# data[].attributes.headline
Afectaciones del COVID-19 sobre los refugiados

# data[].attributes.subject
Afectaciones del COVID-19 sobre los refugiados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
By Binsal Abdulkader

ABU DHABI, 20th October 2020 (WAM) - Climate events and COVID-19 pandemic are worsening the living conditions of more than 1.5 million people who have been displaced due to violence in the Central Sahel region, according to a senior official of UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency.

"The Central Sahel - Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger - is at the epicentre of one of the world's fastest-growing displacement and protection crises. A political, security and humanitarian crisis has displaced millions," Ioli Kimyaci, UNHCR Representative in Burkina Faso, told Emirates News Agency, WAM.
Extreme poverty caused by climate events and COVID
"It is important to highlight the impact of environmental change in the region. In recent months, devastating floods have killed dozens and left hundreds of thousands in urgent need of shelter, clean water and health service," she said in an email interview from Burkina Faso on Tuesday.

Kimyaci stressed that climate events have exacerbated the vulnerabilities of host and displaced communities who are already grappling with extreme poverty, food insecurity, and armed conflict.

"This year, the COVID-19 pandemic has also compounded this situation. Lockdowns and other COVID-19 prevention measures have pushed an additional 6 million people in the region into extreme poverty, with 4.8 million people - most of them children - in need of urgent nutrition assistance," she explained.
Relevance of Ministerial Roundtable
A Ministerial Roundtable on the region hosted by the governments of Denmark and Germany, the European Union and the United Nations on Tuesday is taking place at a critical time, Kimyaci said.

"Solutions - not only through the security lens - are urgently needed. Governance reforms need to be scaled up with the same urgency as lifesaving interventions and with appropriate resources," Kimyaci said.

Meanwhile, humanitarian action also needs to be strengthened as UNHCR needs continued financial support for its operation, she said.

"Humanitarian appeals in the region are just 35 percent funded. This pledging conference is an opportunity for donors to demonstrate commitment before it is too late," the UNHCR official said.
UAE offered US$80 million
She expressed her gratitude to the UAE for its generous support to UNHCR, with more than US$80 million contributions since 2010 in different locations, with life-saving intervention for millions of refugees and internally displaced persons, targeting education, health response, food and protection.

"The government of the UAE also hosts UNHCR's largest Global Stockpile at the International Humanitarian City, IHC, in Dubai. Through its presence in Dubai, UNHCR is able to rapidly deliver life-saving assistance to people in need within 72 hours of the outbreak of a crisis anywhere in the world, in which the government has contributed greatly to support UNHCR's emergency shipments to countries in MENA, Africa and beyond," Kimyaci explained.

Latest help from UAE An aid consignment donated in June by His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President, Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai, brought much needed shelter equipment and plastic sheets that enabled 5,000 people to receive shelter in all of the five regions of Burkina Faso, she revealed.

"This support was timely as it arrived in the midst of the rainy season, with heavy rainfalls and strong winds, and helped better protect these families from possible floods by providing shelter to those without one or strengthening existing ones," the UNHCR official said.

"We are extremely grateful to His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid for his donation, which made a real difference in the lives of those most in need," she emphasised.

Surging violence Elaborating on the crisis in the region, Kimyaci said more than 1.5 million people have fled violence in the region, including over 650,000 forced from their homes this year alone.

In Burkina Faso, over one million people - more than one in every 20 inhabitants - have fled surging violence inside the country, nearly half displaced this year, she said.

UNHCR was able to provide shelter assistance to over 1,600 forcibly displaced persons. The COVID-19 pandemic further impacted children's access to education. In Burkina Faso, some 2,500 schools had already been forced to close due to violence, thus affecting almost 350,000 students.
Solar radios help displaced children
Solar donor support is essential to enable continued education, including through distance learning, Kimyaci said.

Across the Sahel region, some 12,000 displaced and host community children have continued their education through distance learning, for instance with solar radios to listen to education programmes.

"The needs remain huge and we must make sure we are to respond to them not just this year, but next year as well," she said.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Climate events, COVID-19 strain displaced 1.5m people in Central Sahel, UAE's support appreciated: UNHCR

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
By Binsal Abdulkader ABU DHABI, 20th October 2020 (WAM) - Climate events and COVID-19 pandemic are worsening the living conditions of more than 1.5 million people who have been displaced due to violence in the Central Sahel region, according to a senior official of UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency.

# data[].attributes.headline
Saturación de los campamentos de refugiados de UNHCR

# data[].attributes.subject
Saturación de los campamentos de refugiados de UNHCR

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
ACNUR, la Agencia de la ONU para los Refugiados, pide que se ponga fin a la incesante violencia en el Sahel africano, que ya ha causado el desplazamiento de más de dos millones de personas dentro de las fronteras de sus países, una cifra nunca antes alcanzada.

El Sahel - que incluye Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali y Níger - abarca algunos de los países menos desarrollados del mundo y las comunidades que acogen a las personas desplazadas han llegado a su límite.

Las necesidades no dejan de aumentar en una región en la que convergen múltiples crisis, incluyendo conflictos armados, pobreza extrema, inseguridad alimentaria, cambio climático y la pandemia de COVID-19.

La extrema vulnerabilidad del Sahel ha quedado en evidencia debido al impacto de los desplazamientos forzados causados por la violencia generalizada y desenfrenada perpetrada por grupos insurgentes armados y bandas criminales.

La respuesta humanitaria está peligrosamente sobrecargada, y ACNUR insta a la comunidad internacional a redoblar su apoyo a la región. Los Estados deben actuar ahora para ayudar a los países del Sahel a abordar las causas profundas del desplazamiento forzado, para impulsar un desarrollo estratégico y sostenible y para fortalecer instituciones como escuelas y hospitales, muchas de las cuales han cerrado debido a la violencia continua. La situación ha empeorado debido a la pandemia de COVID-19.

El desplazamiento interno en la región se ha cuadruplicado en solo dos años, ya que a principios de 2019 había 490.000 desplazados internos. Más de la mitad de los desplazados internos de la región son burkineses. Los países del Sahel también acogen a más de 850.000 refugiados, principalmente procedentes de Mali.

Este año, la violencia en Níger y Burkina Faso ya ha obligado a más de 21.000 personas a huir de sus hogares y buscar seguridad en otras partes de sus propios países.

En Burkina Faso, desde el 31 de diciembre, una serie de ataques armados contra la ciudad de Koumbri y los pueblos cercanos, en el norte del país, han provocado el desplazamiento de más de 11.000 personas. La mayoría son mujeres, niños y niñas que huyeron por la noche después de que los atacantes empezaran a disparar contra sus casas. Se han puesto a salvo y ahora viven con las comunidades locales de Ouahigouya y Barga, a unos 35 kilómetros de distancia.

A pesar de la generosidad de sus anfitriones, muchos de los desplazados internos carecen de un alojamiento básico y duermen a la intemperie. Necesitan urgentemente albergue adecuado, agua y ayuda de primera necesidad, así como acceso a instalaciones de salud y saneamiento adecuadas para evitar la propagación del COVID-19.

ACNUR está construyendo 108 alojamientos en Ouahigouya y nuestros equipos han distribuido colchonetas y mantas, materiales de higiene y otra ayuda esencial. Las autoridades locales están incrementando sus esfuerzos para registrar a los recién llegados y reubicarlos en otro sitio.

En toda la región, ACNUR y sus socios están trabajando para proporcionar asistencia crucial para cientos de miles de personas desplazadas y a sus comunidades de acogida, como albergue, artículos de ayuda y asistencia en efectivo. Nuestros equipos también están trabajando para prevenir y responder a los casos de violencia sexual, que se han vuelto frecuentes. Estamos rehabilitando escuelas y aulas y apoyando las oportunidades de aprendizaje a distancia.
Para más información sobre este tema, por favor contactar:

En Dakar (regional), Romain Desclous, [email protected] , +221 786 396 385

En Ginebra, Boris Cheshirkov, [email protected] , +41 79 433 7682

En Nueva York, Kathryn Mahoney, [email protected] , +1 347 443 7646

En Niamey, Jean-Sébastien Josset, [email protected] , +227 90766977

En Ouagadougou, Moussa Bougma, [email protected] , +226 253 405 22

En Paris, Céline Schmitt, [email protected] , +33 6 23 16 11 78

Compartir en Facebook Compartir en Twitter

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Un triste hito: la violencia en el Sahel ha provocado el desplazamiento de 2 millones de personas dentro de sus propios países

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
ACNUR, la Agencia de la ONU para los Refugiados, pide que se ponga fin a la incesante violencia en el Sahel africano, que ya ha causado el desplazamiento de más de dos millones de personas dentro de las fronteras de sus países, una cifra nunca antes alcanzada.

# data[].attributes.headline
Refugiados a la intemperie y acogidos en poblados

# data[].attributes.subject
Refugiados a la intemperie y acogidos en poblados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
“La emergencia está aquí, en el Sahel, donde las personas sufren, son asesinadas, las mujeres son violadas, los niños no pueden ir a la escuela. Sahel

# data[].attributes.headline
Formas de refugio y localización en Burkina Faso

# data[].attributes.subject
Formas de refugio y localización en Burkina Faso

# data[].attributes.headline
Mecenazgo privado para la creción de empresas en los campamentos de refugiados

# data[].attributes.subject
Mecenazgo privado para la creción de empresas en los campamentos de refugiados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
La Fundación IKEA apoya la autosuficiencia de los refugiados en África

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Por: Altaf Makhiawala | 09 de julio de 2015 | English | عربي GINEBRA,Suiza, 8 de julio de 2015 (ACNUR/UNHCR) - El mes pasado, Etiopía acogía a más de 700.000 refugiados, reforzando así su posición como el mayor país de acogida de África y el quinto del mundo.

# data[].attributes.headline
Impactos de los campamentos de refugiados en las poblaciones locales

# data[].attributes.subject
Impactos de los campamentos de refugiados en las poblaciones locales

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Impacts of refugees and climate change on agricultural yields in the Sahelian zone of Minawao, Cameroon

# data[].attributes.headline
Amenazas terroristas a los campamentos de refugiados

# data[].attributes.subject
Amenazas terroristas a los campamentos de refugiados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, has helped 3,000 Malian refugees move back into Burkina Faso's Goudoubo refugee camp, nine months after insecurity forced them to abandon the site.

