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http://www.ushistory.org/us/37.asp

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http://people.uncw.edu/pricej/teaching/socialchange/causes%20of%20social%20change.htm

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http://theconversation.com/inequality-can-be-addressed-only-if-we-start-talking-about-the-working-class-44442

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https://bizfluent.com/info-8161648-type-did-industrial-revolution-develop.html

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There where many inventions such as the Steam engine and new modern transportation that made it possable for people to create  the  structures of the world that we see today such as power infustructure or communications system that where long distance and help people communicate.

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Good government link on Industrial Revolution immigration.

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Abstract

In this study, we measure the contribution of immigrants and their descendents to the growth and industrial transformation of the American workforce in the age of mass immigration from 1880 to 1920. The size and selectivity of the immigrant community, as well as their disproportionate residence in large cities, meant they were the mainstay of the American industrial workforce. Immigrants and their children comprised over half of manufacturing workers in 1920, and if the third generation (the grandchildren of immigrants) are included, then more than two-thirds of workers in the manufacturing sector were of recent immigrant stock. Although higher wages and better working conditions might have encouraged more long-resident native-born workers to the industrial economy, the scale and pace of the American industrial revolution might well have slowed. The closing of the door to mass immigration in the 1920s did lead to increased recruitment of native born workers, particularly from the South, to northern industrial cities in the middle decades of the 20 th century.

1. Introduction

Within the span of a few decades from the late 19 th to the early 20 th century, the United States was transformed from a predominately rural agrarian society to an industrial economy centered in large metropolitan cities. Prior to the American industrial revolution, most Americans were reared in largely isolated agricultural households and small towns that were linked to the external world by horse drawn wagons ( Olmstead and Rhode 2000: 711). Except for towns that were connected to railroads or water borne shipping, isolation and the costs of overland transportation meant that many rural communities were largely self sufficient in food, clothing, and many other essentials of everyday life. This changed dramatically in the early decades of the 20 th century, as the supply and lowered costs of manufactured goods created a consumer revolution for both urban and rural households. Many of these goods, which did not even exist a few decades earlier, were manufactured, marketed, and transported through a rapidly expanding national network of rail lines and highways. By 1920, one half of northern farms had automobiles and telephones ( Olmstead and Rhode 2000: 712-713).

Theses changes were the direct result of the American industrial revolution that was founded on rising investment, employment, and productivity in the manufacturing sector. In 1880, when the agricultural frontier had largely disappeared, almost one-half of the American workers were still farmers and only one in seven workers (less than 15%) worked in manufacturing of any sort. The industrial sector, as late as 1870, consisted primarily of small firms and workshops that relied on artisan technology to produce tools, furniture, building materials, and other goods for local markets ( Abramovitz and David 2000: 45). Many small industries, such as grain mills and sawmills, were often located in rural areas close to flowing rivers in order to power machinery. Following the technological revolutions of the early industrial age, workshops and small foundries were supplemented by large factories engaged in mass production. The development of commercial electricity at the end of the 19 th century allowed industries to take advantage of the labor supply in large cities. The scale of change is illustrated by the rise in the share of manufacturing horsepower generated by electrical motors from 23% in 1909 to 77% in 1929 ( Goldin and Katz 1998: 712).

Enormous gains in industrial productivity, accompanied by institutional change and much lower transportation costs, created national markets with goods and people moving in every direction. Perhaps the most consequential change of the American industrial revolution was the increasing urbanization of society and the shift of labor from farms to factories and offices ( Guest 2005). In 1880, workers in agriculture outnumbered industrial workers three to one, but by 1920, the numbers were approximately equal. Employment in the manufacturing sector expanded four-fold from 2.5 to 10 million workers from 1880 to 1920.1

The decades surrounding 1900 were not only the age of industrialization in the United States, but were also the age of urbanization and immigration. The 1880s were the first decade in American history, with the exception of the Civil War decade, when the urban population increased more than the rural population (in absolute numbers). From 1880 to 1920, population growth was concentrated in cities-the urban fraction expanded from a little more than one quarter of the national population to more than one half ( Carter et al. 2006: 1-105).

The pace of rural to urban migration of the native born picked up during this era, but domestic urbanward migrants were dwarfed by the flood of immigrants coming to cities. From 1880 to 1920, the number of foreign born increased from almost 7 million to a little under 14 million ( Gibson and Jung 2006: 26). These figures, however, underestimate the economic and demographic contribution of immigration ( Kuznets 1971b). Immigrants inevitably lead to a second generation-the children of immigrants-whose social, cultural, and economic characteristics are heavily influenced by their origins. Counting the 23 million children of immigrants2, in addition to the 14 million immigrants, means that over one-third of the 105 million Americans in the 1920 population belonged to the "immigrant community," defined as inclusive of the first and second generations.

1.1 Immigration, Urbanization, and Industrialization

Immigrants, as well as manufacturing enterprises, were concentrated in the rapidly growing cities of the Northeast and Midwest during the age of industrialization ( Gibson and Jung 2006: 72). In 1900, about three-quarters of the populations of many large cities were composed of immigrants and their children, including New York, Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, San Francisco, Buffalo, Milwaukee, and Detroit ( Carpenter 1927: 27). Immigration and industrialization were correlated, both spatially and temporally in American history ( Taeuber and Taeuber 1971: 117), but is there a causal impact? Addressing this question, the objective of this analysis, requires consideration of the counterfactual of what would have been the course of the industrialization process in the United States if there had not been an immigrant workforce.

The most commonly cited reasons for the rapid American industrial revolution are the abundance of mineral resources, technological innovation, the evolution of the American system of manufacturing, railroads and lowered costs of transportation, education and human resources, and the rise of the managerial firm ( Abramovitz and David 2000; Chandler 1977; Denison 1974; Hounshell 1984; Wright 1990). Among the studies that address the relationship between immigration and industrialization, few go beyond a general or abstract discussion. In a classic survey of the literature on the American industrial revolution in the Cambridge Economic History of the United States, the role of immigration is summarized in a single paragraph, which simply notes the overrepresentation of immigrants in the manufacturing labor force ( Engerman and Sokoloff 2000: 387). There are some studies that conclude that the flood of immigration in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries had an adverse impact on the per-capita economic growth, the wages of native workers, and diverted domestic migration away from industrializing cities ( Hatton and Williamson 1998: Chapter 8; Goldin 1994). However, other researchers have questioned these conclusions and suggested that immigrants had a generally positive impact on the American economy and facilitated the economic mobility of native born workers during the age of industrialization ( Carter and Sutch 1999; Haines 2000: 202; Muller 1993: 83-85; Thomas 1973: 174).

1.2 Research Objectives

In this study, we address two specific empirical questions, namely: "What was the role of immigration on changes in the industrial structure of the American economy from 1880 to 1920?", and "How much did immigrants and their descendents (children and grandchildren) contribute to the manufacturing sector in 1920?" The findings reported here show that recent immigrants and their descendents were the primary workforce in the rapidly expanding manufacturing economy of the early 20 th century. Demographic and economic pressures on agricultural households in the late 19 th and early 20 th century pushed an increasing share of the children of farmers off the land, but only a minority were willing to join "the pool of eastern industrial and commercial labor" ( Atack, Bateman, and Parker 2000: 322). When immigrant labor was cutoff in the 1920s, the native poor population, especially poor whites and blacks from the South, began migrating to northern industrial cities in much larger numbers. But in the early 20 th century, when manufacturing jobs were dirty, dangerous, and heavily regimented, immigrant workers were the mainstay of industrial employment.

Native born of native parentage (NBNP) Americans continued to be over-represented in the agricultural sector in the early 20 th century, but they were also well represented in many of the better jobs in the public and business sectors that were also expanding rapidly with the industrial economy. The managerial elite during the age of industrialization were almost exclusively native born whites ( Zunz 1982: 2).

2. How Might Immigration Affect Industrialization

There is a long list of potential factors-variables or conditions-that might have caused the American industrial revolution, including the discovery or adoption of new technologies, the availability and mobility of capital, the expansion of markets as a result of new transportation systems, added demand from a growing population and the expansion of trade, increasing entrepreneurship, stable political and institutional systems that foster cheaper credit and the enforcement of contracts, improvements in human capital and meritocratic social mobility of talent, the increasing division of labor in production, and the specialization of enterprises (see Engerman and Gallman 2000, especially volume 2). This list, which is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, does not specify which factors are exogenous nor does it address the question of which factors are absolutely necessary and which may simply facilitate economic growth and industrialization.

Without a comparative analysis across countries or regions, it is impossible to test which factors were necessary or sufficient conditions to cause industrialization. Such studies are not always definitive, however, because labor, capital, and other resources can flow across regions and countries. The analytical strategy adopted here is of a detailed case study of one country, the United States, with a primary focus on measuring the increasing share of immigrants and their descendents in the mobilization of labor during the American industrial revolution from 1880 to 1920. The counterfactual, namely whether the domestic labor supply would have been sufficient for rapid industrial development in the absence of immigration, cannot be directly observed. Our strategy, which draws on theory and prior research in addition to empirical analysis, cannot fully adjudicate between competing explanations. Our conclusion about the centrality of immigrant labor is based on the fact that recent immigrants and their descendents were not just the majority of industrial workers, but the overwhelming majority of workers in the emerging manufacturing sector in early 20 th century America.

2.1 Economic Theory

Labor is an indispensable source of economic production, and all other things being equal, more labor contributes to more economic production. The magnitude of the impact of immigration on economic growth and welfare depends on the availability of physical capital, the human capital of immigrants and natives, and assumptions about economies of scale ( Frieberg and Hunt 1995: 39-42; Smith and Edmonston 1997: chapter 4). Although there was neither a slackening of economic growth nor a slowdown in the trend of rising wages of native born workers during the age of mass immigration in the late 19 th and early 20 th century ( Carter and Sutch 1999: 314-344; Rees 1961), Hatton and Williamson (1998: chapter 8) argued that wages would have grown even faster in the absence of immigration. Differences in the interpretation (or speculation) of the economic impact of immigration are typically based on assumptions of possible effects rather than on measured differences. There is a wide range of mechanisms through which immigrants may affect labor markets and the economy, more generally.

One of the most fundamental effects of immigration is an increase in the number of workers relative to dependents in the population. Immigrants are generally concentrated in the younger working ages. Carter and Sutch (1999: 326) observe that well over 70% of immigrants to the United States during the peak years of the age of mass immigration (1907 to 1910) were between age 18 and 40. Even within the working-age population, immigrants are more likely to participate in the labor force than the native born population. The age selectivity of immigrants reduces the costs of social reproduction for a given population size in the receiving society. Although the costs of support for the dependent population of children and the elderly are generally borne privately by families, there are also public subsidies for education and health care. The costs of rearing and educating persons who immigrate as young adults have been borne by their foreign-resident families and their countries of origin, and might be considered a transfer payment to the taxpayers of the receiving society.3

In an ingenious analysis of the potential impact of the differing age composition of immigrants and the native born populations, Neal and Uselding (1972) estimate the savings received by the United States through immigration from 1790 to 1913 relative to the costs that would have been incurred if all immigrants were replaced by children of the native born population (this counterfactual is posed by the "Walker hypothesis" that posits that native born fertility was depressed by the arrival of immigrants). Assuming these savings had been invested (not consumed by social reproduction), Neal and Uselding (1972: 87) conclude that immigration had contributed from 13 to 42 percent of the capital stock of the United States by 1912. Several analysts have noted that the large number of immigrants in the North in the 1860s provided the manpower surplus that allowed the Union to triumph in the Civil War ( Gallman 1977: 31, Muller 1993: 78-79).

2.2 Empirical Studies

In their study of the impact of immigration on American industrialization and native born workers, Hatton and Williamson (1998: chapter 8) asked whether immigrants accelerated industrialization by solving labor bottlenecks by entering high-wage high-growth occupations faster than native born workers ( Hatton and Williamson 1998: 161-164). Based on their findings that immigrants were more likely to be found in less skilled occupations and in slower growth occupations from 1890 to 1900, Hatton and Williamson conclude that immigration did not contribute to economic development and rapid industrialization. However, other analysts report that immigrants were no less skilled than native born workers ( Schachter 1972). The real question, in our judgment, is not the skill level of immigrants, but their role in filling the demand for labor in manufacturing and other key sectors of emerging industrial economy. The central element of the industrial revolution is most appropriately measured by shifts across industrial sectors - the rise of manufacturing, in particular.

The other problem with Hatton and Williamson's account is their focus on relative growth as the index of labor demand. Starting from a small base (or zero), new industries may experience extraordinarily rapid relative growth, but the absolute number of added workers may be relatively small. For example, the telephone industry grew over 80 times faster than the workforce as a whole from 1880 to 1920, but the total growth was only a quarter of a million workers. On the other hand, the manufacturing sector grew much less rapidly-only about 2.4 times as fast as the work force as a whole, but added about 7.5 million workers. Are immigrant workers in manufacturing not to be considered part of the "shock troops of structural change" ( Hatton and Williamson 1998: 161) simply because of their relative share in the growth in selected high demand occupations? The contribution of immigrants might be evaluated differently if the absolute numbers of workers in expanding industries were counted. In this analysis, we consider the contribution of immigrants to absolute and relative changes in the industrial structure.

One of the most important theoretical claims about the positive impact of immigration on industrialization centers on the creation of economies of scales-both in the production of and the demand for industrial goods ( Abramovitz and David. 2000: 12; Carter and Sutch 1999: 331-332; Romer 1996). The creation of economies of scale was possible only with the growth of cities and urban industries. Before the age of industrialization, per-capita productivity was rarely increased by having large numbers of workers concentrated in one location ( Ward 1971: 90). Artisan labor in most industries, such as grain milling, iron working, and leather goods, did not rely on a complex division of labor. Overall, there were few advantages of locating a factory in large cities. The important considerations for site location were access to sources of raw materials, nearby flowing water, and transportation. There is some evidence that some "non-mechanized" factories in the mid 19 th century were more productive than artisan shops, but these factories were distinctive in employing women and children (e.g. textiles), and economies of scale were only significant for factories with about 20 or fewer employees ( Engerman and Sokoloff 2000: 375).

With electricity to power machinery, it became possible to redesign the organization of factories to create an integrated flow of work (assembly lines) to take advantage of a larger number of workers in one location. Larger factories were located in cities where labor was more plentiful. And cities were disproportionately the home of immigrants. Even in 1850, when only 15% of the American population lived in cities, more than one-third of the population of most large American cities was foreign born. Assuming that second generation immigrants (the children of immigrants) were as numerous as the foreign born, it seems reasonable to conclude that almost all large American cities were predominantly composed of immigrants and their children as early as 1850 ( Gibson and Jung: 2006: 82).4

In the middle decades of the 19 th century, new immigrants were the ready source of labor to unload ships, to build roads and canals, and to transport goods ( Carter 2006: I-590-591). With the growth of factories and the demand for unskilled labor, immigrants, primarily young men in the working years, continued to be the ideal source of labor. Immigrants were generally more willing to accept lower wages and inferior working conditions than native born workers ( Zolberg 2006: 69). Great efficiencies in production led to higher profits that could be reinvested in new technology, which led to even more production and eventually higher wages for workers.

Although the demand for manufactured goods gradually grew to encompass the entire country, the initial demand was from the urban population. Unlike farm families that were largely self sufficient in food and made most of their clothing, urban families needed to purchase everything in the market. The large and growing urban populations, primarily fueled by immigration throughout the second half of the 19 th century and the first two decades of the 20 th century, created a huge demand for the increased production of the emerging industrial sector. Carter and Sutch (1999: 330-331) claim that economies of scale in demand and production also stimulated inventive activity and the diffusion of technological knowledge and innovation. In his analysis of long swings, or Kuznets cycles, Easterlin (1968) found that immigration (and population growth) and subsequent family formation stimulated economic growth through increasing demand for housing, urban development, and other amenities. This association was strongest, Easterlin noted, in the century prior to World War II. In the post World War II era, the federal government assumed more responsibility for maintaining aggregate demand regardless of population dynamics.

If capital is fixed, additional immigrant labor would lead to lowered productivity as capital stocks are spread more thinly and as less capital is invested per worker (capital dilution). However, there is some evidence that capital follows the international movements of labor, especially in labor scarce economies ( Hatton and Williamson 1998: 214-215). In addition to international capital flows, immigrants are thought to save a higher proportion of their incomes than native born workers. Much of this savings is remitted to family and kin in their countries of origin, but there is also evidence that immigrants purchase homes, open small businesses and invest heavily in the education of their children. These claims suggest that immigrants contribute to economic growth by increasing the supply of (or attracting) capital as well as the supply of labor. Rosenberg (1972: 32-33) concludes that immigrants to the United States also brought European technology that increased the productivity of American industry.

Carter and Sutch (1999: 323) review the historical evidence on the debate over immigration and capital dilution at the turn of the 20 th century, with a focus on the claim that immigrants increased the returns to capital (and hence capitalists), but harmed the economic fortunes of native born workers. They conclude that the division between capital and labor was not as clear cut as many assume. A substantial share of American workers owned capital through home ownership and as operators of farms and small shops. About half of American households in 1905 might have been considered as equity investors through their ownership of insurance policies that were self-financed pensions ( Ranson and Sutch 1987 cited in Carter and Sutch 1999: 323).

3. Data and Measurement

The decennial census data analyzed here have been extracted from the IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples) files that have been produced and distributed by researchers at the University of Minnesota ( Ruggles et al. 2004). The IPUMS files are created by extracting samples of household records and all persons in sampled households from the original manuscript (microfilm) records. The samples of the IPUMS census files are sufficiently large to reproduce, within the range of sampling error, published figures in the original census reports. Moreover, the IPUMS files, with complete individual (and family) unit records, can be recoded and tabulated, limited only by the scope and detail of the original census questions and classifications. In addition to the standard census variables, the IPUMS files also contain many new recoded variables to facilitate comparisons across censuses ( Sobek 2001).

Although the classification of workers by industrial sectors is sometimes conflated with occupations, these two dimensions of work are conceptually distinct. Industries refer to product produced or service delivered (by a firm or family run enterprise) while occupations refer to actual work activities and skills of workers ( Sobek 2006, Sutch 2006). There is overlap in some categories - most farmers (occupations) work in the agricultural sector, but there are significant differences in the wide range of occupations (e.g., unskilled labor, clerical workers, managers) for those who work in the manufacturing, construction, and retail trade sectors.

The process of industrialization is associated with industrial restructuring as well as changes in the skills and actual tasks performed by workers. We focus on the shifts in the industrial distribution of workers because technological and organizational change typically results in the origin, growth, decline, and disappearance of businesses and forms of production. As agricultural productivity increased, workers were drawn into manufacturing and services.

Shifts in occupations and the division of labor are likely to be derivative of the changes in industrial structure and technological change. As factories replaced farms (the prototypical shift in the organization of work), many new occupations were created. Aside from the link to industrial structure, there is less theoretical clarity in the expected changes in occupations with industrialization. A widespread assumption is that technological change leads to an upgrading of occupational skills. However, early mass production probably led to a replacement of skilled craft workers with unskilled production workers. Goldin and Katz (1998) argue that this process was reversed in the years around World War I when technological change may have had a pro skill bias. Regardless of changes in the content of nonfarm occupations, the shift from farming to factory work was probably not considered as a step upward, or to a more technologically challenging job, by farmers.5 In addition to their autonomy, farmers have to master a number of trades including animal husbandry, crop management, and the entrepreneurial activities of buying and marketing. With our focus on industrial sectors, we attempt to capture the direct impact of industrialization on the structure of the labor force without additional assumptions of the skill levels or status of workers.

3.1 A Detailed Industrial Classification

For this analysis, we rely on the IPUMS variable "IND 1950," which represents a recoding of the reported industries from each decennial census from 1850 to 2000 to the 1950 census industry classification (for additional details, see http://www.ipums.org/usa/pwork/ind1950a.html). The industry question was first asked in the 1910 census. For prior censuses, IND 1950 was inferred from responses to the census question on occupations. The IND 1950 classification consists of 152 detailed (three-digit) categories plus "nonclassifiable" and "industry not reported" categories.6 Detailed industrial categories are generally nested within primary (one digit) and secondary (two digit) categories. The classification includes some detailed industries that emerged from technological change over time. For example, the detailed category #376 "Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment" did not include any workers until the 1910 census.

Any study of industrial change must attempt to reconcile the need for detail revealed by the tertiary level categories with the need for parsimony evident in the broader categories. The summary industrial classification used here is ad hoc, reflecting elements of both principles with the objective of understanding the creation and expansion of specialized industries during the Age of Industrialization. Two major sectors, AGRICULTURE and CONSTRUCTION, are only reported at the primary level, while TRADE is shown for only the two major secondary levels: WHOLESALE TRADE and RETAIL TRADE. The other primary sectors are subdivided into their detailed (tertiary) industries, though quite a few of the detailed categories have been aggregated. Our primary emphasis is on the MANUFACTURING sector which includes all secondary level categories and most of the tertiary industries. Following Singlemann (1978: 31), we reorganized the very heterogeneous SERVICE sector into three new major categories: BUSINESS SERVICES, PERSONAL SERVICES, and SOCIAL SERVICES. Our final classification is displayed in Appendix 1.

4. Changes in the Industrial Structure and Immigrant Participation: 1880 to 1920

Our first objective is to describe changes in the industrial structure of the gainful workforce from 1880 to 1920, and the share of recent immigrants and their descendents in this industrial transformation. Figure 1 shows the dramatic changes in the structure of the workforce in 1880 and 1920 for the 9 major industrial sectors. The single most striking change was the decline in agriculture (from 48 to 25% of the workforce) and the rise of manufacturing employment (up from 14 to 25%). There are also significant increases in the proportions working in mining, transportation and utilities, trade, producer services and social services. There was relative stability (from 4.6 to 4.8%) in construction, and a relative decline of employment in personal services (from 11.5 to 9.5%).

