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What are the arguments in favour of the responsibility to protect?

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What are the arguments in favour of the responsibility to protect?

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What are the arguments against the responsibility to protect?

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What are the arguments against the responsibility to protect?

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What would the different IR theories say about R2P?

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What would the different IR theories say about R2P?

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Is there such a thing as an international community?

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Is there such a thing as an international community?

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Explanatory, constitutive and normative theory. How are they different?

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Explanatory, constitutive and normative theory. How are they different?

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Is there ever a just reason to go to war?

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Is there ever a just reason to go to war?

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What are the criteria for the right to go to war?

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What are the criteria for the right to go to war?

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•Correct authority
•Just cause
•Right intent
•All other avenues exhausted
•Reasonable chance of success

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Who is intervening?
Who is being intervened?
Reluctance to agree to R2P

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Who holds the rights? State or the individual?

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Who holds the rights? State or the individual?

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R2P vs Sovereignty: what value is more important?

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R2P vs Sovereignty: what value is more important?

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- Does the humanitarian purpose override the norm of sovereignty? (on what grounds? practical/moral?)

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What should guide international relations?: Pluralism (order & sovereignty) versus solidarism (justice)

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What should guide international relations?: Pluralism (order & sovereignty) versus solidarism (justice)

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Practical & normative grounds

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What is sovereignty and why is it important in world politics (pp.82—83)?

In what ways has the “new interventionism” impacted on our understanding of sovereignty (pp.84—85)?

What are the problems with humanitarian intervention that Ayoob identifies (pp.85— 94)?

What is Ayoob’s solution? And, do you think it would work (pp.95—99)?

What R2P actions does the ‘Beyond the coup in Myanmar’ advocate for? Would R2P action adopted by ASEAN mitigate against the problems with humanitarian intervention as outlined in the Ayoob paper?

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How does sovereignty act as a shield for weak states?  

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How does sovereignty act as a shield for weak states?  

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- unequal power distribution among states

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Is sovereignty anything else but a norm? 

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Is sovereignty anything else but a norm? 

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Explain this statement (Ayoob): "International society is based on a set of normative structures, with sovereignty being the foremost among them. If these structures are undermined, it may lead to either unadulterated anarchy or unmitigated hegemony or a combination of the two - anarchy within and hegemony without"

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Explain this statement (Ayoob): "International society is based on a set of normative structures, with sovereignty being the foremost among them. If these structures are undermined, it may lead to either unadulterated anarchy or unmitigated hegemony or a combination of the two - anarchy within and hegemony without"

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Ayoob: dilute sovereignty when it suits major powers

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Ayoob: dilute sovereignty when it suits major powers

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Did interventions really go from 'political and strategic' to for 'humanitarian purposes' and universal in character?

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Did interventions really go from 'political and strategic' to for 'humanitarian purposes' and universal in character?

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- Intervention done by the 'international community' rather than by a state or an alliance of states
- Is anyone from a country where there has been a humanitarian intervention/ or there should have been a humanitarian intervention? Do you want to share how it was perceived?

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Sovereignty + respect for minimal standard of human rights

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Sovereignty + respect for minimal standard of human rights

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- akin to 'standards of civilization'?
- distribute the world into 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' and legitimize intervention of the former in the latter
- this ultimately erodes the legitimacy of the international society

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- Should the international community intervene, or stay out?

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Is there such a thing as a meaningful international community?

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Is there such a thing as a meaningful international community?

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- who determines when intervention is justified?

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How are decisions on interventions taken? 

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How are decisions on interventions taken? 

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- UN Security Council
- Who has a seat?
- Use of veto power --> they could always block an intervention in their country
- Subsequently subcontracted to groups of states

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Would countries ever be motivated and willing to put in resources for a truly selfless purpose?

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Would countries ever be motivated and willing to put in resources for a truly selfless purpose?

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- US pushed for intervention in Haiti (refugees) not in Rwanda with much larger numbers of refugees

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- United Nations resolutions are formal expressions of the opinion or will of United Nations organs.

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United Nations resolutions are formal expressions of the opinion or will of United Nations organs. They generally consist of two clearly defined sections: a preamble and an operative part. The preamble generally presents the considerations on the basis of which action is taken, an opinion expressed or a directive given.

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How does the Security Council operate? Is it a flawed instrument?

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How does the Security Council operate? Is it a flawed instrument?

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NATO intervention: intervention in the name of the 'international community'? Then who is the 'international community'?
- "we should not change the rules to follow our humanitarian impulses" (?)

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How would you regulate R2P?: Protecting sovereignty

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How would you regulate R2P?: Protecting sovereignty

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- a very large majority needed to 'violate' sovereignty
- no ulterior motives
- applied equally in equal cases

Akin to WTO protecting free trade:
- not done for protectionist reasons (no ulterior motives)
- most favored nation and like products are treated alike (applied equally in equal cases)

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Where to intervene? Based on what criteria? What criteria are used for these interventions?

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Where to intervene? Based on what criteria? What criteria are used for these interventions?