This month, in 31 convoys of buses and trucks, UNHCR relocated the refugees to Goudoubo camp in the country's north-east from the nearby town of Dori. Another 150 refugees relocated on their own on motorcycles or in tricycle taxis. Some moved on foot, accompanying their cattle.

Goudoubo hosted 9,000 refugees until March this year when a series of violent attacks and ultimatums by armed extremists emptied the camp. Some 5,000 Malian refugees made the difficult choice to return home to a country still in turmoil, where UNHCR assisted them on arrival.

The remaining Malians fled, many to Dori town, where they were welcomed by a host community already grappling with dire conditions, impacting shelter, clean water, and health services.

Now, national authorities have reinforced security in and around Goudoubo, with more personnel and increased patrols allowing Malian refugees to return to the camp.

"The Malian refugees returning to Goudoubo had been asking us to move them back to the camp where most had lived since 2012. We thank the authorities for making their return to Goudoubo possible by adding security measures and their commitment to keep the camp safe," said UNHCR Representative in Burkina Faso, Ioli Kimyaci. "Goudoubo will offer better access to services and will make life away from home a little easier, while we look for alternatives and lasting solutions."

At Goudoubo, UNHCR and the National Commission for Refugees, CONAREF, have built 1,500 new shelters for the returning refugees. In addition to shelter, essential aid, infrastructure improvements, and helping strengthen community networks, UNHCR and partners have refurbished and restocked a health clinic, and primary and secondary schools are ready to reopen and welcome students. Livelihoods are also expected to return, including farming and pasture lands for cattle to graze.

Returning refugees have begun reopening small businesses in Goudoubo, including grocery shops and butchers. Refugees tell UNHCR that the return to the camp means an end to the struggle to find shelter and access basic services.

Relocations will continue this month, with a further 2,100 refugees expected to move back to Goudoubo from the Mentao camp, near Djibo. Access to Mentao had been cut off for more than a year, after a string of deadly attacks severed aid and food distributions and forced UNHCR staff to stop their work there.

In Africa's turbulent Sahel region, Burkina Faso is at the epicentre of one of the world's fastest-growing displacement and protection crises. One out of every 20 people - amounting to more than one million people - is now internally displaced. Burkina Faso also hosts 20,000 Malian refugees, the majority of whom fled violence in 2012.

Across the Sahel, refugees, internally displaced people and their hosts are subjected to brutal violence, including rape and executions. The COVID-19 pandemic added a new layer of hardship for the refugees and further complicated efforts to support them.

Despite the welcome relocations to Goudoubo, UNHCR is again warning that attacks by armed groups in the Sahel will lead to further displacement in a region already hosting nearly two million IDPs and hundreds of thousands of refugees.
For more information on this topic, please contact:

In Ouagadougou, Melike Trigg [email protected] , +226 65 00 01 52

In Dakar (regional), Fatoumata Sinkoun Kaba, [email protected] , +221 78 526 87 14

In Geneva, Boris Cheshirkov, [email protected] +41 79 433 76 82

In New York, Kathryn Mahoney, [email protected] , +1 347 443 76 46

Share on Facebook Share on Twitter

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
New safety measures allow Malian refugees to return to camp in Burkina Faso

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, has helped 3,000 Malian refugees move back into Burkina Faso's Goudoubo refugee camp, nine months after insecurity forced them to abandon the site. This month, in 31 convoys of buses and trucks, UNHCR relocated the refugees to Goudoubo camp in the country's north-east from the nearby town of Dori.

# data[].attributes.headline
Condiciones de vida en un campamento de la UNHCR

# data[].attributes.subject
Condiciones de vida en un campamento de la UNHCR

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
Dr Grégory Chauzal was a Senior Researcher and the Director of the SIPRI Sahel West Africa Programme.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Importing the Malian conflict to the Group of Five Sahel countries: The case of the Ayorou refugee camp in Niger | SIPRI

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Since the fall of the Libyan regime in 2011, multiple and multifaceted crises in the Sahel region have greatly destabilized the local states and weakened already vulnerable populations. Located at the crossroads of three crises axes (Libya–Mali axis, Liptako–Gourma region, Lake Chad basin), Niger is…

# data[].attributes.headline
Campamentos de refugiados de UNHCR en Mali

# data[].attributes.subject
Campamentos de refugiados de UNHCR en Mali

# data[].attributes.headline
Riesgos de los éxodos rurales: enfermedades, reclutamientos juveniles y violencia de género

# data[].attributes.subject
Riesgos de los éxodos rurales: enfermedades, reclutamientos juveniles y violencia de género

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The Sahel region, already plagued by political instability, widespread violence, food shortages and disproportionately impacted by the climate crisis, is now contending with an increase in the movement of refugees from Burkina Faso, fleeing vicious attacks by armed groups, notably in the region bordering Cote d'Ivoire.

Around 7,000 Burkinabe have arrived in north-western Cote d'Ivoire since May last year. The influx has accelerated in the past six weeks - though is not seen as linked to the recent military coup in Burkina Faso - with an average of 100 people recently crossing the border daily, according to local authorities. UNHCR has registered and provided assistance to over 4,000 of them.

Burkina Faso is also facing an internal displacement crisis. The number of IDPs grew by 50 per cent last year to over 1.5 million, giving it one of the highest proportions of inhabitants that are internally displaced in Africa.

While the regional crisis becomes more protracted, and the limited international focus shifts, large parts of the region remain or have become inaccessible to humanitarian agencies trying to support the 2.5 million people forced to flee their homes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. This is leading more Sahelians to move southwards toward coastal countries or to North Africa, where many end up in a dangerous limbo.

The Sahel also faces an unprecedented rural exodus and movement to urban areas by the forcibly displaced due to shrinking areas under governmental control, reduced access to land and agricultural production, and multiple environmental challenges. In urban centers, displaced populations are exposed to new protection risks. Threats to women and youth are particularly severe, including sexual and labour exploitation, gender-based violence, forced recruitment and trafficking. Interventions to support women and youth are vital to alleviate suffering and prevent abuse, along with investments in a more positive future for Sahelian communities.

The Sahel is also on the front lines of the climate crisis, with temperatures increasing at 1.5 times the global average. This is exacerbating underlying vulnerabilities of states to manage rapidly growing populations, environmental destruction, natural hazard-related disasters, a reversal of development gains, and encroachment by non-state actors. It is also aggravating conflicts over scarce resources.

In 2021, some 19,200 Burkinabe fled to neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Benin - a 50 per cent increase on the previous year. More than 34,000 Burkinabe are now in exile across the region.

The plight of Burkinabe refugees is becoming increasingly precarious as more people arrive in Côte d'Ivoire without personal belongings or food. They told UNHCR staff that civilians had been killed and their homes burnt down by extremists. They are being hosted by Ivorian villagers in crowded conditions. UNHCR staff said many Ivorian families are hosting up to 30 Burkinabe refugees in small houses. Overcrowding is deteriorating sanitary conditions, and there are numerous cases of malaria, respiratory infections and malnutrition, adding pressure to local health facilities.

UNHCR will soon launch an appeal for the Sahel region. With a budget totaling US$307 million, UNHCR's Central Sahel operations are only 7 per cent funded.
For more information on this topic, please contact:
Share on Facebook Share on Twitter

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Insecurity drives more Burkinabe into exile, further straining fragile Sahel region

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The Sahel region, already plagued by political instability, widespread violence, food shortages and disproportionately impacted by the climate crisis, is now contending with an increase in the movement of refugees from Burkina Faso, fleeing vicious attacks by armed groups, notably in the region bordering Cote d'Ivoire.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
En la última década, 2,5 millones de personas han tenido que huir de sus hogares por los conflictos y la violencia en el Sahel Central. Desde 2013, el desplazamiento interno se ha multiplicado por diez hasta alcanzar los 2,1 millones a finales de 2021.

El número de personas refugiadas en los países de la zona asciende ahora a 410.000. La mayoría de los refugiados en la región han huido de la violencia en Malí, donde el conflicto comenzó en enero de 2012.

La situación humanitaria en la zona se deteriora rápidamente. La combinación de conflicto, pandemia y crisis climática está aumentando los niveles de pobreza. Los tres países del Sahel Central - Burkina Faso, Malí y Níger- han sido los más afectados por la violencia y los desplazamientos.

Se trata de una compleja crisis humanitaria y de protección en una región que lleva mucho tiempo sufriendo la violencia, la inseguridad alimentaria, las devastadoras consecuencias del cambio climático y ahora la COVID-19. Por eso la región del Sahel es también uno de los entornos operativos más difíciles de ACNUR en todo el mundo.

Según Martin Griffiths, coordinador de Ayuda de Emergencia de la ONU, casi 15 millones de personas en Malí, Níger y Burkina Faso necesitarán asistencia humanitaria este año. Eso es cuatro millones de personas más que un año antes.

Las mujeres y los niños se llevan la peor parte de la crisis humanitaria en el Sahel. En toda la región, la violencia sexual, los abusos y la explotación, los matrimonios forzados y precoces y la trata de personas se han generalizado.

Conflicto y violencia → pobreza y desplazamiento

La del Sahel es hoy la crisis de desplazamiento de más rápido crecimiento en el mundo. La violencia generalizada en la región ha provocado un aumento vertiginoso del desplazamiento forzado que no parece que vaya a disminuir. Los ataques contra la población civil y las fuerzas de seguridad no cesan. En 2022, se espera que más familias huyan de sus hogares.

Entre 2015 y 2021, los ataques violentos en el Sahel central se multiplicaron por ocho, según la ONU. En el mismo período, el número de muertes se multiplicó por más de diez.

Según las últimas estimaciones, el número de personas que se enfrentan a inseguridad alimentaria aguda se ha triplicado en Malí y se ha duplicado en Níger en comparación con noviembre de 2020.

