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(09/08/2021)-MODULO 1. LA MODERNIDAD Y EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL

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(09/08/2021)-MODULO 1. LA MODERNIDAD Y EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL

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(09/08/2021)-MODULO1. LA MODERNIDAD Y EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL                     

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(09/08/2021)-MODULO1. LA MODERNIDAD Y EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL                     

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Futurama - Fry Gets Frozen (Space Pilot 3000)

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(09/08/2021)-MODULO 1. LA MODERNIDAD Y EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL

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(09/08/2021)-MODULO 1. LA MODERNIDAD Y EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL

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(09/08/2021)-MODULO 1. LA MODERNIDAD Y EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL

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(09/08/2021)-MODULO 1. LA MODERNIDAD Y EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL

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11/09/2021 Módulo 1. Modernidad y pensamiento occidental 

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11/09/2021 Módulo 1. Modernidad y pensamiento occidental 

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An Introduction to Frantz Fanon's Black Skin White Masks  A Macat Sociology Analysis

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(13/08/2021) - CONTINUACIÓN - MODULO 1. LA MODERNIDAD Y EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL 

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(13/08/2021) - CONTINUACIÓN - MODULO 1. LA MODERNIDAD Y EL PENSAMIENTO OCCIDENTAL 

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(27/08/2021) MODULO 1. Introducción a Asia y sus regiones.

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(27/08/2021) MODULO 1. Introducción a Asia y sus regiones.

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Es el 14 ° líder espiritual del pueblo tibetano y ganador del Premio Nobel de la Paz en 1989.

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MODULO 1.  Introducción a Asia y sus regiones.

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MODULO 1.  Introducción a Asia y sus regiones.

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(1/09/2021).Módulo 1. Ranking de religiones del mundo.

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(1/09/2021).Módulo 1. Ranking de religiones del mundo.

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(1/09/2021).Módulo 1. Europa frente a los principales países asiáticos por PIB.

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(1/09/2021).Módulo 1. Europa frente a los principales países asiáticos por PIB.

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Módulo 1: 03/09/2021. How China Overtook the U.S. as the World’s Major Trading Partner

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Módulo 1: 03/09/2021. How China Overtook the U.S. as the World’s Major Trading Partner

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In 2018, trade accounted for 59% of global GDP, up nearly 1.5 times since 1980.

Over this timeframe, international trade has transformed significantly-not just in terms of volume and composition, but also in terms of the countries that the rest of the world leans on for their most important trade relationships.

Now, a critical shift is occurring in the landscape, and it may surprise you to learn that China has already usurped the U.S. as the world's most dominant trading partner.

Trading Places: A Global Shift

Today's animation comes from the Lowy Institute, and it pulls data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) database on bilateral trade flows, to determine whether the U.S. or China is a bigger trading partner for each country from 1980 to 2018.

The results are stark: before 2000, the U.S. was at the helm of global trade, as over 80% of countries traded with the U.S. more than they did with China. By 2018, that number had dropped sharply to just 30%, as China swiftly took top position in 128 of 190 countries.

The researchers pinpoint China's 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization as a major turning point in China's international trade relationships. The dramatic shift that followed is clearly demonstrated in the visualization above-between 2005 and 2010, a number of countries tipped towards Chinese influence, especially in Africa and Asia.

Over time, China's dominance has grown dramatically. It's no wonder then, that China and the U.S. have a contentious trade relationship themselves, as both nations battle it out for first place.

A Tale of Two Economies

The United States and China are competitors in many ways, but to be successful they must rely on each other for mutually beneficial trade. However, it's also the major issue on which they are struggling to reach a common ground.

The U.S. has been vocal about negotiating more balanced trade agreements with China. In fact, a mid-2018 poll shows that 62% of Americans consider their trade relationship with China to be unfair.

Since 2018, both parties have faced a fraught relationship, imposing major tariffs on consumer and industrial goods-and retaliations are reaching greater and greater heights:

While a delicate truce has been reached at the moment, the trade war has caused a significant drag on global growth, and the World Bank estimates it will continue to have an effect into 2021.

At the same time, China's sphere of influence continues to grow.

One Belt, One Road, One Trade Direction?

China seems to have a finger in every pie. The nation is financing a flurry of megaprojects across Asia and Africa-but one broader initiative stands above the rest.

China's "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) Initiative, planned for a 2049 completion, is advancing at a furious pace. In 2019 alone, Chinese companies signed contracts worth up to $128 billion to start Chinese large-scale infrastructure projects in various countries.

