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After nearly 20 years teaching and advising in secondary public education, I have decided to embark on a Master's in Education.  It is my hope that upon graduation with a focus on Student Development and Leadership and with a certification in academic advising that I am able to secure a position as a college student affairs staff member.

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Exploration Option 1 -Current Practicing Professional's Perspective

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Exploration Option 1 -Current Practicing Professional's Perspective

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I was able to speak with the Dean of University College, Dr. Dann Brown, at Texas State University regarding certain leading issues his office is navigating.

Currently, one of the biggest topics of conversation centers around the impact of House Bill 5 on college matriculation.  More specifically, the differences in how k-12 defines college ready and how higher education defines college ready.  High schools have numerous ways they are able to count a graduating student as college ready.  However, higher educations definition is much more narrowly defined.  Students can be in the top 10% of their graduating class, have graduated with all of their required credits, have been accepted to an institution, have housing squared away, and not realize until their new student orientation that they did not make high enough scores on the SAT/ACT or TSI tests to take college degree credit earning courses.  This is making a lot of incoming freshmen struggle with starting college in developmental education courses.

Along with academic concerns, Dr. Brown expressed that the campus is having to navigate the current political climate surrounding immigrant students, especially undocumented students.  As Texas State University has earned Hispanic Serving Institution status (HSI), the campus must be informed and concerned with how the current presidential administration is interacting with this marginalized population.

(D. Brown, personal communication, June 8, 2018)

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About the Dean : University College : Texas State University

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Texas State Division of Academic Affairs University College About Office of the Dean About the Dean

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Exploration Option 3, Slide 1 - Current News on Legal & Ethical Issues

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Exploration Option 3, Slide 1 - Current News on Legal & Ethical Issues

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As the United States becomes ever-more divided, certain terms are being manipulated and twisted from their original meaning. Diversity is one of the latest to come under attack. It seems that more and more conservative-leaning people are protesting that diversity is meant to include more conservative lines of thought and speech. This speech is often tied to racist thought and rhetoric. The question then arises, when is diversity of thought used to validate or justify racism? This same vein of questioning is examined when looking at the reasoning for affirmative action in college admissions. Originally, affirmative action was meant to justify diversifying college campus student populations and staffing. More recently, affirmative action is being used to support a twisted version of its original intention in an attempt to justify adversity rather than diversity.

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Advice

James Fryer for The Chronicle

Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the 1978 Bakke case - in which the court invalidated the racial quotas on admission at the medical school of the University of California at Davis - "diversity" has dominated American higher education's thinking about affirmative action.

Ironically, the opinion that gave diversity that canonical status was supported by just one Justice, the late Lewis Powell, whose vote decided the case. While strict racial quotas were not permissible, universities had, in Justice Powell's view, a compelling interest in the diversity of their student population, since that contributed to the educational experience an institution offered.

In 1961, when President Kennedy called for "affirmative action" by military contractors to end racial discrimination, he was not thinking at all about the value of diversity for military contracting work. He was responding to flagrant racist discrimination against African-Americans and demanding that the huge industry supplying the military change its discriminatory practices.

As the sociologist Frank Dobbin documents in his important 2009 book, Inventing Equal Opportunity, the actual details of what it meant to eliminate discrimination - as well as to implement the commands of the 1964 Civil Rights Act - were left to human-resources personnel in major corporations, who crafted the procedures and rules to which courts soon began to defer. When affirmative action came under attack in the 1970s and 1980s, as Dobbin shows, "human-resources experts pointedly argued that diversity training and work-family programs were not affirmative-action measures at all, but were there to increase productivity."

In short, diversity was good for capitalism and, according to Justice Powell, also for education. Justice for the victims of discrimination, or their descendants, largely dropped out of the national dialogue.

But does racial and ethnic diversity really enhance the educational experience, as Justice Powell opined?

That issue loomed large in the post- Bakke litigation over the University of Michigan's admissions practices in the 1990s, so much so that Michigan created a useful website collecting the briefs and expert testimony in support of its side. Much of the dispute concerns what constitutes a positive effect on educational outcomes. Alas, a reasonable reading of the research, and the competing expert interpretations, is that racial and ethnic diversity may produce some positive education-related effects but is neutral with respect to many other equally important ones.

