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(RESEARCHED BY: Ericka Roche B. Mamparo) 

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URL: https://www.facebook.com/TheSibugayExpress/posts/pfbid032zz7p34NzKY8nw5gTN94Uvxx9tAKbVSDkxunKcyFXy4BVNT4fFQDadN2N9s56xxMl

TITLE: A different kind of Bayot
AUTHOR: SibEx News (Community News of Zamboanga Sibugay)
DATE: June 8, 2017

KEY CONTENT: The late 24-year old Private First Class Dhan Ryan Bayot’s patriotism during the Marawi siege is a symbol of justice in our SDG which is Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions. It is a symbol of justice because in the end, mr. Bayot’s patriotism paid off when the Philippine military won against the terrorists.

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URL: https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/1926561/zamboanga/local-news/troops-foil-roadside-bombing-in-sulu

TITLE: Troops Foil Roadside Bombing in Sulu

AUTHOR: Sunstar Zamboanga

DATE: April 17, 2022

KEY CONTENT: Troops recovered an improvised explosive device (IED) planted by the Abu Sayyaf bandits in Indanan, Sulu. Major General Ignatius Patrimonio, 11th Infantry Division (ID) commander, said the IED was discovered around 8:30 a.m. Saturday.

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TROOPS foiled a roadside bombing attempt as they safely recovered an improvised explosive device (IED) planted by the Abu Sayyaf bandits in Indanan, Sulu, military officials...

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URL: https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/05/24/Duterte-declares-martial-law-in-Mindanao.html

TITLE: Duterte Declares Martial Law in Mindanao

AUTHOR: Yvette Morales, CNN Philippines

DATE: May 24, 2017

KEY CONTENT: President Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law in Mindanao said Presidential Spokesperson Ernesto Abella, amidst the clashes between government forces and armed Maute group in Marawi City. Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana says that Martial Law will help the government control terrorists’ movements.

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URL: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/11/philippines-battle-of-marawi-leaves-trail-of-death-and-destruction/

TITLE: Philippines: ‘Battle of Marawi’ leaves trail of death and destruction

AUTHOR: Amnesty International (News Organization)

DATE: November 17, 2017

KEY CONTENT: International news organization Amnesty International interviewed 48 survivors and witnesses during the surge of the war.

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Civilians on the island of Mindanao paid a high price with dozens killed and widespread destruction of homes and property amid the 'battle of Marawi' that pitted the Philippine military against militants allied to the armed group calling itself Islamic State (IS) between May and October this year, Amnesty International said in a report today.
The 'Battle of Marawi': Death and destruction in the Philippines is the first detailed human rights analysis of the conflict, based on a research trip to Lanao del Sur, Mindanao in September. It documents how IS-allied militants targeted Christian civilians for the worst of the abuses, including at least 25 extrajudicial killings, mass hostage-taking, and extensive looting of civilian property.

Philippine armed forces, meanwhile, detained and ill-treated fleeing civilians, and also engaged in looting. Their extensive bombing of militant-held areas of Marawi city wiped out entire neighbourhoods and killed civilians, highlighting the need for an investigation into its compliance with international humanitarian law.

"Marawi's civilian population has suffered immensely amid one of the Philippine military's most intensive operations in decades. Displaced en masse when the fighting began in May, thousands of people are now returning to a city that has been utterly destroyed in places, where civilians have been slaughtered by militants, and both sides have committed abuses," said Tirana Hassan, Crisis Response Director at Amnesty International.

The IS-linked militants' bloody, months-long siege of Marawi took a heavy toll on civilians, with Christians in particular singled out for brutal attacks, including grisly extrajudicial killings.
Tirana Hassan, Crisis Response Director at Amnesty International

"The IS-linked militants' bloody, months-long siege of Marawi took a heavy toll on civilians, with Christians in particular singled out for brutal attacks, including grisly extrajudicial killings."

Civilians targeted in reign of terror

Marawi is located on the southern Philippines island of Mindanao. © Amnesty International. Basemap data: OCHA, PSA, NAMRIA.

Amnesty International interviewed 48 survivors and witnesses, and many described how IS-linked militants regularly targeted civilians and carried out extrajudicial killings in Marawi city.
Multiple witnesses described 10 separate incidents where militants killed a total of at least 25 civilians by shooting them or slitting their throats. Most were targeted because they were Christians, and some were killed as they attempted to flee to safety. It is a war crime to murder civilians.

During the morning of 23 May, Adam, in his forties, was in the car park of the Amai Pakpak Medical Hospital when he saw three militants hijack the hospital's ambulance and execute the driver:

"I saw them stop the ambulance. They asked [the driver] to say the Shahada [an expression of Muslim faith], but the driver was not able to answer so they shot him... Then they came to me and asked me to recite the Shahada [and I did], and they let me live."

I saw them stop the ambulance. They asked [the driver] to say the Shahada [an expression of Muslim faith], but the driver was not able to answer so they shot him... Then they came to me and asked me to recite the Shahada [and I did], and they let me live.
Adam, a man in his forties

A group of six painters, all Christian, hid in their employer's house for five days after fighting broke out before attempting to escape. After being chased and fired at by militants, they took cover in a canal that led them to Lake Lanao.

Amnesty International interviewed two of the men. One of them said:

"When I was about to [swim across] the lake I saw ISIS [fighters] near... we were six that were supposed to cross the lake but three of our friends were shot... We saw the person shooting, he was [dressed] all in black with long hair and a beard."

Survivors and witnesses told Amnesty International how militants also captured a large number of civilians as hostages. The militants subjected them to forced labour and used them as human shields. At least one hostage was summarily executed, and many were physically abused.