While building new highways and ports abroad is beneficial for Chinese financiers, OBOR is also about creating new markets and trade routes for Chinese goods in Asia. Recent research found that the OBOR program's infrastructure expansion and logistics performance improvements led to positive effects on China's exports.

Nevertheless, it's clear the new infrastructure network is already transforming global trade, possibly cementing China's position as the world's major trading partner for years to come.

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How China Overtook the U.S. as the World's Major Trading Partner

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In 2018, trade accounted for 59% of global GDP, up nearly 1.5 times since 1980. Over this timeframe, international trade has transformed significantly-not just in terms of volume and composition, but also in terms of the countries that the rest of the world leans on for their most important trade relationships.

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Módulo 1. 03/09/2020. World's Largest Companies by Revenue. 

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Módulo 1. 03/09/2020. World's Largest Companies by Revenue. 

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World's Largest Companies by Revenue 1995 to 2019

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MÓDULO 1: Introducción a CHINA V10/SEP9/2021

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MODULO 13/09/2021  ORDEN SOCIAL Y ESPIRITUAL DE CHINA 

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MODULO (15/09/2021) ORDEN SOCIAL Y ESPIRITUAL DE CHINA.

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MODULO (15/09/2021) ORDEN SOCIAL Y ESPIRITUAL DE CHINA.

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MODULO (15/09/2021) ORDEN SOCIAL Y ESPIRITUAL DE CHINA. I-CHING. 

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MODULO (15/09/2021) ORDEN SOCIAL Y ESPIRITUAL DE CHINA. I-CHING. 

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Usage Notice: All the Air Quality data are unvalidated at the time of publication, and due to quality assurance these data may be amended, without notice, at any time. The World Air Quality Index project has exercised all reasonable skill and care in compiling the contents of this information and under no circumstances will the World Air Quality Index project team or its agents be liable in contract, tort or otherwise for any loss, injury or damage arising directly or indirectly from the supply of this data.

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Usage Notice: All the Air Quality data are unvalidated at the time of publication, and due to quality assurance these data may be amended, without notice, at any time.

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNGvDQafrlQ

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O N CHINA'S BORDER with Kazakhstan, a new Silk Road city has sprung up with such speed that Google Earth has scarcely begun to record the high-rises that now float on a winter mist above the steppe. What once would have been flattered to be called a hard-scrabble border town is now home to 200,000 people, giant outdoor video screens extolling the glories of a new Silk Road, and restaurants serving sashimi and European wine. Khorgos has become China's gateway to Central Asia, and all the way to Europe.

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A twin town is going up in Kazakhstan. A duty-free mall already straddles the border for Kazakhstanis to get deals on booze, perfume and cut-price Chinese goods. But the key features, just across the border, are the giant gantry cranes more usually seen in the world's ports. The Khorgos Gateway is a container terminal, a "dry port" built from scratch in 2014. The transport hub is intended as a critical link in what China's president, Xi Jinping, has called the "Eurasian land bridge". Among its investors is China's COSCO, one of the world's shipping giants. It is run by DP World, Dubai's port operator. Last year the dry port handled 160,000 TEU s (a unit equivalent to a 20-foot container). Hicham Belmaachi, its Moroccan manager, expects that to rise to 400,000 in 2025.

Khorgos is in the middle of nowhere: Eurasia's pole of inaccessibility, the point on Earth farthest from any ocean, lies not far away. Now, beyond it, a vast new Eurasian supercontinent is forming. The promise is not just of railways through Central Asia to Europe but of gargantuan plans-some already realised-for pipelines, roads, high-speed rail and fibre-optic cables.

It is reshaping the geography of the Earth's biggest land mass. In this new space, the obstacles of the recent past-the Iron Curtain, China locked in its Mao-made autarky, even the physical impediments of the Himalayas, the Inner Asian deserts and the melting Arctic itself-are of diminishing consequence. The physical and psychological distance between Europe and East Asia is shrinking as the sparsely populated expanse at the heart of Eurasia is being wrangled, through new infrastructure, to manageable size. That, at least, is how Chinese planners see it. And, taking the historical view, if there is a surprise, it is that the transformation is not being made in the West's image or according to its rules. Asia is coming to Europe, not the other way around.

