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The Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference made its first appearance at the University of Denver in 1947, in the form of a Symposium on the History and Status of Philosophy in the Mountain-Plains Region

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Whatever it was, it probably wasn't aesthetics...we think?

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1948: Naturalism vs. Non-Naturalism (Maybe?)

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1948: Naturalism vs. Non-Naturalism (Maybe?)

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The second meeting of the conference was hosted by the University of Colorado, possibly with a keynote address on the subject of Naturalism vs. Non-Naturalism. We're still looking for programs or other information on this one!

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One suspects the discussion was more complicated than this.

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The third meeting was held at Colorado College, featuring work on the theme of Relations Between Theory and Practice.

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Pretty sure they didn't rock out Seattle-style...

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The conference returned to the University of Denver in 1950 to discuss Philosophical Alternatives (To what? We don't know. We'd love to see a program or any of the papers presented!)

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We don't know whether or not Scrabble was involved.

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The conference broke its all-Colorado streak for the first time in 1951, meeting at the University of New Mexico to talk about Fundamental Issues in Philosophy.

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The conference ventured out to the University of Nebraska in 1952 in order to discuss Symbols.

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They probably did not play Dodgeball...probably.

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From Nebraska the conference moved to the University of Utah for its 1953 meeting on the subject of Knowledge and Value.

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The selection of GIFs on "culture" is...unhelpful.

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In 1954, the University of Wyoming hosted the conference for a rousing bit of scholarly fun on the subject of Philosophy and Culture.

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The conference returned to Colorado in 1955, when Colorado A&M hosted a meeting on Philosophy of the Rational and the Non-Rational.

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The University of Colorado once again hosted the conference in 1956, where the theme of the meeting was Philosophy and Politics.

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The Aspen Institute hosted the conference in 1957, taking Myth and Truth as its subject.

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There probably weren't any light sabers, disappointingly.

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The conference took up the subject of the Ideological Struggle for Power in 1958, meeting once again at the University of New Mexico.

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We returned again to Colorado College in 1959 to talk about a pressing question: What has become of evolution and the genetic method?

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There are not a lot of cool GIFs for Analytic Philosophy. This is a problem we must solve.

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1960: The Possibilities of Analytic Philosophy

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1960: The Possibilities of Analytic Philosophy

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Kansas State University hosted the conference for the first time in 1960, where the hot topic of the moment was The Possibilities of Analytic Philosophy.

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The 1961 meeting at the University of Colorado focused on the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead.

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The GIFs for "value" are VERY weird, so here's this coin instead.

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The conference ventured for the first time to the Unviersity of Arizona, taking up the matter of Our Knowledge of Value.

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Perception was the main subject under discussion at the conference's first meeting hosted by the US Air Force Academy in 1963.

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Skidmore, Owings, Merrill: Air Force Academy Chapel, Colorado Springs

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The 1964 meeting back at the University of Nebraska turned to the subject of Analogies.

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Until we figure out which sense of "natural law" applies here, enjoy some Colorado nature photography!

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The conversation turned to Natural Law at Colorado State in 1965. We'd appreciate any program or presentation info that might give us a better idea of what they were actually talking about!

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We were off to Oklahoma State University in 1966 to ponder philosophical issues in the social sciences.

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The conference returned once again to Colorado College for a rousing meeting on Marxism.

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The University of Utah hosted the conference's 1968 meeting on the Philosophy of Mind.

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There were probably many words at this conference.

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In keeping with the conference's trend through the 1960s of bouncing back and forth between Colorado and [places that are, unfortunately, not Colorado], the 1969 meeting addressed the philosophy of language at the University of Denver.

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At this point in our timeline, it becomes clear that the topics provided for each meeting are probably the titles of the keynote addresses given at them, and we can now begin identifying the speakers themselves.

Mostly.

For 1970 at Kansas State University, the speaker was possibly either Carl Wellman or John Hospers, speaking on the subject of Philosophy Since 1950.

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Many books on human rights either concentrate on human rights as fundamental moral rights with little attention to international human rights, or discount moral human rights and focus on international human rights. The Moral Dimensions of Human Rights takes a broad approach by discussing all three species of human rights - moral, international, and national -at length.

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1971 marks Richard Rorty's first Mountain-Plains keynote address, given at our meeting at the University of Colorado.

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1972: Bertrand Russell and the Contemporary Anglo-American University

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1972: Bertrand Russell and the Contemporary Anglo-American University

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Leonard Linsky gave the keynote this time around at Wichita State University.

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Darnell Rucker (notable pragmatist philosopher at Colorado College) presented a keynote talk on aesthetics when the conference returned to his home turf in 1973.

The 1973 conference is the first of several in the 1970s and 80s for which we have more specific date information. This year, the meeting took place Sept. 27-29.

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Theodore Mischel presented the keynote address when the conference met at Oklahoma State University (Oct. 3-5).

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1975: The Philosophy of History and the Social Sciences

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1975: The Philosophy of History and the Social Sciences

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The meeting at Western State College (Sept. 25-27) featured a keynote address by Alan Donagan.

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Kurt Baier and Jeffrie Murphy came together for the keynote at the University of Wyoming April 1-4, one of the rare spring meetings; apparently, the conference did not meet at what would have been its usual time, the fall of 1976.

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Arizona Law Review, Vol. 19, p. 228, 1977

14 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2009

Date Written: 1977

Abstract

Two competing theories of justice are currently dominating discussion within contemporary Anglo-American moral, social, political, and legal philosophy: John Rawls Welfare-State Liberal theory based on the partial redistribution of wealth within society and Robert Nozick's Libertarian theory based upon the claims that justice is the respecting of people's rights. This article explores the concept of a right. It is based on the assumption that one way to develop an understanding of this important moral concept is to examine cases where the ascription of rights seems doubtful. If we can understand what goes wrong in the doubtful cases, then perhaps we can develop a more satisfactory account of the clear cases. This article may be viewed as a tentative start toward showing that a generally Rawlsian theory of justice or rights can make an important place for those moral claims which Nozick calls entitlements.