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https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

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ERROR: The request could not be satisfied

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Protecting sovereignty is necessary for protecting an international society

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Protecting sovereignty is necessary for protecting an international society

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- R2P justifies interventions by the strong states in the weak states --> it leads to anarchy
- R2P leads to more harm than good in the long run
- Sovereignty is needed to protect domestic order
(Ayoob)

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Do new states need violence to establish themselves?

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Do new states need violence to establish themselves?

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- Are state making wars unavoidable?
- Does R2P present a bias against 'new states'?

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No distribution of powers: legislating, executing and judicating

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No distribution of powers: legislating, executing and judicating

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What is the purpose of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter?

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What is the purpose of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter?

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Would simply a majority approval requirement for humanitarian intervention protect the genuine nature of these interventions?

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Would simply a majority approval requirement for humanitarian intervention protect the genuine nature of these interventions?

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What are the wider causes of human rights violations?

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What are the wider causes of human rights violations?

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- new states
- ...

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Protecting human rights vs mass atrocities and humanitarian intervention versus political intervention and building of a new regime

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Protecting human rights vs mass atrocities and humanitarian intervention versus political intervention and building of a new regime

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- Derogatory and non-derogatory rights:
In human rights law, derogability is whether the right may be infringed in certain circumstances. A non-derogable right is one whose infringement is not justified under any circumstances, generally right to life and freedom from torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

Test of three:
- Legal - in accordance with law
- Necessary
- Proportionally

- Humanitarian intervention vs changing political regime

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- Genocide
- War crimes
- Ethnic cleansing
- Crimes against humanity

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Can R2P be 'invoked' vs ongoing responsibility

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Can R2P be 'invoked' vs ongoing responsibility

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- how do we know this is a norm? Does it need to be made explicit? Is it a law?
- Is R2P a global norm?
- Adopted unanimously in 2005 at the U.N. World Summit, R2P is a framework with a range of policy options to protect populations at risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

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What shapes can humanitarian interventions take?

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What shapes can humanitarian interventions take?

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- targeted sanctions
- diplomatic solutions
- economic sanctions
- arms embargoes
- accountability for crimes
- military engagement
- ...

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Is it permissible to use war—death and killing—for presumably altruistic purposes? 

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Is it permissible to use war—death and killing—for presumably altruistic purposes? 

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Could war be necessary? Is war always immoral? Is there such a thing as a just war?

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Could war be necessary? Is war always immoral? Is there such a thing as a just war?

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What are the different elements of just war theory?

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What are the different elements of just war theory?

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- Jus ad bellum - is war permissable: right authority; just cause; intention; last resort; significant chance of success
- Jus in bello - non-combatant immunity; proportionality
- Just post bellum - minimalist, restraining victor after war - maximalist, building a peaceful post war environment

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Norm means appropriate behaviour for an actor to follow; a social rule; expected behavior.

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- Expansionist foreign intervention
- Civil war

- war based on ideology vs war based on identity vs war based on economic gain

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- How are they different?

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International criminal court - state vs individual rights

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International criminal court - state vs individual rights

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International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: Sovereignty not only a right, but also a responsibility to protect citizens..

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"Perhaps the way out of the sceptic’s response to humanitarian intervention—western imposition—is to use regional bodies like the A.U. as a source of legitimacy or justness" (Keith Smith)

- Could that work?

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Kenya, Libya, Syria, China (Uyghurs), Ethiopia (Tigray), Marocco (Polisario Front), Myanmar...

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What are the three pillars of the responsibility to protect? 

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What are the three pillars of the responsibility to protect? 

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Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

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The Responsibility to Protect - known as R2P - is an international norm that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The concept emerged in response to the failure of the international community to adequately respond to mass atrocities committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. The International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty developed the concept of R2P during 2001.

The Responsibility to Protect was unanimously adopted in 2005 at the UN World Summit, the largest gathering of Heads of State and Government in history. It is articulated in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with ChaptersVI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

In January 2009 the UN Secretary-General released a report on implementing the Responsibility to Protect, which articulated the three pillars of R2P. Following this, the first General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect was held in July 2009. At this debate UN Member States overwhelmingly reaffirmed the 2005 commitment and the General Assembly passed a consensus resolution ( A/RES/63/308) taking note of the Secretary-General's report.

The Secretary-General has since released annual reports in advance of the UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect. During June 2018 the General Assembly held its first debate on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009.

R2P has been invoked in more than 80 UN Security Council resolutions concerning crises in Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, as well as thematic resolutions concerning the prevention of genocide, prevention of armed conflict and restricting the trade of small arms and light weapons. The Responsibility to Protect has also been invoked in more than 50 Human Rights Council resolutions and 13 General Assembly resolutions. These resolutions and their related preventive and - as a last resort - coercive measures, have demonstrated that collective action to protect populations at risk is possible.

Individual states and global networks, such as the Global Network of R2P Focal Points, have undertaken various national initiatives to ensure they are preventing mass atrocity crimes through upholding their pillar I and pillar II commitments.