Facts are one thing, however, and rhetoric is another, and the rhetoric of "diversity" has been returning with a vengeance in recent years. Right-wing law professors in the United States have been lobbying the Association of American Law Schools for recognition of "political discrimination" against conservatives and libertarians, invoking precisely the post- Bakke rhetoric about "diversity."

Individuals do not choose their race, though we might hope they choose their political views, yet the post- Bakke consensus in higher education about diversity is now being exploited on behalf of a chosen political ideology. And while libertarians are about 1 percent of the electorate (and thus are dramatically overrepresented in legal academia where they account for between 5 and 15 percent of the faculty at most major law schools), social conservatives of the Ted Cruz stripe are, indeed, underrepresented in the professoriate.

The correct rejoinder, obviously, is that Ted Cruz's worldview (with its denial of climate change and its fictions about Obamacare) involves a panoply of falsehoods that a scholarly community should not welcome. But perhaps that misses the force of the objection?

Conservative appeals to "diversity" should be understood in the spirit of the 19th-century arguments of John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, which, in turn, were indebted to the views of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who shaped the modern idea of a research university in Germany two centuries ago. In the view of Mill and Humboldt, even false views can be a stimulus to nondogmatic belief in the truth, since they force us to articulate and understand our reasons for holding our beliefs.

We should worry, of course, if conservatives' diversity arguments suggest appointing promulgators of ignorance and falsehood to university faculties. But putting that aside, the Millian rationale also does not provide much support for traditional affirmative-action policies based on demographic markers like race and ethnicity, since Mill was concerned with diversity of ideas and opinions only, and the former have only a tenuous connection with the latter.

Should the diversity argument for increasing the representation of victims of vicious race-based discrimination really apply to libertarian ideologues, who are overwhelmingly white and economically advantaged? All of this should be a warning to traditional supporters of affirmative action that something has gone awry with diversity defenses of racial preferences.

Libertarians are not the only members of the academy trying to exploit the rhetoric of diversity.

Last year, Bryan van Norden, arguably America's leading scholar of Chinese philosophy, took to The New York Times's blog with a colleague to argue on diversity grounds for more coverage of non-Western philosophy in American departments: "The present situation is hard to justify morally, politically, epistemically or as good educational and research training practice."

This was corporate HR policy - plus a dash of Mill - brought to bear on one of the most abstract academic disciplines.

What went unnoted is that most Anglophone philosophy departments offer little or no coverage of most of Western philosophy of the past two centuries, from Hegel to Nietzsche to Habermas. Leading philosophy departments from Princeton to Oxford are, indeed, not very intellectually diverse, but their lack of diversity reflects no submerged racial or ethnic motivation: It reflects, instead, the evolution of a discipline - hugely shaped by refugees from Nazism, ironically - that moved closer to the natural sciences than the other humanities in its conception of method.

No one, to my knowledge, is complaining about lack of attention to "Chinese" physics in American physics departments, which suggests that here, again, diversity is being invoked opportunistically to avoid a substantive debate about the merits of alternative methods and substantive views, or the virtues of specialization in a particular method. As Thomas Kuhn famously observed many years ago, "normal science" often makes great progress when there is not diversity, but convergence on methods, assumptions, and problems.

With affirmative action now under real attack from the Trump Administration, perhaps it is time to revisit an older way of understanding the case for affirmative action in university admissions?

To start, the public should be disabused of its belief that college admissions have ever been primarily about rewarding "deserving" students. Institutions usually do look for some evidence of skills and ability adequate for completing a course of advanced study, but beyond that low threshold, admissions have always been driven by instrumental considerations related to social engineering.

For much of American history, the goal was to ensure the racial and ethnic purity of a ruling class requiring certification. Later, the goal was to ensure the flow of alumni dollars (affirmative action for alumni kids and athletes that produce winning sports teams). More recently, in the affirmative-action era, colleges aimed to produce a diverse work force along the most tangible markers of identity - initially gender, and now especially race and certain ethnicities. Most recently, in the era of U.S. News rankings, colleges and universities increasingly make admissions decisions based on yield and numerical credentials to ensure that their rank remains intact, lest the other objectives be defeated.