The source percentages in Figure 1 are presented for detailed industry categories in the first two columns in Table 1 , which provides an overview of the growth and transformation of the American workforce from 1880 to 1920. Columns 3 and 4 show the absolute and relative growth of workers in each industry over the forty years. Columns 5 and 6 show the immigrant share (both first and second generation) of each industrial sector. The final column shows the ratio of the growth of immigrant workers to the overall growth (or decline) of workers in each industry from 1880 to 1920.

Table 1

1880 to 1920 Change

% in Industry of Total LF

Absolute (in 000)

Relative to Total Growth

% Immigrant of Industry

Imm. Grwth as % of Total Grwth

1880

1920

1880

1920

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Machinery
0.7% 5.0% 1,872 11.3 48% 54% 55%

Although we consider these data comparable to the labor force during this period, technically, the data refer to gainful workers or all persons who reported a "gainful occupation" in the census enumeration ( Bancroft 1958: Appendix C; Carter 2006: 1-2 - 1-14). Accordingly, we refer to the gainful working population as the workforce, which does not connote the precision of the modern labor force concept and measurement.

Rapid growth and structural transformation are the two major trends in the American workforce from 1880 to 1920. The number of gainful workers in the United States more than doubled from 1880 to 1920 (18.1 to 40.5 million).7 Even more significant was the shift from an employment structure centered on agriculture to a much more diversified industrial employment structure. These patterns are illustrated with summary measures of "absolute growth" (indexed by the increase in the number of workers in the industry from 1880 to 1920) and "relative growth" (indexed by dividing the absolute growth in each industry by the expected growth, assuming that every industry grew at the same rate as the national workforce). A relative growth index value of 1.0 means the particular industry grew at the same rate as the national workforce (which more than doubled). A value of less than 1.0 means the industry experienced a below-average growth rate, and values greater than 1.0 above-average growth for the sector.

In 1880, at the eve of the age of mass migration and when almost half of the workforce was in the agricultural sector, immigrants and their children comprised about one-third of all workers. We include the second generation (the children of immigrants) as part of the immigrant community because they are reared and socialized by their foreign born parents and would not have been in the United States except for the migration of their parents. 8 The immigrant share increased to 40 percent of the workforce in 1920. Almost half of the total growth of 22 million workers from 1880 to 1920 can be attributed to the increase of first and second generation immigrant workers (the last column of Table 1 ).

4.1 Agriculture

For the first century after the nation's founding, the United States was an agricultural society, and most American farms were small scale household enterprises that relied on family labor. In the early 19 th century, upwards of two-thirds of the working population was employed in agriculture ( Taeuber and Taeuber 1971: 175). At the turn of the twentieth century, nearly two-thirds of Americans lived on farms or in villages and towns of less than five thousand residents ( Katz and Stern 2006: 8). Throughout the 19 th century, government priorities and spending reflected the dominance of rural and agricultural interests. One of the landmark expansions of the federal government was the Morrill Act of 1862, which created the Department of Agriculture and authorized the founding of land grant colleges ( Carter et al. 2006: 4-24; Atack, Bateman, and Parker 2000: 273).

From 1880 to 1920, agriculture added 2.1 million more workers (mostly prior to 1900), but the rate of growth in agriculture was only one-tenth (0.1) of the overall growth rate of the national workforce. By 1920, only one in four American workers remained in agriculture, and the American economy was increasingly centered in urban factories and offices rather than on farms. Although many immigrants were drawn to the agricultural frontier in the 18 th and 19 th centuries, only one of every five farmers was an immigrant or the child of an immigrant during the age of mass immigration from 1880 to 1920.

4.2 Manufacturing and Related Industries

The largest shift in the American workforce from 1880 to 1920 was the expansion of manufacturing employment from 14 to almost 25 percent of the workforce. If mining and construction were combined with manufacturing, one-third of Americans were industrial workers in 1920. Manufacturing employment grew more than twice as fast as the workforce as a whole from 1880 to 1920. In absolute terms, the manufacturing sector expanded from 2.5 to 10 million workers.

Within the manufacturing sector, the largest increases were registered in metals (iron and steel), which grew from 1.3 to 3.7% of the workforce, and in machinery, which grew from 0.7 to 5.0% of the workforce. Closely related to this was the expansion of coal mining (used to produce steel) from 0.5 to 2.1% of workers. More than one out of ten workers in the American economy in 1920 were producing steel, extracting the raw materials used to produce steel, or making machinery from steel (e.g., automobiles).9 The Chemical/Petroleum/Rubber sector, which included the automobile related industries of tire manufacturing and gasoline production, grew from 0.2 to 1.6% of workers.

Another important shift was the rise in apparel (clothing) manufacturing from 0.3 to 1.1% of workers, which paralleled the decline of relative workers in dressmaking shops (listed under Personal Services) from 1.3 to 0.6% of the workforce. In the early 20 th century, American women and men were able for the first time to buy inexpensive manufactured (ready made) dresses, shirts, and suits, and there was less dependence on home made and hand tailored clothing. With less expensive ready made clothing, fashions changed as well. Men and women replaced simple cloaks with fitted coats ( Cahan 1917).

The rapid growth of manufacturing from 1880 to 1920 relied heavily on immigrant labor. In the latter part of the 19 th century, the cotton manufacturing industry and the iron and steel industry relied heavily on "old immigrants" from Great Britain and Northwestern Europe, but in the early decades of the 20 th century, the rapid growth of these industries became increasingly dependent on "new immigrants" from Southern and Eastern Europe ( Perry 1978).

More than one-half of the net growth of 7.5 million workers in manufacturing from 1880 to 1920 was due to the increase of first and second generation workers over this period. The immigrant share was significant in all manufacturing industries, but proportionally less in wood and mineral products and a few other categories. Immigrants provided the majority of added workers in the rapidly growing iron and steel industry, machinery manufacturing, and textiles and apparel. The dominance of the Eastern European immigrants in apparel manufacture (and trade) in New York City is well known ( Kahan 1978), but immigrants were also over-represented in mining and construction and throughout the heavy industries in the Northeast and Midwest.

4.3 Transportation, Communications, and Utilities

The consequences of expansion in the manufacturing sector rippled through other sectors. This led to major changes in the organization of the economy and the structure of employment. The distribution of goods from manufacturing plants to households also required massive investments and expansion in transportation, communications, retailing, and a supportive institutional structure for the expansion of business, and an increasingly urban society. A governmental bureaucracy was needed to build roads, manage cities, and to educate the population for employment in factories and offices.

The transportation and communication sector added more than 2.3 million workers from 1880 to 1920, of which 1.2 million were added to the railway and railroad sector alone. The two million workers employed in the railroads and railway sector in 1920 comprised 5% of the total workforce. The telegraph was the only means of rapid long-distance communication in 1880 and the small number of workers employed in the sector (about 27,000) reflected the limited role of long distance communications (there were an additional 26,000 workers employed in postal services). By 1920, a brand new communications industry-the telephone-grew from zero to 279,000 workers or about 0.7 of the 1920 workforce.10

Immigrants played an important role in the growing transportation and communications sector, but their role was secondary to the 3 rd and higher generation population-the NBNP (Native Born of Native Parentage) population. For example, nearly two-thirds of the added workers in railroads were 3 rd and higher generation Americans. There was a great boom in railroad construction in late 19 th century America. By 1899, "every major city had a rail head that was connected to the national system" ( Cain 2006: 4-771; also see Mayer 1989: 928). The geographic dispersion of railroads, and relatively good wages in the industry, undoubtedly pulled many descendents of the native born workers into the railroad sector.

4.4 Wholesale and Retail Trade

The enormous outpouring of goods from the nation's factories had to be distributed and sold, mostly to domestic markets. Wholesale trade added almost 600,000 workers from 1880 to 1920, and retail trade grew by almost 2.4 million workers. One of every eight American workers in 1920 was employed in retail or wholesale trade-about one-half of the size of the manufacturing sector.

The late 19 th century witnessed the beginnings of mass retailing and the emergence of department stores in large cities ( Ward 1971: 94; Raff 2006: 4-706). Although most studies in the business literature focus on larger firms, most retail enterprises were probably small family owned stores. As late as 1899, the number of proprietors in retail sales was approximately equal to the number of employees in the sector ( Carter et al. 2006: 4-713). The rapid growth of workers in sales were most likely employed in very small shops or as peddlers who sold goods to farm families and other households in scattered rural communities. The availability of new manufactured goods, linked by an expanding transportation system and a network of wholesale and retail enterprises, created a national market for consumer goods that would gradually supplant home production

Immigrants, especially the second generation, provided for about half of the added workers in trade from 1880 to 1920, primarily in general merchandise, food, and apparel stores. Immigrant merchants were often reputed to create new markets through peddling goods to remote regions and in extending credit to people without accumulated savings.

4.4 Services

The very heterogeneous collection of service industries is reorganized here to emphasize the key distinctions between producer, personal, and social services ( Singlemann 1978). Producer services include banking, insurance, real estate, accounting, and other business services that play an important intermediary role in urban and industrial economies. Social services include education, health care, public administration, and other services that are generated by the government to meet the collective needs of communities and individuals. Personal services is the residual category and corresponds most closely to the image of service occupations, and it includes private household workers, dressmakers, and shoe repair shops. This sector also includes repair services (including auto repair), and entertainment services (including movie theaters and recreation). There is a certain amount of arbitrariness in all industrial classifications, including this one. Hotels and lodging places are classified as a personal service, but eating and drinking establishments are considered as part of the retail trade sector.

Concurrent with the creation of an industrial society from 1880 to 1920 was the expansion of business and the beginnings of public provision of education, health care, and welfare - these are evident in the increases of workers in producer services and social services. As business and social services expanded from 1880 to 1920, personal services declined. The decline of personal services was primarily of private household workers (domestics), which declined from 7 to just over 4% of workers from 1880 to 1920. There were also relative declines in some other traditional personal services (dressmaking and repair services), but increases in some "modern" personal services, such as auto repair services, hotels, and the theatre and motion picture industry.

Producer services grew almost 4 times as fast as the overall workforce from 1880 to 1920, and more than doubled their relative share from 1.6 to 4.1% of all workers. The largest components of the increase in producer services were in banking, insurance, real estate, and related business services ( Ward 1971: 99). The absolute number of workers in these business industries is small, but rapid expansion reflects the increasing complexity of an industrial economy. The efficient management and coordination of large firms and corporations required a growing army of accountants, bookkeepers, and other office personnel.

The relative growth of social services from 3.2 to 6.9% was fueled by increasing numbers of teachers, health and hospital workers, and governmental employment at all levels, including postal workers. The expansion of government services was shaped by the increasing urbanization of the population. The concentration of people in cities made it easier to provide proximate access to schooling, health care, and other services including transportation, sanitation, and public safety. Custom, kinship networks, and voluntary associations are often sufficient to satisfy collective welfare needs in low density settlements and rural areas, but the growth of government appears to be an inevitable concomitant of an urban and industrial society. Government employment grew from 3 to 5 times faster than the workforce as a whole.

As the new service industries, including education, government employment, and business services, grew from 1880 to 1920, the second generation participated proportional to their numbers, but 3 rd and higher generation Americans were the majority of added workers. This was particularly true in social service fields such as health, education, the post office, and government employment more generally. By and large, these were good jobs that required educational credentials and social capital, which immigrants were much less likely to possess.

The growth of professional employment in the service economy was a natural accompaniment of the expansion and development. Perhaps, immigrants were more likely to "push up" native born workers than to crowd them out. Michael Haines (2000: 202) observes that as immigrants occupied "a disproportionate share of the lower skill and lower status positions, they made possible, in some sense, the better-paid higher status occupations of the native white population." This interpretation has also been made by Lieberson (1980: chapter 10) in his theory of labor market queues. Lieberson's focus was on the concentration of African Americans in the least desirable occupations in 1900, as they had few resources and encountered the greatest discrimination in northern labor markets. Although new immigrants were ahead of African Americans in most labor queues, the growth of the overall labor market through immigration created demand for managerial, professional, and clerical employment that was more likely to be filled by older stock white Americans than by immigrants or African Americans.

5. A Model to Estimate the 3rd Generation Immigrants by Industry

The underlying question that motivates this analysis is the impact of immigration on the transformation of the American economy from a primarily agrarian structure to one based on manufacturing and associated industries. Would it have been possible to have had the American industrial revolution without immigrants? Or alternatively, would the industrial revolution have been smaller, slower, or more costly? In the prior section, we focused on the magnitude and economic roles of the first and second generation immigrant population. In this section, we extend the analysis with an estimate of magnitude of 3 rd generation immigrants-the grandchildren of immigrants and their economic roles.

The grandchildren of immigrants are unlikely to have attachments to their ancestral homeland and are probably well assimilated into American society. If we desire to attribute the 3 rd generation as part of the immigrant contribution, the skeptical reader may wonder why we do not also count the 4 th and higher generations as also part of the immigrant share. Clearly, there is a thin line from "reasonable" assumptions to a reductio ad absurdum argument that the immigrant contribution includes all Americans. Our claim is that 3 rd generation immigrants in the early 20 th century are the recent descendants of European immigrants who were more likely to have settled in cities than to have moved to the agricultural frontier. In 1880, one-third of all workers were composed of first and second generation immigrants and most lived in cities. We assume that 3 rd generation immigrants were much more likely to have been exposed to emerging opportunities in the urban industrial economy than older stock native born Americans in the late 19 th and early 20 th century.

In this section, we present the methods and results of a "Shift-Share" estimation (akin to indirect standardization) of the industrial structure of the grandchildren of immigrants in 1920. There are two components to estimate: immigration generations and the industrial structure by immigrant generation. We first address the measurement of immigration generations.

The 1920 work force can be divided into two components: immigrants (counting both the foreign born and the second generation) and the native born of native parentage (NBNP). Although the NBNP population is typically assumed to reflect a society without immigration, the distinction between the immigrant and NBNP populations is not fixed, since the 3 rd and higher order generation descendents of immigrants are counted as part of the native born population. Since immigrants were disproportionately living in cities and held industrial jobs in 1880, it seems plausible to assume that their grandchildren are probably over-represented in industrial employment in 1920 relative to the grandchildren of the 1880 NBNP Population.

The logic of our analytical approach is diagrammed in Figure 2 . The two columns represent the 1880 and 1920 work force by immigrant generation. In both years, we can measure only three generational groupings: (1) the foreign born, (2) the second generation-the children of immigrants, and (3) third and higher generations-NBNP. The 1920 workforce is composed of some 1880 workers (those age 20 in 1880 would be age 60 in 1920), the descendants of the 1880 population, and recent immigrants and their descendants. It is impossible to make precise estimates of generational continuity and succession because of the complexity of demographic structure and changes, including variations in age structure, labor force exits and entries, mortality, and differential fertility ( Duncan 1966a). Although most workers in 1880 would have retired (or died) before 1920, some are still working. Some 1880 workers have no children (or no working children) 40 years later, while other 1880 workers may have been "replaced" by one or more descendents.

Nonetheless, we can provide a crude estimate of the contribution of recent immigration to the 1920 workforce with several simplifying assumptions. The first assumption is that the majority of the first and second generation workers in 1920 were recent immigrants. Some of these immigrants (or their parents) may well have arrived before 1880. Thus, the label of "recent immigrants" is somewhat broader than the 1880 to 1920 period. The estimation of the third generation requires even more heroic assumptions about the fraction of the 1920 third and higher generation workers (NBNP) that are descendents of immigrants in 1880.

The analytical task is illustrated in Figure 2 , by the dashed line that identifies the 1920 3 rd generation from the broader category of the 3 rd and higher generation population. To do this, we assume that the ratio of the 3 rd generation population (grandchildren of immigrants) to the 3 rd and higher generation population in 1920 is proportional to the ratio of the 2 nd generation to the 2 nd and higher generation population in 1880. We have three of the four numbers in this equation (1880 2 nd generation, 1880 2 nd and higher generations, and 1920 3 rd and higher generation populations), and it is straightforward to estimate the missing element-the 1920 3 rd generation. 1920 3 rd Gen = [1880 2 nd Gen/1880 2 nd & Higher Gen]* 1920 3 rd & Higher Gen

This equation assumes that the relative magnitude of 1920 3 rd generation is roughly comparable to the descendents of the 1880 2 nd generation. The demographic metabolism that leads to generational replacement over time is exceedingly complex, and our simple model does not directly measure these processes (for more discussion, see Blau and Duncan 1967: 112). Our estimation rests on an assumption about proportionality-that the 1880 2 nd generation (relative to the 2 nd and higher generational total) is proportional to the 1920 3 rd generation (relative to the 3 rd and higher generational total). One virtue of this assumption is its transparency - it does not specify demographic mechanisms, but simply assumes that generational replacement over a 40 year period (from all mechanisms) is roughly proportional to the initial generational composition.

The next step is to measure the industrial composition of the 1920 labor force within each immigrant generation: 1 st, 2 nd, 3 rd, and 4 th and higher. The industrial composition of the 1 st and 2 nd generations is directly measured, but estimating the industrial classification of 1920 3 rd generation (and 4 th & higher) can be done with an adaptation of the standard "Shift-Share" model. The Shift-Share model is often used to measure the expected changes in a subset of the population (state or locality) by assuming that change (share) is proportional to the change in the total population (national). The difference between the expected distribution and the actual distribution for the local area is a residual (shift) that is due to local factors that are independent of the national trend.

In this analysis, we first estimate an expected distribution by industry assuming that the growth rate of workers in each industry from 1880 to 1920 is equal to the national growth rate of the workforce. The next step is to measure the difference between the expected and actual workers in each industry. The logic of the estimation of these two components of industrial transformation-Continuity and Shifts-is diagramed in Figure 3 .

Continuity is measured as the "expected 1920 work force by industry", which assumes 1920 workers are distributed by industry proportional to the industry structure of their ancestors in the 1880 workforce. In other words, the expected workers in each industry in 1920 are assumed to increase at the same rate as "natural growth" of the workforce from 1880 to 1920. The natural growth of the workforce (excluding 1 st generation immigrants) "r" is measured as the ratio of the 3 rd and higher generation population in 1920 to the 2 nd and higher generation labor force in 1880. Specifically, we assume that 24.2 million 3 rd and higher generation workers in 1920 are (approximately) the descendents of the 12.9 million 2 nd and higher generation workers in 1880. This succession process or "continuity" includes a host of demographic processes including aging and the differential "replacement" of 1880 workers by their adult children and grandchildren in 1920. The multiplication of this ratio (approximately 1.9) times the number of 1880 2 nd and higher generation workers in each industry in 1880 yields an "expected" number of 1920 3 rd and higher generation workers in each industry.

Exp 1920 3 rd&Higher Gen in Ind(i) = 1880 2 nd&Higher Gen in Ind(i) ∗ r

5.1 Estimation of Expected Number of Workers by Industry and Generation

This formula assumes that the overall growth rate "r," is the same across all industries. This formula can be extended to divide the 1920 3 rd & higher generation expected populations into two components: the expected 1920 3 rd generation population and the expected 1920 4 th & higher generation population.

The overall natural growth rate is assumed to be equivalent for the 3 rd generation population and the 4 th and higher generation population. The expected distributions of the labor force by industry (and generation) from 1880 to 1920 assume continuity-1920 workers followed their parents (or grandparents) in the same industries. This assumes that skills, preferences, and informal mechanisms of recruitment are passed along across generations. As measured by the index of dissimilarity, the industrial structure of the 1880 first generation is more similar to that of the 1920 second generation than to the 1920 3 rd and higher generations. Of course, workers change employment from time to time, and children do not always follow in the same line of work as their parents. The forces of supply and demand, technological change, and other market forces create pressures to which workers must respond. The measured differences between the "actual" 1920 workers in each industry and the "expected" number are labeled (net) "Shifts."

The next step is to allocate the Shifts between industries to the 3 rd generation and the 4 th and higher generations in 1920. The overall Shift for the 3 rd and higher generations in 1920 is distributed proportional to the relative size of the 1880 generations. Specifically,

The results of this simple estimation of Continuity and Shifts are show in Table 2 .

Table 2

Expected Workforce in 1920

SHIFT (Actual -Expected)

ACTUAL 1920 WORKFORCE (in thousands)

4th + Gen

3rd Gen

4th + Gen

3rd Gen

SHARE OF 1920 LABOR FORCE FROM:

Immigrant Generation

Based on 1880:

Based on 1880:

From 1920

From1880 2nd Gen

Total

Total

3rd +

2nd

1st

3+ Gen

2nd Gen

3+ Gen

2nd Gen

1st & 2nd

Expected

Shift

Imm. Share

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

(r * 1880 3rd +)

(r * 1880 2nd)

(3+4)/(1)

(6/1)

(8/1)

(9+10+11)

Machinery

2,007

921
554
531

119

45
548 209
54%

2%

10%

67%

438 Carpets, rugs, and other floor coverings

34

10

11

13

5

8

− 1

− 2

71%

25%

−6%

89%

489 Leather products, except footwear

39

15

11

13

14

7

− 4

− 2

62%

19%

−6%

75%

Miscellenous

1,035

446
302
288

363

163

− 56

− 25

57%

16%

−2%

70%

Total Work Force (Gainful Workers)
40,519

24,232

8,314

7,973

20,150

4,082

0

0

40%

10%

0%

50%

Column 1 through 4 in Table 2 show the 1920 workforce by industrial sector for all workers and for each immigrant generation (3 rd and higher, 2 nd, and 1 st). The next two columns show the estimated workforce for the 4 th and higher and the 3 rd generations by industry in 1920, assuming intergenerational continuity. The next columns show net shifts, or the differences between the actual and expected workforce by industry, for the same immigrant generations. Let's consider the manufacturing sector as an example to illustrate these calculations.

