matière de dévolution, qui donne à la Cour suprême l'occasion d'être saisie de nouveaux recours et de reconnaître par là même de nouveaux droits, tels que la présence d'un avocat pendant une garde à vue, par exemple.

Par ailleurs, en la mettant formellement en valeur, le CRA a amélioré la perception de la plus haute juridiction britannique et a donné, selon certains Justices, tel Lord Hope, une nouvelle autorité à ses décisions. En rendant plus visible la Cour suprême, le CRA affirme son rôle et celui de sa jurisprudence. La Cour suprême symbolise ainsi la garantie juridictionnelle ultime du principe de Rule of Law qui implique, outre le principe de légalité et d'égalité devant la loi, un principe de protection judiciaire des droits qui est clairement mis en avant, notamment dans les rapports annuels de la Cour. La reconnaissance de tels droits est effectuée par l'intermédiaire de recours fondés sur la common law, l' equity, des lois ordinaires ou constitutionnelles telles que le HRA. La Cour suprême a, par exemple, reconnu de nouveaux droits à des enfants dont la garde était en cause en jugeant qu'une attention particulière devait être accordée à leur bien être, ce qui pouvait impliquer que celui-ci soit gardé par sa grand-mère maternelle plutôt que par son père biologique. Une protection plus étendue a été accordée aux victimes de violences domestiques puisque la Cour suprême a interprété le terme violence domestique mentionné dans la section 177(1) du Housing Act 1996 dans un sens large allant au-delà des violences physiques. La politique d'admission d'un établissement scolaire juif a été jugée contraire à l'interdiction des discriminations fondées sur les origines ethniques prévue par la section 1 du Race Relations Act 1976 car elle imposait que les élèves soient juifs en raison d'une descendance maternelle ou après avoir effectué une conversion orthodoxe. Par ailleurs, la protection judiciaire des droits, essentiellement assurée par le HRA, marque une évolution de la conception Diceyenne du principe de Rule of Law supposant à l'origine l'absence de déclaration de droits. Le Human Rights Act, substitut d'une déclaration de droits, est à l'origine d'un nombre croissant de décisions. Par la place qu'elle donne au sein de son contentieux à la question des droits de l'homme incorporés par le HRA, la Cour suprême à la suite de l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords, montre que la Constitution britannique n'est plus exclusivement le résultat des décisions des juges britanniques, mais s'est familiarisée avec l'idée d'une déclaration de droits plus connue des Constitutions rigides. Elle témoigne en ce sens d'une véritable mutation du principe de Rule of Law.

La concentration des compétences pour juger en dernier ressort de tous types de contentieux contribue à faire de la Cour suprême le juge privilégié de cette "  judge-made Constitution " et affermit en ce sens la Rule of Law. Ce principe, dont l'existence en Amérique avait également été relevée par Tocqueville, renvoie au " goût pour la justice " et à la " place que les tribunaux occupent dans l'opinion publique à côté des rouages politiques ". L'essence de ce principe, commune à ces deux systèmes, repose sur le rôle du juge chargé d'assurer cette " prééminence du droit ". Alors qu'aux États-Unis cette prééminence du droit est entendue comme le droit de la Constitution et s'impose au législateur, elle doit, au Royaume-Uni, être conciliée avec la souveraineté du Parlement qui connaît cependant une érosion progressive.
2) La remise en cause du principe de souveraineté parlementaire
Vecteur de consolidation de la Rule of Law, le CRA donne-t-il à la Cour suprême les moyens de remettre en cause le principe de souveraineté parlementaire ? Ouvre-t-il la porte à une forme plus accomplie de contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois et par là -même à l'existence d'une Cour suprême plus aboutie ? En effet, la compétence de dernier ressort de la Cour connaît des écueils notamment en raison de l'absence de compétence pour le contentieux pénal écossais, ce qui est cependant partiellement compensé par la pratique juridictionnelle en matière de dévolution. L'absence de contrôle complet de constitutionnalité des lois et, par extension le principe de souveraineté du Parlement, constitue un obstacle plus difficile à surmonter afin de pouvoir pleinement assimiler la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni à ses homologues américaine, canadienne, indienne disposant d'une telle compétence.

L'existence et la substance du principe de souveraineté parlementaire sont fondées sur la common law à tel point que certains auteurs parlent de constitutionnalisme de common law. J. Goldworthy, pourtant opposé à cette conception du droit britannique, a résumé cette doctrine dans les termes suivants " La Constitution britannique non écrite consiste en des principes de common law et par conséquent l'autorité du Parlement pour adopter des lois découle de la common law ". Les opinions de certains Lords semblent aller dans ce sens. Dans la décision Jackson, Lord Steyn a ainsi avancé, à propos de la souveraineté du Parlement, qu'il " s'agit d'une construction de la common law. Les juges ont créé ce principe ".

Quelles est alors la portée de l'établissement de la Cour suprême, dont dépend en dernier ressort l'interprétation et l'application de la common law, sur les différentes composantes du principe de souveraineté parlementaire ? L'impossibilité pour le Parlement de lier ses successeurs et l'interdiction d'annuler ou d'écarter une loi, ont déjà été remises en cause, à des degrés différents. L'érosion progressive de ce principe résulte de ce que des lois telles que le European Communities Act 1972, le HRA et les lois de dévolution ont invité le juge à exercer une forme originale de contrôle des lois. La souveraineté du Parlement est, en quelque sorte, contrainte " par le haut " et " par le bas " en raison du contrôle des lois exercé sur le fondement de ces lois constitutionnelles qui se distinguent formellement des lois ordinaires, à la suite de l'arrêt Thoburn. Le dernier aspect du principe de souveraineté parlementaire qui concerne l'absence de hiérarchie entre lois, a également été fragilisé par cet arrêt avant le CRA.