There was, once upon a time, another compelling argument for affirmative action that had nothing to do with "diversity." It was an argument of compensatory justice toward groups of people - most notably African-Americans - who had been exploited, brutalized, humiliated, and stigmatized for much of America's history.
Brian Leiter is professor of jurisprudence and director of the Center for Law, Philosophy & Human Values at the University of Chicago.
In the law, we often confer compensation on descendants of those who suffered wrongdoing, and instrumental social-engineering practices in campus admissions have done exactly that and made huge inroads in propelling African Americans, for example, into the professional classes. These practices have also produced a huge class of aggrieved white people, since compensatory justice in admissions is a zero-sum game: a gain for one group is a cost to another. That raises deep issues about socioeconomic reality in America that are hardly specific to affirmative action.

The justice argument for affirmative action, needless to say, offers nothing to libertarians or scholars of Chinese philosophy, but it might remind us why affirmative action arose in the first place and what grievous moral wrong it meant to remedy. As diversity arguments descend into absurdity, and racist creeps march in Charlottesville, perhaps it is a good time to remember what affirmative action should really be about?

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Academic Ethics: Is 'Diversity' the Best Reason for Affirmative Action?

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Advice Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the 1978 Bakke case - in which the court invalidated the racial quotas on admission at the medical school of the University of California at Davis - "diversity" has dominated American higher education's thinking about affirmative action.

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Exploration Option 3, Slide 2 - Current News on Legal & Ethical Issues

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Exploration Option 3, Slide 2 - Current News on Legal & Ethical Issues

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The stories of young college students, typically female, being manipulated by their male professors have become an American cliche.  The article, "Academic Ethics: What Should We Do With Sexual Harassers in Academe?" from the Chronicle of Higher Education questions how we should be addressing inappropriate behavior during the time of the Me Too movement.  The article suggests that offenders be penalized in ways appropriate, going as far as banning professors from ever teaching again to drastic cuts in pay for others. Ensuring that victims are protected is paramount, and also creating environments that reward good behavior are described as the best pathways forward.

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Colin McGinn, a prominent philosophy professor at the University of Miami, resigned in 2013 rather than subject himself to a faculty inquiry regarding allegations of sexual harassment. He "pled guilty" only to failure to disclose a romantic relationship with a graduate student. She subsequently sued him and the University of Miami, claiming that she was sexually harassed and that the university took the easy way out, getting the wrongdoer to resign in order to avoid a prolonged public spectacle (it appears the latter calculation was not successful).

Should Professor McGinn be allowed to teach again after this scandal? Faculty at East Carolina University offered him a one-year visiting position subsequently, but the university's administration vetoed it. I opened a discussion about all of this on my philosophy blog, posing the question: "Should loss of a job for sexual misconduct bar someone from any future academic appointment?"

A female assistant professor of philosophy responded as follows: "Uh - YES. Is this a serious question?"

Her reaction led John Gardner, then the professor of jurisprudence at the University of Oxford, to reply as follows:

"Of course it's a serious question. We need to begin by asking whether the refusal to hire is punitive, and, if so, whether the punishment is proportionate to the offense. Or whether the refusal to hire is preventative, in which case whether there are ways to prevent that do not destroy someone's life so completely. If the answer is 'both,' we need to know in what proportions, so that we can work out whether the constraints on each goal are being sensibly applied. If the answer is 'neither, we're just trying to send out a signal' - then I invite you to consider whether it's morally acceptable to use a person, any person, to do that. Unpleasant narcissists are people too and it's not open season when one of them gets exposed for what he is. It still matters how we treat him. It shocks me that anyone would doubt whether 'How should we treat a wrongdoer in such a situation?' is a serious question."

Sexual harassment of students by their professors betrays the fundamental idea of a university as a place where everyone can come to learn and master an intellectual discipline, and be evaluated on their intellectual competence, rather than their sexual desirability.

Professors in fields like law, medicine, engineering, or the sciences, fired from an academic post for sexual misconduct, may well find another powerful perch outside the academy.

That ideal has been betrayed for a long time, which has led to widespread frustration with institutional inaction in the face of sexual harassment - but also to vindictive responses from those frustrated. Liberals who no doubt believe that convicted felons "deserve a second chance" sometimes sound like they think that accused or university-convicted sexual harassers should never be heard from again. But how could that be right?

Punishments should be proportional to the offense; that is a widely accepted principle of punitive justice. No one thinks that a sexual harasser should be castrated or hung. One also hopes no one thinks a sexual harasser should be prohibited from earning a living ever again. (Even convicted murderers, released from prison, are allowed to work.)

But should a sexual harasser be barred permanently from teaching?

