# data[].attributes.body
For the past few months of being in lockdown and the passing of christmas I have been really missing where I am from. I’m Mozambican and I wanted to choose a song close to my culture to explore for this project. I chose the song Muthimba from Ghorwane. I'm not really sure what the direct translation is as its made in either Xangane, Ronga or Chopa which are traditional dialects. However the sound of the saxophone, the guitar and drums really bring up various feelings.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Discover Maputo - The Most BEAUTIFUL CITY in Mozambique

# data[].attributes.body
About Ghorwane
Ghorwane is a Mozambican marrabenta musical band who have primarily use guitars saxophones and percussion instrument. It was founded in 1983.

'Ghorwane' means The good boys

# data[].attributes.headline
AIM: Understand more about the importance of Marrabenta and its Colonial routes

# data[].attributes.subject
AIM: Understand more about the importance of Marrabenta and its Colonial routes

# data[].attributes.body
In this article I saw that their Saxophone player Zeca Alege was murdered in 1993 - this sparked my attention and I might go back to looking at this.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Ghorwane is a Mozambican marrabenta musical band who have primarily use guitars saxophones and percussion instrument. It was founded in 1983. The band derived its name from the lake of the same name in the province of Gaza. This name was given by President Samora Machel during a festival to celebrate the ten years of independence in 1985. Samora has declared that "It's prohibited to lie in the People's Republic of Mozambique" and cites Ghorwane as an example. Ghorwane is the Shangaan term for "Good Boys". Their style is a combination of traditional Mozambique music, Afropop, and fusion. Ghorwane's music is sung in local languages, including Shangaan, Ronga and Chope. The band's composer and saxophonist, Jose "Zeca" Alage, was murdered in 1993. Their 2005 album VANA VA NDOTA was dedicated to Zeca Alage (1959-1993) and Pedro Langa (1959-2001).

Later that same year, Ghorwane started a music co-operative, the first of its kind in Mozambique, with the intention of promoting Mozambican music, improving working conditions for local musicians and protecting composers rights.

(May not be complete)

1. Mayvavo - Ghorwane

2. Matxutxubanga

3. Wavitika - Ghorwane

4. Golheani - José Mucavele

5. Tiyisselane - Zebra

6. Xitarato

7. Lanixlamalissa - José Mucavele

8. Kadivae Mono - Stewart Sukuma

9. Danca Marrabenta - Gito Baloi

10. As Tuas Trancas - José Mucavele

11. Mayvavo LL - Ghorwane

1. The official Ghorwane website

2. Ghorwane was featured in episode 5 of the BBC production The African Rock 'n' Roll Years

3. Ghorwane in Real World Records website

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Ghorwane is a Mozambican marrabenta musical band who have primarily use guitars saxophones and percussion instrument. It was founded in 1983. The band derived its name from the lake of the same name in the province of Gaza. This name was given by President Samora Machel during a festival to celebrate the ten years of independence in 1985.

# data[].attributes.body
Marrabenta was a form of eclectic music in Mozambique. It emerged in the south of Mozambique at the end of the 1930s, but it wasn't until the 1960s that it became more popular. Marrabenta has been around before 1930's it just didnt have a name. Whilst under the colonial rule of the portuguese, Mozambicans weren't allowed to speak the local dialect and the Portuguese tried to diminish its culture and assimilate locals.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
It is often said that Mozambicans start the year "a marrabentar." That's because every year, early February, the most representative festival of the country, the Festival of the Marrabenta, takes place. Wherever you go, you hear "teka, teka!", the expression used while dancing to marrabenta, which has a contagious rhythm that makes it difficult not to get carried away.

But in Mozambique, talking about marrabenta music is also serious, because in every hypnotic beat, the country's colonial history and identity resonates.
The Festival of Marrabenta Music
This time, from 1 to 3 February, 2013, the famous Congolese composer and singer Sam Mangwana and other Mozambicans musicians Dilon Djindji, Radio Marrabenta, Xidimingwana, Orquesta Djambo o Cheny Wa Gune, performed at the 6th edition of this festival held in the city of Maputo and in the towns of Marracuene and Matalene.

As every year, a train with live music departed from Maputo and took musicians and audiences to the village of Marracuene for free. An hour and a half trip into the " Train of marrabenta ", people also joined the Gwaza Muthini celebration which coincides with the event.
Music of Resistance
The Gwaza Muthini ceremony commemorates the famous battle of Marracuene which took place on February 2, 1895. In this battle, the warriors of the Gaza Empire, under the command of Ngumgunhane, resisted the Portuguese colonial army.

The men of Ngumgunhane lost the battle and this was the beginning of the end of the Empire of Gaza. In the past, a hippopotamus was hunted and its meat was distributed among the population to commemorate the event. Today, hippopotamus meat has been replaced by goat meat which is often enjoyed with a local moonshine called " canhu" - consumed while dancing to the sound of the marrabenta.

The history and evolution of the marrabenta was not smooth. It emerged in the south of Mozambique at the end of the 1930s, but it wasn't until the 1960s that it became more popular. Multiracial and multicultural policies within the Portuguese colonies in Africa, facilitated its expansion in Mozambique and in its metropolis. The arrival of the first gramophones from South Africa and the emergence of local music broadcasts also contributed to its diffusion.
Music of Struggle
The Portuguese regime in Mozambique demanded that they sing and dance only Portuguese music during most of the colonial period. To defend their cultural identity, various organisations were born, such as the African Association (AA) and the associative Center of Blacks from the Province of Mozambique (CANPM), which ended up playing a fundamental role in the promotion of Mozambican culture. In this way, marrabenta became a music of struggle whose themes are inspired by the experiences of everyday life, love, social criticism and important events that took place in Mozambique.
Evolution of Marrabenta
This rhythm was first played with homemade four-string guitars made from empty cans and pieces of wood. The mixture of the magikay and zukuta rhythms from the South of the country and the assimilation of western rhythms such as the American and South African black music coming to the former Lourenço Marques (today Maputo), enriched this new genre. It had no name until 1930 but finally adopted the name of the marrabenta.

Some authors claim that the term is derived from the Portuguese verb "rebentar" which means break, in this case "break the strings" by the force when they played the guitar; other authors argue that it comes from the idea of "dance until you break" because of the energy required when it is danced, as considered the Mozambican marrabenta musician Dilon Djindji. But for a large majority the marrabenta represents the cultural expression of a people who in the words of the ethnomusicologist Luka Mucavel "it is a product of society, experiences and coexistence between various Mozambicans ethnic groups with influence from outside".

Sam Mangwana from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (formerly Zaire, when he was born) came to the festival for the first time this year.

His father was Zimbabwean and his mother was Angolan, and he grew up listening to Cuban, French, Spanish, Italian and American music. He is considered one of the main singers and promoters of the Congolese rumba and his artistic production is based on sounds from Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Congo. During the 1980s and 90s, Sam popularized the marrabenta themes, "Vamos para o campo (Marracuene)", " Tio António" or " Moçambique Oyé " which are now considered classics.

It's been five years since the first edition of the Festival of the Marrabenta, thanks to the initiative of Litho Sithoe. And five years later, the festival continues through the determination and perseverance of its organizer. On February 3 the festival ended with a concert at the Cultural Center of the town of Matalane. This day is celebrated the "Day of the Mozambicans Heroes", a national holiday that commemorates the lives of the fallen soldiers who fought bravely for the country's independence in 1975. The finishing touch to end a weekend breathing, living and feeling the marrabenta.

No one can predict the future of the marrabenta nor can they decipher how the style will evolve in modern times, if it will take paths towards more commercial sound. But what is clear is that in this 6th edition, entertainment was guaranteed.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Dancing to the Beat of History with Marrabenta in Mozambique

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
It is often said that Mozambicans start the year " a marrabentar." That's because every year, early February, the most representative festival of the country, the Festival of the Marrabenta, takes place. Wherever you go, you hear "teka, teka!", the expression used while dancing to marrabenta , which has a contagious rhythm that makes it difficult not to get carried away.

# data[].attributes.body
To defend Mozambican cultural identity from the colonial Portuguese rule, various organisations were born, such as the African Association (AA) and the associative Center of Blacks from the Province of Mozambique (CANPM), which ended up playing a fundamental role in the promotion of Mozambican culture.

Marrabenta usually talks of huge emotion, love, struggle, social criticism and really is a form in which Mozambicans could communicate.

# data[].attributes.body
first played with homemade four-string guitars made from empty cans and pieces of wood.

It later evolved with foreign musical influences from the American and South African Black music.

"Some authors claim that the term is derived from the Portuguese verb “rebentar” which means break, in this case “break the strings” by the force when they played the guitar; other authors argue that it comes from the idea of “dance until you break” because of the energy required when it is danced, as considered the Mozambican marrabenta musician Dilon Djindji. But for a large majority the marrabentarepresents the cultural expression of a people who in the words of the ethnomusicologist Luka Mucavel “it is a product of society, experiences and coexistence between various Mozambicans ethnic groups with influence from outside”.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Marrabenta is a popular form of Mozambican dance music. The genre originated in the '30s and '40s while the Portuguese still ruled Mozambique and the older local bands tried to simulate traditional African dance rhythms using Portuguese instruments. Today's marrabanta bands primarily play electronic instruments like guitars and keyboards and have brought many global genres into their music, like blues and reggae.

A fun fact from Wikipedia's entry on Marrabenta: "According to vocalist Dilon Djindje, Marrabenta is named for the energetic performances he delivered as he toured across Mozambique. The intensity and vitality of his shows led audiences to believe that he was breaking the emotional limits of those in attendance. The musicians who played this music came to be called arrabenta, a Portugese term for 'break it.'"

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Marrabenta -- What you teach your kids about the world MATTERS

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Marrabenta is a popular form of Mozambican dance music. The genre originated in the '30s and '40s while the Portuguese still ruled Mozambique and the older local bands tried to simulate traditional African dance rhythms using Portuguese instruments. Today's marrabanta bands primarily play electronic instruments like guitars and keyboards and have brought many global genres into their music, like blues and reggae.

# data[].attributes.headline
Portuguese Colonisation of Mozambique 1498-1975 Tale of how Moz got its name

# data[].attributes.subject
Portuguese Colonisation of Mozambique 1498-1975 Tale of how Moz got its name

# data[].attributes.body
Portuguese colonisation has an extremely long history in Mozambique. As a child I remember my gran telling me that Mozambique got its name when the portuguese explorer Vasco de Game arrived and asked a native Arab what the name of this land was. The local arabic tradesman didnt understand and thought he was asking what his name was, to which he replied Moz Albik. Vasco de Game had heard Mozambique, and apparently that is the story of how Mozambique got its name.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Portuguese Mozambique ( Portuguese: Moçambique) or Portuguese East Africa ( África Oriental Portuguesa) was the common terms by which Mozambique was designated during the historic period when it was a Portuguese colony. Portuguese Mozambique originally constituted a string of Portuguese possessions along the south-east African coast, and later became a unified colony, which now forms the Republic of Mozambique.

Portuguese trading settlements and, later, colonies, were formed along the coast and into the Zambezi basin from 1498 when Vasco da Gama first reached the Mozambican coast. Lourenço Marques explored the area that is now Maputo Bay in 1544. The Portuguese increased efforts for occupying the interior of the colony after the Scramble for Africa, and secured political control over most of its territory in 1918, facing the resistance of Africans during the process.

Some territories in Mozambique were handed over in the late 19th century for rule by chartered companies like the Mozambique Company ( Companhia de Moçambique), which had the concession of the lands corresponding to the present-day provinces of Manica and Sofala, and the Niassa Company ( Companhia do Niassa), which had controlled the lands of the modern provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa. The Mozambique Company relinquished its territories back to Portuguese control in 1942, unifying Mozambique under control of the Portuguese government.

The region as a whole was long officially termed Portuguese East Africa, and was subdivided into a series of colonies extending from Lourenço Marques in the south to Niassa in the north. Cabo Delgado was initially merely a strip of territory along the Rovuma River, including Cape Delgado itself, which Portugal acquired out of German East Africa in 1919, but it was enlarged southward to the Lurio River to form what is now Cabo Delgado Province. In the Zambezi basin were the colonies of Quelimane (now Zambezia Province) and Tete (in the panhandle between Northern Rhodesia [now Zambia] and Southern Rhodesia [now Zimbabwe]), which were for a time merged as Zambezia. The colony of Moçambique (now Nampula Province) had the Island of Mozambique as its capital. The island was also the seat of the Governor-General of Portuguese East Africa until the late 1890s, when that official was officially moved to the city of Lourenço Marques. Also in the south was the colony of Inhambane, which lay north-east of Lourenço Marques.

Once these colonies were merged, the region as a whole became known as Moçambique.

Mozambique, according to the official policy of the Salazar regime, was an integral part of the " pluricontinental and multiracial nation" of Portugal. Portugal claimed, as it did in all its colonies, to Europeanise the local population and assimilate them into Portuguese culture. However, this stated policy was largely unsuccessful, and African opposition to colonisation led to a ten-year independence war that culminated in independence from Portugal in June 1975.

During its history as a Portuguese colony, the present-day territory of Mozambique had the following formal designations:

1501-1752: Captaincy of Sofala (Portuguese: Capitania de Sofala); Dependency of the Portuguese State of India.

1569-1752: Captaincy of Mozambique (Capitania de Moçambique e Sofala); Dependency of the Portuguese State of India.

1752-1836: Captaincy-General of Mozambique, Sofala and Rivers of Sena (Capitania-Geral de Moçambique, Sofala e Rios de Sena); Independent of the governor of the Portuguese State of India.