[After they captured us] they brought us to a mansion where they kept us hostage... In the mansion we were used as slaves, following their orders. We cooked, prepared food... If [we] didn't follow their commands, they would hit us. Once they fired [a bullet] near my head.
A construction worker in his twenties

A construction worker in his twenties who was held hostage for several weeks along with dozens of other Christians told Amnesty International:
"[After they captured us] they brought us to a mansion where they kept us hostage... In the mansion we were used as slaves, following their orders. We cooked, prepared food... If [we] didn't follow their commands, they would hit us. Once they fired [a bullet] near my head."

The same hostage was later transferred to two other locations, each of which had many more hostages. One of those locations, a large building with more than 100 other hostages, was hit by an airstrike, killing 10 civilians.

Escape to detention and ill-treatment

In some instances, members of the Philippine military treated civilians who escaped militant-controlled areas with suspicion, detaining them and subjecting them to torture or other ill-treatment.

Amnesty International interviewed eight victims of such abuse at the hands of the Philippine armed forces. Seven of them were Christian construction workers who had been trapped in Marawi city because they feared being captured or killed by militants if they tried to escape.

One of the construction workers, a man in his forties, was shot at by militants on his first attempt to escape Marawi city, an attack which he believes killed three of his colleagues. On the second attempt, he and his companions were crossing a bridge to flee the militant-controlled area of the city when Philippine Marines confronted and detained them. He told Amnesty International:

"We thought that we were safe. But then the master sergeant arrived. Then they told us that we were ISIS...They beat us...I was punched and kicked...My companion showed his ID, but the military said he was a sniper for ISIS... I was beaten with an Armalite [rifle]... They tied our hands and feet with electrical wire. I was crying and they would not listen... The military was very angry because 13 of their men were killed."

The Philippine armed forces detained another escaped civilian who was beaten severely all over his body, had the butt of a rifle smashed on his hands and back, and had burning-hot liquid poured all over his body. The pain eventually caused him to pass out and he was later handed over to the Red Cross.

Trapped under fire

Although the vast majority of civilians fled Marawi city in the first week of the conflict, hundreds or possibly even thousands remained trapped inside amid the ongoing fighting. On 29 May, the UN reported that 2,300 people remained in the city, dropping to fewer than 300 by late August, as many had managed to escape by then.
Many of the civilians trapped for extended periods were workers who were living in a state of fear, at risk of being found by militants and hit by bombs or bullets. An unknown number were reportedly killed by the government's aerial bombardment.

We were not able to sleep because of the airstrikes and gunfire... For 38 days we drank rain water... I tried to escape but bombs were falling near our building... When we did finally leave, we saw dead bodies decaying in the street... When we arrived at the bridge ... we were rescued by the military [and] were turned over to the police.
A married couple from Iligan who were trapped in Marawi

A married couple from Iligan who were trapped in Marawi city for more than five weeks told Amnesty International:

"We were not able to sleep because of the airstrikes and gunfire... For 38 days we drank rain water... I tried to escape but bombs were falling near our building... When we did finally leave, we saw dead bodies decaying in the street... When we arrived at the bridge ... we were rescued by the military [and] were turned over to the police."

Due to restrictions on access to Marawi city itself, Amnesty International was unable to determine whether the Philippine armed forces' use of artillery and airstrikes breached their international humanitarian law obligations. Further independent investigation is needed to determine whether the infrastructure damage and the loss of civilian life was militarily necessary and proportional to the threat posed by the militants.

"The Philippine authorities must bring those responsible for torture and other violations to justice and ensure that the victims receive adequate reparations. They must also initiate a prompt, effective and impartial investigation into whether its bombing of civilian neighbourhoods was proportional under international humanitarian law," said Tirana Hassan.

The Philippine authorities seem to be responding to concerns about looting by members of the security forces, with investigations and charges under way. They must also follow through on promises of compensation.

The satellite image from 1 October 2017 shows much of the east side of Marawi city destroyed along with parts of the west side, after the fighting began on May 23rd. © CNES 2017, Distribution AIRBUS DS.

Background

On 23 May 2017, a firefight broke out between Philippine government forces and an alliance of IS-aligned militants in Marawi - a city of 200,000 in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, in the southern Philippines.
The militants, including the Maute group and the Abu Sayyaf group, quickly took control of large areas of the city, prompting Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to impose martial law and suspend the writ of habeas corpus on the entire island of Mindanao.

Within a month, the conflict displaced 360,000 people in Marawi and surrounding areas. Hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians remained in the besieged city for weeks or months, either as hostages or trapped in the crossfire.

The battle lasted for five months, and resulted in the mass displacement of civilians, the widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure, and the loss of civilian lives.

According to official figures, 920 militants, 165 soldiers and 47 civilians were killed in the fighting, and more than 1,780 hostages were rescued from the IS-linked militants. But restrictions on access to Marawi during the conflict have precluded any independent corroboration of these numbers.

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Philippines: 'Battle of Marawi' leaves trail of death and destruction

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Civilians on the island of Mindanao paid a high price with dozens killed and widespread destruction of homes and property amid the 'battle of Marawi' that pitted the Philippine military against militants allied to the armed group calling itself Islamic State (IS) between May and October this year, Amnesty International said in a report today.

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(RESEARCHED BY: Ericka Roche B. Mamparo)

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URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C93erl9HzGE

TITLE: Visit to the bomb victims 9/3/2016.

AUTHOR: RTVMalacanang

DATE: September 3, 2016.

KEY CONTENT: President Rodrigo Roa Duterte visited the bomb victims in San Pedro Hospital and Davao Medical Center in the wake of the bomb blast that ripped through the crowded night market in Roxas Street, leaving 14 people dead and 66 injured.

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(RESEARCHED BY: Adam Dustin D. Cervantes)

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URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lWtBfVP2SYY

TITLE: Nun Demands Stop the Killings in Mindanao

Author:Sister Stella Matutina

Date: Dec 12, 2012

KEY CONTENT: Sister Stella Matutina, OSB speaks for PANALIPDAN MINDANAO, a network of advocates for the environment and patrimony during the Human Rights Day protest against AFP's Oplan Bayanihan and mining corporate greed that victimize indigenous peoples, farmers and environmental defenders.