The Silk Road's renaissance has been turbocharged as part of a Chinese expansion that has come to be known as the Belt and Road Initiative ( BRI). The BRI is China's signature, indeed all-encompassing, foreign policy-the "project of the century", as Mr Xi calls it. But what exactly is it? Is it mostly aid or trade? Is it a Chinese Marshall Plan? Does it have real substance or is it just a branding exercise for China's international rise? And why is the land part called a belt, and the sea part called a road?
The Communist Party is using the BRI to reshape a world order more to its liking
The World Bank has an elemental definition of the BRI: "a China-led effort to improve connectivity and regional co-operation on a trans-continental scale through large-scale investments". That is a good summary as far as it goes, and helping poor countries build infrastructure is an important component. The global need for new infrastructure is immense. The Asian Development Bank ( ADB) estimates that Asia alone needs to invest $26trn between 2016 and 2030, or $1.7trn a year, if it is to maintain economic growth, eradicate poverty and respond to climate change.

But this special report will argue that, above all, the Chinese Communist Party is using the BRI to reshape a world order more to its liking. The focus is economic engagement and clever diplomacy. Leaders in Beijing ink BRI projects with countries for strategic or political reasons. Often, these are hidden by the sheer commercial anarchy that the BRI has engendered. (For those puzzled as to whether the BRI is a top-down, dirigiste initiative or a bottom-up frenzy, the answer is both.) Yet for China's leaders, it represents a prototype for an emerging geopolitical bloc at a time when the rules-based order is under shaky American management.

The notion of a new order, baldly stated, might alarm. So a more benign idea puts the BRI in a broader historical context: the tributary system of old. China sits at the centre of the world, bringing its wealth and power to bear, first on its near-abroad, and linking people into the concept of China as a beneficent power and an alternative locus to the West. Those who buy into it receive munificence from Beijing. Those who do not will not. It is a way to help knit together continents through improved infrastructure and a catch-all phrase to make anything China does abroad look unthreatening. Crucially, it is Mr Xi's own baby: as much a political project to reflect well on the emperor as an economic one.

One if by land, two if by Xi

Mr Xi launched the initiative in two speeches in 2013. The first-in Astana (now Nursultan), the capital of Kazakhstan-presented the policy's overland component, the "Silk Road economic belt". It links China to Central, South-East and South Asia, and on to Europe. The word "belt" has that curious name to imply something more than mere transport, energy or other nodes. Rather, an interconnected network of infrastructure would grow into something thicker: industrial zones and economic corridors with manufacturing, logistics, construction and more.

Soon after, Mr Xi presented the maritime component in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta. A "21st century maritime Silk Road", a network of port cities in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean would tie China closer by sea to these regions. Mr Xi has unveiled further dimensions to the plan: a "polar Silk Road" to develop Arctic shipping routes; a "digital Silk Road" of undersea cables, 5 G telecoms and cloud computing; and even a "space information corridor" to open up satellite- and space-launch capabilities.

The debates about the BRI began from the outset. At one level, it merely extended a trajectory China had followed for some time, meshing with its major resource suppliers worldwide, as well as its European markets. At another, it was a response to the global financial crisis of 2007-9, which removed a large source of demand for Chinese goods. The lesson was that in future China had to make its own markets abroad. At a third level, it represented an internationalisation of Chinese industrial policy. Faced with overcapacity in steel, cement and more, a party-state whose legitimacy hangs on creating jobs and investment could hardly shut down capacity, as Western countries might do. Instead it must try to export it. Lastly, at a time when the West appeared to be stumbling, both in terms of growth and global leadership, here was a bend in the historical road. Everything was contingent, but China's moment had come and needed to be seized-more Leninist opportunism than Marxist determinism.

The BRI is about all these things and more. Mr Xi calls it a decades-long project, while some estimates put spending on schemes both built and intended at $6trn. But sift through deals actually built or signed for, and the initiative is far smaller than some of the wilder figures imply. Yet it is so broad and amorphous it is meaningless to say you are for or against it. Any investment that China undertakes abroad can be, and is, lumped into it.

Even inside China, where the party ensures unstinting praise for the BRI, a surprising vagueness reigns. No authoritative figure is published for what is invested where. The best guess is that $400bn of financing, in grants but especially in loans, has been or is about to be spent in more than 160 countries with three-fifths of the world's population. In real terms, that dwarfs the Marshall Plan ($130bn in today's money) that America advanced to revive Europe's war-ravaged economies.

But the economic benefits of projects often fall short of the claims made. A vast, bottom-up push to sell the BRI brand and pay lip-service to Mr Xi has produced hare-brained and duplicate schemes. Many provincial enterprises "going out" for the first time had no experience of operating abroad. At the first BRI Forum in Beijing in 2017, convened to spread awe and wonder at China's generosity, there was already disorder under heaven. By the time of the second, last April, more disciplined guidelines were published about lending, the environment and more.