Se espera que más de ocho millones padezcan hambre en la región en los próximos meses, según la ONU.

Durante 2021, en la región del Sahel...

800 ataques

al año perpetrados por grupos armados.

450.000

personas obligadas a desplazarse dentro de sus países.

36.000

personas obligadas a huir a países vecinos.

La desplazada interna Hawa Sawadoga, de 57 años, estaba en su casa en Boukoum, Burkina Faso, cuando hombres armados atacaron su casa y mataron a su esposo y a su hermano menor frente a ella.

"Estoy tan traumatizada que ni siquiera puedo recordar lo que pasó. Ni siquiera sé lo que estoy diciendo".

Hawa.

Inseguridad → pobreza y desplazamiento

Cerca del 80 % de la población de Burkina Faso depende de la agricultura de subsistencia; el algodón es el principal cultivo comercial. El deterioro de la seguridad, unido a la dificultad de llegar a ciertas regiones, ha complicado el acceso a los mercados y a los campos, y ha afectado gravemente a los medios de vida y a las actividades agrícolas.

Níger, Malí y Burkina Faso están luchando para hacer frente a los numerosos grupos militantes que se desplazan entre los tres países. Esta amenaza obliga a la población a abandonar sus hogares y, además, priva a las comunidades más vulnerables de los servicios básicos fundamentales, ya que los grupos armados atacan directamente a las escuelas, los centros de salud y otras infraestructuras.

Según la ONU, más de 5.000 escuelas están cerradas o no operativas. Muchos centros de salud no están funcionando. El desplazamiento y el aumento de la inseguridad han interrumpido el acceso a los servicios de agua, saneamiento e higiene.

Salamata (abajo en la foto) es una de las afectadas por el cierre de escuelas. Tiene 17 años y hace más de tres que no asiste a la escuela. En la foto, sostiene a su bebé. Cuando este ríe, a ella se le iluminan los ojos. Pero cuando se le pregunta por la escuela, le invade la tristeza.

Además, la crisis sanitaria mundial y las medidas adoptadas para limitar la propagación del virus COVID-19 han tenido un fuerte impacto en el contexto operativo, retrasando la asistencia y limitando las oportunidades de subsistencia.

Crisis climática → pobreza, conflicto y desplazamiento

El Sahel es una de las regiones más afectadas por el cambio climático en el mundo. El aumento de las temperaturas en la región es 1,5 veces superior a la media mundial. Las inundaciones y las sequías son cada vez más frecuentes e intensas. La tierra cultivable se está reduciendo a un ritmo alarmante. Como resultado, hay una tremenda falta de alimentos y agua. Esto provoca tensiones y puede exacerbar los conflictos existentes.

En Burkina Faso, por ejemplo, algunos de los peores actos de violencia y desplazamientos se han producido en las zonas más afectadas por la sequía. En Níger, las inundaciones del año pasado afectaron gravemente a los desplazados y a sus comunidades de acogida. La crisis climática multiplica las amenazas de conflictos y genera inestabilidad.

Según el Banco Mundial, la cría de ganado en el Sahel constituye un medio de subsistencia para más de 20 millones de personas que migran cada año en busca de agua y pastos para sus animales. La sequía de 2010 fue particularmente difícil. Se estima que en Níger mató más de 4,8 millones de cabezas de ganado, aproximadamente el 25 % del total, lo que representó una pérdida de más de 700 millones dólares para la economía del país.

Sambo Maiga, un burkinés de 49 años, recuerda con nostalgia la tierra que solía cultivar en la aldea de Taouremba. En su granja tenía ovejas y cabras y varios cultivos, gracias a los cuales podían alimentarse él y su familia. Pero pronto todo cambió. Los árboles murieron, el prado donde sus animales pastaban se secó y las cosechas de sus campos se volvieron cada vez más escasas.

"La tierra ya no es fértil como antes".

Sambo.

ACNUR ayuda a las familias desplazadas a estar mejor preparadas para crisis climática, proporcionando refugios y reforzando los ya existentes con sacos de arena y lonas de plástico. La agencia también trabaja para reubicar en lugares más seguros a las familias que viven en zonas propensas a inundaciones.

La generosidad de las comunidades de acogida

Las comunidades de acogida han seguido dando muestras de generosidad, resiliencia y solidaridad, acogiendo a las familias desplazadas pese a sus escasos recursos. Sin embargo, muchas de estas comunidades también se ven afectadas por la violencia y la pobreza y están al límite de sus posibilidades.

Lambda (nombre ficticio por motivos de protección), de 85 años, recuerda la tristeza que sintió cuando vio por primera vez grupos de personas desplazadas que llegaban a su ciudad, Tougouri, en Burkina Faso. Había oído hablar de ataques armados en la región y de historias de pueblos enteros destruidos.

Ante lo que está pasando en el Sahel, este funcionario jubilado y padre de siete hijos hizo lo que cree que habría hecho cualquiera: abrirles las puertas de su casa.

"Son seres humanos como yo, y lo que están pasando puede pasarme a mí también. No podía soportar verlos dormir a la intemperie a merced del frío y el polvo". Lambda.

Lambda.

ACNUR en el Sahel durante 2022

En este contexto extremadamente difícil y volátil, ACNUR lanzará una estrategia revisada en 2022 para estructurar su respuesta en el Sahel. Continuará proporcionando refugios y artículos básicos de emergencia, educación y ayudas para combatir los efectos de la crisis climática, así como para prevenir y responder a la violencia de género.

La Agencia también se asegurará de que la respuesta humanitaria se complemente con intervenciones a más largo plazo.

En 2021 quedaron sin cubrir más de un tercio de los fondos que necesitaba ACNUR en el Sahel Central. Para poder organizar una respuesta eficaz en 2022 en Burkina Faso, Níger y Malí, ACNUR necesita 307 millones de dólares.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
¿Qué está pasando en el Sahel? Claves para entender la crisis | eACNUR

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
En la última década, 2,5 millones de personas han huido de sus hogares por la violencia en el Sahel Central. Desde 2013, el desplazamiento se ha multiplicado por diez.

# data[].attributes.headline
Procedencia y número total de desplazados

# data[].attributes.subject
Procedencia y número total de desplazados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
These figures represent the number of refugees, asylum-seekers, refugee returnees, internally displaced people (IDP) and IDP returnees, as reported either by national authorities or UNHCR, in central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger), Chad and Mauritania. It does not necessarily imply individual identification, nor registration of each individual, and may include a degree of estimation, as per each government's statistical data processing methodology.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Desertification in the Mediterranean Region. A Security Issue (William G. Kepner (auth.), William G. Kepner etc.) (z-lib.org)

# data[].attributes.headline
Desplazados directamente por los conflictos

# data[].attributes.subject
Desplazados directamente por los conflictos

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
ACNUR, la Agencia de la ONU para los Refugiados, pide una acción internacional concertada para poner fin a los conflictos armados en la región del Sahel Central en África, que han obligado a más de 2,5 millones de personas a huir de sus hogares en la última década.

El desplazamiento interno se ha multiplicado por diez desde 2013, pasando de 217.000 personas a la abrumadora cifra de 2,1 millones a finales de 2021. El número de personas refugiadas en los países del Sahel Central -Burkina Faso, Malí y Níger-, asciende ahora a 410.000. La mayoría de los refugiados en la región han huido de la violencia en Malí, donde el conflicto comenzó en enero de 2012.

El aumento de los ataques violentos en toda la región durante 2021 desplazó a casi 500.000 personas, sin bien las cifras de diciembre aún están pendientes de confirmación.

Los grupos armados habrían llevado a cabo más de 800 ataques el año pasado, según las estimaciones de los socios de ACNUR. Esta violencia forzó a unas 450.000 personas a desplazarse dentro de sus países y obligó a otras 36.000 a huir a países vecinos.

Sólo en Burkina Faso, el número total de desplazados internos ascendió a más de 1,5 millones de personas a finales de 2021. Seis de cada diez desplazados internos del Sahel son ahora burkineses.

En Níger, el número de desplazados internos en las regiones de Tillaberi y Tahoua aumentó en un 53% en los últimos 12 meses. En el vecino Malí, más de 400.000 personas están desplazadas dentro del país, lo que supone un aumento del 30% respecto al año anterior.

Mientras tanto, la situación humanitaria en Burkina Faso, Malí y Níger va deteriorándose rápidamente en medio de una crisis con múltiples frentes. Si bien la inseguridad es el principal motor, la crisis se está viendo agravada por la pobreza extrema, la pandemia de COVID-19 y el agravamiento de los efectos de la crisis climática, registándose un aumento de las temperaturas en la región 1,5 veces superior a la media mundial. Las mujeres y los niños son los principales afectados y se ven desproporcionadamente expuestos a la extrema vulnerabilidad y a la amenaza de la violencia de género.

Las comunidades de acogida han seguido dando muestras de resiliencia y solidaridad, acogiendo a las familias desplazadas pese a sus escasos recursos. Las autoridades gubernamentales también han demostrado un compromiso inquebrantable para ayudar a los desplazados, pero están cediendo ante la creciente presión.

ACNUR y sus socios humanitarios hacen frente a crecientes dificultades para acceder a las personas afectadas y prestar asistencia y protección para salvar vidas. El personal humanitario sigue enfrentándose a ataques en las carreteras, emboscadas y robos de vehículos.

ACNUR hace un llamamiento a la comunidad internacional para que actúe con valentía y no escatime esfuerzos a la hora de apoyar a los países del Sahel Central para conseguir la paz, la estabilidad y el desarrollo que tanto necesita la región.

En respuesta a la crisis actual, ACNUR está liderando los esfuerzos conjuntos de las agencias de la ONU y las ONG para proporcionar alojamiento de emergencia, gestionar los campamentos para desplazados y prestar servicios de protección vitales, entre los que se incluye la lucha contra la violencia de género y la mejora del acceso a documentación civil.

ACNUR sigue actuando en coordinación con las autoridades y otros socios para garantizar la respuesta humanitaria más eficaz para satisfacer las necesidades de las personas refugiadas, desplazadas internas y las comunidades de acogida del Sahel, a pesar de los innumerables desafíos.