5.2 The Contribution of the 3rd Generation

There were a little more than 10 million workers in manufacturing in 1920-about one quarter of the total workforce. This figure is in the first column of Table 2 in the row labeled MANUFACTURING. The next three columns show the absolute number of workers in each industry by generation in 1920. First and second generation immigrants comprised 2.9 and 2.5 million workers in manufacturing -or about 53% of the 10 million workers in the sector in 1920 (as noted in Table 1 ). This figure, as large as it is, is an underestimate of the contribution of immigration to the manufacturing sector in 1920. Recall that 58% of 1880 immigrant workers (which included both 1 st and 2 nd generation) were employed in manufacturing ( Table 1 ). Some of the 1880 immigrants and their descendents are included in the 1 st and 2 nd generation in 1920, but many others have been absorbed into the NBNP (3 rd and higher generation).

Following the logic of the formulae presented above, Columns 5 and 6 show the expected numbers of 1920 workers in each industry for the 1920 4 th & higher generations and the 1920 3 rd generation, respectively. A shorthand designation of these calculations is that the expected 1920 4 th and higher workers are the descendents of the 1880 3 rd and higher generation workers and the expected 1920 3 rd generation are the descendents of the 1880 2 nd generation. However, descendents is only an approximate term, since there are multiple demographic mechanisms that might be responsible for the replacement of the 1880 workforce by workers in 1920, including some individuals who are in the workforce at both time points. The expected generational figures in each industry are generated by an assumption of intergenerational continuity whereby each generation follows their parents (or grandparents) in the same sector of the economy. The measurement of this process is generated by the assumption of proportionality-workers in 1920 by generation were distributed by industrial sector in similar proportions to the prior generation in 1880.

The next two columns, 7 and 8, in Table 2 show the net Shifts (for the 4 th and higher and the 3 rd generations) between the actual and expected numbers in 1920 workforce by industry. Although we have only the actual 1920 workforce for the 3 rd and higher generation, we can estimate shifts for the 4 th and higher and the 3 rd generation in 1920, by assuming proportionality with the 1880 generational composition (the 3 rd and higher generation and the 2 nd generation).

These estimates are combined in columns 9, 10, and 11, which show the percentage of 1920 workers in each industry that can be attributed to 1 st and 2 nd generation workers, 3 rd generation continuity, and 3 rd generation shift. These three components are totaled in column 12 to show our estimates of the share of 1920 workers that might be thought to be the result of recent immigration. The results of this exercise are summarized in Figure 4 , which shows the composition of the 9 major industrial sectors in 1920 by immigrant generation.

In the case of manufacturing, 53% of 1920 workers are immigrants (first and second generation), another 10% might be attributed to 3 rd generation continuity (based on the distribution of 2 nd generation workers in 1880), and the other 6% are estimated to be 3 rd generation shifts or the share of the descendents of 1880 2 nd generation workers who left their parental (grandparental) industry to become a worker in manufacturing. These estimates suggest that over two-thirds of manufacturing workers in 1920 are immigrants or the descendents of recent immigrants.

Most farmers in 1920 were the descendents of old stock Americans. Of the 10 million agricultural workers in 1920, only a quarter was first or second generation immigrants. There was a substantial exodus out of farming-the shift-share model estimates that 4 million 4 th (or higher) generation NBNP descendants of farmers were working in some other sector in 1920.

The mining sector, as shown in Table 1 , grew rapidly from 1880 to 1920 with relative decline in the immigrant share from 64 to 47%. The estimates (and assumptions) in Table 2 , show that all of the native born (NBNP) increase in mining is composed of the grandchildren of immigrants. This is also true of many other sectors in which it appears that the immigrant share declined from 1880 to 1920, such as railroad workers. Note, however, that the workforce in the new petroleum and natural gas industry was disproportionately composed of 4 th and higher generation Americans.

As noted earlier, almost 7 in 10 workers in manufacturing in 1920 were 1 st, 2 nd or 3 rd generation immigrants. This was particularly true in the growth sectors of iron and steel, machinery (but only one half of workers in the new motor vehicle industry), meat packing, and textiles and apparel. More than one half of railroad workers in 1920 had some foreign roots as did two thirds of workers in retail sales.

Although the addition of the 3 rd generation increases the participation of recent immigrants to the service sector, the role of immigrants in many of the relatively good jobs in teaching, health, the post office, and other government services is much lower than in manufacturing and other sectors with less desirable jobs. By virtue of their education and social connections, the descendents of long resident Americans had a leg up on entry into many of the better jobs in 1920. To the extent that there are differential intergenerational transition rates because of proximity, ethnic recruitment, and discrimination, these figures underestimate the advantages of long resident Americans relative to newcomers.

6. The Counterfactual

Would native born workers have been more willing to enter the industrial sector had immigrant labor not been available? Although it is impossible to answer this question definitively, we can review the potential labor reserves and speculate about their likely responses based the extensive research literature on domestic migration patterns.

The potential source of reserve labor in the United States in the late 19 th century and early 20 th century were the sons and daughters of small scale farmers in the Northeast, Midwest, and South. Many of these farms were relatively small and could barely support a family. With a growing population, many of the second and third sons of independent farmers had to descend to the ranks of tenancy or farm laborer, secure funds to purchase a farm (or marry a woman who was an heir to a farm), or seek their fortune elsewhere ( Wright 1988).

Some segments of the rural population were worse off than others. Over the last half of the 19 th century, a large fraction of Southern white famers had lost their land, and became tenant sharecroppers growing cotton on marginal lands ( Raper and Reid 1941, Newby 1989). Even more precarious was the situation of African American tenant farmers, whose plight was comparable to those of persecuted peasantry ( Raper 1936). In addition to the economic privations shared by white and black sharecroppers, African Americans encountered omnipresent racism and rising violence in the Jim Crow South.

Poverty, even abject poverty, is not always an impetus to long distance migration. The thresholds that break the bonds of place vary across time and place. Depravation creates push factors but knowledge of opportunities in other locations, cultural preferences, and the support of family and friends in destination areas are also important ( Massey et al. 1993).

When mass migration from Europe was interrupted during World War I and then halted in the 1920s, Southern blacks migrated in large numbers to become industrial laborers in Northern cities. The African American Great Migration from the 1920s through the 1950s was an epochal movement ( Fligstein 1981; Tolnay 2003). The spread of the boll weevil and farm mechanization laid waste to even marginal employment in much of the rural South. There was a parallel trek of white workers from the South to northern cities ( Berry 2000; Gregory 2005; Kirby 1987: Ch. 9). The destinations and timing of these domestic migrations suggest that Southern born blacks and whites were a partial substitute for European immigrant labor in industrializing cities of the North. Collins (1997) concludes that mass migration from Europe delayed the migration of black workers from the South.

The situation of white farmers outside the South, and their children, is more difficult to assess. A common presumption is that farming was a preferred way of life and migration, especially to the city, was the last resort even for the landless children of farmers. This assumption seems to be consistent with evidence on migration patterns. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the majority of the farm origin population remained on farms or in rural small town areas as adults, though not necessarily in their exact place of origin ( Taeuber 1967: 25). Only a small percentage moved to large metropolitan cities.

This preference for an agricultural way of life was grounded in the historical settlement of the United States. Prior to the late 19 th century, cities were not engines of economic growth, but were primarily centers of commerce and administration and transportation hubs. For the first half of the 19 th century, over 90% of the American population lived in rural areas. Immigrants arrived in port cities, but most probably moved on as soon as they could. During the 18 th and the first half of the 19 th century, the shortage of land in eastern states impelled most immigrants as well as many of the children of older settlers to seek their fortunes on the American frontier, first in Appalachia, then in the Ohio Valley, and eventually in the Great Plains ( Ferrie 2006: 1: 489). As the Eastern seaboard was filled in-at least in terms of agriculture-the western frontier was the source of land for agricultural settlement by immigrants and native born Americans without an inheritance ( Atack, Bateman, and Parker 2000).

The situation changed in the late 19 th century as most of the potential arable land on the American frontier was settled and the economic development of urban industries expanded employment opportunities in cities. With the development of the modern industrial economy, cities offered expanded employment in factories, commerce, and in offices. For persons with the right set of education, skills, and ambitions, the urban economy offered opportunities for social mobility that was impossible in any other location. There is evidence that the well educated sons of farmers were able to find well paid jobs as teachers, clerks, merchants, and in the skilled trades ( Wright 1988: 201).

But for most white Americans with limited skills and ambitions, it was not obvious that menial factory or office work in a city was a step up from living on a farm or in a small town. Most factory jobs were probably not highly desirable. As the author of the 1920 census report on immigrants commented, "It would seem that, generally speaking, the foreign born population is engaged in more laborious, disagreeable, and probably, less skilled and less remunerative work than are the native born white" ( Carpenter 1927: 271). One study reported that the accident rate for non English-speaking workers in one steel mill was twice the average for all workers and that one quarter of all recent immigrant steel workers were injured or killed ( Brody 1960: 100-101). Most historical and comparative studies conclude that the process of industrialization was a profoundly alienating experience for most workers ( Kerr et al. 1964: Chapter 6, Rodgers 1981). Factories that tried to impose industrial discipline were plagued by high rates of absenteeism and turnover.

The children of farmers who left farming were disproportionately represented in the lower rungs of the occupational hierarchy ( Freedman and Freedman 1956, Blau and Duncan 1967: 28). In addition to the loss of autonomy in factory employment, migrants from farm families had to give up the familiarity of family and friends and the economic security of food production. If forced to migrate, many native born white Americans from rural or small towns may have preferred to seek their fortune in the West than to join the ranks of the urban proletariat in industrializing cities. In the late 19 th and early 20 th century long distance (interstate) migration was much more likely to lead to greater occupational mobility than short distance moves ( Ferrie 2005: 213).

Almost 90% of native-born white inter-state migrants went to rural areas during the 19 th century, and the proportion migrating to cities remained modest in the early decades of the 20 th century ( Hall and Ruggles 2004). Similar patterns are also evident in Table 3 , which shows net lifetime migration of African Americans and of whites by nativity for each decade from 1870 to 1950. The rapidly expanding industrial economy of the North and Midwest drew disproportionately on immigrant labor and then on African American workers from the South. From 1870 to 1920, the population growth of the Northeast and Midwest included almost 14 million immigrants, but there was negative net migration of 2.5 million native born whites out of the region. Following the closing of the immigration door, more than 2.5 million African American net migrants (from the South) were added to the population of the Northeast and Midwest from 1920 to 1950, while there was a continuing exodus of native born whites from the region (3.3 million from 1920 to 1950).

Table 3

NORTHEAST/NORTH CENTRAL

SOUTH

WEST

Native Born

Foreign Born

Native Born

Foreign Born

Native Born

Foreign Born

White

Black

White

Black

White

Black

Examining these data, Hatton and Williamson (1998: 164-173) conclude that the competition with immigrants for jobs lowered the wages of the native born (or slowed their rate of increase) and that native born workers were crowded-out from urban labor markets in the Northeast and Midwest. In a detailed empirical study of the relationship between immigrant concentrations, manufacturing wages, and the inter-state (and inter-county) migration of the native born, Carter and Sutch (2006) find no support for Hatton and Williamson's claims that the presence of immigrants lowered the wages and "crowded out" native born workers in industrial labor markets.11 Wages, adjusted for cost of living, rose for manufacturing workers and unskilled workers during the age of immigration ( Rees 1961; Margo 2006). Moreover, Carter and Sutch (2006) show that there is a positive correlation between the destinations of immigrants and native born workers from 1900 to 1910. Rural laborers, both native-born and from abroad, were responding to declining prospects in their places of origin and to the new opportunities in the same destinations.

Many native born workers did go to the industrial cities, but many more sought their fortune in the West. The majority of immigrants, and the African Americans that followed them, settled in the industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest. The willingness of immigrants and African Americans to work in the lowest rungs of urban employment may have been largely due to the lack of better alternatives. Most immigrants had been pushed out of their places of origin and had to brave considerable costs and hardship to emigrate to the United States. The fact that one-third of European immigrants from 1908 to 1923 returned to Europe is testimony of the difficulties of adjusting to life and of finding employment in industrializing America ( Wyman 1993: 10).

Although industrial wages continued to rise during the age of industrialization and immigration, it seems that the prevailing wages, working conditions, and urban life were not sufficiently attractive to many native born workers who had social attachments and security, if not prosperity, in their places of origin. Immigrants and their children remained the mainstay of industrial labor until the 1920s. Perhaps higher wages and better working conditions were necessary to attract a sufficient supply of domestic labor to work in the steel mills, stockyards, and other sectors of the industrial economy in the middle decades of the 20 th century.

7. Discussion and Conclusions

As the American industrial revolution spread in the late 19 th century and the early decades of the 20 th century, the United States passed Great Britain to become the most productive industrial nation in the world ( Romer 1996). In one of the most widely cited studies of this transition, Wright (1990) identifies a number of factors, including the discovery and development of mineral resources (coal, iron, petroleum, copper, and others) and the export of high quality producer goods as key to the American industrial development and rapid economic growth. Other researchers have emphasized the significance of the early American investment in human capital and the spread of public schooling as the primary reason for the ascendance of the American economy during the age of industrialization. In an interesting aside, Wright (1990: 662) notes that most of the workers in the heavy industries were not well educated native born Americans, but immigrants who were not particularly well educated by world standards. He goes on to say, "Key industries like iron and steel and motor vehicles paid high wages to unskilled workers (who were nonetheless much cheaper than the skilled craft workers used with older technologies) presumably because it was rough, disagreeable, demanding work, and because it was vital to have an ample excess labor supply available" ( Wright 1990: 662).

In this study, we have estimated the representation of the immigrant population, including the children and grandchildren of immigrants, in the industrial transformation of the American workforce from 1880 to 1920. This exercise involves a number of assumptions, mostly about the relative proportionality of the 3 rd generation in 1920 to the 2 nd generation in 1880. There are also many other potential problems of measurement, including inferring industry from occupational reports and unclear boundaries of the gainful worker population. Although we make no claims to exactitude, there is little doubt that the American workforce was heavily dependent on immigrant labor in the early 20 th century, and the manufacturing workforce was almost completely dependent on immigrant workers. Most prior studies of the role of industrial labor during these years have acknowledged the centrality of immigrant labor, but they underestimated their numbers because second and third generation immigrants were counted as part of the native born workforce.

Adjusting the immigrant share to include second generation workers is straightforward because parental birthplace was routinely measured in American censuses. Adding the 3 rd generation required a more complicated estimation procedure that relied on fairly crude assumptions. Our estimates of the 3 rd generation add another 15 to 20 percentage points to the prior estimates that about 50% of workers in most manufacturing industries were of immigrant stock. The results presented here show that 1 st, 2 nd and 3 rd generation immigrants comprised 70 to 80% in several core manufacturing industries.

These are conservative estimates (which would underestimate the true level of the 3 rd generation in manufacturing) because third generation immigrant workers are assumed to be no more likely to shift to the manufacturing sector than the workforce as a whole. We expect that the children and grandchildren of urban residents from the mid 19 th century would have been much more likely to have entered industrial employment than the descendents of farmers. In 1880, even before industrialization was in full swing, 1 st and 2 nd generation immigrants comprised over one-third of the American workforce. Almost two-thirds of all miners, 41% of construction workers, 57% of manufacturing workers, 41% of railway workers, and 49% of retail sales workers in 1880 were immigrants or the children of immigrants.

The disproportionate concentration of the immigrant community in cities and nonagricultural employment in 1880 meant that their progeny were proximate to the exploding growth of employment in factories, offices, and retail trade in the late 19 th and early 20 th century. The 3 rd generation immigrants, with their American education, were probably able to rise above the less desirable jobs on the factory floor and found employment as foremen and even in the front office.

If we assume that the urban children and grandchildren of immigrants were prone to find employment in the industrial economy, can we also assume that the children of farmers were motivated to avoid industrial employment? We do not have direct measures on preferences, but over 50% of the sons of farmers found their first job in agriculture circa 1920 and about 40% were still in agricultural jobs several decades later ( Blau and Duncan 1967: Tables 3.3 and 3.8). Most of the decline in agricultural employment over the first half of the 20 th century was a result of inter-cohort shifts rather than intra-cohort changes ( Duncan 1966b). These figures suggest that, in spite of the economic pressures on farmers, the primary reasons for departure were the lack of an inheritance rather than discouragement with farming as a way of life. Most of the farm origin migrants in the early 20 th century went to rural areas or small towns and relatively few moved to large metropolitan cities ( Taeuber 1967: 25). As noted earlier, there was substantial net lifetime out-migration of native born whites during the age of industrialization from the Northeast and Midwest to the West.

This avoidance of large cities, and industrial employment, by old stock white Americans who were reared in rural areas and small towns was probably reinforced by popular culture. For most of American history, cities, where most immigrants settled, were derided and feared as places filled with dangerous people and radical ideas ( Hawley 1972: 521).12 Popular beliefs about the natural superiority of a rural way of life were intertwined with ethnic stereotypes of urban residents and the corruption of people who moved to cities. These stereotypes probably discouraged the children of farmers in the late 19 th century and early 20 th century from migrating to cities and taking the unskilled jobs in the industrial economy.

The continued demand for unskilled labor in industrial cities after the cutoff of immigration in the 1920s certainly played a major role in continuing, if not originating, the African American Great Migration from the 1920s to the 1960s ( Collins 1997; Tolnay 2003). There was also a parallel wave of Southern white labor to Northern industrial cities that began during World War I and grew during the 1920s, 1940s, and 1950s ( Berry 2000; Gregory 2005). If there had not been the massive wave of European immigration from 1880 to 1920, the demand for labor may have started earlier and drew even larger numbers from the dispossessed Southern peasantry. There is substantial literature on the poverty and hardships of sharecroppers and tenant farmers, both black and white in the rural south ( Raper 1936, 1943; Raper and Reid. 1941).

However, the scale of the demand for industrial employment from 1880 to 1920 might have overwhelmed the potential labor reserves. For readers who may not accept the assumptions used to pad our estimate of the impact of immigration with 2.8 million 3 rd generation workers in 1920, there were still 5.3 million 1 st and 2 nd generation workers in manufacturing (directly measured in the 1920 census). Replacing these 5.3 million immigrant workers in manufacturing would have required shifting one-quarter of all 3 rd and higher generation workers in 1920 from other sectors to manufacturing.13 To accomplish even some fraction of this would have required much greater incentives, both in terms of pay and working conditions, than those offered to immigrants. Without immigrant labor, it seems unlikely that the American industrial revolution would have been achieved at the same pace, scale, and profitability that it did. Our claim is not that immigrant labor caused the American industrial revolution; there were a number of factors that played an important role in this epochal process. Immigrant labor, however, may well have been a necessary condition for the pace and scale of the rise of the manufacturing sector from 1880 to 1920.

Acknowledgments

The authors are deeply indebted to Patty Glynn for her statistical advice and assistance and to Brian Gatton, Avery Guest, Matthew Sobek, Stewart Tolnay, and the anonymous reviewers for their detailed criticisms and comments of earlier visions of this paper. All remaining errors are the responsibility of authors.

Appendix 1. Industry classification used in this study

AGRICULTURE

MINING

206 Metal mining

216 Coal mining

226 Crude petroleum and natural gas extraction

236 Nonmettalic mining and quarrying, except fuel

246 CONSTRUCTION

MANUFACTURING
306-326 Wood and Mineral Products (incl. logging/sawmills) Metals (Steel and Iron)
336 Blast furnaces, steel works, & rolling mills

337 Other primary iron and steel industries

338 Primary nonferrous industries

346 Fabricated steel products

347 Fabricated nonferrous metal products

348 Not specified metal industries
Machinery
356 Agricultural machinery and tractors

357 Office and store machines

358 Misc machinery

367 Electrical machinery, equipment and supplies

376 Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment

378 Ship and boat building and repairing

379 Railroad and misc transportation equipment

406-429 Food & Tobacco
Textiles/Footwear/Leather
436 Knitting mills

437 Dyeing and finishing textiles, except knit goods

438 Carpets, rugs, and other floor coverings

439 Yarn, thread, and fabric

446 Misc textile mill products

448 Apparel and accessories

449 Misc fabricated textile products

487 Leather: tanned, curried, and finished

488 Footwear, except rubber

489 Leather products, except footwear
457-459 Paper and Printing 466-478 Chemical/Petro/Rubber 387-399 & 499 Miscellaneous
TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION AND UTILITIES

506 Railroads and railway

516 Street railways and bus lines

526 Trucking service

527 Warehousing and storage

536 Taxicab service

546 Water transportation

578 Telephone

579 Telegraph

586 Electric light and power

587 Gas and steam supply systems

WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE
606-627 Wholesale 636-699 Retail
PRODUCER SERVICES

716 Banking and credit

726 Security and commodity brokerage and invest companies

736 Insurance

746 Real estate

806 Advertising

807 Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services

808 Misc business services

879 Legal services

898 Engineering and architectural services

PERSONAL SERVICES

816 Auto repair services and garages

817 Misc repair services

826 Private households

836 Hotels and lodging places

846 Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing

847 Dressmaking shops

848 Shoe repair shops

849 Misc personal services

857 Theaters and motion pictures

858 Bowling alleys, and billiard and pool parlors

859 Misc entertainment and recreation services

SOCIAL SERVICES

868 Medical and other health services, except hospitals

869 Hospitals

888 Educational services

896 Welfare and religious services

897 Nonprofit membership organizs.

899 Misc professional and related

906 Postal service

916 Federal public administration

926 State public administration

936 Local public administration

Footnotes

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2006 annual meetings of the Population Association of America and at colloquia at the Department of Sociology, University of British Columbia, the Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology, University of Washington, and the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota.