Clearly the answer depends on the nature of the offense and the offender's response to a finding of sexual harassment. Some will point to McGinn's flat denial of any wrongdoing; others will note his "unpleasant narcissis[m]," as Gardner put it. Those are relevant, but hardly decisive. How could his alleged sexual harassment of a Ph.D. student - whom he had hired as a research assistant and with whom he was working closely - bear on the safety of letting him teach undergraduates for a year as a visiting professor at East Carolina University?

What about a new permanent academic appointment? Has his punishment so far been insufficient? He no longer has an academic job or salary, and he has been embarrassed nationally and internationally. What more is required? Compensation to the alleged victim? Perhaps so, and given the lawsuit, he may yet have to pay that.

But suppose he does? What then? Can he at that point become a visiting professor at a state university focused on undergraduate education?

Someone who is found to be a sexual harasser should be punished but also prevented from victimizing someone else. That seems a sound ethical principle, but does it explain the current practices in academe?

On the one hand, academe is notorious for passing off sexual harassers "under the radar" from one campus to another. If a professor is accepting a new teaching job under a cloud of sexual-harassment allegations, that should be disclosed. On the other hand, there are cases like that of Sujit Choudry, former dean of the law school at the University of California at Berkeley, who was found to have violated the university's sexual-harassment policy, though there was no finding that he acted with a sexual intent. Since being sued, he is now subject, remarkably, to a second disciplinary hearing by his university - this time in an attempt to fire him from his tenured position (earlier this month Choudry himself sued the university, alleging that he was the victim of racial discrimination in its handling of this case). When does the punishment end?

A dean of a major law school should not be hugging his secretary on a regular basis, as Choudry did. Such a dean may not be a sexual harasser, but he is sufficiently insensitive to professional norms and legal rules to be unfit for administrative responsibilities, including responsibility for ensuring that others comply with legal rules regarding sexual harassment. He should have been removed from his job as dean. That seems hard to argue with.

So perhaps colleges and universities should consider another approach to dealing with sexual harassment by faculty: cut their salaries.

But now Berkeley wants to fire him for the offense for which he lost his deanship and some salary already. He is now spending tens of thousands of dollars defending his right to remain as a professor, even though there has been no public allegation about misconduct in that role. In cases like this, vindictive hysteria appears to have replaced a proportionate response to the actual misconduct.

Some academics think the punishment for sexual harassers should extend beyond being effectively fired, demoted, and shamed. Thomas Pogge, a professor of philosophy at Yale, has been the subject of several allegations of sexual harassment, though Yale did not find against him on the most recent claim. (I have been among those skeptical of the official exoneration, I should note.)

Pogge has been criticized and excoriated on social media as well as in a public letter signed by most of his department colleagues. But all of that was not enough for James Sterba, a philosophy professor at the University of Notre Dame. According to a report in The Huffington Post, Sterba is "no longer including Pogge's work in exams for his graduate students." Sterba is quoted as saying of Pogge: "You don't need him. He carries too much baggage - he doesn't have to be cited anymore."

But how can Sterba's decision be squared with the obligations of a professor to ensure that students are properly trained in a subject and its literature? In a post on this question on my blog, most philosophers, fortunately, disagreed with Sterba's move.

Even when proportionality of punishment, and protecting possible victims, are kept in mind, there will still be cases where sexual misconduct warrants a permanent bar on teaching. But what then? A terminated faculty member, especially one prone to sexual harassment, is likely to continue behaving the same way in new settings. Is ousting a serial sexual harasser from higher education just a case of passing off the problem not to another university, but to a nonacademic workplace?

The problem may not recur in cases where the fired faculty member can no longer occupy positions that give him power over potential victims. But sexual harassment is a widespread problem in many professions, not just in academe. Professors in fields like law, medicine, engineering, or the sciences, fired from an academic post for sexual misconduct, may well find another powerful perch outside the academy.

So perhaps colleges and universities should consider another approach to dealing with sexual harassment by faculty: cut their salaries. Call it a "carrot and stick" approach, though with a stick bigger than the carrot. Firing tenured professors for harassment, or cutting their salaries, are both legally complicated. But the latter approach does not simply pass off the problem to the nonacademic world. Why not punish sexual misconduct by faculty - at least sexual misconduct that is not criminal, in which case the legal system should take over - with serious internal sanctions, not de minimis ones?