Con los recursos peligrosamente al límite, ACNUR insta a que se preste más apoyo para ayudar a salvar vidas y hacer frente a las vulnerabilidades. En 2021 quedaron sin cubrir más de un tercio de los fondos que necesitaba ACNUR en el Sahel Central. Para poder organizar una respuesta eficaz en 2022 en Burkina Faso, Níger y Malí, ACNUR necesita 307 millones de dólares.
Para obtener más información con respecto a este tema, por favor contacte con:

En Uagadugú, Melike Trigg [email protected] , +226 65 00 01 52

En Malí, Chadi Ouanes, [email protected] , +223 75 99 72 47

En Níger Jean Sébastien Josset, [email protected] , +227 90 76 69 77

En Dakar (regional), Fatoumata Sinkoun Kaba, [email protected] , +221 78 526 87 14

En Ginebra, Boris Cheshirkov, [email protected] +41 79 433 76 82

En Nueva York, Kathryn Mahoney, [email protected] , +1 347 443 76 46

Compartir en Facebook Compartir en Twitter

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Una década de conflicto en el Sahel deja 2,5 millones de personas desplazadas

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
ACNUR, la Agencia de la ONU para los Refugiados, pide una acción internacional concertada para poner fin a los conflictos armados en la región del Sahel Central en África, que han obligado a más de 2,5 millones de personas a huir de sus hogares en la última década.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Chad: 5.300 familias campesinas de Lago Chad reciben semillas

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Alrededor de 5.300 familias en las zonas de Liwa y Baga Sola recibirán semillas, equipamiento agrícola y artículos domésticos esenciales en el marco de la distribución de socorros que el CICR comienza hoy. Esta ayuda de emergencia tiene como objetivo contribuir a mejorar la autonomía y la resilienci…

# data[].attributes.headline
Refugiados acogidos en las ciudades y hacinamiento

# data[].attributes.subject
Refugiados acogidos en las ciudades y hacinamiento

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Burkina Faso: Rising displacement adds to Sahel crises

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Insecurity in Burkina Faso, particularly in the region bordering Côte d’Ivoire, is pushing more people to seek safety both within and outside the country, the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, reported on Friday.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
La inseguridad alimentaria que en 2021 atraviesan los habitantes de Sahel es alarmante y cada vez más aguda. Actualmente, cerca de 29 millones de personas que viven en la decena de países que forman parte de esta franja ubicada al norte del continente africano, precisan de asistencia y protección frente a una inminente crisis humanitaria.

Esta situación se produce en un momento en el que tiene lugar la estación del hambre, también conocida como soudure. Se trata de una compleja situación que se ve agravada por la crisis multifactorial que se vive en Sahel. Nos referimos a la dificultad para acceder alos alimentos, los conflictos armados y de violencia, la pobreza extrema, la crisis económica, el crecimiento demográfico acelerado, la desnutrición y la falta de educación entre las niñas y niños.

¿Qué es la brecha del hambre o estación del hambre en el Sahel?

La estación del hambre, brecha del hambre o época de soudure en Sahel es el período de escasez que comienza con la llegada del verano en junio, cuando los alimentos producidos en la cosecha anterior se comienzan a agotar y se hacen más costosos y difíciles de adquirir, y termina en octubre con la siguiente cosecha.

Este año 2021 la estación del hambre en Sahel ha comenzado coincidiendo con la crisis de la COVID-19 que ha agravado la situación. Esto ha agudizado los problemas que ya existían previamente y ha convertido a los países que lo conforman en epicentros del hambre. Esto ha afectado la situación nutricional e incrementando el riesgo de pasar hambre a millones de personas, especialmente a la población más vulnerable: niños menores de cinco años, mujeres embarazadas y ancianos.

¿Qué está pasando en el Sahel?

Este 2021 la situación alimentaria y nutricional se ha vuelto más dramática y los estudios reflejan cifras sin precedentes:

El número de personas vulnerables con necesidad de asistencia aumentó en un 181% en comparación con 2019 y en un 59% respecto a 2020. Actualmente 27.072.615 personas están en situación de vulnerabilidad alimentaria y nutricional.

Desde 2019 la inseguridad alimentaria se incrementó en un 76%. A ello contribuyó el aumento de los precios de los alimentos que hace que el acceso a ellos sea cada vez más difícil.

La tasa de desnutrición aguda global en diferentes países del Sahel supera el 10% de la población, cifra establecida por la OMS como umbral de desnutrición en alerta.

En otras regiones, especialmente en Sahel central y en el Lago Chad, prevalece una tasa de desnutrición por encima del 15%, catalogada como umbral de desnutrición de emergencia por la OMS.

De acuerdo a los países que conforman el G5 Sahel (Chad, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Malí y Níger), alrededor de 6.057.000 habitantes de la franja se encuentran con desnutrición aguda alta o superior a la habitual (fase 3 de situación de crisis alimentaria).

Las poblaciones en crisis alimentarias en fase 4 y 5 (con altos índices de desnutrición aguda y exceso de mortalidad) se han multiplicado por 8 entre 2019 y 2021. En tal sentido, actualmente se estima que más de 811.000 personas requieren asistencia inmediata.

PMA y UNICEF calculan que alrededor de 2.900.000 niños y niñas (entre 6 y 59 meses) podrían llegar a sufrir por desnutrición aguda, mientras que la desnutrición aguda severa podría afectar a unos 770.000 niños menores de 5 años.

¿Por qué es más agudo el impacto de la estación del hambre en el Sahel?

Cómo es de esperar, las estadísticas no son alentadoras. Todo lo contrario. Denotan un progresivo deterioro de las condiciones de vida de los habitantes de Sahel y el aumento de las personas que pasan hambre. Y es que los problemas por los que regularmente atraviesan sus habitantes se agudizan con la llegada de la temporada de escasez, al tiempo que sirven para empeorarla. Se habla de una crisis dentro de la crisis:

El cambio climático y la disminución de la producción agrícola

Las sequías, la reducción de las zonas de cultivo, las inundaciones y las plagas, entre otros desastres naturales producto del cambio climático son frecuentes y extremos. Todos estos hechos conforman los ingredientes para una tormenta perfecta que perjudica gravemente a la producción agrícola de esta región en la que más del 90% de los habitantes depende de la agricultura de subsistencia y deja millones de euros en pérdidas.

Constantes conflictos armados

Entre 2018 y 2020 se estima que los incidentes de seguridad se incrementaron en más del 114%. Esto ha incidido en el aumento de más del 61% de la población desplazada en los últimos dos años y ha deteriorado indudablemente las condiciones de vida. Solo en la cuenca del lago Chad la inestabilidad provocada por Boko Haram afecta a 30 millones de personas en Camerún, Chad, Níger y Nigeria.

Un ingrediente más: el impacto de la Covid-19

La pandemia por Covid-19 no solo ha profundizado la crisis sanitaria que ya se venía viviendo, también ha inducido al descuido de temas de desnutrición. Esto, sin contar con el impacto que ha producido en materia alimentaria: cierre de mercados, disminución de la producción agrícola, baja de las oportunidades de empleo y de los ingresos, incidencias y retrasos en cuanto al procesamiento, distribución, almacenamiento y entrega de alimentos, inflación, entre otros.

Por mencionar un ejemplo, en Chad los precios de los alimentos, puntualmente los cereales, experimentaron un alza del 4 al 27% haciéndolos inaccesibles para la población.

Sahel, millones de personas vulnerables lo convierten en epicentro de la lucha contra el hambre

Son muchas condiciones desfavorables que convergen: crisis económica, conflictos y violencia civil, la inaccesibilidad de los servicios públicos, el cambio climático, la Covid-19, la inseguridad alimentaria y, ahora, la temporada de escasez ponen a millones de personas, especialmente a las poblaciones más vulnerables, como foco del sistema humanitario en la lucha contra el hambre y de las actividades para la prevención del hambre y las crisis humanitarias.

En Acción contra el hambre, durante el período de cosecha, reforzamos los trabajos de prevención, detección y tratamiento de la desnutrición. En tal sentido, el refuerzo de las redes comunitarias para la vigilancia de las condiciones nutricionales de los más pequeños y la distribución de alimentos y complementos alimentarios a familias en situación de riesgo, a niños y mujeres embarazadas nos permiten aportar nuestro grano de arena para salvar vidas.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Estación de hambre en el Sahel: una crisis dentro de la crisis

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
La inseguridad alimentaria que en 2021 atraviesan los habitantes de Sahel es alarmante y cada vez más aguda. Actualmente, cerca de 29 millones de personas que viven en la decena de países que forman parte de esta franja ubicada al norte del continente africano, precisan de asistencia y protección frente a una inminente crisis humanitaria.

# data[].attributes.headline
Asentamientos informales en Níger y fusión con los poblados rurales

# data[].attributes.subject
Asentamientos informales en Níger y fusión con los poblados rurales

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
In the dusty plains outside Ouallam, a town some 100 kilometres north of Niger's capital Niamey, verdant rows of vegetables sprout from the soil in neat plots. Adding further contrast to the parched surroundings, women in bright shawls walk among the rows, checking irrigation pipes and adding a splash of water to any thirsty-looking specimens.

The 450 or so women who work this land are drawn from three distinct communities: some are locals, others were displaced by conflict and insecurity elsewhere in Niger, and the rest are refugees from neighbouring Mali.

The town's diversity reflects the huge scale of the displacement crisis Niger currently faces. In the fragile Sahel region of which it is a part, political instability and frequent attacks by armed groups have pushed 250,000 refugees, most from Mali and Nigeria, to seek safety in Niger. Violence within its own borders has forced a further 264,000 internally displaced people from their homes.

"We did this ... all together with the different communities: the refugees, the displaced, and the local community of Ouallam. We are very happy to work together," says 35-year-old Rabi Saley, who settled in the area after fleeing armed attacks in her hometown Menaka, 100 kilometres further north across the border in Mali.