1836-1891: Province of Mozambique (Província de Moçambique)

1891-1893: State of Eastern Africa (Estado da África Oriental)

1893-1926: Province of Mozambique (Província de Moçambique)

1926-1951: Colony of Mozambique (Colónia de Moçambique)

1951-1972: Province of Mozambique (Província de Moçambique)

1973-1975: State of Mozambique (Estado de Moçambique)

Until the 20th century, the land and peoples of Mozambique were barely affected by the Europeans who came to its shores and entered its major rivers. As the Muslim traders, mostly Swahili, were displaced from their coastal centres and routes to the interior by the Portuguese, migrations of Bantu peoples continued and tribal federations formed and reformed as the relative power of local chiefs changed. For four centuries the Portuguese presence was meagre. Coastal and river trading posts were built, abandoned, and built again. Governors sought personal profits to take back to Portugal, and colonists were not attracted to the distant area with its relatively unattractive climate; those who stayed were traders who married local women and successfully maintained relations with local chiefs.

In Portugal, however, Mozambique was considered to be a vital part of a world empire. Periodic recognition of the relative insignificance of the revenues it could produce was tempered by the mystique which developed regarding the mission of the Portuguese to bring their civilization to the African territory. It was believed that through missionary activity and other direct contact between Africans and Europeans, the Africans could be taught to appreciate and participate in Portuguese culture.

In the last decade of the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, integration of Mozambique into the structure of the Portuguese nation was begun. After all of the area of the present province had been recognized by other European powers as belonging to Portugal, administrators waged wars against African polities to assert control over the territory. Civil administration was established throughout the area, the building of an infrastructure was begun, and agreements regarding the transit trade of Mozambique's land-locked neighbours to the west were made.

Colonial legislation discriminated against Africans on cultural grounds. Colonial legislation submitted Africans to forced labour, to pass laws and to segregation in schools. That most Africans were perceived to engage in "uncivilized behaviour" by the Portuguese created a low opinion of Africans as a group among Europeans. The uneducated Portuguese immigrant peasants in urban areas were frequently in direct competition with Africans for jobs and demonstrated jealousies and racial prejudice.

Between the urban and rural sectors of the society lied a steadily increasing group of Africans who were loosening their ties with rural villages and starting to participate in the urban economy, to settle in suburbs, and to adopt European customs. Members of this group would later become active participants in the independence movement.

When Portuguese explorers reached East Africa in 1498, Swahili commercial settlements had existed along the Swahili Coast and outlying islands for several centuries. From about 1500, Portuguese trading posts and forts became regular ports of call on the new route to the east.

The voyage of Vasco da Gama around the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean in 1498 marked the Portuguese entry into trade, politics, and society in the Indian Ocean world. The Portuguese gained control of the Island of Mozambique and the port city of Sofala in the early 16th century. Vasco da Gama having visited Mombasa in 1498 was then successful in reaching India thereby permitting the Portuguese to trade with the Far East directly by sea, thus challenging older trading networks of mixed land and sea routes, such as the spice trade routes that used the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and caravans to reach the eastern Mediterranean.

The Republic of Venice had gained control over much of the trade routes between Europe and Asia. After traditional land routes to India had been closed by the Ottoman Turks, Portugal hoped to use the sea route pioneered by da Gama to break the Venetian trading monopoly. Initially, Portuguese rule in East Africa focused mainly on a coastal strip centred in Mombasa. With voyages led by Vasco da Gama, Francisco de Almeida and Afonso de Albuquerque, the Portuguese dominated much of southeast Africa's coast, including Sofala and Kilwa, by 1515. Their main goal was to dominate trade with India. As the Portuguese settled along the coast, they made their way into the hinterland as sertanejos (backwoodsmen). These sertanejos lived alongside Swahili traders and even took up service among Shona kings as interpreters and political advisors. One such sertanejo managed to travel through almost all the Shona kingdoms, including the Mutapa Empire's (Mwenemutapa) metropolitan district, between 1512 and 1516.

By the 1530s, small groups of Portuguese traders and prospectors penetrated the interior regions seeking gold, where they set up garrisons and trading posts at Sena and Tete on the Zambezi River and tried to gain exclusive control over the gold trade. The Portuguese finally entered into direct relations with the Mwenemutapa in the 1560s.

They recorded a wealth of information about the Mutapa kingdom as well as its predecessor, Great Zimbabwe. According to Swahili traders whose accounts were recorded by the Portuguese historian João de Barros, Great Zimbabwe was an ancient capital city built of stones of marvellous size without the use of mortar. And while the site was not within Mutapa's borders, the Mwenemutapa kept noblemen and some of his wives there.

The Portuguese attempted to legitimate and consolidate their trade and settlement positions through the creation of (land grants) tied to Portuguese settlement and administration. While prazos were originally developed to be held by Portuguese, through intermarriage they became African Portuguese or African Indian centres defended by large African slave armies known as . Historically, within Mozambique, there was slavery. Human beings were bought and sold by African tribal chiefs, Arab traders, and the Portuguese. Many Mozambican slaves were supplied by tribal chiefs who raided warring tribes and sold their captives to the prazeiros.

Although Portuguese influence gradually expanded, its power was limited and exercised through individual settlers and officials who were granted extensive autonomy. The Portuguese were able to wrest much of the coastal trade from Arabs between 1500 and 1700, but, with the Arab seizure of Portugal's key foothold at Fort Jesus on Mombasa Island (now in Kenya) in 1698, the pendulum began to swing in the other direction. As a result, investment lagged while Lisbon devoted itself to the more lucrative trade with India and the Far East and to the colonisation of Brazil. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Mazrui and Omani Arabs reclaimed much of the Indian Ocean trade, forcing the Portuguese to retreat south. Many prazos had declined by the mid-19th century, but several of them survived. During the 19th century, other European powers, particularly the British and the French, became increasingly involved in the trade and politics of the region. In the Island of Mozambique, the hospital, a majestic neo-classical building constructed in 1877 by the Portuguese, with a garden decorated with ponds and fountains, was for many years the biggest hospital south of the Sahara. By the early 20th century the Portuguese had shifted the administration of much of Mozambique to large private companies, like the Mozambique Company, the Zambezia Company and the Niassa Company, controlled and financed mostly by the British, which established, with the Portuguese, railroad lines to neighbouring countries. The companies, granted a charter by the Portuguese government to foster economic development and maintain Portuguese control in the territory's provinces, would lose their purpose when the territory was transferred to the control of the Portuguese colonial government between 1929 and 1942.

Although slavery had been legally abolished in Mozambique by the Portuguese authorities, at the end of the 19th century the Chartered companies enacted a forced labour policy and supplied cheap - often forced - African labour to the mines and plantations of the nearby British colonies and South Africa. The Zambezia Company, the most profitable chartered company, took over a number of smaller prazeiro holdings and requested Portuguese military outposts to protect its property. The chartered companies and the Portuguese administration built roads and ports to bring their goods to market including a railway linking Southern Rhodesia with the Mozambican port of Beira. However, the development's administration gradually started to pass directly from the trading companies to the Portuguese government itself.

Because of their unsatisfactory performance and because of the shift, under the Estado Novo regime of Oliveira Salazar, towards a stronger Portuguese control of the Portuguese Empire's economy, the companies' concessions were not renewed when they ran out. This was what happened in 1942 with the Mozambique Company, which however continued to operate in the agricultural and commercial sectors as a corporation, and had already happened in 1929 with the termination of the Niassa Company's concession.

In the 1950s, the Portuguese overseas colony was rebranded an overseas province of Portugal, and by the early 1970s, it was officially upgraded to the status of Portuguese non-sovereign state, by which it would remain a Portuguese territory but with a wider administrative autonomy. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), initiated a guerrilla campaign against Portuguese rule in September 1964. This conflict, along with the two others already initiated in the other Portuguese colonies of Angola and Guinea, became part of the so-called Portuguese Colonial War (1961-74). From a military standpoint, the Portuguese regular army held the upper hand during all of the conflicts against the independentist guerrilla forces, which created favourable conditions for social development and economic growth until the end of the conflict in 1974.

After ten years of sporadic warfare and after Portugal's return to democracy through a leftist military coup in Lisbon which replaced Portugal's Estado Novo regime in favour of a military junta (the Carnation Revolution of April 1974), FRELIMO took control of the territory. The talks that led to an agreement on Mozambique's independence, signed in Lusaka, were started. Within a year, almost the entire ethnic Portuguese population had left, many fleeing in fear (in mainland Portugal they were known as retornados); others were expelled by the ruling power of the newly independent territory. Mozambique became independent from Portugal on 25 June 1975.

At least since the early 19th century, the legal status of Mozambique always considered it as much a part of Portugal as Lisbon, but as an overseas province enjoyed special derogations to account for its distance from Europe.

From 1837, the highest government official in the province of Mozambique has always been the governor-general, who reported directly to the Government in Lisbon, usually through the minister of the Overseas. During some periods in the late 19th and the early 20th century, the governors-general of Mozambique received the status of royal commissioners or of high commissioners, which gave them extended executive and legislative powers, equivalent to those of a government minister.

In the 20th century, the province was also subject to the authoritarian Estado Novo regime that ruled Portugal from 1933 to 1974, until the military coup in Lisbon, known as the Carnation Revolution. Most members of the government of Mozambique were from Portugal, but a few were Africans. Nearly all members of the bureaucracy were from Portugal, as most Africans did not have the necessary qualifications to obtain positions.

The government of Mozambique, as it was in Portugal, was highly centralized. Power was concentrated in the executive branch, and all elections where they occurred were carried out using indirect methods. From the Prime Minister's office in Lisbon, authority extended down to the most remote posts and regedorias of Mozambique through a rigid chain of command. The authority of the government of Mozambique was residual, primarily limited to implementing policies already decided in Europe. In 1967, Mozambique also sent seven delegates to the National Assembly in Lisbon.

The highest official in the province was the governor-general, appointed by the Portuguese cabinet on recommendation of the Overseas Minister. The governor-general had both executive and legislative authority. A Government Council advised the governor-general in the running of the province. The functional cabinet consisted of five secretaries appointed by the Overseas Minister on the advice of the governor. A Legislative Council had limited powers and its main activity was approving the provincial budget. Finally, an Economic and Social Council had to be consulted on all draft legislation, and the governor-general had to justify his decision to Lisbon if he ignored its advice.

Mozambique was divided into nine districts, which were further subdivided into 61 municipalities ( concelhos) and 33 circumscriptions ( circunscrições). Each subdivision was then made up of three or four individual posts, 166 in all with an average of 40,000 Africans in each. Each district, except Lourenço Marques which was run by the governor-general, was overseen by a governor. Most Africans only had contact with the Portuguese through the post administrator, who was required to visit each village in his domain at least once a year.

The lowest level of administration was the regedoria, settlements inhabited by Africans living according to customary law. Each regedoria was run by a regulo, an African or Portuguese official chosen on the recommendation of local residents. Under the regulos, each village had its own African headman.

Each level of government could also have an advisory board or council. They were established in municipalities with more than 500 electors, in smaller municipalities or circumscriptions with more than 300 electors, and in posts with more than 20 electors. Each district also had its own board as well.

Two legal systems were in force - Portuguese civil law and African customary law. Until 1961, Africans were considered to be Natives ( indígenas), rather than citizens. After 1961, the previous native laws were repealed and Africans gained de facto Portuguese citizenship.

Portuguese East Africa was located in south-eastern Africa. It was a long coastal strip with Portuguese strongholds, from current day Tanzania and Kenya, to the south of current-day Mozambique.

In 1900, the part of modern Mozambique northwest of the Zambezi and Shire Rivers was called Moçambique; the rest of it was Lourenço Marques. Various districts existed, and even issued stamps, during the first part of the century, including Inhambane, Lourenço Marques, Mozambique Colony, Mozambique Company, Nyassa Company, Quelimane, Tete, and Zambésia. The Nyassa Company territory is now Cabo Delgado and Niassa.

In the early- and mid-20th century, a number of changes occurred. Firstly, on 28 June 1919, the Treaty of Versailles transferred the Kionga Triangle, a 1,000 km ² (390 sq mi) territory south of the Rovuma River from German East Africa to Mozambique.

During World War II, the Charter of the Mozambique Company expired, on 19 July 1942; its territory, known as Manica and Sofala, became a district of Mozambique. Mozambique was constituted as four districts on 1 January 1943 - Manica and Sofala, Niassa, Sul do Save (South of the Save River), and Zambézia.

On 20 October 1954, administrative reorganization caused Cabo Delgado and Mozambique districts to be split from Niassa. At the same time, the Sul do Save district was divided into Gaza, Inhambane and Lourenço Marques, while the Tete district was split from Manica and Sofala.

By the early 1970s, Mozambique was bordering the Mozambique Channel, bordering the countries of Malawi, Rhodesia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia. Covering a total area of 801,590 km ² (309,500 square miles, slightly less than twice the size of California). With a tropical to subtropical climate, the Zambezi flows through the north-central and most fertile part of the country. Its coastline had 2,470 km (1,530 miles), with 4,571 km (2,840 miles) of land boundaries, its highest point at Monte Binga (2,436 metres, 7,992 ft). The Gorongosa National Park, founded in 1920, was the main natural park in the territory.

The districts with its respective capitals were:

Other important urban centres included Sofala, Nacala, António Enes, Island of Mozambique and Vila Junqueiro.

By 1970, the Portuguese Overseas Province of Mozambique had about 8,168,933 inhabitants. Nearly 300,000 were white ethnic Portuguese. There was a number of mulattoes, from both European and African ancestry, living across the territory. However, the majority of the population belonged to local tribal groups which included the Makua- Lomwe, the Shona and the Tsonga. Other ethnic minorities included British, Greeks, Chinese and Indians. Most inhabitants were black indigenous Africans with a diversity of ethnic and cultural backgrounds, ranging from Shangaan and Makonde to Yao or Shona peoples. The Makua were the largest ethnic group in the north. The Sena and Shona (mostly Ndau) were prominent in the Zambezi valley, and the Shangaan (Tsonga) dominated in the south. In addition, several other minority groups lived a tribal lifestyle across the territory.