Projects may fall short economically for another reason: their priority is strategic, above all, securing critical supplies of natural resources, to drive economic growth at home. Shanghai now gets half its natural gas from Turkmenistan. Such pipelines neatly get around the "Malacca Strait dilemma": seaborne supplies of oil and gas that could easily be choked off in time of war.

Elsewhere, strategic benefits might come from developing ports and cementing dominance in the global shipping industry. They could be stepping stones to China one day projecting naval power far from home-with big implications for Japan, South-East Asia, India and other countries that depend on the world's busiest sea lanes. By rolling out infrastructure across the Eurasian land mass, China becomes the indispensable power in an emerging supercontinent. Crucially, the state directs giant enterprises to do the national bidding, and state banking institutions to provide the financial firepower.

From a Communist Party perspective, cultivating political relationships, and what the party likes to call "people-to-people" ties, bends the world, bit by bit, to China's will. As Bruno Maçães, a former Portuguese foreign minister, puts it in "The Dawn of Eurasia", the spillover effects from infrastructure, trade and finance into politics, culture and security are not "a bug in the project", but its most fundamental feature.

Above all, the BRI is the world's greatest branding exercise. A foreign country or leader usually signs up to the brand in the form of a vague memorandum of understanding lauding "win-win co-operation". After that, it is very hard to be disloyal. Praise the plan and you will be rewarded. Criticise it, and not only have you offended China. You have offended the cosmos, or at least the "Silk Road spirit" of "peace and co-operation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit." This branding, with sanctions, is powerful and it works. Foreign loyalty, in turn, reinforces the brand for a domestic Chinese audience: look what a peaceable, open and future-facing country China is, ready to join in endeavours for mutual benefit.

Not everyone buys it. The harshest criticism comes from the incumbent superpower, whose global dominance the project is challenging. America's National Security Strategy claims that the BRI is "predatory economics"; to borrow money from China is to fall into a well-laid trap. In December Adam Boehler, the head of the new US International Development Finance Corporation, told the Financial Times that China's overseas investments were "100%" like a house of cards, because of heavy debts, badly built infrastructure, corruption and lack of transparency.

That is an overstatement. Certainly, China applies dodgier lending criteria than do members of the Paris Club of major sovereign lenders. Yet there is no nefarious master plan. Indeed, that is part of the problem. Nearly every major project meets bumps along the way. Out of sight, deals often get renegotiated, with lower interest rates and longer grace periods and repayment terms.

China knows flexibility serves its image best. It offers development money and diplomatic support not available elsewhere. If there is to be an American-led pushback, it must work by attraction, too, by offering developing countries better options than China does. The new connectivity must work well for client states.

Laptops via Central Asia

In January 2017 a train quietly pulled into the sidings on the outskirts of London. Its containers had started their journey just 12 days earlier in eastern China, less than half the time than had they gone by sea, at less than half the cost by air, travelling through Khorgos. The route is rapidly becoming more popular. HP, an American computer giant, has moved its computer factories to the inland Chinese city of Chongqing, building its business model on rail delivery via Khorgos to the Netherlands.

In part because of HP's move, trains from China to Europe have risen from three a week in 2013 to over 25. An industrial zone and distribution centre is being built in Khorgos with $600m of investment from the provincial government of Jiangsu province 3,700km to the east. The hope is to attract businesses that serve the through-trade-packaging and putting price tags on retail products, for instance-and light manufacturing migrating from higher-cost China. Coming the other way, BMW sends several trains a week to China, its biggest market. Yet, for all this new connectivity, much still can, and does, go wrong. ■

This article appeared in the Special report section of the print edition under the headline "Return to centre"

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O N CHINA'S BORDER with Kazakhstan, a new Silk Road city has sprung up with such speed that Google Earth has scarcely begun to record the high-rises that now float on a winter mist above the steppe.

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The New Silk Road: Khorgos reemerges as the transit hub between the east and west

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China has approved the removal of the two-term limit on the presidency, effectively allowing Xi Jinping to remain in power for life.

The constitutional changes were passed by the annual sitting of parliament, the National People's Congress.

The vote was widely regarded as a rubber-stamping exercise. Two delegates voted against the change and three abstained, out of 2,964 votes.

China had imposed a two-term limit on its president since the 1990s.

But Mr Xi, who would have been due to step down in 2023, defied the tradition of presenting a potential successor during October's Communist Party Congress.

Instead, he consolidated his political power as the party voted to enshrine his name and political ideology in the party's constitution - elevating his status to the level of its founder, Chairman Mao.