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What is R2P? - Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

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Responsibility to Protect The Responsibility to Protect - known as R2P - is an international norm that seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The concept emerged in response to the failure of the international community [...]

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United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect

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Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect

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Pluralist --> Solidarist International Society? 

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Pluralist --> Solidarist International Society? 

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Is R2P normalised?

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UN: “In general, resolutions adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, are considered binding, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter.”

https://ask.un.org/faq/15010

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Resolutions and decisions are formal expressions of the opinion or will of UN organs. Many types of resolutions on a broad range of topics have been adopted by the principal organs and their subsidiaries since the establishment of the organization in 1945.

Some examples of the various types of resolutions and decisions are:

The nature of the resolution determines if it is considered binding on States.

See, for example, the Secretariat's legal opinion of 9 May 1986, on "Questions relating to the voting procedure and decision-making process of the General Assembly-General rule applicable to the calculation of the majority required for the adoption of resolutions and decisions by the General Assembly-Exceptions to the rule-Effect of absence or non-participation on the binding force of resolutions and decisions", published in the UN Juridical Yearbook, 1986, p. 274 (English) (see link below).

In general, resolutions adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, are considered binding, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter.

Legal scholars have various opinions on this question. See, for example, selected articles and books listed in the Links section below.

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Resolutions and decisions are formal expressions of the opinion or will of UN organs. Many types of resolutions on a broad range of topics have been adopted by the principal organs and their subsidiaries since the establishment of the organization in 1945.

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Who are the permanent members of the Security Council? 

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Who are the permanent members of the Security Council? 

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"regional stability depends on respect for democracy, human rights, and rule of law within each member" (Chong, Thongyoojaroen).

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"“the ASEAN way” – a euphemism for a style of regional cooperation that puts national sovereignty first and that emphasizes “non-interference” in the “internal affairs” of other states. But to ensure continued stability in the region, it is clear the old ASEAN way must change" (Chong, Thongyoojaroen).

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Crimes Against Humanity, Mass Graves, and Human Trafficking from Myanmar and Bangladesh to Malaysia from 2012 to 2015

From 2012 to 2015, more than 170,000 Rohingya Muslims and Bangladeshis fled Myanmar and Bangladesh by sea, boarding ships bound for Thailand and Malaysia. Preying largely on the desperation of Rohingya to escape persecution in Myanmar, traffickers lured men, women, and children onto ships with promises of safety and security in Malaysia. Instead of finding safety and security, traffickers held people captive in deplorable conditions on human-trafficking ships at sea and in human-trafficking camps on the Malaysia-Thailand border. Traffickers gave their captives three options: buy their release, be sold into further exploitation, or die.

In May 2015, Thailand and then Malaysian authorities discovered mass graves in remote camps along the countries' shared border, exhuming scores of remains believed to be victims of human trafficking.

The report finds reasonable grounds to believe that a transnational criminal syndicate committed crimes against humanity against trafficked persons, including acts of murder, extermination, enslavement, forcible transfer, torture, and rape/sexual slavery.

"Sold Like Fish" is based on a multi-year investigation by the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) and Fortify Rights. It sheds new light on the mass human trafficking from Myanmar and Bangladesh to Thailand and Malaysia from 2012 to 2015.

The report is intended to support the work of the newly-established Royal Commission of Inquiry into mass graves at Wang Kelian, Perlis State in Malaysia as well as the Government of Malaysia in their respective efforts to establish the truth and hold perpetrators accountable. It provides detailed information that may be used to finally ensure justice and accountability for crimes perpetrated against the untold numbers of trafficking victims and survivors.

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From 2012 to 2015, more than 170,000 Rohingya Muslims and Bangladeshis fled Myanmar and Bangladesh by sea, boarding ships bound for Thailand and Malaysia. Preying largely on the desperation of Rohingya to escape persecution in Myanmar, traffickers lured men, women, and children onto ships with promises of safety and security in Malaysia.

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Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

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On 1 February Myanmar's military - the Tatmadaw - headed by Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, overthrew the country's civilian-led government and declared a state of emergency. Since then, hundreds of thousands of people have participated in peaceful protests and strikes against the reimposition of military rule, while numerous People's Defence Forces (PDFs) have formed throughout Myanmar as part of an armed resistance to military rule. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 1,000 people have been killed by the security forces since 1 February and over 6,000 people remain detained for resisting the coup. At least 65 people have been sentenced to death by military tribunals.

On 16 April a coalition of democratic opponents to military rule formed the National Unity Government (NUG), which includes members of parliament ousted by the military - known as the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) - as well as politicians from ethnic minority groups. The military has charged their members with high treason and declared the CRPH, NUG and PDFs are terrorist organizations. On 1 August General Min Aung Hlaing declared himself prime minister and extended the state of emergency until August 2023, when he promised to hold general elections.