Mozambique had around 250,000 Europeans in 1974 that made up around 3% of the population. Mozambique was cosmopolitan as it had Indian, Chinese, Greek and Anglophone communities (over 25,000 Indians and 5,000 Chinese by the early 1970s). The white population was more influenced from South Africa. The capital of Portuguese Mozambique, Lourenço Marques ( Maputo), had a population of 355,000 in 1970 with around 100,000 Europeans. Beira had around 115,000 inhabitants at the time with around 30,000 Europeans. Most of the other cities ranged from 10 to 15% in the number of Europeans, while Portuguese Angola cities had European majorities ranging from 50% to 60%.

Starting in 1926, Portugal's colonial authorities abandoned conceptions of an innate inferiority of Africans, and set as their goal the development of a multiethnic society in its African colonies. The establishment of a dual, racialized civil society was formally recognized in Estatuto do Indigenato (The Statute of Indigenous Populations) adopted in 1929, which was based on the subjective concept of civilization versus tribalism. In the administration's view, the goal of civilizing mission would only be achieved after a period of Europeanization or enculturation of African communities.

The Estatuto established a distinction between the colonial citizens, subject to the Portuguese laws and entitled to all citizenship rights and duties effective in the metropole, and the indígenas (natives), subjected to colonial legislation and customary African laws. Between the two groups there was a third small group, the assimilados, comprising native blacks, mulatos, Asians, and mixed-race people, who had at least some formal education and not subjected to paid forced labor. They were entitled to some citizenship rights, and held a special identification card, used to control the movements of forced labor. The indígenas were subject to the traditional authorities, who were gradually integrated into the colonial administration and charged with solving disputes, managing the access to land, and guaranteeing the flows of workforce and the payment of taxes. As several authors have pointed out, the Indigenato regime was the political system that subordinated the immense majority of Africans to local authorities entrusted with governing, in collaboration with the lowest echelon of the colonial administration, the native communities described as tribes and assumed to have a common ancestry, language, and culture. The colonial use of traditional law and structures of power was thus an integral part of the process of colonial domination.

In the 1940s, the integration of traditional authorities into the colonial administration was deepened. The Portuguese colony was divided into (municipalities), in urban areas, governed by colonial and metropolitan legislation, and circunscrições (localities), in rural areas. The circunscrições were led by a colonial administrator and divided into regedorias (subdivisions of circunscrições), headed by régules (tribal chieftains), the embodiment of traditional authorities. Provincial Portuguese Decree No. 5.639, of July 29, 1944, attributed to régulos and their assistants, the cabos de terra, the status of auxiliares da administração (administrative assistants). Gradually, these traditional titles lost some of their content, and the régulos and cabos de terra came to be viewed as an effective part of the colonial state, remunerated for their participation in the collection of taxes, recruitment of the labor force, and agricultural production in the area under their control. Within the areas of their jurisdiction, the régulos and the cabos de terra also controlled the distribution of land and settled conflicts according to customary norms. To exercise their power, the régulos and cabos de terra had their own police force.

The indigenato regime was abolished in 1960. From then on, all Africans were considered Portuguese citizens, and racial discrimination became a sociological rather than a legal feature of colonial society. In fact, the rule of traditional authorities became even more integrated than before in the colonial administration. Legally speaking, by the 1960s and 1970s segregation in Mozambique was minimal compared to that in neighbouring South Africa.

The largest coastal cities, the first founded or settled by Portuguese people since the 16th century, like the capital Lourenço Marques, Beira, Quelimane, Nacala and Inhambane were modern cosmopolitan ports and a melting pot of several cultures, with a strong South African influence. The Southeast African and Portuguese cultures were dominant, but the influence of Arab, Indian, and Chinese cultures were also felt. The cuisine was diverse, owing especially to the Portuguese cuisine and Muslim heritage, and seafood was also quite abundant.

Lourenço Marques had always been a point of interest for artistic and architectural development since the first days of its urban expansion and this strong artistic spirit was responsible for attracting some of the world's most forward architects at the turn of the 20th century. The city was home to masterpieces of building work by, Pancho Guedes, Herbert Baker and Thomas Honney amongst others. The earliest architectural efforts around the city focused on classical European designs such as the Central Train Station (CFM) designed by architects Alfredo Augusto Lisboa de Lima, Mario Veiga and Ferreira da Costa and built between 1913 and 1916 (sometimes mistaken with the work of Gustav Eiffel), and the Hotel Polana designed by Herbert Baker.

As the 1960s and 1970s approached, Lourenço Marques was yet again at the center of a new wave of architectural influences made most popular by Pancho Guedes. The designs of the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by modernist movements of clean, straight and functional structures. However, prominent architects such as Pancho Guedes fused this with local art schemes giving the city's buildings a unique Mozambican theme. As a result, most of the properties erected during the second construction boom take on these styling cues.

Since the 15th century, Portugal founded settlements, trading posts, forts and ports in the Sub-Saharan Africa's coast. Cities, towns and villages were founded all over East African territories by the Portuguese, especially since the 19th century, like Lourenço Marques, Beira, Vila Pery, Vila Junqueiro, Vila Cabral and Porto Amélia. Others were expanded and developed greatly under Portuguese rule, like Quelimane, Nampula and Sofala. By this time, Mozambique had become a Portuguese colony, but administration was left to the trading companies (like Mozambique Company and Niassa Company) who had received long-term leases from Lisbon. By the mid-1920s, the Portuguese succeeded in creating a highly exploitative and coercive settler economy, in which African natives were forced to work on the fertile lands taken over by Portuguese settlers. Indigenous African peasants mainly produced cash crops designated for sale in the markets of the colonial metropole (the center, i.e. Portugal). Major cash crops included cotton, cashews, tea and rice. This arrangement ended in 1932 after the takeover in Portugal by the new António de Oliveira Salazar's government - the Estado Novo. Thereafter, Mozambique, along with other Portuguese colonies, was put under the direct control of Lisbon. In 1951, it became an overseas province. The economy expanded rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s, attracting thousands of Portuguese settlers to the country. It was around this time that the first nationalist guerrilla groups began to form in Tanzania and other African countries. The strong industrial and agricultural development that did occur throughout the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s was based on Portuguese development plans, and also included British and South African investment.

In 1959-60, Mozambique's major exports included cotton, cashew nuts, tea, sugar, copra and sisal. Other major agricultural productions included rice and coconut. The expanding economy of the Portuguese overseas province was fuelled by foreign direct investment, and public investment which included ambitious state-managed development plans. British capital owned two of the large sugar concessions (the third was Portuguese), including the famous Sena states. The Matola Oil Refinery, Procon, was controlled by Britain and the United States. In 1948 the petroleum concession was given to the Mozambique Gulf Oil Company. At Maotize coal was mined; the industry was chiefly financed by Belgian capital. 60% of the capital of the Compagnie de Charbons de Mozambique was held by the Société Minière et Géologique Belge, 30% by the Mozambique Company, and the remaining 10% by the Government of the territory. Three banks were in operation, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Portuguese, Barclays Bank, D.C.O., British, and the Banco Totta e Standard de Moçambique (a partnership between Standard Bank of South Africa and mainland's Banco Totta & Açores). Nine out of the twenty-three insurance companies were Portuguese. 80% of life assurance was in the hands of foreign companies which testifies to the openness of the economy.

The Portuguese overseas province of Mozambique was the first territory of Portugal, including the European mainland, to distribute Coca-Cola. Lately the Lourenço Marques Oil Refinery was established by the Sociedade Nacional de Refinação de Petróleo (SONAREP) - a Franco-Portuguese syndicate. In the sisal plantations Swiss capital was invested, and in copra concerns, a combination of Portuguese, Swiss and French capital was invested. The large availability of capital from both Portuguese and international origin, allied to the wide range of natural resources and the growing urban population, lead to an impressive growth and development of the economy.

From the late stages of this notable period of high growth and huge development effort started in the 1950s, was the construction of Cahora Bassa dam by the Portuguese, which started to fill in December 1974 after construction was commenced in 1969. In 1971 construction work of the Massingir Dam began. At independence, Mozambique's industrial base was well-developed by Sub-Saharan Africa standards, thanks to a boom in investment in the 1960s and early 1970s. Indeed, in 1973, value added in manufacturing was the sixth highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Economically, Mozambique was a source of agricultural raw materials and an earner of foreign exchange. It also provided a market for Portuguese manufacturers which were protected from local competition. Transportation facilities had been developed to exploit the transit trade of South Africa, Swaziland, Rhodesia, Malawi, and Zambia, agricultural production for export purposes had been encouraged, and profitable arrangements for the export of labour had been made with neighbouring countries. Industrial production had been relatively insignificant but did begin to increase in the 1960s. The economic structure generally favoured the taking of profits to Portugal rather than their reinvestment in Mozambique. The Portuguese interests which dominate in banking, industry, and agriculture, exerted a powerful influence on policy.

Mozambique's rural population was largely illiterate. However, some thousands of Africans were educated in religion, Portuguese language, and Portuguese history by Catholic and Protestant missionary schools established in cities and in the countryside.

In 1930, primary schooling became racially segregated. Africans who did not hold assimilated status had to enroll in "rudimentary schools," whereas whites and the few thousand assimilated Africans had access to "primary schools" of better quality.

Starting in the early 1940s, access to education was expanded in all levels. Nevertheless, "rudimentary schools" retained their poor quality. In 1956, there were 292,199 African students enrolled in first grade. Of these, only 9,486 had successfully passed third grade in 1959. By 1970, only 7.7% of Mozambique's population was literate.

A comprehensive network of secondary schools (the Liceus) and technical or vocational education schools were implemented across the cities and main towns of the territory. However, access to these institutions was largely limited to whites. In 1960, only 30 out of 1,000 students of the Liceu Salazar were Africans, in spite of whites making up only 2% of the Mozambican population.

In 1962, the first Mozambican university was founded by the Portuguese authorities: the Universidade de Lourenço Marques.

The Portuguese-ruled territory was introduced to several popular European and North American sports disciplines since the early urbanistic and economic booms of the 1920s and 1940s. This period was a time of city and town expansion and modernization that included the construction of several sports facilities for football, rink hockey, basketball, volleyball, handball, athletics, gymnastics and swimming. Several sports clubs were founded across the entire territory, among them were some of the largest and oldest sports organizations of Mozambique like Sporting Clube de Lourenço Marques established in 1920. Other major sports clubs were founded in the following years like Grupo Desportivo de Lourenço Marques (1921), Clube Ferroviário de Lourenço Marques (1924), Sport Club de Vila Pery (1928), Clube Ferroviário da Beira (1943), Grupo Desportivo da Companhia Têxtil do Punguè (1943), and Sport Lourenço Marques e Benfica (1955). Several sportsmen, especially football players, that achieved wide notability in Portuguese sports were from Mozambique. Eusébio and Mário Coluna were examples of that, and excelled in the Portugal national football team. Since the 1960s, with the latest developments on commercial aviation, the highest ranked football teams of Mozambique and the other African overseas provinces of Portugal, started to compete in the Taça de Portugal (the Portuguese Cup). There were also several facilities and organizations for golf, tennis and wild hunting.

The nautical sports were also well developed and popular, especially in Lourenço Marques, home to the Clube Naval de Lourenço Marques. The largest stadium was the Estádio Salazar, located near Lourenço Marques. Opened in 1968, it was at the time the most advanced in Mozambique conforming to standards set by both FIFA and the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI). The cycling track could be adjusted to allow for 20,000 more seats. Beginning in the 1950s, motorsport was introduced to Mozambique. At first race cars would compete in areas around the city, Polana and along the marginal but as funding and interest increased, a dedicated race track was built in the Costa Do Sol area along and behind the marginal with the ocean to the east with a length of 1.5 kilometres (0.93 miles). The initial surface of the new track, named Autódromo de Lourenço Marques did not provide enough grip and an accident in the late 1960s killed 8 people and injured many more. Therefore, in 1970, the track was renovated and the surface changed to meet the highest international safety requirements that were needed at large events with many spectators. The length then increased to 3,909 kilometres (2,429 miles). The city became host to several international and local events beginning with the inauguration on 26 November 1970.

As communist and anti-colonial ideologies spread out across Africa, many clandestine political movements were established in support of Mozambique's independence. These movements claimed that policies and development plans were primarily designed by the ruling authorities for the benefit of the ethnic Portuguese population, affecting a majority of the indigenous population who suffered both state-sponsored discrimination and enormous social pressure. Many felt they had received too little opportunity or resources to upgrade their skills and improve their economic and social situation to a degree comparable to that of the Europeans. Statistically, Portuguese Mozambique's whites were indeed wealthier and more skilled than the black indigenous majority, in spite of decreasing legal discrimination of Africans starting in the 1960s.

The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), headquartered in Tanzania, initiated a guerrilla campaign against Portuguese rule in September 1964. This conflict, along with the two others already initiated in the other Portuguese overseas territories of Angola and Portuguese Guinea, became part of the Portuguese Colonial War (1961-74). Several African territories under European rule had achieved independence in recent decades. Oliveira Salazar attempted to resist this tide and maintain the integrity of the Portuguese empire. By 1970, the anti-guerrilla war in Africa was consuming an important part of the Portuguese budget and there was no sign of a final solution in sight. This year was marked by a large-scale military operation in northern Mozambique, the Gordian Knot Operation, which displaced the FRELIMO's bases and destroyed much of the guerrillas' military capacity. At a military level, a part of Guinea-Bissau was de facto independent since 1973, but the capital and the major towns were still under Portuguese control. In Angola and Mozambique, independence movements were only active in a few remote countryside areas from where the Portuguese Army had retreated. However, their impending presence and the fact that they wouldn't go away dominated public anxiety. Throughout the war period Portugal faced increasing dissent, arms embargoes and other punitive sanctions imposed by most of the international community. For the Portuguese society the war was becoming even more unpopular due to its length and financial costs, the worsening of diplomatic relations with other United Nations members, and the role it had always played as a factor of perpetuation of the Estado Novo regime. It was this escalation that would lead directly to the mutiny of members of the FAP in the Carnation Revolution in 1974 - an event that would lead to the independence of the former Portuguese colonies in Africa. A leftist military coup in Lisbon on 24 April 1974 by the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA), overthrew the Estado Novo regime headed by Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano.