Quotes from Sister Stella M:

"The church cannot be neutral in (the issue of) human rights violations."

"To foreign corporates, leave us alone! We don't need your money. What we need is Mindanao, our land."

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Nun Demands Stop the Killings in Mindanao

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(RESEARCHED BY: Princess Claire B. Kohler)

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URL: https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/regions/748382/terrorist-tagging-posters-in-davao-cause-alarm-among-groups/story/

TITLE:Terrorist-tagging posters in Davao cause alarm among groups

AUTHOR: Joahna Lei Casilao

DATE: July 24, 2020

KEY CONTENT: Posters displayed in Barangay Maa, Davao City tagging nine individuals as terrorist recruiters have caused alarm among several groups.The posters were a huge threat to individuals who express their opinions on national issues, especially with the  Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 in place.

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Terrorist-tagging posters in Davao cause alarm among groups

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The secretary general of Karapatan in Southern Mindanao said he was alarmed upon seeing his photo and name on the wanted poster. “Maliban po sa na-alarma ay nakaramdam po tayo ng takot dahil unang-una, kami sa human rights organization ng Karapatan ay dumadalo sa court hearings ng mga ina-assi…

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URL: https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/publication/projecthistory/l75nbg000019qo90-att/project_history_EN_02.pdf

TITLE: PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN MINDANAO, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

AUTHOR: Naoyuki Ochiai

DATE: December 2020

KEY CONTENT: The author reveals how ISIS encouraged the terrorists, inspiring them to revolutionize our country. Terrorists now fly the ISIS banner in order to get more strength and be adequately structured in exchange for providing supplies to improve their status in battling the security forces.

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URL: https://youtu.be/HFdYWk7aS4Y

TITLE: Islamic State take extremist mission to Philippines

AUTHOR: 60 Minutes Australia

DATE: July 23, 2019

KEY CONTENT: Allied forces have been effective in wiping out the extremists in Syria and Iraq, but many ISIS fighters have escaped and are relocating. The worrying news is that they’re moving into our region, specifically into areas of Indonesia and the Philippines.

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EXCLUSIVE: Islamic State take extremist mission to Philippines | 60 Minutes Australia

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(RESEARCHED BY: Adam Dustin D. Cervantes)

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URL: https://time.com/4028811/philippines-lumad-mindanao-indigenous-military-war-killings/

TITLE : A 'Civil War' Is Being Waged Against Indigenous Tribes in the Southern Philippines, Rights Groups Say

Author: Lisa Spear

DATE:  SEPTEMBER 15, 2015

Key content: Human-rights groups are accusing the Philippine military of harassing and killing members of indigenous farming communities, who are caught in the crossfire of a long-running communist insurgency on the archipelago’s southernmost island, Mindanao.

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Philippine Tribes Under Attack, Rights Groups Say

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Rights groups say the army is harassing and killing indigenous peoples caught in the crossfire of a communist insurgency in Mindanao

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URL: https://youtu.be/hAexuFyGIaU

TITLE: Hunting For Terrorist in the Philippines

AUTHOR: VICE News

DATE: Jan 7, 2018

KEY CONTENT: After the tragic events that happened in Marawi, the government ordered a military task force to locate the remaining terrorists who escaped from the event. This relates to our issue of "terrorism," because the government must keep a lookout for those terrorists who escape so that they will not be able to gain superiority in their influence.

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Hunting For Terrorists In The Philippines

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(RESEARCHED BY: Ericka Roche B. Mamparo)

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URL: https://open.spotify.com/episode/0RAoZoapCw5kWcjvAoRTqt?si=6bbe34aab9d543cf
TITLE: Dear Children of Marawi

AUTHOR: Shiela Cornepillo

DATE: June 15

KEY CONTENT: Message to the children who were affected by the Marawi Seige. That after all the children’s suffering experiences, comes peace and justice.

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(RESEARCHED BY: Princess Claire B. Kholer)

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URL: https://dfa.gov.ph/dfanews/news-from-our-foreign-service-postsupdate/18387-ph-joins-forces-with-the-un-to-fight-terrorism

TITLE: PH Joins Forces with the UN to Fight Terrorism

AUTHOR: Department of Foreign Affairs

DATE: October 2018

KEY CONTENT: Foreign Affairs Undersecretary for Policy Enrique A. Manalo met with UN Office of Counter-Terrorism undersecretary-general Vladimir Voronkov. The meeting was held on the sidelines of the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly in New York. Philippines Undersecretary-General for Civilian Security and Consular Concerns Ramon Manalo met Russian counterpart Igor Voronkov in New York on Tuesday to discuss ASEAN-United Nations Counter-Terrorism Joint Efforts (CTED), among others.

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URL: https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/terrorism-philippines-examining-data.html

TITLE: Terrorism in the Philippines: Examining the data and what to expect in the coming years

AUTHOR: Anton Alifandi

DATE: March 09, 2021

KEY CONTENT: The Author of that article provides data on a number of NPA attacks in the Philippines, particularly in areas of muslim-majority parts of Mindanao. The five-month siege of Marawi City in 2017 that claimed hundreds of Filipino lives is also mentioned by the author. To better understand the disparity between these two pillars of the Philippines terrorism risk and to help analysts predict the future risk environment, analysts uses analytics that use metadata from a huge collection of security incidents.

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The communist insurgency in the Philippines has been ongoing since 1969 and shows no sign of abating. On the contrary, recent statements by the exiled founder and chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Jose Maria Sison, suggests that the party's armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA), will seek to expand its attacks to major cities from rural areas where the rebels operate.

In the south of the country, the Moro-Islamist insurgency continues despite the establishment of an autonomous region in the Muslim-majority parts of Mindanao in 2019, and the heavy losses suffered by Islamist militant groups that had pledged loyalty to the Islamic State (IS) during and immediately after the five-month siege of Marawi City in 2017.