The produce she grows - including potatoes, onions, cabbages, bell peppers and watermelons - helps to feed her seven children and provide an income by selling the surplus at a local market. Since its creation, the market garden project has also helped smooth the arrival of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people to the town.

"When we learned that they were going to settle here, we were afraid and unhappy," recalls Katima Adamou, a 48-year-old woman from Ouallam who has her own plot nearby. "We thought that they were going to make our life impossible, but instead it's been the opposite."

An added benefit of the project is its role in combatting another major crisis gripping Niger and its neighbours. Climate change is pushing up temperatures in the Sahel at 1.5 times the global average, and the 4.4 million people forcibly displaced across the region are among the most exposed to the devastating impacts of drought, flooding and dwindling resources.

In Ouallam's market garden - an initiative launched in April 2020 by UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency - the women have learned to nourish their plants using drip irrigation to minimize evaporation and preserve scarce water resources.

By cultivating a large swathe of formerly degraded land near the town and planting trees, they are also helping to stave off the desertification that threatens large parts of the country.

During a three-day visit to Niger this week together with IOM Director General António Vitorino, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi went to Ouallam and met with Saley and others involved in the project. He praised the spirit of solidarity on show, and the generosity of the Nigerien people and government in their role as hosts.

"Today we saw first-hand this spirit of welcome, tolerance and coexistence," Grandi said afterwards. "In an area that has a local population, of course, but also hosts displaced Nigeriens and many Malian refugees, [these] projects aim to support the coexistence of all these populations while they wait for solutions so that people can return home."

"Climate change - the climate emergency - [also contributes to] displacement, and we see a lot of it in the Sahel region," the High Commissioner continued. "But equally, population movements can also have an impact on nature, in particular the cutting of trees for firewood ... or the exploitation of water resources that are [already] very limited."

He urged donors to support UNHCR's efforts to promote alternative energy sources and other climate friendly solutions in displacement situations.

In another part of Ouallam, a further boost to community integration and environmental protection comes from a less likely source. The town brickyard employs 200 men and women - refugees, internally displaced and locals - in the manufacture of stabilized soil bricks.

"We have become one community."

Made by combining soil with small amounts of sand, cement and water before compacting and drying in the sun, the interlocking bricks reduce the need for cement mortar during construction. Crucially, they also eliminate the need to burn large amounts of scarce wood or other fuel used in the firing of traditional clay bricks.

"After, these bricks are used to build houses for the people supported by UNHCR - the refugees, the internally displaced, as well as a part of the vulnerable host community," explained Elvis Benge, a UNHCR shelter officer in Niger.

"Ultimately, the refugees and the ... populations who host them are the engines of change and can support themselves and ensure the resilience of their communities," Benge added.

Back in the market garden, having worked with her new neighbours to meet the challenge of daily survival as well as era-defining crises beyond their control, Saley stands surrounded by the fruits of her labour and reflects on a job well done.

"We have become one community - I even got married here!" she says. "The woman blossoms, just like the plants."

Share on Facebook Share on Twitter

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Communities in Niger adapt to displacement and a changing climate

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The 450 or so women who work this land are drawn from three distinct communities: some are locals, others were displaced by conflict and insecurity elsewhere in Niger, and the rest are refugees from neighbouring Mali. The town's diversity reflects the huge scale of the displacement crisis Niger currently faces.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
In the dusty plains outside Ouallam, a town some 100 kilometres north of Niger's capital Niamey, verdant rows of vegetables sprout from the soil in neat plots. Adding further contrast to the parched surroundings, women in bright shawls walk among the rows, checking irrigation pipes and adding a splash of water to any thirsty-looking specimens.

The 450 or so women who work this land are drawn from three distinct communities: some are locals, others were displaced by conflict and insecurity elsewhere in Niger, and the rest are refugees from neighbouring Mali.

The town's diversity reflects the huge scale of the displacement crisis Niger currently faces. In the fragile Sahel region of which it is a part, political instability and frequent attacks by armed groups have pushed 250,000 refugees, most from Mali and Nigeria, to seek safety in Niger. Violence within its own borders has forced a further 264,000 internally displaced people from their homes.

"We did this ... all together with the different communities: the refugees, the displaced, and the local community of Ouallam. We are very happy to work together," says 35-year-old Rabi Saley, who settled in the area after fleeing armed attacks in her hometown Menaka, 100 kilometres further north across the border in Mali.

The produce she grows - including potatoes, onions, cabbages, bell peppers and watermelons - helps to feed her seven children and provide an income by selling the surplus at a local market. Since its creation, the market garden project has also helped smooth the arrival of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people to the town.

"When we learned that they were going to settle here, we were afraid and unhappy," recalls Katima Adamou, a 48-year-old woman from Ouallam who has her own plot nearby. "We thought that they were going to make our life impossible, but instead it's been the opposite."

An added benefit of the project is its role in combatting another major crisis gripping Niger and its neighbours. Climate change is pushing up temperatures in the Sahel at 1.5 times the global average, and the 4.4 million people forcibly displaced across the region are among the most exposed to the devastating impacts of drought, flooding and dwindling resources.

In Ouallam's market garden - an initiative launched in April 2020 by UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency - the women have learned to nourish their plants using drip irrigation to minimize evaporation and preserve scarce water resources.

By cultivating a large swathe of formerly degraded land near the town and planting trees, they are also helping to stave off the desertification that threatens large parts of the country.

During a three-day visit to Niger this week together with IOM Director General António Vitorino, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi went to Ouallam and met with Saley and others involved in the project. He praised the spirit of solidarity on show, and the generosity of the Nigerien people and government in their role as hosts.

"Today we saw first-hand this spirit of welcome, tolerance and coexistence," Grandi said afterwards. "In an area that has a local population, of course, but also hosts displaced Nigeriens and many Malian refugees, [these] projects aim to support the coexistence of all these populations while they wait for solutions so that people can return home."

"Climate change - the climate emergency - [also contributes to] displacement, and we see a lot of it in the Sahel region," the High Commissioner continued. "But equally, population movements can also have an impact on nature, in particular the cutting of trees for firewood ... or the exploitation of water resources that are [already] very limited."

He urged donors to support UNHCR's efforts to promote alternative energy sources and other climate friendly solutions in displacement situations.

In another part of Ouallam, a further boost to community integration and environmental protection comes from a less likely source. The town brickyard employs 200 men and women - refugees, internally displaced and locals - in the manufacture of stabilized soil bricks.

"We have become one community."

Made by combining soil with small amounts of sand, cement and water before compacting and drying in the sun, the interlocking bricks reduce the need for cement mortar during construction. Crucially, they also eliminate the need to burn large amounts of scarce wood or other fuel used in the firing of traditional clay bricks.

"After, these bricks are used to build houses for the people supported by UNHCR - the refugees, the internally displaced, as well as a part of the vulnerable host community," explained Elvis Benge, a UNHCR shelter officer in Niger.

"Ultimately, the refugees and the ... populations who host them are the engines of change and can support themselves and ensure the resilience of their communities," Benge added.

Back in the market garden, having worked with her new neighbours to meet the challenge of daily survival as well as era-defining crises beyond their control, Saley stands surrounded by the fruits of her labour and reflects on a job well done.

"We have become one community - I even got married here!" she says. "The woman blossoms, just like the plants."

Share on Facebook Share on Twitter

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.authors[].name
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Communities in Niger adapt to displacement and a changing climate

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The 450 or so women who work this land are drawn from three distinct communities: some are locals, others were displaced by conflict and insecurity elsewhere in Niger, and the rest are refugees from neighbouring Mali. The town's diversity reflects the huge scale of the displacement crisis Niger currently faces.

# data[].attributes.headline
Condiciones de los campamentos de refugiados

# data[].attributes.subject
Condiciones de los campamentos de refugiados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Rainfall has dropped by 30 percent since 1998 in the West African country, leaving nearly 2 million in need of food aid.

# data[].attributes.headline
Consecuencias de la crisis del Sahel: refugiados

# data[].attributes.subject
Consecuencias de la crisis del Sahel: refugiados

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Rising violence by militant Islamist groups in the Sahel is straining intercommunal tensions, threatening the foundations of social cohesion in the region.

Violence in the Sahel has accelerated in recent years, with violent events linked to the militant Islamist groups doubling every year since 2015. There were roughly 2,600 fatalities related to violent extremist organizations in 2019 alone. This escalating violence has increased instability in the Sahel and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Less understood has been the role of violent extremist groups in stoking intercommunal violence, which simultaneously has been on the rise in the region. These groups have sought to profit from the increased insecurity and to use intercommunal tensions as a tool to boost recruitment. Left unaddressed, the escalation of intercommunal clashes could rapidly intensify the scale and complexity of instability in the region.

Tensions between pastoralists, semi-pastoralists, and sedentary populations have historically always existed. However, violence among them had remained relatively rare in the Sahel. This situation has changed with the rise of violent extremism in the region. Today, intra- and intercommunal rivalries increasingly involve armed violence that is exacerbated by militant Islamist groups. The worsening insecurity threatens the livelihoods of communities, reinforces their need for protection, and endangers the social cohesion that has characterized Sahelian society.

By targeting community leaders, extremist groups also aim to stoke intercommunal violence as part of a strategy to supplant local sources of authority and to leverage the resultant violence to advance their cause. To effectively counter violent extremism in the Sahel, every effort should be made to avoid conflating intercommunal conflict with violent extremism. Mistakenly doing so only intensifies a vicious cycle of violence and instability that propels both. Better understanding how these destabilizing forms of violence intersect with and differ from one another is central to developing specific responses to each.

Explaining the Rise in Intercommunal Violence
Understanding of the Link between Intercommunal Violence and Violent Extremist Groups
Confronted with growing insecurity, many rural communities in the Sahel have decided to organize themselves to fend off violent extremist groups and bandits by arming militias for their own protection. This has led to a complicated security scenario in which multiple armed groups-members of community self-defense militias, criminal gangs, and militant Islamist groups-are operating outside the bounds of statutory forces. At times, they have enhanced security. At other times, they have contributed to insecurity. This array of armed groups presents a challenge to national defense and security forces.