La concentration de cette double contrainte au sein d'une seule et même institution, alors qu'elle était autrefois répartie entre la Chambre des Lords et le Privy Council, conforte l'idée d'un contre-pouvoir juridictionnel renforcé face au Parlement souverain. La Cour suprême ira-t-elle bientôt au bout de la logique de ce contrôle en adoptant un contrôle de constitutionnalité complet par un Marbury v. Madison à l'anglaise ? En effet, ces attributions pourraient avoir donné à la nouvelle Cour suprême un " avant goût " de ce que peuvent faire les juridictions constitutionnelles. Comme le souligne Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, la section 40 (5) du CRA pourrait constituer le fondement d'un pouvoir de contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois puisqu'elle dispose que la Cour suprême "  a le pouvoir de régler toute question nécessaire à la détermination de la justice lorsqu'un appel est porté devant elle sur le fondement de toute loi ". Le Master of the Rolls suggère que si la question de la contrariété d'une loi à un " droit fondamental, un droit constitutionnel " se posait, la section 40(5) pourrait légitimement être interprétée comme autorisant un contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois. Une telle perspective est-elle envisageable ?

Le principe de souveraineté parlementaire est censé y faire obstacle. Néanmoins, ce principe dépend essentiellement de la volonté des juges et notamment de ceux de la Cour suprême, puisque l'on se situe dans le cadre d'une "  judge-made Constitution " et qu'il est, par ailleurs, difficile d'envisager en théorie comme en pratique que le Parlement souverain renonce à sa propre souveraineté. En conséquence, la remise en cause définitive du principe de souveraineté du Parlement dépend de l'attachement dont font preuve les juridictions britanniques, au premier rang desquelles la Cour suprême, à son égard. Il pourrait ainsi être redéfini par les juges sur la base d'une nouvelle théorie constitutionnelle amorcée dans la décision Jackson. Lord STEYN y a affirmé que " la doctrine de la suprématie pure et absolue de la souveraineté du Parlement n'a plus sa place dans le Royaume-Uni moderne ". Il ajoute que " Si tel est le cas il n'est pas impensable que des circonstances puissent conduire les Cours à reconnaître un principe établi sur une théorie différente de constitutionnalisme ". Lady HALE a, pour sa part, suggéré que, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, une loi qui détruirait le principe de Rule of law en " empêchant tout contrôle juridictionnel des actions du gouvernement affectant les droits des individus " pourrait être contrôlée par les Cours.

Si la Cour suprême devait emprunter cette voie, il faudrait qu'elle interprète différemment le principe de Rule of Law puisque le principe de souveraineté parlementaire est " la conséquence et non la cause du principe de la rule of law ". La Cour suprême pourrait, en reprenant, la portée de l'arrêt Thoburn, déduire de la Rule of Law l'existence d'un nouveau recours en inconstitutionnalité sur la base des certaines lois " constitutionnelles " ou de principes constitutionnels de common law prévalant sur les autres lois ou principes de common law. Le renforcement du principe de Rule of Law rendrait ainsi envisageable de nouveaux recours à travers une forme plus aboutie de contrôle de constitutionnalité. Dans une telle hypothèse, la Rule of Law telle qu'elle a été transformée par la pratique constitutionnelle et juridictionnelle américaine qui correspond à l'idée de prééminence du droit de la Constitution s'imposant à tous les pouvoirs reviendrait, par la " porte de service ", sous une forme atténuée au Royaume-Uni. A défaut de pouvoir l'établir en adoptant une Constitution rigide prévoyant un tel contrôle de constitutionnalité, une telle interprétation ouvrirait la voie à la garantie juridictionnelle d'une Constitution toujours emprunte d'originalité en raison du maintien de ses divers fondements ( common law, lois et conventions constitutionnelles), mais partiellement formalisée.

Cette interprétation du principe de Rule of Law conduisant à une remise en cause définitive de la souveraineté du Parlement ne semble pour l'instant pas être partagée par l'actuel Président de la Cour suprême, Lord Phillips, à l'instar de l'ancien Président de la Chambre des Lords, Lord Bingham. Les décisions de la Cour suprême révèlent d'ailleurs une certaine déférence à l'égard du Parlement qui ne laisse pas augurer l'imminence d'un tel changement. Le Royaume-Uni ne franchira le Rubicon qui le sépare encore des autres Cours suprêmes dotées de fonctions constitutionnelles qu'à condition que le principe de Rule of Law nouvellement interprété l'emporte sur la Souveraineté du Parlement. En définitive, l'ultime transformation de la Cour suprême ne dépend que d'elle.

* * *

La Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni a été instaurée dans une phase de transition du constitutionnalisme britannique. Elle conforte, au niveau juridictionnel, des évolutions constitutionnelles, mais ne constitue pas, en elle-même, un véritable bouleversement. Corrélativement à l'écriture progressive de la Constitution britannique, le juge a vu son rôle renforcé face au Parlement. La Cour suprême prend ainsi acte, d'évolutions institutionnelles et normatives en héritant notamment d'un contentieux normatif de dimension régionale et d'un contrôle des lois de Westminter par rapport au droit européen qui s'apparente à une forme originale de contrôle de constitutionnalité. Le CRA a accru les convergences formelles et fonctionnelles avec d'autres Cours suprêmes, dont certaines manifestations existaient déjà à l'époque de la Chambre des Lords. Il n'a cependant pas effacé la nature atypique de cette juridiction qui emprunte à la notion de juridiction suprême et constitutionnelle sans y correspondre exactement.