Analytics using metadata from a large set of security incidents help to shed light on the contrasting nature of these twin pillars of terrorism risk in the Philippines, and aid analysts to better forecast the future risk environment.
Attacks geospatial footprint: New People's Army
A quick glance at our heat map of attack incidents by non-state actors dating back to 2018 shows a broad operational footprint of NPA attacks across the three geographical areas of the Philippines: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.

A region-by-region breakdown graph shows NPA attacks in 15 out of the Philippines' 17 administrative regions, with the exception of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and Metro Manila. Bicol (southern Luzon) has seen the most NPA attacks since 2018, with comparatively large concentrations (>10) in various regions of the Visayas, as well as regions of the Mindanao area such as Caraga, Davao, and Northern Mindanao.
Attacks geospatial footprint: Moro-Islamist insurgency
In contrast to the NPA's very broad spread of attacks across the Philippines, the Moro-Islamist insurgency is much more localised in the southern Mindanao area and involves numerous organisations, factions, and networks. Following the 2014 peace agreement between the government and the main Moro-Islamist organisation, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the two sides agreed on a devolved authority called the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which was established in 2019 and covers the Muslim majority areas of western Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. However, other Islamist groups continue to wage war against the Philippine state, most notably demonstrated in the five-month battle of Marawi City in 2017 which involved Filipino groups that had pledged loyalty to the IS, such as the Isnilon Hapilon faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Maute Group, aided by foreign IS fighters. Although Hapilon and the Maute brothers were killed in Marawi, the ASG and other Moro-Islamist groups continue to pose a security threat.

Our data since 2018 shows that attacks by groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the ASG, the Moro National Liberation Front and Dawlah Islamiya (when used by the Philippine military and then quoted in the domestic media, this refers to BIFF faction allied to IS). These attacks are confined to the south and west of Mindanao as well as the Sulu archipelago, a chain of islands that leads to the Philippines' maritime border with Malaysia. Specifically, the Mindanao regions of Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, Soccsksargen, and the Zamboanga Peninsula.
Modus operandi: New People's Army
Our NPA incident data shows a propensity for small arms use in its operations (73%), with explosives (primarily Improvised Explosive Devices and landmines) used in a comparatively much smaller (15%) proportion of attacks.

NPA units typically ambush Philippine security forces or attack small police and military posts. This reflects the ideological aim of the CPP-NPA to weaken the Philippine state, as a state towards installing a communist political system.

Our data also shows that the targeting of civilians by the NPA is also common. Victims include local government officials or community leaders that the NPA accuses of collaborating with government forces, of committing alleged "crimes" against the people, or refusing to collaborate with the NPA.

However, a revolution cannot live on ideology alone. The policy of weakening security forces in certain areas also serves the dual purpose of creating a space in which the NPA can extort what it deems 'revolutionary taxes' from civilians, politicians, and businesses. A breakdown of the vehicles damaged by the NPA shows a clear focus on those often used in commercial / construction projects, such as diggers, bulldozers, and trucks. Likewise, the graph above shows conduction sites as the second most targeted asset set after police stations - even more so than military bases and camps. The vast majority of these incidents are highly likely to be as a result of a refusal to pay extortion, with small arms and arson attacks a common form of reprisal or warning - yet falling short of seeking to cause such extensive damage as to make the project untenable (and thus unable to be targeted for further extortion revenue).

Sectors most impacted tend to include mining, agribusiness, forestry, construction, telecoms, and power.

There is no reliable, independent, estimate of the cost of NPA extortion on businesses. However, the Philippine Army's military command that covers eastern Mindanao, Eastmincom, estimated that in 2017 the NPA collected PHP2.48 billion (USD49.87mn) from mining and agribusiness companies that operate in the provinces under its command.
Modus operandi: Moro-Islamist insurgency
Our data on attacks perpetrated by Islamist groups reflects the fractured nature of the Moro-Islamist insurgency in the Philippines. As with the NPA, soldiers and police officers are frequently targeted by Islamist groups in their fight against the Philippine state. However, MILF (dissidents who refused to join the peace process), IS and BIFF are also themselves targeted by rival Islamist groups, often driven by differing stances on whether to engage in peace negotiations with the Philippine government.

MILF was founded by MNLF leaders who were opposed to a peace deal that led to the establishment of the now defunct Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in 1990. BIFF was founded in 2008 by MILF members calling for independence instead of the devolved government as expressed in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. BIFF itself subsequently split into three groups, including one that allies itself with IS.

All of the incidents in our data set of Islamist groups targeting vehicles were directed against security forces or pro-government paramilitary militia members (including ambushes against those traveling by motorcycle). This contrasts with the NPA's extortion-related attacks on commercial vehicles. This reflects the focus on kidnap-for-ransom, as opposed to extortion, for funding - mostly notably by the ASG in the southern Philippines, the Malaysian state of Sabah and of sailors in the waters in between. That said, no single data set alone will ever provide the complete security picture. Although such incidents may not get reported frequently in open source new and social media outlets, our human sources int e southern Philippines confirm that IS-affiliated groups in Mindanao are also known to carry out extortion, larceny, and trafficking of arms and drugs; the Mautes and their extended families ran a mix of black market and legitimate businesses, while the BIFF are known to rustle cattle and seize farmland.

The targeting of churches, most notably the suicide attack on Jolo cathedral in 2019 which killed 20 civilians, reflects the rising influence of IS in the tactics of Islamist insurgents, particularly the ASG, in the Philippines. Suicide attacks are relatively recent and rare in the ASG's three-decade insurgency; the first occurred in 2018 against a military checkpoint and there was another in August 2020. The arrests of nine women in February 2021, including three daughters of a deceased ASG leader, on charges of planning suicide bombing suggests this tactic will continue to be used.