As one of the objectives of the MFA, all the Portuguese overseas territories in Africa were offered independence. FRELIMO took complete control of the Mozambican territory after a transition period, as agreed in the Lusaka Accord which recognized Mozambique's right to independence and the terms of the transfer of power.

Within a year of the Portuguese military coup at Lisbon, almost all of the Portuguese population had left the African territory as refugees (in mainland Portugal they were known as retornados) - some expelled by the new ruling power of Mozambique, some fleeing in fear. A parade and a state banquet completed the independence festivities in the capital, which was expected to be renamed Can Phumo, or "Place of Phumo", after a Tsonga chief who lived in the area before the Portuguese navigator Lourenço Marques founded the city in 1545 and gave his name to it. Most city streets, named for Portuguese heroes or important dates in Portuguese history, had their names changed.

Herrick, Allison and others (1969). "Area Handbook for Mozambique", US Government Printing Office.

Media related to Portuguese Mozambique at Wikimedia Commons

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Portuguese Mozambique ( Portuguese: Moçambique) or Portuguese East Africa ( África Oriental Portuguesa) was the common terms by which Mozambique was designated during the historic period when it was a Portuguese colony. Portuguese Mozambique originally constituted a string of Portuguese possessions along the south-east African coast, and later became a unified colony, which now forms the Republic of Mozambique.

# data[].attributes.body
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintexthistories.asp?historyid=ad29

# data[].attributes.headline
Assimilation of public - I couldn't find much information online however this is what my grandmother had told me whilst growing up in Colonial Mozambique 

# data[].attributes.subject
Assimilation of public - I couldn't find much information online however this is what my grandmother had told me whilst growing up in Colonial Mozambique 

# data[].attributes.body
- Native languages were banned, and all children were meant to learn portuguese.
- They had tried to "civilise" Mozambicans by forcing them to adopt Portuguese mannerisms.
- When growing up my gran would get beaten if she had spoken in Xangane.
- Traditional music was banned

# data[].attributes.headline
Different Perspective case study: Portuguese view on colonialism vs Mozambican view 

# data[].attributes.subject
Different Perspective case study: Portuguese view on colonialism vs Mozambican view 

# data[].attributes.body
I found this research report really interesting how the Portuguese defined their history as a time for discovery and voyage. Although the portuguese did not have strict racial rules, it still in many ways had various laws that criminalised the indigenous population. Prime for its country. Whilst Mozambican's describe their history as a struggle against colonialism.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
The multiparty elections that finally took place in October 1994 were the culmination of years of effort to reach a peaceful end to the war between Frelimo and Renamo. Frelimo, once a self-described Marxist-Leninist vanguard party and still progressive if not clearly socialist, made several important concessions to the peace process. Mozambique joined the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1984 and adopted their demands to privatize the economy under a structural-adjustment program. Several years later Joaquim Chissano, who had become Mozambique's president when Machel died in a plane crash in 1986, introduced a new constitution that ended Frelimo's one-party rule and Mozambique's identity as a socialist country. That constitution allowed for multiparty elections, though other goals had to be met before elections could be held.

Renamo changed its image as an international pariah known for burning schools and health clinics and became a legitimate political party. Renamo's leader, Afonso Dhlakama, met with international political leaders and was accepted as a presidential candidate. During the election campaign the United Nations provided military and civilian police, who supervised the activities of their Mozambican counterparts, while the European Union supplied election materials. Although Frelimo and Renamo were the main contenders in the elections, many other smaller parties also emerged, including several founded by Mozambican businessmen who had been in exile for years. There were a dozen presidential candidates and a similar number of parties fielding candidates for the National Assembly. The elections were considered free and fair by international observers, with Frelimo president Chissano garnering the majority of the votes. Renamo, however, was strongly represented in the national government and the National Assembly.

The new government faced the lingering effects of the war, notably the presence of up to two million land mines in the countryside. An international operation has cleared some areas of mines, especially along roads, but many rural areas remain endangered. The effort to demobilize both Frelimo and Renamo forces and form a new, unified military also met with delays and difficulties, and in the mid-1990s soldiers waiting in demobilization camps for weeks without food, money, or prospects for work staged scattered violent uprisings.

In the early 21st century, Mozambique suffered several natural disasters, including drought, an earthquake, and devastating floods. The country's economic growth, though adversely affected by these events, was bolstered by significant debt relief and by economic reform measures enacted by the government. The country also saw an economic boom as foreign investors were drawn to existing and newly discovered sources of coal and natural gas. The new century also ushered in a change in leadership: in 2001 Chissano announced that he would not stand in the next presidential election. Frelimo, however, maintained control of the presidency when its candidate, Armando Guebuza, was victorious in the 2004 presidential election. He was reelected with 75 percent of the vote in 2009, easily defeating Renamo's candidate, Dhlakama, and Daviz Simango, who earlier that year had broken from Renamo to form the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM). Frelimo also maintained control of the legislature, winning about three-quarters of the seats.

Although the country experienced tremendous economic growth in the 21st century, particularly after 2010, most Mozambicans did not benefit, and more than half of the population remained mired in poverty. That imbalance, as well as fears of political marginalization, heightened tensions between Renamo and the Frelimo-led government. Discussions of political reform did not bear fruit, and Renamo launched a low-level insurgency. Sporadic fighting between Renamo and police or government forces culminated in October 2013 with Renamo's abrogating the 1992 Rome peace accord that had ended Mozambique's civil war. A new peace agreement between Renamo and the government was reached in late August 2014, and Dhlakama and Guebuza signed it in a public ceremony on September 5.
Jeanne Marie Penvenne Kathleen Eddy Sheldon The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica

The 2014 elections

Given the recent discontent, the October 2014 presidential and legislative elections were hotly contested. With Guebuza constitutionally barred from serving a third term, Frelimo's candidate was Filipe Nyusi, who faced off against Dhlakama and MDM's Simango. Although Nyusi handily defeated his opponents-he garnered about 57 percent of the vote, while Dhlakama and Simango won about 36 percent and 6 percent, respectively-Frelimo in general did not perform as strongly as in the previous election. Frelimo managed to maintain the most seats in the legislature, but the party saw its share of seats drop from about three-quarters to slightly more than one-half.

Relationship between the government and Renamo

Friction between the Frelimo-led government and Renamo persisted after the election, with a flare-up in fighting occurring in late 2015 and continuing into the next year. Fighting was centred in the northwestern part of the country, and thousands of Mozambicans there fled to neighbouring Malawi. Peace talks between the two sides began in mid-2016, and in December Renamo announced a unilateral two-month truce, which the group extended several times thereafter as both sides continued with ongoing peace discussions. An indication of the progress made, in August 2017 Dhlakama and Nyusi met face-to-face, the first such meeting between the two men since 2015.

Dhlakama's death in May 2018 left some uncertainty regarding the tenuous peace established between Renamo and the Frelimo-led government, especially since much of the discussions had taken place between Nyusi and Dhlakama. Peace negotiations continued, however, with Dhlakama's successor, Ossufo Momade. Progress continued, and in August 2019 the two leaders signed a pair of widely acclaimed agreements that were intended to end hostilities and to foster peace and reconciliation. The agreements set the stage for the possibility that the next round of presidential, legislative, and provincial elections, scheduled to be held later that year in October, would be held in a peaceful environment.

Economic developments

Meanwhile, Mozambique's impressive economic growth slowed dramatically in 2016, partly because of a drop in commodity prices that had begun the previous year as well as an alarming admission by the government that it had a large amount of undeclared debt, later found to be worth about $2 billion. Even more troubling was the fact that some one-fourth of the money could not be accounted for. As a result of the debt admission, the IMF, World Bank, and other donors suspended aid to the country, exacerbating the existing economic problems. The fallout included Mozambique's default in early 2017 on a high-profile and recently restructured loan. In spite of its challenges, Mozambique was still poised to see impressive economic growth again on the basis of its natural gas reserves, although this was not expected to have a significant impact on the country's economy for at least a few more years.

The 2019 cyclones

In March 2019 Mozambique was pummeled by Cyclone Idai, which killed about 600 people and devastated a sizable swath of the country. Hardest hit was the port city of Beira, which was almost completely destroyed. This was followed in April by another cyclone, named Kenneth, which hit the northern part of the country and left more than 40 people dead. In all, more than 162,000 Mozambicans were estimated to have been displaced by the two storms.

The 2019 elections

Hopes for a peaceful campaign period after the August peace agreement were largely sustained, although there were incidents of election-related violence in some of the country's provinces. There were also isolated reports of violence on the day of the election, October 15, as well as reports of voter intimidation and fraud. When the election results were released, Nyusi and Frelimo were declared the overwhelming winners: Nyusi with more than 73 percent of the presidential vote and Frelimo with more than 71 percent of the legislative vote, which allowed them to increase their share in the legislature from slightly more than one-half to a two-thirds majority. Both Renamo and MDM saw their legislative percentages decrease from the last election (Renamo won slightly more than 22 percent while the MDM won only some 4 percent) and lost seats. In the past, Renamo had performed quite well in some provincial assembly elections, and it was expected to do so again, but the party failed to win a majority of the vote in any of them. Under changes to the constitution that replaced presidentially appointed provincial governors with those that were indirectly elected-meeting one of Renamo's main demands during peace talks in recent years-the election results meant that Renamo would not hold the governor's post in any province. Renamo had complained of voting intimidation, irregularities, and fraud while the results were still being tabulated-complaints corroborated by some of the election observers-so it came as no surprise when the party filed a legal challenge to the results with the Constitutional Council. The court, however, dismissed the challenge, saying that Renamo had not provided sufficient evidence to support its complaint. Nyusi was sworn in for his second term as president on January 15, 2020.
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica

education: Education in Portuguese colonies and former colonies

Angola and Mozambique shared a common historical legacy of hundreds of years of Portuguese colonization, and the general overall educational philosophy for both countries was the same until independence. For Portugal, education was an important part of its civilizing mission. In 1921, Decree 77 forbade the use...

...principal Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique, the former used macutas (equal to 50 reis) of copper, followed by centavos and silver escudos, whereas copper reis were current in the latter, followed by escudos or centavos. In the former Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), originally established as...

African literature: Portuguese

In Mozambique, João Albasini was, in 1918, one of the founders of O Brado Africano ("The African Roar"), a bilingual weekly in Portuguese and Ronga in which many of Mozambique's writers had their work first published. Albasini's collection of short stories O livro da dor ("The...

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Mozambique - Mozambique - Peace in Mozambique: The multiparty elections that finally took place in October 1994 were the culmination of years of effort to reach a peaceful end to the war between Frelimo and Renamo. Frelimo, once a self-described Marxist-Leninist vanguard party and still progressive if not clearly socialist, made several important concessions to the peace process.

# data[].attributes.headline
This article highlights the importance of music during crisis and this can very much relate to Marrabenta in Mozambique .

# data[].attributes.subject
This article highlights the importance of music during crisis and this can very much relate to Marrabenta in Mozambique .

# data[].attributes.body
Music gives a sense of belonging and that is what marrabenta had done for Mozambicans under colonial times, but also post-colonial period after entering a 9 year civil war against the Portuguese.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Covid-19 bears out the research: Music brings people together*

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
In the early days of the pandemic reaching Europe, the world watched as Italians emerged onto their balconies to sing the national anthem together, with the occasional performance by an opera star.

# data[].attributes.headline
Out of curiosity and to test whether people have a similar answer, I decided to test out what other mozambicans felt when they heard Gorwhane playing. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Out of curiosity and to test whether people have a similar answer, I decided to test out what other mozambicans felt when they heard Gorwhane playing. 

# data[].attributes.headline
I enjoyed looking through the results and really seeing how in some ways collectively the answers were of positivity, love and enjoyment. Some mentioned cultural pride, the past and growing up. 

# data[].attributes.subject
I enjoyed looking through the results and really seeing how in some ways collectively the answers were of positivity, love and enjoyment. Some mentioned cultural pride, the past and growing up. 

# data[].attributes.body
This category would go into voices and I can further explore in what ways could I bring people together that no longer reside in Mozambique. Or maybe promote traditional mozambican music.

# data[].attributes.headline
I am still really thinking about how one of Gorwhane's member's were murdered. It really reminds me of the common narrative in Mozambique. I have known a few parent's that have been murdered by government for speaking out about corruption or by opposing government. 

# data[].attributes.subject
I am still really thinking about how one of Gorwhane's member's were murdered. It really reminds me of the common narrative in Mozambique. I have known a few parent's that have been murdered by government for speaking out about corruption or by opposing government. 

# data[].attributes.headline
Here are some case studies. Some are quite close to home. I got my mother to speak to me about a few and I have attached some articles to back up quite a few of these assassinations. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Here are some case studies. Some are quite close to home. I got my mother to speak to me about a few and I have attached some articles to back up quite a few of these assassinations. 

# data[].attributes.headline
Cistac was a constitutional lawyer and my friend's father who was shot outside a cafe in broad daylight. With Mozambique being a one-party state (even though democracy and voting came in in 1993) Cistac had been criticised for suggesting to decentralise the ruling party. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Cistac was a constitutional lawyer and my friend's father who was shot outside a cafe in broad daylight. With Mozambique being a one-party state (even though democracy and voting came in in 1993) Cistac had been criticised for suggesting to decentralise the ruling party. 

# data[].attributes.body
This occurred in 2015 and still yet the armed men have not been found.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Gilles Cistac had tried to fix a country that couldn't be fixed. These were the sentiments passed on by his daughter, Rosimele, on the occasion of her father's birthday, two years after his death. Her message bore all the frustration and anguish typical of a child suddenly bereft of a parent and made to live in this world alone - especially when that parent has been taken in an act of stark and abject brutality. Rosimele Cistac was forced to watch as the light ebbed from her father's eyes; he died in her arms.