Keywords: Theory of Justice, John Rawls, Robert Nozick

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Arizona Law Review, Vol. 19, p. 228, 1977 14 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2009 Date Written: 1977 Two competing theories of justice are currently dominating discussion within contemporary Anglo-American moral, social, political, and legal philosophy: John Rawls Welfare-State Liberal theory based on the partial redistribution of wealth within society and Robert Nozick's Libertarian theory based upon the claims that justice is the respecting of people's rights.

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The only information we have for the 1978 meeting is that it took place at the University of Colorado Oct. 12-14, and that the keynote appears to have addressed contemporary ethical problems.

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The only available information we currently have about the 1979 meeting is that it took place Sept. 27-29 at Colorado College and may have featured a keynote address by Manuel Davenport. Maybe. We think.

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The University of Oklahoma hosted the conference from Oct. 2-4, with a keynote address by [someone?].

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The conference met at Fort Lewis College from Oct. 9-10 in 1981, which hardly seems like enough time to address the entire history of philosophy to 1800...

The only other note we currently have on this meeting is "no program available"

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When the conference returned to the University of Nebraska from Oct. 7-9 of 1982, it featured a keynote address by Richard Brandt and Roderick Chisholm.

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The philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm : Chisholm, Roderick M : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

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Virgil Aldrich gave the keynote address at then-Weber State College (Sept. 29-Oct. 1), but apparently we are unsure what he talked about.

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Carl Cohen spoke about either the year or the novel or both at Washburn University.

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1985: Philosophy and the United States Constitution

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1985: Philosophy and the United States Constitution

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We don't know who gave the keynote address in 1985, but we know they spoke about the US Constitution at the University of Wyoming.

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1986: Philosophical Problems of Artificial Intelligence

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1986: Philosophical Problems of Artificial Intelligence

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Wichita State University hosted the conference in 1986, with an unknown person presenting a keynote address on AI.

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We think there was a meeting in 1987, and all signs point to it possibly being in Santa Fe, NM, but that's pretty much all we can say about it. If you know more, please do reach out!

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The conference made its first appearance at Johnson County Community College (Overland Park, KS) in 1988, with a keynote address on the subject of reason by...someone.

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The end of September of 1989 (Sept. 28-30) saw the conference return to Western State College with a keynote address by Henry Johnstone.

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This picture of Searle raises...questions.

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John Searle may have been the keynote speaker when the conference met at Central State University in 1990, but we're not sure, and we don't know precisely what the address was about.

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The bear doesn't know what the keynote address was about, either.

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The conference returned to Colorado State University for the first time since 1975 with a keynote address by Margaret Wilson.

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Ron Giere, noted philosopher of science, gave the keynote address when the conference met at Washburn University in 1992.

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1993: Another year, another unknown keynote topic...

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1993: Another year, another unknown keynote topic...

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Hubert Dreyfus graced the conference with his presence for a keynote address when it met at Fort Lewis College in 1993.

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1994: [Probably something to do with moral philosophy]

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1994: [Probably something to do with moral philosophy]

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The conference met at Creighton University for 1994, and featured a keynote address by James Rachels.

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In keeping with tradition, the details of the conference meeting at the College of Santa Fe remain shrouded in mystery.

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1996: The Distinction Between Killing and Letting Die

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1996: The Distinction Between Killing and Letting Die

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Tom L. Beauchamp gave the keynote address when the conference made its third appearance at Oklahoma State University.

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1997: [Presumably something about art...?]

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1997: [Presumably something about art...?]

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It looks like Carol Becker gave the keynote address in 1997, when the conference met at the University of Colorado in Colorado Springs.

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Addresses the questions: What might be the role of the artist in the 21st century? How essential is art to the psychic and political well-being of American society?

This collection of essays by cultural critic Carol Becker plumbs particular areas of controversy to understand what information these "zones of contention" might yield about the multifarious culture wars taking place within American society today.

In the process she addresses the place of art and artists in society, the difficulties facing women in the workplace, why male bonding exists, why women experience anxiety in relationship to creative endeavors, and why artists are misunderstood within American society. She positions art and artists, as well as institutional dynamics within a philosophical framework.

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Addresses the questions: What might be the role of the artist in the 21st century?

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Simon Blackburn gave the keynote address when the conference met at the University of Central Oklahoma in 1998, speaking on an unknown topic.

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Frederick Ferre was the distinguished keynote speaker for the 1999 meeting at (once again) Colorado State University.

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Alan Soble is listed as the keynote speaker for the conference's 2000 meeting at Washburn University.

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The actual keynote title is unknown for the 2001 conference, but we know that William Lycan was the presenter, and the conference met once again at the US Air Force Academy.

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2002: [Insert the sound of slot machines here]

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2002: [Insert the sound of slot machines here]

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The conference met at UNLV in 2002, and was fortunate enough to hear a keynote address (title unknown) by Robert Brandom. No information is available re: the presence or absence of a parrot at said event.

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Richard Rorty once again shared his thoughts with the conference at the University of Wyoming in 2003. The title and topic of his remarks is unknown.

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2004: [Probably something to do with aesthetics?]

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2004: [Probably something to do with aesthetics?]

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The conference made its first visit to Fort Hays State University in 2004, featuring a keynote address by Marcia Eaton.

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John Searle made his second appearance as a keynote speaker when the conference met at Fort Lewis College in 2005.

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Robert Kane was the keynote speaker when the conference returned for its fourth visit to Washburn University.

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2007: A Philosopher Goes to the Apocalypse: Moral Psychology at the Twilight of the Anthropocene.

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2007: A Philosopher Goes to the Apocalypse: Moral Psychology at the Twilight of the Anthropocene.

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For the first time since the late 1960s, the conference returned to where it started at the University of Denver, featuring a keynote address by John Doris.

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Why is this upside down? Well, why wouldn't it be?

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2008: Meta-metaphysics: Writing the Book of the World?