It is noteworthy that Islamist groups in the Philippines already tend to use explosives in a comparatively higher proportion of attacks than the leftist NPA - 52% compared with 15%.
What next? Moro-Islamist insurgency
The chief of the MILF-led Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) - the interim government of the BARMM - Ahod Ebrahim, claimed in January 2021 that 900 fighters of the two BIFF factions that are not aligned with IS were in talks with the transitional government to rejoin the MILF. A successful conclusion to the talks would mean a considerable weakening of the insurgency on mainland Mindanao where BIFF operates.

The BTA is asking the government to extend its interim authority, which is due to end 2022, by a further three years on the grounds that it has not yet been able to complete the legally-mandated milestones that established the BARMM, such as the decommissioning of fighters and the establishment of a police force. An extension would mean a postponement to the elections due in 2022. The plan enjoys popular support in mainland Mindanao but is opposed by political leaders in Sulu province. A key indicator of whether the extension will be granted - and thus whether the broader MILF peace process and the subsequent reduction in violence it heralded - will be President Rodrigo Duterte potential designation of the related bills (at the time of writing, four in the House of Representatives and two in the Senate) as priority legislation.

However, there is little indication that the ASG in the Sulu archipelago will be pacified in the remainder of Duterte's term, which runs to June 2022. Duterte has sought to defeat the ASG militarily by deploying more troops but the ASG appears to be able to continue to inflict casualties on the Philippine military in armed confrontations and suicide attacks.
New People's Army
Peace negotiations between the government and the CPP-NPA collapsed in February 2017 and, having initially vacillated whether to restart them, President Rodrigo Duterte has in the past year ruled out any prospect of negotiations for the remainder of his term.

In fact, the government's attitude towards the CPP-NPA is hardening: it designated the group as a terrorist organisation in December 2020; it is taking steps to ban civil society groups which Duterte alleges harbour covert communists from having representation in Congress; and it is imposing stricter surveillance of alleged communist students and staff at universities. In response, the NPA has threatened to expand its operations to the cities.

In a statement in December 2020, Jose Maria Sison warned that the NPA would revive its urban assassination teams known as Special Partisan Units (Sparus) or 'Sparrow units' that were last active in the early 1990s to attack groups and assassinate individuals accused of 'crimes against the people'. Sison justified the revival of the Sparrows on the increasing number of 'Oplan Tokhang' incidents and other extrajudicial killings of communists and left-wing activists, allegedly by security forces and paramilitary units. Any increase in urban assassinations of government officials and security personnel would be most likely in Manila, Cebu City, and Davao City, as happened in the 1980s and early 1990s. The NPA's doctrine and expertise indicate that the majority of such operations would probably be limited to their intended targets as opposed to posing significant collateral risks to bystanders, for example via the use of IEDs. However, there are evidently inherent risks of stray bullets as a result of the likely modus operandi of gunmen on motorbikes targeting vehicles in traffic, shootings in workplaces (for example political party offices) or at restaurants, or if bodyguards return fire.

Nevertheless, the CPP-NPA leadership's adherence to Maoist principles means that the reactivation of its urban assassination operations will likely be a limited tactical move rather than a strategic shift away from the primacy of rural insurgency. As such, it is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future to deploy a large number of guerrillas to attack and occupy a town or city in the manner of the occupation of Marawi by Islamist insurgents in 2017. In his post on the CPP-NPA website explaining his reasons to revive operations in the cities, Sison also reiterated his intention to continue to target major mining, agribusiness plantation and logging companies.

Posted 09 March 2021 by Anton Alifandi, Associate Director, Country Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence

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Terrorism in the Philippines: Examining the data and what to expect in the coming years

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The communist insurgency in the Philippines has been ongoing since 1969 and shows no sign of abating. On the contrary, recent statements by the exiled founder and chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Jose Maria Sison, suggests that the party's armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA), will seek to expand its attacks to major cities from rural areas where the rebels operate.

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14.) NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION OR ACADEMIC INSTITUTION ARTICLE

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14.) NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION OR ACADEMIC INSTITUTION ARTICLE

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URL: https://www.mindanews.com/statements/2017/02/statement-all-out-peace-rather-than-all-out-war/

TITLE: STATEMENT: All-out Peace rather than All-out War

AUTHOR: MindaNews STATEMENT

DATE: February 15, 2017

KEY CONTENT: The AOP speaks on behalf of its constituency, which includes women, children, indigenous peoples, peace activists,youth, even spouses and relatives of soldiers, as well as the other most vulnerable groups during times of war especially in Mindanao. They said NO TO ALL-OUT WAR! YES TO ALL-OUT PEACE!

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URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=whi0UE2JefY

TITLE: MARAWI: 153 days of War

AUTHOR: Rappler

Date: October 24, 2017

KEY CONTENT: Showed how the Philippine military fought Marawi insurgents for over 153 days. The documentary also demonstrated the devastation and suffering that Marawi's residents endured as a result of terrorism.

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URL: https://books.google.com.ph/books/about/Black_Flags_Over_Mindanao.html?id=erk6swEACAAJ&redir_esc=y

TITLE: Black Flags Over Mindanao: Terrorism in Southeast Asia

AUTHOR: Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives

DATE: September 17, 2017

KEY CONTENT: “The threat of transnational terrorism in Asia has been at best, a secondary consideration and, at worse, an afterthought. The policy making community doesn't seem to consider terrorism in Asia with the same seriousness as it does in the Middle East.”

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Black flags over Mindanao : terrorism in Southeast Asia : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, first session, July 12, 2017.

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Black flags over Mindanao : terrorism in Southeast Asia : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, first session, July 12, 2017.