On 3 March 2015, the prominent 53-year-old constitutional lawyer was shot outside a popular café in the centre of Maputo. According to witness accounts, he was getting into a taxi when four men approached in a car, lowered their windows and opened fire. The bullets that hit him went deep in his chest and abdomen, causing fatal injuries. Four hours later, he was declared dead at Maputo's Central Hospital.

In the wake of Cistac's murder, questions and suspicions started to arise. Although the attack occurred in broad daylight, the perpetrators have not yet been found. The investigation into the lawyer's death bore little fruit, and the context in which he was killed cast a light on his friction with the ruling party, Frelimo.

As a lawyer specializing in the constitution, Cistac had seen the solution to a problem that had plagued Mozambique since the country's transition from colonial power. He spoke openly of the need to decentralize the political power structure that has kept the country from realizing its potential as a true democracy. In a move that put him directly at odds with the party that has governed since 1975, Cistac proposed a way in which the opposition party, Renamo, could legally break away from the centralized government and establish autonomous regions. Under his plan, Renamo would govern the provinces of Sofala, Manica, Tete, Nampula, Zambezia and Niassa.

According to family and close friends, this proposal placed Cistac in the governing party's firing line. Before his death, threats had been made to his life; and even though these were reported to local authorities, Cistac and his family were not offered any protection. In addition to the threats, a Facebook campaign had been created with the sole purpose of demonizing the lawyer, insulting him on the basis of his race and French origins, and even accusing him of being a spy. The campaign included a profile chillingly called 'Calado Calachnikov' (Portuguese for 'Silencing with a Kalashnikov'), an answer to the unspoken question of how to deal with the perceived dissenter.

Pushback against Cistac's views also came from Frelimo officials and members of pro-government media outlets. Frelimo spokesperson Damião José decried Cistac as an 'ingrate' who had disrespected the people of Mozambique.

To understand the circumstances in which Cistac was killed, one needs to understand the political context of Mozambique itself, João M Cabrita, author of Mozambique - The Tortuous Road to Democracy, said during an interview. After the country achieved independence, the constitution was designed to facilitate a multi-party democracy, but Mozambique ultimately became a one-party socialist state, dominated by Frelimo. Despite the fact that democratic elections came into effect in 1994, every subsequent election cycle has resulted in the same outcome: victory for Frelimo. Throughout Frelimo's administration, several activists, journalists and lawyers who have directly challenged the ruling party have disappeared, been detained, killed or attacked.

'In a nutshell: Frelimo believes the role it played to free Mozambique from the colonial yoke confers upon its leaders the right to treat the country as their dominion, where the fundamental principles of democracy are absent from the totalitarian project introduced at the dawn of independence and which essentially remains in place. Like others before him, Prof. Cistac was a spanner in the works,' said Cabrita.

It is therefore no coincidence that Cistac's stance on the decentralization of the state and criticism of the party's strong influence on the judiciary rendered him a prime target. Cistac advocated impartiality within the judiciary, arguing that it was imperative that judges should be free of the influences of the political system. He argued that there should be structural reform, whereby some of the powers vested in the president would be curbed, namely regarding the appointment of magistrates.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Gilles Cistac had tried to fix a country that couldn't be fixed. These were the sentiments passed on by his daughter, Rosimele, on the occasion of her father's birthday, two years after his death.

# data[].attributes.body
https://www.soas.ac.uk/staff/staff75251.php

Although this isn't in any news feed. Carlos was family friend, an economist and professor in Mozambique. In 2018, he had written a blog condemning the Mozambican government on its blatant corruption. This was shared amongst the expat community in Maputo and I remember he had been receiving death threats and had to exile.

# data[].attributes.headline
Just last month, Journalist Tom Bowker banned from Moz for 10 years. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Just last month, Journalist Tom Bowker banned from Moz for 10 years. 

# data[].attributes.body
He had owned a news agency Zitamar and they had been covering the recent conflicting the northern territory of Cabo Delgado where Jihadists have raided some villages. However the Mozambican government seems to only highlight foreign invasion and ignores the issue (of which Bowker was reporting) that poverty has risen, jobs are extremely scarce, inequality has risen and with these conditions locals have risen up with anger. The Government has stated that they have banned the news agency due to legal reasons such as permit however the question lies.. Why now?

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
WASHINGTON - The expulsion of a British journalist from Mozambique is part of a wider crackdown on independent reporting in the southern African country amid a bloody conflict that threatens the government's plans for developing natural gas deposits, media observers say.

Tom Bowker, founder and editor of the Mozambique-focused website Zitamar News, said Tuesday on Twitter that authorities had expelled and banned him from the country for 10 years.

The expulsion follows a monthslong ordeal in which authorities said Zitamar was not properly registered. But media researchers - and Bowker - say they believe Mozambique's government is trying to stifle his outlet's reporting on a conflict in northern Mozambique's gas-rich Cabo Delgado region.

Founded six years ago, Zitamar is one of the leading English-language news sites in Mozambique and has reported extensively on the Cabo Delgado fighting, which erupted in 2017 following plans to extract natural gas.

Government forces are fighting local militants and Islamist insurgents accused of  carrying out mass beheadings in a conflict that the United Nations estimates has killed more than 2,000 people and forced 500,000 others to flee. Analysts have highlighted the presence of Russian mercenaries in the region, and government forces have been accused of carrying out abuses against civilians.

Restrictions on access to the conflict zone, however, make verifying incidents difficult.
Foreign credentials
Bowker told VOA he was expelled on orders of the Interior Ministry after Mozambique's press regulator and Information Office, Gabinfo, released a statement revoking his press credentials January 29.

In that statement, Gabinfo accused Bowker of representing himself as a correspondent for a foreign media outlet, while owning and running Zitamar from Mozambique.

Zitamar's website says it is "written and edited in Maputo and London - with contributions from a network of researchers in Mozambique, the U.S., and Europe," and is published by the London-based Zitamar Ltd.

Gabinfo director Emilia Moiane told VOA "there is no evidence of [ Zitamar's] international existence."

Bowker said such justification is "ridiculous," and said the Gabinfo statement included false claims about ownership of a U.K. company. Bowker said the press regulator is claiming the site is not a foreign news outlet.

"They wanted proof from the U.K.'s equivalent press regulator, because Zitamar 's regulated in the U.K.," he said. "But that [type of regulator] doesn't exist in the U.K."

He also said authorities did not let him explain himself or correct any registration issues.

Bowker says he believes the expulsion is connected to Zitamar's Cabo Delgado reporting.

Zitamar works with the U.S.-based nonprofit Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)  to document violence in Cabo Delgado. ACLED catalogs armed conflict, political violence and protests globally.

Moiane of the media regulator did not respond to VOA's questions about attempts to correct the outlet's registration and referred other questions to the interior minister.

The assistant to the interior minister did not answer when VOA called and did not respond to a message sent via WhatsApp.
Pattern of harassment
Borges Nhamire, a researcher in Maputo with Mozambique's independent Center for Public Integrity, said the country's laws restrict foreign ownership of domestic media. But he said that should not have led to Bowker's expulsion.

"If there are some problems with Zitamar's registration, they should tell Tom what to do to register Zitamar, to legalize what is illegal, but not to expel a journalist," he told VOA. "I don't think that's a good approach for a civilized country."

Nhamire described Zitamar as "one of the best media outlets in Mozambique," comparable with top privately owned Portuguese-language media houses.

"The substantial difference was that Zitamar was reporting in English, meaning if it was reporting in English and reporting in Mozambique, its audience was foreigners, donors and investors," Nhamire said.

He said Bowker's expulsion cannot be seen as an "isolated case," but fits a pattern of restrictions on journalists working on Cabo Delgado.

In early 2019, military personnel arrested journalists Amade Abubacar and Germano Daniel Adriano, who were reporting for local radio and TV stations on the region. They were  released on bail after three months.

Another radio journalist in Cabo Delgado, Ibraimo Mbaruco,  disappeared in April 2020 after calling colleagues and telling them he was being surrounded by military. He has not been heard from since.

And in the capital, Maputo, in August 2020,  arsonists attacked the  Canal de Moçambique  newspaper, which is seen as critical of the government corruption and its response to attacks by militants.
'A real crackdown'
Angela Quintal, the Africa program coordinator for the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists, said Bowker's expulsion " sends a chilling message" to Mozambique's media community.

"Journalists in Mozambique, especially those covering the conflict in Cabo Delgado, have been arrested, harassed or have gone missing," she said. "Bowker's expulsion is another example of the lengths the government will go to control reporting in Mozambique."

Joseph Hanlon, a U.K.-based journalist and academic who writes newsletters on Mozambique, described recent actions against the media there as "severe."

"Mozambique has had up until now a very free press with very few restrictions on the press, and under the present government there's a real crackdown, and it is about the civil war in Cabo Delgado," Hanlon, a regional expert on Mozambique, told VOA.

Hanlon said the fundamental issue is differing portrayals of the conflict in the resource-rich region.

"The roots of the civil war are because of the discrimination against ordinary people in Cabo Delgado. Poverty has been increasing, inequality has been increasing, [but] it's very wealthy with gas and rubies," he said. "But the Mozambique government wants it to be seen purely as attacks by Islamic State and does not want to accept that it's about poverty, inequality, greed."

Mozambique's president has said that militants in the region are exploiting poverty to recruit young people. President Filipe Nyusi also said the solution requires more than a military response. "We recognize the need to boost socioeconomic development and promote greater social harmony, because the solution to the problem in Cabo Delgado is not just military," he said in August.

Hanlon, along with Nhamire and Bowker, also decried a media bill up for debate in Mozambique's parliament. They said the legislation, if passed, would make it harder for both foreign and domestic journalists to work in Mozambique.

Bowker, who has flown to France with his family, said his expulsion will not affect Zitamar 's output.

"There's no reason it should suffer a hiccup," Bowker said. "It's bigger than just me, bigger than me and my wife. It's a team in Maputo, and we have people in London, New York, Athens, and now we're [going to] be in France in the immediate term."

He added, "It remains to be seen whether the journalists who correspond for Zitamar from Mozambique will now suffer pressure when the authorities realize that expelling me from the country doesn't jeopardize Zitamar."
Editor's Note: Bowker and the author of this article have worked together on a previous VOA article about the conflict in Cabo Delgado.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The expulsion of a British journalist from Mozambique is part of a wider crackdown on independent reporting in the southern African country amid a bloody conflict that threatens the government's plans for developing natural gas deposits, media observers say.

# data[].attributes.headline
Highlighting violence against journalists in Mozambique during Covid 19

# data[].attributes.subject
Highlighting violence against journalists in Mozambique during Covid 19

# data[].attributes.body
This article is really interesting and highlights some of the arrests and disappearances of journalists under covid. It states how the government and police forces have take retaliatory action.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
There is currently a grave pattern of detention or unsubstantiated allegations against journalists in Mozambique. Last month unknown attackers set on fire the office of a weekly newspaper Canal de Moçambique that had recently published investigations exposing corruption in the government. Courtesy: CC by 2.0/The Commonwealth

UNITED NATIONS, Sep 04 (IPS) - While Mozambique was recently rattled by an arson attack on a local media organisation, experts say that it's only a part of a worrying pattern of continuous attacks on the media in the country.

On Aug. 23, unknown attackers set on fire the office of a weekly newspaper Canal de Moçambique that had recently published investigations exposing corruption in the government.

The attack not only destroyed equipment and furniture, but also the files at the office.

Angela Quintal, the Africa programme coordinator at the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), told IPS that while they had never before witnessed an attack of this magnitude or nature, there is currently a grave pattern of detention or unsubstantiated allegations against journalists in the country. CPJ, a non-profit focused on press freedom, also monitors such attacks on the media around the world.

Quintal pointed some of the recent cases: arbitrary arrest and detention of radio journalist Amade Abubacar; the arrest of investigative journalist Estacio Valoi; the detention of Amnesty International researcher David Matsinhe, and driver, Girafe Saide Tufane, who were held for two days before being released without charge; and the repeated harassment of Canal's executive editor Matias Guente.

Then there are the other cases, such as the enforced disappearance of Ibraimo Mbaruco, a community radio journalist and newscaster in Palma district in Cabo Delgado province.

On the same day as the arson attack, journalist Armando Nenane was arrested for not fully complying with regulations surrounding COVID-19, according to Quintal. Nenane published a story about how he managed to deposit funds in a former Defence Minister's bank account in order to verify an exposé that Canal had published.

These arbitrary arrests are part of a pattern, says Matsinhe, the Mozambique researcher for Amnesty International. He told IPS that under the pandemic, there's been an increase in harassment, intimidation, arbitrary arrests and detentions of journalists often under the guise of allegations that they were "violating COVID-19 regulations".

"The police have used COVID-19 state of emergency to practice extortion on people," he told IPS. "Some journalists have been exposing this practice and the police have taken a retaliatory approach against the journalists."

The country's increasingly deteriorating press freedom is also an attack on human rights, he said.

"People's right to information depends on the journalists' ability to do their work, which in turn depends on respect, protection, promotion and fulfilment of press freedom by the government," Matsinhe said. But in taking that away, the government of Mozambique "relies on people's ignorance, lack of information, to exercise its power and practice corruption unchecked."

"Under the current economic, social and political conditions in Mozambique, access to information - which is only possible where press freedom is guaranteed - enables Mozambicans to participate in their country's political life, to hold their government accountable, to exercise their civil and political rights," he added.

While the lack of this right is worrisome, Quintal said the reaction by Canal's staff members - by continuing to work and publish - shows they're not bowing to this pressure. Staff had set up a makeshift office and published a front-page editorial vowing not to back down from their investigative journalism. "Obviously such an attack might have a chilling effect on the media and could well result in some self-censorship by journalists. However, it has been heartening to see how Canal de Moçambique and its online daily publication continued to publish," she said.