L'expérience britannique trouve, de par ces convergences, toute sa place au sein de la comparaison entre systèmes de justice constitutionnelle. Cette juridiction atypique témoigne des limites d'une conception restrictive de la notion de justice constitutionnelle et de sa modélisation. Ses compétences présentent, en effet, des caractéristiques qui n'entrent pas dans la classification entre modèle américain et européen, ni dans aucune autre classification. Les compétences de la Cour suprême ne sont pas fondées sur une Constitution rigide, mais sur la common law ou des lois " constitutionnelles " originales dont certaines incorporent des traités européens. Le contentieux qui naît de l'application de ces règles constitutionnelles n'est, ni concentré, ni totalement diffus puisque les juridictions compétentes varient selon le litige dont il est question. Si toutes les juridictions sont habilitées à contrôler les actes par rapport au droit de l'Union européenne ou encore à juger, selon les règles de droit commun, des actes des membres du Parlement ou du Gouvernement, le contentieux de la dévolution et du HRA en cas de déclaration d'incompatibilité tend à se concentrer puisqu'il appartient aux plus Hautes juridictions. Le contentieux constitutionnel est, en dehors des questions de dévolution contrôlées a priori, essentiellement exercé a posteriori et présente un caractère concret étant résolu par le juge saisi du litige. Ce contentieux est, par ailleurs, essentiellement exercé par voie d'exception puisque les questions constitutionnelles ne sont pas, à l'exception du contentieux a priori de la dévolution, l'objet même du recours et sont accessoires à un litige dont elles permettent la résolution. Enfin, l'effet des décisions est variable. En principe, les décisions ont un effet inter partes, qui est limité, en pratique, par la règle du précédent. En revanche, les décisions prononçant des déclarations d'incompatibilité sur la base du HRA ont une autorité politique en raison de leur absence d'effet juridique sur la loi en cause et de l'invitation qu'elles formulent à l'attention du législateur pour la modifier. D'ailleurs, si les déclarations d'inconstitutionnalité avec effet différé prononcées notamment dans des décisions QPC en France ont un effet abrogatif, le report dans le temps de cette abrogation qui fait obstacle à la disparition immédiate d'une inconstitutionnalité et l'invitation qu'elles formulent à l'égard du législateur pour corriger l'inconstitutionnalité dénoncée ne font-ils pas, dans une certaine mesure, écho à la procédure britannique ? En revanche, au Royaume-Uni, une décision dans laquelle la déclaration d'incompatibilité est formulée aura également un effet inter partes et non erga omnes lorsqu'elle se prononce sur les autres demandes du requérant. Le contentieux constitutionnel exercé par la Cour suprême au Royaume-Uni revêt donc les caractéristiques d'un contrôle partiellement diffus, essentiellement concret, exercé a posteriori, par voie d'exception qui est à l'origine de décisions dotées d'une autorité de chose jugée variable. Cette coexistence entre caractéristiques et les nuances dont elles témoignent existe dans bon nombre d'autres systèmes. La Cour suprême confirme ainsi les limites des classifications qui ne couvrent pas l'ensemble des réalités institutionnelles que l'on rencontre en droit positif. Les caractéristiques du contentieux constitutionnel devant la Cour suprême confortent le caractère atypique de cette juridiction dont les compétences constitutionnelles et de dernier ressort se sont néanmoins développées, favorisant une convergence encore plus accrue avec d'autres Cours suprêmes.

Elle ne correspond en effet, mais comme bien d'autres juridictions, à aucune classification et appelle à penser autrement la justice constitutionnelle. La Cour suprême au Royaume-Uni montre, à l'instar de l'expérience israélienne, que la notion de juge et de justice constitutionnelle n'est pas inconciliable avec celle de Constitution souple et révèle la nécessité d'appréhender plus largement cette notion. Bien qu'il confirme la nature hors norme de la plus haute juridiction britannique, le CRA démontre néanmoins qu'elle assure, comme l' Appellate Committee de la Chambre des Lords, une forme de justice constitutionnelle en raison de l'existence d'un " garantie juridictionnelle ", certes originale, " de la Constitution " du Royaume-Uni. La Cour suprême enrichit ainsi les systèmes de justice constitutionnelle d'une nouvelle forme de juridiction à la croisée des chemins et témoigne de leur diversité. En définitive, puisqu'un système dispose de la justice constitutionnelle dessinée par sa Constitution, celle du Royaume-Uni faisant l'objet d'une écriture permanente, la justice constitutionnelle qui en découle n'est pas non plus stabilisée.

La Cour suprême illustre ainsi l'alternative à laquelle le constitutionnalisme britannique semble faire face. Maintenir son particularisme en préservant une voie médiane à mi-chemin entre souveraineté parlementaire et suprématie constitutionnelle propice à un renouvellement de la notion de justice constitutionnelle ? S'engager, par l'abandon définitif du principe de souveraineté parlementaire, vers une suprématie de la Constitution telle que la garantissent certaines Cours suprêmes, au premier rang desquelles la Cour suprême américaine ? Le statu quo prévaut pour le moment et la souveraineté reste " bi-polaire ", partagée entre le Parlement et les juges. L'un des deux pôles l'emportera-t-il ? On peut douter de l'abandon du principe juridique de souveraineté parlementaire dans un avenir proche, puisque le Parlement est aussi, dans le cadre de l'actuel régime parlementaire, le représentant du souverain politique qu'est le peuple. N'ayant pas été accompli par le CRA, simple révision constitutionnelle, le changement de nature de la Cour suprême nécessitera, en définitive, une véritable révolution constitutionnelle.
Aurélie Duffy-Meunier est Maître de conférences à l'Université Paris II-Panthéon-Assas, membre du Centre de droit public comparé (Université Paris II - Panthéon Assas)), membre associé de l'Institut Louis Favoreu - Groupe d'études et de recherches sur la justice constitutionnelle (CNRS UMR 6201)
Constitutional Reform Act 2005

An Act to make provision for modifying the office of Lord Chancellor, and to make provision relating to the functions of that office; to establish a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, and to abolish the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords; to make provision about the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the judicial functions of the President of the Council; to make other provision about the judiciary, their appointment and discipline; and for connected purposes.[24th March 2005]Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:
1. The rule of law
This Act does not adversely affect -

(a)the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law, or

(b)the Lord Chancellor's existing constitutional role in relation to that principle.