The increased presence of national armed forces and the foreign troops supporting them has, thus far, not stemmed the rise of militant Islamist violence in the region. With few tangible signs of improvement, some local communities doubt the effectiveness of these military deployments to restore security and peace. Indeed, national armed forces are also sometimes perceived as hostile occupying troops that are unable to protect populations. Such perceptions further reinforce the need for local self-defense militias or other sources of security from the perspective of local communities.

Further complicating matters, certain communities, notably the Fulani, are perceived as being supportive of jihadists. For these communities, accepting or tolerating jihadists may sometimes serve as a means of protecting their families and property - and is often tied to the free flow of goods and commerce through contested areas. This cooperation undermines security efforts while aggravating tensions with neighboring communities. These dynamics play into the hands of militant Islamist groups, since they are then able to exploit the stigmatization of the Fulani to further spur recruitment.
The Exploitation of Community Tensions by Violent Extremist Groups
Militant Islamist groups in the Sahel seek to penetrate the social fabric of village communities and take advantage of existing tensions between them. The founder of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Abu Walid al Sahrawi, recognized as far back as 2013 that intercommunal tensions present an opportunity to stir up social discord, weaken Sahelian societies, and establish the authority and legitimacy of militant Islamism. He believed that following foreign counterterrorism interventions, militant Islamist groups needed to forgo largescale operations and wait until intercommunal conflicts would break out to give them a religious, in this case Islamic, veneer and thereby solidify the relevance of groups like ISGS. By triggering social conflict, violent extremist organizations seek to establish their own governance space and present themselves as the most viable entity capable of providing security in the region.

Intercommunal violence also provides an opportunity for violent extremist groups to challenge traditional chiefs or other local authorities and proclaim themselves as peacemakers and social regulators. In the process, the whole social structure is turned upside down, upending longstanding social values and customs. Traditional village chiefs who seek to exercise their local governance functions are often hampered and threatened, and at times targeted in assassinations aimed at instigating intercommunal clashes. Their effectiveness and legitimacy are severely weakened in this new context of armed violence.

By employing identity-based arguments to sharpen rivalries between communities, purposely ethnicizing tensions, violent extremist organizations seek to exacerbate social conflict between community-based armed groups that resist their influence. In this way, militant Islamist groups play communities against one another, imposing their laws through persuasion or coercion and promising impoverished youth immediate profits and a prosperous future. They then use religious indoctrination to justify their actions.

Growing social tensions also provide militant Islamist groups an opportunity to fuel criminality. When a village is attacked, whether by bandits, militias, or jihadists, the attackers will often resort to cattle theft. The practice of cattle raiding makes it possible for raiders to purchase weapons, ammunition, fuel, and do other business. Violence itself becomes an opportunity for enrichment.
The Rise of Identity-Based Militias
Militant Islamist attacks and the need to protect communities have led to the proliferation of self-defense militias with an "ethnic" base (Fulani, Bambara, Dogon, Mossi). The writ of these groups is highly fragmented, sometimes limited to just a few villages. This makes it difficult to map the armed groups in the Sahel and to identify those responsible for massacres. This proliferation of militias has, at times, been advanced by national governments, which have armed and supported some of them, including groups of traditional hunters known as Dozo in the Mandé languages and Koglweogo in the Moré language.

In one such example, the traditional Dozo hunters of the Dogon community in central Mali formed a militia, known as Dan Nan Ambassagou, when the Malian army and French troops asked them for help with their operations due to their knowledge of the terrain. At the request of the Malian government, this group also provided security for the presidential election of July 2018 in several districts in central Mali. This enabled the group to legitimize its existence and organize itself into an armed militia to protect itself from other armed groups. However, multiple attempts to disarm Dan Nan Ambassagou and other Dozo militias after the presidential election have failed. Identity-based militias, such as Dan Nan Ambassagou, frequently perceive other communities, especially the Fulani, as "jihadists' accomplices" and attack these communities without distinction following provocations. This was the case when Dan Nan Ambassagou massacred 160 Fulani civilians in Ogossagou in March 2019.

Similarly, the Koglweogo militias have assumed law enforcement powers and apply their own justice in several parts of Burkina Faso. These militias are said to be responsible for the massacre of between 49 and 210 Fulani in Yirgou in January 2019, in response to the assassination of a Mossi chief and two of his sons, who were themselves Koglweogo members. The lack of formal judicial processes following these killings has raised many questions about the roles of militias and the complacency of soldiers, many of whom also accuse the Fulani of being jihadists.

These events highlight the challenges of distinguishing between community militias, violent extremist organizations, criminal groups, and gangs. This confusion plays into the hands of militant Islamist groups who are able to exploit the growing insecurity and traditional leaders' concerns that their communities are not being adequately protected by state security forces.
A Dynamic That Risks Worsening Social Conflict in the Sahel
The "militia-zation" of society leads to a perilous fragmentation of security. The fraying of social tolerance wrought by episodic reprisal attacks between communities is all the more worrying as it risks turning into a larger internal conflict. This perspective is reinforced by the fact that governments and their armed forces use certain militias for their own operational needs or to fill the security vacuum. Some officers and cabinet members in Bamako and Ouagadougou who allegedly support the creation of paramilitary groups have encouraged the arming of Dozos and Koglweogo to counter the advance of militant Islamist groups at home.

The reigning instability and insecurity in Mali and Burkina Faso are likely to become further entrenched with the proliferation of identity-based militias and violent extremist groups who want to take advantage of the worsening intercommunal relations. The revenge-reprisal spiral exposes Sahelian societies to social fragmentation, which threatens to erode national cohesion. As things stand, if nothing is done quickly, it is a safe bet that intercommunal violence will contribute to further instability and population displacement.

The inability of the Sahelian states to provide security for rural communities is a major contributor to the growing social conflict, which is now being resolved by arms. The linking of Fulani to jihadists, and the reprisal massacres of which they are the target, only consolidates the Fulani's feeling of stigmatization. This scapegoat logic threatens to cement a perception of the Fulani as the problem forged from their stereotyped warlike representations. Over time, there are concerns that this stigmatization may also spread to coastal West Africa, where the traditional relationship between pastoralists, often Fulani, and farmers is deteriorating. Fearful of extremist groups seeking to entrench themselves, the Sahel's southern neighbors also worry about Fulani communities rallying to militant Islamist groups for protection.

How to Reduce Intercommunal Violence and Counter Extremist Groups

The complexity and entanglement of intercommunal violence and its causes makes it difficult to understand. This benefits the strategy of violent extremist organizations. It is crucial to unravel community rivalries from jihadist attacks, local score-settling, criminal activities, and banditry in order to address each appropriately. To weaken and stem violent extremism, it is necessary to restore social order and strengthen legitimate sources of authority through the resolution of intercommunal conflicts.

Any judicial response to episodes of intercommunal violence must be commensurate with the gravity of the crimes committed. To restore citizens' trust in justice, careful investigations will need to be carried out and those responsible must be appropriately punished under the rule of law. This process will require increasing the security presence in regions where intercommunal violence is most concentrated.

Over time, all militias should be disarmed and demobilized so that only state actors are responsible for providing security.
Intercommunal dialogues that have begun at the local level must be deepened and systematically extended to all territories. Led by legitimate mediators from civil society, such dialogues would facilitate constructive discussions based on community grievances, their perceptions, and the misrepresentations advanced by ethnicist propaganda. This would help to rebuild a positive citizen identity and safeguard national cohesion.
Since customary chiefs are responsible for ensuring the social cohesion of rural communities, governments should also collaborate with and protect them during intercommunal dialogues. To better fight the influence of militant Islamist groups and their ability to damage intercommunal relationships, it is necessary to strengthen and restore legitimate sources of authority to resolve intercommunal disputes as they arise.

Additional Resources

Pauline Le Roux, "Responding to the Rise of Violent Extremism in the Sahel," Africa Security Brief No. 36, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, December 2019.

Pauline Le Roux, "Confronting Central Mali's Extremist Threat," Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 22, 2019.

Pauline Le Roux, "Exploiting Borders in the Sahel: The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara," Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 10, 2019.

Pauline Le Roux, "Ansaroul Islam: The Rise and Decline of a Militant Islamist Group in the Sahel," Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 29, 2019.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
How Violent Extremist Groups Exploit Intercommunal Conflicts in the Sahel - Africa Center for Strategic Studies

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Rising violence by militant Islamist groups in the Sahel is straining intercommunal tensions, threatening the foundations of social cohesion in the region. Violence in the Sahel has accelerated in recent years, with violent events linked to the militant Islamist groups doubling every year since 2015.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in Mali

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The disproportionate representation of Fulani in militant Islamist groups in the Sahel has led to the stigmatization of the entire Fulani community. Reversing this will require renewed outreach and trust-building between Fulani leaders, government authorities, and neighboring communities.

Daily life in the Sahel has been punctuated by a rapid rise in violent attacks from militant Islamist groups in recent years. Thousands have been killed and millions displaced since a separatist-turned-militant Islamist conflict erupted in 2012. The disproportionate presence of Fulani among the militant Islamist groups that are responsible for this violence in northern Burkina Faso, western Niger, and northern and central Mali has shattered intercommunal trust and the social harmony for which the region was previously known. This is so despite only a small minority of Fulani having taken up arms and members of other identity groups being present within the extremists' ranks.

The spread of insecurity in the Sahel has led some observers to simplify the current situation as a "Fulani jihad" or a "Fulani rebellion." They point to insurgent groups such as Front de Libération du Macina (FLM) led by Fulani preacher Amadou Koufa in central Mali, Ansaroul Islam founded by Fulani Ibrahim Malam Dicko, the Fulani Tolebe fighters from Niger who fought with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and who are now mixed within the ranks of the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara, and even Ansar Dine and other affiliates of Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) that contain groups of Fulani fighters.

Fulani stigmatization, in turn, has precipitated the targeting of Fulani communities by neighboring community militias such as the Dozo in central Mali and the Koglweogo in Burkina Faso. These militias have mounted attacks killing hundreds of Fulani civilians that have spurred further recruitment for militant Islamist groups, propelling a deadly revenge-reprisal cycle.