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URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/philippines-counter-insurgency-vs-counter-terrorism-mindanao

TITLE: The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in Mindanao

AUTHOR: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

DATE: MAY 14, 2008

KEY CONTENT: The government is boosting its armed forces in order to minimize the difficulties of countering terrorism and also to reduce the nation's fatalities. A stronger army may be able to reduce the amount of damage done in the case of conflict.

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U.S.-backed security operations in the southern Philippines are making progress but are also confusing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency with dangerous implications for conflict in the region.

U.S.-backed security operations in the southern Philippines are making progress but are also confusing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency with dangerous implications for conflict in the region. The "Mindanao Model" - using classic counter-insurgency techniques to achieve counter-terror goals - has been directed against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and has helped force its fighters out of their traditional stronghold on Basilan. But it runs the risk of pushing them into the arms of the broader insurgencies in Mindanao, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The U.S. and the Philippines need to revive mechanisms to keep these conflicts apart and refocus energies on peace processes with these groups. That imperative has become particularly acute since the Malaysian government announced withdrawal, beginning on 10 May, from the International Monitoring Team (IMT) that has helped keep a lid on conflict since 2004. If renewed attention to a peace agreement is not forthcoming by the time the IMT mandate ends in August, hostilities could quickly resume.

A policy tool of proven value is at hand. Called the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), it was designed to facilitate coordination between the Philippines government and the MILF to share intelligence on terrorists and avoid accidental clashes while government forces pursued them. Allowed to lapse in June 2007, it was formally renewed in November but not fully revived. It should be, as a counter-terror and conflict management mechanism that worked, and a similar arrangement should be developed with the MNLF. The problem is that it will only work if there is progress on the political front - that is, in peace negotiations - so that insurgents see concrete benefits from their cooperation with the government.

As part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, U.S. forces are strengthening the Philippines military and using civic action to drive a wedge between rebels and the Muslim populace. But if their goal is to defeat the ASG and its foreign, mainly Indonesian, jihadi allies, they are casting the net too widely and creating unnecessary enemies.

Mass-based insurgencies like the MILF and MNLF rely on supportive populations. By extension, small numbers of terrorists rely on sympathetic insurgents. Counter-terrorism's central task in a setting like that in the Philippines is to isolate jihadis from their insurgent hosts - not divide insurgents from the population. Recent gains against the ASG came only after the MILF expelled key jihadis from mainland Mindanao in 2005. Yet AHJAG, the mechanism that made this possible, is not getting the attention it deserves.

AHJAG was crafted as part of an ongoing government-MILF peace process. For more than two years, it prevented conflict escalation as the search for terrorists intensified in MILF strongholds in western Mindanao and led to a few cases of the MILF's disciplining extremists in its own ranks. It helped force the ASG's core group, including Kadaffy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, to Sulu, where they were killed.

This has come at a heavy price in Sulu, where no equivalent ceasefire machinery exists to separate jihadis from the dominant local guerrilla force, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Instead, heavy-handed offensives against ASG and its foreign jihadi allies have repeatedly spilled over into MNLF communities, driving some insurgents into closer cooperation with the terrorists, instead of with government.

Ceasefire mechanisms like AHJAG depend on substantive progress toward a comprehensive peace pact, but negotiations with the MILF remain deadlocked. While the Arroyo administration is distracted by turmoil in Manila, and Washington focuses on economic and military approaches to an essentially political problem in the Philippines south, AHJAG has been allowed to wither. As an innovative means of depriving transnational extremists of refuge and regeneration while building confidence with insurgents and strengthening moderates among them, this mechanism needs to be strengthened and expanded.

Jakarta/Brussels, 14 May 2008

The transition to self-rule in the Bangsamoro, the majority-Muslim region in the southern Philippines, is proceeding apace. Militants outside the associated peace process are losing strength but could recover. Regional and national authorities should do all in their power to keep that from happening.

What's new?  Nearly three years after Manila granted autonomy to the Bangsamoro, the majority-Muslim region in the southern Philippines, its former main Islamist rebel group is running the interim government. While militant groups outside the peace process are weakened, they are not yet defeated.

Why did it happen?  The Bangsamoro's political transition has brought gains to the war-torn region, depriving militants of some of their appeal. The Philippine military's operations and the pandemic have also pressured insurgents, who are now very few in number and spread over large areas.

Why does it matter?  Despite the interim government's policies to contain violence, sporadic clashes with insurgents continue in various provinces. Delays in delivering the promised peace dividends will not automatically replenish the militants' ranks, but they do raise the risk of renewed recruitment.

What should be done?  The Bangsamoro's interim government should step up socio-economic assistance to hard-hit areas, work with local authorities to reintegrate former militants and devote more energy to resolving the local conflicts militants often exploit. For its part, Manila should fast-track rehabilitation of Marawi, the city ravaged by battles with insurgents in 2017.

Militant violence is declining but has not disappeared in the newly created Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in the southern Philippines. Close to three years into the transition, the former rebels of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who are leading the interim government have largely contained jihadists opposed to the peace process, with the national army's help. Yet while the threat of major violence appears low, sporadic clashes in the region continue. Meanwhile, while frustration at the region's lack of development will not necessarily fuel militancy, it could push people, including youth, into the militants' arms. To avoid this outcome, the interim government should enhance the pace, quality and scope of service delivery; calibrate, where needed, reintegration programs for militants; and boost its conflict resolution efforts throughout the region. The Philippine government, for its part, should fast-track the rehabilitation of Marawi, the city partly destroyed during a five-month battle between the military and a jihadist alliance in 2017.

After the government defeated the coalition that laid siege to Marawi, militants returned to staging smaller-scale attacks on security forces. These armed groups, some of which have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), remain outside the peace process between the national government and the MILF, which culminated in creation of the BARMM in early 2019. Although the total number of fighters remains small - apparently no more than a few hundred - each of these outfits poses a challenge to peace in the Bangsamoro. In Maguindanao province, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters and their ISIS-inspired offshoots still wield some clout. In the Lanao region, remnants of the Maute Group, who made up the bulk of the jihadist forces during the Marawi battle, are much weakened but still appear to be recruiting. In the Sulu archipelago, the Abu Sayyaf criminal-militant network is on the defensive but not extinct.