¹Industrial production experienced an almost five-fold expansion of value added in manufacturing and mining from 1880 to 1915 ( Davis 2006: 3-23-24 and 3-25). Manufacturing's share of value added in commodity production rose more rapidly from 1879 to 1894 than in any other period of the 19 th century ( Fogel 1964: 121).

² The children of immigrants includes native born persons who have at least one foreign born parent.

³"Considering the magnitude and duration of this movement, it is difficult to exaggerate its importance as a factor in the economic growth of the United States. Since immigration brought in a large labor force, the cost of whose rearing and training was borne elsewhere, it clearly represented an enormous capital investment that dwarfed any capital inflows of the more orthodox type-a conclusion that stands with any reasonable estimate we can make of the money value of labor." ( Kuznets 1971a: 357).

⁴ The major exceptions were Charlestown, South Carolina and Washington, DC.

⁵Occupational prestige scales rank farmers above unskilled workers, while occupational socioeconomic scales consider them about the same, see Duncan 1961.

⁶ About 13% of workers in the 1880 census IPUMS file did not have a known industry (codes 997 and 998). However, almost all did have a reported occupation (most were laborers), and this allowed us to impute industries based on the distribution of industries for those with a known occupation. We are grateful to Matthew Sobek who suggested this method.

⁷This fast pace of growth has not slackened. The U.S. labor force also doubled from about 70 to 140 million workers from 1960 to 2000 ( Carter et al. 2006: 2: 83-86).

⁸ The second generation is defined by census practice to include those with two foreign born parents and those with one foreign born parent.

⁹ This is the sum of coal mining, metals (iron and steel) manufacturing, and machinery manufacturing.

¹⁰The absolute figures are not reported in Table 1 , but can be obtained by multiplying the proportion in the industry by the total workforce.

¹¹A less technical version of Carter and Sutch's working paper is available from the Social Science Research Council website ( Carter and Sutch 2007).

¹²Henry Ford, who as much as anyone created the American automobile age, "looked upon big cities as cesspools of iniquity, soulless, and artificial" ( Higham 1988: 283).

¹³There were 24.3 million NBNP workers in 1920 and 4.7 were already employed in manufacturing. The 5.3 million immigrant (1 st and 2 nd generation) workers in manufacturing are 27.2 % of the 19.5 million non-manufacturing NBNP workers.

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Contributor Information

Charles Hirschman, Department of Sociology and Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195-3340.

Elizabeth Mogford, Department of Sociology, Western Washington University, Bellingham, WA 98225-9081.

References

Carter Susan, Sutch Richard. "Resident Impacts of Immigration: Perspectives from America's Age of Mass Migration." Unpublished paper (August 3, 2006) Department of Economics. University of California-Riverside. 2006. Downloaded on November 10, 2008 from: http://www.economics.ucr.edu/papers/papers08/08-08.pdf.

Carter Susan, Sutch Richard. Labor Market Flooding? Migrant Destination and Wage Change during America's Age of Mass Migration. 2007. Available from the Social Science Research Council "Border Battles: U.S. Immigration Debates" website at: http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/

Gibson Campbell, Jung Kay. Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850-2000. Working Paper no. 81. Washington, D.C.: Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census; 2006. Accessed at [http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0081/twps0081.pdf. Google Scholar]

Hawley Amos. Population Density and the City. Demography. 1972;9:521-529. [[PubMed] Google Scholar]

Ruggles Steven, Sobek Matthew, Alexander Trent, Fitch Catherine A, Goeken Ronald, Hall Patricia Kelly, King Miriam, Ronnander Chad. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 3.0. [Machine-readable database] Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor]; 2004. [http://www.ipums.org. Google Scholar]

Schachter Joseph. Net Immigration of Gainful Workers into the United States, 1870-1930. Demography. 1972;9:87-105. [[PubMed] Google Scholar]

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Immigration and the American Industrial Revolution From 1880 to 1920

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An electrical telegraph was a point-to-point text messaging system, used from the 1840s until better systems became widespread. It used coded pulses of electric current through dedicated wires to transmit information over long distances. It was the first electrical telecommunications system, the most widely used of a number of early messaging systems called telegraphs, devised to send text messages more rapidly than written messages could be sent. This system allowed for communication to occur without the necessity of physical transportation. Prior to this, beacons, smoke signal, flag semaphore, and optical telegraphs used visual signals to communicate over distances of land.

An electrical telegraph consisted of two or more geographically separated stations (often called telegraph offices) connected by wires, usually supported overhead on utility poles. There were many different electrical telegraph systems invented, but the ones that became widespread fit into two broad categories. The first category consists of needle telegraphs in which a needle pointer is made to move electromagnetically with a pulse of electric current from a battery or dynamo down the telegraph line. Early systems used multiple needles requiring multiple wires. The first commercial system, and the most widely used needle telegraph, was the Cooke and Wheatstone telegraph, invented in 1837. Early equipment sets used five needles to point to the letter being transmitted, but the cost of installing wires was more economically significant than the cost of training operators so a single-needle system with a code that had to be learned became the norm.

The second category consists of armature systems in which the pulse activates a telegraph sounder which makes a click. The archetype of this category was the Morse system, invented by Samuel Morse in 1838, using a single wire. At the sending station, an operator would tap on a switch called a telegraph key, spelling out text messages in Morse code. Originally, the armature was intended to make marks on paper tape, but operators learned to interpret the clicks and it was more efficient to write down the message directly. In 1865, the Morse system became the standard for international communication with a modified code developed for German railways. However, some countries continued to use established national systems internally for some time afterwards.

In the 1840s the electrical telegraph superseded optical telegraph systems (except in France), becoming the standard way to send urgent messages. By the latter half of the century, most developed nations had created commercial telegraph networks with local telegraph offices in most cities and towns, allowing the public to send messages called telegrams addressed to any person in the country, for a fee. Beginning in 1854, submarine telegraph cables allowed for the first rapid communication between continents. Electrical telegraph networks permitted people and commerce to transmit messages across both continents and oceans almost instantly, with widespread social and economic impacts. In the early 20th century the telegraph was slowly replaced by teletype networks.

From early studies of electricity, electrical phenomena were known to travel with great speed, and many experimenters worked on the application of electricity to communications at a distance. All the known effects of electricity-such as sparks, electrostatic attraction, chemical changes, electric shocks, and later electromagnetism -were applied to the problems of detecting controlled transmissions of electricity at various distances.

In 1753, an anonymous writer in the Scots Magazine suggested an electrostatic telegraph. Using one wire for each letter of the alphabet, a message could be transmitted by connecting the wire terminals in turn to an electrostatic machine, and observing the deflection of pith balls at the far end. The writer has never been positively identified, but the letter was signed C.M. and posted from Renfrew leading to a Charles Marshall of Renfrew being suggested. Telegraphs employing electrostatic attraction were the basis of early experiments in electrical telegraphy in Europe, but were abandoned as being impractical and were never developed into a useful communication system.

In 1800, Alessandro Volta invented the voltaic pile, allowing for a continuous current of electricity for experimentation. This became a source of a low-voltage current that could be used to produce more distinct effects, and which was far less limited than the momentary discharge of an electrostatic machine, which with Leyden jars were the only previously known man-made sources of electricity.

Another very early experiment in electrical telegraphy was an 'electrochemical telegraph' created by the German physician, anatomist and inventor Samuel Thomas von Sömmering in 1809, based on an earlier, less robust design of 1804 by Spanish polymath and scientist Francisco Salva Campillo. Both their designs employed multiple wires (up to 35) to represent almost all Latin letters and numerals. Thus, messages could be conveyed electrically up to a few kilometers (in von Sömmering's design), with each of the telegraph receiver's wires immersed in a separate glass tube of acid. An electric current was sequentially applied by the sender through the various wires representing each letter of a message; at the recipient's end the currents electrolysed the acid in the tubes in sequence, releasing streams of hydrogen bubbles next to each associated letter or numeral. The telegraph receiver's operator would watch the bubbles and could then record the transmitted message. This is in contrast to later telegraphs that used a single wire (with ground return).

Hans Christian Ørsted discovered in 1820 that an electric current produces a magnetic field that will deflect a compass needle. In the same year Johann Schweigger invented the galvanometer, with a coil of wire around a compass, which could be used as a sensitive indicator for an electric current. Also that year, André-Marie Ampère suggested that telegraphy could be achieved by placing small magnets under the ends of a set of wires, one pair of wires for each letter of the alphabet. He was apparently unaware of Schweigger's invention at the time, which would have made his system much more sensitive. In 1825, Peter Barlow tried Ampère's idea but only got it to work over 200 feet (61 m) and declared it impractical. In 1830 William Ritchie improved on Ampère's design by placing the magnetic needles inside a coil of wire connected to each pair of conductors. He successfully demonstrated it, showing the feasibility of the electromagnetic telegraph, but only within a lecture hall.

In 1825, William Sturgeon invented the electromagnet, with a single winding of uninsulated wire on a piece of varnished iron, which increased the magnetic force produced by electric current. Joseph Henry improved it in 1828 by placing several windings of insulated wire around the bar, creating a much more powerful electromagnet which could operate a telegraph through the high resistance of long telegraph wires. During his tenure at The Albany Academy from 1826 to 1832, Henry first demonstrated the theory of the 'magnetic telegraph' by ringing a bell through one-mile (1.6 km) of wire strung around the room in 1831.

In 1835, Joseph Henry and Edward Davy independently invented the mercury dipping electrical relay, in which a magnetic needle is dipped into a pot of mercury when an electric current passes through the surrounding coil. In 1837, Davy invented the much more practical metallic make-and-break relay which became the relay of choice in telegraph systems and a key component allowing weak signals to be periodically renewed. Davy demonstrated his telegraph system in Regent's Park in 1837 and was granted a patent on 4 July 1838. Davy also invented a printing telegraph which used the electric current from the telegraph signal to mark a ribbon of calico infused with potassium iodide and calcium hypochlorite.

The first working telegraph was built by the English inventor Francis Ronalds in 1816 and used static electricity. At the family home on Hammersmith Mall, he set up a complete subterranean system in a 175-yard (160 m) long trench as well as an eight-mile (13 km) long overhead telegraph. The lines were connected at both ends to revolving dials marked with the letters of the alphabet and electrical impulses sent along the wire were used to transmit messages. Offering his invention to the Admiralty in July 1816, it was rejected as "wholly unnecessary". His account of the scheme and the possibilities of rapid global communication in Descriptions of an Electrical Telegraph and of some other Electrical Apparatus was the first published work on electric telegraphy and even described the risk of signal retardation due to induction. Elements of Ronalds' design were utilised in the subsequent commercialisation of the telegraph over 20 years later.

The Schilling telegraph, invented by Baron Schilling von Canstatt in 1832, was an early needle telegraph. It had a transmitting device which consisted of a keyboard with 16 black-and-white keys. These served for switching the electric current. The receiving instrument consisted of six galvanometers with magnetic needles, suspended from silk threads. The two stations of Schilling's telegraph were connected by eight wires; six were connected with the galvanometers, one served for the return current and one for a signal bell. When at the starting station the operator pressed a key, the corresponding pointer was deflected at the receiving station. Different positions of black and white flags on different disks gave combinations which corresponded to the letters or numbers. Pavel Schilling subsequently improved its apparatus by reducing the number of connecting wires from eight to two.

On 21 October 1832, Schilling managed a short-distance transmission of signals between two telegraphs in different rooms of his apartment. In 1836, the British government attempted to buy the design but Schilling instead accepted overtures from Nicholas I of Russia. Schilling's telegraph was tested on a 5-kilometre-long (3.1 mi) experimental underground and underwater cable, laid around the building of the main Admiralty in Saint Petersburg and was approved for a telegraph between the imperial palace at Peterhof and the naval base at Kronstadt. However, the project was cancelled following Schilling's death in 1837. Schilling was also one of the first to put into practice the idea of the binary system of signal transmission.

In 1833, Carl Friedrich Gauss, together with the physics professor Wilhelm Weber in Göttingen installed a 1,200-metre-long (3,900 ft) wire above the town's roofs. Gauss combined the Poggendorff-Schweigger multiplicator with his magnetometer to build a more sensitive device, the galvanometer. To change the direction of the electric current, he constructed a commutator of his own. As a result, he was able to make the distant needle move in the direction set by the commutator on the other end of the line.

At first, Gauss and Weber used the telegraph to coordinate time, but soon they developed other signals and finally, their own alphabet. The alphabet was encoded in a binary code which was transmitted by positive or negative voltage pulses which were generated by means of moving an induction coil up and down over a permanent magnet and connecting the coil with the transmission wires by means of the commutator. The page of Gauss' laboratory notebook containing both his code and the first message transmitted, as well as a replica of the telegraph made in the 1850s under the instructions of Weber are kept in the faculty of physics at the University of Göttingen, in Germany.

Gauss was convinced that this communication would be a help to his kingdom's towns. Later in the same year, instead of a Voltaic pile, Gauss used an induction pulse, enabling him to transmit seven letters a minute instead of two. The inventors and university did not have the funds to develop the telegraph on their own, but they received funding from Alexander von Humboldt. Carl August Steinheil in Munich was able to build a telegraph network within the city in 1835-1836. He installed a telegraph line along the first German railroad in 1835. Steinheil built a telegraph along the Nuremberg - Fürth railway line in 1838, the first earth-return telegraph put into service.

By 1837, William Fothergill Cooke and Charles Wheatstone had co-developed a telegraph system which used a number of needles on a board that could be moved to point to letters of the alphabet. Any number of needles could be used, depending on the number of characters it was required to code. In May 1837 they patented their system. The patent recommended five needles, which coded twenty of the alphabet's 26 letters.

Samuel Morse independently developed and patented a recording electric telegraph in 1837. Morse's assistant Alfred Vail developed an instrument that was called the register for recording the received messages. It embossed dots and dashes on a moving paper tape by a stylus which was operated by an electromagnet. Morse and Vail developed the Morse code signalling alphabet. The first telegram in the United States was sent by Morse on 11 January 1838, across two miles (3 km) of wire at Speedwell Ironworks near Morristown, New Jersey, although it was only later, in 1844, that he sent the message " WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT" over the 44 miles (71 km) from the Capitol in Washington to the old Mt. Clare Depot in Baltimore.

The first commercial electrical telegraph was the Cooke and Wheatstone system. A demonstration four-needle system was installed on the Euston to Camden Town section of Robert Stephenson's London and Birmingham Railway in 1837 for signalling rope-hauling of locomotives. It was rejected in favour of pneumatic whistles. Cooke and Wheatstone had their first commercial success with a system installed on the Great Western Railway over the 13 miles (21 km) from Paddington station to West Drayton in 1838. This was a five-needle, six-wire system. This system suffered from failing insulation on the underground cables. When the line was extended to Slough in 1843, the telegraph was converted to a one-needle, two-wire system with uninsulated wires on poles. The one-needle telegraph proved highly successful on British railways, and 15,000 sets were still in use at the end of the nineteenth century. Some remained in service in the 1930s. The Electric Telegraph Company, the world's first public telegraphy company was formed in 1845 by financier John Lewis Ricardo and Cooke.

In 1851, a conference in Vienna of countries in the German-Austrian Telegraph Union (which included many central European countries) adopted the Morse telegraph as the system for international communications. The code adopted was considerably modified from the original Morse code, and was based on a code used on Hamburg railways ( Gerke, 1848). A common code was a necessary step to allow direct telegraph connection between countries. With different codes, additional operators were required to translate and retransmit the message. In 1865, a conference in Paris adopted Gerke's code as the International Morse code and was henceforth the international standard. The US, however, continued to use American Morse code internally for some time, hence international messages required retransmission in both directions.

As well as the rapid expansion of the use of the telegraphs along the railways, they soon spread into the field of mass communication with the instruments being installed in post offices. The era of mass personal communication had begun. Telegraph networks were expensive to build, but financing was readily available, especially from London bankers. By 1852, National systems were in operation in major countries:

The New York and Mississippi Valley Printing Telegraph Company, for example, was created in 1852 in Rochester, New York and eventually became the Western Union Telegraph Company. Although many countries had telegraph networks, there was no worldwide interconnection. Message by post was still the primary means of communication to countries outside Europe.

A continuing goal in telegraphy was to reduce the cost per message by reducing hand-work, or increasing the sending rate.[citation needed ] There were many experiments with moving pointers, and various electrical encodings. However, most systems were too complicated and unreliable. A successful expedient to reduce the cost per message was the development of telegraphese.

The first system that didn't require skilled technicians to operate, was Charles Wheatstone's ABC system in 1840 where the letters of the alphabet were arranged around a clock-face, and the signal caused a needle to indicate the letter. This early system required the receiver to be present in real time to record the message and it reached speeds of up to 15 words a minute.

In 1846, Alexander Bain patented a chemical telegraph in Edinburgh. The signal current moved an iron pen across a moving paper tape soaked in a mixture of ammonium nitrate and potassium ferrocyanide, decomposing the chemical and producing readable blue marks in Morse code. The speed of the printing telegraph was 16 and a half words per minute, but messages still required translation into English by live copyists. Chemical telegraphy came to an end in the US in 1851, when the Morse group defeated the Bain patent in the US District Court.

For a brief period, starting with the New York-Boston line in 1848, some telegraph networks began to employ sound operators, who were trained to understand Morse code aurally. Gradually, the use of sound operators eliminated the need for telegraph receivers to include register and tape. Instead, the receiving instrument was developed into a "sounder", an electromagnet that was energized by a current and attracted a small iron lever. When the sounding key was opened or closed, the sounder lever struck an anvil. The Morse operator distinguished a dot and a dash by the short or long interval between the two clicks. The message was then written out in long-hand.

Royal Earl House developed and patented a letter-printing telegraph system in 1846 which employed an alphabetic keyboard for the transmitter and automatically printed the letters on paper at the receiver, and followed this up with a steam-powered version in 1852. Advocates of printing telegraphy said it would eliminate Morse operators' errors. The House machine was used on four main American telegraph lines by 1852. The speed of the House machine was announced as 2600 words an hour.

David Edward Hughes invented the printing telegraph in 1855; it used a keyboard of 26 keys for the alphabet and a spinning type wheel that determined the letter being transmitted by the length of time that had elapsed since the previous transmission. The system allowed for automatic recording on the receiving end. The system was very stable and accurate and became accepted around the world.

By this point reception had been automated, but the speed and accuracy of the transmission was still limited to the skill of the human operator. The first practical automated system was patented by Charles Wheatstone, the original inventor of the telegraph. The message (in Morse code) was typed onto a piece of perforated tape using a keyboard-like device called the 'Stick Punch'. The transmitter automatically ran the tape through and transmitted the message at the then exceptionally high speed of 70 words per minute.

Teleprinters

An early successful teleprinter was invented by Frederick G. Creed. In Glasgow he created his first keyboard perforator, which used compressed air to punch the holes. He also created a reperforator (receiving perforator) and a printer. The reperforator punched incoming Morse signals on to paper tape and the printer decoded this tape to produce alphanumeric characters on plain paper. This was the origin of the Creed High Speed Automatic Printing System, which could run at an unprecedented 200 words per minute. His system was adopted by the for daily transmission of the newspaper contents.

With the invention of the teletypewriter, telegraphic encoding became fully automated. Early teletypewriters used the ITA-1 Baudot code, a five-bit code. This yielded only thirty-two codes, so it was over-defined into two "shifts", "letters" and "figures". An explicit, unshared shift code prefaced each set of letters and figures. In 1901, Baudot's code was modified by Donald Murray.

In the 1930s, teleprinters were produced by Teletype in the US, Creed in Britain and Siemens in Germany.

By 1935, message routing was the last great barrier to full automation. Large telegraphy providers began to develop systems that used telephone-like rotary dialling to connect teletypewriters. These resulting system was called "Telex" (TELegraph EXchange). Telex machines first performed rotary-telephone-style pulse dialling for circuit switching, and then sent data by ITA2. This "type A" Telex routing functionally automated message routing.

The first wide-coverage Telex network was implemented in Germany during the 1930s[citation needed ] as a network used to communicate within the government.

At the rate of 45.45 (±0.5%) baud - considered speedy at the time - up to 25 telex channels could share a single long-distance telephone channel by using voice frequency telegraphy multiplexing, making telex the least expensive method of reliable long-distance communication.

The harmonic telegraph

The most expensive aspect of a telegraph system was the installation - the laying of the wire, which was often very long. The costs would be better covered by finding a way to send more than one message at a time through the single wire, thus increasing revenue per wire. Early devices included the duplex and the quadruplex which allowed, respectively, one or two telegraph transmissions in each direction. However, an even greater number of channels was desired on the busiest lines. In the latter half of the 1800s, several inventors worked towards creating a method for doing just that, including Charles Bourseul, Thomas Edison, Elisha Gray, and Alexander Graham Bell.

One approach was to have resonators of several different frequencies act as carriers of a modulated on-off signal. This was the harmonic telegraph, a form of frequency-division multiplexing. These various frequencies, referred to as harmonics, could then be combined into one complex signal and sent down the single wire. On the receiving end, the frequencies would be separated with a matching set of resonators.