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2008: Meta-metaphysics: Writing the Book of the World?

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Starting with the 2008 meeting at Fort Hays State University, we actually have copies of meeting programs (and sometimes keynote flyers) available to share for those interested in viewing them. The address in 2008 was given by Ted Sider.

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2009: A New Defense of Same-Sex Marriage

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2009: A New Defense of Same-Sex Marriage

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Avrum Stroll gave the keynote address when the conference met at the University of Nevada-Reno in 2009.

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2010: Life Is Not A Box-Score: Lived Normativity, Moral Evaluation, and the Is-Ought Distinction

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2010: Life Is Not A Box-Score: Lived Normativity, Moral Evaluation, and the Is-Ought Distinction

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For 2010, the conference traveled a LONG way east to meet for the first time at Washington & Jefferson College (Washington, PA), and included a keynote address by Mark Lance.

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2011: Through the Eyes of Mad Men: Simulation, Interaction, and Ethics

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2011: Through the Eyes of Mad Men: Simulation, Interaction, and Ethics

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The conference returned to its western roots and met at the University of Colorado (Denver) for 2011, featuring a keynote speech by Mitchell Aboulafia. In the absence of a copy of the program, the published version of his remarks is linked above.

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1Not long ago I began to read in earnest about the simulation and theory theory or folk psychology debate in cognitive science. I was led to this debate in researching contemporary approaches to agency in social psychology. Quite coincidently I found myself watching the television series . For those of you unfamiliar with the series, the title refers to the ad men primarily on Madison Avenue in the 1960's. How fortunate, I thought, to be watching a show about a profession in which the name of the game is simulation or mindreading of a sort, and not only from individual to individual but from individual to groups. If anyone has a better than average ability to mindread - for example, to determine the beliefs and predict the decisions of others - it would be these folks. Now I realize that there is a danger of confusing fiction with fact by appealing to a TV series, but good fiction, which by and large this series has been, is often nuanced in dealing with interpersonal relationships, consolidating our own experiences in well-crafted scenes. Such scenes can help to illuminate theories of mindreading in a manner that parallels more traditional thought experiments. And let me assure the reader in advance that my use of Mad Men will not require you to have watched the show.

2I will address important features of simulation theory in order to argue that many of its most valuable insights can be found in a tradition influenced by George Herbert Mead. But my interests here are not merely antiquarian. I intend to show that a neo-Median model of how we relate to others can highlight weaknesses in simulation theory. It can also assist in addressing ethical questions in a more sophisticated and comprehensive way than simulation theory, whether it is the hybrid model defended by Alvin I. Goldman or the transformation approach of Robert M. Gordon. My goal is to entice readers into considering how a neo-Meadian framework might offer a productive path for future reflections and research in ethics.

3Before drawing on some examples from Mad Men to illustrate aspects of simulation theory, it's appropriate to let two influential simulation theorists say a few words about how they view their models. We turn first to Alvin Goldman and his understanding of the differences between simulation theory and theory theory, and then to Robert Gordon. Of course their positions contain nuances that can't be captured by relatively brief quotations. Nevertheless, these carefully crafted summary statements will help to set the stage. I quote first from Goldman's response to criticisms of his book, Simulating Minds, made by Perner and Brandl.

Suppose an attributor wishes to mindread a target's decision. If she uses simulation, she will generate a "pretend" decision of her own, extract that decision, and project it onto the target. If she uses theory, on the other hand, she will not produce a pretend - or genuine - decision at all. She will form a belief about the target's decision, based on purely factual or theoretical reasoning from her (the attributor's) beliefs about the targets prior preferences, prior beliefs, and psychological laws. (Goldman 2009: 478)

4Early in his recent book, Simulating Minds, Goldman spells out his understanding of the basics of simulation with regard to decision making in this way.

Predicting another's decision is a stock example that ST aims to explain. It says that an attributor goes about this task by imaginatively putting herself into the target's shoes. She pretends to have the same initial states - for example, the same desires and beliefs - and then makes a decision given those initial, pretend states. Having made a decision in the pretend mode, the attributor predicts that this is the decision that the target will make. (Goldman 2006: 19)

5Properly speaking this sort of mindreading - one that involves pretence, imagination, and prediction - is high-level simulation. This is distinguished from low-level simulation, which is a relatively primitive form of simulation for Goldman, one that involves, for example, reading basic emotions from facial expressions. This distinction is not accepted by all simulation theorists. Further, Goldman is challenged by one of the parents of simulation theory regarding a basic feature of his account. According to Robert Gordon, simulation doesn't involve turning to one's own mental states in order to help determine what the other is thinking. Gordon understands simulation in terms of the transformation of oneself into the other. The exemplary case is that of the actor who transforms himself into the character he is playing. Shaun Gallagher presents Gordon's position in the following fashion.

I do not retreat introspectively to my own mind to run simulation routines by manipulating propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires. Rather, I put myself in the other person's perspective and look to see what she thinks is true about the world. This involves a transformation that takes place on the personal level. By using my imagination, I imagine/simulate what the other person must think in her situation. I do not imagine myself in her situation; I imagine her in her situation, by imaginatively occupying her situation. The transformation involves an egocentric shift, but does not involve either introspection of my own mental states, or inference making about the other's mental states. I am not concerned with mental states at all. I imagine, in the first-person, how the other person sees the world. (Gallagher 2007: 66-7)

6Gordon's position can be seen as responding to Daniel Dennett and others who have claimed that Goldman's model is open to the standard critiques that have been leveled against approaches to mindreading that employ analogy. In Gordon's words,

One reason I emphasize transformation is that a number of writers, both pro and con the simulation theory, take simulation to involve an implicit inference from oneself to others. It is essentially the old argument from analogy, which requires that you first recognize your own mental states, perhaps under certain imagined hypothetical conditions, and then infer that the other is in similar states. (Gordon 1995: 734)

7Needless to say, Goldman has a retort, and is unwilling to cede ground on the importance of some form of introspection for the simulation process. In responding to Gordon, he states, "Thus, as I interpret ST, it naturally invites an introspective approach to first-person attribution [...]. [T]here is empirical evidence that third-person mindreading involves use of a brain region responsible for self-reference or self-reflection" (Goldman 2006: 187).