[...]

Continued judicial independence
3. Guarantee of continued judicial independence
(1)The Lord Chancellor, other Ministers of the Crown and all with responsibility for matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice must uphold the continued independence of the judiciary.

(2)Subsection (1) does not impose any duty which it would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament to impose.

(3)A person is not subject to the duty imposed by subsection (1) if he is subject to the duty imposed by section 1(1) of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 (c. 26).

(4)The following particular duties are imposed for the purpose of upholding that independence.

(5)The Lord Chancellor and other Ministers of the Crown must not seek to influence particular judicial decisions through any special access to the judiciary.

(6)The Lord Chancellor must have regard to-

(a)the need to defend that independence;

(b)the need for the judiciary to have the support necessary to enable them to exercise their functions;

(c)the need for the public interest in regard to matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice to be properly represented in decisions affecting those matters.

(7)In this section "the judiciary" includes the judiciary of any of the following-

(a)the Supreme Court;

(b)any other court established under the law of any part of the United Kingdom;

(c)any international court.

[F1(7A)In this section "the judiciary" also includes every person who-

(a)holds an office listed in Schedule 14 or holds an office listed in subsection (7B), and

(b)but for this subsection would not be a member of the judiciary for the purposes of this section.

(7B)The offices are those of-

(a)Senior President of Tribunals;

(b)President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland);

(c)Vice President of Employment Tribunals (Scotland);

(d)member of a panel of chairmen of Employment Tribunals (Scotland);

(e)member of a panel of members of employment tribunals that is not a panel of chairmen;

(8)In subsection (7) "international court" means the International Court of Justice or any other court or tribunal which exercises jurisdiction, or performs functions of a judicial nature, in pursuance of-

(a)an agreement to which the United Kingdom or Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is a party, or

(b)a resolution of the Security Council or General Assembly of the United Nations.

[...]

Part 3 The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court
23. The Supreme Court
(1)There is to be a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.

(2)The Court consists of 12 judges appointed by Her Majesty by letters patent.

(3)Her Majesty may from time to time by Order in Council amend subsection (2) so as to increase or further increase the number of judges of the Court.

(4)No recommendation may be made to Her Majesty in Council to make an Order under subsection (3) unless a draft of the Order has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.

(5)Her Majesty may by letters patent appoint one of the judges to be President and one to be Deputy President of the Court.

(6)The judges other than the President and Deputy President are to be styled "Justices of the Supreme Court".

(7)The Court is to be taken to be duly constituted despite any vacancy among the judges of the Court or in the office of President or Deputy President.
24. First members of the Court
On the commencement of section 23-

(a)the persons who immediately before that commencement are Lords of Appeal in Ordinary become judges of the Supreme Court,

(b)the person who immediately before that commencement is the senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary becomes the President of the Court, and

(c)the person who immediately before that commencement is the second senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary becomes the Deputy President of the Court.

Appointment of judges
25. Qualification for appointment
(1)A person is not qualified to be appointed a judge of the Supreme Court unless he has (at any time)-

(a)held high judicial office for a period of at least 2 years,

(b)been a qualifying practitioner for a period of at least 15 years.

[F1(b)satisfied the judicial-appointment eligibility condition on a 15-year basis, or

(c)been a qualifying practitioner for a period of at least 15 years.]

(2)A person is a qualifying practitioner for the purposes of this section at any time when-

(a)F2................................

(b)he is an advocate in Scotland or a solicitor entitled to appear in the Court of Session and the High Court of Justiciary, or
26. Selection of members of the Court
(1)This section applies to a recommendation for an appointment to one of the following offices-

(a)judge of the Supreme Court;

(b)President of the Court;

(c)Deputy President of the Court.

(2)A recommendation may be made only by the Prime Minister.

(3)The Prime Minister-

(a)must recommend any person whose name is notified to him under section 29;

(b)may not recommend any other person.

(4)A person who is not a judge of the Court must be recommended for appointment as a judge if his name is notified to the Prime Minister for an appointment as President or Deputy President.

(5)If there is a vacancy in one of the offices mentioned in subsection (1), or it appears to him that there will soon be such a vacancy, the Lord Chancellor must convene a selection commission for the selection of a person to be recommended.

(6)Schedule 8 is about selection commissions.

(7)Subsection (5) is subject to Part 3 of that Schedule.

(8)Sections 27 to 31 apply where a selection commission is convened under this section.
27. Selection process
(1)The commission must-

(a)determine the selection process to be applied,

(b)apply the selection process, and

(c)make a selection accordingly.

(2)As part of the selection process the commission must consult each of the following-

(a)such of the senior judges as are not members of the commission and are not willing to be considered for selection;

(b)the Lord Chancellor;

(c)the First Minister in Scotland;

(e)the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

(3)If for any part of the United Kingdom no judge of the courts of that part is to be consulted under subsection (2)(a), the commission must consult as part of the selection process the most senior judge of the courts of that part who is not a member of the commission and is not willing to be considered for selection.

(4)Subsections (5) to (10) apply to any selection under this section or section 31.

(5)Selection must be on merit.

(6)A person may be selected only if he meets the requirements of section 25.

(7)A person may not be selected if he is a member of the commission.

(8)In making selections for the appointment of judges of the Court the commission must ensure that between them the judges will have knowledge of, and experience of practice in, the law of each part of the United Kingdom.

(9)The commission must have regard to any guidance given by the Lord Chancellor as to matters to be taken into account (subject to any other provision of this Act) in making a selection.

(10)Any selection must be of one person only.
28. Report
(1)After complying with section 27 the commission must submit a report to the Lord Chancellor.

(2)The report must-

(a)state who has been selected;

(b)state the senior judges consulted under section 27(2)(a) and any judge consulted under section 27(3);

(c)contain any other information required by the Lord Chancellor.

(3)The report must be in a form approved by the Lord Chancellor.