"In terms of solidarity, the fact that a rival media group and its journalists rallied to assist and even offered their premises so that Canal journalists could produce that week's edition of the newspaper, was also great to see," Quintal added.

Still, a lot of work remains to be done.

"In my opinion has simply ignored the attempts to reach out and to engage," Quintal said.

Matsinhe said the government can take some "concrete steps" to improve and ensure freedom of press in the country.

"The government must refrain from seeing the press as the state enemy and investigate the cases of injustices committed against various journalists and bring those found responsible to justice."

Echoing similar demands, Quintal acknowledged the positive efforts by the Media Institute of South Africa-Mozambique, "to form a reference group with the government to review and consolidate the legal framework for cybersecurity and digital rights, and to ensure that it does not undermine access to information".

The government must also conduct a review of legislation that is hostile towards press freedom, such as "overly broad" sections of the Penal Code that are often used to crack down on journalists.
© Inter Press Service (2020) - All Rights Reserved Original source: Inter Press Service

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Mozambique Reels from Repeated Attacks on Press Freedom

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 04 (IPS) - While Mozambique was recently rattled by an arson attack on a local media organisation, experts say that it's only a part of a worrying pattern of continuous attacks on the media in the country.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
The ruling party's unbroken incumbency before and since the introduction of multiparty elections in 1994 has allowed it to establish significant control over state institutions. The opposition has disputed the results of recent elections, and its armed wing fought a low-level conflict against government forces that persisted until a truce was signed in December 2016.

# data[].attributes.headline
José Jaime Macuane, Professor of Political Science abducted and shot for speaking out against government constitution. 

# data[].attributes.subject
José Jaime Macuane, Professor of Political Science abducted and shot for speaking out against government constitution. 

# data[].attributes.headline
Murder of Journalist Carlos Cardoso 2000

# data[].attributes.subject
Murder of Journalist Carlos Cardoso 2000

# data[].attributes.headline
Majority of these assassinations are on the topic of exposing government for corruption or questioning their autocratic authority. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Majority of these assassinations are on the topic of exposing government for corruption or questioning their autocratic authority. 

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
T HE LATEST exhibition by Nelsa Guambe, an artist from Mozambique, is a startling chronicle of her country's predicament. Strange faces stare from a collage of newspaper headlines about corruption. "Sharks of Maputo", reads a clipping pasted onto the tie of an unnamed government minister. A grotesque beast-captioned "the monster of the West"-looms over a city, grasping at a shoal of fish.

Enjoy more audio and podcasts on
Listen to this story.
iOS or Android.

Your browser does not support the <audio> element.

The inspiration for these jarring images is a colossal debt scandal, which has sunk Mozambique's economy and rocked its political elite. Between 2013 and 2014 three state-backed companies took on more than $2bn of questionable debt, guaranteed by the government (equivalent to about 13% of GDP). Some $1.2bn of it was borrowed in secret, behind the backs of parliament and the public. The hidden loans were revealed in 2016, but only now is justice catching up with the alleged conspirators, who are accused of pocketing millions. A string of court cases this year has drawn in a billionaire shipbuilder, a trio of ex-Credit Suisse bankers and a former finance minister.

The context for the three deals was that interest rates in the rich world were low. Investors could find better returns in Mozambique, where huge natural-gas reserves had been found offshore. A plan evolved across three continents. In Mozambique a clique of officials created three companies, ostensibly to build shipyards, police the coast and catch tuna. They bought trawlers and patrol boats from Privinvest, a shipbuilder headquartered in Abu Dhabi. The purchases were paid for with loans arranged by Credit Suisse, VTB and BNP Paribas, three European banks.

Fishy business

Only one of the deals was made public: an $850m loan for a fishing fleet. The loan was chopped up and sold on to investors. In 2016 the government agreed with investors to swap this "tuna debt" for a conventional bond, issued directly by the state. At the time it said little about the other, secret loans-but admitted their existence weeks later. Foreign donors were horrified, and stopped contributing to the budget. The IMF packed its bags. Mozambique's currency lost more than a third of its value against the dollar in six months. Inflation surged and the central bank hiked interest rates. Growth collapsed. The companies made no profit; the trawlers caught few fish.

Uncovering the alleged corruption has been difficult. The same party that oversaw the scandal is still in power. President Filipe Nyusi was, until 2014, head of the defence ministry, which had links to the tainted companies. An audit of the loans, funded by the Swedish embassy and published in 2017, complained that it had not been given access to relevant documents and was unable to trace $500m in borrowed funds. Debt campaigners say that their phones are tapped, their houses broken into and their meetings spied on.

Pressure has come from the American Department of Justice, which dug into suspicious payments wired through American banks. Last December it filed an indictment charging eight people with crimes relating to bribery, wire fraud and money-laundering. The conspirators created the maritime projects, it alleges, "as fronts to raise money to enrich themselves". The companies bought equipment from Privinvest at vastly inflated prices, it claims. In return, say prosecutors, Privinvest diverted more than $200m into bribes and kickbacks, including over $150m to Mozambican officials and some $50m to the bankers who arranged the loans.

The indictment touches three points of a triangle. First, it names the three ex-Credit Suisse bankers: Andrew Pearse, Detelina Subeva and Surjan Singh. It says that they hid information, invented fake competing bids and prepped Mozambican officials with answers to due-diligence questions, wrong-footing their own compliance department. Mr Pearse and Ms Subeva left the bank in the summer of 2013, as the second loan was being finalised, and joined a Privinvest subsidiary. They have each pleaded guilty to one charge against them in a New York court (Mr Singh is yet to plead). Separately, Mozambique is suing Credit Suisse, Privinvest and others in London for damages relating to the secret loans.

Second, the indictment names the lead salesman of Privinvest, who is in American custody, and its chief financial officer. It does not charge the firm itself or its chief executive, Iskandar Safa, a French-Lebanese billionaire (and former discus champion). But in a court statement last month Mr Pearse said that Mr Safa knew about bribes that Privinvest was paying, prompting Mozambique to sue Mr Safa as well. Privinvest and its employees have denied wrongdoing. A lawyer for the group questions whether America even has jurisdiction over alleged crimes on the other side of the world.

At the third point of the triangle are three Mozambican officials, including Manuel Chang, the finance minister who approved the loan guarantees. He was arrested in Johannesburg airport in December, and has been the subject of a legal and diplomatic tussle ever since. The American government is requesting his extradition. But so too is the government of Mozambique, which wants him to face justice at home-perhaps to prevent him spilling the beans on others in a foreign courtroom.

The American intervention has stirred Mozambican authorities into action. In February they arrested several people in connection with the debt scandal, including the son of Armando Guebuza, who was president when the loans were made. This month 20 people were indicted on charges including corruption and money-laundering. But this is not a genuine quest for justice, says Fernando Lima, a veteran journalist in Maputo. The government is desperate to get back into the good books of the international community. It also has one eye on elections in October.

Meanwhile, the debts are not being paid back. Whether they should be is an open question. The three loans are tainted with corruption and were all guaranteed without parliamentary approval, which is required by the constitution (parliament retroactively approved the loans after the scandal broke). As part of its case against Credit Suisse, Mozambique wants the guarantee on the first hidden loan to be ruled invalid. It is trying to restructure the other hidden loan, arranged by VTB, a Russian state bank.

The tuna debt is a different matter. In June the top constitutional court in Mozambique ruled that the initial loan, contracted in 2013, was indeed illegal. But it is unclear what weight the ruling has in English law (under which the debt was issued). A crucial question is whether the sin of the original loan carries forward to the bond which replaced it in 2016. Matthias Goldmann of Goethe University in Germany says it should not be possible to wash clean a dirty deal by swapping it for a new one. Many lawyers think otherwise. So far Mozambique has said it will repay bondholders, albeit later than it first promised.

Mozambique may be able to win enough damages to pay off some of its debts, especially if more evidence of corruption comes to light. It could also sell off the trawlers, which bob idly in Maputo harbour. But beneath the legal questions lies a moral one, say many in Mozambique. "We should not pay," argues Denise Namburete of the Budget Monitoring Forum, a civil-society group. Many players are responsible for the scandal, she says, but not the Mozambican people. ■

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
A $2bn loan scandal sank Mozambique's economy

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Justice is now playing catch-up | Middle East & Africa

# data[].attributes.headline
I was curious to see what my audience would think if I had asked questions on their view about our government and if they were willing to challenge it? 

# data[].attributes.subject
I was curious to see what my audience would think if I had asked questions on their view about our government and if they were willing to challenge it? 

# data[].attributes.body
The results have sparked interesting debate. I am not really surprised with the answers and I actually thought that there would be a higher number of people that knew more about government tactics.

# data[].attributes.headline
Following are some messages people had sent in reply to these stories. I have had permission to post them. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Following are some messages people had sent in reply to these stories. I have had permission to post them. 

# data[].attributes.body
the word "ish" suggests hesitation. In Moz we use this phrase in many ways, in this one he means "well what can we do"

# data[].attributes.body
My dad had asked the question why in answer to whether they agree with the statement that our government is corrupt.

Apart from knowing his character, he is Mozambican and grew up there during the 16 year civil war. Him asking me why I'm looking into it already sets a threatening or weary tone.

# data[].attributes.body
He is write in saying its a much deeper routed problem. Its systematic and embedded in Mozambican politics. He then went on to send some voicenotes of which he has allowed me to share.

# data[].attributes.headline
Part 1 recording of Zaqueu (fellow secondary school classmate) opinion on coming together to campaign against government

# data[].attributes.subject
Part 1 recording of Zaqueu (fellow secondary school classmate) opinion on coming together to campaign against government

# data[].attributes.body
Vide

# data[].attributes.headline
I think he has some really good points and regardless of whether I agree of disagree I think that the fact that my questions sparked debate is the most important thing. I personally as well as many others fear facing government but if there is some way that we can spark conversation around the topic then I feel that would be a good basis.

# data[].attributes.subject
I think he has some really good points and regardless of whether I agree of disagree I think that the fact that my questions sparked debate is the most important thing. I personally as well as many others fear facing government but if there is some way that we can spark conversation around the topic then I feel that would be a good basis.

# data[].attributes.headline
Looking at ways other countries have combatted modern dictatorship. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Looking at ways other countries have combatted modern dictatorship. 

# data[].attributes.body
The Greece-OECD have used YouTube as a major platform to inform and engage its youth about Corruption in government.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
As part of the Greece-OECD project, a key goal of communications was to increase youth's awareness of corruption issues, generate community responsibility amongst youth in Greece and encourage action on how to prevent corruption.

Rather than laying all the emphasis on the scale and scope of corruption, the aim was to engage in a conversation with youth and to highlight that young people have the power and responsibility to change the culture for the better in Greece.

Be the change you want to see

The campaign storyline "Be the change you want to see" is based on the creators' personal experiences of everyday corruption and bribery situations.

Through their YouTube videos, the creators aim to start a conversation with their audience by sensitising them to be aware of the cost of corruption, and encourage them to act for the greater common good.

Youth identify with Vloggers and Greek YouTube is one of the most dynamic and influential platforms today with 94% of users aged 15-24 visiting the platform every week.

What makes the content so successful is its authenticity. YouTube creators are authentic and their videos are almost homemade with "simple" cameras. Youth can easily identify and engage with the creators as they are everyday people with common concerns and interests.

The reaction to the vlogs was positive and has generated a great deal of interest in corruption and public integrity amongst Greek youth. An illustration of the impact is indicated by the following results:

888,240 views

More than 62,000 reactions on the videos

The campaign reached the desired audience: ages 13-34 and made up 78% of the viewers

Konilo's video trended number 1 on YouTube in Greece when it was published

About the OECD-Greece Project

The Greek government is prioritising the fight against corruption and with the assistance of European institutions, is committed to taking immediate action. Under the responsibility of the General Secretariat against Corruption, Greece's National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) identifies key areas of reform and provides for a detailed action plan towards strengthening integrity and fighting corruption and bribery.

The main objective of this project is to increase integrity and reduce corruption in Greece through technical empowerment of the Greek authorities for the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan. Read more about the project here.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.keywords[]
oecd guidelines and principles on corruption

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Engaging Youth in the Fight against Corruption - OECD

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
As part of the Greece-OECD project, a key goal of communications was to increase youth's awareness of corruption issues, generate community responsibility amongst youth in Greece and encourage action on how to prevent corruption.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Sudan's youth will not be silenced by another round of military rule. REUTERS/Umit Bektas

Bashir, who seized power in a military coup in 1989, had crushed two similar protests in 1992 and 2013. And yet in December 2018 crowds once again took to the streets of Khartoum. What began as a protest against a tripling of the price of bread became a widespread movement against Bashir's hardline government, backed up by professional organisations and women's groups, until the military ousted the leader.

The youth-led revolution did not get this far to be ruled by old men in uniform. Thousands still fill the streets of Khartoum demanding a civilian government. They now face a crucial test, as the country careens towards its dream of democracy without the governance institutions necessary for stability.

A dangerous combination of a lack of job opportunities, poor economic growth, a growing youth demographic and an authoritarian government have pushed a generation of people with decades of life ahead of them to the limit. According to the African Development Bank, more than 200 million of the continent's 1.2 billion people are aged between 15-24, and that number is set to rise to 321 million by 2030.

Sudan's youth-led protest movement is one of several around the continent. Some coalesce around a figurehead; others around a cause. But - as was seen with the Arab Spring movements of 2011 - when and if they reach a tipping point depends on the various and complex circumstances of each country: the structure and health of its politics, the quality of youth leaders and the individual choices of millions and millions of young Africans.
Protest, disengage or leave
Africa is no exception to the rule that young people are less likely to be engaged with traditional politics than their older peers. While opinion polls show that young Africans discuss politics to the same extent, a lower percentage of them vote and a higher percentage participate in protests.

But frustrations about poor public services and a lack of jobs can equally contribute to apathy or a desire to leave the country in search of brighter prospects somewhere else. As recent events in Sudan and Uganda show, countries that have autocratic governments and few jobs for young people have the hardest time engaging with youth.