Despite a drop in violence following the interim government's inauguration in 2019, intense flare-ups continue to mar the transition. In Basilan and Sulu provinces, militants carried out a series of suicide bombings between 2018 and 2020 - the first such attacks in the Philippines. Some were perpetrated by foreign fighters, indicating that Mindanao continued to attract jihadists from abroad after the Marawi siege, although in small numbers. Militants in central Mindanao, on the other hand, have been unable to stage large-scale operations; even hit-and-run attacks on soldiers, once common, have fallen off. The BARMM's advent seems to have been crucial in curbing the dissatisfaction in that area that paved the way for the war in Marawi.

Militants, who are overwhelmingly from the Bangsamoro, tap local grievances to promote their agenda and take advantage of the nexus of politics, clan ties and the shadow economy to sustain themselves. Although the armed groups cannot hold territory due to intensified military operations, kinship ties often provide their members with safe havens. At times, militants ally themselves with criminal elements or local politicians. Meanwhile, unemployment and poverty, worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic, threaten to spoil the last few years' gains.

Both national and Bangsamoro policies aimed at curbing militancy have evolved. President Rodrigo Duterte's administration, while supportive of the Bangsamoro government, is in charge of the region's security and thus on the front lines of tackling militancy. Military operations have killed hundreds of fighters over the last two years. But Manila has also altered its counter-insurgency tactics, including by working with local authorities to urge militants, under military pressure, to surrender in return for financial and livelihood assistance. As a result, hundreds of militants have laid down their weapons. Other new measures to curb militancy have included national anti-terrorism legislation and a range of traditional peacebuilding interventions falling under the umbrella of "countering and preventing violent extremism". As for the Bangsamoro government, it first worked to start dialogue with militant groups, and later opted for a more governance-oriented approach, supporting programs to disarm militants and designing development plans for conflict hotspots in the region.

Further stabilisation will depend on whether the national and regional governments can sustain, and even expand, their efforts. Measures they could take include:

Further adjustments to military and police operations, which, while necessary, often lead to large-scale displacement of civilians because units have used excessive force in populated areas. Non-military counter-insurgency tactics should be strengthened to rebalance security operations, for example a stronger focus on policing and intelligence in some areas.

Augmentations of the interim regional government's efforts to resolve local conflicts by strengthening the reach of responsible ministries, such as those handling public safety and local government, and by supporting existing community-based mechanisms.

Closer coordination of the various disengagement programs for militants that exist in BARMM provinces, with extra funding for such initiatives, when required, and cooperation with local authorities. The interim regional government should also design gender-sensitive measures for male and female combatants, as well as for their families.

Better delivery of public services and development outreach in places marred by conflict, for example the hinterlands of Maguindanao province known as the SPMS Box and remote areas of Lanao del Sur province.

Expedited reconstruction of Marawi city, through the Philippine government's Task Force Bangon Marawi.

The BARMM's formation is a long-awaited window of opportunity for peace in Mindanao. Militant groups for now are mostly small outfits that pose nothing like the threat they did some years ago at the height of the battle in Marawi. Still, in the right conditions, they could regain momentum and throw the transition off track. Sustaining peace gains is vital to preventing that from happening.

Born in 2019, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) is the latest attempt by the Philippine government and the former rebels of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to end the Moro Muslim separatist struggle. The outcome of two decades of negotiations, the BARMM provides "self-rule" to the majority-Muslim Bangsamoro region, in an effort to address the population's long-time grievances against Manila. During the transition period, which Manila has extended from three to six years, the MILF is leading the interim regional government, known as the Bangsamoro Transition Authority. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the first Moro rebel movement, is also participating in the interim government.

The MILF considers the BARMM a vital step in bringing peace and development to the region after years of conflict, calling it an "antidote to extremism". But militant groups outside the peace process are, to varying degrees, proving to be resilient. Three years after the BARMM's creation, these armed bands, which operate in most Bangsamoro provinces and draw their members from the region's largest ethno-linguistic groups, are considerably weakened but not yet defeated. These outfits often embrace Islamist objectives, for example advocating for a broad application of Sharia law.

Some of these groups pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 and 2015, coming together as a loose coalition under the banner of Daulah Islamiyah. Their subsequent prominence was to a large extent the outcome of hiccups in the peace process, which led some militants to call for returning to armed struggle.

Drawing from a pool of disgruntled ex-guerrillas, impoverished farmers and frustrated youth, this alliance, including parts of the Abu Sayyaf Group from the Sulu archipelago and the Maute Group from Lanao del Sur, attacked government installations in Marawi in May 2017. Joined by foreign fighters, the ISIS-inspired band seized parts of the city, battling the military for almost five months in what became the largest urban engagement on Philippine soil since World War II. To defeat the militants, President Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law throughout Mindanao. After vicious combat that devastated large parts of Marawi, the army took the city back in October, killing more than 900 militants, according to government sources.

While military operations have clearly weakened the militants, the armed forces have not managed to defeat them.

After lying low for a while, militants relaunched attacks on the army, leading it to mount a counter-insurgency campaign. While military operations have clearly weakened the militants, the armed forces have not managed to defeat them. In central Mindanao, factions of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and remnants of the Maute Group continue to operate, while Abu Sayyaf elements take cover in the Sulu archipelago. A veteran Filipino military officer said: "We have brought the number of insurgents to the lowest [ever], but we never seem to quash the whole thing".