On paper, the congress is the most powerful legislative body in China - similar to the parliament in other nations. But it was widely believed that it would approve what it was told to.

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Xi forever?
Analysis by Stephen McDonell, BBC China correspondent in Beijing
It is now hard to see Xi Jinping being challenged in any way whatsoever.

He has amassed power the likes of which has not been seen since Chairman Mao Zedong.

Only five years ago Beijing was being ruled by a collective leadership. Under ex-President Hu Jintao you could imagine differing views being expressed in the then nine-member Politburo Standing Committee.

There was a feeling that Mr Hu needed to please various factions within the Communist Party and it seemed that every 10 years a new leader would come along with their own people in a process of smooth transition.

From today all this has gone.

The constitution has been altered to allow Xi Jinping to remain as president beyond two terms and they would not have gone to this much trouble if that was not exactly what he intended to do.

There has been no national debate as to whether a leader should be allowed to stay on for as long as they choose. Quietly but surely Xi Jinping has changed the way his country is governed, with himself well and truly at the core.

Rare dissent

The issue is not, however, without controversy.

Online censors in China have been blocking discussion around the topic, including images of Winnie the Pooh. Social media users have taken to using the cartoon character to represent Mr Xi.

One government critic described the proposal in an open letter last month as a "farce", in a rare show of public dissent.

Former state newspaper editor Li Datong wrote that scrapping term limits for the president and vice-president would sow the seeds of chaos - in a message sent to some members of the national congress.

"I couldn't bear it any more. I was discussing with my friends and we were enraged. We have to voice our opposition," he told BBC Chinese.

State media, however, have portrayed the changes as much-needed reform.

US President Donald Trump was criticised by some commentators for seeming to approve of Mr Xi's unlimited rule, saying on Monday: "President for life... I think it's great. Maybe we'll have to give that a shot some day."

At a political rally on Saturday, Mr Trump insisted he had merely been joking during a fundraiser, and that his comments were represented unfairly by some media.

Xi Jinping thought

Mr Xi's possible third term is not the only item the National People's Congress is likely to approve. It was also expected to:

confirm China's new government line-up for the next five years, kicking off Xi Jinping's second term as president

ratify a law to set up a new powerful anti-corruption agency

ratify the inclusion of the president's political philosophy - "Xi Jinping thought" - in the constitution

Xi Jinping thought is the ideology approved by the Communist Party last October. Officially, it is "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era".

Schoolchildren, college students and staff at state factories will have to study the political ideology, which the Communist Party is trying to portray as a new chapter for modern China.

More on China under Xi

Human cost of China's economic reforms

The changing Chinese family in five charts

The lawyer who simply vanished

Mr Xi became president in 2013, and quickly consolidated personal power while cementing China as the regional superpower.

He also fought corruption, punishing more than a million party members - which has helped his popularity among some.

At the same time, however, China has clamped down on many emerging freedoms, increasing its state surveillance and censorship programs. Critics also say Mr Xi has used the anti-corruption purge to sideline political rivals.

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China approves 'president for life' change

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China has approved the removal of the two-term limit on the presidency, effectively allowing Xi Jinping to remain in power for life. The constitutional changes were passed by the annual sitting of parliament, the National People's Congress. The vote was widely regarded as a rubber-stamping exercise.

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What is China's Belt and Road Initiative? | Start Here

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Beijing's multibillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been called a Chinese Marshall Plan, a state-backed campaign for global dominance, a stimulus package for a slowing economy, and a massive marketing campaign for something that was already happening - Chinese investment around the world.

Over the five years since President Xi Jinping announced his grand plan to connect Asia, Africa and Europe, the initiative has morphed into a broad catchphrase to describe almost all aspects of Chinese engagement abroad.

Belt and Road, or yi dai yi lu, is a "21st century silk road," confusingly made up of a "belt" of overland corridors and a maritime "road" of shipping lanes.

From South-east Asia to Eastern Europe and Africa, Belt and Road includes 71 countries that account for half the world's population and a quarter of global GDP.

Everything from a Trump-affiliated theme park in Indonesia to a jazz camp in Chongqing have been branded Belt and Road. Countries from Panama to Madagascar, South Africa to New Zealand, have officially pledged support.

How much money is being spent?

The Belt and Road Initiative is expected to cost more than $1tn (£760bn), although there are differing estimates as to how much money has been spent to date. According to one analysis, China has invested more than $210bn, the majority in Asia.

But China's efforts abroad don't stop there. Belt and Road also means that Chinese firms are engaging in construction work across the globe on an unparalleled scale.