Thirty-seven-year-old Robert 'Bobi Wine' Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, a musician and member of parliament for Kyadondo East in Kampala, wants to represent this youth demographic fed up with the 33-year rule of President Yoweri Museveni. In November 2018, he was in Accra to attend the 2018 All Africa Music Awards but offstage he addressed a gathering of supporters and listeners at Mmofra Park.

Malema and Bobi Wine see each other as part of the same battle

Kyagulanyi engages the crowd, some of whom took part in the worldwide protests that erupted when he and more than 30 others were abducted and brutalised by the Ugandan armed forces during Arua's by-election in August 2018. He spoke of how, rather than working to improve government, many parliamentarians were focused on enriching themselves, some going as far as to tell him to "go slow" and enjoy his pay cheque.

Citing legislation passed in 2013 prohibiting political meetings of more than four people without police permission, he hammered home the great divide between leaders and the people, and how parliament passes unjust laws to keep the people subjugated.
Politics, the 'official platform'
Born in the Kamwokya slum in Kampala, where his family lived while his father was in prison for his role in President Yoweri Museveni's bush war, Kyagulanyi was already a household name by the time he announced his candidacy for the Kyadondo seat in 2016.

His music gave birth to his activism and nurtured his political growth, he told those gathered in Accra: "As a musician drawing inspiration from Jamaican artists like Buju Banton, Bob Marley and Sizzla, there was a general narrative of dissing politicians and describing politics as 'poli-tricks'. [...] I was using my music as my platform of activism to demand what should be in place. But as I grew up I realised that it is one thing raising a voice and and another thing actually changing the way things are."

Kyagulanyi says he wanted to use the 'official platform' to amplify the issues he had long sung about and that the people he lives among want communicated; he was among oppositionists attempting to prevent the removal of presidential term limits and the introduction of a social media tax to muzzle activism.

"Bobi Wine is riding an inevitable wave," says Kampala-based analyst Angelo Izama. "Demographic changes in Africa will produce yet unforeseen consequences. His movement puts a youth banner on economic injustice. It resonates because, well it is true."

Primary school enrolment is estimated around 90%, but only 38% complete it. University graduates can find themselves competing with 50 other candidates for every available opportunity, while 'informal sector' employment is opposed through the state's destruction of settlements and places of work. But will Kyagulanyi's popularity and 'People Power' slogan change the way Uganda runs?

Some analysts believe that though he has much support across the country, he has no established grassroots structure on which to build a political movement. "What's his politics, beyond the critique? How would he balance the kind of issues that the nation faces?" asks Ugandan journalist and blogger Rosebell Kagumire.

"He's a lone voice that has a platform, but if he were to be a presidential figure he would have to show whether he has a committee of people, how he would govern, [...] the idea that he's leading a movement that is visible beyond himself."

Over the years opposition movements in Uganda have grown and fizzled out. "[The] highly polarised foundation upon which politics rests is two and half decades of divide and rule [...] and a dangerously volatile commercial market for politics. [This] will meet with the naked violence of the heirs of the movement under Museveni," says Izama. "What happened in Arua is only the first draft of the history to follow."

How political change will come when Museveni is no longer in power depends on its timing and several other factors. "It matters that they [the youth] are at least excited by the show," says Kagumire. "They see [Bobi Wine] as a sign of change in the truth teller at the time when everybody has been beaten by the system."

He will have to up his game to be able to win via the streets or the ballot box when the cult of personality loses its leader, since the factors are not ripe for a revolution.
Red-beret brothers
Meanwhile in South Africa, which has a stronger democratic system and state institutions, youth politics of late has grabbed national attention through the #FeesMustFall movement and organising activity of Julius Malema and his Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Malema and Kyagulanyi see each other as part of the same battle.

"Museveni firstly must go and rest, and rest on his oversized suits as well," Malema tells The Africa Report. "Bobi Wine is an inspiration, [he] is a brother to us. Even if he can't defeat him through using the state institutions and democratic processes, nature will resolve the man [Museveni]. So Bobi Wine, soldier on young man, victory is certain."

With an ear to the ground, Malema and the EFF have tapped into the concerns of those who feel marginalised. The EFF has also managed to push popular policy positions - notably on land reform - and the debate on the nationalisation of mines to such an extent that it has caused radical shifts in the governing African National Congress's position.

Part of the EFF's political appeal lies in how it has positioned itself at a time when a lot of people are looking for political alternatives, says Tasneem Essop, a researcher at Wits University: "Given the socioeconomic context, deep inequality and sky-high unemployment, the language of the EFF speaks to this and the many popular struggles that have been unfolding in the country."

Ahead of the May 2019 election, opinion polls give the EFF an expected 11% support. This almost doubles the 6% it got in its first elections in 2014, and would give it more clout in the opposition benches of parliament.

The EFF became coalition kingmakers in several major cities after the 2016 municipal elections, but the horse-trading of divided governments has done little to boost the party's national profile. It is doing well on university campuses and using social media to mobilise voters, but it will need to speak to more than young people to make a bigger electoral power push.
#NotTooYoungToRun
In Nigeria, getting your name on the ballot when you are not a billionaire or the 'godchild' of a political bigwig presents its own form of revolution. In May 2015, agitation for the Not Too Young to Run bill began in earnest as a number of civil society groups sought to get parliament to amend laws regarding youth participation in politics at all levels.

This has served as a springboard for young candidates, increasing their number facing the elderly establishment. The group's mission was to reduce the age qualification for president from 40 to 30; governor and senator from 35 to 30; house of representatives membership and state assembly membership from 30 to 25. The Youth Initiative For Advocacy, Growth & Advancement led a nationwide drive to get the bill considered at the national level.

Promises of tech hubs are unlikely to quench youth demands

In April 2018, it was signed into law by President Muhammadu Buhari, leaving room for many young Nigerians to run for elective offices in the 22 February elections. In Lagos, Gbadebo Rhodes-Vivour, a 35 year-old MIT graduate, ran for the Senate, while Rinsola Abiola, daughter of the winner of the annulled 1993 presidential elections, Moshood Abiola, joined the race for the national assembly in the state of Ogun.

In the Middle Belt, Natasha Akpoti tried for a senatorial seat in her native Kogi, while 35-year-old Chike Ukaegbu was the youngest presidential aspirant in this year's polls. Even though the odds were stacked against him, this was emblematic of a paradigm shift.
#VOTE18
Inspired by their neighbours, youth groups in Cameroon are also using the political structures to seek younger political participation in their country. The organisation Network for Solidarity, Empowerment and Transformation for All (NewSETA) started a campaign known as #VOTE18, aimed at lowering the voting age in Cameroon from 20 to 18.

NewSETA's director, Ateki Caxton, saw Nigeria's #NotTooYoungToRun campaign as a success story. He is also planning to launch a campaign to lower the age to run for Senate and build young people's capacity to run for office. "We believe that age is not a factor to determine whether someone makes a difference in society or not," Caxton says.

#VOTE18 faces an uphill battle in a country where octogenarian President Paul Biya has been in power since 1982 and has a strong grip on the three arms of government. At this point, political change is not likely to come through the ballot box in Cameroon.

The same country is producing young combatants in the Anglophone region who are fighting for secession; it is witnessing Boko Haram attacks in its poorly developed northern regions and sending many young people northward across the continent in the hopes of finding something better along the way or in Europe.
Sahel separatists
In countries where states are unable to exercise their authority over all of their territory and governments are dysfunctional - like Mali and Somalia - the youth bulge presents its most serious challenges to African leaders.

Less than a third of the Malian population voted in the second round of the 2018 presidential election, pointing to a general disillusionment with what traditional parties have to offer. While there are 18 million Malians in Mali, there are four million in the diaspora. The government has been unable to tackle jihadist movements, Tuareg separatists and trafficking networks across the Sahel region.

As young people question the status quo and push the limits of old systems, promises of tech hubs and digital job creation seem less and less likely to quench the demands of the coming demographic surge. With today's politicians shaping many possible tomorrows, the Arab Spring, the Sahel, South Africa, Ethiopia and Uganda show how the politics of youth can shift the dial or send a country into crisis.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Africa's youth are making their voices heard

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Bashir, who seized power in a military coup in 1989, had crushed two similar protests in 1992 and 2013. And yet in December 2018 crowds once again took to the streets of Khartoum.

# data[].attributes.body
"This contributes to “corruption fatigue”: the belief that the problem is simply too big for any one person to make a difference generates despondency. It makes individuals more likely to go with the flow than to stand against it."

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Commuters waiting at a bus stop in Lagos Adekunle Ajayi/NurPhoto via Getty Images

Donors and civil society groups spend tens of millions of dollars every year trying to combat corruption. They do it because corruption has been shown to increase poverty and inequality while undermining trust in the government. Reducing corruption is essential to improve public services and strengthen the social contract between citizens and the state.

But what if anti-corruption efforts actually make the situation worse?

Our research in Lagos, Nigeria, found that anti-corruption messages often have an unintended effect. Instead of building public resolve to reject corrupt acts, the messages we tested either had no effect or actually made people more likely to offer a bribe.

The reason may be that the messages reinforce popular perceptions that corruption is pervasive and insurmountable. In doing so, they encourage apathy and acceptance rather than inspire activism.

Fighting corruption

Efforts to combat corruption in "developing countries" initially focused on law enforcement by political leaders and bureaucrats. But these strategies met with limited success and so efforts switched to raising public awareness of the dangers of corruption.

This change of approach made sense. One reason that leaders don't deliver on reforms is that they benefit from the way things are. Encouraging citizens to reject corrupt leaders would give those in power an incentive to act.

The last 20 years therefore saw a vast array of campaigns, from newspaper and radio advertisements to Twitter messages. Short films, theatre productions and signs that proclaim that government institutions are "corruption free zones" were also included.

These messages are seen by large numbers of people, but until recently there had been remarkably little systematic research on whether they actually work.

Researching corruption

To test the impact of anti-corruption messages we developed five short narratives like those promoted by civil society organisations and international donors. One message focused on explaining that corruption is widespread and damaging. Others emphasised the local impact of graft and the way it wasted citizens' taxes.

To test the effect of more positive messages, one narrative talked about recent successes that political leaders had in curbing corruption. Another detailed the role that religious leaders played in promoting clean government.

We read the messages to 2,400 randomly selected people in Lagos. While corruption has often been identified as a major challenge in Nigeria, the Lagos State government has made some progress towards reducing government waste, ensuring all citizens pay taxes and delivering better services. It was therefore plausible that both positive and negative messages about corruption would resonate with Lagosians. The state is also ethnically diverse, with considerable poverty and inequality, and so reflects the kind of context in which anti-corruption messaging is often deployed.

Each person we interviewed was given one of the narratives. A control group was not given any anti-corruption information. This was to enable us to compare the impact of different messages. We then asked everyone a number of questions about their attitudes towards corruption.

In an advance on previous studies, we also invited 1,200 people to play a game in which they had an opportunity to win real money. In the game, players could take away more money if they were willing to pay a small bribe to the "banker" who determined the pay-outs. The game tested players' commitment to rejecting corruption in a more demanding way than simply asking them if they believed corruption was wrong.

We were then able to evaluate whether anti-corruption messages were effective by looking at whether those who received them were more likely to demand clean government and less willing to pay a bribe.

More harm than good

In line with prior research, our findings suggest that anti-corruption campaigns may be doing more harm than good. None of the narratives we used had a positive effect overall. Many of them actually made Lagosians more likely to pay a bribe.

Put another way, the good news is that public relations campaigns can change citizens' minds. But the bad news is that they often do so in unintended and counterproductive ways.

The reason for this seems to be that anti-corruption messages encourage citizens to think more about corruption, emphasising the extent of the problem. This contributes to "corruption fatigue": the belief that the problem is simply too big for any one person to make a difference generates despondency. It makes individuals more likely to go with the flow than to stand against it.

This interpretation is supported by another finding that the negative effect of anti-corruption messaging was far more powerful among individuals who believed that corruption was pervasive. This reveals that the problematic consequences of anti-corruption messages are not universal. Among less pessimistic people, messages did not have a negative effect. And one message had the desired effect of reducing the probability of paying a bribe. This was the narrative that emphasised the relationship between corruption and citizens' tax payments.

Our study therefore suggests that if we can target anti-corruption messages more effectively at specific audiences, we may be able to enhance their positive effects while minimising the risks.

What next?

Other studies have come to similar conclusions in Indonesia, Costa Rica and to some extent Papua New Guinea.

We therefore need to take the lessons of these studies seriously. Anti-corruption campaigns that send untargeted messages should be halted until we work out how to target them more effectively. The most logical response is to embrace new ways of working.

This might mean identifying messages that persuade citizens that corruption is falling and so "nudge" them to believe it is a problem that can be overcome.

Where that's not possible, it is also worth considering a more radical break with the past. As others working within the Anti-Corruption Evidence Consortium have argued, the most promising approach may be to abandon traditional anti-corruption messaging in favour of working more indirectly. This would involve building public demand for greater political accountability and transparency without always talking directly about corruption.

Such an approach would be less high profile, but is far more likely to be effective.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.title
Why some anti-corruption campaigns make people more likely to pay a bribe

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Donors and civil society groups spend tens of millions of dollars every year trying to combat corruption. They do it because corruption has been shown to increase poverty and inequality while undermining trust in the government. Reducing corruption is essential to improve public services and strengthen the social contract between citizens and the state.

# data[].attributes.headline
Wanting to quickly tie it back to Ghorwane 

# data[].attributes.subject
Wanting to quickly tie it back to Ghorwane 

# data[].attributes.headline
Is there a connection between Ghorwane and Politics in Mozambique? 

# data[].attributes.subject
Is there a connection between Ghorwane and Politics in Mozambique? 

# data[].attributes.headline
Ghorwane was one of Frelimo's "puppet musicians" Interview with Janet Duffield, a resident of Mozambique for 24  years.