8Having briefly outlined some of the features of simulation theory, and with caveats that Goldman views his theory as a hybrid, employing both simulation and folk psychology, and that Gordon is quite prepared to acknowledge that hypothetical reasoning has a place in mindreading, we turn to Mad Men. 1

9The central character in Mad Men is Don Draper. He is a whiz at figuring out what will motivate people to buy products. But his talent appears to be mysterious to his colleagues. They stand in awe of how quickly he can determine the right move. We, the audience, have more information about Don than do his colleagues. We know that Don Draper was originally born Dick Whitman. We know that he has lived most of his adult life under an assumed name. We also know enough about his biography - his traumatic childhood, his abusive father - to suggest why he might be so good at his job. He is a person who has had to pay close attention to others in order to survive, first as a child and then as an adult pretending to be someone else. There are four scenes from the show that I wish to discuss, three directly involving Don.

10Scene one ( Mad Men, 2009A). Conrad Hilton has called Don to his hotel suite. They had met at a party but Don didn't know at the time that the man behind a bar, Connie, was Conrad Hilton. It seems that Connie has now tracked him down and wants to talk. He suspects that Don might be really good at his profession. This could be big business for Don. It's Hilton, after all. Within minutes of entering the suite, Connie wants Don to give him advice on an ad campaign. Don resists. He says to Connie, "I think that you wouldn't be in the presidential suite right now if you worked for free." Hilton pushes back. "Don, this is friendly." Don retorts, "Connie, this is my profession; what do you want me to do?" Connie wants him to give him one for free. The mock-ups for the ads are right in front of them on the coffee table. Don lights a cigarette and takes an effortless look. They show hotels with friendly mouse mascots in the foreground. Don briefly pauses and then states his view. "I don't think anyone wants to think about a mouse in a hotel." Hilton realizes that Don is obviously right, even though he admits that the ad campaign was his idea. Chagrined, he asks, "You got something better?." And the courting dance continues.

11Here is the background for the second scene that we want to consider. The staff in the office of Don's agency becomes aware that there has been a terrible crash of an American Airlines plane in NY. Presumably everyone is lost. There is black humor around the office about the crash. One of the executives at the agency, Duck, claims to have a personal relationship with a high level executive at American Airlines. Duck knows that American Airlines is very worried about how the crash will affect the company. He believes that they will be looking for a new ad agency. He also believes that their agency can hook them. In a horrible twist of fate, one of the most ambitious young executives in the office, Pete Campbell, learns that his father, with whom he did not get along, died in the crash. In spite of this loss, Duck wants Pete to join him in a meeting with his contact, Shel, at the university club. Pete, naturally, feels very uncomfortable. He doesn't think he can do it.

12The scene that we wish to consider opens with Duck sitting in the university club with Shel ( Mad Men, 2008). The lighting is low and they are comfortably ensconced in leather chairs, drinks nearby. But things are not going well. Shel is hedging, claiming that it's going to be tough to switch to a new agency. Then Pete shows up. Duck introduces him to Shel as his agency's best. Shel reiterates, we don't know where we are yet. Pete tries a typical sales pitch, asserting how enthusiastic they are about working with American Airlines. Shel is not moved. And then Pete says, "We understand how delicate the process of rebuilding the public's confidence will be." Shel responds, "It's not just the public, our stock holders." Pete replies, "I want you to know that should you decide to bring us your business there will be someone on your account who knows exactly what you are going through [...] My father was on that plane." Shel is shaken and moved. It is something he will pass on, that is, report to his colleagues. The audience is left with the impression that Pete's revelation might have helped salvage the deal.

13Scene three doesn't involve the agency ( Mad Men, 2009B). It takes place in an elementary school classroom. Don and his wife, Betty, have been called in for a teacher's conference because their daughter, Sally, has been acting out and fighting in school. Betty is very pregnant and quiet. She clearly looks depressed, even pained. The teacher, Susan, is young and earnest. She presses Don and Betty about their daughter's behavior. Betty, coolly emotional, reports, "My, um, father passed away (pause) last week, week before, two weeks now." Susan becomes agitated and extremely apologetic. She walks over and holds Betty's hand, saying, "I feel terrible for bringing that up for you." Susan then asks, "Is this grandpa Gene we are talking about? Uh, that poor thing." (Referring to their daughter). If only she (Susan) had known. How horrible! Susan continues, "Now I know why she was asking all of those questions about Medgar Evers' murder." Betty leaves the room and Susan discusses how Sally needs more attention with Don. She says that Sally is grieving. Of course she now understands their daughter's behavior. Susan tells Don, "There is a special pain to losing someone at that age. I don't know if you can understand that." Don responds with a simple, "I can." Betty returns.

14The fourth scene is a follow-up to the classroom exchange ( Mad Men, 2009B). That evening Susan calls Don and Betty at home. Don answers. The camera shifts back and forth from Don to Susan. Susan is smiling at first with a drink in hand. She has called to apologize about their meeting. Don wonders why. Susan becomes very serious. "My father died when I was eight and I might have overdone it relating to Sally in that way [...] I guess I can get caught up in things and lose perspective." (There is a subtext here. Susan and Don appear to be attracted to each other, which adds further complexity to the interactions in the classroom, but we will pass on them here).