(4)After submitting the report the commission must provide any further information the Lord Chancellor may require.

(5)When he receives the report the Lord Chancellor must consult each of the following-

(a)the senior judges consulted under section 27(2)(a);

(b)any judge consulted under section 27(3);

(c)the First Minister in Scotland;

(e)the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
29. The Lord Chancellor's options
(1)This section refers to the following stages-

Stage 1:where a person has been selected under section 27

Stage 2:where a person has been selected following a rejection or reconsideration at stage 1

Stage 3:where a person has been selected following a rejection or reconsideration at stage 2.(2)At stage 1 the Lord Chancellor must do one of the following-

(a)notify the selection;

(b)reject the selection;

(c)require the commission to reconsider the selection.

(3)At stage 2 the Lord Chancellor must do one of the following-

(a)notify the selection;

(b)reject the selection, but only if it was made following a reconsideration at stage 1;

(c)require the commission to reconsider the selection, but only if it was made following a rejection at stage 1.

(4)At stage 3 the Lord Chancellor must notify the selection, unless subsection (5) applies and he makes a notification under it.

(5)If a person whose selection the Lord Chancellor required to be reconsidered at stage 1 or 2 was not selected again at the next stage, the Lord Chancellor may at stage 3 notify that person's name to the Prime Minister.

(6)In this Part references to the Lord Chancellor notifying a selection are references to his notifying to the Prime Minister the name of the person selected.
30. Exercise of powers to reject or require reconsideration
(1)The power of the Lord Chancellor under section 29 to reject a selection at stage 1 or 2 is exercisable only on the grounds that, in the Lord Chancellor's opinion, the person selected is not suitable for the office concerned.

(2)The power of the Lord Chancellor under section 29 to require the commission to reconsider a selection at stage 1 or 2 is exercisable only on the grounds that, in the Lord Chancellor's opinion-

(a)there is not enough evidence that the person is suitable for the office concerned,

(b)there is evidence that the person is not the best candidate on merit, or

(c)there is not enough evidence that if the person were appointed the judges of the Court would between them have knowledge of, and experience of practice in, the law of each part of the United Kingdom.

(3)The Lord Chancellor must give the commission reasons in writing for rejecting or requiring reconsideration of a selection.
31. Selection following rejection or requirement to reconsider
(1)If under section 29 the Lord Chancellor rejects or requires reconsideration of a selection at stage 1 or 2, the commission must select a person in accordance with this section.

(2)If the Lord Chancellor rejects a selection, the commission-

(a)may not select the person rejected, and

(b)where the rejection is following reconsideration of a selection, may not select the person (if different) whose selection it reconsidered.

(3)If the Lord Chancellor requires a selection to be reconsidered, the commission-

(a)may select the same person or a different person, but

(b)where the requirement is following a rejection, may not select the person rejected.

(4)The commission must inform the Lord Chancellor of the person selected following a rejection or requirement to reconsider.

Terms of appointment
32. Oath of allegiance and judicial oath
(1)A person who is appointed as President of the Court must, as soon as may be after accepting office, take the required oaths in the presence of-

(a)the Deputy President, or

(b)if there is no Deputy President, the senior ordinary judge.

(2)A person who is appointed as Deputy President of the Supreme Court must, as soon as may be after accepting office, take the required oaths in the presence of-

(a)the President, or

(b)if there is no President, the senior ordinary judge.

(3)A person who is appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court must, as soon as may be after accepting office, take the required oaths in the presence of-

(a)the President, or

(b)if there is no President, the Deputy President, or

(c)if there is no President and no Deputy President, the senior ordinary judge.

(4)Subsections (1) and (2) apply whether or not the person appointed as President or Deputy President has previously taken the required oaths in accordance with this section after accepting another office.

(5)Subsection (3) does not apply where a person is first appointed as a judge of the Court upon appointment to the office of President or Deputy President.

(6)In this section "required oaths" means-

(a)the oath of allegiance, and

(b)the judicial oath,

as set out in the Promissory Oaths Act 1868 (c. 72).
33. Tenure
A judge of the Supreme Court holds that office during good behaviour, but may be removed from it on the address of both Houses of Parliament.
34. Salaries and allowances
(1)A judge of the Supreme Court is entitled to a salary.

(2)The amount of the salary is to be determined by the Lord Chancellor with the agreement of the Treasury.

(3)Until otherwise determined under subsection (2), the amount is that of the salary of a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary immediately before the commencement of section 23.

(4)A determination under subsection (2) may increase but not reduce the amount.

(5)Salaries payable under this section are to be charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

(6)Any allowance determined by the Lord Chancellor with the agreement of the Treasury may be paid to a judge of the Court out of money provided by Parliament.
35. Resignation and retirement
(1)A judge of the Supreme Court may at any time resign that office by giving the Lord Chancellor notice in writing to that effect.

(2)The President or Deputy President of the Court may at any time resign that office (whether or not he resigns his office as a judge) by giving the Lord Chancellor notice in writing to that effect.

(3)In section 26(4)(a) of and Schedule 5 to the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 (c. 8) (retirement), for "Lord of Appeal in Ordinary" substitute "Judge of the Supreme Court".
36. Medical retirement
(1)This section applies if the Lord Chancellor is satisfied by means of a medical certificate that a person holding office as a judge of the Supreme Court-

(a)is disabled by permanent infirmity from the performance of the duties of his office, and

(b)is for the time being incapacitated from resigning his office.

(2)The Lord Chancellor may by instrument under his hand declare the person's office to have been vacated.

(3)A declaration by instrument under subsection (2) has the same effect for all purposes as if the person had, on the date of the instrument, resigned his office.