The security forces have also launched offensives against ethnic armed groups and PDFs in some regions of the country. Sporadic clashes continue to occur in Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Shan and other states, resulting in civilian casualties and displacement. During June security forces set ablaze Kinma village in the Magway Region, destroying more than 200 homes. During July the bodies of 40 people, who were reportedly killed by the military, were found in the township of Kani, Sagaing region.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, have said that abuses committed by the military since the coup may amount to crimes against humanity. According to the UN's Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), the "security forces have carried out a widespread and systematic attack on the civilian population," and "the reports of murders, sexual assaults, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and persecution collected by the Mechanism, if substantiated, would amount to crimes against humanity."

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 3 million people are currently in need of humanitarian assistance and over 210,000 have been displaced since the coup. Security forces have targeted healthcare professionals treating injured protesters and have issued hundreds of arrest warrants for doctors and nurses accused of supporting the civil disobedience movement. According to Special Rapporteur Andrews, Myanmar's security forces have engaged in at least 260 attacks against medical personnel and facilities, killing 18 people. The military has also taken over at least 50 hospitals. Despite a catastrophic wave of COVID-19 infections, the military continues to confiscate medical supplies from private companies and charities.

Myanmar's armed forces previously ruled the country from 1962-2011, overseeing the violent repression of the democracy movement and waging war against several ethnic armed groups. Despite the beginning of a transition to civilian rule in 2011, the military retained control of crucial ministries and 25 percent of seats in parliament.

In 2018 the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Myanmar concluded that senior members of the military, including General Min Aung Hlaing, should be prosecuted for genocide against the Rohingya ethnic group as well as for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan states. In 2019 the FFM also asserted that Myanmar breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention and "continues to harbor genocidal intent" towards the Rohingya.

The majority of Myanmar's Rohingya population were forced to flee the country after the military launched "clearance operations" in Rakhine State on 25 August 2017, bringing the total number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to over 900,000 people. The estimated 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State are subject to severe violations of their universal human rights. Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law rendered most Rohingya stateless.

Impunity for past atrocities has enabled the security forces to commit widespread and systematic human rights violations and abuses against civilians, particularly those from ethnic minority populations. Anti-coup protests and armed resistance are unlikely to subside and the risk of further atrocities remains extremely high.

The coup also complicates the prospects for a safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh. Given its past history, the military regime is unlikely to address the denial of citizenship for the Rohingya or accountability for past atrocities.

Myanmar's military has manifestly failed to uphold its responsibility to protect and bears responsibility for the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

The only formal response by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to the genocide against the Rohingya was the adoption of a Presidential Statement on 6 November 2017 that stressed the "primary responsibility of the Myanmar government to protect its population." The UNSC has met seven times on Myanmar since the coup and adopted four statements. No substantive action has been taken.

During September 2018 the HRC created the IIMM to "collect, consolidate, preserve and analyze evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations of international law" committed in Myanmar.

During November 2019 Pre-Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court (ICC) authorized the Chief Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation into crimes against humanity that may have been committed against the Rohingya, resulting in their forced deportation across the Myanmar-Bangladesh border.

On 11 November 2019 The Gambia filed a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing Myanmar of violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention. On 23 January 2020 the ICJ ordered Myanmar to comply with four provisional measures.

A number of governments have imposed targeted sanctions in response to the coup, including Canada, the European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US). The EU, UK and US have also sanctioned several military-run conglomerates. The Republic of Korea restricted military exports and suspended defense exchanges. The EU also suspended development funds.

On 24 April the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed to a "Five-Point Consensus," which includes an immediate cessation of violence. On 4 August ASEAN announced the appointment of Brunei's Second Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erywan Yusof, as its Special Envoy to Myanmar.

On 18 June the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the immediate release of all political detainees and for all member states to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar.

The UNSC should immediately impose a comprehensive arms embargo on Myanmar and refer the situation to the ICC. All UN member states and regional organizations should take urgent measures in response to the reimposition of military rule, including by imposing economic sanctions on Myanmar's oil and gas sector. The military junta should not be diplomatically recognized as the legitimate representatives of Myanmar. Foreign companies should immediately divest and sever ties with all businesses linked to Myanmar's military. The ASEAN Special Envoy should promptly travel to Myanmar and engage with both the junta and the NUG.

Myanmar's military must cease attacking healthcare workers, occupying hospitals and obstructing efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.

General Min Aung Hlaing and other senior military leaders who bear responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide should face international justice.

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Myanmar (Burma) - Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect

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On 1 February Myanmar's military - the Tatmadaw - headed by Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, overthrew the country's civilian-led government and declared a state of emergency. Since then, hundreds of thousands of people have participated in peaceful protests and strikes against the reimposition of military rule, while numerous People's Defence Forces (PDFs) have formed throughout Myanmar as part of an armed resistance to military rule.

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UN Charter interventions to protect sovereignty or to trump sovereignty?

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UN Charter interventions to protect sovereignty or to trump sovereignty?