For a first-time sexual harasser, whose actions were not criminal, cut that offender's salary by 25 percent (or more if someone is very highly compensated) for a probationary period of two years. Then, if the offender gets his act together, his salary goes back to where it was. Make clear that a second offense during the probationary period will result in termination and disclosure of the grounds for termination.

If an offense occurs after the probationary period, cut that repeat offender's salary by, say, 40 percent for another probationary period, with similar conditions.

Incentives, as my law and economics colleagues emphasize, often do work. The incentives for appropriate behavior when it comes to sexual misconduct need to be more severe than they have been to really change behavior, but they must also hold a promise of redemption. Absent such an approach, I fear we will see a continued slide into disproportionate and vindictive responses to sexual harassment, ones that will either condemn sexual harassers (disproportionately) to penury or that will simply send the problem outside the academy.

Brian Leiter is a professor of jurisprudence and director of the Center for Law, Philosophy, and Human Values at the University of Chicago.

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Academic Ethics: What Should We Do With Sexual Harassers in Academe?

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Colin McGinn, a prominent philosophy professor at the University of Miami, resigned in 2013 rather than subject himself to a faculty inquiry regarding allegations of sexual harassment. He "pled guilty" only to failure to disclose a romantic relationship with a graduate student.

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After Investigative Research - Legal & Ethical Educational Issue of Interest to Me...

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After Investigative Research - Legal & Ethical Educational Issue of Interest to Me...

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Having done some initial research, I am most interested in learning more about the rights and services available to undocumented immigrant students. This topic interests me because throughout my time as a college access counselor, I have worked with hundreds of undocumented students, and I have witnessed the struggles they encounter at the higher education level.  I would like to be a better support for those students.

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The myriad of bureaucratic terms being used in today's debate over immigration has created confusion among many including immigrants, advocates, and young people. The centerpiece of the discussion is "DACA," President Obama's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. Undocumented people who qualify for DACA are deferred from deportation and receive two-year work permits and are also eligible to receive a Social Security number.

At the heart of the debate, however, are the undocumented immigrants themselves, people who have been living in constant fear of one day being taken from their homes and into deportation procedures. One of these people is Carlos Estrada, who has moved back and forth between Mexico and the United States since he was three years old. Fluently bilingual in Spanish and English, confident, and charismatic, one would be tempted to think he has mastered that impossible immigrant balancing act between fitting in and preserving his identity.

But asking him about his path towards higher education-now a gate-keeping factor for almost all upwardly mobile jobs in the United States-quickly reveals the enormous struggles he has faced and continues to bear. "It was really tough," he says after a pause when asked about financing his education. "My freshman year, there weren't a lot of scholarships for undocumented students. So I ended up having to pay out of pocket, which was a huge strain on my parents." In California, where Estrada attended the University of California Santa Barbara, qualifying undocumented students are able to pay in-state tuition, which is meant to provide some financial relief, but even that wasn't enough. "They had to sell pretty much everything they owned to pay for my education, and by my sophomore year, I knew I was going to have to drop out. Then, the president made the announcement about DACA."

Since the program was first announced by President Obama on June 15, 2012, advocates and scholars have described the financial, educational, and even health benefits that DACA has had on the qualifying undocumented population. "DACA has allowed our students to take advantage of opportunities they historically have not had access to," says Alberto Morales, former Assistant Director of the Georgetown Scholarship Program at Georgetown University. "They are going abroad for the first time, doing internships at prestigious organizations, and working on-campus jobs." In states where DACA is tied to in-state tuition, higher education has become more affordable for qualifying undocumented students.

Furthermore, DACA beneficiaries can access some forms of financial aid by filling out the Free Applications for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), which requires a Social Security number. Filling out the FAFSA generates the Estimated Family Contribution number, which universities use to determine the amount of university-based financial aid a student will receive.

"DACA made it so I was able to apply for FAFSA and financial aid, while I didn't qualify for most scholarships because they required citizenship or legal residence," Estrada says. "If DACA wasn't announced, I would have had to drop out of college my sophomore year."

However, it is clear that DACA alone is not enough to increase higher education attainment. One reason is the soaring cost of education, compounded by the fact that undocumented people, including those eligible for DACA, are prohibited from accessing federal financial aid such as Pell grants, work-study, and federal loans.