15In terms of how these scenes relate to simulation theory, let's start with the classroom scene first. If Goldman were to apply simulation theory to the people in this scene, it is unlikely that he would focus solely on low-level emotional simulation, which typically involves the presence of the person to whom one is responding. Susan, the teacher, seems to be reacting to Betty in this fashion, although it is possible to interpret her reaction to Betty as also involving higher level simulation. But it is not Betty's state that is the most obvious target for a higher level simulation. It is her daughter's. The teacher uses her own feelings and beliefs, her own mental state, to help ascertain how Betty and Don's daughter must be feeling because of the loss. Yet on reflection Susan is aware that she may have overreacted due to the loss of her father as a child. Besides violating the rules of decorum, she may not have simulated Sally correctly, and she definitely failed to simulate Don's state of mind. He had in fact experienced the loss of his father as a child. If simulation is a process that is mediated by one's own mental states, then there is always the possibility of misreading or failure due to an egocentric bias, according to Goldman. And this raises the issue of projection, which Goldman addresses.

I shall call the act of assigning a state of one's own to someone else projection [...] [P]rojection is a standard part of the ST story of mindreading. It is the final stage of each mindreading act, a stage that involves no (further) simulation or pretense. Indeed, it typically involves an "exit" from the simulation mode that occupies the first stage of a two-stage routine. (Goldman 2006: 40)

Quarantine prevents something from happening that might otherwise occur; specifically, it prevents one's own states from being projected onto the target. In neural terms, such prevention is inhibition. It might be described as "inhibiting the self-perspective." If simulation is a major facet of third-person mindreading, successful mindreading should involve inhibition of the self-perspective. (Goldman 2006: 170)

3 Here is the key paragraph. "Of crucial importance, the evidence from WBA appears to demonstrate tha (...)

4 To make matters worse, instead of providing any further discussion of his own account of inhibition (...)

5 In Simulating Minds Goldman also discusses evidence from childhood studies that suggest there is a (...)

6 The latter would apparently involve "decision procedures" for determining degrees of "accuracy." It (...)

17Goldman needs "inhibition" for his model to work. But he doesn't actually provide an account of the development of inhibitory mechanisms. In the section of Simulating Minds on egocentrism and projection, he presents us with behavioral studies of egocentric bias that are "interpretable within the projection framework" (Goldman 2006: 165). In the next section, "The Neuropsychology of Quarantine," he turns to a case study involving a stroke victim. Goldman informs us that, "someone impaired in the ability to inhibit the self-perspective should have trouble producing accurate mindreading. This is what ST predicts, and this prediction is dramatically confirmed in the case of a particular stroke patient" (Goldman 2006: 170). The damage done to this stroke victim was in a region of the brain that one study "highlighted as possibly sustaining the ability to inhibit one's own perspective" (Goldman 2006: 171). So we have the case study of one patient (WBA), who is having problems inhibiting her own perspective, who has suffered damage to a region of the brain, a region which possibly has something to do with inhibiting one's own perspective, according to another study. Goldman concludes from these two studies, "it is natural to infer that inhibition of self-perspective is a vital aspect of mindreading" (Goldman 2006: 172). 3 Something like the inhibition of self-perspective may very well be a part of mindreading, but one case study and one study of a brain region isn't solid evidence. At best Goldman has suggestive results that may point to a necessary condition, a part of the brain that needs to be functioning in order for x to happen, without an explanation of x. 4 A mature theory of how inhibition develops is never presented. 5 And such a theory would at minimum have to address what an effective, as opposed to "accurate," simulation would mean in different cultural and social contexts, because what we inhibit is not simply a matter of how accurate, if that is the correct term, we need to be, but how effective we want or intend to be. 6 To explore how the intention to be effective might complicate the picture for simulationists, let's return to the first scene.

18Recall that Conrad Hilton has asked Don to his hotel suite for some free advice and to test him. Don understands the game. He can't simply give free advice if he is going to be seen as a valuable player. But he accedes to Connie's request anyway. However, he does so only after lighting a cigarette and allowing himself a pregnant pause, as if to say, 'ok, here is your advice, no effort involved'. If we interpret his response in terms of simulation, in evaluating the mock-ups Don would be placing himself in the shoes of prospective hotel guest(s) through imagination, and then after processing his pretend beliefs, he would project them back on to the target, the hotel guest. How would she react? She would be turned off to ads with mice.

19Without going into the details of the theory theory versus simulation debate in any depth, I do want briefly to raise the issue here of which model might better explain Don's reaction. According to Joe Cruz and Gordon,

What unifies theory theorists is the view that attributing inner states and making sense of the behavior of others is carried out by a capacity that deploys knowledge encoded in a theory. The most straightforward sense in which ST is opposed to TT is that simulation theorists deny that our capacity to attribute mental states is subsumed by a body of knowledge about the minds of others. Rather, our own mental processes are treated as a manipulable model of other minds. (Cruz & Gordon 2005)

20So perhaps Don didn't simulate hotel guests at all. Perhaps he simply inferred, relatively quickly, from his knowledge of people and their aversions, that associating a hotel with a mouse is a bad idea. Since both Goldman and Gordon have conceded that we employ theory at times to read others, how are we to decide whether Don did so in this case? In this particular situation I submit that there is no way. He could have used theory or simulation or both. The interaction can't tell us. How might we tell? Well, if you are a certain kind of cognitive scientist you will argue that different regions or networks of the brain may be involved if we are using theory instead of simulation to read a target.

22There is a group of social psychologists, several at Simon Fraser University, who have developed a neo-Meadian approach to agency, in part in response to TT and ST. At first it may be somewhat difficult to see just how they differ from the simulation theorists. There is an extraordinary emphasis in their framework on taking the perspective of the other, which can be framed in terms of stepping into the other guy's shoes, an expression which Goldman and other simulationists often use. And like the simulationists they often cite studies that show how infants are interactive and engage in incipient intentional behavior (e.g., gaze following) from an early age, that is, prelinguistically. But they don't conceptualize our relationship to others in the same fashion. Here is how three of them, Jack Martin, Bryan Sokol, and Theo Elfers, frame the differences.