To date, Chinese companies have secured more than $340bn in construction contracts along the Belt and Road.

However, China's dominance in the construction sector comes at the expense of local contractors in partner countries.

The vast sums raked in by Chinese firms are at odds with the official rhetoric that Belt and Road is open to global participation and suggest that the initiative is also motivated by factors other than trade, such as China's need to combat excess capacity at home.

What are the risks for countries involved?

More recently, governments from Malaysia to Pakistan are starting to rethink the costs of these projects. Sri Lanka, where the government leased a port to a Chinese company for 99 years after struggling to make repayments, is a cautionary tale.

Earlier this year, the Center for Global Development found eight more Belt and Road countries at serious risk of not being able to repay their loans.

The affected nations - Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan and Tajikistan - are among the poorest in their respective regions and will owe more than half of all their foreign debt to China.

Critics worry China could use "debt-trap diplomacy" to extract strategic concessions - such as over territorial disputes in the South China Sea or silence on human rights violations. In 2011, China wrote off an undisclosed debt owed by Tajikistan in exchange for 1,158 sq km (447 sq miles) of disputed territory.

"There are some extreme cases where China lends into very high risk environments, and it would seem that the motivation is something different. In these situations the leverage China has as lender is used for purposes unrelated to the original loan," said Scott Morris, one of the authors of the Washington Centre for Global Development report.

Why is the initiative sparking global concern?

As Belt and Road expands in scope so do concerns it is a form of economic imperialism that gives China too much leverage over other countries, often those that are smaller and poorer.

Jane Golley, an associate professor at Australian National University, describes it as an attempt to win friends and influence people. "They've presented this very grand initiative which has frightened people," says Golley. "Rather than using their economic power to make friends, they've drummed up more fear that it will be about influence."

According to Shan Wenhua, a professor at Jiaotong University in Xi'an, Xi's signature foreign policy is "the first major attempt by the Chinese government to take a proactive approach toward international cooperation ... to take responsibility."

Some worry expanded Chinese commercial presence around the world will eventually lead to expanded military presence. Last year, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti. Analysts say almost all the ports and other transport infrastructure being built can be dual-use for commercial and military purposes.

"If it can carry goods, it can carry troops," says Jonathan Hillman, director of the Reconnecting Asia project at CSIS.

Others worry China will export its political model. Herbert Wiesner, general secretary of Germany's PEN Center, says human rights are being "left in the ditches by the sides of the New Silk Road".

Where does it end?

Belt and Road is likely to continue, not least because these projects signal loyalty to Xi. The initiative has been enshrined in the Chinese communist party's constitution, which also eliminated term limits, leaving Xi room to continue Belt and Road for as long as he wants.

It also gives disparate Chinese projects overseas the veneer of being part of a grand strategic plan, according to Winslow Robertson, a specialist in China-Africa relations. It is not a centralised initiative, so much as a brand, he says.

"Who determines what is a Belt and Road project or a Belt and Road country? Nobody is sure. Everything and nothing is Belt and Road."

What's next?

Not all of the most ambitious Belt and Road projects are about hard infrastructure. China plans to set up international courts, in Shenzhen and Xi'an, the former hub of the original Silk Road, to resolve commercial disputes related to Belt and Road.

"It's a reminder BRI is about more than roads, railways, and other hard infrastructure," said Jonathan Hillman, director of the Reconnecting Asia project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "It's also a vehicle for China to write new rules, establish institutions that reflect Chinese interests, and reshape 'soft' infrastructure."

Officials have said the courts, to be based on the judiciary, arbitration and mediation agencies of China's Supreme People's Court in Beijing, will follow international rules and will invite legal experts from outside China to participate.

Legal experts say the courts will likely be modelled on the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts and the International Commercial Court in Singapore, which has already struck an agreement with China to resolve Belt and Road-related disputes.

But critics of the independence of the country's judicial system, which traditionally answers to China's ruling communist party, worry the courts will favour Chinese parties over foreign firms.

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What is China's Belt and Road Initiative?