(4)But such a declaration has no effect unless it is made-

(a)in the case of an ordinary judge, with the agreement of the President and Deputy President of the Court;

(b)in the case of the President, with the agreement of the Deputy President and the senior ordinary judge;

(c)in the case of the Deputy President, with the agreement of the President and the senior ordinary judge.
37. Pensions
(1)In the tables in sections 1 and 16 of the Judicial Pensions Act 1981 (c. 20) (application and interpretation), for "Lord of Appeal in Ordinary"-

(a)in the first column, substitute " Judge of the Supreme Court ", and

(b)in the second column, in each place substitute " judge of the Supreme Court ".

(2)In Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 (qualifying judicial offices: judges), for "Lord of Appeal in Ordinary" substitute "Judge of the Supreme Court".

(3)The amendments made by this section to the 1981 and 1993 Acts do not affect the operation of any provision of or made under those Acts, or anything done under such provision, in relation to the office of, or service as, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.

Acting judges
38. Acting judges
(1)At the request of the President of the Supreme Court any of the following may act as a judge of the Court-

(a)a person who holds office as a senior territorial judge;

(b)a member of the supplementary panel under section 39.

(2)A request under subsection (1) may be made by the Deputy President of the Court if there is no President or the President is unable to make that request.

(3)In section 26(7) of the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 (c. 8) (requirement not to act in certain capacities after the age of 75) for paragraph (b) substitute-

"(b)act as a judge of the Supreme Court under section 38 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005;".

(4)Every person while acting under this section is, subject to subsections (5) and (6), to be treated for all purposes as a judge of the Supreme Court (and so may perform any of the functions of a judge of the Court).

(5)A person is not to be treated under subsection (4) as a judge of the Court for the purposes of any statutory provision relating to-

(a)the appointment, retirement, removal or disqualification of judges of the Court,

(b)the tenure of office and oaths to be taken by judges of the Court, or

(c)the remuneration, allowances or pensions of judges of the Court.

(6)Subject to section 27 of the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993, a person is not to be treated under subsection (4) as having been a judge of the Court if he has acted in the Court only under this section.

(7)Such remuneration and allowances as the Lord Chancellor may with the agreement of the Treasury determine may be paid out of money provided by Parliament to any person who acts as a judge of the Court under this section.

(8)In this section "office as a senior territorial judge" means office as any of the following-

(a)a judge of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales;

(b)a judge of the Court of Session, but only if the holder of the office is a member of the First or Second Division of the Inner House of that Court;

(c)a judge of the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, unless the holder holds the office only by virtue of being a puisne judge of the High Court.
39. Supplementary panel
(1)There is to be a panel of persons known as the supplementary panel.

(2)On the commencement of this section any member of the House of Lords who-

(a)meets one of the conditions in subsection (3),

(b)does not hold high judicial office,

(c)has not attained the age of 75, and

(d)is not a person who was appointed to the office of Lord Chancellor on or after 12 June 2003, becomes a member of the panel.

(3)The conditions are-

(a)that he ceased to hold high judicial office less than 5 years before the commencement of this section;

(b)that he was a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council immediately before that commencement;

(c)that he ceased to be a member of that Committee less than 5 years before that commencement.

(4)A person becomes a member of the supplementary panel on ceasing to hold office as a judge of the Supreme Court or as a senior territorial judge, but only if, while he holds such office-

(a)his membership of the panel is approved in writing by the President of the Supreme Court, and

(b)the President of the Court gives the Lord Chancellor notice in writing of the approval.

(5)Subsection (4) does not apply to a person who ceases to hold office as a judge of the Supreme Court when he ceases to be President of the Court.

(6)Such a person becomes a member of the supplementary panel on ceasing to be President of the Court, unless-

(a)while President, he gives the Lord Chancellor notice that he is not to become a member of the panel,

(b)he ceases to be President on being removed from office as a judge of the Court on the address of both Houses of Parliament, or

(c)his office is declared vacant under section 36.

(7)A person does not become a member of the supplementary panel under subsection (4) or (6) if-

(a)on ceasing to hold office as a judge of the Supreme Court he takes office as a senior territorial judge, or

(b)on ceasing to hold office as a senior territorial judge he takes office as a judge of the Supreme Court.

(8)A member of the supplementary panel may resign by notice in writing to the President of the Court.

(9)Unless he resigns (and subject to sections 26(7)(b) and 27 of the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 (c. 8)), a person ceases to be a member of the supplementary panel-

(a)at the end of 5 years after the last day on which he holds his qualifying office, or

(b)if earlier, at the end of the day on which he attains the age of 75.

(10)In this section-

(a)"office as a senior territorial judge" has the same meaning as in section 38;

(b)a person's "qualifying office" is the office (that is, high judicial office, membership of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, office as a judge of the Supreme Court or office as a senior territorial judge) that he held before becoming a member of the supplementary panel.

Jurisdiction, relation to other courts etc
40. Jurisdiction
(1)The Supreme Court is a superior court of record.

(2)An appeal lies to the Court from any order or judgment of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales in civil proceedings.

(3)An appeal lies to the Court from any order or judgment of a court in Scotland if an appeal lay from that court to the House of Lords at or immediately before the commencement of this section.

(4)Schedule 9-

(a)transfers other jurisdiction from the House of Lords to the Court,

(b)transfers devolution jurisdiction from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to the Court, and

(c)makes other amendments relating to jurisdiction.

(5)The Court has power to determine any question necessary to be determined for the purposes of doing justice in an appeal to it under any enactment.

(6)An appeal under subsection (2) lies only with the permission of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court; but this is subject to provision under any other enactment restricting such an appeal.
41. Relation to other courts etc
(1)Nothing in this Part is to affect the distinctions between the separate legal systems of the parts of the United Kingdom.

(2)A decision of the Supreme Court on appeal from a court of any part of the United Kingdom, other than a decision on a devolution matter, is to be regarded as the decision of a court of that part of the United Kingdom.

(3)A decision of the Supreme Court on a devolution matter-

(a)is not binding on that Court when making such a decision;

(b)otherwise, is binding in all legal proceedings.