Whereas simulation and theory theorists tend to think about perspective taking in cognitive and mentalistic terms supported by neurophysiological mechanisms, we locate perspective taking, its emergence, and its development within the coordinated interactivity and conduct of infants, children, adolescents, and adults with objects and others in the biophysical and sociocultural world. For us, the development of our abilities to work with and through perspectives is not an instantiation or stimulation of preexisting mental concepts and structures. It is a situated, embodied, dynamic, and coordinated way of being and conducting ourselves with others and things that moves from a social, interactive to a psychological, intersubjective footing during ontogenesis. However, even with this graduated emergence of more advanced psychological aspects, perspective taking never loses its situated, embodied foundation. As we interact in a world of objects and others, our orientations are constantly shifting, forming, and transforming in interaction with the activities and orientations of others. It is within this ongoing interaction and coordination that the generative processes of our psychological lives are located. (Martin, Sokol, Elfers 2008: 295-6)

23Part of the difficulty in distinguishing the approach of the interactionists from that of the simulationists revolves around the phrase "taking the perspective (or role) of the other." Simulationists such as Goldman tend to see this activity in terms of low-level mimicry and emotional contagion, or as an explicit attempt to predict how a target will respond using pretend-states, which appears to involve stepping into the other guy's shoes. Mead incorrectly denied the sort of imitation that we find in infants and young children, an error that neo-Meadians do not make. But Mead does supply us with a distinction that is crucial here. For Mead, taking the perspective or role of the other can be seen as taking the attitude of the other. According to Gary Cook,

We can avoid some of the misleading connotations of the phrase "taking the role of the other" by using in its stead the alternative phrase Mead himself often employs, namely, "taking the attitude of the other." An attitude, he says, consists of a behavioral disposition, a tendency to respond in a certain manner to certain sorts of stimuli, or the beginnings of an action that seek an occasion for a full release or expression. (Cook 1993: 79)

24When we see two boxers or fencers feinting and parrying, we might say that they are predicting the decision of the other in order to make a decision of their own. Yet, this is not the sort of decision state that allows time for determining the belief states of the opponent. Nor is there simple mimicry taking place. The opponents are taking the attitude of the other in order to respond. There is anticipation of the other but it is not reflective anticipation. So here we have an interactional state that requires a form of taking the perspective of the other but one that is not easily accommodated by the way in which either Goldman or Gordon describe simulation. Of course one can say that they are talking about simulation in terms of mindreading while I am now addressing another phenomenon. This would be a mistake. Much of what they take to be simulation is better described in terms of taking the attitude of the other. And by failing to see perspective taking in attitudinal terms, in addition to mimicry and explicit role taking, we drop out crucial resources for describing how agents navigate social worlds. Further, why should simulationists be allowed to define how the phrase "taking the perspective of the other" is understood.

11 The passage continues, "Because persons are themselves social, their perspective taking may be enha (...)

For Mead, sociality consists of the ability to occupy two or more different perspectives at the same time. The relation of an organism and an environment is continuously dynamic. The natural and social world consists of a multiplicity of perspectives, any one of which may enter into an organism's field of activity. It is by virtue of the organism's ability to be several things simultaneously, in the sense of taking up (acting within) two or more different perspectives, that the organism is able to deal with emergent events or novel, unexpected occurrences. (Martin, Sugarman & Hickenbottom 2010: 123-4) 11

13 Portions of "Ethics and Cognitive Science" (Goldman 1993) are identical to the published version of (...)

14 The notion that similarity is a significant factor in how much empathy we feel for strangers has be (...)

29In his 1993 article, "Ethics and Cognitive Science," as well as in his 1992 presidential address to the Pacific Division of the APA, Goldman demonstrated that he was quite prepared to use the term empathy to describe forms of simulation. (Goldman 1993, 1992). 13 In Simulating Minds we learn that in ethics empathy probably comes into play at both the level of compassion, care, and concern for the other and at the epistemic level, that is, through helping to clarify what the other may be experiencing (Goldman 2006: 298). Goldman does not claim that empathy can in and of itself make us moral, only that it can be an important component of moral practice if assisted by other tools. For example, one of the problems with focusing on empathy is the danger of parochialism, that is, we tend to be more empathic toward those who are more like us and spatially closer. 14 To counter this we need to extend our empathetic sensibilities. Goldman uses what he calls enactment imagination, or E-imagination, to explain how we can counter parochialism. "To accurately E-imagine the situation of an anonymous and distant individual, it helps to receive detailed information about that person's life experience and an image of her and her immediate environment. Thus, news coverage of ongoing wars, famines, and other catastrophes are more effective when they supply biographical details of selected individuals, as well as photographs or visual footage" (Goldman 2006: 297-8).

30Heightening our empathic responses may play a role in altruistic actions. But presumably we must also defeat our egocentric biases. As we saw, Goldman appeals to the notions of quarantine and inhibition to keep egocentric biases in check. However, there doesn't appear to be a connection between these mechanisms and the social development of the self or group dynamics. To his credit, Gordon seeks to tie our ability to distance ourselves from what could be called egocentric biases to our ability to become an other, that is, to a form of sociality, although his model limits his success.

31In his 1995 paper, "Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator," Gordon must confront a basic problem for his approach. Recall that for Gordon we transform ourselves into the other when we simulate. If transformation is truly successful, we in a sense become the other, as does the actor who is fully engaged in playing a role (Gordon 1995: 734-5). But if we become the other, then we lose the ability to evaluate the other critically, whether we are talking about ethics or other tasks, such as giving advice. How do we avoid falling into this trap? Gordon appeals to Adam Smith for assistance.

According to Smith, rather than simply respond to another's pleasure with pleasure and to another's suffering with suffering, we find ourselves turning our attention to the cause of the other's emotion. We imagine ourselves being in the other's situation, ourselves faced with whatever is causing the other's emotion. Then, in imagination, we respond independently, in our own way, to the imagined cause. (Gordon 1995: 741)

32But although Smith is on the right track here he fails to make a distinction that Gordon deems salient, between what the other is experiencing and our own experience. To show this he quotes Smith.