With a set of frequencies being carried down a single wire, it was realized that the human voice itself could be transmitted electrically through the wire. This effort led to the invention of the telephone. (While the work toward packing multiple telegraph signals onto one wire led to telephony, later advances would pack multiple voice signals onto one wire by increasing the bandwidth by modulating frequencies much higher than human hearing. Eventually the bandwidth was widened much further by using laser light signals sent through fiber optic cables. Fiber optic transmission can carry 25,000 telephone signals simultaneously down a single fiber.)

Soon after the first successful telegraph systems were operational, the possibility of transmitting messages across the sea by way of submarine communications cables was first proposed. One of the primary technical challenges was to sufficiently insulate the submarine cable to prevent the electric current from leaking out into the water. In 1842, a Scottish surgeon William Montgomerie introduced gutta-percha, the adhesive juice of the Palaquium gutta tree, to Europe. Michael Faraday and Wheatstone soon discovered the merits of gutta-percha as an insulator, and in 1845, the latter suggested that it should be employed to cover the wire which was proposed to be laid from Dover to Calais. Gutta-percha was used as insulation on a wire laid across the Rhine between Deutz and Cologne. In 1849, C. V. Walker, electrician to the South Eastern Railway, submerged a two-mile (three-point-two-kilometre) wire coated with gutta-percha off the coast from Folkestone, which was tested successfully.

John Watkins Brett, an engineer from Bristol, sought and obtained permission from Louis-Philippe in 1847 to establish telegraphic communication between France and England. The first undersea cable was laid in 1850, connecting the two countries and was followed by connections to Ireland and the Low Countries.

The Atlantic Telegraph Company was formed in London in 1856 to undertake to construct a commercial telegraph cable across the Atlantic Ocean. It was successfully completed on 18 July 1866 by the ship SS Great Eastern, captained by Sir James Anderson after many mishaps along the away. John Pender, one of the men on the Great Eastern, later founded several telecommunications companies primarily laying cables between Britain and Southeast Asia. Earlier transatlantic submarine cables installations were attempted in 1857, 1858 and 1865. The 1857 cable only operated intermittently for a few days or weeks before it failed. The study of underwater telegraph cables accelerated interest in mathematical analysis of very long transmission lines. The telegraph lines from Britain to India were connected in 1870 (those several companies combined to form the Eastern Telegraph Company in 1872). The HMS Challenger expedition in 1873-1876 mapped the ocean floor for future underwater telegraph cables.

Australia was first linked to the rest of the world in October 1872 by a submarine telegraph cable at Darwin. This brought news reports from the rest of the world. The telegraph across the Pacific was completed in 1902, finally encircling the world.

From the 1850s until well into the 20th century, British submarine cable systems dominated the world system. This was set out as a formal strategic goal, which became known as the All Red Line. In 1896, there were thirty cable laying ships in the world and twenty-four of them were owned by British companies. In 1892, British companies owned and operated two-thirds of the world's cables and by 1923, their share was still 42.7 percent.

The Falmouth, Malta, Gibraltar Telegraph Company

The British Indian Submarine Telegraph Company

The Marseilles, Algiers and Malta Telegraph Company

The Eastern Telegraph Company

The Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Company

The Eastern and Associated Telegraph Companies

Main article § Section: History of longitude § Land surveying and telegraphy.

The telegraph was very important for sending time signals to determine longitude, providing greater accuracy than previously availble. Longitude was measured by comparing local time (for example local noon occurs when the sun is at is highest above the horizon) with absolute time (a time that is the same for an observer anywhere on earth). If the local times of two places differ by one hour, the difference in longitude between them is 15° (360°/24h). Before telegraphy, absolute time could be obtained from astronomical events, such as eclipses, occultations or lunar distances, or by transporting an accurate clock (a chronometer) from one location to the other.

The idea of using the telegraph to transmit a time signal for longitude determination was suggested by François Arago to Samuel Morse in 1837, and the first test of this idea was made by Capt. Wilkes of the U.S. Navy in 1844, over Morse's line between Washington and Baltimore. The method was soon in practical use for longitude determination, in particular by the U.S. Coast Survey, and over longer and longer distances as the telegraph network spread across North America and the world, and as technical developments improved accuracy and productivity

The "telegraphic longitude net" soon became worldwide. Transatlantic links between Europe and North America were established in 1866 and 1870. The US Navy extended observations into the West Indies and Central and South America with an additional transatlantic link from South America to Lisbon between 1874-90. British, Russian and US observations created a chain from from Europe through Suez, Aden, Madras, Singapore, China and Japan, to Vladivostok, thence to Saint Petersburg and back to Western Europe. Australia was connected to Singapore via Java in 1871 and the web circled the globe in 1902 with the connection of Australia and New Zealand to Canada via the All Red Line. The double detemination of longitudes from east and west agreed within one second of arc (1/15 second of time, less than 30 metres).

The ability to send telegrams brought obvious advantages to those conducting war. Secret messages were encoded, so interception alone would not be sufficient for the opposing side to gain an advantage. There were geographical constraints on intercepting the telegraph cables, but once radio was used, interception could be much more widespread.

Journalistic recording of the war was provided by William Howard Russell (writing for newspaper) with photographs by Roger Fenton. News from war correspondents kept the public of the nations involved in the war informed of the day-to-day events in a way that had not been possible in any previous war. After the French extended the telegraph to the coast of the Black Sea in late 1854, the news reached London in two days. When the British laid an underwater cable to the Crimean peninsula in April 1855, news reached London in a few hours. The daily news reports energised public opinion, which brought down the government and led to Lord Palmerston becoming prime minister.

During the American Civil War the telegraph proved its value as a tactical, operational, and strategic communication medium and an important contributor to Union victory. By contrast the Confederacy failed to make effective use of the South's much smaller telegraph network. Prior to the War the telegraph systems were primarily used in the commercial sector. Government buildings were not inter-connected with telegraph lines, but relied on runners to carry messages back and forth. Before the war the Government saw no need to connect lines within city limits, however, they did see the use in connections between cities. Washington D.C. being the hub of government, it had the most connections, but there were only a few lines running north and south out of the city. It wasn't until the Civil War that the government saw the true potential of the telegraph system. Soon after the shelling of Fort Sumter, the South cut telegraph lines running into D.C., which put the city in a state of panic because they feared an immediate Southern invasion.

Within 6 months of the start of the war, the U.S. Military Telegraph Corps (USMT) had laid approximately 300 miles (480 km) of line. By war's end they had laid approximately 15,000 miles (24,000 km) of line, 8,000 for military and 5,000 for commercial use, and had handled approximately 6.5 million messages. The telegraph was not only important for communication within the armed forces, but also in the civilian sector, helping political leaders to maintain control over their districts.

Even before the war, the American Telegraph Company censored suspect messages informally to block aid to the secession movement. During the war, Secretary of War Simon Cameron, and later Edwin Stanton, wanted control over the telegraph lines to maintain the flow of information. Early in the war, one of Stanton's first acts as Secretary of War was to move telegraph lines from ending at McClellan's headquarters to terminating at the War Department. Stanton himself said "[telegraphy] is my right arm". Telegraphy assisted Northern victories, including the Battle of Antietam (1862), the Battle of Chickamauga (1863), and Sherman's March to the Sea (1865).

During World War I, Britain's telegraph communications were almost completely uninterrupted, while it was able to quickly cut Germany's cables worldwide. The British government censored telegraph cable companies in an effort to root out espionage and restrict financial transactions with Central Powers nations. British access to transatlantic cables and its codebreaking expertise led to the Zimmermann Telegram incident that contributed to the US joining the war. Despite British acquisition of German colonies and expansion into the Middle East, debt from the war led to Britain's control over telegraph cables to weaken while US control grew.

Resistance movements in occupied Europe sabotaged communications facilities such as telegraph lines, forcing the Germans to use wireless telegraphy, which could then be intercepted by Britain. The Germans developed a highly complex teleprinter attachment (German: Schlüssel-Zusatz, "cipher attachment") that was used for enciphering telegrams, using the Lorenz cipher, between German High Command ( OKW) and the army groups in the field. These contained situation reports, battle plans, and discussions of strategy and tactics. Britain intercepted these signals, diagnosed how the encrypting machine worked, and decrypted a large amount of teleprinter traffic.

While the telegraph was not the focus of the legal battles that occurred around 1878, the companies that were affected by the effects of the battle were the main powers of telegraphy at the time. Western Union thought that the agreement of 1878 would solidify telegraphy as the long-range communication of choice. However, due to the underestimates of telegraph's future[further explanation needed ] and poor contracts, Western Union found itself declining. AT&T acquired working control of Western Union in 1909 but relinquished it in 1914 under threat of antitrust action. AT&T bought Western Union's electronic mail and Telex businesses in 1990.

Although commercial "telegraph" services are still available in many countries, transmission is usually done by some form of data transmission other than traditional telegraphy.

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Wiley, Samuel T. (ed.), Biographical and Historical Cyclopedia of Indiana and Armstrong Counties, John M. Gresham and Co., Philadelphia PA, 1891, pages 475-476.

Yates, JoAnne. The Telegraph's Effect on Nineteenth Century Markets and Firms, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 149-163.

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An electrical telegraph was a point-to-point text messaging system, used from the 1840s until better systems became widespread. It used coded pulses of electric current through dedicated wires to transmit information over long distances.

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Definition: a member of any of the bands of English workers who destroyed machinery, especially in cotton and woolen mills, that they believed was threatening their jobs

Wiki

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The Leader of the Luddites, 1812. Hand-coloured etching.

The Luddites were members of a 19th-century movement of English textile workers which opposed the use of certain types of cost-saving machinery, often by destroying the machines in clandestine raids. They protested against manufacturers who used machines in "a fraudulent and deceitful manner" to replace the skilled labour of workers and drive down wages by producing inferior goods. Members of the group referred to themselves as Luddites, self-described followers of " Ned Ludd", a legendary weaver whose name was used as a pseudonym in threatening letters to mill owners and government officials.

The Luddite movement began in Nottingham, England, and spread to the North West and Yorkshire between 1811 and 1816. Mill and factory owners took to shooting protesters and eventually the movement was suppressed with legal and military force, which included execution and penal transportation of accused and convicted Luddites.

Over time, the term has been used to refer to those opposed to industrialisation, automation, computerisation, or new technologies in general.

The name Luddite () occurs in the movement's writings as early as 1811. The movement utilised the eponym of Ned Ludd, an apocryphal apprentice who allegedly smashed two stocking frames in 1779 after being criticized and instructed to change his method. The name often appears as Captain, General, or King Ludd. Different versions of the legends place his residence in Anstey, near Leicester, or Sherwood Forest like Robin Hood.

'Lud' or 'Ludd' ( Welsh: Lludd map Beli Mawr), according to Geoffrey of Monmouth's legendary History of the Kings of Britain and other medieval Welsh texts, was a Celtic King of 'The Islands of Britain' in pre- Roman times, who supposedly founded London and was buried at Ludgate. In the Welsh versions of Geoffrey's Historia, usually called Brut y Brenhinedd, he is called Lludd fab Beli, establishing the connection to the early mythological Lludd Llaw Eraint.

The machine-breaking of the Luddites followed from previous outbreaks of sabotage in the English textile industry, especially in the hosiery and woolen trades. Organized action by stockingers had occurred at various times since 1675. In Lancashire, new cotton spinning technologies were met with violent resistance in 1768 and 1779. These new inventions produced textiles faster and cheaper because they could be operated by less-skilled, low-wage labourers. These struggles sometimes resulted in government suppression, via Parliamentary acts such as the Protection of Stocking Frames, etc. Act 1788.

Periodic uprisings relating to asset prices also occurred in other contexts in the century before Luddism. Irregular rises in food prices provoked the Keelmen to riot in the port of Tyne in 1710 and tin miners to steal from granaries at Falmouth in 1727. There was a rebellion in Northumberland and Durham in 1740, and an assault on Quaker corn dealers in 1756.

Malcolm L. Thomas argued in his 1970 history The Luddites that machine-breaking was one of the very few tactics that workers could use to increase pressure on employers, undermine lower-paid competing workers, and create solidarity among workers. "These attacks on machines did not imply any necessary hostility to machinery as such; machinery was just a conveniently exposed target against which an attack could be made." The Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm has called their machine wrecking " collective bargaining by riot", which had been a tactic used in Britain since the Restoration because manufactories were scattered throughout the country, and that made it impractical to hold large-scale strikes. An agricultural variant of Luddism occurred during the widespread Swing Riots of 1830 in southern and eastern England, centring on breaking threshing machines.

Peak activity: 1811-1817

See also Barthélemy Thimonnier, whose sewing machines were destroyed by tailors

The Luddite movement emerged during the harsh economic climate of the Napoleonic Wars, which saw a rise in difficult working conditions in the new textile factories. Luddites objected primarily to the rising popularity of automated textile equipment, threatening the jobs and livelihoods of skilled workers as this technology allowed them to be replaced by cheaper and less skilled workers.[failed verification ] The movement began in Arnold, Nottingham, on 11 March 1811 and spread rapidly throughout England over the following two years. The British economy suffered greatly in 1810 to 1812, especially in terms of high unemployment and inflation. The causes included the high cost of the wars with Napoleon, Napoleon's Continental System of economic warfare, and escalating conflict with the United States. The crisis led to widespread protest and violence, but the middle classes and upper classes strongly supported the government, which used the army to suppress all working-class unrest, especially the Luddite movement.

The Luddites met at night on the moors surrounding industrial towns to practice military-like drills and manoeuvres. Their main areas of operation began in Nottinghamshire in November 1811, followed by the West Riding of Yorkshire in early 1812, and then Lancashire by March 1813. They wrecked specific types of machinery that posed a threat to the particular industrial interests in each region.[citation needed ] In the Midlands, these were the "wide" knitting frames used to make cheap and inferior lace articles. In the North West, weavers sought to eliminate the steam-powered looms threatening wages in the cotton trade. In Yorkshire, workers opposed the use of shearing frames and gig mills to finish woolen cloth.

Many Luddite groups were highly organized and pursued machine-breaking as one of several tools for achieving specific political ends. In addition to the raids, Luddites coordinated public demonstrations and the mailing of letters to local industrialists and government officials. These letters explained their reasons for destroying the machinery and threatened further action if the use of "obnoxious" machines continued. The writings of Midlands Luddites often justified their demands through the legitimacy of the Company of Framework Knitters, a recognized public body that already openly negotiated with masters through named representatives. In North West England, textile workers lacked these long-standing trade institutions and their letters composed an attempt to achieve recognition as a united body of tradespeople. As such, they were more likely to include petitions for governmental reforms, such as increased minimum wages and the cessation of child labor. Northwestern Luddites were also more likely to use radical language linking their movement to that of American and French revolutionaries. In Yorkshire, the letter-writing campaign shifted to more violent threats against local authorities viewed as complicit in the use of offensive machinery to exert greater commercial control over the labor market. Differences in the occupational composition (e.g., frameworkers, weavers, spinners) of each region manifested as variation in the Luddites' rhetoric, tactics, and degree of organization.

Luddites clashed with government troops at Burton's Mill in Middleton and at Westhoughton Mill, both in Lancashire. The Luddites and their supporters anonymously sent death threats to, and possibly attacked, magistrates and food merchants. Activists smashed Heathcote's lacemaking machine in Loughborough in 1816. He and other industrialists had secret chambers constructed in their buildings that could be used as hiding places during an attack.

In 1817, an unemployed Nottingham stockinger and probably ex-Luddite, named Jeremiah Brandreth led the Pentrich Rising. While this was a general uprising unrelated to machinery, it can be viewed as the last major Luddite act.

The British government ultimately dispatched 12,000 troops to suppress Luddite activity, which historian Eric Hobsbawm said was a larger number than the army which the Duke of Wellington led during the Peninsular War. Four Luddites, led by a man named George Mellor, ambushed and assassinated mill owner William Horsfall of Ottiwells Mill in Marsden, West Yorkshire, at Crosland Moor in Huddersfield. Horsfall had remarked that he would "Ride up to his saddle in Luddite blood". Mellor fired the fatal shot to Horsfall's groin, and all four men were arrested. One of the men, Benjamin Walker, turned informant, and the other three were hanged. Lord Byron denounced what he considered to be the plight of the working class, the government's inane policies and ruthless repression in the House of Lords on 27 February 1812: "I have been in some of the most oppressed provinces of Turkey; but never, under the most despotic of infidel governments, did I behold such squalid wretchedness as I have seen since my return, in the very heart of a Christian country".

Government officials sought to suppress the Luddite movement with a mass trial at York in January 1813, following the attack on Cartwrights Mill at Rawfolds near Cleckheaton. The government charged over 60 men, including Mellor and his companions, with various crimes in connection with Luddite activities. While some of those charged were actual Luddites, many had no connection to the movement. Although the proceedings were legitimate jury trials, many were abandoned due to lack of evidence and 30 men were acquitted. These trials were certainly intended to act as show trials to deter other Luddites from continuing their activities. The harsh sentences of those found guilty, which included execution and penal transportation, quickly ended the movement. Parliament made "machine breaking" (i.e. industrial sabotage) a capital crime with the Frame Breaking Act of 1812. Lord Byron opposed this legislation, becoming one of the few prominent defenders of the Luddites after the treatment of the defendants at the York trials.

In the 19th century, occupations that arose from the growth of trade and shipping in ports, also as "domestic" manufacturers, were notorious for precarious employment prospects. Underemployment was chronic during this period, and it was common practice to retain a larger workforce than was typically necessary for insurance against labour shortages in boom times.

Moreover, the organization of manufacture by merchant capitalists in the textile industry was inherently unstable. While the financiers' capital was still largely invested in raw materials, it was easy to increase commitment when trade was good and almost as easy to cut back when times were bad. Merchant capitalists lacked the incentive of later factory owners, whose capital was invested in buildings and plants, to maintain a steady rate of production and return on fixed capital. The combination of seasonal variations in wage rates and violent short-term fluctuations springing from harvests and war produced periodic outbreaks of violence.

Nowadays, the term "Luddite" often is used to describe someone who is opposed or resistant to new technologies.

In 1956, during a British Parliamentary debate, a Labour spokesman said that "organised workers were by no means wedded to a 'Luddite Philosophy'." By 2006, the term neo-Luddism had emerged to describe opposition to many forms of technology. According to a manifesto drawn up by the Second Luddite Congress (April 1996; Barnesville, Ohio), neo-Luddism is "a leaderless movement of passive resistance to consumerism and the increasingly bizarre and frightening technologies of the Computer Age".

The term "Luddite fallacy" is used by economists about the fear that technological unemployment inevitably generates structural unemployment and is consequently macroeconomically injurious. If a technological innovation reduces necessary labour inputs in a given sector, then the industry-wide cost of production falls, which lowers the competitive price and increases the equilibrium supply point that, theoretically, will require an increase in aggregate labour inputs. During the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century, the dominant view among economists has been that belief in long-term technological unemployment was indeed a fallacy. More recently, there has been increased support for the view that the benefits of automation are not equally distributed.

Ford, Martin R. (2009), The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future, Acculant Publishing, ISBN 978-1448659814.

Anderson, Gary M., and Robert D. Tollison. "Luddism as cartel enforcement." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 142.4 (1986): 727-738. JSTOR 40750927.

Darvall, F. Popular Disturbances and Public Order in Regency England (Oxford University Press, 1934)

Dinwiddy, John. "Luddism and politics in the northern counties." Social History 4.1 (1979): 33-63.

Fox, Nicols (2003). Against the Machine: The Hidden Luddite History in Literature, Art, and Individual Lives. Island Press. ISBN 1-55963-860-5.

Grint, Keith & Woolgar, Steve (1997). "The Luddites: Diablo ex Machina". The machine at work: technology, work, and organization. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-7456-0924-9.

Haywood, Ian. "Unruly People: The Spectacular Riot." in Bloody Romanticism (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2006) pp. 181-222.

Hobsbawm, E. J. (1952). "The Machine Breakers". Past & Present. 1 (1): 57-70. doi:10.1093/past/1.1.57.

Horn, Jeff. "Machine-Breaking and the 'Threat from Below' in Great Britain and France during the Early Industrial Revolution." in Crowd actions in Britain and France from the middle ages to the modern world (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015) pp. 165-178.

Linebaugh, Peter. Ned Ludd & Queen Mab: machine-breaking, romanticism, and the several commons of 1811-12 (PM Press, 2012).

Linton, David. "The Luddites: How did they get that bad reputation?" Labor History 33.4 (1992): 529-537. doi:10.1080/00236569200890281.

McGaughey, Ewan (2018). "Will Robots Automate Your Job Away? Full Employment, Basic Income, and Economic Democracy". ssrn.com. SSRN 3044448.

Munger, Frank. "Suppression of Popular Gatherings in England, 1800-1830". American Journal of Legal History 25 (1981): 111+.

Navickas, Katrina. "The search for 'general Ludd': The mythology of Luddism." Social History 30.3 (2005): 281-295.

O'Rourke, Kevin Hjortshøj, Ahmed S. Rahman, and Alan M. Taylor. "Luddites, the industrial revolution, and the demographic transition." Journal of Economic Growth 18.4 (2013): 373-409. JSTOR 42635331.

Pallas, Stephen J. "'The Hell that Bigots Frame': Queen Mab, Luddism, and the Rhetoric of Working-Class Revolution". Journal for the Study of Radicalism 12.2 (2018): 55-80. doi:10.14321/jstudradi.12.2.0055. JSTOR 10.14321/jstudradi.12.2.0055.