(4)In this section "devolution matter" means-

(a)a question referred to the Supreme Court under [F5section 96, 99 or 112 of the Government of Wales Act 2006,] section 33 of the Scotland Act 1998 (c. 46) or section 11 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (c. 47);

Composition for proceedings
42. Composition
(1)The Supreme Court is duly constituted in any proceedings only if all of the following conditions are met-

(a)the Court consists of an uneven number of judges;

(b)the Court consists of at least three judges;

(c)more than half of those judges are permanent judges.

(2)Paragraphs and of subsection are subject to any directions that in specified proceedings the Court is to consist of a specified number of judges that is both uneven and greater than three.

(3)Paragraph of subsection is subject to any directions that in specified descriptions of proceedings the Court is to consist of a specified minimum number of judges that is greater than three.

(4)This section is subject to section 43.

(5)In this section-

(a)"directions" means directions given by the President of the Court;

(b)"specified", in relation to directions, means specified in those directions;

(c)references to permanent judges are references to those judges of the Court who are not acting judges under section 38.

(6)This section and section 43 apply to the constitution of the Court in any proceedings from the time judges are designated to hear the proceedings.
43. Changes in composition
(1)This section applies if in any proceedings the Court ceases to be duly constituted in accordance with section 42, or in accordance with a direction under this section, because one or more members of the Court are unable to continue.

(2)The presiding judge may direct that the Court is still duly constituted in the proceedings.

(3)The presiding judge may give a direction under this section only if-

(a)the parties agree;

(b)the Court still consists of at least three judges (whether the number of judges is even or uneven);

(c)at least half of those judges are permanent judges.

(4)Subsections (2) and (3) are subject to directions given by the President of the Court.

(5)If in any proceedings the Court is duly constituted under this section with an even number of judges, and those judges are evenly divided, the case is to be re-argued in a Court which is constituted in accordance with section 42.

(6)In this section-

(a)"presiding judge" means the judge who is to preside, or is presiding, over proceedings;

(b)references to permanent judges have the same meaning as in section 42.

Practice and procedure
44. Specially qualified advisers
(1)If the Supreme Court thinks it expedient in any proceedings, it may hear and dispose of the proceedings wholly or partly with the assistance of one or more specially qualified advisers appointed by it.

(2)Any remuneration payable to such an adviser is to be determined by the Court unless agreed between the adviser and the parties to the proceedings.

(3)Any remuneration forms part of the costs of the proceedings.
45. Making of rules
(1)The President of the Supreme Court may make rules (to be known as "Supreme Court Rules") governing the practice and procedure to be followed in the Court.

(2)The power to make Supreme Court Rules includes power to make different provision for different cases, including different provision-

(a)for different descriptions of proceedings, or

(b)for different jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

(3)The President must exercise the power to make Supreme Court Rules with a view to securing that-

(a)the Court is accessible, fair and efficient, and

(b)the rules are both simple and simply expressed.

(4)Before making Supreme Court Rules the President must consult all of the following-

(a)the Lord Chancellor;

(b)the bodies listed in subsection (5);

(c)such other bodies that represent persons likely to be affected by the Rules as the President considers it appropriate to consult.

(5)The bodies referred to in subsection (4)(b) are-

The General Council of the Bar of England and Wales;

The Law Society of England and Wales;

The Faculty of Advocates of Scotland;

The Law Society of Scotland;

The General Council of the Bar of Northern Ireland;

The Law Society of Northern Ireland.
46. Procedure after rules made
(1)Supreme Court Rules made by the President of the Supreme Court must be submitted by him to the Lord Chancellor.

(2)Supreme Court Rules submitted to the Lord Chancellor-

(a)come into force on such day as the Lord Chancellor directs, and

(b)are to be contained in a statutory instrument to which the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (c. 36) applies as if the instrument contained rules made by a Minister of the Crown.

(3)A statutory instrument containing Supreme Court Rules is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

[...]

Staff and resources
48Chief executive
(1)The Supreme Court is to have a chief executive.

(2)The Lord Chancellor must appoint the chief executive, after consulting the President of the Court.

(3)The President of the Court may delegate to the chief executive any of these functions-

(a)functions of the President under section 49(1);

(b)non-judicial functions of the Court.

(4)The chief executive must carry out his functions (under subsection (3) or otherwise) in accordance with any directions given by the President of the Court.
49. Officers and staff
(1)The President of the Supreme Court may appoint officers and staff of the Court.

(2)It is for the chief executive of the Supreme Court to determine these matters with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor-

(a)the number of officers and staff of the Court;

(b)subject to subsection (3), the terms on which officers and staff are to be appointed.

(3)The civil service pension arrangements for the time being in force apply (with any necessary adaptations) to the chief executive of the Court, and to persons appointed under subsection (1), as they apply to other persons employed in the civil service of the State.

(4)In subsection (3) "the civil service pension arrangements" means-

(a)the principal civil service pension scheme (within the meaning of section 2 of the Superannuation Act 1972 (c. 11), and

(b)any other superannuation benefits for which provision is made under or by virtue of section 1 of that Act for or in respect of persons in employment in the civil service of the State.
50. Accommodation and other resources
(1)The Lord Chancellor must ensure that the Supreme Court is provided with the following-

(a)such court-houses, offices and other accommodation as the Lord Chancellor thinks are appropriate for the Court to carry on its business;

(b)such other resources as the Lord Chancellor thinks are appropriate for the Court to carry on its business.

(2)The Lord Chancellor may discharge the duty under subsection (1) by-

(a)providing accommodation or other resources, or

(b)entering into arrangements with any other person for the provision of accommodation or other resources.

(3)The powers to acquire land for the public service conferred by-

(a)section 2 of the Commissioners of Works Act 1852 (c. 28) (acquisition by agreement), and

(b)section 228(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (c. 8) (compulsory acquisition), are to be treated as including power to acquire land for the purpose of its provision under arrangements under subsection (2)(b).