Some observers postulate that ISIS left an enduring ideological legacy in the Philippines. Whether its beliefs will spread beyond a small number of militants remains an open question, however. Some groups seem to be ISIS-inspired, but without direct links to the Middle East. Elements of salafi-jihadist thinking permeate some leaders' discourse, even if they do not always resonate with the rank and file. Talking about members of an Abu Sayyaf faction, a Sulu-based observer said they "idolise" ISIS - admiring its videos, for example - without "embracing" it". Bangsamoro leaders and former fighters alike emphasise that militants use Islamist ideas mainly as a tool to mould the rank and file in fighting the state. A civil society leader from Sulu said: "If you talk about religion, everyone will come".

This report assesses the efforts of the Philippine government and Bangsamoro interim authority in tackling militancy in Mindanao. It builds upon Crisis Group's previous work on the southern Philippines and draws on research in Mindanao and Manila, conducted between late 2019 and October 2021, including interviews with MILF commanders, national and regional government officials, military officers, civil society representatives, development practitioners, villagers and international observers. It was not possible to meet active militants because of COVID-19 travel restrictions and security considerations, but the report makes use of other primary sources, for example sermons and speeches, to study these groups' ideas.

Since coming to power in early 2019, the former MILF rebels have focused on building the BARMM's bureaucracy, managing its budget and passing priority legislation. The transition was largely on track until mid-2020, although dealing with powerful local clans had its challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, muddied the waters. The interim government had no choice but to shift gears to emergency response, and although it did so competently, it lost precious time in implementing the peace process roadmap. The broader normalisation agenda, a joint commitment by the Philippine government and the MILF under the 2014 peace treaty, is also running behind schedule. Originally scheduled for 2022, the Bangsamoro's first parliamentary elections were postponed to 2025, as the three-year transition period doubled in length.

Militancy in the Bangsamoro has not disappeared, however. Some militants have grown disillusioned, but the various Islamist outfits retain enough appeal to continue a lower-level armed struggle. Some localities continue to see episodic violence.

A. Central Mindanao: The BIFF and Its Offshoots

Animbang, aka Kagi Karialan, leads a faction centred in the village of Kitango in Datu Saudi Ampatuan town. Some of his followers, many of whom are relatives, come from other places in Maguindanao and Cotabato provinces, including the towns of Midsayap, GSK Pendatun and Datu Paglas. Karialan has emphasised his group's enmity for the Philippine state. In a speech he said: "The Philippine government is our enemy. There is no highway in Mindanao, and there is no road that is not full of government soldiers. All municipalities and barangays [villages] are occupied by the military". As it considers the army an outside aggressor, the group describes its mission as defensive. Karialan's spokesperson, Abu Jihad, said: "We are living quietly in our area. But if you provoke us, we will fight back". In late May 2021, Karialan was wounded in battle. On 29 October, he reappeared on social media, admitting his faction had taken heavy losses but vowing to continue the fight.

Two other outfits originally tied to the BIFF now operate on their own, to the extent that they may be considered separate splinters. Both have pledged allegiance to ISIS, and their modus operandi includes attacks on civilians, in contrast to the above two factions that primarily target government forces.

Esmael Abdulmalik, or Abu Toraife, the former vice chair for internal affairs of the original BIFF, is the leader of the most hardline splinter, known as Jama'atul al-Muhajireen wal Ansar or Daulah Islamiyah-Toraife. The military and MILF look at his faction as the most ideologically inflexible because of its strident rhetoric and incorporation of foreign fighters, whom it has sheltered in exchange for training in finance and logistics. On social media, Abu Toraife has accused the ex-rebels of abandoning the original Bangsamoro cause of Islamic governance, even calling them apostates, and blasted the national government for its continuous military presence. His group has remained mobile, periodically attacking government forces but losing its impetus from 2019 onward. Abu Toraife himself appears to be in poor health.

Over the last two years, another member of the original group that split from the BIFF, Salahuddin Hassan, mounted a challenge to Abu Toraife as the pre-eminent BIFF dissident leader. Thanks to his links to other groups, such as Abu Sayyaf, as well as to foreign elements, ISIS apparently designated him as its new emir in the Philippines after the death of Sulu-based militant Hatib Sawadjaan. Yet despite his efforts to coordinate action with other jihadist groups, such as in the Sulu archipelago, Salahuddin failed to extend his reach outside central Mindanao. On 29 October 2021, the military killed Salahuddin during an operation in Talayan town, Maguindanao. Two days later, armed men (presumably his or Abu Toraife's followers) retaliated against an army detachment in the SPMS Box. Soldiers then killed Salahuddin's successor, Abu Azim, in Maguindanao on 2 December.

Overall, the BIFF and its offshoots appear to be a dwindling force yet one that is still potentially disruptive and capable of gaining strength in the right conditions. Militants in Mindanao have previously found ways to regroup when the military has killed subleaders.

B. The Sulu Archipelago and the Abu Sayyaf Group

Even with only a handful of militants left in the province, peace in Basilan should not be taken for granted.

But even with only a handful of militants left in the province, peace in Basilan should not be taken for granted. On 12 September 2021, a small number of Abu Sayyaf fighters ambushed Philippine soldiers in the village of Baguindan, Tipo-Tipo town, killing one and injuring another. ISIS claimed the attack; whether the perpetrators were indeed tied to an ISIS-inspired faction is unclear, but local sources s

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The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in Mindanao

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U.S.-backed security operations in the southern Philippines are making progress but are also confusing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency with dangerous implications for conflict in the region. U.S.-backed security operations in the southern Philippines are making progress but are also confusing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency with dangerous implications for conflict in the region.

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URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26984797#metadata_info_tab_contents

TITLE: Counterterrorism in the Philippines: Review of Key Issues

AUTHOR: Ronald U. Mendoza, Rommel Jude G. Ong, Dion Lorenz L. Romano and Bernadette Chloe P. Torno

DATE: February 2021

KEY CONTENT: In order to provide law enforcement personnel with a better legal weapon to prevent terrorist acts in the country, President Duterte declared a new anti-terrorism bill, and Congress immediately adopted and approved the Senate version.