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Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1

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Rome Statute (1998) and the International Criminal Court

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Rome Statute (1998) and the International Criminal Court

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https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works

Rome Statute article 5 onwards, https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf:
- Genocide
- Crimes against humanity
- War crimes (breaches of Geneva Convention)
- Crime of agression

--> cases brought by prosecutor

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The crimes

The Court's founding treaty, called the Rome Statute, grants the ICC jurisdiction over four main crimes.

First, the crime of genocide is characterised by the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group by killing its members or by other means: causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Second, the ICC can prosecute crimes against humanity, which are serious violations committed as part of a large-scale attack against any civilian population. The 15 forms of crimes against humanity listed in the Rome Statute include offences such as murder, rape, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, enslavement - particularly of women and children, sexual slavery, torture, apartheid and deportation.

Third, war crimes which are grave breaches of the Geneva conventions in the context of armed conflict and include, for instance, the use of child soldiers; the killing or torture of persons such as civilians or prisoners of war; intentionally directing attacks against hospitals, historic monuments, or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes.

Finally, the fourth crime falling within the ICC's jurisdiction is the crime of aggression. It is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, integrity or independence of another State. The definition of this crime was adopted through amending the Rome Statute at the first Review Conference of the Statute in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010.

On 15 December 2017, the Assembly of States Parties adopted by consensus a resolution on the activation of the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression as of 17 July 2018.

See The Rome Statute and Elements of Crimes

Legal process

As an international court, the ICC's legal process may function differently from that in your national jurisdiction. Below are a few highlights giving key information on the legal process.

Example investigation and case from start to finish
After crimes occur

Jurisdiction

The Court may exercise jurisdiction in a situation where crimes against humanity or war crimes were committed on or after 1 July 2002 and:

the crimes were committed by a State Party national, or in the territory of a State Party, or in a State that has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court; or

the crimes were referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) pursuant to a resolution adopted under chapter VII of the UN charter.

As of 17 July 2018, a situation in which an act of aggression would appear to have occurred could be referred to the Court by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, irrespective as to whether it involves States Parties or non-States Parties.

In the absence of a UNSC referral of an act of aggression, the Prosecutor may initiate an investigation on her own initiative or upon request from a State Party. The Prosecutor shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. Where no such determination has been made within six months after the date of notification to the UNSC by the Prosecutor of the situation, the Prosecutor may nonetheless proceed with the investigation, provided that the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the commencement of the investigation. Also, under these circumstances, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression when committed by a national or on the territory of a State Party that has not ratified or accepted these amendments.

Complementarity

The ICC is intended to complement, not to replace, national criminal systems; it prosecutes cases only when States do not are unwilling or unable to do so genuinely.

Cooperation

As a judicial institution, the ICC does not have its own police force or enforcement body; thus, it relies on cooperation with countries worldwide for support, particularly for making arrests, transferring arrested persons to the ICC detention centre in The Hague, freezing suspects' assets, and enforcing sentences.

While not a United Nations organization, the Court has a cooperation agreement with the United Nations. When a situation is not within the Court's jurisdiction, the United Nations Security Council can refer the situation to the ICC granting it jurisdiction. This has been done in the situations in Darfur (Sudan) and Libya.

The ICC actively works to build understanding and cooperation in all regions, for example, through seminars and conferences worldwide. The Court cooperates with both States Parties and non-States Parties.

The Court works in particularly close cooperation with its host state, the Netherlands, regarding practical matters such as constructing the Court's new permanent buildings, transferring suspects to the ICC Detention Centre, facilitating their appearances before the Court, and many other matters.

Countries and other entities, including civil society groups such as NGOs, also cooperate with the Court in numerous ways, such as raising awareness of and building support for the Court and its mandate. The Court seeks to increase this ongoing cooperation through such means as seminars and conferences.

Ten key facts about the legal process

Further to the Key Features listed above, here are some of the basics you may want to know:

The ICC does not prosecute those under the age of 18 when a crime was committed.

Before the Prosecutor can investigate, she must conduct a preliminary examination considering such matters as sufficient evidence, jurisdiction, gravity, complementarity, and the interests of justice.

When investigating, the Prosecutor must collect and disclose both incriminating and exonerating evidence.

The defendant is considered innocent until proven guilty. The burden of proof lies with the Prosecutor.

During all stages of proceedings (Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals), the defendant has the right to information in a language he or she fully understands, thus the ICC proceedings are conducted in multiple languages, with teams of interpreters and translators at work.

Pre-Trial judges issue warrants of arrest and ensure there is enough evidence before a case can go to trial.

Before a case is committed to trial (during the Pre-Trial phase), the defendant is referred to as a suspect. Once the case is committed to trial, since at that point the charges have been confirmed, the defendant is referred to as the accused.

Trial judges hear the evidence from the Prosecutor, Defence, and the Victims' lawyers, render a verdict, and if a person is found guilty, the sentence and decision on reparations.

Appeals judges render decisions on appeals from the Prosecutor or Defence.

If a case is closed without a verdict of guilt, it can be reopened if the Prosecutor presents new evidence.