Patterson, A. Temple. "Luddism, Hampden Clubs, and Trade Unions in Leicestershire, 1816-17." English Historical Review 63.247 (1948): 170-188. online

Poitras, Geoffrey. "The Luddite trials: Radical suppression and the administration of criminal justice". Journal for the Study of Radicalism 14.1 (2020): 121-166.

Pynchon, Thomas (28 October 1984). "Is It O.k. to Be a Luddite?". The New York Times.

Stöllinger, Roman. "The Luddite rebellion: Past and present". wiiw Monthly Report 11 (2018): 6-11.

Thomis, Malcolm I. The Luddites: Machine-Breaking in Regency England (Archon Books. 1970).

Thompson, E. P. (1968). The Making of the English Working Class.

Wasserstrom, Jeffrey. "'Civilization' and Its Discontents: The Boxers and Luddites as Heroes and Villains." Theory and Society (1987): 675-707. JSTOR 657679.

Primary sources

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The Luddites were members of a 19th-century movement of English textile workers which opposed the use of certain types of cost-saving machinery, often by destroying the machines in clandestine raids. They protested against manufacturers who used machines in "a fraudulent and deceitful manner" to replace the skilled labour of workers and drive down wages by producing inferior goods.

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Detailed article on the life of Eric Hobsbawm from The Guardian, Hobsbawm was a Marxist 20th Century Historian who studied the 19th Century.

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Eric Hobsbawm was a schoolboy in Berlin when Hitler came to power. He knew he stood at a turning-point in history. "It was impossible to remain outside politics," he says. "The months in Berlin made me a lifelong communist." They may also have shaped his moral universe. When asked on Radio 4's Desert Island Discs in 1995 whether he thought the chance of bringing about a communist utopia was worth any sacrifice, he answered "yes". "Even the sacrifice of millions of lives?" he was asked. "That's what we felt when we fought the second world war," he replied.

Martin Amis in his new book Koba the Dread: Laughter and the Twenty Million, discussing a perceived "asymmetry of indulgence" in attitudes towards Hitler's crimes and Stalin's Great Terror, characterises Hobsbawm's "yes" as "disgraceful". Interesting Times, Hobsbawm's autobiography, also out this month, offers an insight into the adherence to communism of many of the brightest of his generation, from an "unrepentant communist": Hobsbawm, who joined the party in 1936, remained in it until he let his membership lapse not long before the party's dissolution in 1991. His book - taking its title from the Chinese curse - traces his communist faith in "the most extraordinary and terrible century in human history".

"I've never tried to diminish the appalling things that happened in Russia, though the sheer extent of the massacres we didn't realise," says Hobsbawm. "In the early days we knew a new world was being born amid blood and tears and horror: revolution, civil war, famine - we knew of the Volga famine of the early '20s, if not the early '30s. Thanks to the breakdown of the west, we had the illusion that even this brutal, experimental, system was going to work better than the west. It was that or nothing."

He says of Stalin's Russia: "These sacrifices were excessive; this should not have happened. In retrospect the project was doomed to failure, though it took a long time to realise this." Yet he appears to argue that some goals are worth any sacrifice. "I lived through the first world war, when 10 million-to 20 million people were killed. At the time, the British, French and Germans believed it was necessary. We disagree. In the second world war, 50 million died. Was the sacrifice worthwhile? I frankly cannot face the idea that it was not. I can't say it would have been better if the world was run by Adolph Hitler."

Since coming to Britain in 1933 as a 15-year-old orphan, Hobsbawm has been both influential and controversial, not least as Britain's best known and most enduring Marxist historian. His innovative social history on bandits, revolutionaries and workers inspired a "Hobsbawm generation" of researchers in the 1960s and '70s. His trilogy charting the rise of capitalism - The Age of Revolution (1962), The Age of Capital ('75) and The Age of Empire ('87) - became a defining work of his chosen period, the "long 19th century", from 1789 to 1914. Encylopaedic and determinedly accessible, Hobsbawm has been credited with a hand in history's current popularity.

Ben Pimlott, warden of Goldsmiths College, London University, says Hobsbawm - multilingual and steeped in the culture and history of central Europe - "thinks on a grand scale". While Hobsbawm has described history as a process of uncovering the patterns and mechanisms that transform the world, Pimlott says his Marxism has been "a tool not a straitjacket; he's not dialectical or following a party line". According to Stuart Hall, emeritus professor of sociology at the Open University, he is one of few leftwing historians to be "taken seriously by people who disagree with him politically".

The Age of Extremes (1994), which was translated into 37 languages, extended Hobsbawm's range into the "short 20th century" almost spanned by his own life, from the first world war to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. He sees his autobiography as a "flipside" to The Age of Extremes, being world history "illustrated by the experiences of an individual". Interesting Times also reveals other sides to a man, who, under the pseudonym Francis Newton, was the New Statesman's jazz critic for a decade. His proudest moments were receiving an honorary degree beside Benny Goodman and meeting the gospel singer Mahalia Jackson. He disparaged modernism in high art, when the "real revolution", he suggested, lay elsewhere, such as in the movies.

Now 85, and professor emeritus at Birkbeck College, London University, Hobsbawm lives in Hampstead, on the slopes of Parliament Hill, with his second wife, Marlene, a recently retired music teacher and writer. They also have a cottage in Wales "between the Hay-on-Wye literary festival and the Brecon jazz festival", where, according to the biographer Claire Tomalin, "they reproduce the urban intelligentsia in a Welsh wilderness". The couple have a "social circle of immense variety", says Roy Foster, a former colleague at Birkbeck. "Eric's a European intellectual; he doesn't allow ideology to infect the ordinary relations of life." While some find Hobsbawm cold and imperious, for Pimlott he has a great serenity.

Peripatetic as a displaced child then as an academic, Hobsbawm speaks German, French, Spanish and Italian fluently, and reads Dutch, Portuguese and Catalan. His reputation is arguably even greater abroad. Official recognition came slowly in Britain, where he was made a Companion of Honour in 1998. Hobsbawm insists that "whatever I've achieved has been with minimum, or no, concessions".

He was born in Alexandria in 1917. His British father, Leopold Percy Hobsbaum (a clerical error altered Eric's surname), was the son of a cabinet-maker from London's East End who had migrated from Russian Poland in the 1870s. Eric's mother, Nelly Grün, was the daughter of a "moderately prosperous Viennese jeweller". She met Leopold in 1913 in Egypt, a British protectorate, and they married in neutral Switzerland in 1915, but were unable to live in either country until the first world war ended.

His parents moved to Vienna when Eric was two, and continued to speak English at home. Both died during the Depression, his father of a heart attack at the age of 48, when Eric was 11, and his mother of lung disease two years later, at 36. In the interim, the family was destitute. Eric, whose only sibling, Nancy, was two years younger, worked as an English tutor, then a male au pair, while the social insurance of "Red Vienna" paid his mother's medical bills. Hobsbawm remembers little of his father, a tradesman and amateur boxer. "I must have made a conscious effort to forget," he says. His insecure childhood, he believes, made him "more self-contained, unwilling to open out", as well as hard-headed: "not having illusions - facing the situation without trying to kid oneself".

His maternal aunt Gretl and paternal uncle Sidney married, and after Eric's mother died, he and Nancy lived with them and their son Peter, in Berlin, where Sidney worked for Hollywood's Universal Films. Arriving in 1931, "as the world economy collapsed", Eric joined the Socialist Schoolboys.

"In Germany there wasn't any alternative left. Liberalism was failing. If I'd been German and not a Jew, I could see I might have become a Nazi, a German nationalist. I could see how they'd become passionate about saving the nation. It was a time when you didn't believe there was a future unless the world was fundamentally transformed."

He had grown up in an "entirely unobservant" Jewish household, though he recalls his mother's injunction never to do "anything that suggests you're ashamed of being a Jew". In Israel later, "people didn't see this as as sufficient basis for Jewishness, but it is". He was known at school as "der Engländer", an identity which he believes shielded him from overt anti-Semitism. It also immunised him - a lifelong anti-Zionist - against the "temptations" of Jewish nationalism.

In March 1933 the family regrouped in London - not, he insists, as refugees. Isolated and bored, he retreated into "hot jazz" and the library near his Marylebone grammar school, reading English poetry and The Communist Manifesto, and keeping voluminous diaries in German. In these he listed the basis of his communism as a sense of "mass ecstasy"; "pity for the exploited"; the "aesthetic appeal of a perfect and comprehensive intellectual system - dialectical materialism"; a "Blakean vision of the new Jerusalem"; and "intellectual anti-philistinism".

He joined the Communist party while at King's College, Cambridge, in 1936-39, though he speculates that his overt politics precluded any Soviet efforts to recruit him as one of the Cambridge spies - Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt. He edited the student weekly, Granta, and joined the Apostles, a university secret society which had previously counted Burgess, Philby et al as members. Vacations were partly spent in France, where he lost his virginity in a Paris brothel. "It's just what young men did," he says. Weeks before finals in 1939 (he took a starred first), his remaining family emigrated to Chile. His sister, who died some 10 years ago, later married a naval officer and became, he says, a "conventional Anglican country matron and Conservative Party activist in Worcestershire".

After the non-aggression pact between Hitler and Stalin, Hobsbawm followed the party line that the western powers were more interested in defeating communism than in fighting Hitler, until the German invasion of France in 1940, when he realised the party line was "absolutely useless". He held it until the German attack on Russia in 1941. Called up in February 1940, Hobsbawm had an "empty war" in Britain, first with the Royal Engineers, then the Educational Corps. Despite speaking German, he was turned down for intelligence work, whether owing to his party membership or his mother's nationality. In 1943 he married Muriel Seaman, a "very attractive LSE communist girl" who became a senior civil servant.

"For 20 years my intimate relationships would invariably be with communists," he says. Their divorce in 1951 left him wounded. "We separated in nasty circumstances: she went off with another man." They never saw each other again, and the new couple died in a car crash in Portugal 10 years later. Hobsbawm had a son, Joshua, by a married woman, who opted to remain with her husband. Joshua works in schools drama, as a writer and teacher.

Hobsbawm returned to Cambridge in 1947 to do a PhD on the Fabian Society, and was a fellow of King's in 1949-55. He became a lecturer at Birkbeck in 1947, fortunate in getting in "under the wire" before the cold war slammed the door on further Communist appointments. He was then rejected by a succession of Oxbridge colleges, and despite a growing international reputation, became a professor of history at Birkbeck only in 1970. It was 1959 before he published his first major work, Primitive Rebels - about banditry - alongside his collection The Jazz Scene. Yet while the cold war delayed his career, there was no purge. While teaching evening classes at Birkbeck, he reviewed jazz for the New Statesman and Nation, thinking he could more than match Kingsley Amis in the Spectator. From a Bloomsbury flat he led a late-night lifestyle, sharing the jazz scene of Colin MacInnes, George Melly and Francis Bacon and becoming drawn into protests against the 1958 Notting Hill riots.

Hobsbawm was a member of the Communist party historians' group of 1946-56, which included EP Thompson and Christopher Hill, and in 1952 he co-founded the influential journal, Past and Present, whose contributors included many non-Marxists. They pioneered social history from the "bottom up". For Roy Foster, Hobsbawm "brought British social and labour history into an intellectually exciting and European-influenced sphere, bringing in culture from Romantic music to the role of the flat cap and fish and chips in working-class consciousness. At the same time he was writing about Sicilian bandits and Chicago gangsters." Unlike fellow British Marxist historians, Hobsbawm took an international approach, in such works as Industry and Empire (1968).

In 1954 he paid the first of only two visits to the Soviet Union , finding a "dispiriting" absence of intellectuals. The year 1956, with Khrushchev's speech on Stalin's crimes to the 20th party congress and the Soviet invasion of Hungary, destroyed the international communist movement, says Hobsbawm. Yet despite the droves quitting the party - including many Marxist historians, such as EP Thompson - Hobsbawm weathered the "intolerable tensions". He recalls being repelled by the idea of being in the company of those ex-members who turned into fanatical anti-communists and describes keeping faith with fallen anti-fascist heroes, "because the movement bred such men and women". Perhaps most crucially, he writes: "I did not come into communism as a young Briton in England but as a central European in the collapsing Weimar Republic."

Hobsbawm's decision to stay in the party continues to puzzle even his sympathisers. Yet the writer and journalist Neal Ascherson, a student of his at Cambridge in the early 1950s who became a friend, recalls Hobsbawm being "in great distress and finding it difficult to talk... He said that you could achieve more by criticising from within." Hobsbawm signed a historians' letter of protest against the Soviet invasion of Hungary and was passionately in favour of the Prague spring, arguing against the "tankies" who backed its crushing by the Soviets in 1968. Yet he remained in the party, "recycling" himself from militant to fellow traveller, and resigning himself to interpreting the world, rather than actively changing it. Pimlott says Hobsbawm remained a member when it was deeply unfashionable and limiting; "he couldn't travel freely to the US. There was sacrifice in his position." Hobsbawm remained friends with many who did leave. Robin Blackburn, former editor of the New Left Review, for which he wrote, says, "I doubt he had many illusions about the Soviet Union after 1956; he was more hard-headed than many others."

"The [British] party criticised Moscow like mad from 1968," says Hobsbawm. "Those of us in Britain and elsewhere weren't in it because of anything happening in the Soviet Union, but because of things we wanted to happen in Britain and elsewhere." Yet he writes: "I belonged to the generation tied by an unbreakable umbilical cord to hope of the world revolution and of its original home, the October Revolution, however sceptical or critical of the USSR."

Hobsbawm was prolific, with Bandits (1969) and Revolutionaries (1973). He co-authored Captain Swing (1969) on the English agrarian uprising of 1830 and reopened the "standard of living debate" by challenging labour historians who claimed industrialisation was benign for 19th-century workers. He says, "These aren't my people, and I'm not like them. But there was sympathy, because these were the poor trying to come to terms with social injustice. You can't be against social injustice unless you're for the poor." His grander scale work began when George (now Lord) Weidenfeld commissioned The Age of Revolution for £500 in 1958, initiating what grew, unexpectedly, into the trilogy.

He married the Viennese-born Marlene Schwarz in 1962. "She brought me a lot more happiness than I expected," he says. He traversed South America and visited Castro's Cuba, though sceptical of the Guevarist guerrilla strategy. He wrote about music in Havana's black barrios but the rock-and-roll revolution eluded him (he attributed its appeal to "infantilism"). He has avowedly never worn blue jeans. In the 1960s he was visiting professor at Stanford, then MIT, having to apply each time for exceptions to the US ban on communists.

In Paris in 1968, Hobsbawm found the events welcome "and puzzling to middle-aged leftwingers". He was enthusiastic yet critical of the limitations of protests. "I misunderstood the historical significance of the 1960s," he says. "It wasn't a political or social revolution. It was more a spiritual equivalent of a consumer society - everybody doing their own thing. I'm not certain I welcome this." Another movement which some claim has eluded him is feminism. "His unwillingness to take seriously the research and concerns of women historians pissed off a whole generation of feminists in his profession in the '70s and '80s," says Harriet Jones, director of the Institute of Contemporary British History at London University. She senses a possible change of heart, however. "It's interesting that he has now identified women's history in the Communist party as one of the key gaps in 20th-century British politics."

Hobsbawm espoused Italian Eurocommunism, which distanced itself from Moscow (he found its late guru Gramsci "marvellously stimulating"). He also played a controversial role in the emergence of New Labour in Britain, having canvassed for the Labour party in 1945 ("If there was anything to be done in this country we knew it would be through the Labour party"). His Marx memorial lecture in 1978, The Forward March of Labour Halted? pointed to the inadequacy of Old Labour in the face of social and economic changes. Dubbed "Kinnock's guru", Hobsbawm reveals that he was depressed about "[Kinnock's] potential as a future prime minister". Hobsbawm has since criticised New Labour for going "much too far in accepting the logic of the free market", and been disparaged in turn as an out-of-touch "special intellectual" by the Number 10 adviser Geoff Mulgan, in 1998. Hobsbawm says: "While I share people's disappointment in Blair, it's better to have a Labour government than not."

His daughter, Julia Hobsbawm, a proponent of "ethical PR", was a fund-raising consultant for the Labour party before the 1992 election, then co-founded a public relations company with Sarah Macaulay (now married to Gordon Brown) in 1993, though they ended the business partnership last year. Hobsbawm's son, Andy, is an executive for an American internet advertising firm. Neither has a degree.

"It's very tough on kids to have a father who's an academic and known to be good at it," Hobsbawm says. "It's something to live up to." Hobsbawm turned a sceptical eye on nationalism in the ground-breaking co-edited book The Invention of Tradition (1983), and in Nations and Nationalism (1990). For Tony Judt, director of the Remarque Institute at New York University, Hobsbawm's tendency to disparage any nationalist movement as passing and irrational weakens his grasp of parts of the 20th century. In Ascherson's view "Eric's Jewishness increased his sensitivity about nationalism. He's the original happy cosmopolitan, who's benefited from being able to move freely." After retiring from Birkbeck in 1982, Hobsbawm began a "seasonal commute" to teach a semester a year at the New School for Social Research in Manhattan, until 1997.

Hobsbawm says he felt relief at the fall of the Berlin Wall, though he sees conditions in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union as an "unbelievable economic and social tragedy". In his new book he declares that Communism is dead. Looking back, he says, "starting in Russia, this system would not and could not have worked". But he still believes that asking Marxist questions is the way to understand the world - to tackle the big questions, to fit things together into a pattern , "even if it may not be the right pattern". He adds: "I used to believe you could predict the direction in which history goes. But contingency is clearly more important than we used to allow."

Hobsbawm felt freed by the end of the Soviet experiment to write the history of his own century. He had avoided what he saw as a choice between being denounced "as a heretic" for openly countering the party line or compromising "my conscience as an academic". The Age of Extremes involved the greatest test of his own objectivity, though it is also one his most highly praised books. Judt argues that on the two great issues of the 20th century, "Eric's political stance has prevented his achieving the analytical distance he does on the 19th century: he isn't as interesting on the Russian revolution because he can't free himself completely from the optimistic vision of earlier years. For the same reason he's not that good on fascism."

Hobsbawm, Judt says, "clings to a pernicious illusion of the late Enlightenment: that if one can promise a benevolent outcome it would be worth the human cost. But one of the great lessons of the 20th century is that it's not true. For such a clear-headed writer, he appears blind to the sheer scale of the price paid. I find it tragic, rather than disgraceful."

Many see Hobsbawm's failed faith as setting the pessimistic tone of The Age of Extremes, with its insistence on the built-in defects of capitalism. He also believes the collapse of a rival superpower has ended half a century of stability. Of the current "war on terrorism" he says, "There's no enemy; it's an occasion for America to assert global hegemony. There's no difficulty about winning battles, but what you do afterwards is what counts. The world cannot be recolonised."

While some might seek a mea culpa in his autobiography, Hobsbawm writes that he seeks "historical understanding... not agreement, approval or sympathy". In Ascherson's view, "Eric is not a man for apologising or feeling guilty. He does feel bad about the appalling waste of lives in Soviet communism. But he refuses to acknowledge that he regrets anything. He's not that kind of person."

"I look back in amazement rather than regret," says Hobsbawm, "that not only I but humanity have made it through the past hundred-odd years."

Eric John Ernest Hobsbawm

Born: June 9 1917; Alexandria, Egypt

Education: S chools in Vienna; Prinz Heinrich Gymnasium, Berlin; St Marylebone Grammar School, London; King's College, Cambridge (BA, PhD).

Married: 1943-51 Muriel Seaman; '62- Marlene Schwarz (one son, Andy; one daughter, Julia).

Career: Birkbeck College, London University: 1947 lecturer, '59 reader, '70-82 professor, '82- Emeritus professor of history; King's College, Cambridge: '49-55 Fellow; New School for Social Research New York: '84-97 visiting professor.

Some books: 1959 Primitive Rebels; The Jazz Scene (as Francis Newton); '62 The Age of Revolution; '64 Labouring Men; '68 Industry and Empire; '69 Captain Swing; Bandits; '73 Revolutionaries; '75 The Age of Capital; '78 History of Marxism; '83 co-ed The Invention of Tradition; '84 Workers; '87 The Age of Empire; '90 Nations and Nationalism; Echoes of the Marseillaise; '94 The Age of Extremes; '97 On History; '98 Uncommon People; '99 The New Century; 2002 Interesting Times .

Some honours: 1973 Honorary Fellow, King's College, Cambridge; '78 Fellow of the British Academy; '98 Companion of Honour.

· Interesting Times is published by Allen Lane The Penguin Press on September 30, price £20.00. To order a copy for £17 plus p&p call the Guardian book service on 0870 066 7979.
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When Eric Hobsbawn came to England in the 1930s he became a Marxist and began a distinguished academic career. His new autobiography reveals that at 85 he remains an 'unrepentant communist'. Maya Jaggi on the historian who made us fall in love with history again

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Started in 1870 and was marked by mass production of steel or other chemicals.
Created the first Giant companys in the world and increased the populatriy of the stock market

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A telegraph key used to transmit text messages in Morse code

The ocean liner SS Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, a steamboat. As the main means of trans-oceanic travel for more than a century, ocean liners were essential to the transport needs of national governments, commercial enterprises and the general public.

The Second Industrial Revolution, also known as the Technological Revolution, was a phase of rapid scientific discovery, standardisation, mass production and industrialisation from the late 19th century into the early 20th century. The First Industrial Revolution, which ended in the middle of the 19th century, was punctuated by a slowdown in important inventions before the Second Industrial Revolution in 1870. Though a number of its events can be traced to earlier innovations in manufacturing, such as the establishment of a machine tool industry, the development of methods for manufacturing interchangeable parts, as well as the invention of the Bessemer process and Open hearth furnace to produce steel, the Second Industrial Revolution is generally dated between 1870 and 1914 (the beginning of World War I).