(4)The Scottish Ministers may make payments by way of contribution to the costs incurred by the Lord Chancellor in providing the Court with resources in accordance with subsection (1)(b).

(5)In this section "court-house" means any place where the Court sits, including the precincts of any building in which it sits.
51. System to support Court in carrying on business
(1)The chief executive of the Supreme Court must ensure that the Court's resources are used to provide an efficient and effective system to support the Court in carrying on its business.

(2)In particular-

(a)appropriate services must be provided for the Court;

(b)the accommodation provided under section 50 must be appropriately equipped, maintained and managed.

Fees
52. Fees
(1)The Lord Chancellor may, with the agreement of the Treasury, by order prescribe fees payable in respect of anything dealt with by the Supreme Court.

(2)An order under this section may, in particular, contain provision about-

(a)scales or rates of fees;

(b)exemptions from fees;

(c)reductions in fees;

(d)whole or partial remission of fees.

(3)When including any provision in an order under this section, the Lord Chancellor must have regard to the principle that access to the courts must not be denied.

(4)Before making an order under this section, the Lord Chancellor must consult all of the following-

(a)the persons listed in subsection (5);

(b)the bodies listed in subsection (6).

(5)The persons referred to in subsection (4)(a) are-

(a)the President of the Supreme Court;

(b)the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales;

(c)the Master of the Rolls;

(d)the Lord President of the Court of Session;

(e)the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland;

(f)the Lord Justice Clerk;

(g)the President of the Queen's Bench Division;

(h)the President of the Family Division;

(i)the Chancellor of the High Court.

(6)The bodies referred to in subsection (4)(b) are-

(a)the General Council of the Bar of England and Wales;

(b)the Law Society of England and Wales;

(c)the Faculty of Advocates of Scotland;

(d)the Law Society of Scotland;

(e)the General Council of the Bar of Northern Ireland;

(f)the Law Society of Northern Ireland.
53. Fees: supplementary
(1)Supreme Court fees are recoverable summarily as a civil debt.

(2)The Lord Chancellor must take such steps as are reasonably practicable to bring information about Supreme Court fees to the attention of persons likely to have to pay them.

(3)In this section "Supreme Court fees" means fees prescribed in an order under section 52.

Annual report
54. Annual report
(1)As soon as practicable after each financial year, the chief executive of the Supreme Court must prepare a report about the business of the Supreme Court during that year and give a copy of that report to the following persons-

(a)the Lord Chancellor;

(b)the First Minister in Scotland;

(c)the First Minister and the deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland;

(2)The Lord Chancellor must lay a copy of any report of which a copy is given under subsection (1)(a) before each House of Parliament.

(3)Each of the following is a "financial year" for the purposes of this section-

(a)the period which begins with the date on which this section comes into force and ends with the following 31 March;

(b)each successive period of 12 months.

[...]

Supplementary
57. Proceedings under jurisdiction transferred to the Supreme Court
Schedule 10 contains transitional provision relating to proceedings under jurisdiction which is transferred to the Supreme Court by this Act from the House of Lords or the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
58. Northern Ireland Act 1998: excepted and reserved matters relating to the Supreme Court
(1)The Northern Ireland Act 1998 (c. 47) is amended as follows.

(2)In Schedule 2 (excepted matters), after paragraph 11 insert-

"11AThe Supreme Court."

(3)In Schedule 3 (reserved matters), after paragraph 14 insert-

"14AThe following matters-

(a)rights of appeal to the Supreme Court;

(b)legal aid for appeals to the Supreme Court."
59. Renaming of Supreme Courts of England and Wales and Northern Ireland
(1)The Supreme Court of England and Wales is renamed the Senior Courts of England and Wales.

(2)The Supreme Court of Judicature of Northern Ireland is renamed the Court of Judicature of Northern Ireland.

(3)The Northern Ireland Supreme Court Rules Committee is renamed the Northern Ireland Court of Judicature Rules Committee.

(4)Any reference in an enactment, instrument or other document to a court or committee renamed by this section is to be read, so far as necessary for continuing its effect, as a reference to the Senior Courts, the Court of Judicature or the Northern Ireland Court of Judicature Rules Committee (as the case may be).

(5)Schedule 11 (which makes amendments in connection with the renaming) has effect.

(6)Unless otherwise provided, amendments made by an enactment (A) (whether or not in force) to another enactment (B)-

(a)are not included in references in that Schedule to enactment A;

(b)are included in references in that Schedule to enactment B.

[...]
148. Commencement
(1)This Act, except the following provisions, comes into force in accordance with provision to be made by the Lord Chancellor by order.

(2)The provisions excepted from subsection (1) are-

(a)section 4;

(b)sections 18 to 22;

(c)sections 140 to 144;

(d)section 147;

(e)this section;

(f)section 149;

(g)Schedules 6 and 7.

(3)Section 4 comes into force in accordance with provision to be made by the Secretary of State by order.

(4)An order by which section 23(1) comes into force at any time may not be made unless the Lord Chancellor is satisfied that the Supreme Court will at that time be provided with accommodation in accordance with written plans that he has approved.

(5)The Lord Chancellor may approve plans only if, having consulted the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary holding office at the time of the approval, he is satisfied that accommodation in accordance with the plans will be appropriate for the purposes of the Court.

(6)An order under this section may make different provision for different purposes.

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La Cour suprême au Royaume-Uni après le Constitutional Reform Act 2005 : une juridiction hors norme

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[1]Nde: Le présent article a fait l’objet d’une précédente publication dans la Revue internationale de droit comparé (RIDC, 2012, n°3 - Juillet-Septembre 2012, pp. 681-734) qui en a autorisé la mise en ligne.

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Les juridictions Françaises en schéma : l'organisation de la justice en France | Le droit animé

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Lex Animata Law Visualized | Hesham Elrafei 

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Common Law vs Civil Law, Legal Systems explained