How we are organized

The Rome Statute established three separate bodies: The Assembly of States Parties, the International Criminal Court, which comprises four separate organs, and the Trust Fund for Victims.

The Rome Statute System

The Assembly of States Parties

Representatives of States Parties meet and provide management oversight for the Court, including electing judges and the Prosecutor and approving the ICC's budget

Four organs of the ICC

Presidency
Conducts external relations with States, coordinates judicial matters such as assigning judges, situations and cases to divisions, and oversees the Registry's administrative work

Judicial Divisions
18 judges in 3 divisions - Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals - conduct judicial proceedings

OTP
Conducts preliminary examinations, investigations, and prosecutions

Registry
Conducts non-judicial activities, such as security, interpretation, outreach, support to Defence and victims' lawyers, and more

Trust Fund for Victims

Provides assistance, support and reparations to victims

States Parties to the Rome Statute

States Parties support the Court, accept the ICC's jurisdiction, and also work to incorporate the rules stipulated in the Rome Statute into their own judicial systems. Thus, each country that becomes a State Party brings the world closer to an ICC universal protection under the Rome Statute system.

States Parties to the Rome Statute gather at least once a year at sessions of the Assembly of States Parties, to provide the management oversight for the Court, for example, by establishing the budget, providing funding and also electing the Court's judges and Prosecutor.

Although the Court's expenses are funded primarily by States Parties, it can also receive voluntary contributions from governments, international organisations, individuals, corporations and other entities.

While States Parties to the Rome Statute have an obligation to cooperate with the Court, countries that are not yet States Parties may also provide ad hoc voluntary cooperation.

"I reiterate the importance of redoubling our efforts to ensure the continued expansion of the family of States that cooperate to fight against impunity and to protect the victims of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression".
President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute Sidiki Kaba

Learn more about the Assembly of States Parties.

Trust Fund for Victims

Though the Trust Fund for Victims is separate from the Court, it was created in 2004 by the Assembly of States Parties, in accordance with article 79 of the Rome Statute.The Fund's mission is to support and implement programmes that address harms resulting from genocide, crimes of humanity and war crimes. To achieve this mission, the TFV has a two-fold mandate: (i) to implement Court-Ordered reparations and (ii) to provide physical, psychological, and material support to victims and their families. By assisting victims to return to a dignified and contributory life within their communities, the TFV contributes to realizing sustainable and long-lasting peace by promoting restorative justice and reconciliation.

Where we operate

Seat of the Court in The Hague, the Netherlands

The ICC's permanent premises, located at Oude Waalsdorperweg 10 2597 AK, The Hague
The Netherlands.

Close to the North Sea, the new buildings are in an area between nature and city, set in the rolling dune landscape on the edge of The Hague. The compact, sculptural arrangement of six buildings includes a central tower, which houses the ICC Courtrooms. The new location is closer to the ICC detention centre and is in the International Zone of the City of The Hague.
Find out more about the construction project
The new premises are funded by the States Parties to the Rome Statute. The host state (the Netherlands) made the site available free of charge and organised and financed the architectural design competition, which started at the end of 2008. It has also provided loans for some States Parties to participate in finding the project.

In 2010 the Danish firm schmidt hammer lassen was selected to design the new premises, as its design met all the ICC's criteria, including design quality, sustainability, functionality and cost. In October 2012 the tendering procedure for the general contractor was completed and the combination Visser & Smit Bouw and Boele & van Eesteren ("Courtys") was selected to realize the ICC permanent premises.

Country offices

The ICC has offices in several of the countries in which investigations are being conducted.

Those wishing to cooperate with the Court at these local offices, participate in proceedings, assist in Outreach activities, or otherwise engage with the Court in the field are welcome to contact the offices.

Margot Tedesco, Field Outreach Coordinator +243 8297 88 013

Liaison office in New York

The ICC has a liaison office to the United Nations in New York, USA, which is primarily responsible for coordinating ICC-related events or activities at the UN headquarters. Diplomats and others involved in these events are welcome to contact this office.

ICC's Liaison Office to the United Nations
Head of the Office, Ms Karen Mosoti
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 476
New York NY 10017
Tel: 1 212 486 1346/47/62
Fax: 1 212 486 1361
[email protected]

Detention centre

The ICC detention centre is used to hold in safe, secure and humane custody those detained by the ICC. It is not used for enforcing sentences; convicted persons serve sentences in one of the States Parties which have concluded agreements on enforcement of sentences with the ICC and have accepted to place a particular convicted person or persons within a national facility. Until such an arrangement is made, a convicted person remains temporarily in the detention centre.

The Court endeavours to ensure the mental, physical and spiritual welfare of those in the Detention Centre; detainees have access to fresh air, recreational time, sports activities, library books, news, computers (for preparing their cases), quality food and facilities for cooking. Detainees are entitled to privacy with defence lawyers, to privileged communication with a consular or diplomatic representative, to visits a minister or spiritual advisor, and to visits with family, including a spouse or partner.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the Detention Centre's inspecting authority and as such has unrestricted access and examine, on unannounced visits, the treatment of the detained persons, their living conditions and their physical and psychological conditions, in conformity with widely accepted international standards governing the treatment of persons deprived of liberty.