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The project is often described as a 21st century Silk Road, made up of a 'belt' of overland corridors and a maritime 'road' of shipping lanes

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Dabbawalas: How India's 130-year-old food delivery system works

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The World’s Best Delivery Service? Lunch in Mumbai

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BBC Future has brought you in-depth and rigorous stories to help you navigate the current pandemic, but we know that's not all you want to read. So now we're dedicating a series to help you escape. We'll be revisiting our most popular features from the last three years in our Lockdown Longreads. You'll find everything from the story about the world's greatest space mission to the truth about whether our cats really love us, the epic hunt to bring illegal fishermen to justice and the small team which brings long-buried World War Two tanks back to life. What you won't find is any reference to, well, you-know-what. Enjoy.
Every morning, six days a week, Kiran Gavande tours the Lower Parel neighbourhood of Mumbai on his bicycle collecting lunchboxes called dabbas from his customers. Over the next few hours Gavande and his fellow dabbawalas - "ones who carry the box" - will criss-cross the busy city multiple times delivering hundreds of thousands of home-cooked meals to workers in time for lunch.

In the last few years, online food-delivery companies like Deliveroo and Uber Eats have made having specially prepared food brought to your desk seem like the height of app-based luxury. Similar start-ups are gaining popularity in India too. But dabbawalas have been doing it for 125 years - and the newcomers have much to learn.

Dabbawala captioned video

Watch the dabbawalas deliver lunches in the bustling streets of Mumbai.
Despite relying on an unskilled workforce, a two-tier management system and nothing more high-tech than Mumbai's train network, this 5,000-strong cooperative is recognised as one of the world's most efficient logistics systems. They make a tidy side-line hosting executives from delivery giants like FedEx and Amazon. Even Richard Branson has spent a day learning their secrets.

Unlike Deliveroo and Uber Eats - or India's home-grown equivalents, such as Swiggy and Runnr - dabbawalas do not deliver restaurant food. Instead, they pick up home-cooked meals - mostly from the customers' own houses - and deliver them to their workplace in time for lunch.

"We don't like apps," says event organiser Rashmika Shah, who hires Shivaji Sawant to deliver a dabba to her husband at the Mumbai stock exchange. "We've known this person so long we know he'll do a proper job."

The service is not only reliable, it's cheap - roughly 800 rupees a month (less than £10). "People think it's a luxury getting food delivered to their office," says Subodh Sangle, coordinator of the Mumbai dabbawalas. "But we make our service available to everyone from the security guard to the CEO."

Most dabbawalas are quick to dismiss their new digital rivals. "There's no competition. They won't be able to keep up with the service we provide," says Gavande. "There's only one Mumbai dabbawala."

It's hard to argue. The organisation runs its low-cost service at a very high level of performance. A 2010 study by the Harvard Business School graded it "Six Sigma", which means the dabbawalas make fewer than 3.4 mistakes per million transactions. With deliveries to and from roughly 200,000 customers each day that translates to little more than 400 delayed or missing dabbas in a year.

Timeliness is crucial. Lunchboxes have to reach the client by 13:00 every day and it can take up to three hours to deliver them. The whole city can be affected by late deliveries, says Sangle. Dabbawalas are waved through by members of the public and traffic police alike. "If you see a dabbawalla in the street, you will give way," he says.

The delivery schedule also has built-in buffers. If a delivery is due at 13:00, the dabbawala will aim for around 12:00 - even if the destination is only a quarter of an hour away, says Sangle. "That allows him to improvise if there are mistakes." For every 15 to 20 dabbawalas there is also always someone on stand-by in case one of them gets delayed.

Despite the tight schedule, most of the time dabbawalas appear surprisingly relaxed, joking and chatting as they sort their dabbas. But when the next stage of the process nears, there is five minutes of sudden intense activity.

At 12:45 a dabbawala races around the corner on a bike and rushes shouting into an office building. "You wanted to see a panicked dabbawala, there you go," says Sangle. The dabbawala was late by his own standards but the customer was probably never aware of the hiccup, he says.

Following them around for the day is tough work. Sometimes I get distracted and when I turn back the group I'm shadowing has gone. Strict timekeeping even extends to customers - if the full lunchbox is late for collection in the morning more than two or three times, they are dropped.

Dabbawala subtitled interview

Watch a dabbawala explain the unique code that gets each lunchbox to its destination.
Each dabbawala has a single collection and delivery area. At mid-morning they tour their neighbourhood on foot or by bicycle collecting an average of 30 dabbas. These are sorted at a local office or railway station and each dabbawala gets on a train with the dabbas heading for their delivery area. On arrival dabbas coming from all over the city are sorted again before being loaded onto bicycles and handcarts for the final leg.

This complex series of exchanges relies on an esoteric alphanumeric code scrawled on each lunchbox - indecipherable to the uninitiated but designed to be easily understood by all dabbawalas.

A dabbawalas' commitment to the job is partly because it pays well - roughly 12,000 rupees (£140) a month, a good salary in India for what is essentially unskilled labour. The fame of the dabbawalas also gives the job a certain prestige. This can lead to perks like discounted mobile phone subscriptions and scholarships for a dabbawala's children funded by organisations keen to be associated with the respected network.