As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. (Gordon 1995: 741)

15 Smith emphasizes different aspects of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. We are not confin (...)

16 It's worth noting here how Goldman and Gordon seem to have opposite problems: one worries about ego (...)

33For Gordon, simply imagining how we would feel would result in our transforming simulation into a form of projection, which would be deadly for his transformational model, and render it especially useless in making ethical evaluations. 15 What does Gordon propose? We must distinguish "between just imagining being in X's situation and making the further adjustments required to imagine being X in X's situation" (Gordon 1995: 741). In other words, we must separate merely imagining being in someone else's situation from imagining being that person in his or her situation. The latter can lead to an over-identification with the other. I in a sense become the other. The former - that is, merely imagining - allows us to still say, "If I were you, I would [...]," with an implicit, "but I am also not you," factored in. If we perform both of these operations, we can then compare our responses. In Gordon's words, "If your response is the same in each case, approve X's conduct; if not, disapprove" (Gordon 1995: 741). He goes no further with this analysis and moves on to the problem of self-judgment, to which we will turn momentarily. He seems to think that it is enough that he has provided us with a decision procedure. How a rift between these two imaginary states provides an impartial vantage point is never addressed. So in spite of the title of the article, with its promissory note of addressing impartiality, what Gordon appears to be offering us is a method for holding back so that we don't immediately assent to the actions of others. Or as he has told us earlier, "unlike the explanation or prediction of behavior, moral assessment requires holding back" (Gordon 1995: 740). If we don't hold back we may find ourselves flooded by the other's emotion and unable to judge. But while the activity of holding back may be of assistance, it certainly doesn't produce impartiality, even if we define the term generously. 16

34Gordon tells us that there is one problem with the analysis he presented regarding the decision procedure. How can we handle judging ourselves? We can't use our own beliefs or conduct as we might when we judge someone else, for it is our own conduct that we may have to disapprove. Again, he turns to Smith for assistance and quotes the following passage from The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

When I endeavor to examine my own conduct [...] I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; [...] I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself. (Gordon 1995: 741-2; Smith 1976: 113)

It can happen only if the very process of becoming a spectator, and of coming to regard myself as an other, changes me. I believe that the process does change us, and that this was Smith's contention, too. But the topic is a complex one: observing myself trying to argue the case in a paragraph or two, I see a lot of hand waving. So I will not try. Q.E.D. (Gordon 1995: 742)

18 Psychopaths can successfully take perspectives and yet lack concern for others, in all likelihood d (...)

19 Sometimes simulationists sound as if they are trying to create a clear telephonic connection betwee (...)

36Yes, too cute and clever by half. But Gordon was actually on to something here, although I cannot locate any place in which he followed up on this discussion. In response to Gordon's words, a neo-Meadian would say: precisely, the process does change us. For example, an impartial spectator would never have arisen without the to and fro of perspective taking, although this is not the only condition. 18 Mead refers to the ability to place oneself between two perspectives, or systems, as sociality. And it includes the experience of being "caught" or suspended between one's own perspective and that of another. This is indeed transformative and we learn how to do this as socially interactive or transactive persons. We are self and other, and can be both self and other. But ST, in either Goldman's or Gordon's versions, is not the best way to capture this interactivity because it is grounded in a model of subjectivity that views the self as requiring a bridge - whether it is one of emotional contagion, imagination, or theory - to overcome the self's separation from the other. No doubt we employ these mechanisms in interacting but we don't require them in the manner that Goldman and Gordon suggest. 19 Briefly here is how Mead and the neo-Meadians would tell the story.

37For Mead, the taking of the perspective of others is the condition for the possibility of self-consciousness and self-criticism. Through the reflexivity involved in linguistic interaction the capacity for perspective-taking is nurtured, although it certainly has proto-versions in the interactivity of infants. Specifically, Mead addresses the importance of the vocal gesture in setting the stage for the reflexivity that is made possible by role-taking. For neo-Meadians there is a smooth trajectory from infant interactions through early symbolic interactions. In learning to speak one must be able to hear the other as one hears oneself. This proto-role taking sets the stage for taking the perspective of others in more complex social interactions that we call roles. In order to play roles, we must be able to take the position of the other, as well as our own, and invert them. This is a form of stepping into the other guy's shoes but it is interactive from the get-go. As interactions increase we develop a capacity for taking multiple perspectives. Mead uses the game to illustrate this. If I am playing baseball, and I am the pitcher or third baseman, in order to play the game I must be able to take the perspective of everyone else on the team. Is this mindreading? Not as Goldman understands it. There may not be any introspection at all and yet I am engaged in multiple perspectives. Of course there can be introspection, especially when problems arise. But this phenomenon emerges out of my developing ability to take multiple perspectives. I "see" myself from different perspectives and the perspective of the whole, that is, the generalized other. The latter allows me to see myself or an aspect of myself, depending on how one is defining the self, as if I were the (generalized) other. For neo-Meadians, the taking of multiple perspectives contributes to the development of what might be called an impartial spectator, although as a pragmatist, Mead would never view impartiality as a perfectly calibrated neutrality. There is no view from the mountaintop.

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Traditionally pragmatists have been favorably disposed to improving our understanding of agency and ethics through the use of empirical research. In the last two decades simulation theory has been championed in certain cognitive science circles as a way of explaining how we attribute mental states and predict human behavior.

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2012: The Scope of Normative Disagreement and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy

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2012: The Scope of Normative Disagreement and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy

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Robert Audi was kind enough to drive a very long way to Buena Vista University (Storm Lake, IA) to give the keynote address at the 2012 conference.

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2013: Restoration, Continuity, and Change:	Negotiating	History and	Meaning in Complex	Landscapes

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2013: Restoration, Continuity, and Change:	Negotiating	History and	Meaning in Complex	Landscapes

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Marion Hourdequin was our keynote speaker for the 2013 meeting at the US Air Force Academy.

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The conference once again ventured to the University of Nevada (Reno) for 2014, featuring a keynote address by Lynne Rudder Baker

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Martin Shuster gave the keynote address when the conference met at the University of Missouri (Kansas City) for its 2015 meeting.

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2016: Modal Empiricism: What is the Problem?