Advancements in manufacturing and production technology enabled the widespread adoption of technological systems such as telegraph and railroad networks, gas and water supply, and sewage systems, which had earlier been limited to a few select cities. The enormous expansion of rail and telegraph lines after 1870 allowed unprecedented movement of people and ideas, which culminated in a new wave of globalization. In the same time period, new technological systems were introduced, most significantly electrical power and telephones. The Second Industrial Revolution continued into the 20th century with early factory electrification and the production line; it ended at the beginning of World War I.

The Second Industrial Revolution is followed by the Third Industrial Revolution starting in 1947.

The Second Industrial Revolution was a period of rapid industrial development, primarily in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States, but also in France, the Low Countries, Italy and Japan. It followed on from the First Industrial Revolution that began in Britain in the late 18th century that then spread throughout Western Europe. It came to an end with the start of the First World War. While the First Revolution was driven by limited use of steam engines, interchangeable parts and mass production, and was largely water-powered (especially in the United States), the Second was characterized by the build-out of railroads, large-scale iron and steel production, widespread use of machinery in manufacturing, greatly increased use of steam power, widespread use of the telegraph, use of petroleum and the beginning of electrification. It also was the period during which modern organizational methods for operating large-scale businesses over vast areas came into use.

The concept was introduced by Patrick Geddes, Cities in Evolution (1910), and was being used by economists such as Erich Zimmermann (1951), but David Landes' use of the term in a 1966 essay and in The Unbound Prometheus (1972) standardized scholarly definitions of the term, which was most intensely promoted by Alfred Chandler (1918-2007). However, some continue to express reservations about its use.

Landes (2003) stresses the importance of new technologies, especially, the internal combustion engine, petroleum, new materials and substances, including alloys and chemicals, electricity and communication technologies (such as the telegraph, telephone and radio).[citation needed ]

A synergy between iron and steel, railroads and coal developed at the beginning of the Second Industrial Revolution. Railroads allowed cheap transportation of materials and products, which in turn led to cheap rails to build more roads. Railroads also benefited from cheap coal for their steam locomotives. This synergy led to the laying of 75,000 miles of track in the U.S. in the 1880s, the largest amount anywhere in world history.

The hot blast technique, in which the hot flue gas from a blast furnace is used to preheat combustion air blown into a blast furnace, was invented and patented by James Beaumont Neilson in 1828 at Wilsontown Ironworks in Scotland. Hot blast was the single most important advance in fuel efficiency of the blast furnace as it greatly reduced the fuel consumption for making pig iron, and was one of the most important technologies developed during the Industrial Revolution. Falling costs for producing wrought iron coincided with the emergence of the railway in the 1830s.

With the greatly reduced cost of producing pig iron with coke using hot blast, demand grew dramatically and so did the size of blast furnaces.

A diagram of the Bessemer converter. Air blown through holes in the converter bottom creates a violent reaction in the molten pig iron that oxidizes the excess carbon, converting the pig iron to pure iron or steel, depending on the residual carbon.

The Bessemer process, invented by Sir Henry Bessemer, allowed the mass-production of steel, increasing the scale and speed of production of this vital material, and decreasing the labor requirements. The key principle was the removal of excess carbon and other impurities from pig iron by oxidation with air blown through the molten iron. The oxidation also raises the temperature of the iron mass and keeps it molten.

The "acid" Bessemer process had a serious limitation in that it required relatively scarce hematite ore which is low in phosphorus. Sidney Gilchrist Thomas developed a more sophisticated process to eliminate the phosphorus from iron. Collaborating with his cousin, Percy Gilchrist a chemist at the Blaenavon Ironworks, Wales, he patented his process in 1878; Bolckow Vaughan & Co. in Yorkshire was the first company to use his patented process. His process was especially valuable on the continent of Europe, where the proportion of phosphoric iron was much greater than in England, and both in Belgium and in Germany the name of the inventor became more widely known than in his own country. In America, although non-phosphoric iron largely predominated, an immense interest was taken in the invention.

The Barrow Hematite Steel Company operated 18 Bessemer converters and owned the largest steelworks in the world at the turn of the 20th century.

The next great advance in steel making was the Siemens-Martin process. Sir Charles William Siemens developed his regenerative furnace in the 1850s, for which he claimed in 1857 to able to recover enough heat to save 70-80% of the fuel. The furnace operated at a high temperature by using regenerative preheating of fuel and air for combustion. Through this method, an open-hearth furnace can reach temperatures high enough to melt steel, but Siemens did not initially use it in that manner.

French engineer Pierre-Émile Martin was the first to take out a license for the Siemens furnace and apply it to the production of steel in 1865. The Siemens-Martin process complemented rather than replaced the Bessemer process. Its main advantages were that it did not expose the steel to excessive nitrogen (which would cause the steel to become brittle), it was easier to control, and that it permitted the melting and refining of large amounts of scrap steel, lowering steel production costs and recycling an otherwise troublesome waste material. It became the leading steel making process by the early 20th century.

The availability of cheap steel allowed building larger bridges, railroads, skyscrapers, and ships. Other important steel products-also made using the open hearth process-were steel cable, steel rod and sheet steel which enabled large, high-pressure boilers and high-tensile strength steel for machinery which enabled much more powerful engines, gears and axles than were previously possible. With large amounts of steel it became possible to build much more powerful guns and carriages, tanks, armored fighting vehicles and naval ships.

A rail rolling mill in Donetsk, 1887

The increase in steel production from the 1860s meant that railways could finally be made from steel at a competitive cost. Being a much more durable material, steel steadily replaced iron as the standard for railway rail, and due to its greater strength, longer lengths of rails could now be rolled. Wrought iron was soft and contained flaws caused by included dross. Iron rails could also not support heavy locomotives and were damaged by hammer blow. The first to make durable rails of steel rather than wrought iron was Robert Forester Mushet at the Darkhill Ironworks, Gloucestershire in 1857.

Steel rails lasted over ten times longer than did iron, and with the falling cost of steel, heavier weight rails were used. This allowed the use of more powerful locomotives, which could pull longer trains, and longer rail cars, all of which greatly increased the productivity of railroads. Rail became the dominant form of transport infrastructure throughout the industrialized world, producing a steady decrease in the cost of shipping seen for the rest of the century.

The theoretical and practical basis for the harnessing of electric power was laid by the scientist and experimentalist Michael Faraday. Through his research on the magnetic field around a conductor carrying a direct current, Faraday established the basis for the concept of the electromagnetic field in physics. His inventions of electromagnetic rotary devices were the foundation of the practical use of electricity in technology.

In 1881, Sir Joseph Swan, inventor of the first feasible incandescent light bulb, supplied about 1,200 Swan incandescent lamps to the Savoy Theatre in the City of Westminster, London, which was the first theatre, and the first public building in the world, to be lit entirely by electricity. Swan's lightbulb had already been used in 1879 to light Mosley Street, in Newcastle upon Tyne, the first electrical street lighting installation in the world. This set the stage for the electrification of industry and the home. The first large scale central distribution supply plant was opened at Holborn Viaduct in London in 1882 and later at Pearl Street Station in New York City.

Three-phase rotating magnetic field of an AC motor. The three poles are each connected to a separate wire. Each wire carries current 120 degrees apart in phase. Arrows show the resulting magnetic force vectors. Three phase current is used in commerce and industry.

The first modern power station in the world was built by the English electrical engineer Sebastian de Ferranti at Deptford. Built on an unprecedented scale and pioneering the use of high voltage (10,000V) alternating current, it generated 800 kilowatts and supplied central London. On its completion in 1891 it supplied high-voltage AC power that was then "stepped down" with transformers for consumer use on each street. Electrification allowed the final major developments in manufacturing methods of the Second Industrial Revolution, namely the assembly line and mass production.

Electrification was called "the most important engineering achievement of the 20th century" by the National Academy of Engineering. Electric lighting in factories greatly improved working conditions, eliminating the heat and pollution caused by gas lighting, and reducing the fire hazard to the extent that the cost of electricity for lighting was often offset by the reduction in fire insurance premiums. Frank J. Sprague developed the first successful DC motor in 1886. By 1889 110 electric street railways were either using his equipment or in planning. The electric street railway became a major infrastructure before 1920. The AC motor ( Induction motor) was developed in the 1890s and soon began to be used in the electrification of industry. Household electrification did not become common until the 1920s, and then only in cities. Fluorescent lighting was commercially introduced at the 1939 World's Fair.

The use of machine tools began with the onset of the First Industrial Revolution. The increase in mechanization required more metal parts, which were usually made of cast iron or wrought iron-and hand working lacked precision and was a slow and expensive process. One of the first machine tools was John Wilkinson's boring machine, that bored a precise hole in James Watt's first steam engine in 1774. Advances in the accuracy of machine tools can be traced to Henry Maudslay and refined by Joseph Whitworth. Standardization of screw threads began with Henry Maudslay around 1800, when the modern screw-cutting lathe made interchangeable V-thread machine screws a practical commodity.

The importance of machine tools to mass production is shown by the fact that production of the Ford Model T used 32,000 machine tools, most of which were powered by electricity. Henry Ford is quoted as saying that mass production would not have been possible without electricity because it allowed placement of machine tools and other equipment in the order of the work flow.

The first paper making machine was the Fourdrinier machine, built by Sealy and Henry Fourdrinier, stationers in London. In 1800, Matthias Koops, working in London, investigated the idea of using wood to make paper, and began his printing business a year later. However, his enterprise was unsuccessful due to the prohibitive cost at the time.

It was in the 1840s, that Charles Fenerty in Nova Scotia and Friedrich Gottlob Keller in Saxony both invented a successful machine which extracted the fibres from wood (as with rags) and from it, made paper. This started a new era for paper making, and, together with the invention of the fountain pen and the mass-produced pencil of the same period, and in conjunction with the advent of the steam driven rotary printing press, wood based paper caused a major transformation of the 19th century economy and society in industrialized countries. With the introduction of cheaper paper, schoolbooks, fiction, non-fiction, and newspapers became gradually available by 1900. Cheap wood based paper also allowed keeping personal diaries or writing letters and so, by 1850, the clerk, or writer, ceased to be a high-status job. By the 1880s chemical processes for paper manufacture were in use, becoming dominant by 1900.

The petroleum industry, both production and refining, began in 1848 with the first oil works in Scotland. The chemist James Young set up a tiny business refining the crude oil in 1848. Young found that by slow distillation he could obtain a number of useful liquids from it, one of which he named "paraffine oil" because at low temperatures it congealed into a substance resembling paraffin wax. In 1850 Young built the first truly commercial oil-works and oil refinery in the world at Bathgate, using oil extracted from locally mined torbanite, shale, and bituminous coal to manufacture naphtha and lubricating oils; paraffin for fuel use and solid paraffin were not sold till 1856.

Although there were many efforts in the mid-19th century to drill for oil, Edwin Drake's 1859 well near Titusville, Pennsylvania, is considered the first "modern oil well". Drake's well touched off a major boom in oil production in the United States. Drake learned of cable tool drilling from Chinese laborers in the U. S. The first primary product was kerosene for lamps and heaters. Similar developments around Baku fed the European market.

Kerosene lighting was much more efficient and less expensive than vegetable oils, tallow and whale oil. Although town gas lighting was available in some cities, kerosene produced a brighter light until the invention of the gas mantle. Both were replaced by electricity for street lighting following the 1890s and for households during the 1920s. Gasoline was an unwanted byproduct of oil refining until automobiles were mass-produced after 1914, and gasoline shortages appeared during World War I. The invention of the Burton process for thermal cracking doubled the yield of gasoline, which helped alleviate the shortages.

The BASF-chemical factories in Ludwigshafen, Germany, 1881

Synthetic dye was discovered by English chemist William Henry Perkin in 1856. At the time, chemistry was still in a quite primitive state; it was still a difficult proposition to determine the arrangement of the elements in compounds and chemical industry was still in its infancy. Perkin's accidental discovery was that aniline could be partly transformed into a crude mixture which when extracted with alcohol produced a substance with an intense purple colour. He scaled up production of the new " mauveine", and commercialized it as the world's first synthetic dye.

After the discovery of mauveine, many new aniline dyes appeared (some discovered by Perkin himself), and factories producing them were constructed across Europe. Towards the end of the century, Perkin and other British companies found their research and development efforts increasingly eclipsed by the German chemical industry which became world dominant by 1914.

HMS Devastation, built in 1871, as it appeared in 1896

Propellers of the RMS Olympic, 1911

This era saw the birth of the modern ship as disparate technological advances came together.

The screw propeller was introduced in 1835 by Francis Pettit Smith who discovered a new way of building propellers by accident. Up to that time, propellers were literally screws, of considerable length. But during the testing of a boat propelled by one, the screw snapped off, leaving a fragment shaped much like a modern boat propeller. The boat moved faster with the broken propeller. The superiority of screw against paddles was taken up by navies. Trials with Smith's SS Archimedes, the first steam driven screw, led to the famous tug-of-war competition in 1845 between the screw-driven HMS Rattler and the paddle steamer HMS Alecto; the former pulling the latter backward at 2.5 knots (4.6 km/h).

The first seagoing iron steamboat was built by Horseley Ironworks and named the Aaron Manby. It also used an innovative oscillating engine for power. The boat was built at Tipton using temporary bolts, disassembled for transportation to London, and reassembled on the Thames in 1822, this time using permanent rivets.

Other technological developments followed, including the invention of the surface condenser, which allowed boilers to run on purified water rather than salt water, eliminating the need to stop to clean them on long sea journeys. The Great Western , built by engineer Isambard Kingdom Brunel, was the longest ship in the world at 236 ft (72 m) with a 250-foot (76 m) keel and was the first to prove that transatlantic steamship services were viable. The ship was constructed mainly from wood, but Brunel added bolts and iron diagonal reinforcements to maintain the keel's strength. In addition to its steam-powered paddle wheels, the ship carried four masts for sails.

Brunel followed this up with the Great Britain, launched in 1843 and considered the first modern ship built of metal rather than wood, powered by an engine rather than wind or oars, and driven by propeller rather than paddle wheel. Brunel's vision and engineering innovations made the building of large-scale, propeller-driven, all-metal steamships a practical reality, but the prevailing economic and industrial conditions meant that it would be several decades before transoceanic steamship travel emerged as a viable industry.

Highly efficient multiple expansion steam engines began being used on ships, allowing them to carry less coal than freight. The oscillating engine was first built by Aaron Manby and Joseph Maudslay in the 1820s as a type of direct-acting engine that was designed to achieve further reductions in engine size and weight. Oscillating engines had the piston rods connected directly to the crankshaft, dispensing with the need for connecting rods. To achieve this aim, the engine cylinders were not immobile as in most engines, but secured in the middle by trunnions which allowed the cylinders themselves to pivot back and forth as the crankshaft rotated, hence the term oscillating.

It was John Penn, engineer for the Royal Navy who perfected the oscillating engine. One of his earliest engines was the grasshopper beam engine. In 1844 he replaced the engines of the Admiralty yacht, HMS Black Eagle with oscillating engines of double the power, without increasing either the weight or space occupied, an achievement which broke the naval supply dominance of Boulton & Watt and Maudslay, Son & Field. Penn also introduced the trunk engine for driving screw propellers in vessels of war. HMS Encounter (1846) and HMS Arrogant (1848) were the first ships to be fitted with such engines and such was their efficacy that by the time of Penn's death in 1878, the engines had been fitted in 230 ships and were the first mass-produced, high-pressure and high-revolution marine engines.

The revolution in naval design led to the first modern battleships in the 1870s, evolved from the ironclad design of the 1860s. The Devastation-class turret ships were built for the British Royal Navy as the first class of ocean-going capital ship that did not carry sails, and the first whose entire main armament was mounted on top of the hull rather than inside it.

The vulcanization of rubber, by American Charles Goodyear and Englishman Thomas Hancock in the 1840s paved the way for a growing rubber industry, especially the manufacture of rubber tyres

John Boyd Dunlop developed the first practical pneumatic tyre in 1887 in South Belfast. Willie Hume demonstrated the supremacy of Dunlop's newly invented pneumatic tyres in 1889, winning the tyre's first ever races in Ireland and then England. Dunlop's development of the pneumatic tyre arrived at a crucial time in the development of road transport and commercial production began in late 1890.

The modern bicycle was designed by the English engineer Harry John Lawson in 1876, although it was John Kemp Starley who produced the first commercially successful safety bicycle a few years later. Its popularity soon grew, causing the bike boom of the 1890s.

Road networks improved greatly in the period, using the Macadam method pioneered by Scottish engineer John Loudon McAdam, and hard surfaced roads were built around the time of the bicycle craze of the 1890s. Modern tarmac was patented by British civil engineer Edgar Purnell Hooley in 1901.

German inventor Karl Benz patented the world's first automobile in 1886. It featured wire wheels (unlike carriages' wooden ones) with a four-stroke engine of his own design between the rear wheels, with a very advanced coil ignition and evaporative cooling rather than a radiator. Power was transmitted by means of two roller chains to the rear axle. It was the first automobile entirely designed as such to generate its own power, not simply a motorized-stage coach or horse carriage.

Benz began to sell the vehicle (advertising it as the Benz Patent Motorwagen) in the late summer of 1888, making it the first commercially available automobile in history.

Henry Ford built his first car in 1896 and worked as a pioneer in the industry, with others who would eventually form their own companies, until the founding of Ford Motor Company in 1903. Ford and others at the company struggled with ways to scale up production in keeping with Henry Ford's vision of a car designed and manufactured on a scale so as to be affordable by the average worker. The solution that Ford Motor developed was a completely redesigned factory with machine tools and special purpose machines that were systematically positioned in the work sequence. All unnecessary human motions were eliminated by placing all work and tools within easy reach, and where practical on conveyors, forming the assembly line, the complete process being called mass production. This was the first time in history when a large, complex product consisting of 5000 parts had been produced on a scale of hundreds of thousands per year. The savings from mass production methods allowed the price of the Model T to decline from $780 in 1910 to $360 in 1916. In 1924 2 million T-Fords were produced and retailed $290 each.

Applied science opened many opportunities. By the middle of the 19th century there was a scientific understanding of chemistry and a fundamental understanding of thermodynamics and by the last quarter of the century both of these sciences were near their present-day basic form. Thermodynamic principles were used in the development of physical chemistry. Understanding chemistry greatly aided the development of basic inorganic chemical manufacturing and the aniline dye industries.

The science of metallurgy was advanced through the work of Henry Clifton Sorby and others. Sorby pioneered the study of iron and steel under microscope, which paved the way for a scientific understanding of metal and the mass-production of steel. In 1863 he used etching with acid to study the microscopic structure of metals and was the first to understand that a small but precise quantity of carbon gave steel its strength. This paved the way for Henry Bessemer and Robert Forester Mushet to develop the method for mass-producing steel.

Other processes were developed for purifying various elements such as chromium, molybdenum, titanium, vanadium and nickel which could be used for making alloys with special properties, especially with steel. Vanadium steel, for example, is strong and fatigue resistant, and was used in half the automotive steel. Alloy steels were used for ball bearings which were used in large scale bicycle production in the 1880s. Ball and roller bearings also began being used in machinery. Other important alloys are used in high temperatures, such as steam turbine blades, and stainless steels for corrosion resistance.

The work of Justus von Liebig and August Wilhelm von Hofmann laid the groundwork for modern industrial chemistry. Liebig is considered the "father of the fertilizer industry" for his discovery of nitrogen as an essential plant nutrient and went on to establish Liebig's Extract of Meat Company which produced the Oxo meat extract. Hofmann headed a school of practical chemistry in London, under the style of the Royal College of Chemistry, introduced modern conventions for molecular modeling and taught Perkin who discovered the first synthetic dye.

The science of thermodynamics was developed into its modern form by Sadi Carnot, William Rankine, Rudolf Clausius, William Thomson, James Clerk Maxwell, Ludwig Boltzmann and J. Willard Gibbs. These scientific principles were applied to a variety of industrial concerns, including improving the efficiency of boilers and steam turbines. The work of Michael Faraday and others was pivotal in laying the foundations of the modern scientific understanding of electricity.

Scottish scientist James Clerk Maxwell was particularly influential-his discoveries ushered in the era of modern physics. His most prominent achievement was to formulate a set of equations that described electricity, magnetism, and optics as manifestations of the same phenomenon, namely the electromagnetic field. The unification of light and electrical phenomena led to the prediction of the existence of radio waves and was the basis for the future development of radio technology by Hughes, Marconi and others.

Maxwell himself developed the first durable colour photograph in 1861 and published the first scientific treatment of control theory. Control theory is the basis for process control, which is widely used in automation, particularly for process industries, and for controlling ships and airplanes. Control theory was developed to analyze the functioning of centrifugal governors on steam engines. These governors came into use in the late 18th century on wind and water mills to correctly position the gap between mill stones, and were adapted to steam engines by James Watt. Improved versions were used to stabilize automatic tracking mechanisms of telescopes and to control speed of ship propellers and rudders. However, those governors were sluggish and oscillated about the set point. James Clerk Maxwell wrote a paper mathematically analyzing the actions of governors, which marked the beginning of the formal development of control theory. The science was continually improved and evolved into an engineering discipline.