No visits to the detention centre are granted to the media or general public.

COVID-19 related measures in the Detention centre

Since 19 March 2020, measures have been in place at the Detention Centre in order to protect the health, safety and lives of the detained persons during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, by minimizing contacts to detained persons and thus their risk of exposure to the virus to the extent possible.

As a result, all in-person visits to detained persons, including privileged, recreational and spiritual activities have been suspended and alternative measures have been taken to ensure the respect of the detained persons' rights and to limit the impact on them. This includes the establishment of privileged video conferencing in addition to the already existing privileged electronic link for case related material in order to facilitate privileged communications between detained persons at the Detention Centre and their defence teams. At this moment, the Registry is further exploring the possibilities to facilitate video conferencing between detained persons and their families. Furthermore arrangements have been made for all spiritual advisors to provide regular spiritual content by video conference or by written material. Video based instructions are in place and physical materials are provided for language classes. Detained persons continue to benefit from daily fresh air opportunities.

In addition, the Detention Centre adopted an import regime, allowing items to be imported into the Detention Centre following a mandatory quarantine period prior the delivery.

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The crimes The Court's founding treaty, called the Rome Statute, grants the ICC jurisdiction over four main crimes.

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Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity

- article 138

- What is the status of this document?

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The International Court of Justice is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations. It settles disputes between states in accordance with international law and gives advisory opinions on international legal issues.

- Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)

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The Court may entertain two types of cases: legal disputes between States submitted to it by them (contentious cases) and requests for advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by United Nations organs and specialized agencies (advisory proceedings).

Only States (States Members of the United Nations and other States which have become parties to the Statute of the Court or which have accepted its jurisdiction under certain conditions) may be parties to contentious cases.

The Court is competent to entertain a dispute only if the States concerned have accepted its jurisdiction in one or more of the following ways:

by entering into a special agreement to submit the dispute to the Court;

by virtue of a jurisdictional clause, i.e., typically, when they are parties to a treaty containing a provision whereby, in the event of a dispute of a given type or disagreement over the interpretation or application of the treaty, one of them may refer the dispute to the Court;

through the reciprocal effect of declarations made by them under the Statute, whereby each has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory in the event of a dispute with another State having made a similar declaration. A number of these declarations, which must be deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General, contain reservations excluding certain categories of dispute.

States have no permanent representatives accredited to the Court. They normally communicate with the Registrar through their Minister for Foreign Affairs or their ambassador accredited to the Netherlands. When they are parties to a case before the Court they are represented by an agent. An agent plays the same role, and has the same rights and obligations, as a solicitor or avoué in a national court. However, since international relations are at stake, the agent is also as it were the head of a special diplomatic mission with powers to commit a sovereign State. He/she receives communications from the Registrar concerning the case and forwards all correspondence and pleadings, duly signed or certified, to him. In public hearings the agent opens the argument on behalf of the government he/she represents and lodges the submissions. In general, whenever a formal act is to be done by the government represented, it is done by the agent. Agents are sometimes assisted by co-agents, deputy agents or assistant agents and always have counsel or advocates, whose work they co-ordinate, to assist them in the preparation of the pleadings and the delivery of oral argument. Since there is no special International Court of Justice Bar, there are no conditions that have to be fulfilled by counsel or advocates to enjoy the right of pleading before it, the only exception being that they must have been appointed by a government to do so.

Proceedings may be instituted in one of two ways:

Through the notification of a special agreement: this document, which is bilateral in character, can be lodged with the Court by either or both of the States parties to the proceedings. A special agreement must indicate the subject of the dispute and the parties thereto. Since there is neither an "applicant" State nor a "respondent" State, in the Court's publications their names are separated by an oblique stroke at the end of the official title of the case, e.g., Benin/Niger.

By means of an application: the application, which is unilateral in character, is submitted by an applicant State against a respondent State. It is intended for communication to the latter State and the Rules of Court contain stricter requirements with regard to its content. In addition to the name of the party against which the claim is brought and the subject of the dispute, the applicant State must, as far as possible, indicate briefly on what basis - a treaty or a declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction - it claims that the Court has jurisdiction, and must succinctly state the facts and grounds on which its claim is based. At the end of the official title of the case the names of the two parties are separated by the abbreviation v. (for the Latin versus), e.g., Nicaragua v. Colombia.

The date of the institution of proceedings, which is that of the receipt by the Registrar of the special agreement or application, marks the opening of proceedings before the Court. Contentious proceedings include a written phase, in which the parties file and exchange pleadings containing a detailed statement of the points of fact and of law on which each party relies, and an oral phase consisting of public hearings at which agents and counsel address the Court. As the Court has two official languages (English and French), everything written or said in one language is translated into the other. The written pleadings are not made available to the press and public until the opening of the oral proceedings, and only then if the parties have no objection.

