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Burns, K. (2017). The Vietnam War: A film by Ken Burns & Lynn Novick. [online] PBS. Available at: http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/the-vietnam-war/home/ [Accessed 21 May 2018].

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"no actual visual sighting by the maddox. suggest complete evaluation before further action is taken"

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"no actual visual sighting by the maddox. suggest complete evaluation before further action is taken"

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LBJ ignored and lied about this saying that they aggressively attacked.

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Green, John, narr. The Cold War in Asia: Crash Course US History #38.      CrashCourse, 2013. Accessed May 16, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/      watch?v=Y2IcmLkuhG0. 

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Green, John, narr. The Cold War in Asia: Crash Course US History #38.      CrashCourse, 2013. Accessed May 16, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/      watch?v=Y2IcmLkuhG0. 

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"the vietnamese weren't fighting for communism they were fighting for Vietnam

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"the vietnamese weren't fighting for communism they were fighting for Vietnam

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-1971 New York times published pentagon papers exposing LBJ

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-1971 New York times published pentagon papers exposing LBJ

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-More then 100 billion dollars spent
-58000 Americans died
-3-4 million vietnamese

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"More bombs dropped in north and south Vietnam than both the axis and allied powers in all of WWII

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"More bombs dropped in north and south Vietnam than both the axis and allied powers in all of WWII

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W knew that if we did not send in troops communism would spread over the entirety of Asia which justified the troops that we sent in and hid to the public.

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Ellsberg, D. (2001). Lying About Vietnam. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/29/opinion/lying-about-vietnam.html

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As the Pentagon Papers later showed, that was contradicted as early as May 1964 by the estimates and recommendations of virtually all of Johnson's own civilian and military advisers. I believe he worried, not only in 1964 but over the next four years, that if he laid out candidly just how difficult, costly and unpromising the conflict was expected to be, the public would overwhelmingly want escalation on a scale that promised to win the war.

To this end, Congress and the voters might compel him to adopt the course secretly being pressed on him by his own Joint Chiefs of Staff. From 1964 through 1968, the Joint Chiefs continuously urged a litany of secret recommendations, including mining Haiphong; hitting the dikes; bombing near the Chinese border; closing all transportation routes from China; sending ground troops to Laos, Cambodia and the southern part of North Vietnam; possibly full-scale invasion of North Vietnam.

I think that this escalation would not have won the war. I suspect that Johnson thought this as well. But beyond that -- as Johnson brought up repeatedly -- the Joint Chiefs' course would have greatly risked war with China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were ready to accept that risk. President Johnson was not.

But Johnson didn't want to get out either. We now know from memoirs and documents declassified after the Pentagon Papers that a number of his people, not only George Ball, were urging him to do just that, to extricate us by a disguised withdrawal. But Johnson couldn't face being accused of losing a war. Instead, he stayed in and lied about the prospects. And that made for a prolonged war, an escalating war and essentially a hopeless war.

I do not believe that the war would have been less hopeless if the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs had been followed. It would have been much more bloody. It might well have involved a nuclear war or a major conventional war with China. That would have been even more catastrophic than what actually happened. So the worst was avoided. But at the cost of 58,000 American and several million Vietnamese lives.

I first learned of these debates in 1964 and 1965, when I was special assistant to John McNaughton, the assistant defense secretary. I read all the documents of that period that were later included in the Pentagon Papers, and I heard from McNaughton of his discussions with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and President Johnson. I strongly regret that at that time, I did not see it as my duty to disclose that information to the Senate.

But then I was in Vietnam for two years from 1965 to 1967. I saw that our ground effort in South Vietnam was hopelessly stalemated, and I did not believe that increased bombing of the north would ever cause our adversaries to give up. Therefore I came to the belief in 1967 that we should negotiate our way out.

But in 1969, when I read the entire Pentagon Papers, covering 1945 to 1968, I became aware that every president from Harry Truman on had heard this advice from people more authoritative than me. And for some reason the presidents had always chosen to stay in. Their determination not to suffer the political consequences of losing a war outweighed, for them, the human costs of continuing.

Finally, I learned that Richard Nixon also refused to lose. In the fall of 1969, Morton Halperin, who had just given up his job as deputy to Henry Kissinger, informed me that Nixon really had a secret plan. It was widely thought he had no plan, that his campaign claim was just a bluff. Not true. His plan included secret threats of escalation unless there was a mutual withdrawal of North Vietnamese as well as United States forces.

I thought this plan would fail. From my experience in the government and in Vietnam, and from reading the Pentagon Papers, I thought the Vietcong would not give up, that the threat of escalation would be carried out, and that it would fail, with a great loss of life on both sides.

So my concern in releasing the Pentagon Papers was not simply, or even primarily, to get out the truth. I thought I would probably go to prison for the rest of my life. I wouldn't have done that just to set the record straight. I released the papers because I foresaw prolonged war and eventual escalation, including incursions into Laos and Cambodia, the mining of Haiphong and the bombing of Hanoi. I wanted to avert these events, but they all occurred.

I never had any sense that putting out these documents was likely to end the war, just that it might help. Maybe it did.

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Op-Ed article by Daniel Ellsberg, former Defense Dept and State Dept official, explains why he risked prison 30 years ago to release Pentagon Papers, documentary record of American involvement in Vietnam; says papers revealed policy of concealment and quite deliberate deception by presidents, particularly Pres Lyndon B Johnson, who refused

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Minh, Ho Chi. "Ho Chi Minh reply to LBJ letter." Ho Chi Minh Reply To LBJ Letter (August 2017): 596. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed May 14, 2018).

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Stockdale, J.B. "The total Vietnam War story needs to be told." Vital Speeches Of The Day 55, no. 17 (June 15, 1989): 519-525. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed May 14, 2018).

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Sign in with your credentials to access the EBSCOhost premium information resources provided by your subscribing institution.

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Lewis, Thomas Tandy. "Vietnam War." Salem Press Encyclopedia (2013): Research Starters, EBSCOhost (accessed May 14, 2018).

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Important User Information: Remote access to EBSCO's databases is permitted to patrons of subscribing institutions accessing from remote locations for personal, non-commercial use. However, remote access to EBSCO's databases from non-subscribing institutions is not allowed if the purpose of the use is for commercial gain through cost reduction or avoidance for a non-subscribing institution.

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Important User Information: Remote access to EBSCO's databases is permitted to patrons of subscribing institutions accessing from remote locations for personal, non-commercial use. However, remote access to EBSCO's databases from non-subscribing institutions is not allowed if the purpose of the use is for commercial gain through cost reduction or avoidance for a non-subscribing institution.

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End of first paragraph
Universal
One Sentence
Everything must support
Hook-Bait
Don't use "You", "One"
Entitled to your own opinion, not facts

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The section ‘The Vietnam War’ looks at the US intervention (1965–1973) in the Vietnam War. The Americans justified their military intervention in Vietnam by the domino theory, which stated that if one country fell under the influence of Communism, the surrounding countries would inevitably follow.

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1. Was it a mistake to send our own troops in
2.Did public know about Johnson's choice
3. At what point were we in to deep
4. Was it that important to stop communism to kill thousand of Americans
5. How does this relate to Cold War

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The Vietnam War was a long, costly and divisive conflict that pitted the communist government of North Vietnam against South Vietnam and its principal ally, the United States.