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2016: Modal Empiricism: What is the Problem?

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Albert Casullo did the keynote honors at the 2016 meeting at the University of Colorado (Colorado Springs).

Keynote abstract:

In his introduction to the first Critique, Kant contends that necessity is a criterion of the a priori -- that is, that all knowledge of necessary propositions is a priori. This contention, together with two others that Kant took to be evident -- we know some mathematical propositions and such propositions are necessary -- leads directly to the conclusion that some knowledge is a priori. Although many contemporary philosophers endorse Kant's criterion, supporting arguments are hard to come by. My purpose in this paper is to articulate and examine his argument. I have two goals in doing so. The first is to uncover several significant gaps in the argument. The second is to show that it suffers from a common defect in rationalist arguments. If the argument were successful against empiricist accounts of modal knowledge, it would apply with equal force to extant rationalist accounts of such knowledge. Hence, the cost of refuting modal empiricism is modal skepticism.

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The conference traveled to Weber State University in 2017, and featured a delightful keynote address by Charlie Huenemann.

Keynote abstract:

In a lecture on science as a vocation, Max Weber identified "the problem of disenchantment." The problem is that a scientific worldview leaves no room for "skyhooks" on which to hang magical, religious, or possibly even mroal ideals. In my talk I'll explore where philosophy engages with this problem: is it part of the "forces of disenchantment" -- as we might suppose from naturalist programs like Dennett's? Or might philosophy be in the business of providing ideals to counter disenchantment, as we see in Peter Sloterdijk's work?

Those interested may read a version of the text of this talk at Charlie Huenemann's personal site.

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Matthias Steup was our keynote speaker when the conference returned to the University of Colorado (Denver) in 2018.

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2019: Kitsch & Bullshit: Transgression and Imposture in Aesthetics and Epistemology

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2019: Kitsch & Bullshit: Transgression and Imposture in Aesthetics and Epistemology

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Eva Dadlez brought an excellent keynote address to our last pre-COVID face-to-face meeting at the University of Central Oklahoma.

Keynote abstract:

This paper will maintain that kitsch is to aesthetics what bullshit is to epistemology. While it appears likely that there is more than one kind of thing that such proverbial outliers have in common, and that there is more than one way in which each my prove detrimental, the focus here will be on kitsch and bullshit as clear examples of bad faith. I would like to dwell on this similarity, taking as fuel for my fire the account of bullshit offered by Harry Frankfurt and the account of kitsch presented in Thomas Kulka's Kitsch and Art. These two accounts make it exceptionally clear that kitsch sidesteps the aims of art in the same way that bullshit sidesteps the aims of justifiable assertion and that each does so while laying claim to class inclusion. The inspiration for this paper comes initially from Thorsten Botz-Bornstein's claim that the relations between kitsch and bullshit are many and various, since kitsch can, for instance, convey bullshit, and since bullshit may at least in some respects admit of artistry. However, I believe that an investigation of the parallels between kitsch and bullshit can help to clarify the peculiar species of bad faith and the heart of each.

Publication:

Dadlez, E.M. “Kitsch and Bullshit as Cases of Aesthetic and Epistemic Transgression:” Southwest Philosophy Review 34, no. 1 (2018): 59–67. https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20183416.

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2020: The Right, The Good, and Our Ultimate Moral Concerns [online]

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2020: The Right, The Good, and Our Ultimate Moral Concerns [online]

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With the world locked down due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the conference carried on and met online, hosted by Weber State University. Douglas W. Portmore gave the conference's first virtual keynote address.

Keynote abstract:

In this presentation, I'll argue that a complete moral theory should provide us nt only with accounts of both what's right and what's good, but also with an account of what our ultimate moral concerns should be. Such an account would tell us what we morally ought ultimately to care about and, thus, what we morally ought to be ultimately aiming to achieve or, at least, what we morally ought to be hoping will be achieved -- and, if not by us, then others. For one, the question of what we morally ought ultimately to care about is an important fundamental moral question and, thus, one that we should expect a complete moral theory to answer for us. For another, whether the ultimate moral concerns that a moral theory prescribes for us is consistent with our being motivated to do as its criterion of rightness directs us to act will determine whether that theory is incoherent -- determine, that is, whether it gives us inconsistent moral motivations. In the process of arguing for this, I'll explicate this notion of an ultimate moral concern, explain why it's important, and speculate as to what our ultimate moral concerns should be.

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2021: The Role of Fiction in Fictionalism [online]

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2021: The Role of Fiction in Fictionalism [online]

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Once again faced with challenging pandemic meeting conditions, the conference met online (courtesy of Utah State University) for 2021. This year's keynote came from  Bradley Armour-Grab and James Woodbridge.

Keynote abstract:

"Fictionalism" is a banner flying over a significant number of philosophical accounts currently on offer. Various philosophers have proposed different versions of mathematical fictionalism, modal fictionalism, moral fictionalism, alethic fictionalism, fictionalism about propositions, and fictionalism about fictional characters. But despite the production and discussion of theories classified as fictionalist accounts, there is still a need for clarification on how best to understand the classification itself. In much of the literature on fictionalism, the relationships between various ideas surrounding it have been muddled, with a fair degree of confusion resulting. To address this, we will set out some of the details of some different species within the genus of fictionalism and motivate a preference for one in particular. Our aim is both to clarify what we see as the most promising sort of fictionalist approach and to indicate how one could employ it as a means for resolving certain puzzles, problems, and paradoxes that are familiar from metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophies of language and mind.

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For a variety of pandemic-related and other reasons, the conference missed its usual fall meeting for the first time since 1976. We will be meeting again online for 2023, and hope to return to in-person philosophical fun in 2024!

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2023: Silenced and Invisible: Confronting Childism through Philosophy for Children [online]

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2023: Silenced and Invisible: Confronting Childism through Philosophy for Children [online]

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For the 76th meeting (held online, courtesy of Chadron State College), our keynote speaker was Karen Mizell (Utah Valley University).