After the oral proceedings the Court deliberates in camera and then delivers its judgment at a public sitting. The judgment is final, binding on the parties to a case and without appeal (at the most it may be subject to interpretation or, upon the discovery of a new fact, revision). Any judge wishing to do so may append an opinion to the judgment.

By signing the Charter, a Member State of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the Court in any case to which it is a party. Since, furthermore, a case can only be submitted to the Court and decided by it if the parties have in one way or another consented to its jurisdiction over the case, it is rare for a decision not to be implemented. A State which considers that the other side has failed to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court may bring the matter before the Security Council, which is empowered to recommend or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

The procedure described above is the normal procedure. However, the course of the proceedings may be modified by incidental proceedings. The most common incidental proceedings are preliminary objections, which are raised to challenge the competence of the Court to decide on the merits of the case (the respondent State may contend, for example, that the Court lacks jurisdiction or that the application is inadmissible). The matter is one for the Court itself to decide. Then there are provisional measures, interim measures which can be requested by the applicant State if it considers that the rights that form the subject of its application are in immediate danger. A third possibility is that a State may request permission to intervene in a dispute involving other States if it considers that it has an interest of a legal naturein the case, which might be affected by the decision made. The Statute also makes provision for instances when a respondent State fails to appear before the Court, either because it totally rejects the Court's jurisdiction or for any other reason. Failure by one party to appear does not prevent the proceedings from taking their course, although the Court must first satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction. Finally, should the Court find that parties to separate proceedings are submitting the same arguments and submissions against a common opponent in relation to the same issue, it may order the proceedings to be joined.

The Court discharges its duties as a full court but, at the request of the parties, it may also establish ad hoc chambers to examine specific cases. A Chamber of Summary Procedure is elected every year by the Court in accordance with its Statute.

The sources of law that the Court must apply are: international treaties and conventions in force; international custom; the general principles of law; judicial decisions; and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. Moreover, if the parties agree, the Court can decide a case ex aequo et bono, i.e., without confining itself to existing rules of international law.

A case may be brought to a conclusion at any stage of the proceedings by a settlement between the parties or by discontinuance. In case of the latter, an applicant State may at any time inform the Court that it does not wish to continue the proceedings, or the two parties may declare that they have agreed to withdraw the case. The Court then removes the case from its List.

Advisory proceedings before the Court are only open to five organs of the United Nations and 16 specialized agencies of the United Nations family or affiliated organizations.

The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council may request advisory opinions on "any legal question". Other United Nations organs and specialized agencies which have been authorized to seek advisory opinions can only do so with respect to "legal questions arising within the scope of their activities".

When it receives a request for an advisory opinion the Court must assemble all the facts, and is thus empowered to hold written and oral proceedings, similar to those in contentious cases. In theory, the Court may do without such proceedings, but it has never dispensed with them entirely.

A few days after the request has been filed, the Court draws up a list of the States and international organizations that are likely to be able to furnish information on the question before the Court. Such States are not in the same position as parties to contentious proceedings: their representatives before the Court are not known as agents, and their participation in the advisory proceedings does not render the Court's opinion binding upon them. Usually the States listed are the member States of the organization requesting the opinion. Any State not consulted by the Court may ask to be.

It is rare, however, for the ICJ to allow international organizations other than the one that requested the opinion to participate in advisory proceedings. The only non-governmental international organizations that has ever been authorized by the ICJ to furnish information did not in the end do so ( International Status of South West Africa). The Court has rejected all such requests by private parties.

The written proceedings are shorter than in contentious proceedings between States, and the rules governing them are relatively flexible. Participants may file written statements, which sometimes form the object of written comments by other participants. The written statements and comments are regarded as confidential, but are generally made available to the public at the beginning of the oral proceedings. States are then usually invited to make oral statements at public sittings.

Advisory proceedings conclude with the delivery of the advisory opinion at a public sitting.

Such opinions are essemtially advisory; in other words, unlike the Court's judgments, they are not binding. The requesting organ, agency or organization remains free to give effect to the opinion as it sees fit, or not to do so at all. However, certain instruments or regulations provide that an advisory opinion by the Court does have binding force (e.g., the conventions on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations).

Nevertheless, the Court's advisory opinions are associated with its authority and prestige, and a decision by the organ or agency concerned to endorses an opinion is as it were sanctioned by international law.

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The Court may entertain two types of cases: legal disputes between States submitted to it by them (contentious cases) and requests for advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by United Nations organs and specialized agencies (advisory proceedings).

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- African Court of Human and People's Rights (individuals and NGOs can submit cases)
- European Court of Human Rights (individuals, groups of individuals or states can submit cases)
- ...

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Vetoed UNSC resolutions on Syria.

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UN Documents for Syria: Security Council Resolutions

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UN Documents for Syria: Security Council Resolutions.

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Sovereignty not only a right, but also a responsibility

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Sovereignty not only a right, but also a responsibility