For "DACAmented" students, undocumented students with DACA, the path towards obtaining a degree continues to be fraught with obstacles, with some states explicitly banning undocumented and DACAmented students from accessing state financial aid and from enrolling in public colleges and universities. In addition, the very nature of DACA means that students who qualify for the program only receive relief in two-year increments. "I still have no legal status," Estrada explains. "They're just telling me 'we're not going to deport you, for right now.'"

For students who are not eligible or have not applied for DACA, their future is even more uncertain. "It further marginalizes the undocumented in two groups," Morales says of the binary between the DACAmented and undocumented, which serves to further the narrative of "deserving" and "undeserving" immigrants. "They can't participate in paid internships, work-study, or on-campus employment opportunities.... Students are working to meet their basic needs and to send money home, so there is a constant dilemma on how to maximize college opportunities while meeting financial demands."

Some colleges and universities are taking the proactive step of creating programs to support students who do not have legal status. During his time as an administrator of the Georgetown Scholarship Program, Morales worked to raise awareness among faculty and staff of the presence of undocumented and DACAmented students on campus and provided a blueprint for different ways to support them. "Universities need to set up specific discretionary funds available to undocumented students so they have access to additional financial resources when they need it," explains Morales. At Georgetown, discretionary funds help students apply for DACA, which costs $465, and pay for things like unforeseen medical bills, allowing students to focus on their college experience.

While millions of undocumented people wait for congressional action on comprehensive immigration reform, millions of undocumented and DACAmented young people continue to wait for the moment they are able to fully harness their talents. As young people like Carlos wait for full legal status, efforts should be dedicated towards the expansion of education resources to all undocumented people, including those who do not qualify for the 2012 DACA program. Progressive organizations and advocates should work at all levels-federal, state, local, and institutional-to provide opportunities for all students to thrive.

More from Generation Progress:

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Going Beyond DACA: Demanding Tuition Equity For Undocumented Students - Generation Progress

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The myriad of bureaucratic terms being used in today's debate over immigration has created confusion among many including immigrants, advocates, and young people. The centerpiece of the discussion is "DACA," President Obama's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program.

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Summarizing the Legal & Ethical Implications for My Future Professional Work with Immigrant Students - 

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Summarizing the Legal & Ethical Implications for My Future Professional Work with Immigrant Students - 

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The United States is a country made of immigrants.  This is one of our greatest attributes.  The millions of young people who were brought here by their families in hopes for a better life, as well as those children who fled here in pursuit of a safer environment, are now part of the generation graduating high school and matriculating to college.  The reality is that immigrant students, both documented and undocumented, are part of the fabric of our society, and we should support them.

These students have so many specific needs.  They are required to navigate much more complex processes for admissions and financial aid.  They are doing this in a current climate of intimidation by our federal government to deport them and their families.  Immigrant students have rights.  In the state of Texas, can they qualify for in-state tuition prices, and they can also qualify for state financial aid.  However, navigating the many requirements for these processes can be overwhelming for a student who is most likely to be navigating attempting college on their own.  Once a student arrives to college, the processes do not become simpler.  Many times, these students are still living at home, working a job to support their family, or caring for siblings that are younger than they.  Immigrant students need counselors, advisers, professors, and staff at the higher education level that understand their needs.

As a future student affairs professional, there are many instances I can imagine needing to know the legal and ethical landscapes for immigrant students.  For example, how will DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) being repealed impact a student who is currently enrolled on my campus?  What are the laws surrounding confidentiality with paperwork for financial aid and other processes on our campus?  What student support services do we offer for our students who have family who has been deported?  What types of career counseling do we offer for students with DACA?  Do we have mentors for our immigrant students?  How do we go about pairing them without revealing citizenship status?

How we serve our most vulnerable says a lot about who we are as a people. In the future, I hope to work at an institution that wants to be a leader in supporting immigrant students. Being knowledgeable about their legal issues can only help me to serve them better.

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Jefferies, J. (2014). Fear of deportation in high school: Implications for breaking the circle of silence surrounding migration status. Journal of Latinos and Education, 13(4), 278-295. doi:10.1080/15348431.2014.887469

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Website: Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC)

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Immigrant Legal Resource Center | ILRC |

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The Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC) builds a democratic society that values diversity and the rights of all people. Through the ILRC's policy and advocacy efforts, we promote a vision of racial justice that advances the rights of all immigrants, including those who have had contact with the criminal legal system.