# data[].attributes.subject
Ghorwane was one of Frelimo's "puppet musicians" Interview with Janet Duffield, a resident of Mozambique for 24  years.

# data[].attributes.body
"Ghorwane has always however been associated with Frelimo because lead singer. In the early days of liberation from the Portuguese, radio was the only way that music and information was going out. It spoke of freedom and bonded people together for this freedom.

Radio mozambique had a group of artists for the pro revolution. The aim of these musicians was to maintained the visibility of tradition and culture and recognised the importance of it. The album Nao precise de empurar translated to "There is no need to push" was really famous and highlighted how no matter what part you are from in the country we should come together.

Ghorwane members were part of this group of musicians that worked with Radio Mozambique. They represented culture and music and generated a message to the country. Developing a national profile and had to deal with 100 dialects and music can do that to overcome he actual words. If the song is good it will capture you."
Brief interview with Janet Duffield, lived in Mozambique for 24 years.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.readable_text
Vocals/Rhythm Guitar - Roberto ChitsonzoVocals/Percussion - David MacuácuaKeyboards - João Carlos SchwalbachTrumpet - Julio BazaTrumpet - António BazaSaxofones - Pedro RijoBass Guitar - LoteDrums - Paíto TchecoPercussion - Enrique
Ghorwane, the "Good Guys" of Mozambique by José Pinto Sá

In the hot and dusty Gaza province of Mozambique there is a small lake called Ghorwane that never runs dry, even in the hottest season. In 1983, a group of young musicians in Maputo, took the name Ghorwane as they launched their musical career. Today they are one of Mozambique's most respected bands. Ghorwane chose to base their music on traditional Mozambican rhythms, combined with Afropop and fusion. At the time when most established groups earned a living by imitating foreign artists, this approach came as a stimulating innovation. The injection of life they have shot into the stagnant music scene, and their subsequent success, have inspired other bands to take a similar route.

The band is noted for the political and social criticism in their songs which has put them at loggerheads with the government from time to time. They have mirrored the frustration of their people at the continuing war that was grinding deeper into despair day after day, year after year. The lyrics are sung in African languages of Mozambique, like Changana, Ronga and Chope. The security services often attended their shows with instructions to listen closely to their lyrics. What saved them was that, in 1985 during the festival to celebrate the ten years of independence, Samora Machel (then President of Mozambique) declared that "It's prohibited to lie in the People's Republic of Mozambique" and cites Ghorwane as an example calling them "bons rapazes" - good guys - which they are called until today by the Mozambican people.

In 1986 Ghorwane recorded a number of songs amongst which "Massotcha" written by Zeca Alage, which spoke about the horror of war and the danger of the military to the people they meant to be protecting. This song immediately became number one on the Mozambican hit parade. Again voices were raised to lay a total censorship on the band and again Samora Machel defended his "bons rapazes" and invited them to play at the anniversary of his wedding, a few months before the dead of Samora Machel.

In 1987 Ghorwane were invited by the DDR to perform at a political music festival. Just before their departure their visa were refused. The leader of the Mozambican National Youth Organization advised this as according to him the lyrics of Ghorwane were subversive. The same year in September, Ghorwane played for the first time abroad at the independence festival in Swaziland, together with the South African groups P.J. Powers and Stimela.

Peter Gabriel invited them to play at the WOMAD Festival in 1990. During this festival Realworld offered them an opportunity to record the CD "Majurugenta". Just before the European promotional tour of "Majurugenta" in 1993 Ghorwane's most beloved member the saxophone player and composer Zeca Alage was assassinated. In memorial of Zeca Ghorwane decided to go on with the promotional tour. The CD was launched and distributed by Virgin Records. For distribution in southern Africa, Ghorwane printed a new version of "Majurugenta".
With Karen Boswell as musical director, Ghorwane made the music for the soap opera series "Não é preciso empurrar" - you don't have to push -, an education series for the elections in 1994. The text was written by Mia Couto, a well known Mozambican writer. A year later Ghorwane accompanied forty Mozambican artists to the SADC Music Festival in Zimbabwe.
Ghorwane made the recordings of their second CD "Kudumba" in 1996 which was released in 1997 by Piranha.

After the devastating floods that hit Mozambique in the beginning of the year 2000, Ghorwane participated in a Project called MOZAMBIQUE RELIEF. A production of a CD that would benefit the victims of the floods.

"Recorded in Maputo, Mozambique in April 2000, this collection of southern African music brings together some of Mozambique's best musicians for a benefit record in aid of rebuilding and helping victims of the country's flooding disaster. The devastating floods and cyclones that hit Mozambique between February and early April were the worst in 40 years. It affected 4.5 million people (27% of the total population) and a million people lost everything. About this time, Finnish musician Eero Koivistoinen was suppose to travel to a village in the Zavala district and make a field recording with a timbila ensemble for Naxos World. But with the disaster making the project impossible at the time, he and Naxos World executive Andrew Sun drew up a new plan. Koivistoinen had worked with Ghorwane, the most famous band to come out of Mozambique (they had recorded an album for Peter Gabriel's Real World label) and their leader Joao Carlos Schwalbach rounded up other artists in the local music community in Maputo, Mozambique.

The result is an inspired and solid set of Afro-pop music made by artists from the community, but more significantly a portion of the proceeds from this recording will come back to help the country. As Koivistonen explains, "Every musician involved understood the importance of the matter. There was a possibility of helping to rebuild the country, because the profits from the record would come back to Mozambique through Oxfam. In this respect, the project is unique: the Mozambicans can help themselves." Of the participating acts, Ghorwane is indeed the best known and most respected band in Mozambique. They contribute three tracks to the CD, 'Mayvavo' (two versions) and 'Wavitika.'."(Naxos World)

Even though the war is over Ghorwane have not stopped their political and social criticism concerning developments in their country and the influence of the foreign countries and organizations in aid programs.

Majurujenta: O Cartao de Visitas

RELEASES Year Title Format/Ref Territory Distributor
2000 Mozambique Relief CD / 79019-2 The World NAXOS WORLD
1998 Não é preciso empurrar CD / GHO 01 Mozambique GHORWANE S.C.R.L.
1994 Majurugenta CD / GHO 01 Africa GHORWANE S.C.R.L.
1994 Não é preciso empurrar Cassette Mozambique GHORWANE S.C.R.L.
1993 Majurugenta CD / RW29 The World REAL WORLD RECORDS(Excl Africa) WOMAD MUSIC/EMI-VIRGIN1997 Kudumba CD The World PIRANHA MUSIC
1999 Não é Preciso Empurrar CD Mozambique GHORWANE S.C.R.L.
2000 Mozambique Relief CD The World NAXOS WORLD

RECORDINGS Year Title Studio Use
2000 Mozambique Relief Mozambique

CD Release1996 Kudumba PIRANHA - BERLIN

CD Release1994 Não é preciso empurrar Radio Moçambique

Film/Cassette1994 Makwero Radio Moçambique

Film/Cassette1994 Xicuembo Radio Moçambique

Film/Cassette1994 Moçambipreto Radio Moçambique

Film/Cassette1994 Matapa-Matapa Radio Moçambique

Film/Cassette1994 Sonhos Radio Moçambique

Film/Cassette1992 Nudez Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1992 Kanjani Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1991 Muthimba Real World Studios.

UK CD Release1991 Majurugenta Real World Studios.

UK CD Release1991 Matarlatanta Real World Studios.

UK CD Release1991 Xai-Xai Real World Studios.

UK CD Release1991 Mavabwyi Real World Studios.

UK CD Release1991 Sathuma Real World Studios.

UK CD Release1991 Buluku Real World Studios.

UK CD Release1991 Terehumba Real World Studios.

UK CD Release1991 Akuhanha Real World Studios.

UK CD Release1990 Akuhanha Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1986 Tlhanga Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1986 Massotchua Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1984 Ndlala Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1984 Ferido Regresso Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1984 Xizambiza Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1984 Buluko Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1984 Rapariga Bonita Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay 1984 Xindzavane Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1984 Matarlatanta Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1984 Np'ulani Radio Moçambique

Radio Airplay1984 Vamaplele Radio Moçambique

INTERNATIONAL TOURS & FESTIVALS
2003 ZANZIBAR BUSSARA FESTIVAL TANZANIA

2001 Mozambique-SA ASSOCIATION SOUTH AFRICA

2001 KIPPIES SOUTH AFRICA

2001 BASS LINE SOUTH AFRICA

2001 BLUES ROOM SOUTH AFRICA

2000 BASS LINE SOUTH AFRICA

1996 FESTIVAL MUNDIAL HOLLAND

1996 MUSIQUE METISSE FRANCE

1996 WOMAD IN CACERES SPAIN

1996 MEGA MUSIC SOUTH AFRICA

1995 SADC MUSIC FESTIVAL ZIMBABWE

1993 WOMAD FESTIVAL & TOUR ENGLAND

1991 WOMAD FESTIVAL ENGLAND

1989 FESTIVAL DO REI SWAZILAND

1989 FESTIVAL OF YOUTH NORTH KOREA

1988 LUSOPHONE FESTIVAL & TOUR PORTUGAL

1987 INDEPENDENCE FESTIVAL SWAZILAND

NATIONAL TOURS AND FESTIVALS
2000 FACIM "Professor's Day" MAPUTO

1994 FESTIVAL with KASSAVE MACHAVA

1993 OPERA MARRABENTA* MAPUTO

1992 OPERA MARRABENTA* BEIRA

1990 FESTIVAL FRELIMO NATIONAL TOUR

1990 BLOOD DONOR CAMPAIGN XAI-XAI

1988 NAMPULA1988 SCHOOLS/FACTORIES TOUR MAPUTO

1988 COMMUNITY STREET FESTIVALS MAPUTO

1987 CHIMOIO. MANICA. CHOKWE

1985 SOUNDS OF THE EARTH FESTIVAL MAPUTO

1985 FESTIVAL KANIMBO MAPUTO

1984 ROOTS FESTIVAL MAPUTO

*OPERA MARRABENTA NAMBU (Sept 1991 - March 1993)A two year project developing and performing an opera extravaganza involving 40 actors, dancers and musicians.
FILM/TELEVISION SOUNDTRACKS

1994 Não é Preciso Empurrar 7 part TV drama

1993 Sabadão Weekly TV music programme

1991 Masseve Weekly TV music programme

1991 Solidão Mozambican Feature Film

1988 Colheta do diabo Mozambican Feature Film

In 1993 GHORWANE established a music co-operative, the first of its kind in Mozambique with the objectives of promoting Mozambican music, improving working conditions for local musicians and defending composers rights.

# data[].attributes.attachment_link.description
Vocals/Rhythm Guitar - Roberto ChitsonzoVocals/Percussion - David MacuácuaKeyboards - João Carlos SchwalbachTrumpet - Julio BazaTrumpet - António BazaSaxofones - Pedro RijoBass Guitar - LoteDrums - Paíto TchecoPercussion - EnriqueGhorwane, the "Good Guys" of Mozambique by José Pinto Sá In the hot and dusty Gaza province of Mozambique there is a small lake called Ghorwane that never runs dry, even in the hottest season.

# data[].attributes.body
- The problem is that people fear the government and feel its much easier to go along with it than challenge it. However people do care, but they feel hopeless.

Social media is the way in which I connect with lots of Mozambicans living abroad.

Social media and the internet is so globalised that government could only attack it by officially blocking sites or turning off 3g etc.

# data[].attributes.body
Create a zine that would target the younger audience and keep them up to date about Moz news. I have direct contact with journalists that live in Mozambique through family connections. However I feel that this heavily rely's on a third party though.

# data[].attributes.body
Create a Carousel or informative page on what's going on there and how we can combat it.

.. I think this might be too direct as a first start.

# data[].attributes.body
A club where Mozambicans that live in London or (this could be digital) and we can have bi weekly or monthly seminars or just a chat about our country, the good and the bad. Sharing individual stories and also learning from each other.

# data[].attributes.headline
IDEA 3.2: A Club could then eventually be made into a podcast that could reach more people when the group feels comfortable. 

# data[].attributes.subject
IDEA 3.2: A Club could then eventually be made into a podcast that could reach more people when the group feels comfortable. 

# data[].attributes.headline
IDEA 3.3: Whatever we discuss at the club we could then all make some artwork, or those that want to that represent what has been discussed and the feelings we have faced. This could then be posted on Instagram and would follow the topic of conversation at the club and inform those that do not go about what's going on in the world. It's more about informing and having people just speak about it. 

# data[].attributes.subject
IDEA 3.3: Whatever we discuss at the club we could then all make some artwork, or those that want to that represent what has been discussed and the feelings we have faced. This could then be posted on Instagram and would follow the topic of conversation at the club and inform those that do not go about what's going on in the world. It's more about informing and having people just speak about it. 

# data[].attributes.body
This is something that people would feel more comfortable with. Also just like the Bolsheviks, they started small and grew.

# data[].attributes.headline
I have chosen the slogan LET ME SPEAK, LET MOZ SPEAK

# data[].attributes.subject
I have chosen the slogan LET ME SPEAK, LET MOZ SPEAK

# data[].attributes.body
This Could be the flyer that could go out on social media or in person (post-covid)

# data[].attributes.body
I have shown this to some of my contacts and they have stated as previously that they would attend a seminar or a monthly meet up with other mozambicans to celebrate but also talk about these challenging subjects. However they do not feel comfortable at this stage to openly campaign against government. I think this is the most important step to take. To let people know that they can open up and its a safe space to talk about the political trials faced by Mozambicans.

# data[].attributes.headline
Our voices need to be heard. This group can give us a chance to openly discuss without fear of violence and persecution. Start small and this could grow into something larger. A team to show Frelimo that this generation will not turn a blind eye to corruption and abuse. 

# data[].attributes.subject
Our voices need to be heard. This group can give us a chance to openly discuss without fear of violence and persecution. Start small and this could grow into something larger. A team to show Frelimo that this generation will not turn a blind eye to corruption and abuse. 