And as a cooperative all dabbawalas are equal partners with supervisors called mukadams who are elected. "You don't have to say 'Salam, sir' or 'Yes, sir' to anyone," says dabbawala Anil Bhawagat.

But there are also more profound reasons for their dedication. The dabbawalas belong almost exclusively to the Vakari community, which worships the Hindu god Vithala. Vithala teaches that giving food is one of the greatest donations you can make. "The dabbawalas say we are getting a golden chance to walk the path of spirituality while earning our bread," says Sangle.

Even so, as the convenience of app-based delivery services catches on, will the dabbawalas keep up? Food delivery is firmly in the sights of India's new breed of tech entrepreneurs, says Pankaj Jain, a partner at US start-up accelerator 500 Start Ups.

But he thinks any threat is some way off. The sector has yet to get going, he says. Part of the problem is that companies just assumed they could transplant business models from Silicon Valley to India.

Many burned through investor cash making fancy apps and offering discounts in pursuit of market share rather than building reliable supply chains and a solid business plan, says Jain. He thinks food-tech businesses could learn from the "strong fundamentals" of the dabbawalas. "I think food delivery 2.0 in India is going to be dabbawalas on tech," he says.

He's not the only one. Both Swiggy and Runnr, two leading tech-powered food delivery companies, have tapped the dabbawalas for their expertise. Bangalore-based Runnr has built its delivery service using a similar crowd-sourcing model to ride-sharing companies like Uber.

Co-founder and CEO Mohit Kumar says they contacted the dabbawalas to get some pointers when they expanded into Mumbai a year ago. The company has also signed up around 200 dabbawalas to work part-time after they finish their lunchtime deliveries.

One of the lessons Runnr learned was how to navigate Mumbai. The way Google Maps divides the city into neighbourhoods does not take traffic into account, but years of experience had taught the dabbawalas where the bottlenecks were. "No other system has this level of data for each locality," says Kumar. "That really helped us get our delivery times down."

As well as its on-demand service, Runnr is now experimenting with regular lunchtime deliveries to big offices in Bangalore - putting it in more direct competition with the dabbawalas.

A pre-ordered delivery must arrive on time, however. "It's more mission critical," says Kumar. "Like the dabbawalas we are trying to build a system that is extremely fault tolerant." That includes extensive driver training, a rigid schedule and aligning driver incentives to reward punctual delivery rather than number of orders.

Kumar thinks adopting more technology could help the dabbawalas. Combined with local knowledge, mapping technology could help create better delivery routes that can be adapted quickly as customers join and leave. If Runnr decides to launch scheduled lunchtime deliveries in Mumbai, Kumar says he would consider partnering with the dabbawalas.

Pawan Agrawal is not so sure that the dabbawalas will be quick to adopt new tech, however. A motivational speaker on management topics, Agrawal did his PhD on the dabbawala network and now gives lectures to businesses around the world about how to apply some of the organisation's processes. Agrawal points out that many dabbawalas are over 50 and there is no retirement age. "I think it will take time," he says.

But their low-tech approach could be a strength. The dabbawalas offer a different service to the digital start-ups. "You cannot order home cooked food online," he says. And on the crowded streets of Mumbai, trains and bicycles are quicker than cars and motorbikes. Dabbawala Gangaram Hemade agrees: "If you're on a motorbike you have to follow all the rules and parking is a problem. This way we can move anywhere even in heavy traffic."

Dabbawalas are not afraid to embrace new opportunities, however. They are talking to Indian e-commerce giant Flipkart about carrying out last-mile deliveries. And one group is working with start-up Raw Pressery to deliver health juices on-demand.

According to Sangle, the healthy-eating craze in India is good for dabbawalas as food companies are turning to them for delivery. Profits from these newer ventures are bumping the dabbawalas' salaries up from 12,000 to 20,000 rupees a month, he says.

Still, Sangle does not expect the core business to change. For one thing, he thinks the dabbawalas' spiritual connection to the job will always give them an edge. "New companies give their customers good offers but they're just interested in capturing the market," he says. "The dabbawalas have deeper reasons for doing it. Serving their customers is like serving their god."
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The unsurpassed 125-year-old network that feeds Mumbai

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BBC Future has brought you in-depth and rigorous stories to help you navigate the current pandemic, but we know that's not all you want to read. So now we're dedicating a series to help you escape. We'll be revisiting our most popular features from the last three years in our Lockdown Longreads.