Fulani leaders, thus, are faced with the dual challenge of defusing the group-wide stigmatization while stemming further recruitment from militant groups.

The Causes and Consequences of Fulani Enrollment in Jihadism

Fulani pastoralists have joined militant Islamist groups in the Sahel for reasons that are as varied as they are numerous. These nomadic shepherds have taken up arms to fight against the abuses of some government authorities who have sought to extract arbitrary fees. In other cases, some Fulani have joined militant Islamist groups simply for economic gain after livestock epidemics such as cattle plague and bovine pleuropneumonia or severe droughts decimated their herds and impoverished their families.

As Islamist and separatist Tuareg groups advanced their 2012 rebellion in northern Mali, they made many enemies besides the Malian armed forces. Their fighters looted the businesses of Arab smugglers and raided cattle from Fulani shepherds. These actions prompted Arab merchants to form and Fulani herders to join MUJAO in 2012 as a means of defending themselves against the growing power of the Tuareg Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) and its Islamist allies al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine.

Similar reactions by Fulani communities have continued in the face of persistent violence. In March 2013, a Tuareg battalion killed 21 Fulani livestock merchants and threw their corpses in the wells of the village of Doungoura located in the Mopti Region of central Mali. Subsequent efforts by pastoralist leaders to engage local officials and national authorities to address the security concerns of pastoralists were ineffective. It subsequently took the Malian gendarmerie 2 years to come to Doungoura to investigate. This strengthened the perception that Malian authorities and the international community remained indifferent toward Fulani pastoralists, fostering a sentiment of injustice.

Seeking to exploit this perception, in 2013, Hamma Founè Diallo, the future leader of the Mouvement pour la défense de la patrie (MDP), called on Fulani pastoralists to join in rebellion against the Malian state, but not to side with the jihadists. His calls were mostly unheeded, however, because many Fulani pastoralists had already been influenced by the ideas of Amadou Koufa, leader of FLM, who was preaching jihad throughout the region by this time. Koufa's ideas found fertile ground among Fulani herders who, tired of perceived official indifference and abuses, were primed for a social revolution cloaked in religious inspiration.

The desire for social change and protection has resulted in the dominant presence of Fulani among militant Islamist groups in the Sahel. This, in turn, has been a principal factor in the increase in intercommunal clashes. Violence between communities has occurred in the form of unprecedented attacks on Fulani villages and camps, following the collaboration of the armed forces with non-Fulani militias. Used by the military as reconnaissance scouts, these militias have at times found themselves in the crosshairs of the jihadists. In short, ethnic identity has become highly polarized and sparked bouts of intercommunal violence.

The massacres of Fulani have, in turn, spurred more recruitment for militant Islamist groups. In a 2019 recording, Amadou Koufa stated ironically that Fulani herders designated as jihadists by the expression yimbe laddè (literally "bush men" in Fulani language, Fulfuldè), would have had the bush as their home regardless of whether they joined the jihad, since they would have been hunted down like game by militias and soldiers had they not joined. Using this rhetoric to appeal to Fulani herders, extremists offer their protection to Fulani communities and to those displaced by violence who desire to avenge themselves.

The Voice of Fulani Leaders in the Face of Stigmatization

The radicalization of certain members of the Fulani community and the subsequent stigmatization and abuses that followed have mobilized Fulani leaders to take various actions. Some leaders have attempted to organize meetings, press conferences, and visits to displacement camps to facilitate intercommunal reconciliation. They have worked diligently to remove their community from widespread stigmatization by denouncing and condemning attacks, as well as the abuses their communities have suffered. Similarly, they have supported the displaced and brought aid to the wounded.

Fulani leaders also have taken steps to distance themselves from violent groups such as Alliance nationale pour la sauvegarde de l'identité peule et la restauration de la justice (ANSIRPJ). These leaders vehemently denounced the attack on Malian armed forces at Nampala in July 2016 led by ANSIRPJ. Across local and national airwaves, they showed that the head of ANSIRPJ, the Tuareg Oumar Aldjana, did not represent the Pulaaku ("Fulani society" in Fulfuldè) and should not be seen as speaking for this community.

These efforts at reconciliation have not been uniformly welcomed by their communities. While some view these messages of non-violence very positively, others remain critical. These critics feel Fulani leaders did nothing at the height of their power to improve the lives of poor Fulani pastoralists. Rising to defend the cause of the Fulani and appealing for nonviolence now, after conflict has already erupted, has done little to sway the opinions of many pastoralists.

Instead, in some cases, these calls have sharpened grievances. Some pastoralists speak scornfully of "sons of farmers" in ministerial posts having responsibility for "every inch of rural land" (implying the system favors farmers' interests over those of pastoralists). This rhetoric has fanned the flames of old grudges between different members of the Fulani community itself. For instance, many Fulani pastoralists are wary of negotiations with the government since the Fulani feel they never received the reparations promised them in deals struck back in the 1990s.

Fulani Leaders Facing Reprisals from Militant Islamist Groups

An opportunity was lost to squelch the militant Islamist groups' threat in 2014-2015 when these groups were just gaining momentum. However, local and national officials overlooked the threats posed by these extremist groups in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso. Those groups espousing violent extremist views, particularly FLM and Ansaroul Islam, took advantage of this space to reach out to villages spreading their radical message. They also made impromptu visits to mosques where they would preach violent jihad.

Their sermons and rhetoric were tailor-made for local recruitment, denouncing abuses suffered by local communities at the hands of government authorities and the monetization of local pasture access. They also criticized local Fulani chiefs known as diowros, other local leaders, the moderate forms of Islam commonly practiced in the region, the large families of marabouts, and democracy. Ultimately, militant Islamist groups were able to recruit from those within the Fulani community who harbored these grievances and were less connected to villages throughout the region, notably pastoralists.

The resulting violence turned large segments of the local population against the militant Islamist groups. Some local religious authorities have used every means available to them to prevent the arrival of militant Islamist groups in their respective territories using collective prayers and sermons to speak out against violent extremism.

Some local leaders have even solicited the presence of Malian armed forces in their villages attracting the anger of the jihadists who consequently began targeting these Fulani leaders in assassinations. Those who refuse to support militant Islamist groups face the threat of death and the extortion of their livestock.

Despite these threats, the jihadist discourse, which hinges on a characterization of the Malian state as the embodiment of injustice, has not been able to mobilize large numbers of Fulani. To the extent that they do cooperate with the extremist groups, it is often out of fear of reprisal rather than conviction. By and large, however, most traditional chiefs and ordinary Fulani have not been convinced by militant Islamists groups' goals. Rather, Fulani leaders have for the most part distanced themselves from the ideology of militant Islamists who call for a return to Islamic theocracy.

The diversity of the Fulani community , comprised of numerous subgroups found throughout the Sahel, presents additional challenges for largescale recruitment. The extensive livestock-rearing and herding that long typified the Fulani community no longer characterize the entire Pulaaku, as fewer and fewer practice this livelihood. Tellingly, those who continue to rely on this vulnerable way of life have tended to be those most susceptible to extremist discourse, whereas other members of the Fulani population in the region have largely rejected violent extremism.

For still other Fulani, religious motives serve as the basis for their rejection of violent jihad. Most Muslim Fulani in central Mali and the wider Sahel follow Maliki legal traditions and view Wahhabism as extreme and antithetical to their beliefs. Militant Islamist groups promote the legalistic and bellicose version of Islam upheld by Wahhabi practices, which is incongruent with the beliefs of most Muslims in the region. This is why as far back as 2012 when the insurgency began, some rebel fighters rejected this ideology.

Reflecting this lack of support, in a recording from 2015, an unidentified extremist preacher was recorded saying that he deplored "the absence of the great masters of the Quran [well-known imams] and rich pastoralists in their ranks." In another recording from 2016, Amadou Koufa laments that he is "still waiting for descendants of the great marabout families to commit to the jihad." Such statements underscore that many Fulani reject the militant cause, even if Fulani constitute a significant faction within the jihadist movement in the Sahel.

Responding to the Stigmatization of the Pulaaku

Traditional leaders within the Pulaaku and those of other ethnic communities need to shake off their inward turn toward ethnic identity and speak frankly to one another as compatriots. These leaders must realize there is nothing to gain from blaming someone else for their predicament. Communal leaders need to step back from the appeal of reactionary rhetoric that provokes hate from other groups. Instead they must express the Fulani communities' goals in terms of hope, peace, and unity. Divisive rhetoric should be condemned and denounced, just as calls for violence have been.

Governments in the region need to hold their armed forces accountable and push them to operate in strict accordance with the law, lest they foment perceptions of abuse of power. Similarly, governments must hold militias accountable for their involvement in communal clashes, whether they are working in conjunction with the armed forces or independently. Soldiers have the right to ensure security, but they also have other roles to uphold. Indeed they should strive to educate local populations. The role model of soldier-educator in the defense and security forces has been nearly forgotten at a time when there is perhaps no greater need.

Local and national governments must use all their channels to put an end to the stigmatization of the Fulani. One option may be to pursue policies similar to what was done by the administration of Amadou Toumani Touré in Mali to address the stigmatization of the Tuareg following rebellions in the 1990s and 2000s. This administration developed simple skits in local languages that were performed throughout the region to explain to local communities that not every Tuareg was a rebel. Similar skits might be developed to explain that not every Fulani is a jihadist.

International partners should take into account the voices of local populations-not only political elites-and create the conditions for an inclusive dialogue capable of resulting in a durable peace. They need to prioritize the words of those communities that have fallen victim to this crisis. They must also help to ensure that these voices are protected from retaliation by militant Islamist groups.
Modibo Ghaly Cissé is a doctoral student in anthropology at the Center of African Studies at Leiden University (the Netherlands). His research focuses on the trajectories of radicalization of nomadic Fulani pastoralists in the Sahel, specifically in central Mali.
Additional Resources

Laurence-Aïda Ammour, "How Violent Extremist Groups Exploit Intercommunal Conflicts in the Sahel," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 26, 2020.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, " Threat from African Militant Islamist Groups Expanding, Diversifying ," Infographic, January 18, 2020.