Justus von Liebig was the first to understand the importance of ammonia as fertilizer, and promoted the importance of inorganic minerals to plant nutrition. In England, he attempted to implement his theories commercially through a fertilizer created by treating phosphate of lime in bone meal with sulfuric acid. Another pioneer was John Bennet Lawes who began to experiment on the effects of various manures on plants growing in pots in 1837, leading to a manure formed by treating phosphates with sulphuric acid; this was to be the first product of the nascent artificial manure industry.

The discovery of coprolites in commercial quantities in East Anglia, led Fisons and Edward Packard to develop one of the first large-scale commercial fertilizer plants at Bramford, and Snape in the 1850s. By the 1870s superphosphates produced in those factories, were being shipped around the world from the port at Ipswich.

The Birkeland-Eyde process was developed by Norwegian industrialist and scientist Kristian Birkeland along with his business partner Sam Eyde in 1903, but was soon replaced by the much more efficient Haber process, developed by the Nobel prize-winning chemists Carl Bosch of IG Farben and Fritz Haber in Germany. The process used molecular nitrogen (N ₂) and methane (CH ₄) gas in an economically sustainable synthesis of ammonia (NH ₃). The ammonia produced in the Haber process is the main raw material for production of nitric acid.

The steam turbine was developed by Sir Charles Parsons in 1884. His first model was connected to a dynamo that generated 7.5 kW (10 hp) of electricity. The invention of Parson's steam turbine made cheap and plentiful electricity possible and revolutionized marine transport and naval warfare. By the time of Parson's death, his turbine had been adopted for all major world power stations. Unlike earlier steam engines, the turbine produced rotary power rather than reciprocating power which required a crank and heavy flywheel. The large number of stages of the turbine allowed for high efficiency and reduced size by 90%. The turbine's first application was in shipping followed by electric generation in 1903.

The diesel engine was independently designed by Rudolf Diesel and Herbert Akroyd Stuart in the 1890s using thermodynamic principles with the specific intention of being highly efficient. It took several years to perfect and become popular, but found application in shipping before powering locomotives. It remains the world's most efficient prime mover.

The first commercial telegraph system was installed by Sir William Fothergill Cooke and Charles Wheatstone in May 1837 between Euston railway station and Camden Town in London.

The rapid expansion of telegraph networks took place throughout the century, with the first undersea telegraph cable being built by John Watkins Brett between France and England. The Atlantic Telegraph Company was formed in London in 1856 to undertake construction of a commercial telegraph cable across the Atlantic Ocean. This was successfully completed on 18 July 1866 by the ship SS Great Eastern, captained by Sir James Anderson after many mishaps along the away. From the 1850s until 1911, British submarine cable systems dominated the world system. This was set out as a formal strategic goal, which became known as the All Red Line.

As mentioned above, one of the most important scientific advancements in all of history was the unification of light, electricity and magnetism through Maxwell's electromagnetic theory. A scientific understanding of electricity was necessary for the development of efficient electric generators, motors and transformers. David Edward Hughes and Heinrich Hertz both demonstrated and confirmed the phenomenon of electromagnetic waves that had been predicted by Maxwell.

It was Italian inventor Guglielmo Marconi who successfully commercialized radio at the turn of the century. He founded The Wireless Telegraph & Signal Company in Britain in 1897 and in the same year transmitted Morse code across Salisbury Plain, sent the first ever wireless communication over open sea and made the first transatlantic transmission in 1901 from Poldhu, Cornwall to Signal Hill, Newfoundland. Marconi built high-powered stations on both sides of the Atlantic and began a commercial service to transmit nightly news summaries to subscribing ships in 1904.

The key development of the vacuum tube by Sir John Ambrose Fleming in 1904 underpinned the development of modern electronics and radio broadcasting. Lee De Forest's subsequent invention of the triode allowed the amplification of electronic signals, which paved the way for radio broadcasting in the 1920s.

Railroads involved complex operations and employed extremely large amounts of capital and ran a more complicated business compared to anything previous. Consequently, they needed better ways to track costs. For example, to calculate rates they needed to know the cost of a ton-mile of freight. They also needed to keep track of cars, which could go missing for months at a time. This led to what was called "railroad accounting", which was later adopted by steel and other industries, and eventually became modern accounting.

Later in the Second Industrial Revolution, Frederick Winslow Taylor and others in America developed the concept of scientific management or Taylorism. Scientific management initially concentrated on reducing the steps taken in performing work (such as bricklaying or shoveling) by using analysis such as time-and-motion studies, but the concepts evolved into fields such as industrial engineering, manufacturing engineering, and business management that helped to completely restructure[citation needed ] the operations of factories, and later entire segments of the economy.

Taylor's core principles included:[citation needed ]

replacing rule-of-thumb work methods with methods based on a scientific study of the tasks

scientifically selecting, training, and developing each employee rather than passively leaving them to train themselves

providing "detailed instruction and supervision of each worker in the performance of that worker's discrete task"

dividing work nearly equally between managers and workers, such that the managers apply scientific-management principles to planning the work and the workers actually perform the tasks

"The economic changes that have occurred during the last quarter of a century -or during the present generation of living men- have unquestionably been more important and more varied than during any period of the world's history".

Crop failures no longer resulted in starvation in areas connected to large markets through transport infrastructure.

Massive improvements in public health and sanitation resulted from public health initiatives, such as the construction of the London sewerage system in the 1860s and the passage of laws that regulated filtered water supplies-(the Metropolis Water Act introduced regulation of the water supply companies in London, including minimum standards of water quality for the first time in 1852). This greatly reduced the infection and death rates from many diseases.

By 1870 the work done by steam engines exceeded that done by animal and human power. Horses and mules remained important in agriculture until the development of the internal combustion tractor near the end of the Second Industrial Revolution.

The tremendous growth in productivity, transportation networks, industrial production and agricultural output lowered the prices of almost all goods. This led to many business failures and periods that were called depressions that occurred as the world economy actually grew. See also: Long depression

By 1900, the leaders in industrial production was Britain with 24% of the world total, followed by the US (19%), Germany (13%), Russia (9%) and France (7%). Europe together accounted for 62%.

Relative per capita levels of industrialization, 1750-1910 (relative to G.B. in 1900 = 100)[96]

New products and services were introduced which greatly increased international trade. Improvements in steam engine design and the wide availability of cheap steel meant that slow, sailing ships were replaced with faster steamship, which could handle more trade with smaller crews. The chemical industries also moved to the forefront. Britain invested less in technological research than the U.S. and Germany, which caught up.

The development of more intricate and efficient machines along with mass production techniques (after 1910) greatly expanded output and lowered production costs. As a result, production often exceeded domestic demand. Among the new conditions, more markedly evident in Britain, the forerunner of Europe's industrial states, were the long-term effects of the severe Long Depression of 1873-1896, which had followed fifteen years of great economic instability. Businesses in practically every industry suffered from lengthy periods of low - and falling - profit rates and price deflation after 1873.

The U.S. had its highest economic growth rate in the last two decades of the Second Industrial Revolution; however, population growth slowed while productivity growth peaked around the mid 20th century. The Gilded Age in America was based on heavy industry such as factories, railroads and coal mining. The iconic event was the opening of the First transcontinental railroad in 1869, providing six-day service between the East Coast and San Francisco.

During the Gilded Age, American railroad mileage tripled between 1860 and 1880, and tripled again by 1920, opening new areas to commercial farming, creating a truly national marketplace and inspiring a boom in coal mining and steel production. The voracious appetite for capital of the great trunk railroads facilitated the consolidation of the nation's financial market in Wall Street. By 1900, the process of economic concentration had extended into most branches of industry-a few large corporations, some organized as "trusts" (e.g. Standard Oil), dominated in steel, oil, sugar, meatpacking, and the manufacture of agriculture machinery. Other major components of this infrastructure were the new methods for manufacturing steel, especially the Bessemer process. The first billion-dollar corporation was United States Steel, formed by financier J. P. Morgan in 1901, who purchased and consolidated steel firms built by Andrew Carnegie and others.

Increased mechanization of industry and improvements to worker efficiency, increased the productivity of factories while undercutting the need for skilled labor. Mechanical innovations such as batch and continuous processing began to become much more prominent in factories. This mechanization made some factories an assemblage of unskilled laborers performing simple and repetitive tasks under the direction of skilled foremen and engineers. In some cases, the advancement of such mechanization substituted for low-skilled workers altogether. Both the number of unskilled and skilled workers increased, as their wage rates grew Engineering colleges were established to feed the enormous demand for expertise. Together with rapid growth of small business, a new middle class was rapidly growing, especially in northern cities.

In the early 1900s there was a disparity between the levels of employment seen in the northern and southern United States. On average, states in the North had both a higher population, and a higher rate of employment than states in the South. The higher rate of employment is easily seen by considering the 1909 rates of employment compared to the populations of each state in the 1910 census. This difference was most notable in the states with the largest populations, such as New York and Pennsylvania. Each of these states had roughly 5 percent more of the total US workforce than would be expected given their populations. Conversely, the states in the South with the best actual rates of employment, North Carolina and Georgia, had roughly 2 percent less of the workforce than one would expect from their population. When the averages of all southern states and all northern states are taken, the trend holds with the North over-performing by about 2 percent, and the South under-performing by about 1 percent.

The German Empire came to rival Britain as Europe's primary industrial nation during this period. Since Germany industrialized later, it was able to model its factories after those of Britain, thus making more efficient use of its capital and avoiding legacy methods in its leap to the envelope of technology. Germany invested more heavily than the British in research, especially in chemistry, motors and electricity. The German concern system (known as Konzerne), being significantly concentrated, was able to make more efficient use of capital. Germany was not weighted down with an expensive worldwide empire that needed defense. Following Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, it absorbed parts of what had been France's industrial base.

By 1900 the German chemical industry dominated the world market for synthetic dyes. The three major firms BASF, Bayer and Hoechst produced several hundred different dyes, along with the five smaller firms. In 1913 these eight firms produced almost 90 percent of the world supply of dyestuffs, and sold about 80 percent of their production abroad. The three major firms had also integrated upstream into the production of essential raw materials and they began to expand into other areas of chemistry such as pharmaceuticals, photographic film, agricultural chemicals and electrochemical. Top-level decision-making was in the hands of professional salaried managers, leading Chandler to call the German dye companies "the world's first truly managerial industrial enterprises". There were many spin offs from research-such as the pharmaceutical industry, which emerged from chemical research.

Belgium during the Belle Époque showed the value of the railways for speeding the Second Industrial Revolution. After 1830, when it broke away from the Netherlands and became a new nation, it decided to stimulate industry. It planned and funded a simple cruciform system that connected major cities, ports and mining areas, and linked to neighboring countries. Belgium thus became the railway center of the region. The system was soundly built along British lines, so that profits were low but the infrastructure necessary for rapid industrial growth was put in place.

There have been other times that have been called "second industrial revolution". Industrial revolutions may be renumbered by taking earlier developments, such as the rise of medieval technology in the 12th century, or of ancient Chinese technology during the Tang dynasty, or of ancient Roman technology, as first. "Second industrial revolution" has been used in the popular press and by technologists or industrialists to refer to the changes following the spread of new technology after World War I.

Excitement and debate over the dangers and benefits of the Atomic Age were more intense and lasting than those over the Space age but both were predicted to lead to another industrial revolution. At the start of the 21st century the term "second industrial revolution" has been used to describe the anticipated effects of hypothetical molecular nanotechnology systems upon society. In this more recent scenario, they would render the majority of today's modern manufacturing processes obsolete, transforming all facets of the modern economy. Subsequent industrial revolutions include the Digital revolution and Environmental revolution.

in alphabetical order

Economic history of selected countries:

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Smil, Vaclav. Creating the Twentieth Century: Technical Innovations of 1867-1914 and Their Lasting Impact

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Second Industrial Revolution - Wikipedia

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The Second Industrial Revolution, also known as the Technological Revolution, was a phase of rapid scientific discovery, standardisation, mass production and industrialisation from the late 19th century into the early 20th century. The First Industrial Revolution, which ended in the middle of the 19th century, was punctuated by a slowdown in important inventions before the Second Industrial Revolution in 1870.

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A Roberts loom in a weaving shed in Great Britain in 1835

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Check out chapter 9 of your textbook for an overview of many of the ideas you will need to research.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
The factory system is a mode of capitalist production that emerged in the late eighteenth century as a result of Englands Industrial Revolution. Preindustrial England was largely organized around localized forms of production. Goods were produced on family-centered farms, and items such as yarn and other textiles were contracted for larger distribution or produced independently to be sold at a market. After technological innovations created the ability to produce textiles using waterpower, production became centralized in a single place: a factory owned in many cases by members of the former aristocratic class and staffed by workers who were paid a wage (see E. P. Thompsons 1963 book, The Making of the English Working Class ). While this mode of production began with the cotton and textile industries, it was the development of the steam engine that fully established the shift from craftspeople and localized production into production under the factory system.

There are several interconnected factors beyond technological innovation that created the factory system in England in its particular moment in history. One was the development of banking institutions, which were able to channel investments into the establishment of factories, and which were also able to facilitate economic exchange. Similarly, landowners were able to take advantage of the banking industrys low interest rates to facilitate and finance the development of transit systems, created to move goods produced under this new system. At the same time, a rise in the British population not only increased demand for goods, but also created a large pool of laborers who would eventually work for a wage after the development of the factory system. Finally, social changes in Britain at the time both facilitated the training of upper-middle-class men who would administrate the factory system and also the development of British persons as free workers, as opposed to serfs, who could sell their labor power in exchange for a wage.

As such, the development of the factory system was central to the eventual entrenchment of capitalism on a world scale. It was this very shift in production and landownership, combined with the legal backing of free individuals who may enter into a state-sanctioned contractual relationship, that created what Karl Marx (18181883) would identify as the two classes in capitalist society: those who own the means of productions and those who own labor power, which they exchange for a wage in the marketplace. Although both workers and owners share the distinction of equality under the law, it was the old aristocrats who were able to develop the infrastructure and purchase the land to develop factories, and the old serfs who had nothing to sell and exchange but their capacity for labor. This system, whereby the owners of the factories could, through the labor process, transfer the value of the workers productivity into the value of a commodity, established the efficient yet exploitative mode of capitalist production that is still with us today.

The factory system was not only the foundation for the development of capitalism; it also radically shifted many aspects of social organization and daily life. Agricultural families were largely disenfranchised by this process, and in many cases were required to move to industrial centers in order to survive. They were thrust into the system of wage labor, fundamentally changing relationships between men and women. Whereas in preindustrial societies, all members of the family were involved in production work, the advent of the factory system created a gendered division of labor for middle- and working-class families, whereby men went to work for a wage and women were relegated to household work. In poor and nonwhite families, women worked for a wage outside the home in both formal and informal settings. Men were nearly always wageworkers, while women were either relegated to unpaid work to support the work of the men in their families or themselves worked for wages as a means of survival.

The link of the wage system to factory production created not only a different work process and a gendered division of labor, but also a new form of work. Whereas work under preindustrial forms of organization was often exploitative, particularly under systems of slavery and feudalism, the development of the factory system as a defining feature of capitalism created alienated work for the first time. Work is said to be alienated when the worker is in a relationship of production whereby he or she has no autonomy or control over what he or she is producing, where the goods being produced belong exclusively to the owner of the factory, and whereby this process makes the worker alien to himself or herself and his or her community. Marx, in his book Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (1867) argued that workers are alienated to the same extent that they are subject to livelihood exclusively through the wage labor market. This same process has created a social life whereby workers are more fundamentally tied to the workplace than to their homes in terms of livelihood and dependence. This process has also created levels of bureaucracy that divide labor into segmented, de-skilled tasks.

There has been tremendous resistance to the organization of work and social life under the factory system of production. Historically, that resistance has resulted in the abolition of child labor, the creation of the eight-hour workday, and various other labor laws regulating the extent to which owners of the means of production may exploit their workers. Moral arguments about whose labor is fair to exploit, and under which conditions that labor power may be extracted, have resulted in change. Many of the first nations to develop the factory system are now seeing a decline in factory production, as its mode of efficiency under capitalism seeks ever-cheaper ways to produce goods outside the limits of environmental and labor laws. These same nations have seen a shift from factory production to a service economy. However, the fundamental form of factory production, and the inherent link to exploitative relationships under capitalism, is as yet unaltered.

Marx, Karl. [1867] 19061909. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Chicago: Kerr.

Thompson, E. P. 1963. The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage.

Ward, J. T. 1970. The Factory System, Vol. 1: Birth and Growth. New York: Barnes & Noble.

Ward, J. T. 1970. The Factory System, Vol. 2: The Factory System and Society. New York: Barnes & Noble.

Meghan A. Burke

David G. Embrick

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BIBLIOGRAPHY The factory system is a mode of capitalist production that emerged in the late eighteenth century as a result of Englands Industrial Revolution. Preindustrial England was largely organized around localized forms of production. Goods were produced on family-centered farms, and items such as yarn and other textiles were contracted for larger distribution or produced independently to be sold at a market.

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The inventions and innovations of the Industrial Revolution transformed the U.S. and Great Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries. Tremendous gains in science and technology helped Britain become the world's dominant economic and political power, while in the U.S. it fueled a young nation's westward expansion and built vast fortunes.

A Revolution Twice Over

British innovations harnessed the power of water, steam, and coal, helping the U.K. dominate the global textile market of the mid-1770s. Other advancements made in chemistry, manufacturing, and transportation allowed the nation to expand and fund its empire around the globe.

The American Industrial Revolution began after the Civil War as the U.S. rebuilt its infrastructure. New forms of transportation such as the steamboat and the railroad helped the nation expand trade. Meanwhile, innovations such as the modern assembly line and electric light bulb revolutionized both business and personal life.

Transportation

Water had long been used to power simple machines such as grain mills and textile spinners, but Scottish inventor James Watt's refinements to the steam engine in 1775 launched the revolution in earnest. Up until that point, such engines were crude, inefficient, and unreliable. Watt's first engines were used primarily to pump water and air into and out of mines.

With the development of more powerful, efficient engines which would operate under higher pressure and increased output, came newer, better forms of transportation. ​ Robert Fulton was an engineer and inventor who had become fascinated with Watt's engine while living in France at the turn of the 19th century. After several years of experimenting in Paris, he returned to the U.S. and launched the Clermont in 1807 on the Hudson River in New York. It was the first commercially viable steamboat line in the nation. ​​

As the nation's rivers began opening to navigation, commerce expanded along with the population. Another new form of transportation, the railroad, also relied on steam power to drive the locomotives. First in Britain and then in the U.S., rail lines began appearing in the 1820s. By 1869, the first transcontinental rail line linked the coasts.

If the 19th century belonged to steam, the 20th century belonged to the internal combustion engine. American inventor George Brayton, working on earlier innovations, developed the first liquid-fueled internal combustion engine in 1872. During the next two decades, German engineers including Karl Benz and Rudolf Diesel would make further innovations. By the time Henry Ford unveiled his Model T car in 1908, the internal combustion engine was poised to transform not just the nation's transportation system but also spur 20th-century industries like petroleum and aviation.

Communication

As the populations of both the U.K. and the U.S. expanded in the 1800s and America's boundaries pushed westward, new forms of communication that could cover great distances were invented to keep pace with this growth. One of the first significant inventions was the telegraph, perfected by Samuel Morse. He developed a series of dots and dashes that could be transmitted electrically in 1836; they came to be known as Morse Code, though it wouldn't be until 1844 that the first telegraph service opened, between Baltimore and Washington, D.C.

As the rail system expanded in the U.S., the telegraph followed along, literally. Rail depots doubled as telegraph stations, bringing news to the far-flung frontier. Telegraph signals began flowing between the U.S. and the U.K. in 1866 with Cyrus Field's first permanent transatlantic telegraph line. The following decade, Scottish inventor Alexander Graham Bell, working in the U.S. with Thomas Watson, patented the telephone in 1876.

Thomas Edison, who made a number of discoveries and innovations during the 1800s, contributed to the communications revolution by inventing the phonograph in 1876. The device used paper cylinders coated with wax to record sound. Records were first made of metal and later shellac. In Italy, Enrico Marconi made his first successful radio wave transmission in 1895, paving the way for the radio to be invented in the next century.

In 1794, the American industrialist Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin. This device mechanized the process of removing seeds from cotton, something that had previously been done largely by hand. But what made Whitney's invention particularly special was its use of interchangeable parts. If one part broke, it could be easily replaced by another inexpensive, mass-produced copy. This made processing cotton cheaper, in turn creating new markets and wealth. Elijah McCoy, a mechanical engineer, filed more than 50 patents for various industrial inventions.

Although he did not invent the sewing machine, Elias Howe's refinements and patent in 1844 perfected the device. Working with Isaac Singer, Howe marketed the device to manufacturers and later consumers. The machine allowed for the mass production of clothing, expanding the nation's textile industry. It also made housework easier and allowed the growing middle class to indulge in hobbies like fashion.

But factory work-and home life-still were dependent upon sunlight and lamplight. It wasn't until electricity began being harnessed for commercial purposes that industry truly was revolutionized. Thomas Edison's invention of the electric light bulb in 1879 became the means by which large factories could be illuminated, extending shifts and increasing manufacturing output. It also spurred the creation of the nation's electrical grid, into which the many inventions of the 20th century from TVs to PCs would eventually plug.

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The Most Important Inventions of the Industrial Revolution

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Learn about some incredible innovations from the Industrial Revolution and how they transformed life in the U.S., the U.K., and the world.

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Coal, Steam, and The Industrial Revolution: Crash Course World History #32

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The Industrial Revolution began in the 18th century, when agricultural societies became more industrialized and urban. The transcontinental railroad, the cotton gin, electricity and other inventions permanently changed society.