Pauline Le Roux, "Responding to the Rise in Violent Extremism in the Sahel," Africa Security Brief No. 36 , Africa Center for Strategic Studies, December 2, 2019.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Strategies for Peace and Security in the Sahel," Video, September 27, 2019.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Mitigating Farmer-Herder Violence in Mali," , August 8, 2019.

Kaley Fulton and Benjamin P. Nickels, "Africa's Pastoralists: A New Battleground for Terrorism," Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 11, 2017.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Understanding Fulani Perspectives on the Sahel Crisis - Africa Center

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The disproportionate representation of Fulani in militant Islamist groups in the Sahel has led to the stigmatization of the entire Fulani community. Reversing this will require renewed outreach and trust-building between Fulani leaders, government authorities, and neighboring communities. Daily life in the Sahel has been punctuated by a rapid rise in violent attacks from militant Islamist groups in recent years.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Cuando el actual presidente, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, subió al poder en diciembre de 2015 tras más de 30 años de Gobierno dictatorial, Burkina Faso no había sufrido ningún gran ataque yihadista. Dos semanas después ocurrió el primero, con 30 muertos. Tres años más tarde, el país sufre una emergencia humanitaria con una amalgama de grupos yihadistas que han dinamitado la estabilidad y la balanza religiosa.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Burkina Faso: un oasis de seguridad convertido en polvorín del Sahel

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Cuando el actual presidente, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, subió al poder en diciembre de 2015 tras más de 30 años de Gobierno dictatorial, Burkina Faso no había sufrido ningún gran ataque yihadista. Dos semanas después ocurrió el primero, con 30 muertos.

# data[].attributes.body
Conflictos armados, insurgencias, contrainsurgencias, terrorismo y contraterrorismo

# data[].attributes.body
Causas políticas

# data[].attributes.body
Crisis climática mundial

# data[].attributes.body
Crisis ecológica antropogénica

# data[].attributes.headline
Aumento de las temperaturas, de las sequías y de los fenómenos metereológicos imprevisibles (e.g., inundaciones)

# data[].attributes.subject
Aumento de las temperaturas, de las sequías y de los fenómenos metereológicos imprevisibles (e.g., inundaciones)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The Sahel Crisis and the Need for International Support

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The French Intervention in the 2012 Malian Conflict- Neocolonialism Disguised as Counterterrorism

# data[].attributes.headline
Conflictos armados entre pastores y agricultores

# data[].attributes.subject
Conflictos armados entre pastores y agricultores

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Conflict Between Farmers and Herders in the Semi-Arid Sahel and East Africa- A review

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
In May 1934, a cloud of topsoil from the Great Plains blanketed the eastern U.S. as far as 2,400 km (1,500 miles) away. In 1935, the U.S. established the Soil Conservation Service to promote good soil management practices. But according to some experts, this is not enough. Human-accelerated soil erosion continues to occur because much of the Great Plains is suited to moderate grazing rather than farming. And in 1975, the Council of Agricultural Science and Technology warned that severe drought in the Great Plains could trigger another Dust Bowl.

In semiarid grasslands, such as the Sahel region, dust storms are often generated where the ground has been stripped of vegetative cover by cultivation or grazing. The path of dust from a single desert storm can be traced as far as 4,000 km (2,500 miles).

The Sahel, or Sahelian Zone, lies south of the Sahara Desert in North Africa. This dry savanna environment is particularly prone to devastating drought years. Typically, several years of abnormally low rainfall alternate with several successive years of average or higher-than-average rainfall. But since the late 1960s, the Sahel has endured an extensive and severe drought.
Desertification occurs when land surfaces are transformed by human activities, including overgrazing, deforestation, surface land mining, and poor irrigation techniques, during a natural time of drought. Desertification in the Sahel can largely be attributed to greatly increased numbers of humans and their grazing cattle.

Most overgrazing is caused by excessive numbers of livestock feeding too long in a particular area. Extreme overgrazing compacts the soil and diminishes its capacity to hold water, and exposes the soil to erosion.

Although the relationship between drought and human influences is complex, desertification can be successfully mitigated if financial resources are available. But exploding population growth in developing African nations means that pressures on the land there will continue to intensify.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
In May 1934, a cloud of topsoil from the Great Plains blanketed the eastern U.S. as far as 2,400 km (1,500 miles) away. In 1935, the U.S. established the Soil Conservation Service to promote good soil management practices. But according to some experts, this is not enough.

# data[].attributes.headline
Pérdida de tierras por el cambio climático

# data[].attributes.subject
Pérdida de tierras por el cambio climático

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Land Conflict Has Long Been a Problem in Nigeria. Here’s How Climate Change Is Making It Worse

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Conflicts have claimed at least 86 lives

# data[].attributes.headline
Sedentarización de los pastores sahelianos

# data[].attributes.subject
Sedentarización de los pastores sahelianos

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Does climate change drive land-use conflicts in the Sahel?

# data[].attributes.headline
Ineficacia gubernamental y debilidad militar

# data[].attributes.subject
Ineficacia gubernamental y debilidad militar

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Conflict and Growth in Africa  the Sahel. (OECD) (z-lib.org)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
FRENCH COLONIALISM TO NEO-COLONIALISM IN MALI- AN ANALYTICAL STUDY

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
The Black Man's Burden- The Cost of Colonization of French West Africa

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
In Cameroon, violence caused by Boko Haram has driven out around 228,000 Cameroonians in the areas bordering Nigeria. Cameroon is simultaneously dealing with a separate conflict in a different region of the country and though that part of the country is not within the Sahel region, the effects of the conflict are devastating. Over the past two years, unrest has increased in the English-speaking South-West and North-West Regions of the largely French-speaking country. During the autumn of 2018, 437,000 Cameroonians were displaced in these areas and 30,000 refugees crossed the border into Nigeria.

Further developments in the Sahel belt will also depend on what is happening in Sudan and in parts of North Africa such as Algeria and Libya - countries with great tensions and instability.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Sahel - The world's most neglected and conflict-ridden region

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
In Cameroon, violence caused by Boko Haram has driven out around 228,000 Cameroonians in the areas bordering Nigeria. Cameroon is simultaneously dealing with a separate conflict in a different region of the country and though that part of the country is not within the Sahel region, the effects of the conflict are devastating.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
What Causes Desertification?

-Overgrazing
Overgrazing was not as large of a problem long ago because animals would move in response to rainfall. People would move with the animals so it prevented overgrazing in such areas. Now, humans have a steady food supply so they do not have to move about. Therefore, people use fences to keep their animals in one place which causes overgrazing. (Desertification, 2001)

-Farming of Average Land
Farming of average land is causing desertification worldwide. Farmers are clearing average land, and using it which takes away the richness in the soil. People should let the average land replenish itself before farming. (Desertification, 2005)

-Destruction of Plants in Dry Regions
Destruction of plants in dry regions is causing desertification to occur. People are cutting down tress to use them as a source of fuel. Once all these trees are cut down there is nothing to protect the soil. Therefore, it turns to dust and is blown away by the wind. (Desertification, 2005)

-Incorrect Irrigation in Arid Regions Causes a Build Up of Salt in the Soil
Incorrect irrigation is commonly used in poorer areas. Farmers are using canal irrigation and other poor techniques because of the lack of water. This type of irrigation causes a build up of salt in the soil. (Desertification, 2005)

The Effects Of Desertification

-Soil becomes less usable
The soil can be blown away by wind or washed away rain. Nutrients in the soil can be removed by wind or water. Salt can build up in the soil which makes it harder for plant growth.

-Vegetation is Lacked or Damaged
Loosened soil may bury plants or leave their roots exposed. Also, when overgrazing occurs, plant species may be lost.

-Causes Famine
Places that have war and poverty are most likely to have famine occur. Drought and poor land management contribute to famine.

-Food Loss
The soil is not suited for growing food; therefore the amount of food being made will decline. If the population is growing, this will cause economic problems and starvation.

-People near Affected Areas
Desertification can cause flooding, poor water quality, dust storms, and pollution. All of these effects can hurt people living near an affected region. (The Facts of Desertification and United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, 2000)

Case Stude: The Sahel Desert

In the Sahel Desert, desertification is becoming a huge problem. Around the 1950's, people settled into the Sahel region, in areas where there was water. This resulted in overgrazing, which is one of the greatest causes of desertification. Eventually, the perennial shrubs were destroyed because of grazing, and they were replaced by annuals. Then, the annuals were grazed out which left bare soil. A lot of the topsoil was washed away, and all that was left were rocks. Silt turned hard when it was hit by rain. Therefore, plants were not able to grow because there roots could not penetrate this hard layer. Now this region has turned to desert and it continues to expand. (Desertification, The Sahel, 2004) Records show that rainfall in Sahel has decreased and sands have shifted about sixty miles south into the area. Sahel is expanding due to lack of vegetation in the area. (Sahel, 2005) Another reason desertification is occurring in the Sahel region is because people are using the slashing and burning method to clear land. This degrades the quality of soil just like overgrazing. (Desertification-a Threat to the Sahel, 2000)

Short Term Effects of Desertification in the Sahel:

-Soil loses its nutrients which makes it not useful
-Overgrazing destroys vegetation and without it erosion occurs
-Land becomes salty which makes it difficult to grow crops

Long Term Effects of Desertification in the Sahel:

-People die of starvation
-Cattle die of starvation
-The soil becomes completely useless
(Prospects and Problems, 2004)
(www.esa.int/esaEO/SEMIRD3VQUD_environment_1.html)

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
What Causes Desertification? -Overgrazing Overgrazing was not as large of a problem long ago because animals would move in response to rainfall. People would move with the animals so it prevented overgrazing in such areas. Now, humans have a steady food supply so they do not have to move about.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Boko Haram- origins, challenges and responses

# data[].attributes.headline
Causas de la crisis de refugiados en el Sahel

# data[].attributes.subject
Causas de la crisis de refugiados en el Sahel

# data[].attributes.body
Burkina Faso, Níger, Nigeria, Mali y Mauritania